Please see the [Transcriber’s Notes] at the end of this text.
New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.
The first part, Naval Battles of the World, starts [here], the second part, Naval Battles of America, starts [here].
RETURN OF THE GREEKS FROM SALAMIS.
Naval Battles
of the World.
Great and Decisive
Contests on the Sea;
Causes and Results of
Ocean Victories and Defeats;
Marine Warfare and Armament
in all ages;
with an account of the
Japan-China War,
and the recent
Battle of the Yalu.
The Growth, Power and Management of
OUR NEW NAVY
in its Pride and Glory of Swift Cruiser, Impregnable Battleship, Ponderous
Engine, and Deadly Projectile;
Our Naval Academy, Training Ship, Hospital,
Revenue, Light House, and Life Saving Service.
BY EDWARD SHIPPEN,
OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY.
P. W. ZIEGLER & CO.,
PHILADELPHIA AND CHICAGO
COPYRIGHTED BY
JAMES C. McCURDY.
1883, 1894, 1898.
PREFACE.
This collection is intended to present, in a popular form, an account of many of the important naval battles of all times, as well as of some combats of squadrons and single ships, which are interesting, from the nautical skill and bravery shown in them.
In most instances an endeavor has been made to give, in a concise manner, the causes which led to these encounters, as well as the results obtained.
As this book is not intended for professional men, technicalities have been, as far as possible, avoided. But it is often necessary to use the language and phraseology of those who fought these battles.
In all there has been a desire to give an unbiased account of each battle; and, especially, to make no statement for which authority cannot be found.
A study of naval history is of value, even in the most inland regions, by increasing a practical knowledge of geography, and by creating an interest in the great problems of government, instead of concentrating it upon local affairs. At the time that this volume was first issued, some people wondered why such a publication was necessary. The answer was that it was to inform the people of the great centre and West of the necessity of a navy, by showing them what navies had done and what influence they exercised in the world’s history.
That they are fully aware of this now is also not doubtful, and the probability is that those representatives of the people who oppose a sufficient navy for our country will be frowned down by their own constituents. Commonsense shows that, with our immense seacoast, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific, the navy, in the future, is to be the preponderant branch of our military force.
CONTENTS.
| PAGE | |
|---|---|
| INTRODUCTION. | |
| The Ancients’ Dread of the Sea; Homer’s Account of It; Slow Progress in Navigation before the Discovery of the Lode-stone;Early Egyptians; The Argonauts; The Phenicians and Greeks; Evidences of Sea-fights Thousands of Years before Christ; Naval Battle Fought byRameses III; The Fleets of Sesostris; Description of Bas-relief at Thebes; Roman Galleys Described; Early Maritime Spirit of the Carthaginians;Herodotus’ Account of the Battle of Artemisium; The Greeks under Alexander; Romans and Carthaginians. | [I-19] |
| I. SALAMIS. B. C. 480. | |
| The Island of Salamis; Xerxes; His Immense Power; His Fleet and Army; Events Preceding the Battle; The Contending Hosts Engagein Worship before the Fight Begins; The Greek Admiral Gives the Signal for Action; Many Persian Vessels Sunk at the First Onset; Fierce Hand-to-HandFighting; A Son of the Great Darius Falls; Dismay Among the Asiatics; Panic-stricken; Artifice of Queen Artemisia; She Escapes; Xerxes Powerless;He Rends his Robes and Bursts into Tears; Resolves to Return to Asia; Greece Wins her Freedom. | [I-25] |
| II. NAVAL BATTLE AT SYRACUSE. B. C. 415. | |
| A Bloody Battle; Strength of the Athenians; The Fleet enters Syracuse Harbor in Fine Order; The Sicilians Blockade the Entranceand Imprison the Fleet; The Perils of Starvation Compel the Greeks to Attempt to Raise the Blockade; Both Fleets Meet at the Mouth of the Harbor;Confusion Among the Greeks; They are Finally Compelled to Turn Back and Take Refuge in their Docks; Another Attempt to Escape from the Harbor; MutinyAmong the Sailors; The Syracusans Appear in their Midst and Capture both Men and Ships; End of Athens as a Naval Power. | [I-31] |
| III. ROMANS AND CARTHAGINIANS. | |
| Carthage a Place of Interest for Twenty Centuries; Romans and Carthaginians in Collision; First Punic War; Rome Begins theConstruction of a Navy; A Stranded Carthaginian Vessel Serves as a Model; They Encounter the Carthaginians at Mylœ; Defeat of the Latter; RenewedPreparations of both Countries for the Mastery of the Mediterranean: A Great Battle Fought, 260 B. C.; The Romans Finally Victorious; They Land anArmy in Africa and Sail for Home; Encounter a “Sirocco” and Lose nearly all their Galleys on theRocks; The Succeeding Punic Wars; Rome in Her Greatness; Antony and Octavius Appear Upon the Scene. | [I-36] |
| IV. ACTIUM. B. C. 31. | |
| The Decisive Battle of Philippi, B. C. 42; Antony and Octavius Divide the Empire of the World Between Them; Trouble between Antonyand Octavius; Antony’s Dissipations; His Passion for Egypt’s Queen; Octavius (the Future Augustus) Raises Fresh Legions to Oppose Antony; The LatterProclaims Cleopatra Queen of Cyprus and Cilicia; The Republic Suspicious of Antony; Octavius Declares War Against Cleopatra; Crosses the Ionian Sea withhis Fleet and Army, and Anchors at Actium, in Epirus; Meeting of the Roman and Antony’s Fleets; Preparation for Battle; A Grand Scene; Cleopatra’sMagnificent Galley; Discomfiture of Antony’s Centre; Cleopatra Panic-stricken; Flight of the Egyptian Contingent; Antony Follows Cleopatra; His FleetSurrenders to Octavius; The Land Forces Refuse to Believe in Antony’s Defection; Despairing of His Return, they Accept Octavius’ Overtures and PassUnder his Banner; Octavius Master of the World; Suicide of Antony and Cleopatra. | [I-48] |
| V. LEPANTO. A. D. 1571. | |
| A Momentous Battle that Decides the Sovereignty of Eastern Europe; Naval Events Preceding Lepanto; Turkish Encroachments; PopePius V Forms a League Against Them; Siege and Capture of Famagousta by the Turks; Barbarities of Mustapha; Christian Europe Aroused; Assembly of thePontifical Fleet and Army; Don John, of the Spanish Squadron, Placed in Chief Command; Resolves to Seek and Attack the Ottoman Fleet; Encounters theEnemy in a Gulf on the Albanian Coast; Character of Don John; Preparations for Battle; Strength of his Fleet; A Magnificent Scene; The Turkish Fleet;Ali Pasha in Command; The Battle Opens; Desperate Fighting at all Points, Barberigo, of the Venetian Fleet, Badly Wounded; Two Renowned Seamen Face toFace; Uluch Ali Captures the Great “Capitana” of Malta; The Galley of Don John Encounters that of Ali Pasha; They Collide; Terrible Hand-to-Hand Fighting;Bravery of a Capuchin Friar; The Viceroy of Egypt Killed; Ali Pasha Killed; His Galley Captured; Dismay among the Turks; Uluch Ali Gives the Signal forRetreat; Terrible Loss of Life in the Battle; Christian Slaves Liberated; The Turkish Fleet Almost Annihilated; Alexander Farnese; Cervantes; FierceStorm; Two Sons of Ali Prisoners; Don John and Veniero; Division of the Spoils; The Te Deum at Messina; Joy Throughout Christendom; Colonna inRome; The Great Ottoman Standard; Decline of the Ottoman Empire. | [I-56] |
| VI. THE INVINCIBLE ARMADA. A. D. 1588. | |
| Significance of the Term; Philip II; His Character; Determines to Invade England; The Duke of Parma; Foresight of Elizabeth; The ArmadaReady; An Enormous Fleet; It Encounters a Tempest; Mutiny; The Armada reaches the English Channel in July;Lord Howard, Drake, Frobisher and Hawkins in Command of the English Fleet; Tactics of the English; Capture of the “Santa Anna” by Drake; The Spanish ReachCalais; Disappointment of the Spanish Commander; Another Storm Sets In; Distress in the Spanish Fleet; The English hang on its Rear and cut off StragglingVessels; Shipwreck and Disaster Overtake the Armada on the Scottish and Irish Coast; A Fearful Loss of Life; Apparent Indifference of Philip II Concerningthe Armada’s Failure; The Beginning of Spain’s Decline. | [I-85] |
| VII. SOME NAVAL EVENTS OF ELIZABETH’S TIME, SUCCEEDING THE ARMADA. | |
| The Armada’s Discomfiture Encourages England to Attack Spain; Drake and Norris Unsuccessful at Lisbon; The Earl of Cumberland’s Expedition;Meets with a Bloody Repulse; League of Elizabeth with Henri Quatre, against the Duke of Parma; Sir Thomas Howard in Command of an English Fleet to theAzores; Frobisher and Raleigh’s Expedition of 1592; Prizes Taken on the Coast of Spain; Frobisher Wounded; His Death; Richard Hawkins; Walter Raleigh’sExpedition to Guiana; Expedition of Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins; Repulsed at Porto Rico; Death of Hawkins; England Anticipates Philip II in 1596 andAttacks Cadiz; The City Taken; The English Attack and Capture Fayal; Attempt to Intercept Spanish Merchantmen. | [I-103] |
| VIII. NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND HOLLAND. A. D. 1652-3. | |
| The Dutch Supreme on the Sea; The Commonwealth and the United Provinces; Negotiations for an Alliance Broken Off; An English CommodoreFires into a Dutch Fleet; Van Tromp sent to Avenge this Insult; Blake in Command of the English; The English Temporarily Masters in the Channel; Great NavalPreparations in Holland; The South of England at Van Tromp’s Mercy; Blake Collects his Fleet to meet Van Tromp; A Storm Scatters Both; The Dutch PeopleDissatisfied with Van Tromp; He Resigns; De Witt Assumes Chief Command; Blake Meets the French Fleet under Vendome; He Captures the Latter’s Fleet; Battle ofNorth Foreland; De Witt Withdraws at Nightfall; Van Tromp to the Front Again; Denmark Declares Against the Commonwealth; The Dutch and English Meet in theEnglish Channel; Blake Beaten; Van Tromp Sails Up and Down the Channel with a Broom at his Masthead; Battle off Portland; A Decisive Engagement; Van TrompEscorts Dutch Merchantmen into Port; Discontent in the Dutch Fleet; Terrible Loss on Both Sides; Blake Learns of a New Fleet Fitted out by Van Tromp in April;They Meet Again; A Two Days’ Battle; Another Effort Two Months Later; The Brave Van Tromp Killed; The Power of Holland Broken: The States General Sues forPeace. | [I-112] |
| IX. FRENCH AND DUTCH IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. A. D. 1676. | |
| Revolt of Messina and Sicily; Louis XIV Sends Duquesne with a Fleet to Sustain the Insurgents; Sketch of Duquesne; England Makes Peace withHolland; Duquesne Repulses the Spanish Fleet and Captures the Town of Agosta; Learns of De Ruyter’s Presence in the Mediterranean; Meeting of the Hostile Fleets,Jan. 16, 1676; Splendid Manœuvres; The Advantage with the French; They Meet Again, in Spring, Near Syracuse; Sharp and Terrible Firing; De Ruyter MortallyWounded; The Dutch Seek Shelter in Syracuse Harbor; The Sicilian and French Fleets Encounter the Dutch and Spanish Fleets Again, in May; Destruction of theLatter; Honors to the Remains of De Ruyter; Recompensing Duquesne; His Protestantism Distasteful to Louis XIV; Humiliates Genoa; Edict of Nantes; His Death andPrivate Burial; Subsequent Honors to his Memory. | [I-146] |
| X. BATTLE OF CAPE LA HAGUE. A. D. 1692. | |
| Louis XIV Prepares to Attack England, to Seat James II on the Throne; Count de Tourville in Command of the French Fleet; Sketch of his Life;He is Ordered to Sail from Brest; Bad Weather; Arrogance of Pontchartrain, the Minister of Marine; Tourville meets a Powerful English and Dutch Fleet; Bravery ofthe Soleil Royal, the French Flag-ship; A Fog Ends the Fight; Louis XIV Compliments Tourville on his Gallant Defence Against Such Great Odds; Bestows the Title ofField Marshal on Him. | [I-157] |
| XI. BENBOW, A. D. 1702. | |
| Benbow a Favorite of William III; Queen Anne Declares War Against France; Benbow Sent to the West Indies; He Falls in with a French Fleet; AVigorous Attack Commenced; Disobedience of his Captains; He is Badly Wounded and Dies; The Captains Court-martialed; Detailed Account of the Capture and Destructionof the French and Spanish Fleets. | [I-166] |
| XII. BYNG AND LA GALISSONIÈRE. A. D. 1756. | |
| Sketch of Admiral Byng; War between England and France; Capture of Minorca by the Latter; Byng sent to the Relief of the Island; La Galissonièrein Command of the French; Failure to Engage the Latter’s Fleet, as Directed, by Byng; The English Driven Back to Gibraltar; Byng Superseded Without a Hearing; Triedby Court-martial and Sentenced to Death; The Sentence Considered Unjustly Severe by Pitt; Wrangling among the Officers of the Admiralty; Final Execution of theSentence; Voltaire’s Sarcasm. | [I-174] |
| XIII. SIR EDWARD HAWKE AND CONFLANS. A. D. 1759. | |
| Sketch of Hawke; Succeeds the Ill-fated Admiral Byng; In Command of a Blockading Squadron at Brest; Meets the French Fleet Under AdmiralConflans Near Belleisle; The Latter Inferior in Strength and Numbers; A Gale Arises During the Fight and Many Injured French Vessels Wrecked; The Latter FleetAlmost Entirely Disabled and Destroyed; Honors to Hawke. | [I-183] |
| XIV. DE GRASSE AND RODNEY. A. D. 1782. | |
