And to speak compendiously, if it were obvious in each department that the introducer of any salutary measure whatsoever will not remain unhonoured, that in itself will stimulate a host of pople who will make it their business to discover some good thing or other for the state. Wherever matters of advantage to the state excite deep interest, of necessity discoveries are made more freely and more promptly perfected. But if you are afraid, O mighty prince, that through the multitude of prizes offered (23) under many heads, expenses also must be much increased, consider that no articles of commerce can be got more cheaply than those which people purchase in exchange for prizes. Note in the public contests (choral, equestrian, or gymnastic) (24) how small the prizes are and yet what vast expenditure of wealth and toil, and painful supervision these elicit. (25)
(23) Reading {protithemenon} with Cobet.
(24) Lit. "hippic, gymnic, and choregic contests."
(25) e.g. "in the choral dances (1) money on the part of the choragoi;
(2) pains on the part of the choreutai; (3) supervising care on
the part of the choro-didaskoi, and so mutatis mutandis of the
hippic and gymnic."
X
And Hiero replied: Thus far you reason prettily, methinks, Simonides; but about these mercenary troops have you aught to say? Can you suggest a means to avoid the hatred of which they are the cause? Or will you tell me that a ruler who has won the affection of his subjects has no need for body-guards?
Nay, in good sooth (replied Simonides), distinctly he will need them none the less. I know it is with certain human beings as with horses, some trick of the blood they have, some inborn tendency; the more their wants are satisfied, the more their wantonness will out. Well then, to sober and chastise wild spirits, there is nothing like the terror of your men-at-arms. (1) And as to gentler natures, (2) I do not know by what means you could bestow so many benefits upon them as by means of mercenaries.
(1) Lit. "spear-bearers"; the title given to the body-guard of kings
and tyrants.
(2) Lit. "the beautiful and good," the {kalois kagathois}. See "Econ."
vi. 11 foll.
Let me explain: You keep them, I presume, in the first instance, for yourself, as guards of your own person. But for masters, owners of estates and others, to be done to death with violence by their own slaves is no unheard-of thing. Supposing, then, the first and foremost duty laid on mercenary troops were this: they are the body-guards of the whole public, and bound as such to come to the assistance of all members of the state alike, in case they shall detect some mischief brewing (3) (and miscreants do spring up in the hearts of states, as we all know); I say then, if these mercenary troops were under orders to act as guardians of the citizens, (4) the latter would recognise to whom they were indebted.
(3) "If they become aware of anything of that sort." Is not this
modelled on the {krupteia}? See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," ch.
viii. "Lacedaemon," p. 186.
(4) Or, "as their police." {toutous}, sc. "the citizens"; al. "the
evil-doers." If so, transl. "to keep watch and ward on evil-doers;
the citizens would soon recognise the benefit they owe them for
that service."
But in addition to these functions, such a body might with reason be expected to create a sense of courage and security, by which the country labourers with their flocks and herds would greatly benefit, a benefit not limited to your demesne, but shared by every farm throughout the rural district.
Again, these mercenaries, if set to guard strategic points, (5) would leave the citizens full leisure to attend to matters of more private interest.