HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
GEORGE GROTE, Esq.
VOL. V.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1857.
PREFACE TO VOL. V.
VOLUMES V AND VI.
FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON
TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.
B. C. 490-421.
I had reckoned upon carrying my readers in these two volumes down to the commencement of the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse.
But the narration of events, now that we are under the positive guidance of Thucydidês,—coupled with the exposition of some points on which I differ from the views generally taken by my predecessors,— have occupied greater space than I had foreseen: and I have been obliged to enlarge my Sixth Volume beyond the usual size, in order to arrive even at the Peace of Nikias.
The interval of disturbance and partial hostility, which ensued between that peace and the Athenian expedition, will therefore be reserved for the beginning of my Seventh Volume, the publication of which will not be long delayed.
G. G.
Dec. 1848.
CONTENTS.
VOL. V.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.
Resolutions of Darius to invade Greece a second time. His death. — Succeeded by his son Xerxes. — Revolt and reconquest of Egypt by the Persians. — Indifference of Xerxes to the invasion of Greece — persons who advised and instigated him — persuasions which they employed — prophecies produced by Onomakritus. — Xerxes resolves to invade Greece. — Historical manner and conception of Herodotus. — Xerxes announces his project to an assembly of Persian counsellors — Mardonius and Artabanus, the evil and good genius. — Xerxes is induced by Artabanus to renounce his project — his repeated dreams — divine command to invade Greece. — Religious conception of the sequences of history — common both to Persians and Greeks. — Vast preparations of Xerxes — March of Xerxes from the interior of Asia — collection of the invading army at Sardis — his numerous fleet and large magazines of provision beforehand. — He throws a bridge of boats across the Hellespont. — The bridge is destroyed by a storm — Wrath of Xerxes — he puts to death the engineers and punishes the Hellespont. — Remarks on this story of the punishment inflicted on the Hellespont: there is no sufficient reason for disbelieving its reality. — Reconstruction of the bridge — description of it in detail. — Xerxes cuts a ship-canal across the isthmus of Mount Athos. — Superior intelligence of the Phenicians. — Employment of the lash over the workmen engaged on the canal — impression made thereby on the Greeks. — Bridge of boats thrown across the Strymon. — March of Xerxes from Sardis — disposition of his army. — Story of the rich Kappadokian Pythius — his son put to death by order of Xerxes. — March to Abydos — respect shown to Ilium by Xerxes. — Xerxes and his army cross over the Hellespontine bridges. — March to Doriskus in Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus — his fleet joins him here. — Review and muster on the plain of Doriskus — immense variety of the nations brought together. — Numbering of the army — method employed. — Immense and incredible totals brought out by Herodotus. — Comments upon the evidence of Herodotus and upon himself as witness and judge. — Other testimonies about the number of the Persians. — Xerxes passes in review the land-force and the fleet at Doriskus — his conversation with the Spartan king Demaratus. — March of Xerxes from Doriskus westward along Thrace. — Contributions levied on the Grecian towns on the coast of Thrace — particularly Thasus and Abdêra. — Xerxes crosses the Strymon — marches to Akanthus — zeal of the Akanthians in regard to the canal of Athos. — March of Xerxes to Therma — his fleet join him in the Thermaic Gulf. — Favorable prospects of the invasion — zeal of the Macedonian prince to assist Xerxes.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.
Violent proceedings and death of Kleomenês king of Sparta. — Complaint of the Æginetans at Sparta against Kleomenês and Leotychidês, on the subject of the hostages which those two kings had taken from Ægina. — The Spartans deliver Leotychidês to the Æginetans, who require him to go with them to Athens, to get back the hostages. — Refusal of the Athenians to give up the hostages — reprisals of the Æginetans. — The Æginetan Nikodromus lays a scheme for a democratical revolution in Ægina, in concert with Athens — the movement fails. — Treatment of the defeated conspirators — sacrilege. — The Athenians land a force in Ægina — war which ensues. — Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their military force. — Themistoklês and Aristeidês, the chief men at Athens — intense rivalry between them. — Banishment of the latter by ostracism. — Conversion of Athens from a land power into a naval power proposed and urged by Themistoklês. — Views and long-sighted calculations of Themistoklês — he was at this time more essential to his country than Aristeidês. — Fleet of Athens — the salvation of Greece as well as of herself. — Valuable fund new first available to Athens from the silver mines of Laurium in Attica. — Themistoklês prevails upon the Athenian people to forego the distribution of this fund, and employ it in building an increased number of ships. — Preparations of Xerxes — known beforehand in Greece. — Heralds from Persia to demand earth and water from the Grecian cities — many of them comply and submit. — Pan-Hellenic congress convened jointly by Athens and Sparta at the Isthmus of Corinth. — Important effect on Grecian mind. — Effects of the congress in healing feuds among the different Greeks — especially between Athens and Ægina. — Alarm and mistrust prevalent throughout Greece. — Terror conveyed in the reply of the Delphian oracle to the Athenian envoys. — Sentence of the oracle frightful, yet obscure: efforts of the Athenians to interpret it: ingenuity and success of Themistoklês. — Great and genuine Pan-Hellenic patriotism of the Athenians — strongly attested by Herodotus, as his own judgment. — Unwillingness, or inability, on the part of a large proportion of Greeks, to resist the Persians. — Ambiguous neutrality of Argos. — Different stories current in Greece about Argos — opinion of Herodotus. — Refusal or equivocation of the Kretans and Korkyræans. — Mission to Gelon at Syracuse — his reply. — Grecian army sent into Thessaly, to defend the defile of Tempê against Xerxes. — On arriving, they find that it cannot be successfully held against him, and retire. — Consequences of this retreat — the Thessalians, and nearly all Hellas north of Kithæron, either submit to Xerxes or waver.
CHAPTER XL.
BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.
Engagement taken by the Confederate Greeks against such Greeks as joined the Persians. — Resolution taken to defend Thermopylæ as well as the adjoining strait of Eubœa. — Pass of Thermopylæ and its neighborhood. — The Greeks take post at Thermopylæ — Leonidas, king of Sparta, conducts the force thither — the combined fleet under Eurybiadês occupy the Eubœan strait. — Numbers and composition of the force of Leonidas. — Phocians and Lokrians. — Olympian and Karneian festivals — the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these, even under such imminent danger. — Path over Mount Œta by which Thermopylæ might be evaded — Leonidas first informed of it on reaching the spot — the Phocians engage to defend it. — Numbers and composition of the Greek fleet at Artemisium. — Three triremes of the Grecian fleet sent forward as scouts — their first encounter with the Persian fleet. — Capture of these three triremes — panic of the general Grecian fleet, who abandon Artemisium, and retire to Chalkis. — Imminent danger of the Greek scheme of defence — they are rescued by a terrific storm. — Movements of Xerxes from Therma. — He arrives with his army in the Malian territory, close upon the pass of Thermopylæ. — Advance of the Persian fleet — it is overtaken by a destructive storm and hurricane on the coast of Magnesia. — Immense damage inflicted upon it by the storm. — Encouragement occasioned to the Greek fleet — they return from Chalkis to Artemisium. — Delay of Xerxes with his land-force near Trachis. — Impressions of Xerxes about the defenders at Thermopylæ — conversation with Demaratus, whom he will not believe. — Doubts about the motives ascribed by Herodotus to Xerxes. — First attack upon Thermopylæ — made by the Median troops — repulsed. — Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter. — Embarrassment of Xerxes — he is relieved from it by hearing of the path over the mountain. — A Persian detachment under Hydarnês march over the mountain-path, driving away the Phocian guard. — They arrive in the rear of Leonidas. — Debate among the defenders of Thermopylæ, when it became known that the Persians were approaching their rear. — Resolution of Leonidas to stay and die in the pass. — The three hundred Spartans, together with the Thespians, remain with Leonidas: the rest of the detachment retire. — Doubts about the Theban contingent. — Last exploits and death of Leonidas and his band. — Individuals among them distinguished — scorn exhibited towards Aristodêmus who did not fight. — Fate of the Theban contingent. — Impressions of Xerxes after the combat — advice given to him by Demaratus — he rejects it. — Proceedings of the two fleets, at Artemisium and Aphetæ — alarm among the Grecian fleet — Themistoklês determines them to stay and fight, at the urgent instance of the Eubœans. — Important service thus rendered by Themistoklês. — Confident hopes of the Persian fleet — they detach a squadron to sail round Eubœa, and take the Greeks in the rear. — Sea-fight of Artemisium — advantage gained by the Greeks. — Second storm — increased damage to the Persian fleet, and ruin to the detachment sent round Eubœa. — Renewed sea-fight off Artemisium — indecisive — but the Greek fleet resolves to retreat. — They retreat immediately on hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ — they go to Salamis. — Advance of the Persian fleet to Eubœa — manœuvres ascribed to Xerxes in respect of the dead bodies at Thermopylæ — Numbers of dead on both sides. — Subsequent commemorating inscriptions. — Impressive epigram of Simonides.
