Transcriber's Note:

Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original document have been preserved. Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.

In some cases, Bancroft uses both "u" and "v" to spell an author's name, e.g. Vetancurt and Vetancvrt.

Other archaic letter substitutions include "b" for "v" and "i" for "y" and vice versa. These have been left as printed.

Possible printer's errors include:

• On [page 5], córtes extraordinary should possibly be córtes extraordinarias.
• On [page 149], Patsun should possibly be Patzún.
• On [page 270], quarters should possibly be halves.
• On [page 387] repeated should possibly be repealed.
• On [page 652], 1855-5 appears to be an error.
• Joaquin Eufracio Guzman should possibly be Joaquin Eufrasio Guzman.
• Joaquin Eustacio Guzman should possibly be Joaquin Eufrasio Guzman.
• The index reference to ["Atrato River"] wasn't found.
• The index reference to ["Montaiglon, M. de, works of,"] wasn't found.

Possible alternate spellings or printers errors include:

• Jutecalpa and Jutigalpa
• Tempsky and Tempski
• Blazquez and Blasquez
• Savana and Sabana
• Sutiaba and Subtiaba
• Pontaz and Pontaza
• Mourgeon and Murgeon
• Iztapan and Iztapam
• Serapiqui, Sesapiqui, Sarapiqui River
• Carataska and Caratasca
• Gualcince and Gualcinse
• Nandaime, Nandayme, and Nandaimé
• mosquitoes and musquitoes
• Cuzcatlan and Cuscatlan
• Granadans and Granadians
• Chimilapa and Chimalapa
• Fitzroy and Fitz-Roy
• Victor and Víctor
• Jil and Gil
• Carlos and Cárlos
• Quiroz and Quiróz
• Angel and Ángel
• Vijil and Vigil
• Jerardo and Gerardo

Italics in the footnote citations were inconsistently applied by the typesetter.

Accents and other diacritics are inconsistently used.

This volume contains references to the previous seven volumes of this work. They can be found at:

• Volume 1: [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/41070/41070-h/41070-h.htm]
• Volume 2: [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/42808/42808-h/42808-h.htm]
• Volume 3: [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43123/43123-h/43123-h.htm]
• Volume 4: [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/44104/44104-h/44104-h.htm]
• Volume 5: [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/45268/45268-h/45268-h.htm]
• Volume 6 (Volume 1 of the History of Central America): [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/58658/58658-h/58658-h.htm]
• Volume 7 (Volume 2 of the History of Central America): [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/58669/58669-h/58669-h.htm]

THE WORKS
OF
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT.

VOLUME VIII.

HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA.
Vol. III. 1801-1887.

SAN FRANCISCO:
THE HISTORY COMPANY, PUBLISHERS.
1887.

Entered according to Act of Congress in the Year 1887, by
HUBERT H. BANCROFT,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

All Rights Reserved.

CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

HISTORY
OF
CENTRAL AMERICA.

CHAPTER I.
LAST DAYS OF SPANISH RULE.
1801-1818.

Popular Feeling in Central America—Effect of Events in Spain—Recognition of American Equality—Representation in the Spanish Córtes—Delusive Reforms—End of Saravia's Rule—President José Bustamante—His Despotic Course—Demands in the Córtes—Constitutional Guarantees—Official Hostility—Campaign in Oajaca—Revolutionary Movements in Salvador—War in Nicaragua—Conspiracy in Guatemala—Treatment of the Insurgents—Disrespect to the Diputacion—The Constitution Revoked—Royal Decrees.

The opening century was pregnant with important events both in Europe and America. By 1808 affairs in Spain culminated in the French emperor's detention of the king and other members of the royal family at Bayonne, where he forced them finally to resign in his favor their rights to the Spanish crown. The circle surrounding the captain-general, audiencia, and archbishop of Guatemala was made up, not only of European Spaniards, but of Guatemalans belonging to the so-called noble families. Popular displeasure was manifested both against the Spaniards and against the provincial aristocracy.[I-1] The oligarchy was hated throughout the province of Guatemala proper, and still more in the other provinces of the presidency.

However, when the news of Napoleon's usurpation reached America, it caused a strong revulsion of feeling in Central America, as well as elsewhere in the Spanish dominions, even among the large class which had hitherto secretly fostered a warm desire for independent national existence. Creoles of pure Spanish descent, though yearning to be free from the old thraldom, could not bring themselves to discard the country which gave them blood, religion, and civilization. As to the educated Indians, who were also among the wishers for independence, like all of their race, they looked up to the ruling power with reverence and fear. Thus arose a struggle between the old veneration and the love of freedom; a struggle which was to last in Central America a few years longer, though the people were becoming more and more impatient, while leaning to the side of independent nationality. Circumstances seemed to demand that the old connection should not be ruptured till 1821, when decisive results in New Spain brought on the final crisis here. When the news of Napoleon's acts of violence and usurpations reached Guatemala, popular loyalty was aroused, and showed itself in various ways. Manifestations by the authorities, expressive of fealty to the mother country and the royal family, met with an apparently hearty response from the people.

Advices came on the 30th of June, 1808, of the occurrences at Aranjuez of March 19th.[I-2] July passed amid much anxiety about affairs in Spain, and the public mind became depressed by unfavorable news received on the 13th of August. Next day, at a meeting of the authorities,[I-3] the state of affairs was anxiously discussed. The mariscal de campo, Antonio Gonzalez Mollinedo y Saravia, had succeeded Dolmas on the 28th of July, 1801, in the offices of governor, captain-general, and president of the audiencia. He had seen forty years of service in the royal armies,[I-4] and had with him his wife, Micaela Colarte, and offspring.[I-5]

SARAVIA AND FERNANDO VII.

President Saravia read to the meeting a despatch from the viceroy of Mexico, and a copy of the Gaceta giving an account of the abdication of Fernando VII., and of the surrender by other members of the royal family of their rights to the Spanish crown. After due consideration, the meeting declared these acts to have resulted from violence, being therefore illegal and unjust, and not entitled to recognition. It was further resolved that the authorities and people should renew their allegiance to the legitimate sovereign, continue upholding the laws hitherto in force, and maintain unity of action, for the sake of religion, peace, and good order. Instructions were received[I-6] to raise the standard of Fernando VII., and swear allegiance to him, which were duly carried out.[I-7]

The opportunity has now arrived for a radical change in the political status of Spanish America. The colonies have hitherto had no government, save that of rulers set over them by a monarch whose will was absolute, whose edicts constituted their code of laws; the subject being allowed no voice in public affairs, save occasionally as a timid petitioner. But troubles beset Spain at this time. Her king is powerless; the friends of constitutional government have now the control, and proceed to establish the desired liberal régime. In order to be consistent, and to some extent satisfy the aspirations of their fellow-subjects in America, the provisional government decrees, and the córtes upon assembling confirm, all the rights claimed for Spaniards dwelling in Spain, together with representation in the córtes and other national councils.

