Seeing, then, that what we may call “pure feeling” remains the same in all possible combinations, we must expect to meet with the same phenomena in connection with the manifestations of the higher emotions and sentiments, as those already described in case of simple pain or pleasure. It is true that in fully formed anger, joy, contempt, and so on, the tendency to expression for expression’s sake—as when a child laughs or dances for mere joy—is seldom found pure and unmixed. But even in such complex states we may in the abstract distinguish the impulse directly and inherently connected with the physiological change—the impulse which tends automatically to bring out the tone of pleasure with more prominence or to relieve the tone of pain—from all the conscious and volitional activities by which the external cause of the feeling is either approached or avoided. We have only to remember that, as was the case with sensation-feelings, those intentional movements which are directly or by virtue of association connected with an emotion will always work in the same direction as the purely automatic expression.
With regard to anger, for instance, we can in theory, at all events, distinguish the activity which follows as a purely physiological reaction upon the initial inhibition, and which therefore is quite undirected by any idea of attacking an enemy, from the conscious reaction by which we strive with all our powers to overcome and annihilate a real or imaginary foe. But we know that both these kinds of expression produce similar mental effects. Whether we concentrate our attention on the element of pure feeling and its accompanying activities, or on the intermixture of intellectual and volitional elements by which the emotion is distinguished from simple pleasure-pain, we shall thus find that active manifestations always enhance the positive tone of feeling, which is in itself the counterpart of a functional enhancement, and relieve the negative tone, which is the counterpart of functional arrest.
To prove this assertion with regard to all the different emotions would mean an unnecessary repetition of the arguments adduced in the preceding chapter. We need therefore only dwell on a few individual cases in which the effects of expression, owing to the complex nature of all fully developed emotions, are subject to misinterpretation. It has, for instance, often been contended in psychological literature that pleasurable emotions lose in strength in the same degree as they are expressed. Mr. Spencer, who finds the physiological basis of all emotion in nervous tension, has tried to prove that joy is always strongest when most restrained. But the argument he adduces is by no means unimpeachable. He says that people who show the finest appreciation of humour are often capable of saying and doing the most laughable things with the utmost gravity.[63] In this instance joy has, however, been confounded with the sense of the comic, which is of course a purely intellectual gift, and which does not even presuppose a cheerful disposition. The less the expenditure of nervous force on outward activity, the greater is the efficiency with which the work of thought can be carried on.[64] There is thus a physiological reason why he who laughs least utters the best jokes. But all the fools whose mouths overflow with laughter (risus abundat in ore stultorum) may no doubt often be happier than the most talented humourist. No sane man would say that Swift was happy.
It is, however, undeniable that even joy gradually decreases if it is allowed an unimpeded outlet. But that is often a result of bodily fatigue, which makes thought as well as feeling impossible. Pleasure may also increase qua feeling, if its most outward manifestations are controlled. But hereby the activity has only, as Spencer himself remarks, been directed into new channels.[65] The motor impulses reflect themselves inwards and accumulate when their outlet is stopped. From bodily movements, which are its simplest and most natural expression, joy may thus be diverted into the region of thought. When a savage has attained so high a state of development as to be able to control the impulse to dance and yell for joy, the first dithyramb has been composed.
It is impossible for us to estimate the relative importance of internal and external activity. All we can say is that a joy, the outward expressions of which are controlled, probably gains in durability. But on the other hand it is possible that a joy which has been allowed a free discharge, in the very moment of expression is stronger qua feeling. If the motor impulses find no outlet in any direction, the emotional state will, as has already been pointed out, become more and more affected with elements of pain.
When the physiological counterpart of an emotion takes the form of an inhibition, the feeling-tone will of course gain in intensity in the same degree as wider and wider areas of activity come under the influence of the arrest. This law can also be observed in the course of development of all pain-emotions. Sorrow, despair, humiliation, and so on, are relatively mild as long as the inhibition is restricted to the voluntary muscles. They acquire their full and proper strength as feeling only when the involuntary activities take part in the functional disturbance. And we can often notice in ourselves how, in the same degree as a painful emotion increases, the inhibition cuts its way deeper and deeper into the organism.[66] Humiliation, which of all emotions is the most hopelessly and irredeemably painful, is in its higher degrees always accompanied by functional changes which make themselves felt even in our digestive organs. Literature, to which in questions of emotional psychology we must apply for the information which no experiment can supply, proves that it is hard to swallow. It has a bitter taste, and is sickening even in purely physical sense.[67] The greatest grief, on the other hand, that man has been able to imagine manifests itself physiologically as a complete internal as well as external paralysis, such as is suggested by the Greek myth of the sorrowing mother turned into stone.