CHAPTER XLI.
BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.
Surprise and terror of the Greeks immediately after the battle of Thermopylæ. — No ulterior plan of defence formed — no new position to be found, capable of defending Attica — the Peloponnesians crowd to fortify the Isthmus of Corinth. — Hopeless situation of the Athenians — no measures yet taken to remove their families from Attica. — The Athenians abandon Attica, removing their families and property to Salamis, Ægina, Trœzen, etc. — Unavoidable hurry and sufferings of the emigrants. — Energy of the Athenians, and unanimity of the leaders — Themistoklês proposes the restoration of Aristeidês from exile. — Numbers and composition of the combined Greek fleet at Salamis. — Xerxes occupies Athens and Attica — the Persian fleet enters the road of Phalêrum. — The Persian army ravage the Phocian townships in their march from Thermopylæ to Attica — pillage of the temple at Abæ. — Persian division detached against the temple of Delphi. — Failure, flight, and ruin of the detachment. — Xerxes with the Peisistratids in Athens — the acropolis holds out — is taken and sacked. — Atoning visit of the Peisistratids to the ruined acropolis. — Xerxes reviews his fleet at Phalêrum — debate about the policy of fighting a naval battle at Salamis — prudent counsel of Queen Artemisia. — Resolution taken by Xerxes to fight at Salamis. — Dissensions among the Greeks in the fleet at Salamis. Resolution taken to remove the fleet to the Isthmus. — Ruinous consequences, if that resolution had been executed. — Themistoklês opposes the resolution, persuades Eurybiadês, and prevails upon him to reopen the debate. — Synod of Grecian chiefs again convened — Themistoklês tries to get the former resolution rescinded — the Peloponnesians adhere to it — angry words. — Menace of Themistoklês to retire with the Athenian squadron, unless a battle were to be fought at Salamis — Eurybiadês takes upon him to adopt this measure. — The Peloponnesian chiefs, silenced for the moment, afterwards refuse obedience. Third synod convened — renewed disputes; the majority opposed to Themistoklês and determined on retreating to the Isthmus. — Desperate stratagem of Themistoklês — he sends a private message across to Xerxes, persuading him to surround the Greek fleet in the night, and thus render retirement impossible. — Impatient haste of Xerxes to prevent any of the Greeks from escaping — his fleet incloses the Greeks during the night. — Aristeidês comes in the night to the Greek fleet from Ægina — informs the chiefs that they are inclosed by the Persians, and that escape has become impossible. — Position of Xerxes — order of the fleets, and plan of attack. — Battle of Salamis — confusion and complete defeat of the Persians. — Distinguished gallantry of Queen Artemisia. — Expectations of the Greeks that the conflict would be renewed — fears of Xerxes for his own personal safety — he sends his fleet away to Asia. — Xerxes resolves to go back himself to Asia — advice and recommendation of Mardonius, who is left behind, as general, to finish the conquest of Greece. — The Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros — second stratagem of Themistoklês by secret message to Xerxes. — Themistoklês with the fleet — levying money in the Cyclades. — Xerxes evacuates Attica and returns home by land, with the larger portion of his army. — Retreating march of Xerxes to the Hellespont — sufferings of his troops. He finds the bridge broken, and crosses the strait on shipboard into Asia. — Joy of the Greeks — distribution of honors and prizes. — Honors rendered to Themistoklês.
CHAPTER XLII.
BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.
The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kymê, and collects in the spring at Samos. — The Greek fleet assembles in the spring at Ægina. — General adherence of the medizing Greeks to Mardonius — revolt of Potidæa — which is besieged in vain by Artabazus. — Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the Bœotian oracles. — Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the most honorable terms of peace. — Temptation to Athens to accept this offer — fear of the Lacedæmonians that she would accept it — Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it. — Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering. — Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens. — The Spartans, having fortified the Isthmus, leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second time. — Second migration of the Athenians to Salamis — their bitter disappointment and anger against Sparta for deserting them. — Second offer of Mardonius to the Athenians — again refused — intense resolution which they display. — Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta — ungenerous slackness of the Spartans. — Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus. — Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into Bœotia. — Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally: Thersander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies between Mardonius and Artabazus, the second in command — zeal and eagerness of the Thebans. — Numbers of the Greeks collected under Pausanias. — March of Pausanias over Kithæron into Bœotia. — He is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much harassed — superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry — Masistius is slain. — The Greeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds and take up a position nearer to Platæa, along the Asôpus. — Mardonius alters his position, and posts himself nearly opposite to the Greeks on the other side of the Asôpus. — Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack — the prophets on both sides discourage first aggression. — Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear. — Impatience of Mardonius — in spite of the reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favorable to him. — His intention communicated to the Athenians in the night by Alexander of Macedon. — Pausanias changes places in the line between the Spartans and Athenians. — Mardonius again attacks them with his cavalry. — In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island. — Confusion of the Grecian army in executing this night-movement. — Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus to obey the order for the night-march. — Mistrust of Pausanias and the Spartans, exhibited by the Athenians. — Pausanias moves without Amompharetus, who speedily follows him. — Astonishment of Mardonius on discovering that the Greeks had retreated during the night — he pursues and attacks them with disorderly impatience. — Battle of Platæa. — Great personal bravery of the Persians — they are totally defeated, and Mardonius slain. — The Athenians on the left wing defeat the Thebans. — Artabazus, with a large Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece — the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the fortified camp. — Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought. — The Greeks attack and carry the fortified camp. — Loss on both sides. — Funeral obsequies by the Greeks — monuments — dead body of Mardonius — distribution of booty. — Pausanias summons Thebes, requiring the surrender of the leaders — these men give themselves up, and are put to death. — Honors and distinctions among the Greek warriors. — Reverential tribute to Platæa, as the scene of the victory, and to the Platæans: solemnities decreed to be periodically celebrated by the latter, in honor of the slain. — Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed by the victors, to hold meetings at Platæa. — Proceedings of the Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians. — The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to Mykalê in Ionia. — Mistrust of the fidelity of the Ionians entertained by the Persian generals. — The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore — revelation of the victory of Platæa, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, springs up in their minds before the battle. — Battle of Mykalê — revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp — complete defeat of the Persians. — Retirement of the defeated Persian army to Sardis. — Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance — proposition to transport them across the Ægean into Western Greece — rejected by the Athenians. — The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese. — Siege of Sestos — antipathy of the Chersonesites against Artayktês. — Capture of Sestos — crucifixion of Artayktês. — Return of the fleet to Athens.
CHAPTER XLIII.
EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.
Agrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B. C. — Phalaris despot of Agrigentum. — Syracuse in 500 B. C. — oligarchical government under the Gamori, or privileged descendants of the original proprietary colonists — the Demos — the Kyllyrii, or Serfs. — Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily — original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots — attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus. — Kleander despot of Gela, B. C. about 500. — First rise of Gelo and Ænesidêmus in his service. Têlinês, the first marked ancestor of Gelo. — Gelo — in high command among the mercenaries of Hippokratês despot of Gela. — Fate of the Ionic town of Zanklê, afterwards Messina — it is seized by the Samians — conduct of Hippokratês. — Hippokratês is victorious over the Syracusans — takes Kamarina — dies. — Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela. — Greatness of Gelo — he gets possession of Syracuse, and transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. — Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo — he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse and sells the Demos for slaves. — Increased power and population of Syracuse under Gelo — it becomes the first city in Sicily. — Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid, B. C. 481. — Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands. — Spartan and Athenian envoys apply to Gelo — his answer. — Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, simultaneous with the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. — The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besiege Himera — battle of Himera — complete victory gained over them by Gelo. — Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily — he grants peace to the Carthaginians. — Conduct of Gelo towards the confederate Greeks who were contending against Xerxes. — Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among the Carthaginian cities — their prosperity, especially that of Agrigentum. — Death and obsequies of Gelo. — Number of new citizens whom Gelo had introduced at Syracuse. — Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse — jealous of his brother Polyzêlus — harsh as a ruler — quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thêro of Agrigentum — appeased by the poet Simonides. — Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro. — Power and exploits of Hiero — against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians — against Anaxilaus — he founds the city of Ætna — new wholesale transplantation of inhabitants — compliments of Pindar. — Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Thêro of Agrigentum. Thrasydæus, son of Thêro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government — he is defeated by Hiero and expelled. — Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of Thrasydæus — his death. — Thrasybulus, brother and successor of Hiero — disputes among the members of the Gelonian family. — Cruelties and unpopularity of Thrasybulus — mutiny against him at Syracuse. — Expulsion of Thrasybulus, and extinction of the Gelonian dynasty. — Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities — confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes. — Internal dissensions and combat in Syracuse. — Defeat of the Gelonians — Syracuse made into one popular government, one city, one fortification. — Disorders in other Sicilian cities, arising from the return of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katana and Ætna. — General congress and compromise — the exiles are provided for — Kamarina again restored as a separate autonomous city. — Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favor of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities. — Italiot Greeks — destructive defeat of the inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium.
CHAPTER XLIV.
FROM THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.
Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece — his own defects — inferior quality and slackness of most of his army. — Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks. — Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great. — No improvement in warfare among the Persians during that interval of one hundred and fifty years — great improvement among the Greeks. — Progressive spirit in Greece — operating through Athenian initiative. — Conduct of Athens in the repulse of the Persians — her position, temper, and influence, after that event. — Proceedings of the Athenians to restore their city — jealous obstructions caused by the Peloponnesians. — Stratagem of Themistoklês to procure for the Athenians the opportunity of fortifying their city. — Athens fortified — confusion of the Spartans — disappointment of the allies. — Effect of this intended, but baffled, intervention upon Athenian feelings. — Enlargement of the walls of Athens. — Large plans of Themistoklês for the naval aggrandizement of the city — fortified town and harbor provided at Peiræus — vast height and thickness projected for the walls. — Advantages of the enlarged and fortified harbor — increase of metics and of commerce at Athens. — Resolution to build twenty new triremes annually. — Expedition of the united Greek fleet against Asia, under the Spartan Pausanias — capture of Byzantium. — Misconduct of Pausanias — refusal of the allies to obey him — his treasonable correspondence with Xerxes. — Pausanias, having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his behavior. He is recalled to Sparta. — The allies transfer the headship from Sparta to Athens. — Importance of this change in the relations of the Grecian states. — Tendency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreign service — Leotychidês. — Momentary Pan-Hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes — now broken up and passing into a schism, with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens. — Proceedings of Athens in her capacity of leader — good conduct of Aristeidês. — Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as president — general meetings of allies held in that island. — Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made by Aristeidês — definite obligation in ships and money — money total — Hellênotamiæ. — Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members. — State and power of Persia at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed. — Conduct of Pausanias after being removed from the command — he prosecutes his treasonable designs in conjunction with Persia. — He is recalled to Sparta — imprisoned — put on his trial — tries to provoke the Helots to revolt. — He is detected by the revelation of a slave — incredulity or fear of the Ephors. — His arrest and death — atonement made for offended sanctuary. — Themistoklês is compromised in the detected treason of Pausanias. — Position of Themistoklês at Athens — tendency of Athenian parties and politics. — Effect of the events of the Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment — stimulus to democracy. — Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution — all citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to office: first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates — next, sortition, or drawing by lot. — Increase of the power of the Stratêgi — alteration in the functions and diminution of the importance of the archons. — Administration of Athens enlarged — new functionaries appointed — distribution between Athens and Peiræus. — Political career and precarious tenor of Themistoklês — bitter rivals against him — Kimon, Alkmæon, etc. — His liability to charges of corruption. — Themistoklês is charged with accepting bribes from Persia — acquitted at Athens. — Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracized. — While in banishment under ostracism, the Lacedæmonians prefer a charge of treason against him. — Flight and adventures of Themistoklês. — Themistoklês gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian king. — Stories about the relations between the Persian king and Themistoklês. — Real treatment of Themistoklês in Persia. — Influence which he acquires with the Persian king. — Large reward which he receives — His death at Magnesia. — Death of Aristeidês — his poverty.
CHAPTER XLV.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD. — FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.
Consequence of the formation of the confederacy of Delos. — Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens. — Distinction between the confederacy of Delos, with Athens as president — and the Athenian empire which grew out of it. — Tendency to confuse these two, and to impute to Athens long-sighted plans of ambition. — The early years, after the formation of the confederacy of Delos, were years of active exertion on the part of Athens. — Our imperfect knowledge of them. — Necessity of continued action against the Persians, even after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê. This necessity was the cause, both of the willing organization of the confederacy of Delos and of the maritime improvement of Athens. — Confederacy of Delos — sworn to by all the members — perpetual and peremptory — not allowing retirement nor evasion. — Enforcing sanction of Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod. — Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies — substitution of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens. — Change in the position as well as in the feelings of Athens. — Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece — causes of it. — Synod of Delos — gradually declines in importance and vanishes. — Superior qualities and merit of the Athenians as compared with the confederates of Delos generally. — Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos — assessment of Aristeidês. — Events between B. C. 476-466. — Eion — Skyros — Karystus. — Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy. — The Hero Theseus. — First revolt among the members of the confederacy of Delos — Naxos revolts and is reconquered. — Operations of Athens and the confederacy against Persia. — Defeat of the Persians by Kimon at the river Eurymedon. — Revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of Delos. — Siege of Thasos by the Athenians under Kimon. — Mines in Thrace. — First attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain. — Reduction of Thasos after a blockade of two years — it is disarmed and dismantled. — Application of the Thasians to Sparta for aid — granted, but not carried into effect — glimpse of hostilities between Sparta and Athens. — Trial and acquittal of Kimon at Athens. — Great increase of the Athenian power. — Proceedings in Central Greece between 470-464 B. C. Thebes and the Bœotian towns. Discredit of Thebes. — Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser Bœotian towns. — Events in Peloponnesus — Arcadia — Elis, etc. — Terrible earthquake at Sparta, 464 B. C. — Revolt of the Helots. — The Lacedæmonians invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted Helots. — March of the Athenians under Kimon into Laconia, to aid them. — Mistrust conceived by the Lacedæmonians of their Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure and change of policy at Athens. — The Athenians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position of Argos — her conquest of Mykênæ and other towns. — Megara becomes allied with Athens. Growing hatred of Corinth and the neighboring Peloponnesian states towards Athens. — Energetic simultaneous action of the Athenians — in Cyprus, Phenicia, Egypt, and Greece — they build the first “Long Wall” from Megara to Nisæa. — War of Athens against Corinth, Ægina, etc. Total defeat of the Æginetans at sea. — The Athenians besiege Ægina — the Corinthians, Epidaurians, etc. are defeated by the Athenians under Myrônidês. — The Long Walls between Athens and Peiræus are projected — espoused by Periklês, opposed by Kimon — political contentions at Athens — importance of the Long Wall. — Expedition of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia — they restore the ascendancy of Thebes. — Intention of the Spartan army in Bœotia to threaten Athens and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party opposed to the Long Walls. — Battle of Tanagra — defeat of the Athenians. — Effects of the battle — generous behavior of Kimon — he is recalled from ostracism. — Compromise and reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties at Athens. — Victory of Œnophyta gained by the Athenians — they acquire ascendency over all Bœotia, Phocis, and Lokris. — Completion of the Long Walls. — Conquest of Ægina, which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered tributary. — The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus — their operations in the gulf of Corinth. — Defeat and losses of the Athenians in Egypt. — The revolted Helots in Laconia capitulate and leave the country. — Truce for five years concluded between Athens and Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Kimon. — Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia. — Death of Kimon at Cyprus — victories of the Athenian fleet — it returns home. — No farther expeditions of the Athenians against Persia — convention concluded between them. — Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention — doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of those doubts — confirmatory hints of Thucydidês. — Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, succeeds Kimon as leading opponent of Periklês. — Transfer of the common fund of the confederacy from Delos to Athens. — Gradual passage of the confederacy into an Athenian empire. — Transfer of the fund was proposed by the Samians. — Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of inland and maritime states. — Commencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens. — Revolt of Bœotia from Athens — defeat of the Athenians at Korôneia — they evacuate Bœotia. — Revolt of Phocis, Lokris, Eubœa, and Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under the Lacedæmonian king Pleistoanax. — Eubœa reconquered by Periklês. — Humiliation and despondency of Athens. — Conclusion of the Thirty years’ truce. — Diminution of Athenian power. — Feud between Athens and Megara.