The Junta Suprema Central Gubernativa in the king's name declares on the 22d of January, 1809, the Spanish possessions in America to be, in fact, integral parts of the monarchy,[I-8] and, approving the report of the council of the Indies of November 21, 1808, in favor of granting to the American dominions representation near the sovereign, and the privilege of forming by deputies a part of the aforesaid junta, issues to the president of Guatemala an order to invite the people of the provinces to choose their deputy to reside at court as a member of the governing junta.[I-9] On the 3d of March, 1810, the electors assembled in Guatemala and chose for deputy the colonel of militia, Manuel José Pavon y Muñoz.[I-10] The powers given him by his constituents were general, but enjoined allegiance to the king and permanent connection with the mother country.[I-11]

DIPUTACION AMERICANA.

The supreme government, early in 1810, in its anxiety to be surrounded by the representatives of the people, hastened the convocation of córtes extraordinary. Fearing, however, that there might not be a sufficient number chosen for their timely attendance at the opening of the session, it apprised the provincial authorities, reiterating the decree a little later,[I-12] that deficiencies would be temporarily supplied until regularly elected deputies presented themselves to occupy their seats in the chamber. Guatemala, in common with the rest of America, was unable to send her deputies in time, and had to be represented at the inauguration by suplentes, or proxies. These[I-13] were Andrés del Llano, a post-captain, and Colonel Manuel del Llano. One of the first acts of the córtes[I-14] was to confirm the principle that all the Spanish dominions possessed the same rights, promising to enact at an early day laws conducive to the welfare of the American portion, and to fix the number and form of national representation in both continents.

At the suggestion of the diputacion americana, as the body of American members was called, a general amnesty for political offences was decreed, with the expectation of its yielding the best results in favor of peace and conciliation. Promises of reform, and of better days for Central America, were held out, but the provincial government paid little attention to them. Meanwhile a jealous and restless police constantly watched the movements of suspected persons. Informers and spies lurked everywhere, seeking for some one against whom to bring charges.

The promised blessings proved delusive. Instead of reforms, the people witnessed the installation of a tribunal de fidelidad, with large powers, for the trial and punishment of suspected persons.[I-15] This court was short lived, however, being suppressed about the middle of the following year, under the order of the supreme government, dated February 20, 1811. And thus Guatemala was kept quiet and apparently loyal, when the greater part of Spanish America was in open revolt.

Saravia's rule came to an end on the 14th of March, 1811. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general, and appointed by the government at Cádiz to the command in chief of the forces in Mexico. On his arrival in Oajaca, the viceroy, who was chagrined at his powers having been thus curtailed, detained him at that place. In November 1812, the city being captured by the independents, Saravia was taken prisoner and shot.[I-16]

BUSTAMANTE Y GUERRA.

The successor of Saravia was Lieutenant-general José Bustamante y Guerra, appointed by the supreme council of regency, and soon after confirmed by the córtes generales extraordinarias. He was a naval officer, and had made several important cruises in the cause of science,[I-17] and latterly had been civil and military governor of Montevideo, a position that he filled efficiently. His zeal against the independents in that country pointed him out as the one best fitted to retard the independence of Central America. On his return to Spain from South America he refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte.

Bustamante is represented to have been an inflexible, vigilant, and reticent ruler. He lost no time in adopting stringent measures to check insurrections, and displayed much tact in choosing his agents and spies. No intelligent native of the country was free from mistrust, slight suspicion too often bringing upon the subject search of domicile, imprisonment, or exile. He never hesitated to set aside any lenient measures emanating from the home government in favor of the suspected, and spared no means that would enable him, at the expiration of his term, to surrender the country entire and at peace to his superiors. He was successful, notwithstanding there were several attempts at secession.

Meanwhile the American representatives had been permitted to lift their voice in the national councils. They had called attention to the grievances of their people. In a long memorial of August 1, 1811, to the córtes, they had refuted the oft-repeated charge that the friends of independence in America were or had been under Napoleonic influence. They set forth the causes of discontent,[I-18] which they declared was of long standing, and called for a remedy. Reference was made to Macanar's memorial to Felipe V.,[I-19] wherein he stated that the Americans were displeased, not so much because they were under subjection to Spain, as because they were debased and enslaved by the men sent out by the crown to fill the judicial and other offices.[I-20]

The organic code was finally adopted on the 18th of March, 1812.[I-21] The instrument consisted of ten titles, divided into chapters, in their turn subdivided into sections, and might be considered in two parts: 1st, general form of government for the whole nation, namely, a constitutional monarchy; 2d, special plan for the administration of the Indies.[I-22]

NEW ORGANIC CODE.

In lieu of the old ayuntamientos, which were made up of hereditary regidores, whose offices might be transferred or sold, others were created, their members to be chosen by electors who had been in their turn chosen by popular vote. The ayuntamientos were to control the internal police of their towns, their funds, public instruction within their respective localities, benevolent establishments, and local improvements. They were to be under the inspection of a diputacion provincial, formed of seven members, elected by the above-mentioned electors, in each province, under the presidency of the chief civil officer appointed by the king; the chief and the diputacion were jointly to have the direction of the economical affairs of the province. No act of either corporation was final till approved by the national córtes. In America and Asia, however, owing to great distances, moneys lawfully appropriated might be used with the assent of the chief civil authority; but a timely report was to be made to the supreme government for the consideration of the córtes. Such were the chief wheels in the machinery of provincial and municipal administration. Now, as to popular rights, equality of representation in the provinces of the Spanish peninsula, Asia, and America was fully recognized. The descendants of Africans were alone deprived of the rights of citizenship. This exclusion was combated with forcible arguments by many of the American deputies setting forth the faithful, efficient services colored men had repeatedly rendered and were still rendering to the nation, and their fitness for almost every position. Many of them, they said, had received sacred orders, or had been engaged in other honorable callings, in which they had made good records; besides which, they comprised a considerable portion of the useful mining and agricultural population. Unfortunately for the negro race, the American deputies were not all of one mind. Larrazábal, from Guatemala, probably acting both on his own judgment and on the opinion expressed in 1810 by the real consulado, asserted the black man's incapacity, advocating that persons of African blood should be conceded only the privilege of voting at elections. This motion was supported by a Peruvian deputy. The peninsular members favored the admission to full rights of colored priests, and all colored men serving in the royalist armies. The measure was lost, however; but the article as passed authorized the admission to full political rights, by special acts of the córtes, of colored men proving themselves worthy by a remarkably virtuous life, good service to the country, talents, or industriousness, provided they were born in wedlock, of fathers who had been born free, married to free-born wives, and were residents of Spanish possessions, practising some useful profession and owning property.

