TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been placed at the end of the book.

Contractions such as ’tis are displayed as in the original text, so they sometimes have a space (’t is).

Several letters from Old English (Anglo-Saxon) and the Insular Script are used. These will display on this device as:

ð eth
þ thorn
ħ h with stroke
ꝼ insular f
ꞃ insular r
ꞅ insular s
ꞇ insular t

There are several words and phrases in Greek and Hebrew. These may display imperfectly on some devices.

The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.

Some minor changes to the text are noted at the [end of the book.]

THE
ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX
OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE

EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED.

BY THE REV. ALEX. CROMBIE,

LL.D. F.R.S. M.R.S.L. AND F.Z.S.

SEVENTH EDITION.

LONDON:
SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO.,

STATIONERS’ HALL COURT.

1853.

LONDON:

GEORGE WOODFALL AND SON,

ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET.

PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those, whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement. Inquiry is necessarily the parent of knowledge; error itself, proceeding from discussion, leads ultimately to the establishment of truth.

Were we to estimate our progress in the knowledge of English grammar from the number of works already published on the subject, we should perhaps be prompted to infer, that in afield so circumscribed, and at the same time so often and so ably explored, no object worthy of notice could have escaped attention. And yet in this, as in every other art or science, strict examination will convince us, that, though much may have been accomplished, still much remains, to stimulate the industry, and exercise the ingenuity, of future inquirers. The author indeed is fully persuaded, that it is impossible to examine the English language with any degree of critical accuracy, and not perceive, that its syntactical principles especially are yet but imperfectly illustrated, and that there are many of its idioms, which have entirely eluded the attention of our grammarians. That these defects are all supplied by the present work, the author is far from having the vanity to believe. That he has examined a few peculiarities, and elucidated some principles, which have escaped the observation of other grammarians, he trusts the intelligent reader will remark.

The Treatise, the second edition of which now solicits the notice of the public, is intended chiefly for the improvement of those, who have made some advancement in classic literature. That an acquaintance with Greek and Latin facilitates the acquisition of every other language, and that by a knowledge of these the classical scholar is therefore materially assisted in attaining a critical acquaintance with his native tongue, it would argue extreme perversity to deny. But that an extensive knowledge of Greek and Latin is often associated with an imperfect and superficial acquaintance with the principles of the English language, is a fact, which experience demonstrates, and it would not be difficult to explain. To make any tolerable progress in a classical course, without acquiring a general knowledge of English grammar, is indeed impossible; yet to finish that course, without any correct acquaintance with the mechanism of the English language, or any critical knowledge of its principles, is an occurrence neither singular nor surprising. No language whatever can be critically learned, but by careful study of its general structure, and peculiar principles. To assist the classical scholar in attaining a correct acquaintance with English grammar, is the chief, though not the sole, end for which the present Treatise was composed. That it is, in some degree, calculated to answer this purpose, the author, from its reception, is willing to believe.

His obligations to his predecessors in the same department of literature, he feels it his duty to acknowledge. He trusts, at the same time, that the intelligent reader will perceive, that he has neither copied with servility nor implicitly adopted the opinions of others; but has, in every question, exercised his own judgment, in observance of that respect, which all men owe to truth, and consistently, he hopes, with that deference, which is confessedly due to transcendent talents.

The Treatise, he believes, contains some original observations. That all of these deserve to be honoured with a favourable verdict in the court of Criticism, he has neither the presumption to insinuate, nor the vanity to suppose. If they be found subservient to the elucidation of any controverted point, be the ultimate decision what it may, the author will attain his aim.

The work having been composed amidst the solicitudes and distractions of a laborious profession, the author has reason to apprehend, that some verbal inaccuracies may have escaped his attention. But, in whatever other respects the diction may be faulty, he trusts at least, that it is not chargeable with obscurity; and that he may be able to say, in the humble language of the poet,

... “Ergo, fungar vice cotis, acutum

Reddere quæ ferrum valet, exsors ipsa secandi.”

Hor. Art. Poet.

Greenwich.

PREFACE
TO THE THIRD EDITION.

The following work, which has been for some time out of print, having been favoured with the gratifying approbation of the Rev. Professor Dale, and selected by that learned and worthy preceptor, as one of the text books for the class of English literature in the University of London, a new edition has become necessary. The author’s time and attention having been recently devoted to another publication, which was not completed until it became indispensable that this volume should be sent to press, the only additions here introduced are such as occurred to the author while the work was proceeding through the hands of the printer. They will be found, however, to be in number not inconsiderable; and it is hoped, that in quality they will be thought not unworthy of the student’s attention. They consist chiefly of examples of solecism and impropriety, accompanied with such critical remarks as these errors have suggested, and such illustrations as they seemed to require. This mode of enlargement the author has preferred, persuaded of the truth of Dr. Lowth’s observation, that one of the most successful methods of conveying instruction is, “to teach what is right, by showing what is wrong.”

York Terrace, Regent’s Park.

CONTENTS.

ETYMOLOGY AND SYNTAX

OF

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man; the latter is common to all animals. By inarticulate language, we mean those instinctive sounds, or cries, by which the several tribes of inferior creatures are enabled to express their sensations and desires. By articulate language is understood a system of expression, composed of simple sounds, differently modified by the organs of speech, and variously combined.

Man, like every other animal, has a natural language intelligible to all of his own species. This language, however, is extremely defective, being confined entirely to the general expression of joy, grief, fear, and the other passions or emotions of the mind; it is, therefore, wholly inadequate to the purposes of rational intercourse, and the infinitely-diversified ideas of an intelligent being. Hence arises the necessity of an artificial or articulate language; a necessity coeval with the existence of man in his rudest state, increasing also with the enlargement of his ideas, and the improvement of his mind. Man, therefore, was formed capable of speech. Nature has furnished him with the necessary organs, and with ingenuity to render them subservient to his purposes. And though at first his vocabulary was doubtless scanty, as his wants were simple, and his exigencies few, his language and his intellect would naturally keep pace. As the latter improved, the former would be enlarged.

Oral language, we have reason to suppose, continued long to be the only medium by which knowledge could be imparted, or social intercourse maintained. But, in the progress of science, various methods were devised for attaining a more permanent and more extensive vehicle of thought. Of these, the earliest were, as some think, picture-writing and hieroglyphics. Visible objects and external events were delineated by pictures, while immaterial things were emblematically expressed by figures representative of such physical objects as bore some conceived analogy or resemblance to the thing to be expressed. These figures or devices were termed hieroglyphics[1]. It is obvious, however, that this medium of communication must not only have embarrassed by its obscurity, but must have also been extremely deficient in variety of expression.