| Sketch of De Grasse; Earliest Exploits; Aids Washington in the Reduction of Yorktown; Recognition by Congress; Subsequent Events; Encountersan English Fleet, Under Rodney; De Grasse Loses Five Line-of Battle Ships; Exultation in England; De Grasse a Prisoner; Assists in Bringing About a Treaty of PeaceBetween the United States and England; Career of Rodney; Receives the Title of Baron and a Pension. | [I-187] |
| LORD HOWE AND THE FRENCH FLEET. JUNE 1, A. D. 1794. | |
| The First of a Series of Memorable Engagements; Traits of Lord Howe; Anecdotes; Watching the French Fleet; The Latter Put to Sea; Skirmishing,May 28; A Great Battle, June 1; The French Open Fire First; Concentrated and Deadly Firing on Both Sides; The French Lose Six Line-of-Battle Ships; Howe’s OrdersNot Obeyed by Some of the Captains; Some French Ships that Had Struck Escape in the Darkness; Anecdotes Concerning the Battle. | [I-197] |
| BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. A. D. 1797. | |
| Location of Cape St. Vincent; Admiral Sir John Jervis in Command of the English; Strength of His Fleet; Commodore Horatio Nelson; Chased by aSpanish Fleet; The Latter in Command of Don Joseph de Cordova; Feb. 14 a Disastrous Day for Spain; Surprised to See so Large an English Fleet; The Battle Opens;Boarding the San Nicolas; The Spanish Beaten at Every Point; The Battle over by 5 o’clock; Both Fleets Lay To to Repair Damages; Escape of the Spanish During theNight; Damages Sustained; Description of the Santissima Trinidada; The Cause of the Spanish Discomfiture; Great Rejoicing in Lisbon; Honors and Pensions Awarded tothe English Commanders at Home; Admiral Cordova and His Captains. | [I-217] |
| ENGLISH FLEET IN CANARY ISLANDS. A. D. 1797. | |
| English Expedition to the Canary Islands; Cutting Out a Brig in the Harbor of Santa Cruz; Attempt of the English to Capture the Town of SantaCruz; An Expedition Under Rear Admiral Nelson Organized for the Purpose; The Garrison Apprised of Their Coming; Nelson Shot in the Arm and Disabled; The EnglishAgree not to Molest the Canary Islands any Further if Allowed to Retire in Good Order; The Spanish Governor Finally Accepts this Offer; A Disastrous Defeat forNelson. | [I-236] |
| BATTLE OF CAMPERDOWN. 11TH OCTOBER, A. D. 1797. | |
| Viscount Duncan; His Early Life; The Mutiny of the Nore; Causes Leading to It; Disgraceful Practices of the English Admiralty of this Period;War with Holland; The Dutch Fleet Off the Texel under the Command of Vice-Admiral De Winter; The English Immediately Set Out to Intercept them; The Battle Opensabout Noon of October 11th; Hard Fighting; The English Victorious; Accurate Firing of the Hollanders; The LossesHeavy on both Sides; Actual Strength of both Fleets; Duncan’s Admirable Plan of Attack; Nelson’s Memorandum. | [I-243] |
| BATTLE OF THE NILE, 1ST AUGUST, 1798. | |
| Aboukir Bay; Its History; Learning that a Strong French Fleet Had Left Toulon, Nelson Seeks Them, He Finds the Fleet in Aboukir Bay; He ComesUpon Them at 6 o’clock in the Evening and Resolves to Attack Them at Once; A Terrible Battle; Misunderstanding of the French Admiral’s Instructions; Many Acts ofIndividual Heroism; Death of the French Admiral; Villeneuve Escapes with Four French Vessels; The Battle Over by 11 o’clock; The Most Disastrous Engagement theFrench Navy Ever Fought; Detailed Account of the Great Fight; The French Ship L’Orient Blown Up with a Terrific Explosion; Summary of the Losses on both sides;Masterly Tactics of Nelson; Gallant Behavior of the French; The Loss of This Battle of Immense Consequences to the Latter; Nelson Sails for Naples; Honors to HimEverywhere; His Official Report; French Officers of High Rank Killed; Anecdotes on Board the Vanguard on the Voyage to Naples. | [I-259] |
| LEANDER AND GÉNÉREUX. 16TH AUG., A. D. 1798. | |
| Contest Between Single Ships; The Leander a Bearer of Dispatches from Nelson; Encounters the French Frigate Généreux; Attempts to Avoid theLatter; A Close and Bloody Fight of Six Hours; The Leander Surrenders; Captain Le Joille; Plundering the English Officers; Captain Thompson; Another StrikingIncident; A French Cutter in Alexandria Harbor Abandoned on Being Attacked by Two English Frigates; The Officers and Crew of the Former, on Reaching the Shore,Massacred by the Arabs; General Carmin and Captain Vallette Among the Slain; Dispatches from Bonaparte Secured by the Arabs. | [I-290] |
| ACTION BETWEEN THE AMBUSCADE AND BAYONNAISE A. D. 1798. | |
| Decisive Single Ship Actions; A Fruitful Source of Discussion; The British Account of It; History and Description of the Ambuscade; UnexpectedMeeting with the Bayonnaise; The English Vessel the Fastest Sailer; A Battle Takes Place; Detailed Account of the Fight; The English Frigate Surrenders to the FrenchCorvette; Causes of Discontent on Board the Former; Great Rejoicing in France; Promotion of the French Captain. | [I-297] |
| SIR SIDNEY SMITH AND HIS SEAMEN AT ACRE. A. D. 1799. | |
| Minister to the Sublime Porte; Notified of Bonaparte’s Presence in Syria; The Latter Lays Siege to Acre; He Repairs Thither with a Fleet andAssists the Turks in Defending the Place; Admiral Perée, of the French Navy, Puts in an Appearance; Desperate Attempts to Storm the Place; Strength of Napoleon’sArmy on Entering Syria; Kleber’s Grenadiers; Repeated and Desperate Assaults of the French; Unsuccessful Each Time; The Siege Abandoned After Sixty-one Days;Importance of the Place as Viewed by Napoleon. | [I-304] |
| FOUDROYANT AND CONSORTS IN ACTION WITH THE GUILLAUME TELL. A. D. 1800. | |
| Preliminary History; Rear Admiral Denis Décrès; Sketch of this Remarkable Man; His Tragic End; Engagement of the Guillaume Tell with theEnglish Fleet Near Malta; Detailed Account of the Fight; Entirely Dismasted and Surrounded by English Vessels, the Guillaume Tell at last Surrenders; A More HeroicDefence Not To Be Found in the Record of Naval Actions; Taken to England, the Guillaume Tell is Refitted for the English Service, Under the Name of Malta; A SplendidShip. | [I-312] |
| NAVAL OPERATIONS AT ABOUKIR BAY AND CAPTURE OF ALEXANDRIA. A. D. 1801. | |
| Expulsion of the French Determined Upon; An English Fleet and Army Sent Thither Under Command of Lord Keith and Sir Ralph Abercrombie; The FrenchUnder Command of General Friant; The Former Land Troops Under a Galling Fire from Fort Aboukir and the Sand Hills; Sir Sidney Smith in Command of the Marines; A HeavyBattle Fought March 21; The French Forced to Retire; General Abercrombie Mortally Wounded; The French, Shut in at Alexandria, Finally Capitulate; Renewed Interest inthis Campaign on Account of Recent Events; Points of Similarity. | [I-318] |
| THE CUTTING OUT OF THE CHEVRETTE. JULY, A. D. 1801. | |
| An Example of a “Cutting-out Expedition”; The Combined French and Spanish Fleets at Anchor in Brest; The English Watching Them; The Chevretteat Anchor in Camaret Bay; The English Resolve to Cut Her Out; An Expedition Starts Out at Night, in Small Boats; They Board and Capture Her, in Spite of the DesperateResistance of the French; Details of the Fight; The Losses on Both Sides. | [I-322] |
| BOAT ATTACK UPON THE FRENCH FLOTILLA AT BOULOGNE. A. D. 1801. | |
| Another Boat Attack by the English, with Less Favorable Results; Lord Nelson in Command; Darkness and the Tides Against Them; They “Catch aTartar”; The Affair a Triumph for the French. | [I-328] |
| COPENHAGEN. A. D. 1801. | |
| Preliminary History; An English Fleet Under Sir Hyde Parker and Lord Nelson Ordered to the Cattegat; A Commissioner Empowered to Offer Peaceor War Accompanies Them; Denmark Repels Their Insulting Ultimatum and Prepares for Defence; Strength of the English Fleet; They Attempt to Force the Passageof the Sound, and the Battle Begins; Early Incidents; Difficulties of the Large English Vessels in Entering the Shallow Waters; Strength of the Danish Fleet andShore Batteries; Sir Hyde Parker Makes Signal to Withdraw; Lord Nelson Disobeys and Keeps up the Fight; TheDanish Adjutant General Finally Appears and an Armistice is Agreed Upon; A Characteristic Action of Lord Nelson; Death of the Emperor Paul, of Russia; SecondAttack on Copenhagen, 1807; Observations Concerning England’s Conduct; A Powerful English Fleet Appears in the Sound; The Crown Prince Rejects England’sHumiliating Proposals; Copenhagen Bombarded and Set on Fire; Final Surrender; Plunder by the English. | [I-331] |
| TRAFALGAR. OCTOBER 21ST, A. D. 1805. | |
| Napoleon’s Grand Schemes; Nelson in Search of the French Fleet; His Extensive Cruise; Napoleon’s Orders to His Admiral, Villeneuve; TheEnglish Discover the French and Spanish Fleets at Cadiz; Nelson’s Order of Battle a Master-piece of Naval Strategy; Strength of the English Fleet; VilleneuveOrdered to Sea; Strength of the Combined French and Spanish Fleets; The Hostile Forces Meet at Cape Trafalgar; The Battle; One of the Most Destructive NavalEngagements Ever Fought; The French Account of It; The Allied Fleet Almost Annihilated; Nelson Mortally Wounded; Further Particulars of the Battle; Estimateof Nelson’s Character; Honors to His Memory. | [I-352] |
| LORD EXMOUTH AT ALGIERS. A.D. 1816. | |
| Biographical Sketch of Lord Exmouth; Atrocities of the Algerines Prompt the English to Send a Fleet, Under Lord Exmouth, Against Them; ADutch Fleet Joins Them at Gibraltar; Strength of the Combined Fleet; Fruitless Negotiations with the Algerines; Strength of their Fortifications; The AlliedFleets Open Fire on the Forts and City; A Tremendous Cannonade; The Dey Comes to Terms; Capture of the Place by the French, Fourteen Years Later. | [I-397] |
| NAVARINO. A. D. 1827. | |
| Assembly of the Allied English, French and Russian Fleets in the Mediterranean; Their Object; An Egyptian Fleet, with Troops, entersNavarino Harbor; History and Geographical Position of the Latter; Strength of the Opposing Fleets; Treachery of the Egyptians; The Battle Opens; DesperateFighting; Bad Gunnery of the Turks; Destruction of Their Fleet. | [I-407] |
| SINOPE. A. D. 1853. | |
| History of Sinope; An Abuse of Superior Force on the Part of the Russians; They Encounter the Turkish Fleet in Sinope Harbor and Demandthe Latter’s Surrender; They Decline and the Battle Opens Furiously; The Turkish Fleet Totally Destroyed and That of the Russians rendered Comparatively Useless;Appearance of the Town of Sinope. | [I-417] |
| LISSA. A. D. 1866. | |
| Position of the Island of Lissa; Its History; Attacked and Taken by the Italians; The Austrians Shortly After Come to its Relief; A GreatNaval Battle Takes Place; Strength of the Opposing Fleets; The Ironclads That Took Part; Bad Management of the Italians Under Admiral Persano; They are BadlyBeaten; Sketch of the Italian Admiral; His Court-Martial; William Baron Tegethoff, the Austrian Commander. | [I-420] |
| SOME NAVAL ACTIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL, THE ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION AND PARAGUAY. A. D.1865-68. | |
| Origin of the Long and Deadly Struggle; The Brazilian Fleet Starts Out on a Cruise; Lopez, Dictator of Paraguay, Determines to Capturethis Fleet; His Preparations; The Hostile Fleets Encounter each other; Details of the Fight; Bad Management on both sides; The Paraguayans Forced to Retire;Another Battle in March, 1866, on the Parana River; Full Account of the Desultory Fighting; The Paraguayans Driven Out of their Earthworks; Two UnsuccessfulAttacks, in 1868, on the Brazilian Monitors lying off Tayi; Interesting Account of one of these Attacks. | [I-429] |
| THE CAPTURE OF THE HUASCAR. OCTOBER 8TH, A. D. 1879. | |
| Description of the Huascar; Her Earlier Exploits; Strength of the Chilian Squadron; The Latter Seek the Huascar; The Enemies Recognizeeach other; The Battle Begins at Long Range; Full Details of this Spirited Engagement; Terrible Loss of Life on Board the Huascar; She Finally Surrenders;Condition of the Chilian Fleet. | [I-445] |
| BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. JULY 11TH, A. D. 1882. | |
| Political Complications; Arabi Pasha; Important Events Preceding the Bombardment; England Demands that Work on the Fortifications Cease;Arabi Promises to Desist, but Renews the Work Secretly; A Powerful English Fleet Opens Fire on the Defences; Silenced by the Fleet and Abandoned; AlexandriaSet on Fire and Pillaged; Sailors and Marines from the American and German Fleets Landed to Protect the Consulates; Injury Sustained by the English Fleet. | [I-458] |
| THE WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN. | |
| The Opening of Japan to Foreign Nations; Japanese Geography and History; Early Explorers; Revolution of 1617; First American Effortsat Intercourse; Commander Glynn’s Attempt; Successful Expedition of Commodore Perry in 1852; First Treaty Signed; Subsequent Development of Japan; Outbreakof War with China; Sinking of the Kow-Shing; Historic Hostility between the Two Nations; Disputes over Korea; The Battle of the Yalu, September 17th, 1894;Details of the Fight; Results of this Battle; Importance to Naval Experts; Conclusions Derived; Succeeding Events of the War; Capture of Port Arthur; TheJapanese Emperor; New Treaty with the United States. | [I-467] |
List of Illustrations.