The progress of functional inhibition from organ to organ and the accompanying increase of the pain-emotion does of course generally take place without the co-operation of volition. But the increase of an incipient pain-sentiment can also be facilitated by voluntary efforts. As Professor James remarks, we may effectively strengthen a mood of sadness if we only consistently arrest the activity of all the organs which are under the control of our will.[68] And it is well known that much is possible in the way of working up feelings of melancholy. It may seem somewhat strange that the cultivation of such painful states has attained so high a development in man. But the apparent paradox is solved if we direct our attention to the secondary tones of pleasure which can always be derived from artificial moods of suffering. Sentimental reflection is able to extract from them a peculiar satisfaction which is highly appreciated by certain temperaments. We need only refer to the literature of romanticism, which gives us most instructive instances of pride in sensibility. Another kind of enjoyment is attained when persons who consider themselves unfairly treated by cruel fortune deliberately feed upon their own sufferings. As Spencer has shrewdly pointed out, they will infallibly derive a pleasurable sensation of their own value when contrasting their fate with the happiness which they consider their due.[69] Melancholy people, on the other hand, may perhaps be inclined to make themselves as helpless and unfortunate as possible for the sake of experiencing both sides of that “love of the helpless”[70] which, according to Spencer, is the most primordial form of altruistic feeling. The expressions and pantomimes of sadness often strike us as a kind of self-caressing in which the sufferer, by division of his own personality, enjoys the double pleasure of giving and receiving.
According to the most consistent terminology, this tendency to enhance feeling by voluntary co-operation with functional inhibition ought perhaps to be considered as the characteristic expression of painful emotion. It is, however, as has already been pointed out in our treatment of sensation-feeling, more in conformity with ordinary usage—and also with etymology—to apply the word expression to those active, outward manifestations by which the inhibition is relieved. There can be no inconvenience in doing so if we only keep constantly in mind the distinction between the expression which enhances and the expression which relieves. As long as these two notions are confounded, a consistent explanation of emotional states is quite impossible. The contradictions in Professor James’ brilliant chapter on the emotions furnish us with a ready proof of this impossibility. If he had based his theory upon a close discrimination of either class of expression, as they can be distinguished in simple sensational feeling, he would probably not have contended that sorrow is increased by sobbing,[71] while admitting in another passage that “dry and shrunken sorrow” is more painful than any “crying fit.”[72]
It is, however, impossible to deny that sighing, sobbing, twisting the hands, and other active manifestations are often effectively used, by actors, for example, as means for working up despair or sorrows.[73] But it seems to us indubitable that these movements when they succeed in creating the real feeling do so by help of association. A pain-emotion which has been called into existence by such dramatic mechanism is therefore seldom quite genuine. Real sorrow, hate, or anger, as pain-feelings, are on their physiological side much more deeply seated than these surface expressions, which, properly speaking, are merely a reproduction of the usual reactions upon the primary feeling. They are therefore not to be easily stirred up by aid of mimetic action.
It may perhaps be contended that these remarks apply only to the artificial creation of pain-emotion. When under the sway of veritable sorrow we undoubtedly feel as if the mental state were really intensified during its expression by the direct influence of the muscular activities, which constitute the sighing, sobbing, or crying. As far as the compound emotion is concerned, this observation is unquestionably correct. Sorrow, with all its intellectual and volitional elements, may become more distinct for consciousness the more it is actively expressed. But the pain itself, which constitutes the primary and initial state of this emotion, has by no means been increased. On the contrary, a crying fit, for instance, as even Professor James admits, may be accompanied by a kind of excitement which has a peculiar tone of pungent pleasure.[74]