At length oral language, by an effort of ingenuity which must ever command admiration, was resolved into its simple or elementary sounds, and these were characterized by appropriate symbols[2]. Words, the signs of thought, came thus to be represented by letters, or characters arbitrarily formed, to signify the different sounds of which the words were severally composed. The simplest elementary part of written language is, therefore, a letter: and the elements or letters into which the words of any language may be analyzed, form the necessary alphabet of that language.

In the English alphabet are twenty-six letters.

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z.
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z.

Of these there are six vowels, or letters which by themselves make every one a perfect sound. The remaining twenty are called consonants, or letters which cannot be sounded without a vowel.

This alphabet is both redundant and defective. It is redundant; for of the vowels, the letters i and y are in sound the same: one of them therefore is unnecessary. Of the consonants, the articulator c having sometimes the sound of k, and sometimes of s, one of these must be unnecessary. Q, having in all cases the sound of k, may likewise be deemed superfluous. W appears to me in every respect the same with the vowel u (oo), and is therefore supernumerary[3]. The double consonant x might be denoted by the combination of its component letters, gs or ks.

It is to be observed also, that g, when it has the soft sound, is a double consonant, and performs the same office as the letter j; each having a sound compounded of the sounds of d and the French j. Thus, g in general has the same sound as j in join. J, however, is not, as some have supposed, resolvable into two letters, for we have no character to express the simple sound of the French j, of which, with the consonant d, the sound of the English j is compounded. To resolve it into dg, as some have done, is therefore an error; as the soft g, without the aid of the other consonant, is precisely identical, in respect to sound, with the consonant j. The letter h is no consonant; it is merely the note of aspiration.

Our alphabet is likewise defective. There are nine simple vowel sounds, for which we have only six characters, two of which, as it has been already observed, perform the same office. The simple vowel sounds are heard in these words,

Hall, hat, hate, met, mete, fin, hop, hope, but, full.

Some of these characters occasionally perform the office of diphthongs. Thus, in the word fine, the vowel i has the diphthongal sound of the letters â è, as these are pronounced in French; and the vowel u frequently represents the diphthong eu (e-oo), as fume (fe-oom).

There are, besides, four different consonants for which we have no proper letters; namely, the initial consonant in the word thin, the initial consonant in then, the sibilating sound of sh, and the final consonant (marked ng), as in the word sing.

Consonants are generally divided into mutes and semi-vowels. The mutes are those which entirely, and at once, obstruct the sound of the vowel, and prevent its continuation. These are called perfect mutes. Those which do not suddenly obstruct it are called imperfect mutes.

Semi-vowels are those consonants which do not entirely obstruct the voice: but whose sounds may be continued at pleasure, thus partaking of the nature of vowels.

The nature of these consonants I proceed briefly to explain.

A vowel sound may be continued at pleasure, or it may be terminated, either by discontinuing the vocal effort, in which case it is not articulated by any consonant, as in pronouncing the vowel o; or by changing the conformation of the mouth, or relative position of the organs of speech, so that the vowel sound is lost by articulation, as in pronouncing the syllable or. It is to be observed, also, that a vowel may be articulated, not only by being terminated by a consonant, as in the example now given, but likewise by introducing the sound with that position of the organs, by which it had, in the former case, been terminated, as in pronouncing the syllable ro.

In pronouncing the consonants, there are five distinguishable positions of the organs[4]. The first is the application of the lips to each other, so as to close the mouth. Thus are formed the consonants p, b, and m.

In the second position, the under lip is applied to the fore teeth of the upper jaw; and in this manner we pronounce the consonants f and v.

The third position is, when the tongue is applied to the fore teeth; and thus we pronounce th.

In the fourth position we apply the fore part of the tongue to the fore part of the palate, and by this application we pronounce the letters t, d, s, z, r, l, n.

The fifth position is, when the middle part of the tongue is applied to the palate, and thus we pronounce k, the hard sound of g (as in ga), sh, j, and ng.

In the first position we have three letters, of which the most simple, and indeed the only articulator, being absolutely mute, is p. In the formation of this letter, nothing is required but the sudden closing of the mouth, and stopping the vowel sound; or the sound may be articulated by the sudden opening of the lips, in order to emit the compressed sound of the vowel.

Now, if instead of simply expressing the vowel sound by opening the lips, in saying for example pa, we shall begin to form a guttural sound, the position being still preserved; then, on opening the lips, we shall pronounce the syllable ba. The guttural sound is produced by a compression of the larynx, or windpipe; and is that kind of murmur, as Bishop Wilkins expresses it, which is heard in the throat, before the breath is emitted with the vocal sound. B, therefore, though justly considered as a mute, is not a perfect mute.

The mouth being kept in the same position, and the breath being emitted through the nostrils, the letter m is produced.

In the first position, therefore, we have a perfect mute p, having no audible sound; a labial and liquid consonant m, capable of a continued sound; and between these two extremes we have the letter b, somewhat audible, though different from any vocal sound.

Here, then, are three things to be distinguished. 1st, The perfect mute, having no sound of any kind: 2dly, The perfect consonant, having not only a proper, but continued sound: and 3dly, Between these extremes we find the letter b, having a proper sound, but so limited, that, in respect to the perfect consonant, it may be termed a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may be properly termed imperfect.

In the second position, we have the letters f and v, neither of which are perfect mutes. The letter f is formed by having the aspiration not altogether interrupted, but emitted forcibly between the fore teeth and under lip. This is the simple articulation in this position. If to this we join the guttural sound, we shall have the letter v, a letter standing in nearly the same relation to f, as b and m, in the first position, stand to p. The only difference between f and v is, that, in the former, the compression of the teeth and under lip is not so strong as in the latter; and that the former is produced by the breath only, and the latter by the voice and breath combined.

The consonant f, therefore, though not a mute like p, in having the breath absolutely confined, may notwithstanding be considered as such, consistently with that principle, by which a mute is understood to be an aspiration without guttural sound.

Agreeably to the distinction already made, v may be termed a perfect consonant, and f an imperfect one, having no proper sound, though audible. Thus we have four distinctions in our consonantal alphabet; namely, of perfect and imperfect consonants; perfect and imperfect mutes: thus,

p is a perfect mute, having no sound.

b an imperfect mute, having proper sound, but limited.

m a perfect consonant, having sound, and continued.

f an imperfect consonant, having no sound, but audible.