Pursuant to the constitution, the córtes ordered, May 23, 1812, elections for members to the ordinary córtes of 1813.[I-23]

The constitution was received at Guatemala on the 10th of September, 1812, proclaimed on the 24th, and its support solemnly sworn to by the authorities and people on the 3d of November, with great satisfaction and evidences of loyalty. Gold and silver medals were struck off to commemorate the event.[I-24]

The installation of the córtes took place, with the apparent approval of Guatemala. The president, members of the audiencia, and other dignitaries who had thriven under absolutism, looking on Americans as 'our colonists,' became at once liberals and constitutionalists, pretending to recognize the wisdom of the national congress in declaring that the Americans were no longer colonists, but citizens of one common country. Their manifestation of September 15, 1812, was followed three days after by one from the ayuntamiento of Guatemala to Deputy Larrazábal, in the same strain, suggesting the creation of a board advisory to the córtes, on the reino de Guatemala legislation.

EXPEDITION TO OAJACA.

After the fall of Oajaca during the Mexican war of independence, the patriot chief Morelos regarded the rear of his military operations as secure. Sympathizing messages had reached him from men of weight in Guatemala, which lulled him into the belief that attack need not be apprehended from this quarter. To Ignacio Rayon he wrote: "Good news from Guatemala; they have asked for the plan of government, and I'll send them the requisite information." It was all a mistake. His cause had friends in Central America, and enemies likewise. Among the most prominent of the latter were Captain-general Bustamante and Archbishop Casaus. The ecclesiastic, with a number of Spanish merchants from Oajaca who had sought refuge in Guatemala, prompted the general, then anxious to avenge the execution of his predecessor, to fit out an expedition, invade Oajaca, and harass the insurgents even at the gates of the city.

About 700 men, mostly raw recruits, were accordingly put in the field, early in 1813, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dambrini, a man of little ability and unsavory record, and crossed the line into Tehuantepec. Dambrini could not abandon his money-making propensities; and having been led to believe he would encounter but little or no resistance, took along a large quantity of merchandise for trading. On the 25th of February a small insurgent force was captured in Niltepec, and Dambrini had its commander, together with a Dominican priest and twenty-eight others, shot the next day. This was the usual treatment of prisoners by both belligerents. But on April 20th the Guatemalans were flanked and routed at Tonalá by the enemy under Matamoros. Dambrini fled, and his men dispersed, leaving in the victors' possession their arms, ammunition, and Dambrini's trading goods. The fugitives were pursued some distance into Guatemalan territory.[I-25]

Germs of independence, as I have said, were fostered in secret by the more intelligent, and slowly began to develop, the movement being hastened by a few enthusiasts who were blind to the foolhardiness of their attempt. The government tried all means to keep the people in ignorance of the state of affairs in Mexico and South America, and when unsuccessful, would represent the royalist army as victorious. Other more questionable devices were also resorted to.[I-26]

Undue restraint and ill treatment, as practised under the stringent policy of Bustamante, soon began to produce effects. Restiveness and despair seized a portion of the people; the hopes for a government more consonant with the spirit of the age, which had been held out from Spain, evaporated. Men were unwilling to live longer under the heel of despotism; and the more high-spirited in Salvador and Nicaragua resolved to stake their fortunes upon a bold stroke for freedom. It was, indeed, a rash step, undertaken without concert, and almost without resources. It could but end as it did at every place where a revolutionary movement was initiated.

Matías Delgado and Nicolás Aguilar, curates of San Salvador, Manuel and Vicente Aguilar, Juan Manuel Rodriguez, and Manuel José Arce were the first to strike the blow for Central American independence. Their plan was carried into execution on the 5th of November, 1811, by the capture of 3,000 new muskets, and upwards of $200,000 from the royal treasury at San Salvador. They were supported by a large portion of the people of the city, and in Metapan, Zacatecoluca, Usulutan, and Chalatenango. But other places in the province of Salvador, namely, San Miguel, Santa Ana, San Vicente, and Sonsonate, renewed their pledges of fealty to the government, declaring the movement for freedom a sacrilege.[I-27]

The promoters of the revolt, which had been started in the king's name, became disheartened and gave up further effort, and with the dismissal of the intendente, Antonio Gutierrez Ulloa, and other officials, peace was soon restored. San Salvador had been quiet without other government than that of alcaldes during the disturbance.

AYCINENA IN SALVADOR.

Upon the receipt of the news of these occurrences, Bustamante despatched Colonel José de Aycinena with ample powers to take charge of the intendencia, and restore quiet. He had been getting troops ready to send down, but by the mediation of the ayuntamiento of Guatemala he had suspended preparations, and had adopted the former course. A member of that body, José María Peinado, was associated with Aycinena.[I-28] They reached San Salvador on the 3d of December, amid the acclamations of the fickle populace; their presence and the exhortations of the missionaries checked all revolutionary symptoms. The authors of the revolt were leniently treated under a general amnesty.[I-29] Peinado was a short time after appointed Aycinena's successor as acting intendente.[I-30]

Another and a still more serious attempt at revolution, which may be called a sequel to that of Salvador, had its beginning in the town of Leon, Nicaragua, on the 13th of December, 1811, when the people deposed the intendente, José Salvador. This action was seconded on the 22d at Granada, where the inhabitants, at a meeting in the municipal hall, demanded the retirement of all the Spanish officials. The insurgents, on the 8th of January, 1812, by a coup-de-main captured Fort San Cárlos. The officials fled to Masaya. Villa de Nicaragua—the city of Rivas in later times—and other towns at once adopted the same course.