CHAPTER XLVI.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.
First establishment of the democratical judicial system at Athens. — Union, in the same hands, of functions both administrative and judicial in early Athens — great powers of the magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus. — Magistrates generally wealthy men — oligarchical tendencies of the senate of Areopagus — increase of democratical sentiment among the bulk of the citizens. — Political parties in Athens. — Periklês and Ephialtês democratical: Kimon, oligarchical or conservative. — Democratical Dikasteries, or Jury-courts, constituted by Periklês and Ephialtês. — How these dikasteries were arranged. — Pay to the dikasts introduced and made regular. — The magistrates are deprived of their judicial and confined to administrative functions. — Senate of Areopagus — its antiquity — semi-religious character — large and undefined controlling power. — Large powers of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. — New interests and tendencies then growing up at Athens. — Senate of Areopagus — a centre of action for the conservative party and Kimon. — Opposition between Kimon and Periklês — inherited from their fathers. — Character and working of Periklês. — Reserved, philosophical, and business-like habits of Periklês — his little pains to court popularity — less of the demagogue than Kimon. — Ephialtês belonging to the democratical party, and originally equal to Periklês in influence. — Efforts of Ephialtês against magisterial abuse. — Kimon and his party, more powerful than Ephialtês and Periklês, until the time when the Athenian troops were dismissed from Laconia. — Ostracism of Kimon. — Measures carried by Ephialtês and Periklês to abridge the power of the senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. — Institution of the paid dikasteries. — Separation of judicial from administrative functions. — Assassination of Ephialtês by the conservative party. — Commencement of the great ascendency of Periklês, after the death of Ephialtês. Compromise between him and Kimon. — Brilliant success of Athens, and era of the maximum of her power. — Other constitutional changes. — The Nomophylakes. — The Nomothetæ — distinction between laws and psephisms, or special decrees — process by which laws were enacted and repealed. — Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated to the procedure in judicial trials. — Graphê Paranomôn — indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional propositions. — Working of the Graphê Paranomôn. — Conservative spirit in which it is framed. — Restraint upon new propositions, and upon the unlimited initiative belonging to every citizen. — Abusive extension of the Graphê Paranomôn afterwards. — It was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an existing law — without personal aim against the author of the law. — Numbers and pay of the dikasts, as provided by Periklês. — The Athenian democracy, as constituted by Periklês, remained substantially unaltered afterwards down to the loss of Athenian independence — excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. — Working of the numerous dikasteries — their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimidation — liability of individual magistrates to corruption. — The Athenian dikasteries are jury-trial applied on the broadest scale — exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in an exaggerated form. — The encomiums usually pronounced upon the theory of jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the Athenian dikasteries. — Imperfections of jury-trial — exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries. — Powerful effects of the dikasteries in exercising and stimulating the intellect and feelings of individual citizens. — Necessity of learning to speak — growth of professional teachers of rhetoric — professional composers of speeches for others. — Rhetors and Sophists. — Polemics of Sokratês, himself a sophist, against the sophists generally. — Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the democracy. — The dikasteries were composed, not exclusively of poor men, but of middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.
In the last chapter but one of the preceding volume, I described the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens: an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested,—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them, as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships, both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece.[1] Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises,—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt,—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendency of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition.[2] It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.
The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest[3] and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that, even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it well might have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.
On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that the tribute was increased, as well as the numbers of the Persian occupying force maintained, by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.
But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. Nor were there wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation, both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa, and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas: while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus,—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out, prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, Hipparchus banished him with indignation. The Peisistratids, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offence, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed: for when introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions wherein the bridging of the Hellespont and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus,[4] strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political cooperation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Nor indeed was it difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire.[5] The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged: and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition;—“it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings.”[6] Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras,[7] when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece,—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.
Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced to them his resolution to invade Greece, setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the æther of Zeus and the limits of the sun’s course. On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant,—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear coördinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian’s own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Crœsus, as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, “Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello,” in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second book of the Iliad: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project,—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host,—have both of them marked parallels in the Iliad: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces “the counsel of Zeus” as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the Iliad and Odyssey:[8] though the godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus,—that the godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man,—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination: for we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his “malignity,” neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.[9]
I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius: this was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.[10] As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force[11] of Persia and depreciating the Ionians in Europe—so he denominated them—as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor emboldens him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek: it opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision,—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger,—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont,—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction—averted only by Histiæus and his influence—of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the godhead towards overgrown human power.[12]
The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall, stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his angry language towards Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. “If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed.”[13] Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne[14]), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. “Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine.”[15] Accordingly, Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and, as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, “Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou too shalt not escape, either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be.” With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakes in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. “I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsion is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands.”[16]
It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated: partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Platæa,—but still more in the influence of “mischievous Oneiros,” who is sent by the gods—as in the second book of the Iliad—to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined—as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês, and others—that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry: modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise, as Herodotus tells us,[17] in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appeared to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed[18] into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the Persæ of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis,—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man,[19] though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.[20]
While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion: considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, he began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war,—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transports, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish,[21] was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes. The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa, including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdêra, with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa.[22] It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war,—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the medizing Greeks,—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.
In the autumn of the year 481 B. C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.[23] From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatêbus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once: the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and coöperate. A fleet of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover, Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that which his father Darius had displayed in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of military preparation, there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.[24]
If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience,—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme,—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia; but this bridge, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact, that the poet Æschylus[25] speaks as if he had never heard of it, while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered, both by Persians and by Greeks, as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather, the two separate bridges not far removed from each other—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighborhood of Abydos, on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprized of this catastrophe, burst all bounds; it was directed partly against the chief-engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off,[26] but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with three hundred lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment: moreover Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes will cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water.”[27]
Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont,—Herodotus calls them “non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms,” which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont,[28] as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact: the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy’s calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and wide-spread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion: and although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary Fetichism, and banishes it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fictions, yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit, and even an intelligent man[29] may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens,—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border: and the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day’s hunting,[30] scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath: and the vengeance ascribed by Herodotus to Cyrus towards the river Gyndês (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts essentially public in their nature,—known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified,—the decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus[31] (as well as to Arrian, afterwards), not childish but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.
New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was doubtless executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns towards the Euxine, and their heads towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly towards the latter.[32] They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and sixty: the number in the other, three hundred and fourteen. Over or through each of the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along that line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling trading vessels, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.
Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other.[33] Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured by ropes to keep them in their places: and lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed, out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.
The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the main land.[34] That isthmus, near the point where it joins the main land, was about twelve stadia or furlongs across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic gulf: and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire,[35] were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians,—Bubarês and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.
Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus, respecting this work, deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides: the others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides,—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: “for it would have cost no trouble at all,” he observes,[36] “to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed.” So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B. C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove, or slip, being seemingly prepared for them: such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; and that the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus, and a subject of the brave queen Artemisia, may perhaps have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians,[37]—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling: the Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact, when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.
At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls, or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon: and these two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter, 481-480 B. C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring, 480 B. C.
While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water: for news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare “dinner” for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it,—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification,[38]—while another was misinterpreted into a favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests. On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns: a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself, with his guards and select Persians. First of all[39] came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations: next, the select troops, one thousand Persian cavalry, with one thousand Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses,—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian, named Patiramphês, being seated in it by the side of the monarch,—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of one thousand horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of one thousand horse, ten thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, all native Persians. Of these ten thousand Persian infantry, called the Immortals, because their number was always exactly maintained, nine thousand carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining one thousand distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell.[40] Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.
