You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).

(13) Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie
verite" of the matter).

Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate his enemies—which things are the sources not only of advantage but of deepest satisfaction (15)—to the continent and self-controlled it is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.

(14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble
study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.
(15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."

Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with virtue.

And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion. (19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in debate. (21)

(16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."
(17) i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the
brain."
(18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf.
Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.
(19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most
capable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41:
"What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the
leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,
or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight
would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"
(Jowett).
(20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G."
viii. 590.
(21) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C;
"Statesm." 286 D foll.

VI

At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.

(1) Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in
dialectic."
(2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of
anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing
that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind
leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to
stumble also."
(3) Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'
—such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an
answer."