Early in 1812, after the first excitement had become somewhat allayed, a board of government was organized in Leon, the members of which were Francisco Quiñones, Domingo Galarza, Cármen Salazar, and Basilio Carrillo. Bishop Fray Nicolás García Jerez was recognized as gobernador intendente by all the towns, and his authority was only limited in one point, namely, he was in no way to favor the deposed officials. The people of Granada resolved to send two deputies to the board.[I-31]

REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA.

The royal officials at Masaya having called for assistance from Guatemala, Bustamante had 1,000 or more troops placed there under command of Sargento Mayor Pedro Gutierrez. The people of Leon had ere this accepted an amnesty from Bishop Jerez, and thereafter took no part in movements against the crown. Granada, more firm of purpose, resolved upon defence; caused intrenchments to be built to guard all avenues leading to the plaza, and mounted thereon twelve heavy cannon. A royalist force, under José M. Palomar, on the 21st of April approached Granada to reconnoitre, and reached the plazuela de Jalteva.[I-32] Early in the morning he opened a brisk fire on the town, and kept it up for several hours. After a parley, next day the citizens agreed to surrender, on Gutierrez solemnly pledging the names of the king and Bustamante, as well as his own, that they should in no wise be molested. But after the royal troops were allowed to enter the city on the 28th, Bustamante, ignoring the solemn guarantees pledged by his subordinate, ordered the arrest and prosecution of the leaders. The governor accordingly named Alejandro Carrascosa fiscal to prosecute the conspirators of Granada. The proceedings occupied two years, at the end of which the fiscal called for, and the court granted, the confiscation of the estates, in addition to the penalties awarded to those found guilty. Sixteen of the prisoners, as heads of the rebellion, were sentenced to be shot, nine were doomed to the chain-gang for life, and 133 to various terms of hard labor.[I-33] The sentence of death was not carried out, however. The condemned were taken to Guatemala, and thence transported to Spain, where the majority died as exiles. Four others were removed as convicts to Omoa and Trujillo. The survivors were finally released by a royal order of June 25, 1817.[I-34]

The conduct of the Leonese in leaving Granada to bear alone the consequences of the revolution had, as I remarked, a bad effect upon the country.[I-35] From that time dates a bitter feeling between Leon and Granada, and between Managua and Masaya on the one part and Granada on the other.[I-36]

Notwithstanding the existing grievances and the generally depressed condition of business, the people did not fail to respond to the calls from the home government upon all parts of the Spanish dominions for pecuniary aid to meet the enormous expenses of the war against Napoleon's forces, and other pressing demands. In 1812 there were collected and remitted as donations $43,538. The citizens of San Salvador also agreed to give $12,000 for 1812, and an equal sum in 1813, if they could obtain a certain reform for the benefit of indigo-planters.[I-37]

FANATICISM.

We have seen how the first steps toward independence failed. Nor could any other result have been expected from the degraded condition, socially and intellectually, of the masses. The people were controlled by fanaticism, in abject submission to king and clergy. Absurd doctrines and miracles were implicitly believed in; and every effort made to draw the ignorant people out of that slough was in their judgment treason and sacrilege, a violation of the laws of God, an attempt to rob the king of his rights; certain to bring on a disruption of social ties, and the wrath of heaven. The lower orders had been taught that freedom signified the reign of immorality and crime, while fealty to the sovereign was held a high virtue. Hence the daily exhibitions of humble faithfulness, the kneeling before the images of the monarch and before their bishops, and the more substantial proof of money gifts to both church and crown.[I-38]

The first efforts on behalf of emancipation were not wholly lost, as they led to definitive results in the near future. The next attempts also met with failure, and brought upon their authors the heavy hand of Bustamante. The first one, in 1813, was known as the Betlen conspiracy, which derived its name from the convent where the conspirators usually assembled. Much importance was given to this affair by the government and the loyalists. The meetings were presided over by the sub-prior Fray Ramon de la Concepcion, and were sometimes held in his cell, and at others in the house of Cayetano Bedoya, under the direction of Tomás Ruiz, an Indian.[I-39] All were sworn to secrecy, and yet the government suspected the plot, and arrested some persons who had the weakness to divulge the plan and the names of their associates.[I-40]

The conspirators, all of whom were men of character and good standing, soon found themselves in prison, excepting José Francisco Barrundia, who remained concealed six years, and afterward was one of the most prominent statesmen of Central America. Major Antonio del Villar was commissioned fiscal to prosecute the prisoners. He spared no one in his charges, and managed to bring into the meshes of the prosecution several persons who were innocent.[I-41] On the 18th of September, 1814, he asked the military court for the penalty of death, by garrote, against Ruiz, Víctor Castrillo, José Francisco Barrundia pro contumacia, and Joaquin Yúdice, who were hidalgos; and the same penalty, by hanging, against the sub-prior and ten others who were plebeians.[I-42] Ten years of hard labor in the chain-gang of the African possessions, and a life exile from America, were pronounced upon others against whom no guilt was proved. The prisoners were all set free, however, in 1819, under a royal order of the 28th of July, 1817.

THE PLOT OF BETLEN.

Among the men regarded as the most dangerous, and strongly suspected of being the real managers of the Betlen plot, was Mateo Antonio Marure, who had been confined two years in a dungeon for the part he took in the disturbances of 1811.[I-43] Bustamante dreaded his presence in Guatemala, and in 1814 despatched him as a prisoner to the supreme council of regency in Spain, with his reasons for this measure. After recounting the Betlen affair, and naming Marure as the real instigator and manager of it, he adds that the conspirators counted on him as a fearless man to carry it out, and that his bold language and writings rendered his sojourn in America a constant menace to Spanish interests.

Another and a worse planned attempt at revolution than the one of 1811 occurred in Salvador in 1814. The government quelled it, and the promoters were arrested, Manuel José Arce suffering an imprisonment of several years.[I-44]

The reader's attention is now called to matters concerning the capitanía general of Guatemala, which occupied the government both here and in Europe immediately before King Fernando's coup-d'état.

