Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?
And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source of good?
Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to spare—when those who owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind—as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness—are saved.
Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.
Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?
Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom, (48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.
(48) See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.
Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?
(49) See Ovid. "Met." viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab." 39,
40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.
Yes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)