In the third position we have th as heard in the words then and thin, formed by placing the tip of the tongue between the teeth, and pressing it against the upper teeth. The only difference between these articulations is, that like f and v, the one is formed by the breath only, and the other by the breath and voice together[5].

Here also may be distinguished the perfect and the imperfect consonant; for the th in thin has no sound, but is audible, whereas the th in this, there, has a sound, and that continued[6].

In the fourth position there are several consonants formed.

1st, If the breath be stopped, by applying the fore part of the tongue forcibly to that part of the palate, which is contiguous to the fore teeth, we produce the perfect mute t, having neither aspiration nor guttural sound. By accompanying this operation of the tongue and palate with the guttural sound, we shall pronounce the letter d, which, like b, of the first position, may be considered as a mute, though not perfect. For in pronouncing ed, the tongue at first gently touches the gum, and is gradually pressed closer, till the sound is obstructed; whereas in pronouncing et, the tongue is at once pressed so close, that the sound is instantly intercepted.

2dly, If the tip of the tongue be turned up towards the upper gum, so as not to touch it, and thus the breath be cut by the sharp point of the tongue passing through the narrow chink left between that and the gum, we pronounce the sibilating sound of s. If we accompany this operation with a guttural sound, as in b, v, and th in then, we shall pronounce the letter z; the same difference subsisting between s and z as between f and v, p and b, tħ and th.

3dly, If we make the tip of the tongue vibrate rapidly between the upper and lower jaw, so as not to touch the latter, and the former but gently, we shall pronounce the letter r. The more closely and forcibly the tongue vibrates against the upper jaw, the stronger will the sound be rendered. It is formed about the same distance from the teeth as the letter d, or rather somewhat behind it.

4thly, If the end of the tongue be gently applied to the fore part of the palate, a little behind the seat of the letter d, and somewhat before the place of r, and the voice be suffered to glide gently over the sides of the tongue, we shall pronounce the letter l. Here the breadth of the tongue is contracted, and a space left for the breath to pass from the upper to the under part of the tongue, in forming this the most vocal of all the consonants.

5thly, If the aspirating passage, in the formation of the preceding consonant, be stopped, by extending the tongue to its natural breadth, so as to intercept the voice, and prevent its exit by the mouth, the breath emitted through the nose will give the letter n.

In the fifth position, namely, when we apply the middle or back part of the tongue to the palate, we have the consonants k, g, sh, j, and ng.

If the middle of the tongue be raised, so as to press closely against the roof of the mouth, and intercept the voice at once, we pronounce the letter k (ek). If the tongue be not so closely applied at first, and the sound be allowed to continue a little, we have the letter g (eg). Thus ek and eg bear the same analogy to each other, as et and ed of the fourth position. If the tongue be protruded towards the teeth, so as not to touch them, and be kept in a position somewhat flatter than in pronouncing the letter s, the voice and breath passing over it through a wider chink, we shall have the sound of esh.

If we apply the tongue to the palate as in pronouncing sh, but a little more forcibly, and accompanying it with the guttural sound, we shall have the sound of the French j. Thus j is in this position analogous to the letters b, v, th, in the first, second, and third positions, and is a simple consonant: j in English is a double consonant, compounded of d and the French j, as in join.

If we raise the middle of the tongue to the palate gently, so as to permit part of the voice to issue through the mouth, forcing the remainder back through the nose, keeping at the same time the tongue in the same position as in pronouncing eg, we shall have the articulating sound of ing, for which we have no simple character.

The only remaining letter h is the note of aspiration, formed in various positions, according to the vowel with which it is combined.

The characters of the several letters may be seen in the following table:

What effect the compression of the larynx has in articulation may be seen by comparing these pairs of consonants:

These, as Mr. Tooke observes, differ, each from its partner, by a certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of or near the larynx. This compression, he remarks, the Welsh never use. For instead of

I vow by God, that Jenkin is a wizard;

they say,

I fow by Cot, that Shenkin iss a wisart.

The consonants have been distributed into different classes, according to the organs chiefly employed in their formation.

The association of two vowels, whether the sound of each be heard or not, is called a diphthong, and the concurrence of three is called a triphthong.

Of diphthongs there are twenty, viz. ai, au, ea, ee, ei, eo, eu, ie, oa, oo, ui, ay, ey, uy, oi, oy, ou, aw, ew, ow. Of the diphthongs seventeen have a sound purely monophthongal; hence they have been called improper diphthongs. It would be idle to dispute the propriety of a term almost universally adopted; but to call that a diphthong whose sound is monophthongal is an abuse of language, and creates confusion. The only proper diphthongs in our language are eu, oi, ou, in which each vowel is distinctly heard, forming together one syllable. The triphthongs are three, eau, ieu, iew. Of these, the first eau is sometimes pronounced eu, as in beauty; sometimes o, as in beau: the other two have the diphthongal sound of eu.

PART I.
ETYMOLOGY.

OF WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

A word, in oral language, is either a significant simple sound, or a significant combination of sounds. In written language, it may be defined to be a simple character, or combination of characters, expressive of significant sounds, simple or compound.

A word of one syllable is called a monosyllable; of two syllables, a dissyllable; a word of three syllables, a trisyllable; and a word of more than three syllables is called a polysyllable. The last term, however, is frequently applied to words exceeding two syllables.

Words are either derivative or primitive.

A primitive is that which is formed from no other word, being itself a root, whence others spring, as angel, spirit, school.

A derivative is that which is derived from some other word, as angelic, spiritual, scholar.

A compound is a word made up of two or more words, as archangel, spiritless, schoolman.

In examining the character of words as significant of ideas, we find them reducible into classes, or denominations, according to the offices which they severally perform. These classes are generally called parts of speech; and how many of these belong to language has long been a question among philosophers and grammarians. Some have reckoned two, some three, and others four; while the generality have affirmed, that there are not fewer than eight, nine, or ten[7]. This strange diversity of opinion has partly arisen from a propensity to judge of the character of words more from their form, which is a most fallacious criterion, than from their import or signification. One thing appears certain, how much soever the subject may have been obscured by scholastic refinements, that to assign names to objects of thought, and to express their properties and qualities, are the only indispensable requisites in language. If this be admitted, it follows, that the noun and the verb are the only parts of speech which are essentially necessary; the former being the name of the thing of which we speak, and the latter, verb, (or the word, by way of eminence,) expressing what we think of it[8]. All other sorts of words must be regarded as subsidiaries, convenient perhaps for the more easy communication of thought, but by no means indispensably requisite.

Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain. Language, therefore, must be composed of general signs, that it may be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals. Now, whatever mode be adopted to render general terms significant of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must be regarded as a substitute for the proper name. Thus man is a general term to denote the whole of a species; if I say, the man, this man, that man, it is obvious that the words the, this, and that, termed definitives, serve, with the general term, as a substitute for the proper name of the individual.

Hence it is evident, that those words which are termed definitives, how useful soever, cannot be regarded as indispensable.

The pronoun is clearly a substitute for the noun: it cannot therefore be deemed essential. The adjective expressing merely the property or quality in concreto, without affirmation, may be dispensed with; the connexion of a substance with a quality or property being expressible by the noun and the verb. Thus, “a good man” is equivalent to “a man of, with, or having, goodness.” Adverbs, which have been termed attributes of the second order, are nothing but abbreviations, as, here, for in this place, bravely, for brave like. These, therefore, cannot be considered as essentials in language. In the same manner it might be shown, that all parts of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substitutes or abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indispensably requisite. But, as there will be occasion to illustrate this theory, when the generally received parts of speech are severally examined, it is unnecessary to enlarge on the subject at present.

Though the essential parts of speech in every language are only two, the noun and the verb; yet, as there is in all languages a number of words not strictly reducible to either of these primary divisions, it has been usual with grammarians to arrange words into a variety of different classes. This distribution is partly arbitrary, there being no definite or universally-received principle, by which to determine what discriminative circumstances are sufficient to entitle any species of words to the distinction of a separate order. Hence grammarians are not agreed concerning the number of these subordinate classes. But, into whatever number of denominations they may be distributed, it should be always remembered, that the only necessary parts of speech are noun and verb; every other species of words being admitted solely for despatch or ornament. The parts of speech in English may be reckoned ten: Noun, Article, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, Interjection.

CHAPTER I.
OF THE NOUN.

SECTION I.

Noun (Nomen) is that part of speech which expresses the subject of discourse, or which is the name of the thing spoken of, as, table, house, river.

Of nouns there are two kinds, proper and appellative.

A proper noun, or name, is the name of an individual, as Alexander, London, Vesuvius.

An appellative, or common noun, expresses a genus, or class of things, and is common or applicable to every individual of that class.

Nouns or Substantives (for these terms are equivalent) have also been divided into natural, artificial, and abstract. Of the first class, man, horse, tree, are examples. The names of things of our own formation are termed artificial substantives, as, watch, house, ship. The names of qualities or properties, conceived as existing by themselves, or separated from the substances to which they belong, are called abstract nouns; while Adjectives, expressing these qualities as conjoined with their subjects, are called concretes. Hard, for example, is termed the concrete, hardness the abstract.

Nouns have also been considered as denoting genera, species, and individuals. Thus man is a generic term, an Englishman a special term, and George an individual. Appellative nouns being employed to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called Number, by which we signify, whether one or more individuals of any genus or species be intended.

In English there are two numbers, the singular and the plural. The singular, expressing only one of a class or genus, is the noun in its simple form, as, river; the plural, denoting more than one, is generally formed by adding the letter s to the singular, as, rivers[9]. To this rule, however, there are many exceptions.

Nouns ending in ch, sh, ss, or x, form their plural by adding the syllable es to the singular number, as, church, churches. Dr. Whately, (Archbishop of Dublin,) in violation of this universal rule, writes premiss in the singular number, and premises in the plural. (See his Logic, pp. 25, 26.) Premise, like promise, is the proper term, and makes premises in the plural. Premiss and premises are repugnant to all analogy.—Ch hard takes s for the plural termination, and not es, as patriarch, patriarchs; distich, distichs.

Nouns ending in f or fe, make their plural by changing f or fe into ves, as, calf, calves; knife, knives. Except hoof, roof, grief, dwarf, mischief, handkerchief, relief, muff, ruff, cuff, snuff, stuff, puff, cliff, skiff, with a few others, which in the formation of their plurals follow the general rule.

Nouns in o impure form their plural by adding es, as, hero, heroes; echo, echoes: those which end in o pure, by adding s, as, folio, folios.

Some nouns have their plural in en, thus following the Teutonic termination, as, ox, oxen; man, men.

Some are entirely anomalous, as, die, dice; penny, pence; goose, geese; sow, swine; and brother makes brethren[10], when denoting persons of the same society or profession. Die, a stamp for coining, makes dies in the plural.

Index makes in the plural indexes, when it expresses a table of contents, and indices, when it denotes the exponent of an algebraic quantity.

Some are used alike in both numbers, as, hose[11], deer, sheep, these being either singular or plural.

Nouns expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural have no singular, as, bowels, lungs, scissors, ashes, bellows.

Nouns ending in y impure form their plural by changing y into ies, as quality, qualities.

Nouns purely Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, &c., retain their original plurals.

when denoting aërial spirits; but when signifying men of genius, or employed to express the plural of that combination of mental qualities which constitutes genius, it follows the general rule.

A proper name has a plural number when it becomes the name of more individuals than one, as, the two Scipios; the twelve Cæsars. It is to be observed, however, that it ceases then to be, strictly speaking, a proper name.

Some nouns have no plural. 1st. Those which denote things measured or weighed, unless when they express varieties, as, sugar, sugars; wheat, wheats; oil, oils; wine, wines. Here, not numbers of individuals, but different species or classes, are signified. In this sense the nouns are used plurally.

2d. Names of abstract, and also of moral qualities, as, hardness, softness, prudence, envy, benevolence, have no plural. It is to be observed, however, that several nouns of this class ending in y, when they do not express the quality or property in the abstract, but either its varieties or its manifestations, are used plurally. Thus we say, levities, affinities, gravities, &c. There may be different degrees and different exhibitions of the quality, but not a plurality.

Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using with Hume (vol. vii. p. 411) the plural insolences, the expression acts of insolence, would be preferable.

Some of those words which have no singular termination are names of sciences, as, mathematics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, pneumatics, &c.

Of these, the term ethics is, I believe, considered as either singular or plural.