Bustamante, evidently hostile to constitutional government, and loath to suffer readily any curtailment of his quasi-autocratic powers, proclaimed, under the pressure of necessity, the national constitution, and permitted elections under it; but between this and allowing the diputaciones provinciales and ayuntamientos free action under the fundamental law, there was a wide chasm. He had no intention of tamely submitting to such innovations, whatever might be said of their merits in the abstract. In the first place, he postponed for three whole months the installation of the diputacion, and when it was installed, refused to honor the event with a high mass and te deum, which would have been the proper thing to do. Such a recognition of the importance of the diputacion might have shaken the faith of the populace in a one-man power. He next insisted on the diputacion having its sittings at the government house, where it would be at his mercy. He treated the body disrespectfully in several ways,[I-45] and as he could not make it subservient to his will, tried by all means in his power to destroy its influence and usefulness. In fact, he looked upon it as a mere consultative corporation, whose advice he might ask for or not, as suited his fancy. Lastly, he would not permit the acts of the diputacion to be published; and for the matter of that, there was no liberty of the press.

END OF BUSTAMANTE'S RULE.

These complaints were laid before the national córtes[I-46] for redress, coupled with a petition that the royal authority should remove Bustamante from office. But grievances were unredressed, and their author continued wielding power in the country several years more. Indeed, this was not to be wondered at. The Spanish government had rarely, if ever, shown inclination to do justice to the ruled against the high rulers it placed over them, or to punish the despotic acts of the latter. Residencias had of late become mere matters of form. If the complainants had wealth and influence at court, they might obtain the recall of the ruler obnoxious to them, but no other punishment. The prestige of authority must be upheld; such was the principle acted upon.[I-47] Guatemala was finally relieved of Bustamante's hated rule on the 28th of March, 1818.

The people of Central America, like the rest of the Spanish dominions, were soon invited to another view in the political kaleidoscope. Fernando VII., upon his release by Napoleon a few months after the treaty of Valençay,[I-48] returned to Spain without delay, and on arriving at Valencia, issued his manifesto of May 4, 1814, setting aside the constitution, and assuming the authority of an absolute sovereign. He did this with fair promises, which he carried out when and how it suited him.[I-49] Among many decrees issued by the monarch soon after, which were of interest to Central America, was one enjoining on the archbishop and bishops to see that their subordinates did their duty faithfully, and entertained only wholesome opinions. No associations or leagues were to be tolerated which might lead to a disturbance of the public peace; in other words, liberty and constitutional government were not to be thought of.[I-50] Another decree of June 17th, demanded of the deputies from America having in their possession petitions from their constituents to lay them before the royal government, in order that they might be acted upon. Several measures for the protection of morals and the advancement of civilization were also enacted.

CHAPTER II.
INDEPENDENCE ACHIEVED.
1818-1821.

President Cárlos Urrutia—His Liberal Views—Colombian Assaults—Spanish Constitution Restored—The Gazistas, or Bacos—The Cacos—José del Valle—Pedro Molina—Liberal Institutions—Extent of the Political Government—Ecclesiastical Administration—Work of American Deputies—Party Excitement in Guatemala—Urrutia Delegates his Powers—Substitute President Gavino Gainza—Chiapas and her Government—She Secedes from Spain and Joins the Mexican Empire—Guatemala Declares for Independence—Junta Gubernativa—Convocation of a Congress.

Successor to Bustamante in the position of governor, president, and captain-general, in March 1818, was Lieutenant-general Cárlos Urrutia,[II-1] knight grand cross of the military order of San Hermenegildo, which entitled him to be called excelentísimo señor. It was a difficult position. The country was at peace, it is true, but a political volcano was at work, and no one could foretell when the upheaval of revolution might occur,[II-2] letting loose the elements of destruction, as had happened in other parts of Spanish America. However, another constitutional term under the Spanish monarch was about being inaugurated, and this fact helped to bring on definitive results.

Urrutia was a man of experience, with a well-balanced mind, whose political opinions leaned to the side of progress. He would have been well adapted to guide the course of events in Central America had it not been for the infirmities of old age. Guatemala, being as yet under the sway of Spain, was open to attack from the enemies of that government, or at least, to such action as they might adopt in aid of the disaffected portion of the people to secure their country's independence. The latter was the plan of the Colombian insurgents in fitting out a combined sea and land expedition to operate against the ports of Omoa and Trujillo in 1820.[II-3]

ATTACK ON TRUJILLO.

On the 21st of April the watch-tower at Capiro, in Trujillo, announced the approach of a Colombian flotilla of small vessels from the windward. The garrison, commanded by José M. Palomar, at once made preparations for emergencies. The flotilla, consisting of two brigantines, four large and as many small schooners, one felucca, and one sloop, under Commodore Aury, sailed in at two o'clock,[II-4] and despatched a boat to shore to demand the surrender of the place within one hour. Nothing further was done on that day, however; but early the next morning the flotilla moved toward the mouth of the Guaimoreto, and after reconnoitering the defences, opened a bombardment with ball and grape-shot on the intrenchment and demolished it, which compelled the defenders to fall back. The assailants landed 400 men and 15 horses, and advanced against the garrison, meeting with a repulse at the fourth parapet. The garrison retreated to the fifth line, at which the enemy was a second time driven back. The vessels fired broadside upon broadside on the shore batteries, which were warmly returned. The bombardment was kept up from nine a. m. till two p. m., when the flotilla retired out of reach of the batteries. A portion of the land force then attempted to enter the town by the rear of it, but was detected and compelled to retire. Early in the morning of the 23d, the invading troops returned to the vessels, leaving their horses; and soon afterward the flotilla put to sea, each vessel firing a broadside, on passing Point Castilla, against the watch-tower. During the night of the 24th the Colombian vessels dropped out of sight.[II-5] On the 25th the flotilla appeared off Omoa, and for several days was making attempts to effect a landing, which being unsuccessful, it retired on the 6th of May, after setting fire to the larger brig, which had been damaged by the fire from the town.

Fernando VII., under compulsion, restored the constitution of 1812 throughout his dominions. On the 9th of March, 1820, he swore to support it, and the next day issued a manifesto conveying an apology for having set it aside in 1814, and giving plausible reasons for his present change of mind. On the 11th of April he issued another manifesto, addressed to the people of America, expressing sorrow at not having sooner reinstated the constitutional government. In another decree of April 15th he restores to full force and vigor all decrees of the córtes, both the extraordinary and ordinary, for the better government and progress of the provinces in America.

