To all whom it may concern. The state of hostility which exists between the Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States makes it necessary that the intercourse which may take place between this country and the adjacent province of Canada should be regulated on the principles which govern belligerent nations. I have had it in charge from the commanding general, Chandler [John Chandler, of New Hampshire, d. 1841] that no person should be permitted to pass in or out of Canada without his permission, or, in his absence, the permission of the commandant of the district of Champlain. This order has been communicated to the commanding officer on the lines, and will be strenuously enforced.
Some members of the community have been found so void of all sense of honor, love of country, or any other principle which has governed the virtuous of all nations and ages, as to hold correspondence with and give intelligence to our enemies. It therefore becomes my duty to put the laws in full force. The two following sections of the rules and articles of war, which are equally binding on the citizen and the soldier, are published for the information of the public, that no one may plead ignorance, as from this time henceforward they shall be enforced with the greatest severity.
"Art. 56. Whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbor or protect an enemy shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial.
"Art. 57. Whosoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court-martial."
[Signed] Z. M. Pike, Col. 15th Regt. Inf.
Commanding West Lake Champlain.
During the winter of 1812-13, when the 15th regiment was stationed on the northern frontier, in view of the operations to be undertaken against the posts of the enemy on the lakes, great confidence in this well-disciplined and zealous body of troops was felt by General Henry Dearborn, formerly secretary of war, and then the senior major-general of the army, in immediate command. As we have just seen, General Pike was in charge of a military district on Lake Champlain; his command was then of about 2,500 men. Various desultory demonstrations against the enemy had proved futile, in some cases fatuous and disgraceful. The War Department determined upon a more consistent and apparently feasible plan of concerted operations, which had in view the reduction of all the British posts on the St. Lawrence river and Lake Ontario. The capture of Kingston (site of old Fort Frontenac) was a measure of first importance. The garrison was supposed to be small, and lulled in a sense of security, owing to the rigors of the season and the numerical insignificance of our troops at Sackett's Harbor; nor was Kingston likely to be re-enforced from below, as the British forces were menaced on the Lower St. Lawrence by Pike's troops on Lake Champlain. It was proposed to transport these in sleighs to the foot of Lake Ontario with such promptitude that the movement could not be counteracted. General Dearborn also proposed to concentrate other forces at Sackett's Harbor, to which place his headquarters at Albany were to be moved at once. This was in Feb., 1813. But while these measures were pending, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of the Canadas, prorogued the Parliament then in session, and moved to Kingston with re-enforcements for that place. According to General Dearborn's dispatches of Mar. 3d from Sackett's Harbor, this demonstration seemed so alarming that operations against Kingston were suspended in favor of others which had regard to the safety of Sackett's Harbor; though it appears in General Armstrong's History of the War that Sir George Prevost had executed a clever ruse with few troops, and "countervailed his antagonist only by dexterous and well-timed reports," Whiting's Pike, p. 290 seq.
The proposed attack on Kingston over the ice having been abandoned, the Secretary of War's alternative plan of reducing in succession the several posts on and about Lake Ontario engaged General Dearborn's attention. The Secretary indicated the order in which the successive attacks were to be made, viz.: Kingston and York on Lake Ontario; George and Erie on the Niagara river. But this sequence was not strictly regarded by General Dearborn, who determined to attack Kingston last instead of first; considering the rotation of the assaults to be of minor consequence, in view of the main features of a campaign which had for its object the reduction of all the posts named in the order of the Secretary. The general commanding, on consultation with Commodore Isaac Chauncey, concluded to make York the initial point of attack; George to come next, and then Kingston.
The prospect held out by this plan of the campaign was certainly very promising. It had all such probabilities in its favor as could be commanded by those who control only one side of the current of events. The force that could and would be brought to bear on each point of attack was ample, and left as little to hazard as prudence would suggest. The plan was founded on the best principles of strategy, and highly creditable to the generalship which dictated it. Had it been carried out with the spirit and perseverance with which it was commenced, there was every reasonable prospect of a successful issue. The causes of its failure were obvious: delays, without proper objects, after the capture of Fort George; and a change of command, wholly unnecessary and inexpedient, which led to the waste of nearly an entire season of inactivity (Whiting, p. 297).
As noted by this military critic and historian, General Dearborn was relieved from command early in July, 1813, his successor being enjoined to rest on his arms, except in the event of certain improbable contingencies which never arose, until the arrival of General Wilkinson, who did not reach Fort George until September, or resume operations until Oct. 1st; so that "nearly three months were utterly wasted by a body of 4,000 troops."
But I have digressed from the attack on Fort York, with which alone are we here concerned.