Mathematics is generally construed as plural; sometimes, however, we find it as singular. “It is a great pity,” says Locke, (vol. iii. p. 427, 8vo. 1794,) “Aristotle had not understood mathematics, as well as Mr. Newton, and made use of it in natural philosophy.”

“But when mathematics,” says Mr. Harris, “instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place, no wonder if logic pass into contempt.”

Bacon improperly uses the word as singular and plural in the same sentence. “If a child,” says he, “be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin.” He likewise frequently gives to some names of sciences a singular termination; and Beattie, with a few others, have, in some instances, followed his example.

“Thus far we have argued for the sake of argument, and opposed metaphysic to metaphysic.”—Essay on Truth.

“See physic beg the Stagyrite’s defence,

See metaphysic call for aid on sense.”—Pope.

This usage, however, is not general.

Metaphysics is used both as a singular and plural noun.

“Metaphysics has been defined, by a writer deeply read in the ancient philosophy, ‘The science of the principles and causes of all things existing.’”—Encyc. Brit. Here the word is used as singular; as likewise in the following example:

“Metaphysics has been represented by painters and sculptors as a woman crowned and blindfolded, holding a sceptre in her hand, and having at her feet an hour-glass and a globe.”

“Metaphysics is that science, in which are understood the principles of other sciences.”—Hutton.

In the following examples it is construed as a plural noun.

“Metaphysics tend only to benight the understanding in a cloud of its own making.”—Knox.

“Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science.”—Hume.

The latter of these usages is the more common, and more agreeable to analogy. The same observation is applicable to the terms politics, optics, pneumatics, and other similar names of sciences.

“But in order to prove more fully that politics admit of general truths.”—Hume.

Here the term is used as plural.

Folk and folks are used indiscriminately; but the plural termination is here superfluous, the word folk implying plurality.

Means is used both as a singular and plural noun. Lowth recommends the latter usage only, and admits mean as the singular of means. But notwithstanding the authority of Hooker, Sidney, and Shakspeare, for the expressions this mean, that mean, &c., and the recommendation they receive from analogy, custom has so long decided in favour of means, repudiating the singular termination, that it may seem, perhaps, idle, as well as fastidious, to propose its dismission.

It is likewise observable, that the singular form of this noun is not to be found in our version of the Bible; a circumstance which clearly shows, that the translators preferred the plural termination.

That the noun means has been used as a substantive singular by some of our best writers, it would be easy to prove by numberless examples. Let a few suffice.

“By this means it became every man’s interest, as well as his duty, to prevent all crimes.”—Temple, vol. iii. p. 133.

“And by this means I should not doubt.”—Wilkins’s real Character.

“He by that means preserves his superiority.”—Addison.

“By this means alone the greatest obstacles will vanish.”—Pope.

“By this means there was nothing left to the parliament of Ireland.”—Blackstone, vol. i. p. 102.

“Faith is not only a means of obeying, but a principal act of obedience.”—Young.

“Every means was lawful for the public safety.”—Gibbon.

That this word is also used as plural, the most inattentive English reader must have frequently observed.

“He was careful to observe what means were employed by his adversaries to counteract his schemes.”

While we offer these examples to show that the term is used either as a singular or as a plural noun, we would at the same time remark, that though the expression “a mean” is at present generally confined to denote “a middle, or medium, between two extremes,” we are inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a more extended use of the noun singular. This usage was common in the days of Shakspeare.

“I’ll devise a mean to draw the Moor out of the way.”—Othello.

“Pamela’s noble heart would needs gratefully make known the valiant mean of her safety.”—Sidney.

“Their virtuous conversation was a mean to work the Heathen’s conversion unto Christ.”—Hooker.

Melmoth, Beattie, and several other writers, distinguished by their elegance and accuracy of diction, have adopted this usage. A means, indeed, is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported by analogy, is yet so repugnant to the general idiom of our language, and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause, that we should be pleased to see it dismissed from use. If we say, “This was one of the means which he employed to effect his purpose,” analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending a mean, or one mean, as preferable to a means. News, alms, riches, pains, have been used as either singular or plural; but we never say, “one of the news,” “one of the alms,” “one of the riches,” “one of the pains,” as we say “one of the means;” we may, therefore, be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general usage, in pronouncing “a means” a palpable anomaly.

News is likewise construed sometimes as a singular, and sometimes as a plural noun. The former usage, however, is far the more general.

“A general joy at this glad news appeared.”—Cowley.

“No news so bad as this at home.”—Shakspeare, Richard III.

“The amazing news of Charles at once was spread.”—Dryden.

“The king was employed in his usual exercise of besieging castles, when the news was brought of Henry’s arrival.”—Swift.

“The only news you can expect from me is news from heaven.”—Gay.

“This is all the news talked of.”—Pope.

Swift, Pope, Gay, with most other classic writers of that age, seem to have uniformly used it as singular.

A few examples occur of a plural usage.

“When Rhea heard these news.”—Raleigh, Hist. World.

“Are there any news of his intimate friend?”—Smollett.

“News were brought to the queen.”—Hume.

The same rule as that just now recommended in regard to the noun means might perhaps be useful here also, namely, to consider the word as singular when only one article of intelligence is communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported.

Pains is considered as either singular or plural, some of our best writers using it in either way. This word is evidently of French extraction, being the same with peine, pains or trouble, and was originally used in a singular form thus, “Which may it please your highness to take the payne for to write.”—Wolsey’s Letter to Henry VIII. It seems probable, that this word, after it assumed a plural form, was more frequently used as a singular than as a plural noun. Modern usage, however, seems to incline the other way. A celebrated grammarian indeed, has pronounced this noun to be in all cases plural; but this assertion might be proved erroneous by numberless examples[12].

“The pains they had taken was very great.”—Clarendon.

“Great pains has been taken.”—Pope.

“No pains is taken.”—Pope.

In addition to these authorities in favour of a singular usage, it may be observed, that the word much, a term of quantity, not of number, is frequently joined with it, as,

“I found much art and pains employed.”—Middleton.

“He will assemble materials with much pains.”—Bolingbroke on History.

The word much is never joined to a plural noun; much labours, much papers, would be insufferable[13].

Riches is generally now considered as a plural noun; though it was formerly used either as singular or plural. This substantive seems to have been nothing but the French word richesse; and therefore no more a plural than gentlenesse, distresse, and many others of the same kind. In this form we find it in Chaucer:

“But for ye spoken of swiche gentlenesse,

As is descended out of old richesse.