On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. “I possess (replied Pythius) besides lands and slaves, two thousand talents of silver, and three million nine hundred and ninety-three thousand of golden darics, wanting only seven thousand of being four million. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough.” Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of seven thousand darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of four million. The latter was so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. “Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about thy son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me, with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity,—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection; but for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty.” He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain: of which one half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.[41]
A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.
From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaïkus,—then through Atarneus, Karinê, and the plain of Thêbê: they passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder.[42] From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals: in spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves, even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute: he ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed one thousand oxen to the patron goddess Athênê,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details,[43] abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date: and doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day’s march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium, and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.
On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis,—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity,—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore, and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phenicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents), but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. “Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators[44]), why dost thou, O Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish that without so much ado.” Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.
At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals,[45] the passage was ordered to begin: the bridges being perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar;—“I do not exactly know[46] (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it.” Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force,—the other, to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden. The ten thousand Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over, and Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him “under the lash.” But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over,—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.[47]
Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Hellê on his right,—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the gulf of Melas and the Ægean sea,—crossing the river from which that gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up—according to Herodotus—with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbor called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus, covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus: a fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Salê and Zonê, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled[48] the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.
Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. “What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus,[49] whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?” Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrênê. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations,[50] each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force; eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines; and the real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows: Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Utii, Myki, Parikanii, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Mariandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabêlians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were: Phenicians, three hundred ships of war; Egyptians, two hundred; Cypriots, one hundred and fifty; Kilikians, one hundred; Pamphylians, thirty; Lykians, fifty; Karians, seventy; Ionic Greeks, one hundred; Doric Greeks, thirty; Æolic Greeks, sixty; Hellespontic Greeks, one hundred; Greeks from the islands in the Ægean, seventeen; in all one thousand two hundred and seven triremes, or ships of war, with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costume and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied; but it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i. e. arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,[51]—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight); while the other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords, and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them; their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire.[52] A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of eight thousand horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.
It was at Doriskus that the fighting men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,[53] and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of inclosure built around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising ten thousand each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of one million seven hundred thousand foot, besides eighty thousand horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of twenty thousand additional men.[54] Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the twelve hundred and seven triremes,[55] or war-ships, of three banks of oars, but also three thousand smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised two hundred rowers, and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of two million three hundred and seventeen thousand men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed: deriving from hence a reinforcement of one hundred and twenty triremes with aggregate crews of twenty-four thousand men, and of three hundred thousand new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was two million six hundred and forty thousand men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to five million two hundred and eighty-three thousand two hundred and twenty! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the Eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus,[56] who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of “camp followers” as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess: together with cattle, beasts of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.
To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible: yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited.[57] He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learned the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators,—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war, great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the “Persæ” gives the exact number of twelve hundred and seven Persian ships as having fought at Salamis: but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus[58] has himself enumerated six hundred and forty-seven ships as lost or destroyed, and only one hundred and twenty as added. No exaggeration, therefore, can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about two hundred and seventy-six thousand as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of three thousand smaller ships, and still more, that of one million seven hundred thousand infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate,—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself,—so that the military total of land-force and ships’ crews, which Herodotus gives as two million six hundred and forty-one thousand on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions noway admissible; for though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier, or attendant, for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.[59] And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions, when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude; and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire, that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded, and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offence, and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march,—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data: and when we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantineia,[60] we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased; for Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise, and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.
Ktesias gives the total of the host at eight hundred thousand men, and one thousand triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the eight hundred thousand men, as seems probable, the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of seven hundred thousand men: Diodorus[61] appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is, in some sort, an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us both their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us, in his Persæ, a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men,—the women of Susa are left without husbands and brothers,—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men.[62] The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.
After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers: he then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme, which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent, and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about four hundred feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence, and it was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries,—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks to such a force was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language.[63] Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterwards, by the last monarch of Persia.[64]
After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies: all was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed: the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodopê. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland, and the Grecian colonies Dikæa,[65] Maroneia, and Abdêra, were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men; and, what was still more ruinous, they were further constrained to provide a day’s meal for the immense host as it passed: for the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch,—grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around: on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course, so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for this purpose, was no less than four hundred talents[66] (equal to ninety-two thousand eight hundred pounds): while at Abdêra, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution.[67] A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.[68]
Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi, or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Nor were his religious feelings satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians: he here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the Spot:[69] moreover, he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ, near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos, which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ[70] refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodopê for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.
All the Greek cities, which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation; Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two southwestern capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic gulf, in the region called Krusis, or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallênê. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia,—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls, of prodigious size and fierceness: at length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.[71]
Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army, with additional contingents levied in his course, and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus.[72] The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself,—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ,—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him, shall be related in the coming chapter.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.
Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.
Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder, or Eurystheneïd, the latter to the younger, or the Prokleïd, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleïd king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long: his habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation, but which among the misdeeds of his life had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess:[73] but the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own,—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis,—the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenês had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenês was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad, they affirmed, through habits of intoxication, learned from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.[74]
The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,[75] yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person,—the Spartans, he observed, had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence realized.
Accordingly the Æginetans, instead of executing the sentence, contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit:[76] they justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone: but they probably recollected that the hostages were placed less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility,—which security they were not disposed to forego.
Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves: they waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium, on which occasion a ship peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs, or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know; but the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina,[77] beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B. C., and lasting until 481 B. C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.
An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island: having been before, as he thought, unjustly banished, he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly, on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town,—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient.[78] But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing: he was obliged to make his escape from the island after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans,—a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Dêmêtêr Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp: his pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping[79] the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries; but the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Dêmêtêr never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.[80]
The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number, and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybatês, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.
At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybatês, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat: he slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sôphanês of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.[81] At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides,—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part;[82] the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.
The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerned with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.
The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in my preceding volume. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival, Themistoklês, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into coöperation: and the rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidês himself is reported to have said, “If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both of us into the barathrum.” Under such circumstances, it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, of which so much has been said in the preceding volume. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidês was banished.
Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was, the important change of policy above alluded to,—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power,—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklês:[83] on that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidês would probably be found opposed to it,—but it was, moreover, a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life and narrow range of active duty and experience, which Aristeidês seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas and the quickness of his intelligence:[84] the land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers:[85] though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman, whose training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete,[86] than that of the Athenian hoplite, or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklês, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.
In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklês displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidês, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor,—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression and increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklês knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon;[87] against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklês, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia.[88] Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen,—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklês was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalêrum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus, with its three separate natural ports,[89] admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus,—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.”[90] The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes, at his first accession, towards Hellenic matters,—postponed until 480 B. C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B. C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls,—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.
Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built,—a considerable amount of public money,—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium[91] in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium,[92] amidst a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anaphlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus, nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons, were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenês first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights to all the parts, and a common centre at Athens,—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies,—on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one-twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.
We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklês made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum[93] arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens,—ten drachms to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years: new and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government, in order to produce at the moment so overflowing an exchequer and to furnish means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklês availed himself of this precious opportunity,—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia,—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.[94] One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution, insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.
Immense, indeed, was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper,—especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.[95] The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance;[96] and other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B. C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle: while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.
I have in the preceding volume pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: it seeks to combine, moreover, every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it,—even the Kretans, Korkyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are intreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose,[97]—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before,—enlarging, prodigiously, the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage,—and thus introducing increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.
Its first step was, indeed, one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among the particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of medizing,[98] i. e., embracing the cause of the Persians, which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius: but her present conduct gave no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens.[99] In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklês took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia.[100] The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit coöperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks,—and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.
These spies presently returned, having been detected and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous,—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human:[101] of course, such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace a manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed: “Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods,—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.”[102]
So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here, as elsewhere, the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here until death.” Upon which the priestess replied: “Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus.[103] But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant: when everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.”[104]
This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first: it left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible,—and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing, probably, the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by “the wooden wall?” Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out: but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever: the last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will: it harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle; and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistoklês, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as “wretched Salamis:” but the fact that it was termed “divine Salamis,” indicated that the parties, destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board.[105] Great, indeed, were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.
Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers:[106] nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states,—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence.[107] Nor was it only that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,[108] as will appear farther in the sequel. But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding state, and with regard to the land-force no one dreamed of contesting the preëminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea. and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force, at this moment of peril, would be compromised.[109] To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of preëminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character: a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.
We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance,—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive,—furnishing two thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment,[110]—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or at least lukewarm in the cause of independence,—so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three years afterwards), was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.[111] Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, to set forth the common danger and solicit coöperation; the result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained,—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle,—exacting only as conditions, that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship: but the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians, who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right, as nothing better than insolent encroachment. and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset,—preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.[112]
Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes, and some even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they medized, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards.[113] It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs; but probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression then so widely diffused throughout Greece as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending; nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, medizing.
The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;[114] the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weatherbound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.[115] Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.[116]
The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon, the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a [subsequent chapter]: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.[117]
The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was near the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B. C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen, it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted: the Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ:[118] while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes, for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus,[119] intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly, a body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklês, were despatched by sea to Halus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.[120] Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.
The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê, formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly: the lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.[121] But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain-passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them, and active in their service; who sent a communication of this fact to the Greeks at Tempê, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position.[122] This Macedonian prince passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.[123] On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying, or seeming to justify, the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the isthmus of Corinth,—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.[124]
This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states north of that boundary to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before.[125] When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name,—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænianes, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians,—among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Platæa. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.[126]
Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence appears to have been formed; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.[127]
CHAPTER XL.
BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.
It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment,—to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.[128] Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed it was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.
To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê,—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between mount Knêmis and cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium: a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiæa. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space[129] was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa, to the north and west, from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia, becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence: but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.
Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself,—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north, and Mount Œta to the south,—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—inclosed between mount Œta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Œta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.[130] On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phenix and the Asôpus, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.
Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Œta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated,—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri, or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phocians, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs, here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,[131] whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region,—mount Œta, Trachis, cape Kenæum, Lichades islands, the river Dyras: some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian maidens.
Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit; while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of mount Œta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories southeast of Œta, only through the strait gate;[132] save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain-path, which will be presently spoken of. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phocians was now half-ruined by age and neglect: but the Greeks easily reëstablished it, determined to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing: but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.
Though the resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken, seemingly, not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans,—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.[133] Along with them were five hundred hoplites from Tegea, five hundred from Mantineia, one hundred and twenty from the Arcadian Orchomenus, one thousand from the rest of Arcadia, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius, and eighty from Mykenæ. There were also, doubtless, Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by seven hundred hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by four hundred Thebans, of more equivocal fidelity, under Leontiadês. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly medized, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of four hundred men,[134] chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.
With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken, probably, only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious:[135] while the Phocians, if originally disposed to medize, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes, and influential in guiding his movements.[136] The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragement in their power. “The troops now at Thermopylæ, they said, were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard: nor was there any cause for fear, since the invader was, after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in preëminent condition.”[137] Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind: whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and one thousand Phocians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.
That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character,—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.[138] Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival obligations,—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice,—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.[139] The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force:[140] and they engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.
At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain-path starting from the neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Œta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path-–then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian gulf, the ancient Amphissa–-was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis, after the Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phocians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it.[141] But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain-path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them; and the Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.[142] So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.
Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows: one hundred Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platæa, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard; forty Corinthian, twenty Megarian, twenty Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis, and lent to them by Athens; eighteen Æginetan, twelve Sikyonian, ten Lacedæmonian, eight Epidaurian, seven Eretrian, five Trœzenian, two from Styrus in Eubœa, and two from the island of Keos. There were thus in all two hundred and seventy-one triremes; together with nine pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.[143] Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.
It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat,—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.
On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship’s head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps, observes the historian, his name may have contributed to determine his fate.[144] The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence—communicated by fire-signals[145] from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships—inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand.[146] They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy’s advance.
Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which king Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with.[147] Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succor was at hand.[148] On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.[149]
Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempê.[150] Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.[151] His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days:[152] the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family: he respected and protected these sacred places,—an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.[153] Along the shore of the Malian gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance,[154] now that the enemy were immediately in his front.
But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned, which captured the three Grecian guardships, that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,[155] his station in the Thermaic gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day’s sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable: but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach, where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê.[156] The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.[157] Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice,—not merely to the Winds, but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê,—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:[158] thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length, on the fourth day, calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed, put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia, to Aphetæ, at the entrance of the gulf of Pagasæ. Little, indeed, had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.
Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê,—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda in Karia,—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus,—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.[159]
Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack: a probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe, according to him, that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist: he had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under an Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman,—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence,—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.[160]
Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality: we rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Crœsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied,—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus[161] that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,[162] together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet, meanwhile, would be arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm: we may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.
The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,[163] manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks,[164] and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: “thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army.”[165]
At the end of two days’ fighting no impression had been made, the pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than courageous,—when a Malian, named Ephialtês, revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Persians, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honored as a patriot.[166] There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant,—indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phocians. At nightfall, Hydarnês with a detachment of Persians was detached along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Œtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phocian guard of one thousand men. In the stillness of daybreak, the noise of his army trampling through the wood[167] aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm asked his guide whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phocians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.
Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phocians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.[168] But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan[169] named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news: and even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended; but there was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,[170] forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy:[171] moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall a victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired, he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed: while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.
The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension:[172] the same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.[173] None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a preëstablished fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders;[174] while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans.[175] All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer,—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of medism: but when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for medism, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.
The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the three hundred Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with seven hundred Thespians and apparently four hundred Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide, Ephialtês, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive,[176] but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat all together on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.[177]
Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades,—three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless, Herodotus mentions the Spartans Diênekês, Alpheus, and Maron,—and the Thespian Dithyrambus,—as standing preëminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned.[178] “The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learned the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred, and even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta.[179] One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpêni, suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprized that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.[180] He was denounced as “the coward Aristodêmus;” no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.[181] After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honor at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.
Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands, and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves,—an indignity to which their commander, Leontiadês was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author,[182] who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.
The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind: he was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible,—he now learned to be anxious respecting the resistance which remained behind. “Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me, how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?” “O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone, there are eight thousand adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers.” “Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?” Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.[183]
Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxes, interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who, he affirmed, like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune, above his own. The fleet, added he, after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass.[184]
A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number: yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.[185]
Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return, by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm,—and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy’s fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and refused: and he was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon, to Themistoklês, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs: the most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.[186]
However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish without the money,—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistoklês, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium: but his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome,—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.[187] It was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait: but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus,[188] they would have packed up and removed long before: for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but, having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.
Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.[189] Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks,—and postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter,—Skyllias of Skionê. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.[190]
It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ.[191] Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.[192] Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries: to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the circumference;[193] in this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks: but the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station,—the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.[194]
The result of this first day’s combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer,—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece,—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder, prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril: the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.[195]
But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults,—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments,—still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it.[196] The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.
Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders,—and Themistoklês, as it seems, among them,—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece:[197] though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklês to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklês, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some neighboring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible,—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklês hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency.[198] With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.
The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiæa and the neighboring territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were left out,—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.[199] According to the statement of Herodotus, twenty thousand men were slain on the side of the Persians,—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as four thousand: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the three hundred Spartans, the seven hundred Thespians, and the four hundred Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days’ battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about seven thousand:[200] but the epigram, composed shortly afterwards, and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that four thousand warriors “from Peloponnesus had here fought with three hundred myriads or three million of enemies.”[201] Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of four thousand warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal,—especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: “Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians, that we lie here, in obedience to their orders.” On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor of Leonidas; decorated, apparently, with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, “who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs.”
CHAPTER XLI.
BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.
The sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.[202] Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations,—and, what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan,—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.[203] Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader, Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns,[204] as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium,[205] were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades,—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.[206]
At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.[207] It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.[208] As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,[209] abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,[210] while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair’s breadth of ruin.
If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.[211] The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.[212]
Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,[213] and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.[214] The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go father than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution. The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.[215] Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation[216] of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades.[217] When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,[218] we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.
In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy,—arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklês proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included but even specially designated among them his own great opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.[219] It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in the public treasury,—but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others,[220] and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.
This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon’s head from the statue of Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man’s baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying out, available to the public service.[221] By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica,—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.[222] Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.