It seems that Brigadier Gavino Gainza, appointed sub-inspector-general of the forces in Central America, was commissioned to bring out the royal proclamations and decrees for the reinstatement of the constitution, and of the laws which were passed under it by the córtes. There is nothing to show the precise time of his arrival in Guatemala, but it will suffice to state that the diputacion provincial was installed at the capital on the 13th of July.

At a preparatory sitting of the córtes, on the 26th of June, 1820, Juan N. San Juan and José Sacasa were present as representatives from Guatemala, and on the 2d of August Juan N. Tuero, or Fuero, presented his credentials as a deputy elected from Chiapas for the córtes of 1815-16, which body he found closed on arriving in Spain at the end of 1814.[II-6] The necessity of such a diputacion was ably discussed in the córtes on the 30th of April, 1821, by Deputy Hermosilla, seconded by Deputy Milla, both supporting the report of the committee on the subject. On the 17th of June the chamber was officially informed of the installation of the diputacion, and commended its patriotic labors.[II-7]

The 'junta suprema de censura,' created to adjudicate upon alleged offences against the law regulating the press, had, on the 9th of August, 1820, nominated, and the córtes confirmed, the members of the junta de censura for Guatemala.[II-8]

BACOS AND CACOS.

The reëstablishment of the constitutional régime under such favorable circumstances soon brought into life two great parties that for a long time bore the respective names of Gazista, or Baco, and Caco. The gazista, with José del Valle as its leader,[II-9] was made up of Spaniards and artisans. The cacos recognized as their chieftain José María Delgado.[II-10] Their party was composed of members of the nobility, and of the men calling themselves independents. This party from the first aspired to independence, and its candidates were taken from the independent wing at the election of deputies and other officials.

The gazistas, or bacos, were numerous and strong, for they had in their ranks the rulers, many wealthy merchants, and the artisans, and abundant funds at command, which were scattered without stint among the needy and ignorant, who were ready enough to sell their votes.[II-11] They likewise strengthened their influence with the lower class by means of a pretended hostility to the aristocracy, or to what from that time went by the name of 'espíritu de familia.' They won the elections, but their triumph proved to be far from a solid one.

The cacos now resolved to use every endeavor to accomplish independence. The connection with the aristocratic element was a drawback; and the absolute necessity of winning over the mechanics being recognized, a middle party was at once organized, which attached itself to the independents, and would have no connection with the nobles. This arrangement facilitated the accomplishment of the object in view.

The political struggle was now fairly inaugurated. Pedro Molina[II-12] began the publication of El Editor Constitucional, to defend American rights. The Amigo de la Patria appeared at the same time, and often opposed Molina's radical doctrines. Urrutia, now styling himself jefe político y capitan general, made an address to the people, congratulating them and himself on the happy termination of the election in the several parishes, and giving assurances that every voter should have full liberty to cast his vote for representative in the general congress, the diputacion, and the ayuntamiento.[II-13] A portion of his address was specially devoted to artisans and laboring men, whom he warned not to allow themselves to be tampered with to the discredit of the government on the question of trade in cotton goods; for, he told them, it was a positive misconception that the government had it in view to decree freedom of foreign trade; on the contrary, it had endeavored to check illegal traffic, which had been carried on to the detriment of national interests and the royal treasury.

The measures adopted by him had to some extent corrected that evil. By making the traders pay import dues, the treasury had profited, and the people had been saved from new taxes. Formerly, English goods were paid for wholly in coin; now, only one sixth of their cost was covered with money, and the remainder with the produce of the country.[II-14]

The gobierno político de Guatemala had jurisdiction over the same extent of country as the metropolitan,[II-15] namely, 214 leagues from the ejidos of Motocinta on the west, and 116 leagues from Golfo Dulce on the Atlantic, to the Pacific coast.[II-16]

ARCHBISHOPS.

The first archbishop of Guatemala appointed by the Spanish crown in the present century was Luis Peñalver y Cárdenas,[II-17] who reached his see the 3d of June, 1802, and on the 26th took possession. During his brief incumbency he founded several rectorships, and two primary schools for girls. His sight becoming seriously affected, he relinquished the mitre, and returned to his native city, secretly departing March 1, 1806.[II-18]

Rafael de la Vara de la Madrid, Peñalver's successor, arrived in Acajutla on the 13th of December, 1807; in Guatemala city on the 4th of January, 1808; and on the 3d of February took possession of his office. In April 1809 he visited the province of Vera Paz, where he died on the 31st of December, much regretted, as he had endeared himself by his peaceable disposition and affability.[II-19]

Antonio Bergoza y Jordan, bishop of Oajaca, was nominated for the succession, but declined the position.

The next and eighth archbishop of the diocese was Ramon Casaus y Torres, nominated by the supreme council of regency on the 30th of March, 1811; who entered the capital on the 30th of July, and being a consecrated bishop, at once began to perform episcopal functions.[II-20] His nomination was ratified by the king on the 27th of August, 1814; the papal bulls of confirmation were issued on the 15th of March, 1815, and Casaus received the pallium on the 28th of September of the same year.

At the sitting of the Spanish córtes on the 25th of June, 1821, the American deputies laid before that body a memorial setting forth the condition of their provinces, and the measures which, in their opinion, would lead to a definitive peace. They not only assured their Spanish colleagues that Americans were fully conscious of their rights as freemen, but also of their determination and ability to defend them; nevertheless, if those rights were respected, and justice was done, existing difficulties might be obliterated. They believed, however, that a constitutional system would be impracticable in America, unless new and efficacious measures were adopted to enable the three branches of government to act freely within their respective bounds, and likewise to make effective the responsibility of public officials for their acts. Another point upon which they laid stress was the inutility of American deputies at the Spanish córtes unless they were effectively upheld from their respective countries. They found other faults with the existing government, and declared that the solution of the great problem would be found in the establishment of autonomic governments in America.

RIPE FOR INDEPENDENCE.