And he that ones to love doeth his homage,

Full often times dere bought is the richesse.”

Accordingly he gives it a plural termination, and uses it as a plural word.

“Thou hast dronke so much hony of swete temporal richesses, and delices, and honours of this world.”

It seems evident, then, that this word was originally construed as a substantive singular, and even admitted a plural form. The orthography varying, and the noun singular assuming a plural termination, it came in time to be considered by some as a noun plural.

In our translation of the Bible, it is construed sometimes as a singular, but generally as a plural noun.

“In one hour is so great riches come to nought.”—Bible.

“Riches take to themselves wings, and fly away.”—Ibid.

Modern usage, in like manner, inclines to the plural construction; there are a few authorities, however, on the other side, as,

“Was ever riches gotten by your golden mediocrities?”—Cowley.

“The envy and jealousy which great riches is always attended with.”—Moyle.

Alms was also originally a noun singular, being a contraction of the old Norman French almesse, the plural of which was almesses.

“This almesse shouldst thou do of thy proper things.”—Chaucer.

“These ben generally the almesses and workes of charity.”—Ibid.

Johnson says this word has no singular. It was, in truth, a first a noun singular, and afterwards, by contraction, receiving a plural form, it came to be considered by some as a noun plural. Johnson would have had equal, nay, perhaps, better authority for saying that this word has no plural. Our translators of the Bible seem to have considered it as singular. “To ask an alms,” “to give much alms,” and other similar phraseologies, occur in Scripture. Nay, Johnson himself has cited two authorities, in which the indefinite article is prefixed to it.

... “My arm’d knees,

Which bow’d but in my stirrup, bend like his

That hath received an alms.”—Shakspeare.

“The poor beggar hath a just demand of an alms from the rich man.”—Swift.

Lowth objected to the phraseology a means, for this reason, that means, being a plural noun, cannot admit the indefinite article, or name of unity. The objection would be conclusive, if the expressions this means, that means, did not oppose the learned author’s opinion, that means is a noun plural. To the substantive alms, as represented by Johnson to have no singular, the objection is applicable.

Thanks is considered to be a plural noun, though denoting only one expression of gratitude. It occurs in Scripture as a substantive singular. “What thank have ye?”

It has been observed, that many of those words which have no singular denote things consisting of two parts, and therefore have a plural termination. Hence the word pair is used with many of them, as, “a pair of bellows, a pair of scissors, a pair of colours, a pair of drawers.”

SECTION II.
Of Genders.

We not only observe a plurality of substances, or of things of the same sort, whence arises the distinction of number; but we distinguish also another character of some substances, which we call sex. Every substance is either male or female, or neither the one nor the other. In English, all male animals are considered as masculine; all female animals as feminine; and all things inanimate, or destitute of sex, are termed neuter, as belonging neither to the male nor the female sex. In this distribution we follow the order of nature; and our language is, in this respect, both simple and animated.

The difference of sex is, in some cases, expressed by different words, as,

Sometimes the female is distinguished by the termination ess or ix.

There are a few whose feminine ends in ix, viz.

Where there is but one word to express both sexes, we add another word to distinguish the sex; as, he-goat, she-goat; man-servant, maid-servant; cock-sparrow, hen-sparrow.

It has been already observed, that all things destitute of sex are in English considered as of the neuter gender; and, when we speak with logical accuracy, we follow this rule. Sometimes, however, by a figure in rhetoric, called personification, we assign sex to things inanimate. Thus, instead of “virtue is its own reward,” we sometimes say, “virtue is her own reward;” instead of “it (the sun) rises,” we say, “he rises;” instead of “it (death) advances with hasty steps,” we say, “he advances.”

This figurative mode of expression, by which we give life and sex to things inanimate, and embody abstract qualities, forms a singular and striking beauty in our language, rendering it in this respect superior to the languages of Greece and Rome, neither of which admitted this animated phraseology[14].

When we say,

“The sun his orient beams had shed,”

the expression possesses infinitely more vivacity than

“The sun its orient beams had shed.”

In assigning sex to things inanimate, it has been supposed that we have been guided by certain characters or qualities in the inanimate objects, as bearing some resemblance to the distinctive or characteristic qualities of male and female animals. Thus, it has been said, that those inanimate substances, or abstract qualities, which are characterized by the attributes of giving or imparting, or which convey an idea of great strength, firmness, or energy, are masculine; and that those, on the contrary, which are distinguished by the properties of receiving, containing, and producing, or which convey an idea of weakness or timidity, having more of a passive than active nature, are feminine. Hence it has been observed, that the sun, death, time, the names also of great rivers and mountains, are considered as masculine; and that the moon, a ship, the sea, virtue, in all its species, are considered as feminine. Of these and such speculations it may be truly said, as the learned author of them remarks himself, that they are at best but ingenious conjectures. They certainly will not bear to be rigorously examined; for there are not any two languages which harmonize in this respect, assigning the same sex to the same inanimate objects, nor any one language in which this theory is supported by fact[15]. Hence it is evident, that neither reason nor nature has any share in the regulation of this matter; and that, in assigning sex to inanimate things, the determination is purely fanciful. In Greek, death is masculine: in Latin, feminine. In those languages the sun is masculine; in the Gothic, German, Anglo-Saxon, and some other northern languages, it is feminine; in Russian it is neuter. In several of the languages of Asia, the sun is feminine. According to our northern mythology, the sun was the wife of Tuisco. The Romans considered the winds as masculine; the Hebrews, says Caramuel, represented them as nymphs. In the Hebrew language, however, they were of the masculine gender, as were also the sun and death. In short, we know not any two languages which accord in this respect, or any one language in which sex is assigned to things inanimate according to any consistent or determinate rule.

In speaking of animals whose sex is not known to us, or not regarded, we assign to them gender either masculine or feminine, according, as it would appear, to the characteristic properties of the animal himself. In speaking, for example, of the horse, a creature distinguished by usefulness and a certain generosity of nature, unless we be acquainted with the sex and wish to discriminate, we always speak of this quadruped as of the male sex; thus,

“While winter’s shivering snow affects the horse

With frost, and makes him an uneasy course.”—Creech.

In speaking of a hare, an animal noted for timidity, we assign to it, if we give it sex, the feminine gender; thus, “the hare is so timorous a creature, that she continually listens after every noise, and will run a long way on the least suspicion of danger: so that she always eats in terror.”