| Page | ||
|---|---|---|
| [0]. | Return of the Greeks from Salamis | Frontispiece |
| [1]. | Naval Battle, Eighteenth Century | I-20 |
| [2]. | A Norse Galley | I-35 |
| [3]. | Capture of the Carthaginian Fleet by the Romans | I-36 |
| [4]. | Roman Galley | I-47 |
| [5]. | Battle of Actium | I-53 |
| [6]. | The Ptolemy Philopater | I-55 |
| [7]. | Battle of Lepanto | I-68 |
| [8]. | The English Fleet following the Invincible Armada | I-85 |
| [9]. | A Spanish Galeass of the Sixteenth Century | I-102 |
| [10]. | Sir Francis Drake in Central America | I-103 |
| [11]. | Henry Grace DeDieu | I-111 |
| [12]. | A Caravel of the time of Columbus | I-156 |
| [13]. | Norman Ship of the Fourteenth Century | I-173 |
| [14]. | Venetian Galley of the Sixteenth Century | I-182 |
| [15]. | Bucentoro | I-186 |
| [16]. | Le Soleil Royal | I-195 |
| [17]. | Howe’s Action of June 1, 1794 | I-196 |
| [18]. | Battle of Cape St. Vincent | I-229 |
| [19]. | English Fleet off Teneriffe | I-244 |
| [20]. | Battle of the Nile | I-259 |
| [21]. | Nelson Wounded at Teneriffe | I-270 |
| [21a]. | Dutch Man-of-War, 17th Century. | I-270 |
| [22]. | Capture of Admiral Nelson’s Dispatches | I-293 |
| [23]. | Siege of Acre, 1799 | I-308 |
| [24]. | Capture of Alexandria, 1801 | I-318 |
| [25]. | Battle of Copenhagen | I-341 |
| [26]. | Nelson’s Victory at Trafalgar | I-356 |
| [27]. | Sinope, 1853 | I-417 |
| [28]. | Battle of Lissa, 1866 | I-420 |
| [29]. | Ferdinand Max Ramming the Re d’Italia | I-424 |
| [30]. | The Dreadnaught | I-444 |
| [31]. | Appearance of the Huascar after Capture | I-456 |
| [32]. | Steel Torpedo Boat and Pole | I-457 |
| [33]. | Bombardment of Alexandria | I-465 |
| [34]. | The Alexandra | I-466 |
| [35]. | Battle of the Yalu | I-482 |
NAVAL BATTLES,
ANCIENT AND MODERN
INTRODUCTION.
The Ancients were full of horror of the mysterious Great Sea, which they deified; believing that man no longer belonged to himself when once embarked, but was liable to be sacrificed at any time to the anger of the Great Sea god; in which case no exertions of his own could be of any avail.
This belief was not calculated to make seamen of ability. Even Homer, who certainly was a great traveler, or voyager, and who had experience of many peoples, gives us but a poor idea of the progress of navigation, especially in the blind gropings and shipwrecks of Ulysses, which he appears to have thought the most natural things to occur.
A recent writer says, “Men had been slow to establish completely their dominion over the sea. They learned very early to build ships. They availed themselves very early of the surprising power which the helm exerts over the movements of a ship; but, during many ages, they found no surer guidance than that which the position of the sun and of the stars afforded. When clouds intervened to deprive them of this uncertain direction, they were helpless. They were thus obliged to keep the land in view, and content themselves with creeping timidly along the coasts. But at length there was discovered a stone which the wise Creator had endowed with strange properties. It was observed that a needle which had been brought in contact with that stone ever afterwards pointed steadfastly to the north. Men saw that with a needle thus influenced they could guide themselves at sea as surely as on land. The Mariner’s compass loosed the bond which held sailors to the coast, and gave them liberty to push out into the sea.”
As regards early attempts at navigation, we must go back, for certain information, to the Egyptians. The expedition of the Argonauts, if not a fable, was an attempt at navigation by simple boatmen, who, in the infancy of the art, drew their little craft safely on shore every night of their coasting voyages. We learn from the Greek writers themselves, that that nation was in ignorance of navigation compared with the Phenicians, and the latter certainly acquired the art from the Egyptians.
We know that naval battles, that is, battles between bodies of men in ships, took place thousands of years before the Christian era. On the walls of very ancient Egyptian tombs are depicted such events, apparently accompanied with much slaughter.
History positively mentions prisoners, under the name of Tokhari, who were vanquished by the Egyptians in a naval battle fought by Rameses III, in the fifteenth century before our era. These Tokhari were thought to be Kelts, and to come from the West. According to some they were navigators who had inherited their skill from their ancestors of the lost Continent, Atlantis.
The Phenicians have often been popularly held to have been the first navigators upon the high seas; but the Carians, who preceded the Pelasgi in the Greek islands, undoubtedly antedated the Phenicians in the control of the sea and extended voyages. It is true that when the Phenicians did begin, they far exceeded their predecessors. Sidon dates from 1837 before Christ, and soon after this date she had an extensive commerce, and made long voyages, some even beyond the Mediterranean.
LINE OF BATTLE.
HOSTILE FRIGATES GRAPPLING.
NAVAL BATTLE, EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
To return to the Egyptians. Sesostris had immense fleets 1437 years before Christ, and navigated not only the Mediterranean, but the Red Sea. The Egyptians had invaded, by means of veritable fleets, the country of the Pelasgi. Some of these ancient Egyptian ships were very large. Diodorus mentions one of cedar, built by Sesostris, which was 280 cubits (420 to 478 feet) long.
One built by Ptolemy was 478 feet long, and carried 400 sailors, 4000 rowers, and 3000 soldiers. Many other huge vessels are mentioned. A bas-relief at Thebes represents a naval victory gained by the Egyptians over some Indian nation, in the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf, probably 1400 years before Christ.
The Egyptian fleet is in a crescent, and seems to be endeavoring to surround the Indian fleet, which, with oars boarded and sails furled, is calmly awaiting the approach of its antagonist. A lion’s head, of some metal, at the prow of each Egyptian galley, shows that ramming was then resorted to. These Egyptian men-of-war were manned by soldiers in helmets, and armed as those of the land forces.
The length of these vessels is conjectured to have been about 120 feet, and the breadth 16 feet. They had high raised poops and forecastles, filled with archers and slingers, while the rest of the fighting men were armed with pikes, javelins, and pole-axes, of most murderous appearance, to be used in boarding. Wooden bulwarks, rising considerably above the main-deck, protected the rowers. Some of the combatants had bronze coats of mail, in addition to helmets of the same, and some carried huge shields, covered, apparently, with tough bull’s hide. These vessels had masts, with a large yard, and a huge square sail. They are said to have been built of acacia, so durable a wood that vessels built of it have lasted a century or more. They appear to have had but one rank of oars; although two or three tiers soon became common. None of the ancient Egyptian, Assyrian, Greek or Roman monuments represent galleys with more than two tiers of oars, except one Roman painting that gives one with three. Yet quinqueremes are spoken of as very common. It is not probable that more than three tiers were used; as seamen have never been able to explain how the greater number of tiers could have been worked; and they have come to the conclusion that scholars have been mistaken, and that the term quinquereme, or five ranks of oars, as translated, meant the arrangement of the oars, or of the men at them, and not the ranks, one above another, as usually understood.
Much learning and controversy has been expended upon this subject, and many essays written, and models and diagrams made, to clear up the matter, without satisfying practical seamen.
The Roman galleys with three rows of oars had the row ports in tiers. These ports were either round or oval, and were called columbaria, from their resemblance to the arrangement of a dove-cote. The lower oars could be taken in, in bad weather, and the ports closed.
The “long ships” or galleys of the ancient Mediterranean maritime nations—which were so called in opposition to the short, high and bulky merchant ships—carried square or triangular sails, often colored. The “long ships” themselves were painted in gay colors, carried flags and banners at different points, and images upon their prows, which were sacred to the tutelary divinities of their country. The “long ships” could make with their oars, judging from descriptions of their voyages, perhaps a hundred miles in a day of twelve hours. In an emergency they could go much faster, for a short time. It is reliably stated that it took a single-decked galley, 130 feet long, with 52 oars, a fourth of an hour to describe a full circle in turning.
Carthage was founded by the Phenicians, 1137 years before our era; and not very long after the Carthaginians colonized Marseilles. Hanno accomplished his periplus, or great voyage round Africa, 800 years B. C., showing immense advance in nautical ability, in which the Greeks were again left far behind. Still later, the Carthaginians discovered the route to the British Islands, and traded there—especially in Cornish tin—while 330 years B. C. Ultima Thule, or Iceland, was discovered by the Marseillais Pitheas. Thus Carthage and her colonies not only freely navigated the Atlantic, but some have thought that they actually reached northern America.
Four hundred and eighty years before the Christian era the Grecian fleet defeated that of the Persians, at Salamis; and the next year another naval battle, that of Mycale (which was fought on the same day as that of Platæa on land), completely discomfited the Persian invaders, and the Greeks then became the aggressors.