Commerce between Spanish America and the mother country should be treated as internal trade, the Americans having equal rights and privileges with their brethren of Europe. The same equality in respect to civil rights and appointment to office was likewise to exist between the natives of America and Spain. If such demands were conceded, Mexico and Central America would pay to Spain ten million dollars within six years, in yearly installments from January 1, 1823, to be applied to the cancelling of the national debt. They would also allow Spain two million dollars yearly for the support of the royal navy.[II-21]

It was now too late, however, for conciliatory efforts to be successful. Events crowded upon each other, and were beyond the control even of the men who made them. Central America was at peace, but the constitutional system recently established, with its popular elections and a free press, after the spirit of nationality had gained so much ground, naturally tended to excite the public mind, emboldening the timid, and increasing the number of the friends of independence. Party spirit controlled everything; it was felt even in the domestic circle. The people were prepared and anxious for a change, when vague rumors were set afloat of renewed revolutionary efforts in Mexico.[II-22] Party leaders were of one mind on the desirability of separation. It was generally admitted that the subjection of the country to Spain could no longer be maintained. Only a few high officials and Spaniards dissented. Now was the time, if ever, for a sound head and strong hand to helm the ship of state. Urrutia, owing to age and physical ailings, was not the man for the occasion; nor was he, though opposed to the scheme of secession, able to retard it. Under the circumstances, the diputacion provincial prevailed on the jefe superior político to delegate his powers to the sub-inspector of the troops, Gavino Gainza.[II-23] This officer at first tried to stem the torrent of revolution, to act as the agent of Spain, disapproving the plan of separation, but at the same time maintained intimate relations with the independents and aided their efforts. This party publicly circulated a paper for signatures to ask Gainza to proclaim independence himself. He pretended to be indignant; and upon the receipt of the plan of Iguala, formed in Mexico by Iturbide and Guerrero,[II-24] he issued a manifesto depicting it in the blackest colors, and ordered that all who had called on him to declare independence should be prosecuted.[II-25] The independents became disgusted, but had to make the best of the situation. They then resolved to play upon his personal ambition, assuring him that for his coöperation in their plans he would be retained in command, and afterward chosen the first chief magistrate of the young nation. While he still hesitated, they despatched Cayetano Bedoya to Oajaca for military aid from General Bravo. But on the messenger's arrival at Ciudad Real de Chiapas, he found that the place had followed the example of Oajaca and Tehuantepec, accepting the plan of Iguala. This step hastened events in Guatemala, and Bedoya had no need of going farther.

The act of Ciudad Real, received September 13th, caused the greatest excitement in the city of Guatemala, and the government had to give way. Urged by the diputacion, Gainza summoned, on the 14th, the high officials and other notables to a meeting next day to resolve on some action responsive to the demands of the people.[II-26]

GAINZA'S MEETING.

During the night of the 14th Molina and the cacos scattered their agents throughout the wards to stir up the masses, and at the same time to awe the españolistas, or royal partisans. At 8 a. m. on the 15th a throng of independents filled the porticos, court-yard, halls, and ante-chambers of the government house. Among them and instructing the crowds were Molina, Barrundia, Basilio Porras, and other leaders. Soon after began to arrive at the government house the officials called to take part in the deliberations of the meeting, namely, two members of each corporation deputized therefor; the archbishop and prelates of the religious orders; the chief officers of the army and treasury; who, together with the diputacion provincial, and under the presidency of the acting jefe superior político, Gainza,[II-27] at once proceeded to business. After reading the declarations in Chiapas, several members briefly expressed their views. The first speaker was Valle, leader of the gazistas, who eloquently advocated independence as necessary and just, but ended advising that it should not be proclaimed till the other sections had formally declared in its favor. The motion was seconded. The anti-independents[II-28] opposed all action until final results in Mexico should be received. Every attempt at a vacillating policy was defeated by the energetic efforts of the independents, who voted for an immediate declaration of independence.[II-29] Every vote favorable to independence was received by the people with loud applause, and every one against it with groans. The popular preference became so marked and boisterous that the anti-independents, fearing for their lives, retired from the palace.

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

The diputacion and ayuntamiento then, as the legitimate organs to express the public will, drew up the Acta de Independencia, which was adopted, signed, and sworn to by all the members present.[II-30] This instrument, after declaring the aspiration of Guatemalans to be a free and independent people,[II-31] invited all citizens of the provinces to choose without delay representatives, on the basis of one for every 15,000 inhabitants, to a national congress that was to meet March 1, 1822. In the mean time the Spanish laws, courts of justice, and public functionaries were to continue as heretofore. The representatives were to be chosen by the same juntas electorales that had lately, since the restoration of the constitution, elected deputies to the córtes, without excluding, as the constitution did, men of African descent from the rights of full citizenship.[II-32] The clause giving the last electoral college, with its majority of Valle's partisans, the power to choose the members of the constituent congress, is said to have been inserted in the acta by himself.[II-33]

On the 17th Gainza issued a proclamation formally placing before the people the resolutions adopted on the 15th, and enjoining on all the duty of abiding by them, and of respecting the laws and authorities recognized by them. Any attempt, by word or deed, to restore Spanish domination was declared high treason, punishable with death.[II-34] The powers of the congress would be constituent to adopt a form of government and frame the national constitution. Meantime Gainza held civil and military authority, acting with the advice of a provisional junta consultiva, formed with the diputacion provincial and seven additional members, representing respectively Leon, Comayagua, Costa Rica, Quezaltenango, Sololá, Chimaltenango, Sonsonate, and Ciudad Real.[II-35] Neither the people at large nor the meeting of the 15th created such a body. It was the creation of the men who remained behind in the hall, including Valle, who drew up the acta.[II-36] Continuing his double dealing, Gainza had issued his proclamation, on the 16th, for the election of representatives to congress. He spoke therein of the longing for independence since 1810, of the popular love for the cause which had been so forcibly sustained at the meeting of the preceding day, and concluded by inviting the whole people to approve the plan, and to appoint their deputies to complete the work.

Before proceeding further with the political situation at the capital of Guatemala, I will devote a little space to laying before the reader some information on one of its most important sections, namely, Chiapas. The population was computed in 1813 at over 100,000 inhabitants, of whom 70,000 were Indians; the remainder were Spaniards and mixed breeds, with a few negroes.[II-37]

As a reward for good services and generous pecuniary contributions to the nation, the Spanish córtes passed, October 29, 1813, a decree bestowing the title of city on the town of Comitan, and that of villa on those of Tusta, Tonalá, Tapachula, and Palenque.[II-38]

THE SUBDELEGADOS.

In contravention of law, the first name of the three proposed by the intendente to the president of Guatemala, for chief of each of the eleven subdelegaciones, was that of some creature of the intendente. Unfitness for the place or immorality counted for nothing if the nomination suited the proposer or the confirming power. These subdelegados, by means of their comisarios, collected the tribute and speculated with it; each being a tyrant who oppressed the Indians at his will.