The elephant is generally considered as of the masculine gender, an animal distinguished not only by great strength and superiority of size, but also by sagacity, docility, and fortitude.

“The elephant has joints, but not for courtesy;

His legs are for necessity, not flexure.”—Shakspeare.

To a cat we almost always assign the female sex; to a dog, on the contrary, or one of the canine species, we attribute the masculine gender.

“A cat, as she beholds the light, draws the ball of her eye small and long.”—Peacham on Drawing.

“The dog is a domestic animal remarkably various in his species.”

It would be easy to illustrate, by more examples, this ascription of either male or female sex to animals, when we speak of them in the species, or are not acquainted with the sex of the individual; but these now adduced will, I presume, be sufficient.

By what principle this phraseology is dictated, or whether it be merely casual or arbitrary in its origin, it would be of no utility at present to inquire. It may be necessary, however, to remark that, when speaking of animals, particularly those of inferior size, we frequently consider them as devoid of sex. “It is a bold and daring creature,” says a certain writer, speaking of a cat, “and also cruel to its enemy; and never gives over, till it has destroyed it, if possible. It is also watchful, dexterous, swift, and pliable.”

Before I dismiss this subject, I would request the reader’s attention to an idiom which seems to have escaped the notice of our grammarians. It frequently happens, as I have already observed, that our language furnishes two distinct terms for the male and the female, as shepherd, shepherdess. It is to be observed, however, that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male and female, and is always employed, when the office, occupation, profession, &c., and not the sex of the individual is chiefly to be expressed; and that the feminine term is used in those cases only, when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be illustrated by the following examples. If I say, “The poets of this age are distinguished more by correctness of taste, than sublimity of conception,” I clearly include in the term poet, both male and female writers of poetry. If I say, “She is the best poetess in this country,” I assign her the superiority over those only of her own sex. If I say, “She is the best poet in this country,” I pronounce her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female. “Spinning,” says Lord Kames in his Sketches, “is a female occupation, and must have had a female inventor.” If he had said “a female inventress,” the expression would have been pleonastic. If he had said “must have had an inventress,” he would not have sufficiently contrasted the male and the female; he would have merely predicated the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the term inventor as applicable to each of the sexes, limiting it to the female by the appropriate term[16]. When distinction of sex is necessary for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather than the general idea implied by the term, is the primary object, the feminine noun must be employed to express the female; thus, “I hear that some authoresses are engaged in this work.”—Political Register. Here the feminine term is indispensable[17]. This subject will be resumed in “the Critical Remarks and Illustrations.”

SECTION III.
Of Cases.

The third accident of a noun is case, (casus, or fall,) so called because ancient grammarians, it is said, represented the cases as declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by a perpendicular, and thence called Casus rectus, or upright case, while the others were named Casus obliqui, or oblique cases. The cases, in the languages of Greece and Rome, were formed by varying the termination; and were intended to express a few of the most obvious and common relations.

In English there are only three cases, nominative, genitive, and objective, or accusative case. In substantives the nominative case and the objective, have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the same form, being distinguishable from each other by nothing but their place; thus,

where the meaning is reversed by the interchange of the nouns, the nominative or agent being known by its being placed before the verb; and the subject of the action by its following it. Pronouns have three cases, that is, two inflexions from the nominative, as, I, mine, me; thou, thine, thee.

The genitive in English, by some called the possessive case, is formed by adding to the nominative the letter s, with an apostrophe before it, as king, king’s. It expresses a variety of relations, and was hence called by the Greeks the general case[18]. The relation which it most commonly denotes is that of property or possession, as, the king’s crown; and is, in general, the same with that which is denoted by the word of, as, the crown of the king, the rage of the tyrant, the death of the prince, equivalent to the king’s crown, the tyrant’s rage, the prince’s death.

The nature of the relation which the genitive expresses must, in some instances, be collected from the scope of the context; for, in English, as in most other languages, this case frequently involves an ambiguity. When I say, “neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God,” it may mean, either from the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for “God’s love” may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, “love to God.”

An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing either the relation of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its subject. “A little after the reformation of Luther,” says Swift. This may import either the change produced by Luther, or a change produced in him. The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though not that which was intended by the author. He should have said, “the reformation by Luther.” It is clear, therefore, that the relation expressed by the genitive is not uniformly the same, that the phrase may be interpreted either in an active or passive sense[19], and that the real import must be collected not from the expression, but the context.

Mr. Harris has said, that the genitive is formed to express all relations commencing from itself, and offers the analysis of this case in all modern languages as a proof. That it expresses more than this, both in English and Latin, and that it denotes relations, not only commencing from itself, but likewise directed to itself, the examples already quoted are sufficient to prove. Nay, were it necessary, it would be easy to demonstrate, that this ambiguity in the use of the genitive is not confined to these two languages, but is found in Greek, Hebrew, Italian, and, I believe, in all the modern languages of Europe.

Concerning the origin of the English genitive, grammarians and critics are not agreed. That the cases, or nominal inflexions, in all languages were originally formed by annexing to the noun in its simple form a word significant of the relation intended, is a doctrine which, I conceive, is not only approved by reason, but also attested by fact. That any people, indeed, in framing their language, should affix to their nouns insignificant terminations, for the purpose of expressing any relation, is a theory extremely improbable. Numerous as the inflexions are in the Greek and Latin languages, I am persuaded that, were we sufficiently acquainted with their original structure, we should find that all these terminations were at first words significant, subjoined to the radix, and afterwards abbreviated. This opinion is corroborated by the structure of the Hebrew, and some other oriental languages, whose affixes and prefixes, in the formation of their cases and conjugation of their verbs, we can still ascertain.

Now the English genitive being formed by annexing to the nominative the letter s, with an apostrophe, several critics, among whom is Mr. Addison, deliver it as their opinion, that this termination is a contraction for the possessive pronoun his. This opinion appears to be countenanced by the examples which occur in the Bible, and Book of Common Prayer, in which, instead of the English genitive, we find the nominative with the possessive pronoun masculine of the third person; thus, “for Christ his sake,” “Asa his heart was perfect.” Dr. Lowth considers these expressions as errors either of the printers or the authors. That they are not typographical mistakes I am fully persuaded. They occur in the books now mentioned, and also in the works of Bacon, Donne, and many other writers, much too frequently to admit this supposition. If errors, therefore, they are errors not of the printers, but of the authors themselves.

