(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.
(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the
wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise
things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his
being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things
base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who
not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,
in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in
the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.
"Charm."
And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and self-controlled?"—"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor self-controlled.
(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;
"Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them
wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."
(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."
He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.
On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom; not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself, yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled madness.
(7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.
(8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who are
all abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos. Pol." i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.
trans.)
In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy—that is not envy; but, as he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained. "I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)
(9) Or, "a man in his senses... a simpleton"; for the sentiment L.
Dind. cf. Isocr. "ad Demonic." 7 D.
In answer to the question: what is leisure? I discover (he said) that most men do something: (10) for instance, the dice player, (11) the gambler, the buffoon, do something, but these have leisure; they can, if they like, turn and do something better; but nobody has leisure to turn from the better to the worse, and if he does so turn, when he has no leisure, he does but ill in that.
(10) See above, I. ii. 57; and in ref. to these definitions, K. Joel,
op. cit. p. 347 foll.
(11) For "dice-playing" see Becker, "Charicl." 354 (Engl. trans.); for
"buffoonery," ib. 98; "Symp."