Education was neglected; ignorance prevailed to such an extent that a large portion of the inhabitants did not know even the first rudiments of their religion. The poorer Spaniards and the mixed breeds were entirely without education. Indeed, in nearly three centuries, not only had the Indians not learned to speak Spanish, but the native Spaniards spoke the six Indian tongues of the province better than their own.[II-39]

Chiapas, it is well known, had been an episcopal see, with its cathedral at Ciudad Real, since the first years of the conquest.[II-40] The country is fertile and well watered. Its agricultural products were wheat—of which there was a surplus for exportation—maize, beans, rice, coffee, and cacao.[II-41] A variety of vegetables in abundance, and the fruits of all climes, could also be obtained. The maguey was extensively cultivated for pulque and aguardiente. A great deal of sugar-cane and good tobacco were grown. Indigo and cochineal were cultivated to some extent. The country had likewise excellent grazing. Cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and mules abounded. The mines of gold, silver, lead, copper, and iron were not worked, owing to the poverty of the inhabitants. The governor-intendente of Chiapas in 1817, Cárlos Castañon, as appears in the records, was a confirmed royalist.[II-42]

From the time that Iturbide proclaimed the independence of Mexico, the canons of the chapter in the diocese of Ciudad Real—bitterly hostile, like the majority of the Mexican and Central American clergy, to the reforms of the Spanish córtes respecting the church[II-43]—had been in communication with that chieftain's auditor de guerra, Fernandez Almansa, who kept them informed on the progress of the revolution. The clericals looked upon the Mexican chief as the savior of their ancient prerogatives and monopolies, and with this end in view, prepared public opinion for setting aside the authority of Fernando VII. and his córtes.[II-44]

Chiapas.

CHIAPAS ACCEPTS ITURBIDE.

The governor-intendente, Juan N. Batres, together with the ayuntamiento of Ciudad Real, proclaimed, on the 3d of September, 1821, the separation of Chiapas from Spain, and her acceptance of Iturbide's plan of Iguala. On the 8th all the authorities and officers, civil and military, took the oath to support that act, which was administered by the governor of the diocese; after which they had high mass and a sermon in the cathedral, where the secular clergy and the people took the same oath[II-45] before the aforesaid ecclesiastic authority. The obligations assumed were to support the Roman catholic apostolic religion; to secure the independence of the empire, preserving to that end peace and union between Europeans and Americans; and to obey Fernando VII., should he adopt and swear to support the constitution to be enacted by the córtes of the Mexican empire. Chiapas was, therefore, the first province of the captain-generalcy of Guatemala to throw off the Spanish yoke; she at the same time separated herself from Guatemala, and manifested her determination to link her future with Mexico. All this was made known September 21st by the comandante-general of Oajaca to Iturbide. The example of Ciudad Real was unhesitatingly followed by the other towns in the province.

We have seen that Guatemala, at her declaration of independence, did not at once accept annexation to the Mexican empire. This course did not suit the rulers and notables of Ciudad Real, who hastened to manifest their displeasure at a meeting held September 20th, and attended by the intendente, ayuntamiento, and other official bodies, prelates, and a large number of citizens.

CHIAPAS A PART OF MEXICO.

As a matter of fact, the desire of Chiapas to be detached from Guatemala and annexed to Mexico existed with some strength even before the declaration of independence;[II-46] and Guatemala having failed to return an answer to the letter from the authorities of Chiapas, announcing her action of the 3d, this neglect had strengthened the notables of the latter in their resolution to recognize no other government than that of the Mexican empire under the treaties of Córdoba. It was also resolved at the meeting not to circulate the declaration of independence which the jefe político of Guatemala had sent. These sentiments were duly seconded by the other cities and towns.

In order to guard against any action Guatemala might take because of the course of Chiapas, at a formal session of the diputacion, presided over by the jefe político, and held on the 22d of October, it was resolved to send to Mexico a commissioner to take the necessary steps, and procure his province's separation from Guatemala, even if the latter should come to be thereafter a part of the Mexican empire.[II-47]

CHAPTER III.
UNION WITH MEXICO.
1821-1822.

First Acts of Guatemalan Rulers—Intrigues of Parties—Their Evil Consequences—Gainza's Intrigues—Independence in the Other Provinces—Rewards to Gainza—Troubles in Salvador—Dissensions in Honduras—Local Squabbles in Nicaragua—Predilection for Imperialism—Costa Rica Neutral—Condition of Various Sections—Seceding Districts of Guatemala—Perplexities of the Junta Consultiva—Iturbide's Devices—Military Pressure—His Proposals Accepted—Illegal Annexation—Protests and Resistance—War Begins.

Among the first acts of the junta at Guatemala was the promotion of two officers who were supposed to be reliable supporters of the late movement.[III-1] Both proved themselves afterward recreant to their pledges, by their hostility to the republican cause.

PARTY STRIFE.

The cacos were republicans. They strove to rid the country of the antiquated errors and practices, including in their plans the abolishment of the privileges of the clergy, and the restriction of their power, which had been a constant source of injury to the people at large. They wanted the adoption of democratic institutions, in order to place the masses on the level heretofore occupied only by the ruling class. They succeeded in prevailing on the people to take an interest and a direct intervention in public affairs. Barrundia, Molina, and Córdoba led them to the galleries of the junta chamber to witness its acts, and even take part in its deliberations.[III-2] They attacked Valle for the clause he inserted in the acta of the 15th, to which I have alluded in the preceding chapter. On that point they certainly had a well-founded grievance, but their manner of presenting it resulted in a loss of confidence in the junta, the organization of new parties, and general distraction. The point taken by them, however, was decided in their favor by the junta. But the latter held secret sessions after the 29th of September, significant of sinister purposes.

The other party—formerly constituting the ruling class—scouted the idea of equality. Most of the churchmen had the same feeling; for in joining the movement for separation from Spain their motive had been to shield their menaced prerogatives, rather than love for America or freedom.

On the 18th of September Gainza wrote Iturbide, generalissimo of the so-called empire of Mexico, that his course had been hailed with joy, and that political parties had consolidated on the proposition of independence from Spain; hence he had proclaimed it. And that, since then, amid the transition from one system to another, the minds of the people of Guatemala had been fixed on Iturbide, and they had desired to tender him their congratulations as the liberator of New Spain.[III-3]

The junta consultiva passed a number of decrees, which were sanctioned by Gainza. