Don Francisco de Quevedo: Drama en Cuatro Actos

by Eulogio Florentino Sanz

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

When Philip IV became king of Spain in 1621 he inherited a kingdom whose resources had been recklessly wasted. His father, Philip III, had been ruled by the most inept of ministers, the Duke of Lerma. Great sums of money, wrung from the productive lower classes, had been spent to carry on a fruitless war in the Netherlands, to provide amusement for an idle, frivolous court, and to fill the pockets of the minister's creatures. Government was in the hands of a bureaucracy of parasites. The collective conscience of the governing class had withered and died. The office-holders in this bureaucracy had come to regard the acquisition of riches at the expense of the state as one of their official privileges.

If Spain were to maintain her preëminent position as the greatest power in Europe the most radical economic reform was necessary. Stimulus must be given to the productive activity of the country by relief from oppressive taxation, and expenditure must be wisely restrained and administered.

The situation demanded a man of exceptional keenness of vision, great energy, and absolute integrity. There were not lacking men who foresaw the disaster that threatened, men who still kept some of that energy and fearlessness that had made America a Spanish dependency, but such individuals were silenced as menaces rather than encouraged as helpers. In Philip himself the mental vigor and physical stamina of the Spanish Hapsburgs had been greatly diminished. The consanguineous marriages of his immediate ancestors had weakened the stock. There can be no doubt that he loved his people in his own pitiful, ineffectual way, but he was hopelessly weak; lacking in the ability and even the will to rule, he delegated government to Don Gaspar de Guzmán, Count of Olivares and soon to be the first Duke of San Lúcar.

Here, on the other hand, was a man of undoubted energy and courage. Yet his weakness was his utter lack of vision and his inability to profit by the mistakes of his predecessors. He had many a lesson to learn in the failure of the reigns of Philip II and Philip III; he should have seen that the reason for the disasters of the former was the continuance of a hopeless war in the Netherlands for the sake of an ideal of religious unity which the progress of the sixteenth century had made impossible; above all he should have realized the economic folly of a system of taxation and industrial repression that was choking the nation.

Olivares himself was to blame for the initial appearance in the machinery of the State of only a few vital weaknesses, for at the beginning of his administration many fatal tendencies were already at work. But because he failed to check those tendencies he must ever be the scapegoat. To be sure he signalized his arrival by a few months of rigid economy, but he did not cut deep enough. He soon realized the futility of saving where there was nothing to save. Then, either because he failed to see the source of the evil or because he lacked the constructive ability to attack it, he went to the extreme of lavish expenditure. As the situation grew more and more hopeless he temporized, striving to hide the internal decay beneath a gilded exterior of ostentatious wealth. As he plunged deeper his critics grew bolder, and to silence them his rule became more barbarously arbitrary.

Moreover, he found himself face to face with the great Richelieu at the head of a rich and well-administered France. Under him France was to become organized and to extend her dominions to her natural physical boundaries—at the expense of Spain. Olivares ruled Spain from 1621 until 1643, Richelieu ruled France from 1622 until 1642; it was a life-long duel between the two ministers. Richelieu laid the foundation for the greatness of Louis XIV, while Olivares made inevitable the abject impotence of Spain under Charles II.

The culminating disasters began to arrive in 1640 with the rebellion of Catalonia. The determination of the Catalans in 1626 to grant Philip no more arbitrary taxes marks the beginning of the revolt that ended with the entire loss of Catalonia. Olivares could never forget its opposition to his will. While the Catalans in 1639 were bravely resisting the entrance of French troops into Roussillon, Santa Coloma, the viceroy of Olivares, made even more severe his policy of sternness and repression. The Catalans were to be driven against the French and to be made to understand by the application of brute force that the welfare of their particular province was of small importance beside the prosperity of the kingdom in general. The Spanish soldiers quartered upon them behaved with such lawlessness that in May of 1640 the population of Barcelona broke into open rebellion. Santa Coloma was cut down in his attempt to escape the consequences of his lack of diplomacy and tact. From Barcelona the revolt soon spread through the entire province. It has been said that the gentle measures of repression inaugurated by the new viceroy, the Duke of Cardona, particularly displeased Olivares, who saw at last what he believed to be his opportunity utterly to crush Catalan liberty. The answer of the Catalans was to throw themselves into the hands of the French and Richelieu, by seeking foreign aid against Castile.

In September 1640 an army under the Marqués de los Vélez was sent north to straighten out the tangled affairs of Catalonia. At first he was successful, but in January 1641 he was beaten back from Barcelona itself after a bloody defeat at the hands of the local soldiery.

To make sure of French aid the rebels offered their allegiance to Louis XIII of France, and the revolt was kept alive with French money and soldiers, while Philip's armies were invariably defeated.