To evince the incorrectness of this phraseology, and to show that Addison’s opinion is erroneous, Dr. Lowth observes that, though we can resolve “the king’s crown” into “the king his crown,” we cannot resolve “the queen’s crown” into “the queen her crown,” or “the children’s bread” into “the children their bread.” This fact, he observes, ought to have demonstrated to Mr. Addison the incorrectness of his opinion. Lowth, therefore, refers the English to the Saxon genitive for its real origin, and observes, that its derivation from that genitive decides the question[20]. Hickes, in his Thesaurus, had previously delivered the same opinion. Speaking of the Anglo-Saxon genitive in es, he observes, “Inde in nostratium sermone nominum substantivorum, genitivus singularis, et nominativus pluralis, exeunt in es, vel s.” From the introduction of the Saxons into this island, to the Norman conquest, the Saxon genitive was in universal use. From the latter period to the time of Henry II. (1170), though the English language underwent some alterations, we still find the Saxon genitive. Thus, in a poem, entitled “The Life of St. Margaret,” in the Normanno-Saxon dialect, we find the following among other examples, “chrisꞇes angles,” and the pronoun hyꞅ (his) spelled is; thus, “Theodosius was is name.”—See Hickes, Thes. vol. i. p. 226.

Webster has asserted that, in the age of Edward the Confessor (1050), he does not find the Saxon genitive; and as a proof that the pronoun his was used instead of the Saxon termination, he quotes a passage from a charter of Edward the Confessor, where the words, “bissop his land” occur, which he conceives to be equivalent to “bishop’s land.” Now, had he read but a small part of that charter, he would have found the Saxon genitive; and what he imagines to be equivalent to the English genitive is neither that case, nor synonymous with it. The passage runs thus: “And ich ke þe eu þat Alfred havet iseld Gise bissop his land at Llyton;” the meaning of which is, “Know that Alfred hath sold to Bishop Gise his land at Lutton.” In the time of Richard II. (1385) we find Trevisa and Chaucer using the Saxon genitive. Thus, in Trevisa’s translation of the Athanasian creed, we find among other examples, “Godes sight.”

In Gavin Douglas, who lived in the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find is instead of es, thus, faderis hands.

In the time of Henry the Eighth we find, in the works of Sir T. More, both the Saxon and the English genitive; and in a letter, written in 1559, by Maitland of Lethington, the English genitive frequently occurs. Had this genitive, then, been an abbreviation for the noun and the pronoun his, the use of the words separately would have preceded their abbreviated form in composition. This, however, was not the case.

To form the genitive plural, we annex the apostrophe without the letter s, as eagles’ wings, that is, the wings of eagles. The genitive singular of nouns terminating in s, is formed in the same manner, as, righteousness’ sake, or the sake of righteousness.

I finish this article with observing, that there are in English a few diminutive nouns, so called from their expressing a small one of the kind. Some of these end in kin, from a Dutch and Teutonic word signifying a child, as manikin, a little man, lambkin, pipkin, thomkin. Proper names ending in kin belonged originally to this class of diminutives, as, Wilkin, Willielmulus; Halkin, Hawkin, Henriculus; Tomkin, Thomulus; Simkin, Peterkin, &c.

Some diminutives end in ock, as, hill, hillock; bull, bullock; some in el, as pike, pickrel; cock, cockrel; sack, satchel; some in ing, as goose, gosling. These seem to be the only legitimate ones, as properly belonging to our language. The rest are derived from Latin, French, Italian, and have various terminations.

CHAPTER II.
OF THE ARTICLE.

Language is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of genera or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common and more general name than that which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name man to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of animal[21]. Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,

“The proper study of mankind is man,” i.e. not one man, not many men, but all men.

Not only, however, has this rule its limitations, though these seem governed by no fixed principle, but we frequently find the articles admitted when the whole genus or species is evidently implied. Thus we may say,

“Metal is specifically heavier than water;” i.e. not this or that metal, but all metals. But we cannot say, “Vegetable is specifically lighter than water;” or, “Mineral is specifically heavier than water.” Again; we say, “Man is born unto trouble;” but we cannot say, “Tiger is ferocious,” or, “Fox is cunning;” but, “The tiger, or a tiger, is ferocious;” “The fox, or a fox, is cunning;” the expressions being applicable to the whole species. It would appear, indeed, that when proper names assume the office of appellatives, the reverse of the rule takes place. Thus we say, “A Douglas braves the pointed steel;” the meaning being “every Douglas.” Suppress the indefinite article, and the general proposition becomes individual.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as ae man, ane ox. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a, and ane be shortened into an. These words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms, a, an, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence a and an cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where a or an occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, “Will one man be able to carry this burden so far?” I evidently oppose one to more: and the answer might be, “No; but two men will.” Let us substitute the term a, and say, “Will a man be able to carry this burden?” Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, “No; but a horse will.” I have here substituted a, for one; the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying, “A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse,” I should say, “One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse,” the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea, “one kingdom for one horse.” In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donnez-moi un livre means either “give me one book,” i.e. not two or more books; or “give me a book,” that is, “a book, not something else; a book, not a pen,” for example.

I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered, as Quintilian observes[22], that language should be, not such as the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that one may in every case be substituted for a, without in the least degree injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the sense. Be it observed also, that, though a, an, ae, ane, one, may have been all etymologically the same, it does not follow, nor is it practically true, as has been now shown, that they are all precisely equivalent words. In Scotland, the distinction between a and ae is well known. “Give me a book,” means any book, in contradistinction to any other object, as “a chair,” “a pen,” “a knife;” “give me ae book,” is in contradistinction to one or more. Such also is the difference between a and one.

It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word a, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred to a different class of words from the numeral one, and called an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must acknowledge the distinctive name of article assigned to this word appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle of classification, (and I see no other distinction between a and one,) the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number.

Besides the words a and an, termed indefinite articles, as not defining which of the species is signified, we have also another word, the, named the definite article, because it is said to point out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from the word this or that, much in the same manner as a and an from ae and ane. To what class of words this and that should be referred has been a subject of controversy[23]. That they are not pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives; and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinary numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. This means “the nearer,” “the latter,” or “the second;” that, “the more remote,” “the former,” or “the first.” Their office, in general, seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object whose character was either previously known, or is then described; hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives they accord with nouns, frequently denoting the accident of place, they may be grammatically referred to the class of adjectives. Their import will appear from a few examples.