Herodotus, who wrote about 450 years B. C., gives accounts of many naval actions, and even describes several different kinds of fighting vessels. He mentions the prophecy of the oracle at Delphi, when “wooden walls” were declared to be the great defence against Xerxes’ huge force—meaning the fleet—just as the “wooden walls of England” were spoken of, up to the time of ironclads. Herodotus says the Greek fleet at the battle of Artemisium, which was fought at the same time as Thermopylæ, consisted of 271 ships, which, by their very skillful handling, defeated the much larger Persian armament, which latter, from its very numbers, was unwieldy.
At Artemisium, the Greeks “brought the sterns of their ships together in a small compass, and turned their prows towards the enemy.” And, although largely outnumbered, fought through the day, and captured thirty of the enemy’s ships. This manner of manœuvring was possible, from the use of oars; and they never fought except in calm weather.
After this, the Greeks, under Alexander, renewed their energies, and his fleet, under the command of Nearchus, explored the coast of India and the Persian Gulf. His fleets principally moved by the oar, although sails were sometimes used by them.
Among other well authenticated naval events of early times, was the defeat of the Carthaginian fleet, by Regulus, in the first Punic war, 335 years B. C. This victory, gained at sea, was the more creditable to the Romans, as they were not naturally a sea-going race, as the nations to the south and east of the Mediterranean were.
When they had rendered these nations tributary, they availed themselves of their nautical knowledge; just as the Austrians of to-day avail themselves of their nautical population upon the Adriatic coast, or the Turks of their Greek subjects, who are sailors.
Of naval battles which exercised any marked influence upon public events, or changed dynasties, or the fate of nations, the first of which we have a full and definite description is the battle of Actium. But before proceeding to describe that most important and memorable engagement, we may look at two or three earlier sea fights which had great results, some details of which have come down to us.
NAVAL BATTLES,
ANCIENT AND MODERN.
I.
SALAMIS. B. C. 480.
This great sea fight took place at the above date, between the fleet of Xerxes and that of the allied Greeks.
Salamis is an island in the Gulf of Ægina, ten miles west of Athens. Its modern name is Kolouri. It is of about thirty square miles surface; mountainous, wooded, and very irregular in shape.
It was in the channel between it and the main land that the great battle was fought.
Xerxes, in the flush of youth, wielding immense power, and having boundless resources in men and money, determined to revenge upon the Greeks the defeat of the Persians, so many of whom had fallen, ten years before, at Marathon. After years of preparation, using all his resources and enlisting tributary powers, he marched northward, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, and laid a bridge of boats at the Hellespont, over which it took seven days for his army to pass. His fleet consisted of over 1200 fighting vessels and transports, and carried 240,000 men.
Previous to the naval battle of which we are about to speak, he lost four hundred of his galleys in a violent storm; but still his fleet was immensely superior in number to that of the Greeks, who had strained every nerve to get together the navies of their independent States. Such leaders as Aristides and Themistocles formed a host in themselves, while the independent Greeks were, man for man and ship for ship, superior to the Persians and their allies. Of the Greek fleet the Athenians composed the right wing; the Spartans the left, opposed respectively to the Phenicians and the Ionians; while the Æginetans and Corinthians, with others, formed the Greek reserve.
The day of the battle was a remarkably fair one, and we are told that, as the sun rose, the Persians, with one accord (both on sea and land, for there was a famous land battle as well on that day), prostrated themselves in worship of the orb of day. This was one of the oldest and greatest forms of worship ever known to man, and it still exists among the Parsees. It must have been a grand sight; for 240,000 men, in a thousand ships, and an immense force on the neighboring land, bowed down at once, in adoration.
The Greeks, with the “canniness” which distinguished them in their dealings with both gods and men, sacrificed to all the gods, and especially to Zeus, or Jupiter, and to Poseidon, or Neptune.
Everything was ready for the contest on both sides. Arms, offensive and defensive, were prepared. They were much the same as had been used for ages, by the Egyptians and others. Grappling irons were placed ready to fasten contending ships together; gangways or planks were arranged to afford sure footing to the boarders, while heavy weights were ready, triced up to the long yards, to be dropped upon the enemy’s deck, crushing his rowers, and perhaps sinking the vessel. Catapults and balistæ (the first throwing large darts and javelins, the second immense rocks) were placed in order, like great guns of modern times. Archers and slingers occupied the poops and forecastles; while, as additional means of offence, the Rhodians carried long spars, fixed obliquely to the prows of their galleys, and reaching beyond their beaks, from which were suspended, by chains, large kettles, filled with live coals and combustibles. A chain at the bottom capsized these on the decks of the enemy, often setting them on fire. Greek fire, inextinguishable by water, is supposed, by many, to have been used thus early; while fire ships were certainly often employed.
Just as the Greeks had concluded their religious ceremonies, one of their triremes, which had been sent in advance to reconnoitre the Persian fleet, was seen returning, hotly pursued by the enemy.
An Athenian trireme, commanded by Ameinas, the brother of the poet Æschylus, dashed forward to her assistance. Upon this Eurybiades, the Greek admiral, seeing that everything was ready, gave the signal for general attack, which was the display of a brightly burnished brazen shield above his vessel. (This, and many other details may be found in Herodotus, but space prevents their insertion here.)
As soon as the shield was displayed the Grecian trumpets sounded the advance, which was made amid great enthusiasm, the mixed fleets, or contingents, from every state and city, vying with each other as to who should be first to strike the enemy. The right wing dashed forward, followed by the whole line, all sweeping down upon the Persians, or Barbarians, as the Greeks called them.
On this occasion the Greeks had a good cause, and were fighting to save their country and its liberties. Undaunted by the numbers of the opposing fleet, they bent to their long oars and came down in fine style. The Athenians became engaged first, then the Æginetans, and then the battle became general. The Greeks had the advantage of being in rapid motion when they struck the Persian fleet, most of which had not, at that critical moment, gathered way. The great effect of a mass in motion is exemplified in the act of a river steamboat running at speed into a wharf; the sharp, frail vessel is seldom much damaged, while cutting deep into a mass of timber, iron and stone. Many of the Persian vessels were sunk at once, and a great gap thereby made in their line. This was filled from their immense reserve, but not until after great panic and confusion, which contributed to the success of the Greeks. The Persian Admiral commanding the left wing, seeing that it was necessary to act promptly in order to effectually succor his people, bore down at full speed upon the flagship of Themistocles, intending to board her. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle ensued, and the vessel of Themistocles was soon in a terrible strait; but many Athenian galleys hastened to his rescue, and the large and magnificent Persian galley was sunk by repeated blows from the sharp beaks of the Greeks, while Ariamenes, the Admiral, was previously slain and thrown overboard. At this same moment the son of the great Darius, revered by all the Asiatics, fell, pierced by a javelin, at which sight the Persians set up a melancholy wailing cry, which the Greeks responded to with shouts of triumph and derision.
Still, the Persians, strong in numbers, renewed and maintained the battle with great fury; but the Athenian fleet cut through the Phenician line, and then, pulling strong with starboard and backing port oars, turned short round and fell upon the Persian left flank and rear.
A universal panic now seized the Asiatics; and in spite of numbers, they broke and fled in disorder—all, that is, except the Dorians, who, led by their brave queen in person, fought for their new ally with desperate valor, in the vain hope of restoring order where all order was lost. The Dorian queen, Artemisia, at last forced to the conviction that the fugitives were not to be rallied, and seeing the waters covered with wreck, and strewn with the floating corpses of her friends and allies, reluctantly gave the signal for retreat.
She was making off in her own galley, when she found herself closely pursued by a Greek vessel, and, to divert his pursuit, as well as to punish one who had behaved badly, she ran her galley full speed into that of a Lycian commander, who had behaved in a cowardly manner during the engagement. The Lycian sank instantly, and the Greek, upon seeing this action, supposed that Artemisia’s galley was a friend, and at once relinquished pursuit; so that this brave woman and able naval commander succeeded in making her escape.
Ten thousand drachmas had been offered for her capture, and this, of course, was lost. Ameinas, who had pursued her, was afterwards named, by general suffrage, one of the “three valiants” who had most distinguished themselves in the hard fought battle against such odds. Polycritus and Eumenes were the two others.
The victory being complete at sea, Aristides, at the head of a large body of Athenians, landed at a point where many of the Persians were. The latter were divided from the main body of Xerxes’ army by a sheet of water, and were slain, almost to a man, by the Greeks, under the very eyes of the Persian monarch and his main army, who could not reach them to afford assistance.
The discomfiture of his fleet rendered Xerxes powerless for the time; and, recognizing the extent of the misfortune which had befallen him, the mighty lord of so many nations, so many tributaries, and so many slaves, rent his robes, and burst into a flood of tears.
Thus ended the great battle of Salamis, which decided the fate of Greece.
The forces of the several independent Greek States returned to their homes, where their arrival was celebrated with great rejoicing, and sacrifices to the gods.
Xerxes, as soon as he realized the extent of the disaster which had befallen him, resolved at once to return with all possible expedition into Asia. His chief counsellor in vain advised him not to be downcast by the defeat of his fleet: “that he had come to fight against the Greeks, not with rafts of wood, but with soldiers and horses.” In spite of this, Xerxes sent the remnant of his fleet to the harbors of Asia Minor, and after a march of forty-five days, amidst great hardship and privation, arrived at the Hellespont with his army. Famine, pestilence and battle had reduced his army from a million or more to about 300,000.
The victory at Salamis terminated the second act of the great Persian expedition. The third, in the following year, was the conclusive land battle of Platæa, and subsequent operations. These secured not only the freedom of Greece and of adjoining European States, but the freedom and independence of the Asiatic Greeks, and their undisturbed possession of the Asiatic coast—an inestimable prize to the victors.
II.
NAVAL BATTLE AT SYRACUSE. B. C. 415.
This battle was not only remarkable for its desperate fighting and bloody character, but for the fact that the complete and overwhelming defeat of the Athenians was the termination of their existence as a naval power.
An Athenian fleet had been despatched to the assistance of the small Greek Republic of Ægesta, near the western end of Sicily, then threatened by Syracuse.
The Athenian fleet numbered one hundred and thirty-four triremes, 25,000 seamen and soldiers, beside transports with 6000 spearmen and a proportionate force of archers and slingers. This considerable armament was designed to coöperate not only in the reduction of Syracuse, the implacable enemy of the Ægestans, but also to endeavor to subdue the whole of the large, rich and beautiful island of Sicily, at that time the granary and vineyard of the Mediterranean.
The Greek fleet drew near its destination in fine order, and approached and entered Syracuse with trumpets sounding and flags displayed, while the soldiers and sailors, accustomed to a long succession of victories, and regarding defeat as impossible, rent the air with glad shouts.
Syracuse is a large and perfect harbor; completely landlocked, and with a narrow entrance. The Sicilians, entirely unprepared to meet the veteran host thus suddenly precipitated upon them, looked upon these demonstrations with gloomy forebodings. Fortunately for their independence, they had wise and brave leaders, while the commander of the great Athenian fleet was wanting in decision of character and in the ability to combine his forces and move quickly; a necessity in such an enterprise as his. It therefore happened that the tables were turned, and the proud invaders were eventually blockaded in the harbor of Syracuse, the people obstructing the narrow entrance so as to prevent escape, while the country swarmed with the levies raised to resist the invaders by land, and to cut them off from all supplies.
In the meantime the Greeks had seized a spot on the shores of the harbor, built a dock yard, and constructed a fortified camp.
Such being the state of affairs, a prompt and energetic movement on the part of the Athenians became necessary to save them from starvation. Nikias, their commander-in-chief, entrusted the fleet to Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, and prepared to fight a decisive battle.
Taught by recent partial encounters that the beaks of the Syracusan triremes were more powerful and destructive than those of his own vessels, he instructed his captains to avoid ramming as much as possible, and to attack by boarding. His ships were provided with plenty of grappling irons, so that the Sicilians could be secured as soon as they rammed the Greek vessels, when a mass of veteran Greeks was to be thrown on board, and the islanders overcome in a hand-to-hand fight.
When all was ready the fleet of the Athenian triremes, reduced to one hundred and ten in number, but fully manned, moved in three grand divisions. Demosthenes commanded the van division, and made directly for the mouth of the harbor, toward which the Syracusan fleet, only seventy-five in number, was also promptly converging.
The Athenians were cutting away and removing the obstructions at the narrow entrance, when their enemy came down rapidly, and forced them to desist from their labors, and form line of battle. This they did hurriedly, and as well as the narrow limits would permit. They were soon furiously attacked, on both wings at once, by Licanus and Agatharcus, who had moved down close to the shore, the one on the right and the other on the left hand of the harbor. The Syracusans, by this manœuvre, outflanked the Greeks, who, their flanks being turned, were necessarily driven in upon their centre, which point was at this critical moment vigorously attacked by the Corinthians, the faithful allies of the Syracusans. The Corinthian squadron, led by Python, had dashed down the middle of the harbor, and attacked, with loud shouts, as if assured of victory. Great confusion now ensued among the Athenian vessels, caught at a great disadvantage, and in each other’s way. Many of their triremes were at once stove and sunk, and those which remained afloat were so hemmed in by enemies that they could not use their oars. The strong point of the Athenian fleet had consisted in its ability to manœuvre, and they were here deprived of that advantage.
Hundreds of their drowning comrades were calling for assistance, while their countrymen on shore, belonging to the army, witnessed their position with despair, being unable to come to the rescue. Still, the Athenians fought as became their old renown. They often beat off the enemy by sheer force of arms, but without avail. The Syracusans had covered their forecastles with raw bulls’ hides, so that the grappling irons would not hold for boarding; but the Greeks watched for the moment of contact, and before they could recoil, leaped boldly on board the enemy’s triremes, sword in hand. They succeeded thus in capturing some Sicilian vessels; but their own loss was frightful, and, after some hours of most sanguinary contest, Demosthenes, seeing that a continuance of it would annihilate his force, took advantage of a temporary break in the enemy’s line to give the signal for retreat. This was at once begun; at first in good order, but the Syracusans pressing vigorously upon the Athenian rear, soon converted it into a disorderly flight, each trying to secure his own safety.
In this condition the Greeks reached the fortified docks, which they had built during their long stay, the entrance to which was securely guarded by merchant ships, which had huge rocks triced up, called “dolphins,” of sufficient size to sink any vessel upon which they might be dropped. Here the pursuit ended, and the defeated and harassed Athenians hastened to their fortified camp, where their land forces, with loud lamentations, deplored the event of the naval battle, which they had fondly hoped would have set them all at liberty.
The urgent question now was as to the preservation of both forces—and that alone.
That same night Demosthenes proposed that they should man their remaining triremes, reduced to sixty in number, and try again to force a way out of the harbor; alleging that they were still stronger than the enemy, who had also lost a number of ships. Nikias gave consent; but when the sailors were ordered to embark once more, they mutinied and flatly refused to do so; saying that their numbers were too much reduced by battle, sickness, and bad food, and that there were no seamen of experience left to take the helm, or rowers in sufficient numbers for the benches. They also declared that the last had been a soldiers’ battle, and that such were better fought on land. They then set fire to the dock-yard and the fleet, and the Syracusan forces appearing, in the midst of this mutiny, captured both men and ships. Her fleet being thus totally destroyed, Athens never recovered from the disaster, and ceased from that day to be a naval power.
The subsequent events in this connection, though interesting and instructive, do not belong to naval history.
A NORSE GALLEY.
III.
ROMANS AND CARTHAGINIANS.
Carthage, the Phenician colony in Africa, which became so famous and powerful, was very near the site of the modern city of Tunis. It has been a point of interest for twenty centuries. Long after the Phenician sway had passed away, and the Arab and Saracen had become lords of the soil, Louis XI, of France, in the Crusade of 1270, took possession of the site of the ancient city, only to give up his last breath there, and add another to the many legends of the spot. The Spaniards afterwards conquered Tunis and held it for a time; and, in our own day, the French have again repossessed themselves of the country, and may retain it long after the events of our time have passed into history.
As soon as Rome rose to assured power, and began her course of conquest, trouble with the powerful State of Carthage ensued. Their clashing interests soon involved them in war, and Sicily and the Sicilian waters, being necessary to both, soon became their battle ground.
The Carthaginians had obtained a footing in Sicily, by assisting Roman renegades and freebooters of all nations who had taken refuge there. The Romans therefore passed a decree directing the Consul, Appius Claudius, to cross over to Messina and expel the Carthaginians who, from that strong point, controlled the passage of the great thoroughfare, the strait of the same name. Thus commenced the first Punic war. The Romans were almost uniformly successful upon land, but the Carthaginians, deriving nautical skill from their Phenician ancestors, overawed, with their fleet, the whole coast of Sicily, and even made frequent and destructive descents upon the Italian shores themselves.
ROMAN GALLEY AND DRAW-BRIDGE.
CARTHAGINIAN GALLEY.
SMALLER ROMAN GALLEY.
CAPTURE OF THE CARTHAGINIAN FLEET BY THE ROMANS.
The Romans at this time had no ships of war; but they began the construction of a fleet, to cope with their enemy, then the undisputed mistress of the seas.
Just at this time a Carthaginian ship of large size was stranded upon the Italian shores, and served as a model for the Romans, who, with characteristic energy, in a short time put afloat a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. No particular description of these vessels is necessary, as they were the same in general plan as those already spoken of as in use among the Egyptians, Phenicians, and Greeks, for centuries. Able seamen were obtained from neighboring tributary maritime States, and bodies of landsmen were put in training, being exercised at the oar on shore; learning to begin and cease rowing at the signal. For this purpose platforms were erected, and benches placed, as in a galley.
It will here be necessary to give a short account of the Roman naval system, which was now rapidly becoming developed and established. As has been said, they had paid no attention, before this period, to naval affairs; and were only stirred up to do so by the necessity of meeting the Carthaginians upon their own element.
It is true that some authorities say that the first Roman ships of war were built upon the model of those of Antium, after the capture of that city, A. U. C. 417; but the Romans certainly made no figure at sea until the time of the first Punic war.
The Roman ships of war were much longer than their merchant vessels, and were principally driven by oars, while the merchant ships relied almost entirely upon sails.
It is a more difficult problem than one would at first sight suppose, to explain exactly how the oars were arranged in the quadriremes and quinqueremes of which we read. The Roman ships were substantial and heavy, and consequently slow in evolutions, however formidable in line. Augustus, at a much later period, was indebted to a number of fast, light vessels from the Dalmatian coast, for his victory over Antony’s heavy ships.
The ship of the commander of a Roman fleet was distinguished by a red flag, and also carried a light at night. These ships of war had prows armed with a sharp beak, of brass, usually divided into three teeth, or points. They also carried towers of timber, which were erected before an engagement, and whence missiles were discharged. They employed both freemen and slaves as rowers and sailors. The citizens and the allies of the State were obliged to furnish a certain quota of these; and sometimes to provide them with pay and provisions; but the wages of the men were usually provided by the State.
The regular soldiers of the Legions at first fought at sea as well as on land; but when Rome came to maintain a permanent fleet, there was a separate class of soldiers raised for the sea service, like the marines of modern navies. But this service was considered less honorable than that of the Legions, and was often performed by manumitted slaves. The rowers, a still lower class, were occasionally armed and aided in attack and defence, when boarding; but this was not usual.
Before a Roman fleet went to sea it was formally reviewed, like the land army. Prayers were offered to the gods, and victims sacrificed. The auspices were consulted, and if any unlucky omen occurred (such as a person sneezing on the left of the Augur, or swallows alighting on the ships), the voyage was suspended.
Fleets about to engage were arranged in a manner similar to armies on land, with centre, right and left wings, and reserve. Sometimes they were arranged in the form of a wedge, or forceps, but most frequently in a half moon. The admiral sailed round the fleet, in a light galley, and exhorted the men, while invocations and sacrifices were again offered. They almost always fought in calm or mild weather, and with furled sails. The red flag was the signal to engage, which they did with trumpets sounding and the crews shouting. The combatants endeavored to disable the enemy by striking off the banks of oars on one side, or by striking the opposing hulls with the beak. They also employed fire-ships, and threw pots of combustibles on board the enemy. Many of Antony’s ships were destroyed by this means. When they returned from a successful engagement the prows of the victors were decorated with laurel wreaths; and it was their custom to tow the captured vessels stern foremost, to signify their utter confusion and helplessness. The admiral was honored with a triumph, after a signal victory, like a General or Consul who had won a decisive land battle; and columns were erected in their honor, which were called Rostral, from being decorated with the beaks of ships.
And now, to return to the imposing fleet which the Romans had equipped against the Carthaginians:—
When all was ready the Romans put to sea; at first clinging to their own shores, and practicing in fleet tactics. They found their vessels dull and unwieldy, and therefore resolved to board the enemy at the first opportunity, and avoid as much as possible all manœuvring. They therefore carried plenty of grappling-irons, and had stages, or gangways, ingeniously arranged upon hinges, which fell on board of the enemy, and afforded secure bridges for boarding. By this means many victories were secured over a people who were much better seamen.
After various partial engagements with the Carthaginian fleet, productive of no definite results, Duilius assumed command of the Roman fleet, and steered for Mylœ, where the Carthaginians, under Hannibal, were lying at anchor.
The latter expected an easy victory, despising the pretensions of the Romans to seamanship, and they accordingly left their anchorage in a straggling way, not even thinking it worth while to form line of battle to engage landsmen.
Their one hundred and thirty quinqueremes approached in detachments, according to their speed, and Hannibal, with about thirty of the fastest, came in contact with the Roman line, while the rest of his fleet was far astern. Attacked on all sides, he soon began to repent of his rashness, and turned to fly—but the “corvi” fell, and the Roman soldiers, advancing over the gangways, put their enemies to the sword. The whole of the Carthaginian van division fell into the Roman hands, without a single ship being lost on the part of the latter. Hannibal had fortunately made his escape in time, in a small boat, and at once proceeded to form the rest of his fleet to resist the Roman shock. He then passed from vessel to vessel, exhorting his men to stand firm; but the novel mode of attack, and its great success, had demoralized the Carthaginians, and they fled before the Roman advance; fifty more of Hannibal’s fleet being captured.
So ended the first great naval engagement between Rome and Carthage; bringing to the former joy and hope of future successes, and to the latter grief and despondency.
Duilius, the Consul, had a rostral column of marble erected in his honor, in the Roman forum, with his statue upon the top.
Hannibal was soon afterward crucified by his own seamen, in their rage and mortification at their shameful defeat.
Slight skirmishes and collisions continued to occur, and both nations became convinced that ultimate success could only be obtained by the one which should obtain complete mastery of the Mediterranean Sea. Both, therefore, made every effort; and the dock-yards were kept busily at work, while provisions, arms, and naval stores were accumulated upon a large scale.
The Romans fitted out three hundred and thirty, the Carthaginians three hundred and fifty quinqueremes; and in the spring of the year 260 B. C., the rivals took the sea, to fight out their quarrel to the bitter end.
The Roman Consuls Manlius and Regulus had their fleet splendidly equipped, and marshaled in divisions, with the first and second Legions on board. Following was a rear division, with more soldiers, which served as a reserve, and as a guard to the rear of the right and left flanks.
Hamilcar, the admiral of the opposing fleet, saw that the Roman rear was hampered by the transports which they were towing, and resolved to try to separate the leading divisions from them; hoping to capture the transports, and then the other divisions in detail; with this intention he formed in four divisions. Three were in line, at right angles to the course the Romans were steering, and the fourth in the order called “forceps.”
The last division was a little in the rear and well to the left of the main body.
Having made his dispositions, Hamilcar passed down the fleet in his barge, and reminded his countrymen of their ancestral renown at sea, and assured them that their former defeat was due, not to the nautical ability of the Romans, but to the rash valor of the Carthaginians against a warlike people not ever to be despised. “Avoid the prows of the Roman galleys,” he continued, “and strike them amidships, or on the quarter. Sink them, or disable their oars, and endeavor to render their military machines, on which they greatly rely, wholly inoperative.” Loud and continuous acclamations proclaimed the good disposition of his men, and Hamilcar forthwith ordered the advance to be sounded, signaling the vessels of the first division—which would be the first to engage—to retreat in apparent disorder when they came down close to the enemy. The Carthaginians obeyed his order to the letter, and, as if terrified by the Roman array, turned in well simulated flight, and were instantly pursued by both columns, which, as Hamilcar had foreseen, drew rapidly away from the rest of the fleet. When they were so far separated as to preclude the possibility of support, the Carthaginians, at a given signal, put about, and attacked with great ardor and resolution, making a desperate effort to force together the two sides of the “forceps” in which the Romans were formed. But these facing outward, and always presenting their prows to the Carthaginians, remained immovable and unbroken. If the Carthaginians succeeded in ramming one, those on each side of the attacked vessel came to her assistance, and thus outnumbered, the Carthaginians did not dare to board.
While the battle was thus progressing in the centre—without decided results—Hanno, who commanded the Carthaginian right wing, instead of engaging the left Roman column in flank, stretched far out to sea, and bore down upon the Roman reserve, which carried the soldiers of the Triarii. The Carthaginian reserve, instead of attacking the Roman right column, as they evidently should have done, also bore down upon the Roman reserve. Thus three distinct and separate engagements were going on at once—all fought most valiantly. Just as the Roman reserve was overpowered, and about to yield, they saw that the Carthaginian centre was in full retreat, chased by the Roman van, while the Roman second division was hastening to the assistance of their sorely pressed reserve. This sight inspired the latter with new courage, and, although they had had many vessels sunk, and a few captured, they continued the fight until the arrival of their friends caused their assailant, Hanno, to hoist the signal for retreat. The Roman third division, embarrassed by its convoy, had been driven back until quite close to the land, and while sharp-pointed, surf-beaten rocks appeared under their sterns, it was attacked on both sides and in front, by the nimble Carthaginians. Vessel by vessel it was falling into the enemy’s hands, when Manlius, seeing its critical condition, relinquished his own pursuit, and hastened to its relief. His presence converted defeat into victory, and insured the complete triumph of the Roman arms; so that, while the Carthaginians scattered in flight, the Romans, towing their prizes stern foremost, as was their custom in victory, entered the harbor of Heraclea.
In this sanguinary and decisive battle thirty of the Carthaginian and twenty-four of the Roman quinqueremes were sent to the bottom, with all on board. Not a single Roman vessel was carried off by the enemy; while the Romans captured sixty-four ships and their crews.
Commodore Parker, of the U. S. Navy, in commenting upon this important naval action, says, “Had Hanno and the commander of the Carthaginian reserve done their duty faithfully and intelligently upon this occasion, the Roman van and centre must have been doubled up and defeated, almost instantly; after which it would have been an easy matter to get possession of the others, with the transports. Thus the Carthaginians would have gained a decisive victory, the effect of which would have been, perhaps, to deter the Romans from again making their appearance in force upon the sea; and then, with such leaders as Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal to shape her policy and conduct her armaments, Carthage, instead of Rome, might have been the mistress of the world. Such are the great issues sometimes impending over contending armies and fleets.”
As soon as the Consuls had repaired damages they set sail from Heraclea for Africa, where they disembarked an army under Regulus; and most of the naval force, with the prisoners, then returned home. Regulus, however, soon suffered a defeat, and the Roman fleet had to be despatched to Africa again, in hot haste, to take off the scant remnant of his army. Before taking on board the defeated Legions the fleet had another great naval battle; and captured a Carthaginian fleet of one hundred and fourteen vessels. With the soldiers on board, and their prizes in tow, Marcus Emilius and Servius Fulvius, the Consuls then in command, determined to return to Rome by the south shore of Sicily. This was against the earnest remonstrances of the pilots, or sailing masters, “who wisely argued that, at the dangerous season when, the constellation of Orion being not quite past, and the Dog Star just ready to appear, it were far safer to go North about.”
The Consuls, who had no idea of being advised by mere sailors, were unfortunately not to be shaken in their determination; and so, when Sicily was sighted, a course was shaped from Lylybeum to the promontory of Pachymus. The fleet had accomplished about two-thirds of this distance, and was just opposite a coast where there were no ports, and where the shore was high and rocky, when, with the going down of the sun, the north wind, which had been blowing steadily for several days, suddenly died away, and as the Romans were engaged in furling their flapping sails they observed that they were heavy and wet with the falling dew, the sure precursor of the terrible “Scirocco.” Then the pilots urged the Consuls to pull directly to the southward, that they might have sea room sufficient to prevent them from being driven on shore when the storm should burst upon them. But this, with the dread of the sea natural to men unaccustomed to contend with it, they refused to do; not comprehending that, although their quinqueremes were illy adapted to buffet the waves, anything was better than a lee shore, with no harbor of refuge.
The north wind sprang up again after a little, cheering the hearts of the inexperienced, blew in fitful gusts for an hour or more, then died nearly away, again sprang up, and finally faded out as before. The seamen knew what this portended. “Next came a flash of lightning in the southern sky; then a line of foam upon the southern sea; the roaring of Heaven’s artillery in the air above, and of the breakers on the beach below—and the tempest was upon them!” From this time all order was lost, and the counsels and admonitions of the pilots unheeded. The Roman fleet was completely at the mercy of the hurricane, and the veterans who had borne themselves bravely in many a hard fought battle with their fellow man, now, completely demoralized in the presence of this new danger, behaved more like maniacs than reasonable beings. Some advised one thing, some another; but nothing sensible was done—and when the gale broke, out of four hundred and sixty-four quinqueremes (an immense fleet) three hundred and eighty had been dashed upon the rocks and lost.
The whole coast was covered with fragments of wreck and dead bodies; and that which Rome had been so many years in acquiring, at the cost of so much blood, labor, and treasure, she lost in a few hours, through the want of experienced seamen in command.
During the succeeding Punic wars Rome and Carthage had many another well contested naval engagement.
Adherbal captured ninety-four Roman vessels off Drepanum, but the dogged courage of the Roman was usually successful.
We have few details of these engagements. What the Romans gained in battle was often lost by them in shipwreck; so that, at the end of the first Punic war, which lasted twenty-four years, they had lost seven hundred quinqueremes, and the vanquished Carthaginians only five hundred.
At the time spoken of, when the Romans were fighting the Carthaginians, the former were a free, virtuous and patriotic people. No reverses cast them down; no loss of life discouraged them.
After a lapse of two hundred years, Marcus Brutus and Cassius being dead, and public virtue scoffed at and fast expiring, an arbitrary government was in process of erection upon the ruins of the Republic.
The triumvirate had been dissolved, and Octavius and Antony, at the head of vast armies and fleets, were preparing, on opposite sides of the Gulf of Ambracia, to submit their old quarrel to the arbitrament of the sword. In this emergency Antony’s old officers and soldiers, whom he had so often led to victory, naturally hoped that, assuming the offensive, he would draw out his legions, and, by his ability and superior strategy, force his adversary from the field. But, bewitched by a woman, the greatest captain of the age—now that Cæsar and Pompey were gone—had consented to abandon a faithful and devoted army, and to rely solely upon his fleet; which, equal to that of Octavius in numbers, was far inferior in discipline and drill, and in experience of actual combat.
ROMAN GALLEY.
IV.
ACTIUM. B. C. 31.
Scene VII. Near Actium. Antony’s Camp.
Enter Antony and Canidius.
Ant.
Is it not strange, Canidius,
That from Tarentum and Brundusium
He could so quickly cut the Ionian Sea,
And taken in Toryne? you have heard on’t, sweet?
Cleo.
Celerity is never more admired
Than by the negligent.
Ant.
A good rebuke,
Which might have well becomed the best of men,
To taunt at slackness. Canidius, we
Will fight with him by sea.
Cleo.
By sea! What else?
Canid.
Why will my lord do so?
Ant.
For that he dares us to ’t.
Enob.
So hath my lord dared him to single fight.
Canid.
Ay, and to wage this battle at Pharsalia,
Where Cæsar fought with Pompey: but these offers
Which serve not for his vantage he shakes off;
And so should you.
Enob.
Your ships are not well mann’d;
Your mariners are muleteers, reapers, people
Ingrossed by swift impress; in Cæsar’s fleet
Are those that often have ’gainst Pompey fought;
Their ships are yare; yours, heavy; no disgrace
Shall fall you for refusing him at sea,
Being prepared for land.
Ant.
By sea, by sea.
Enob.
Most worthy sir, you therein throw away
The absolute soldiership you have by land;
Distract your army, which doth most consist
Of war-mark’d footmen; leave unexecuted
Your own renowned knowledge; quite forego
The way which promises assurance; and
Give up yourself merely to chance and hazard,
From firm security.
Ant.
I’ll fight at sea.
Cleo.
I have sixty sails, Cæsar none better.
Ant.
Our overplus of shipping will we burn;
And, with the rest full mann’d, from the head of Actium,
Beat the approaching Cæsar. But if we fail,
We then can do ’t at land.
Shakespeare—Antony and Cleopatra.
Philippi, the decisive battle between Octavius and Brutus and Cassius, took place B. C. 42. Octavius, who afterward assumed the name of Augustus, is very differently described by historians. It is said that he did not fight at Philippi; and he is called a coward by some writers, who declare that he was always sick on critical days. Be that as it may, it seems certain that Antony fought that battle, although Octavius got the credit of success with the Roman public, which soon endowed him with every quality which goes to make the title of “August,” which title he was the first to bear; being the favorite of the citizens, much more by reason of his ancestry, and by the judicious bestowal of offices and of money, than by feats of arms.
After their victory at Philippi, Antony and Octavius divided the empire of the world between them. But the two were devoured by an equal ambition; and, although a common danger had for a time lulled their mutual suspicion and dislike, and forced them to act in unison, harmony between them could not long continue. Neither of them wished to share empire, and each was determined that the other, sooner or later, should be forced to renounce power, if not life itself. The repudiation of Octavia the sister of Octavius, by Antony, added increased fuel to the fires of hatred, and we learn from contemporary writers that clear-sighted persons not only foresaw that a death struggle between the two great leaders was only a question of time, but they predicted the result, as Antony, in the midst of feasts and other dissipation, was fast losing that activity of mind and body which had brought him his successes, and had, in former days, gained him the esteem and confidence of Cæsar.
While Antony was placing his laurels and his renown under the feet of an Egyptian queen, the cool and astute Octavius, never losing sight of the end he had in view, turned to his own aggrandizement and elevation, in the estimation of the Roman people, Antony’s disgraceful conduct.
The future Augustus, with the full consent of the Senate, raised fresh legions in Italy, equipped a fleet, and made every preparation for an enterprise upon which was to depend the control of the whole civilized world.
As if Antony had taken pains to furnish his already too powerful rival with the pretexts which should serve as a mask to his ambitious views, the former caused general disgust and indignation at Rome by dismembering the Empire—so to speak—in the interests of Cleopatra, whom he proclaimed Queen of Cyprus, Cilicia, Cœlesyria, Arabia and Judea; while he gave to the two sons whom he had had by her the title of “King of Kings.” This insane defiance of the susceptibility and pride of the Republic was one of the principal causes of Antony’s destruction. People ceased to fear him when they learned that he had become habitually intemperate; and they no longer saw in him a redoubtable and successful Roman general, but an Eastern Satrap, plunged in pleasure and debauchery.
Octavius, affecting rather contempt than anger at Antony’s proceedings, declared war against Cleopatra only, and seemed to regard Antony as already deprived of the power and majesty which he had sullied in committing them to the hands of the Egyptian queen.
Octavius could only raise on the Italian peninsula, then exhausted by civil war, 80,000 legionaries, with 12,000 cavalry, and two hundred and fifty ships—a small force to oppose to the five hundred ships and 120,000 men of Antony, without counting the allied troops which his rival was able to bring against him. But, more active and daring than Antony, he had, with astonishing celerity, collected his forces, and crossed the Ionian Sea, while Antony was lingering in Samos, and indulging in all sorts of debasing pleasures, with little thought devoted to preparation for the inevitable and momentous struggle.
At last the imminence of the danger awoke him to the realities surrounding him, and he brought forward his powerful fleet, anchoring it near the promontory of Actium, in Epirus, ready to oppose the advance of Octavius.
His ships were double in number those of the Romans, well armed and equipped, but heavy, and badly manned, so that their manœuvres did not compare in celerity with those of the western fleet.
Although Octavius had fewer ships and fewer men, those which he had were Romans; and he was fighting, ostensibly, to vindicate the wounded pride and honor of his country, which had been trampled under foot by Antony and a stranger queen.
The generals of Antony united in imploring him not to confide his destiny to the uncertainty of winds and waves, but to give battle on shore, where, they answered for it, victory would perch upon their banners. But Antony remained deaf to their supplications, and Cleopatra, who had joined him with seventy Egyptian ships, also preferred to fight a naval battle; it is said, in order that, if her lover was vanquished, she herself could more easily escape.
Boldly searching for Antony, the Roman fleet came in contact with his, near the promontory of Actium.
On opposite shores of the bay partly formed by that promontory lay the two armies, spectators of a conflict which was to decide their fate, but in which they were not to join.
The wind and weather were both favorable, but the two fleets remained for a long time opposite to each other, as if hesitating to begin the struggle, the issue of which was fraught with such momentous consequences.
Antony had confided the command of his left wing to Cœlius; the centre to Marcus Octavius and Marcus Inteius; while he himself, with Valerius Publicola, assumed command of the right wing.
The fleet of Octavius was commanded by Agrippa, to whom all the glory of the victory is due. Octavius and his admiral at first regarded with surprise and uneasiness the immobility of the enemy, who were ensconced in the arm of the sea, which sheet of water contained many shoals and reefs, and therefore, if the enemy remained there, deprived Octavius of the advantage to be derived from the rapidity of manœuvre of his vessels.
BATTLE OF ACTIUM.
But Antony’s officers, eager to show their prowess, proceeded to get their left wing under way, and moved to the attack of Octavius’ right. The latter, taking advantage of this false move, made a retrograde movement, and endeavored to draw out the whole opposing force from their commanding position unto the high sea, where the Romans would have room to manœuvre, and thereby successfully assail Antony’s heavier vessels.
At this moment the scene was grand. The flashing of arms, and glinting of the sun upon polished casques, the streaming flags, and thousands of oars simultaneously put in motion, gave life and animation; while the blare of the brazen trumpets and the shouts of the myriads of combatants were echoed from the shores by the cheers and cries of two large armies, each encouraging its own fleet, and inciting them to the greater exertion.
Cleopatra’s large and magnificent galley hovered in the rear of the fleet, with the purple sails furled, and the poop occupied by herself and her ladies, surrounded by all the splendor of the Egyptian court.
Thinking, as we have said, that Octavius’ fleet fled before them, Antony and his commanders abandoned their advantageous position, and followed Agrippa out to sea.
Once there, the Roman fleet quickly put about, in good order, and a terrible battle at once began—Roman disputing with Roman the empire of the world.
At last an able movement of Agrippa caused Antony’s centre to give way; but despite the disorder which resulted, the action was steadily maintained, the losses on each side being about equal, and victory undecided.
The force of Agrippa made up by celerity of movement for the greater number of Antony’s fleet, and the battle was at its height, when, suddenly, Cleopatra, panic-stricken by the noise and dreadful carnage, gave a signal for retreat, hoisted her purple sails, and, with the whole Egyptian contingent, retreated rapidly, leaving a great gap in the line of battle. Some were sunk by the beaks of their pursuers, but the majority made their escape, and were soon far from the scene.
This shameful action should have opened Antony’s eyes, and have stimulated him—being even yet superior in numbers—to repair by renewed exertions the defection of the beautiful queen. But his movements seemed to be controlled by her’s, and, forgetting his own honor, his former glory, his empire, and his duty as commander, as a soldier and as a man, he abandoned the brave seamen and soldiers who were fighting for him, and took a fast, light vessel, and followed the woman who had been his ruin, and at whose shrine he was about to offer as a sacrifice the dishonor of Cæsar’s greatest lieutenant.
It is said that for some time he sat upon the deck, his head bowed between his hands, and wrapped in his own thoughts. But he only regained sufficient command of himself to resolve to protect the cause of his ruin. He therefore continued his flight to the promontory of Tenaros; and then soon after learned of the entire defeat of his fleet.
Even after being thus shamefully abandoned by their commander, his troops and sailors had for a long time; maintained the combat; but bad weather coming on they at last surrendered, after a loss of five thousand killed, and having three hundred ships captured, with their crews.
For a long time the land forces of Antony could not believe in his defection, and looked for him to reappear, and, at their head, redeem the fortunes of the sea fight. Indeed, for many days after the victory they declined the overtures of Octavius. But at last, despairing of Antony’s return, their general, with his principal officers and the troops, passed under the banners of Octavius. This event left him the undisputed master of the world.
Upon his return to Rome he was decreed a three days’ triumph, and he now assumed in public the imperial powers which he had long virtually possessed.
The shocking death of both Antony and Cleopatra, by suicide, hardly belongs to the account of Actium, although the direct consequence of the overwhelming defeat there sustained.
THE PTOLEMY PHILOPATER—405 B. C.
(Constructed by Ptolemy Philopater, of Egypt, after a Greek Model.)
V.
LEPANTO. A. D. 1571.
Sixteen hundred years after Actium another great naval battle took place upon the coast of Greece. It was of momentous importance, as it is not too much to say that it decided the future fate and sovereignty of at least the eastern part of Europe.
Before we speak of Lepanto, however, it may be well to glance at naval events for two or three centuries previous to the eventful year 1571.
After the Republic of Venice had become strong, their first great sea fight was with the Saracens, then a terror to all the Christian nations of the Mediterranean. The Venetians, at the solicitation of the Emperor Theodosius, coöperated with the Greeks against their implacable enemy. The hostile fleets met at Crotona, in the Gulf of Taranto, where the Greeks fled at the first onset of the Saracens, leaving their Venetian allies to fight against vastly superior numbers. In spite of their courage and constancy, which maintained the unequal fight for many hours, the Venetians were defeated, and lost nearly every one of the sixty ships which they took into the fight.
Twenty-five years afterwards the Venetian fleet met the Saracens again, almost in the very spot of their former discomfiture, and obtained a splendid victory; and their naval fights continued, almost without intermission, and with varying fortunes; the Venetians, on the whole, holding their own.
On February 13th, 1353, there was a remarkable naval fight between the allied fleets of Venice, Aragon, and Constantinople, and the Genoese fleet, under the command of the redoubtable Paganino Doria. The Genoese were victorious.
In spite of the successful achievements of Doria, which should have brought him the respect and support of his countrymen, he was supplanted by his bitter foe, Antonio Grimaldi, who was put in command of the fleet. He was, not long after, defeated by the allied fleets of Spain and Venice, with tremendous loss. Grimaldi, thereupon, fell out of favor; and the next year the Genoese were obliged to again place Doria in command of their fleet, with which he gained a great victory over the Venetians at Porto Longo, capturing the whole of their fleet.
Peace between the two Republics was then made, and continued until 1378, when war was again declared. Victor Pisani, in command of the fleet of Venice, had a successful battle with the Genoese off Actium, the scene of the wonderful fight just before the commencement of the Christian era.
In 1379 Pisani was forced by the Venetian Senate, against his own judgment, to fight a far superior Genoese fleet, under Luciano Doria, off Pola, in the Adriatic. The Venetian fleet was almost annihilated, and Pisani, on his return, was loaded with chains, and thrown into a dungeon. The Genoese, after burning several Venetian towns upon the Adriatic, appeared off Venice, entered the lagoon, took Chioggia, and filled the Venetians with consternation and terror. The people flocked to the Piazza San Marco, in thousands, and demanded that Pisani be restored to the command of the fleet. The authorities were at their wits’ ends, and consented, while Pisani, with true patriotism, condoned his wrongs and ill treatment, and applied himself at once to the work of organization. After unheard of exertions he succeeded in discomfiting the enemy, and Venice was saved.
Pisani afterwards made a cruise in command of the fleet on the Asiatic coast, but, worn out by hard service and his former ill treatment, he died soon after his return, to the common sorrow and remorse of all Venetians.
The Turks took Constantinople in 1453, and the contests between them and the Venetians continued with even greater bitterness; and after the capture of Cyprus by the Moslems, and the fitting out by the Sultan Selim of an immense and powerful fleet, it became evident to the western world that some supreme effort should be put forth to curb the advance of the Turkish power.
Let us now glance at the state of affairs about the time of Lepanto.
The latter part of the 16th century was a stirring and eventful period in the world’s history.
Charles V had resigned his empire to that sullen bigot, his son, Philip II.
About the same time Moscow was being burned by the Tartars; the Russians having been the abject subjects of the Tartars but a few years before.
Prussia, so powerful to-day, was then a small hereditary duchy, Lutheran in religion, and still a fief of Poland. The Poles were then a much more powerful nation than the Russians.
The States of the north, Sweden and Denmark, were very strong, and made their influence felt in all Europe. Tycho Brahe, the subject of the latter, was then a young man.
Portugal, from her brilliant maritime discoveries, had extended relations with Japan, China, India and Brazil; and had rendered Lisbon the market of the world, usurping the place of Antwerp. Her decline was, however, soon to follow.
Soon after Lepanto, Holland, driven to despairing effort by the tyranny of Philip, revolted, and William of Orange became Stadtholder. He was succeeded by Maurice, whose efforts to secure independence were so ably seconded by Elizabeth of England, as to draw down upon the latter nation the vengeance of Philip, shown later in the despatch of his grand Armada, but a very few years after the event of Lepanto.
The Church of England had been established, and Elizabeth was enjoying her splendid reign. Sir Walter Raleigh, Drake, and other heroes of the sea were then young men.
Florence was about to enjoy her highest distinction as the home of learning and art, under Cosmo de Medici, and Pius V was Pope; one of the greatest that ever occupied the Papal throne.
Rodolph, of Hapsburg, had had his fierce struggle with the Turks, by land; but Austria then had no naval force.
In France the weak and bloody Charles IX was upon the throne, and the massacre of Saint Bartholomew was close at hand.
And now, to come to the great event of Lepanto, which decided the question of supremacy between Christianity and Islamism.
The Turks had captured Cyprus; possessed almost irresistible power, and everything looked very dark for Christendom.
But in spite of the connivance of Charles IX in their advance, who by this base conduct preluded the great crime of his reign; in spite of the calculated inaction of England; the timidity of Austria; the exhaustion of Poland, after a long war with still barbarous Muscovy, the genius of Christianity took a fresh flight, and the star of the west once more rose in the ascendant.
The honor of being the head of the effort at resistance to the encroaching Turkish power, and of victorious reprisals, belongs especially to Pope Pius V, a simple monk who had been exalted to the Pontifical throne; a zealous and austere priest, of a disposition naturally violent, which had been subdued by experience, foresight, and real greatness of soul.
This Pontiff, upon the first menace of the Turks against Cyprus, bestirred himself to form a league of several Christian States.
A crusade was no longer possible, from the condition of Europe, which was divided by religious schism, and by the ambition of princes. But, if the Pope could no longer send the whole of Europe to a holy war, such as was condemned by Luther as unjust and inhuman, he could at least, as a temporal prince, take his part in active operations.
Not even the coolness and calculated slowness of Philip of Spain—the Monarch from whom he had a right to expect the most assistance—could arrest the zeal of the ardent and generous Pontiff, who saw that the time had come for Christendom to conquer or submit.
Philip II, who was without mercy for the Mahomedans still scattered throughout his dominions, nevertheless hesitated to enter upon a struggle with the Turks; and above all did he dislike to defend Venice against them—so much did he envy the latter her rich commerce.
The first power asked to join the league against Selim, he only finally consented upon being given by the Pope the revenues of the church throughout his vast realm, for as long as the war should last. But even this gilded bait became the source of delay, the avaricious and cunning monarch deferring preparations, and multiplying obstacles to the undertaking, so as to profit as long as possible from the rich revenue derived from that source.
Thus it happened that, by his delay, in spite of the coalition, and of the allied fleet, equal in number and superior in condition and discipline to that of the Turks, the Island of Cyprus was captured, after stubborn sieges of its two capitals, Nicosia and Famagousta, without any assistance from the rest of Christendom.
Famagousta was captured after a very prolonged and obstinate defence, which had been conducted at the expense of fifty thousand lives to the Turks, who had made six general assaults. Finally the city was allowed to capitulate on honorable terms. Mustapha, the same fierce Moslem general who had conducted the siege of Malta, requested four of the principal Venetian leaders to meet him at his quarters. Here a short and angry conference ensued, when, in violation of the terms of the capitulation, Mustapha ordered three of them to instant execution. But he reserved Bragadino, who had held the supreme command during the siege, and ordered him to have his ears cut off, and to be set to work to carry earth to repair the works. After a few days of this humiliation Mustapha caused him to be flayed alive, in the public market place. This horrible sentence was not only carried into effect, but his skin was stuffed and suspended from the yard arm of Mustapha’s galley; and, with this shocking trophy thus displayed, he returned to Constantinople. Here he was rewarded by Selim for the capture of Cyprus. These terrible events added fuel to the flame of revenge which the Venetians felt, and were, of course, additional incentives to their allies.