The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of three hundred and sixty-six ships,—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.[223] The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.[224]
Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. “What prize does the victor receive?” he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch’s uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders: “Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!”[225] Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.
Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms.[226] Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.[227] The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which medized and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Platæa: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.[228]
Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard,—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death,—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also, as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.[229] Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.
Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain,—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.[230] The Athenian acropolis,—a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to south,—had no practicable access except on the western side:[231] moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus:[232] from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified:[233] moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.[234] The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.[235]
Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.[236] On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,[237] as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city: not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.
About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê,—an estimate certainly not admissible.[238]
Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis,—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island,—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia,—an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,[239] and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the next day,[240] while the land-force should move forward towards Peloponnesus.
Whilst on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation,—great, indeed, was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the land service,—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.[241] In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.[242]
Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corinthian in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place,—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.
When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron,—he found an Athenian friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês. On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.[243] He vehemently urged Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed himself to each of the chief’s separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying: “Themistoklês, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged.” “True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns.”[244]
Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate, and vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus,—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent,—Athens being in the power of the enemy: nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês, until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said: “If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.[245] For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying.”
Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;[246] the succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis,—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.
But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were they not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked.[247] Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans,[248] and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent,—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave,—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,[249] who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master,—was instructed to acquaint them privately, in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.[250]
Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklês across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days,[251] as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch: nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.
It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night,[252] to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica,—its head-quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus,—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum: while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica. During the night,[253] a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.[254] These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor the next morning.
Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval force on the other,—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favorable to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly, the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklês himself, he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklês to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence, and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.[255]
Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,[256]—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phenicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,[257]—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.[258]
The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians; and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate,—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet,—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.[259] The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example.[260] The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phenician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and some even averse;[261] the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage,—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other: those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance:[262] the oar-blades were broken by collision,—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship’s course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum:[263] Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral, Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was great:[264] the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand. It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent it.[265]
In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit,—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city;[266] but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy’s ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, “Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy’s ship?” Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, “My men have become women; my women, men.” Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships,—among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.[267]
Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.[268]
Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second engagement.[269] But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity[270] of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations,—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects;[271] he fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube.[272] Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.[273] Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night,—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board.[274] They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.[275]
This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch,—it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him[276] in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do,—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious,—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch’s revenge upon Hellas;—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch’s wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. “If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked, contemptuously[277]), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens.” Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport them to Ephesus.
The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes,—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he, Themistoklês, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge,—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.[278] Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.
Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested,—since Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred,—and though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.
He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods,—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that they were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island,—Poverty and Helplessness.[279] In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals,[280] but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the fleet was brought back to Salamis.[281]
The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all, according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to Winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.[282]
Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were circulated,[283]—inconsistent with each other, fanciful and even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,[284] delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow,—magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing: the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed,—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days’ march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.[285] But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never, since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as the presumed conqueror of the western world.[286]
Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed.[287] In the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.[288] Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.[289]
Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the second.[290] The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the frontiers of Tegea.[291] Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended by being deprived of the general prize,—and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his post of general and Xanthippus nominated.[292] Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus: the fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklês.
CHAPTER XLII.
BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.
Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos: in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.[293] Early in the spring they were reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.[294]
For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hêraklês,[295]—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.
Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,[296] and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê, together with the other towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius, in Thessaly.[297]
The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian, named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.[298] It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.[299] The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.[300] The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend, to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its isthmus.[301]
This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians reëstablished wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.[302] The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: “Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know that, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless, love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.”[303]
To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.[304] The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,[305] and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.
Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.[306] But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed, their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.[307] Besides these two reasons,—indifference and unfavorable omens,—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object, says the historian,[308] to fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.
Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B. C.[309]
Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.[310] The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.
Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor: unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.[311] Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.
While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed, and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.[312] Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Periœki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias.
It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.[313] We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia,—a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,[314] he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Platæa through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes, seemingly near to that of Platæa.[315] He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiæ, and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp[316] of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.
Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes[317] in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:[318] even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged, and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,[319] continued thus: “Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied: “Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:” but the Persian rejoined: “My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over any result.”[320] “This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of Platæa.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.[321] Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.
Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous cavalry all around them: while the phêmê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.[322] The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.[323]
Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Trœzen, one thousand; from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from Phlius, one thousand; from Hermionê, three hundred; from Eretria and Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palê in Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian hoplites, and six hundred Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.[324] The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed, or unarmed generally,—some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus; thirty-five thousand in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.[325]
Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions[326] continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows, and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.[327] So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,[328] however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.[329]
The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.[330] And so much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,[331] and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero, Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name,—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.[332] In the field, even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.
Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at fifty thousand:[333] nor can we place any confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.
In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in Elis,—the latter invited one from Leukas.[334] All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa[335] had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed[336] by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive. More over, the annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant: their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,[337] near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron, in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the Greeks.[338] Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.[339] In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.[340]
But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, “Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the Greeks.” With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.[341]
It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men’s minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,[342] that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.
The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he) remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”[343]
The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.[344]
No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy’s line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.[345] Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,[346] casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a “single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians.” This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable,—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.[347]
In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent, and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê,[348] both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.[349] It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy’s cavalry would have completely withdrawn.
In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;[350] insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum, or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i. e. between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.[351] Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan; nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,[352] obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring “that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner.”[353] Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.[354]
Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions: for in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised: the movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding:[355] yet it proved fortunate in its results,—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus; who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock, fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—“This is my pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers.” Pausanias denounced him as a madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the mean time the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat,—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt,—either to await Amompharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.[356] The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the island.
When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence, which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ: “These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!” With that, he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack, with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.
The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:[357] but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.
Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrion, or temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse, and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprize the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. Nor were the Athenians slack in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.[358] Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed, without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha, or long wicker shields, forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:[359] their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,[360] among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable:[361] but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge, and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.[362] They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.[363] Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.[364]
The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of three hundred of their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.[365] With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other medizing Greeks rendered any real service: instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that, in point of fact, the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right: the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.[366]
Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of forty thousand men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprized that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success, and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be contradicted. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army: accordingly, before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat: not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp, or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phocis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.[367]
As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle, was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order; the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of six hundred men.[368] But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the ruin of the general defeat.
Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea,—while his silver-footed throne, and cimeter[369] were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only three thousand men out of the three hundred thousand which had composed the army of Mardonius,—save and except the forty thousand men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.[370] Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss, his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified; while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than thirteen hundred and sixty Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites,—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.[371] Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,[372] while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other medizing Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia: the interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.[373] It will be seen that Artabazus afterwards rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.
Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasians, each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration: the Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus, the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês,—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians,[374]—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Platæa by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.[375] The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.[376] On the morrow, the body was stolen away and buried; by whom, was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius: the funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of the traveller Pausanias.[377]
The spoil was rich and multifarious,—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.[378] By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general,—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.[379] The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês, of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.[380] Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.
The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans: the Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.[381] It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantineia, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.[382]
There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius,—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the medizing leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory,—giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the latter at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,[383] that they were nowise implicated in the medism of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth, and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.[384] It is remarkable that Pausanias himself, only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta, under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.[385] In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted, as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.
Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Platæa, may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize,—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies,—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.[386] But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all,—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor, and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodêmus to a level with the most honored citizens.[387]
But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch, that the Platæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias, after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of this ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.[388] The Platæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê,—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.[389] In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias, and the whole body of allies, bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.
But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent: an aggregate force of ten thousand hoplites, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified: moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.[390] This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might reassemble, or be reinforced; indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable,[391] nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still medizing, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendency in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Platæa, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment, though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Platæa, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.[392]
On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Platæa, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important, at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet, which numbered one hundred and ten triremes, having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia,—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychidês was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, “Hegesistratus, i. e. army-leader.” “I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychidês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us,—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith.” Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Dêiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.[393]
When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,[394] and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy’s fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phenician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.[395] Here they were under the protection of a land-force of sixty thousand men, under the command of Tigranês,—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia: the ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.[396]
It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy’s fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them: but since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land; while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê,—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.[397]
Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day,—the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September) 479 B. C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platæa in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine phêmê, or message, flew into the camp,—whilst a herald’s staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean;—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,[398] and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their own story: he moreover mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity, there was a chapel of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê as well as at Platæa. Diodorus and other later writers,[399] who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.
