The permanent fisheries are called vataghis and outshoughis; the places where they are temporary are called stania. An outshoughi consists in a barrier of stakes planted across the river, and sometimes wattled. Below this barrier the apparatus called in Russian samoloff, is placed in the current. It is a cord hung with short lines and hooks, and the business of the fisherman consists in examining the lines, and taking off the fish that are hooked. These are immediately taken to a shed built on piles at the waterside, where they are cut up; the roes, the fat, and the nerves are afterwards conveyed to places where they undergo the processes necessary to fit them for commerce.

As the lines of stakes hinder the fish from ascending the river, the government has for some time prohibited the use of outshoughis, and also of the lines and hooks, by which it is found that scarcely one fish is taken out of a hundred that swallow the bait; the rest escape though wounded, and thus perish uselessly.

The invention of these barriers is ascribed to the Tatars of the khanat of Astrakhan. As fish was an important article of commerce between them and the Russians, it may be presumed that they adopted this means to keep the fish from ascending to the upper portions of the Volga.

The vataghis, usually placed on the heights above the shore, are cellars in which fish is salted and dried. Before the door there is always a platform sheltered by a screen of reeds, where the fish are cut up and cleaned. Nets, some of them several hundred yards in length, are exclusively used in these establishments. It is forbidden, however, to stretch them across the entire width of the river.

The fishing season is divided into several distinct periods. The first, which extends from March till May, that is from the breaking up of the ice to the time of flood, is called the caviar season; it is the most important and most productive of the caviar and isinglass. The second occurs in July when the waters have sunk within their ordinary bed, and the fish having spawned, are returning to the sea. The third, from September to November, is the season when the beluga, sturgeon, and sevriuga[34] return to the deepest parts of the river. These fish are also taken in winter by nets of a peculiar form. At that time of year the fishermen of the coasts often travel over the ice for dozens of miles from the land. Every two men have a horse and sledge, and carry with them 3000 yards of net, with which they capture belugas, sturgeons, silures, and even seals under the ice. These expeditions are very dangerous. The wind often drives the ice-blocks on a sudden out to sea, and then the loss of the fishermen is inevitable, unless the wind chops round and drives them back to land. Old experienced fishermen allege that the instinct of the horses forewarns them of these atmospheric changes, and that their uneasiness puts their masters on their guard against the danger; according to the same authorities, the moment the animals are yoked they turn of their own accord towards the shore, and set off thither with extraordinary speed.

The fishermen of Astrakhan reckon three classes of fish. The first they call red fish, which includes the beluga, the sevriuga, and the sturgeon. The second consists of white fish, such as the salmon-trout, the bastard beluga, the sterlet,[35] the carp or sazan, the soudak,[36] and the silure. To the third class belong all those designated by the general name of tchistia, kovaya or riba, either on account of the closeness of the nets employed to take them, or of their habits of entering rivers in very dense shoals. They are small fish, which are little prized, and are salted for the consumption of the interior of the empire.

The government fishing board has the general control of the fisheries, grants the requisite licences, superintends the election of the headmen, sends out inspectors to maintain order, and collects information as to the produce of the fisheries. In 1828, 8887 men employed in fishing, and 254 in taking seals, with 3219 boats, brought in 43,033 sturgeons, 653,164 sevriugas, and 23,069 belugas: these yielded 330 tons of caviar, and about 34 tons of isinglass. There were also taken 8335 soudaks, and the enormous quantity of 98,584 seals. The sturgeon fishery alone produces about 2,000,000 of rubles annually, but the expenses are very considerable. The revenue derived by the government from the fisheries of the Volga amounts to 800,000 paper rubles.

The celebrated imperial ukase appointing a uniform monetary system throughout the empire, was promulgated during our stay in Astrakhan, and afforded us a fresh opportunity of beholding the amazing impassiveness of the Russians, and their extreme incapability of self-assertion. The change was certainly excellent in itself, and loudly called for by the circumstances of the country, but the manner of carrying it into effect caused a loss of eighteen per cent, to all holders of coin. In Astrakhan, the voice of the public crier sufficed at once, and without warning, to reduce the 4 ruble piece to 3.5, that of 1.20 to 1.05, that of 1 ruble to 0.87, and that of 0.62 to 0.52; and immediately after beat of drum, the law was carried into full force on all commercial transactions. It must not be supposed, however, that this inert resignation of the tzar's subjects is merely the result of their profound reverence for whatever emanates from the omnipotence of their sovereign. Every one of them is fully and keenly sensible of his loss, and if no voice is uplifted against such ministerial spoliations, the cause abides in that total absence of will and reflection which we have already had many occasions to point out as a distinguishing trait of the Russian character. For our own part we cannot but highly approve of the idea of establishing a complete uniformity in the value of coinage, for the variations of value which the same coin formerly underwent in passing from one government to another were exceedingly injurious to trade. We think, however, that the change might have been accomplished by more legal and less violent means. It is true, that by acting as he did, Count Cancrine was sure of realising a gain of eighteen per cent., and this, it may be presumed, was the principal motive that actuated him. Be this as it may, this was not the first time the Russian government took such a course; every one knows that in 1812, the silver ruble fell abruptly to the value of a paper ruble, entailing a loss of seventy-one per cent. on all holders of government bills, who received but a paper ruble for every silver ruble represented by the bills. This state of things lasted until 1839, when the old system was restored. The present government paper, having for its basis a real coin, the silver ruble, worth 3.50 paper rubles (about 3s. 2d.), consists of notes for 5, 10, 20, and even 10,000 rubles. These notes are extremely small, and the government must inevitably realise a large profit annually by their wear and tear and loss. It is likewise very possible that the ministry of finance had no other motive for creating these new notes, than that of preparing means to repeat the bankruptcy of 1812; and seeing the actual state of the imperial treasury, there is no doubt that such an act of bankruptcy would be committed in case of war. Never was the state so oppressed with debt as it is at this day. The war in the Caucasus, the grand military parades, and the payment of a countless host of diplomatic agents, avowed and secret, all absorb immense sums, and the ministry is consequently reduced to miserable shifts to make up the deficit, and restore the balance of the finances. The proposal of a great military expenditure was discussed in the imperial council of 1841, and was opposed with reason by Cancrine, on the too real ground of want of money. The emperor, chafed by an opposition to his wishes such as he was not used to, ordered the grand treasurer to produce all his accounts, that the matter might be investigated in council. Next day the accounts were examined in presence of the tzar and his ministers. One item excited great surprise; an enormous sum was set down as expended, but how or wherefore it was spent was not stated. The emperor yielding without reflection to a sudden impulse of anger, commanded Cancrine to explain what had become of the money, and the minister, who had taken his precautions beforehand, instantly laid before his master a note in which were revealed some singular mysteries. It was, they say, after this memorable sitting that all public works were immediately stopped, the stamp duties were quadrupled, the charge for passports centupled, and new notes payable to the bearer, were issued for more than 100,000,000 of silver rubles. Such are the expedients that constitute the genius of the ministry, and which Count Cancrine thought it right to employ to augment the financial resources of the country. I recollect an anecdote that exactly typifies the notions of that statesman. I was once in the house of a Moldavian landowner of Bessarabia, whose lands bring him in about 10,000 rubles a year. The conversation turned on agriculture. "What!" exclaimed a Russian who was present, "your estate yields you but 10,000 rubles a-year? Nonsense; put it into my hands and I warrant you twice as much."—"That would be a very agreeable thing, if it could be done," said the landlord; "I flatter myself I am tolerably well versed in these matters, and yet I have never been able to discover any possible means of increasing my income."—"How many days do your peasants work?" said the Russian.—"Thirty."—"That's not enough: make them work sixty. What breadth of land do they till for you?"—"So much."—"Double it." And so he went on through the other items of the inquiry, crying, "Double it! double it!" We could not help heartily laughing. But the Russian remained perfectly serious, and I am sure he thought himself as great a man as Cancrine himself; I really regret that I did not ask him, had he taken lessons in economics in the office of that illustrious financier.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] Notwithstanding the assertions of most geographers, we are of opinion that the communications between Soldaïa, Kaffa, and Astrakhan generally took place by way of the Don and the Volga. Many reasons seem to confirm this opinion. Had it been otherwise, the Genoese would not have attached so much importance to the possession of Tana, on the mouth of the Don. Furthermore, the route by the banks of the Terek and the Kouban, skirting the northern slope of the Caucasus, being much longer as well as more dangerous, by reason of the neighbourhood of the Caucasian tribes, preference would naturally have been given to the route by the Don and the Volga, which passed only through Tatar countries, inhabited by the same people as the traders, and subjected to the same government. It seems confirmatory of this opinion that in the expedition of Sultan Selim against Astrakhan, in 1560, part of the Turkish army marched by that very route. The line of the Manitch must have been little frequented on account of its almost total want of drinkable water.