The capture of Cyprus, and the disgraceful events following it, aroused the indignation of all Europe. The iron yoke of the Turk, with his following hosts of Asiatic robbers and cut-throats, owing to the delay in relief, extended over the whole of the large, rich and populous island.
Pius V, in terrible grief at these events, and full of foreboding for the future, made himself heard throughout Europe; and with renewed ardor he insisted upon carrying out the treaty of alliance already made, the assembly of the allied fleet, and upon vengeance upon the Ottomans, since succor for Cyprus would arrive too late.
The greatest mark of his terrible earnestness was the assembling of a Pontifical fleet and army—a thing unheard of at that time. The Pope gave the command to a member of the very ancient Roman family of Colonna.
In the latter part of 1571, five months after the capture of Cyprus, the Christian armament appeared upon the Mediterranean, consisting of galleys to the number of two hundred, with galleasses, transports and other vessels, carrying fifty thousand soldiers. Then immediately followed the most important event of the sixteenth century.
The Christian fleet made rendezvous at Messina; whence Sebastian Veniero, the Venetian admiral, would have sailed at once, and have sought the enemy without delay, so much did he fear for the Venetian possessions in the Adriatic, from the rapid advance of the Ottomans.
But Don John, the supreme commander, with a prudence worthy of an older and less fiery man, would not move until he was strengthened by every possible reinforcement, as he wished to use every means in his power to avoid a defeat which must be a final and crushing one to the side which should lose. He was certain that the great resources of the Ottoman empire would, on this supreme occasion, be strained to the utmost to equip their greatest armament. During this delay the Pope proclaimed a jubilee—granting indulgences to all engaged in the expedition—such as had formerly been given to the deliverers of the Holy Sepulchre.
On September 16th, the magnificent armament, unrivaled since the days of imperial Rome, put to sea from Messina. They were baffled by rough seas and head winds on the Calabrian coast, and made slow progress. The commander had sent a small squadron in advance, for intelligence. They returned with the news that the Turks were still in the Adriatic, with a powerful fleet, and had committed fearful ravages upon the Venetian territories. The fleet then steered for Corfu, and reached there on September 26th, seeing for themselves traces of the enemy in smoking towns and farms, and deserted fields and vineyards. The islanders welcomed them, and furnished what they could of needed supplies.
Don John seems to have had his own plans: but he now called a council, because courtesy required that he should consult the commanders of the Allies—and because he had promised Philip to do so—the latter fearing his fiery and impetuous disposition.
The opinions were divided—as is always the case in councils of war. Those who had had personal experience of Turkish naval prowess appeared to shrink from encountering so formidable an armament, and would have confined the operations of the Christian fleet to besieging some city belonging to the Moslems. Even Doria, the old sea-dog, whose life had been spent in fighting the infidel, thought it was not advisable to attack the enemy in his present position, surrounded as he was by friendly shores, whence he could obtain aid and reinforcement. He wished to attack Navarino, and thus draw the enemy from the gulf where he was anchored, and force him to give battle in the open sea. But, strange to say (for a proverb has it that councils of war never fight), the majority took a different view, and said that the object of the expedition was to destroy the Ottoman fleet, and that a better opportunity could not present itself than when they were shut in a gulf, from which, if defeated, they could not escape.
The most influential of the council held these views: among them the Marquis of Santa Cruz, Cardona, the commander of the Sicilian squadron, Barberigo, second in command of the Venetians, Grand Commander Requesens, Colonna, and young Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma—the nephew of Don John, who was seeing his first service now, but who was to become, in time, the greatest captain of his age.
Thus supported in his judgment, the young commander-in-chief resolved to give the Turks battle in the position they had chosen. But he was delayed by weather, and other causes, and the enemy were not actually met until October 7th.
The Ottoman fleet, two hundred strong, rowed by Christian slaves, and accompanied by numbers of transports, was moored in a gulf upon the Albanian coast, while the Christian fleet, seeking its enemy, came down from the north, led by the galleys of the Venetian contingent.
As the time of conflict approached, the commander-in-chief, Don John, rose superior to the timid counsels of the generals of Philip II, who accompanied him, and who were, in a manner, charged with his safety.
Don John, of Austria, was the natural son of Charles V, but was fully recognized, not only by his father, but by Philip, his legitimate brother, who originally intended him for high ecclesiastical dignities. But Don John early showed great predilection for the profession of arms, and was conspicuous during the revolt of the Moors of Grenada. In 1570, when only twenty-six years old, he received the supreme command of the Spanish fleet; and his ability and success justified an appointment which was due to favoritism.
After Lepanto he conquered Tunis, and the idea was entertained of founding a Christian kingdom there, for him; but the jealousy of his arbitrary and suspicious brother prevented this. He then received the governorship of the Low Countries, succeeding the notorious and bloody Duke of Alva, and he there died, in his camp at Namur, in 1578, aged thirty-three. It is said that he was about to undertake an expedition to deliver Mary Stuart, at the time of his death, which was attributed by some to poison.
Don John was one of the remarkable soldiers of his time. Generous, frank, humane, he was beloved by both soldiers and citizens. He was a fine horseman, handsome, well made, and graceful.
Don John’s principal force, in ships and fighting men, was Italian; for, besides the twelve galleys of the Pope, and those of Genoa, Savoy, and other Italian States and cities, many were contributed by rich and generous Italian private citizens. The greater number, however, were Venetian; this State contributing one hundred and six “royal galleys” and six galleasses. The galleasses were large ships, rather dull as sailers, but carrying forty or fifty pieces of cannon.
Among the complement of the Venetians were many Greeks—either refugees from the Morea, or recruited in Candia, Corfu, and other islands, then subject to the Venetian power. In keeping with the jealous policy of Venice, none of these subjects had any maritime command or military rank; but they fought valiantly under the flag of St. Marc, which lost in the battle its chief admiral and fifteen captains.
The Spaniards had about eighty galleys; but had also a number of brigantines, and vessels of small size—and were better manned than the Venetians—so that Don John drafted several thousand men from the other Italian ships, and from those of Spain, to make good the Venetian complement. Veniero, the Venetian Admiral, took great offence at this, and much trouble arose from it, but the imminence of the conflict and the importance of the result to Venice prevented him from withdrawing his force, as he at first threatened to do.
The total number of men on board the allied fleet was eighty thousand. The galleys, impelled principally by oars, required a large number of rowers. Of the 29,000 soldiers embarked, 19,000 were sent by Spain. They were good troops, officered by men of reputation, and most of them illustrious, not only for family, but for military achievement. It was so also with the Venetian officers, as it should have been—for her very existence was at stake, unless the Turks were defeated.
Don John himself arranged the order of battle; and, standing erect in a fast pulling boat, clad in his armor, and bearing in his hand a crucifix, he pulled round the fleet, exhorting the Allies, by voice and gesture, to make a common cause, and without reference to the flags they bore, to act as one nationality in the face of the common foe.
He then returned to his own galley, where a staff of young Castilian and Sardinian nobles awaited him, and unfurled the great banner of the League, presented by the Pope, and bearing the arms of Spain, Venice and the Pope, bound together by an endless chain.
The Real, or Admiral’s galley of Don John, was of great size, and had been built in Barcelona, at that time famous for naval architecture. Her stern was highly decorated with emblems and historical devices, while her interior was furnished most luxuriously. But, most of all, she excelled in strength and speed, and right well did she do her part when exposed to the actual test of battle.
Lepanto was fought on Sunday. The weather was beautiful, and the sun shone in splendor upon the peculiarly clear blue water of those seas.
The sight on that morning must have been surpassingly grand. The beautiful galleys, with their numerous oars dashing the water into foam; gaudy pennons streaming from the picturesque lateen yards; gaily painted hulls, decorated with shields and armorial insignia; culverins mounted at the prows, with matches smoking; the decks filled with men in polished armor and gay plumes, and armed with sword and spear, matchlock and arquebus, cross-bow and petronel. Shouts of command and of enthusiasm went up amid a brandishing of weapons, while an occasional hush occurred when the holy fathers of the church gave absolution to those who were about to meet the fierce infidel.
More than half the ships carried at their mast-heads the Lion of St. Marc, which waved over the sturdy sea-dogs of Venice, while other divisions showed the red and yellow of Spain, the white, with crossed keys and triple mitre of the Pope, or the varied ensigns of the Italian cities.
On the other side were the Turks, with their numerous and powerful galleys, mostly pulled by Christian slaves, who were driven by cruel blows to put forth their utmost strength against their co-religionists; for in every galley, Turkish or Christian, where slaves worked the oars, there extended between the benches of the rowers, fore and aft, a raised walk, on which two or three boatswains, with long rods, walked back and forth, dealing heavy blows upon those who were not thought to be doing their utmost at the oars. The slaves were shackled to the benches when they rowed; and never left them, day or night. Their food and clothing were scanty, and the filth about them was seldom cleared away, except by the rain from heaven, or the seas, which sometimes washed on board. The fighting men of the galleys were mostly on the fore-deck, and on outside galleries, or platforms above the gunwales.
The Turks had the wild music which they love to encourage their fighting men, kettle-drums and pipes, cymbals and trumpets. The horse-tails of the Pashas streamed from the poops of their galleys, as with loud cries they appealed to Allah to deliver the Christian dogs once more into their hands. And there was every reason to suppose that their wish would be fulfilled, for they had the stronger force, and carried with them the prestige of former victories won over the best efforts of the Christians.
THE BATTLE.
On the morning of the memorable 7th of October the Christian fleet weighed anchor for Lepanto, at two hours before dawn. The wind was light, but adverse, and oars had to be used. At sunrise they came up with a group of rocky islets which form the northern cape of the Gulf of Lepanto. The rowers labored hard at the oars, while all others strained their eyes for the first glimpse of the great Moslem fleet. At length they were descried from the masthead of the Real, and almost at the same moment by Andrew Doria, who commanded on the right.
BATTLE OF LEPANTO.
Don John ordered his pennon to be displayed, unfurled the banner of the Christian League, and fired a gun, the preconcerted signal for battle.
This was answered by an exultant shout from all the ships.
The principal captains now came on board the Real, to receive their final orders; and a few, even then, doubted the propriety of fighting, but Don John sternly said, “Gentlemen, this is the time for battle, and not for counsel!” and the armada was at once deployed in fighting array, according to orders previously issued.
When ready for battle the Christian force had a front of three miles. On the extreme right was Doria, whose name was justly held in terror by the Moslem, with sixty-four galleys. In the centre, consisting of sixty-three galleys, was Don John, supported on one side by Colonna, and on the other by Veniero. In his rear was the Grand Commander Requesens, his former tutor in military matters. The left wing was commanded by Barberigo, a Venetian noble, who was to keep his vessels as near the Ætolian coast as the rocks and shoals would permit, to prevent his wing being turned by the enemy.
The reserve, of thirty-five galleys, was commanded by the Marquis of Santa Cruz, a man of known courage and conduct, who had orders to act in any quarter where he thought his aid most needed.
The smaller craft took little part in the battle, the action being fought almost entirely by the galleys.
Each commander was to take space enough for manœuvring, yet to keep so close as to prevent the enemy from piercing the line. Each was to single out his adversary, close with him, and board as soon as possible.
Don John had the beak of his galley cut away; so little did he rely upon an instrument once, and for so long, considered formidable.
By this time galleys mounted guns upon their prows, and beaks were beginning to fall out of use. It is said that many commanders of the allies followed Don John’s example.
The Ottoman fleet weighed and came out to the battle. But they came on slowly, as the wind had suddenly shifted and was now against them, while, as the day advanced, the sun, which had been in the faces of the Allies, shone in those of the Moslem; and both these natural phenomena were hailed by the Christians as an evidence of divine interposition.
The Turkish armament proved to be even greater in number than had been anticipated by the Christians, consisting of nearly two hundred and fifty “royal galleys,” most of them of the largest class; and a number of smaller vessels in the rear, which, however, like the similar ones of the Allies, do not appear to have come much into action.
The number of the Turks, including rowers, is said to have been 120,000. As we have said, the rowers were principally Christian slaves, with some blacks and criminals.
As was usual with the Turks, their order of battle was crescentic, and, being more numerous than the Allies, they occupied a wider space than the straight alignment of the Christians.
As their formidable and magnificent array advanced, the moving sun shone upon gaudy paint and gilded prows, thousands of pennons, polished cimeters and head pieces, and the jeweled turbans of the Pachas, and other chief men.