The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Platæa, employed their gerrha, or wicker bucklers, planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows, and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it, and in driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of the pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,[400] with disadvantages of armor, such as had been felt severely at Platæa, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat: first, the disarmed Samians; next, other Ionians and Æolians; lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear, not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack; and the Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burned. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless: among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.[401] The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.[402]
The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat: the general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his cimeter and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,[403] who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês; the consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.[404] But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast, so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.
The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet had full confidence in their power of defending the islands, and willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Stratis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.[405] But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the medizing Greeks from their seaport towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.[406] The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute,[407]—yet, at the same time, to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendency and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos,—next, Athenian maritime empire.
From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge; for so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B. C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before, about November, 480 B. C.[408] Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês[409] down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia: from the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B. C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to reëstablish the ascendency of Athens and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese,—probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own.[410] To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another,—the importance of its corn-produce as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.[411] Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus,—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together, under Œobazus and Artayktês.[412]
The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus,—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore,[413] was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings, and probable deposits for security,—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran, that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him: “Master, here is the house of a Greek, who, in invading thy territory, met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade thy land,”—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. Nor was he content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.[414] Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison, which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted; nor was it without difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.
Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægos Potamos, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of one hundred talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of two hundred talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus and the citizens of Elæus disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.[415] There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.
After the capture of Sestus, the Athenian fleet returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.[416]
CHAPTER XLIII.
EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.
I have already mentioned, in the third volume of this history, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.
Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B. C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens, named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot, seemingly, about the year 570 B. C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it, by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.[417] Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêron established in that position.
It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the southeast of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.[418] With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B. C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês. The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical: we do not know under what particular modifications, but probably all more or less resembling that of Syracuse, where the Gamori—or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs—possessing large landed properties titled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllyrii, formed the qualified citizens, out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens, together with the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent: ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,[419] is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B. C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.[420] It was about the year 509 B. C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the northwestern corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions: such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia,[421]—a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.[422]
We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phenicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe,—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.[423]
Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander, despot of Gela, began to raise his city to ascendency over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,[424] did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus, the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction, by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle, and forced to seek shelter in the neighboring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the subterranean goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê; “from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus) I cannot say:” but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power,—deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phyê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament: the restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses,[425]—a function certainly honorable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.
Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes,—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits in the army of the despot Hippokratês as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to his activity that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.[426]
The fate of Zanklê,—seemingly held by its despot Skythês, in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium, on the opposite side of the strait of Messina,—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B. C. 494-493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode, and the Zanklæans especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily,—a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony,—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels,—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê: and his enemy the Rhegian Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,[427] at Inykus, in the interior of the island; but he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention, ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered,—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter,—imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.[428] The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it,—Anaxilaus, of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messênê,—a name which it ever afterwards bore;[429] and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B. C. 476.
Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having repeopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.[430]
Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendency enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B. C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators, called the Kyllyrii, and the smaller freemen, called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.[431] But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, and left Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space, he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled,—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighboring towns of Megara and Eubœa. Both these towns, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf cultivators dependent upon them, and a Dêmos, or body of smaller freemen, excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments,—both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the year, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves, under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. “His conduct (says Herodotus[432]) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with.” It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ, or dependent cultivators, occupying and tilling the land on their account,—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, and leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as “troublesome yoke-fellows,”—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy,—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.
So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and southeast of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.[433] A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute; besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence, he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis[434] the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia,—and Agêsias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus,[435]—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia; for the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiership; nor can we doubt that the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.[436] Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper, the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.
These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B. C., when the Greeks from the isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greek—so the historian tells us—twenty thousand hoplites, two hundred triremes, two thousand cavalry, two thousand archers, two thousand slingers, two thousand light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.[437] If this numerical statement could be at all trusted, which I do not believe, Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:[438] and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.
Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince, Dorieus;—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this plan,—and that, upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.[439] We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily,—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B. C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only,—that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land-force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest: “We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, we would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece,—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home,—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army,—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet,—we will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan.”
“Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring.”[440]
That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece, and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for preëminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.
The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them, as has been above stated, and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes,[441]—probably by the Phenicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless, this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro: while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus, Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus, and Selinus, seem to have formed an opposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.[442] It was seemingly about the year 481 B. C., that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage, backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian suffes, or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B. C., with a fleet of three thousand ships of war and a still larger number of storeships, disembarked a land-force of three hundred thousand men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.[443] These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.[444] This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies, which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,[445] in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general. Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town: while the Himeræans, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo,—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo’s horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships: while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, one hundred and fifty thousand men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled partly to the Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines,—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion: twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm in the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.[446] Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire, wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast),[447] to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:[448] on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of three thousand Grecian prisoners.[449]
We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.[450] Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê, wife of Gelo, on condition of paying two thousand talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.[451] If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship:[452] but such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know, moreover, that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.[453] Indeed, we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus, and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement, of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:[454] and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.
The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi: and the epigram of Simonidês,[455] composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Platæa. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable,—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus, to Delphi, with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.[456] When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis, and of the Carthaginians at Himera, cleared away, suddenly and unexpectedly, the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.
To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution: among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum: while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,[457] and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity,—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians,—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.[458]
The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover, he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint, not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one’s recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless, the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. Nor did the respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera ever afterwards die out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced, first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklês.[459] And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.
It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,[460] that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than ten thousand mercenary soldiers. It will, moreover, appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia, and the portion of the city closely bordering on it, which bore the name of Achradina,[461]—the interior strongholds of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of newcomers; but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.
Gelo left a son in tender years; but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force,—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero,—a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidês, Bacchylidês, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint, jealous in his temper, cruel and rapacious in his government,[462] and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction: but Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thêron; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and, on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place: it is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.[463]
The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus,—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera:[464] his victory was followed by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.[465]
The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:[466] he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighboring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbors, the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist.[467] Those heroic honors, which in Greece belonged to the œkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him; and he procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna,[468] on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted ten thousand new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna: five thousand from Syracuse and Gela,—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant, Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city: its religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model,[469] and Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar,[470] that Hiero was vain of his new title as founder; but we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.
Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians; but such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.[471] But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place, seemingly, about 472 B. C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar,—and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of twenty thousand men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbor, Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, two thousand men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and four thousand on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.[472] But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara, in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.[473] The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero: they are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,[474] nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.
The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him, is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,[475] the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern,—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.[476]
On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew, the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.[477] This family division,—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities,[478]—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his energy, in Thrasybulus,—who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those citizens whom Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, and master of the interior strongholds of the city,—the island of Ortygia with Achradina, while the great body of the revolted Syracusans were assembled in the outer city called Tychê. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes,—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot, like the powerful Thêro, to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus: Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans: Thrasybulus was totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, and obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia and Achradina, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.[479] The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri,—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus, son of Thêro at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.
Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.[480] Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.[481] The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,[482] and began their era of freedom.
But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought; but there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero,—the former alone had enrolled ten thousand, of whom more than seven thousand yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus, as a body, and probably many of them took part against him. After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution; and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty,—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner and separately fortified sections of Syracuse,[483]—Achradina and Ortygia,—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of all the outer sections of the city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position. They could only block it up, and intercept its supplies, which the garrison within were forced to come out and fight for. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial conflicts both by land and sea: the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of six hundred trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of six hundred, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per head.[484]
The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that the separate fortifications of the island and Achradina were abolished, and that from henceforward there was only one fortified city, until the time of the despot Dionysius, more than fifty years afterwards.[485]
Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory,—seemingly Sikel,—of Ennesia, or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,[486] with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder,—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.
These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by reëstablishing the city of Kamarina,[487] which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês, despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it,—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.[488] For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rights and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.[489]
Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,[490] probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos, or aggregate of small self-working proprietors, was considered as “a troublesome yoke-fellow,” fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation: it is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.
Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B. C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched three thousand of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of twenty thousand men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them: the battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion, both of Rhegians and Tarentines, perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.[491] Of the Tarentines slain, a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.[492]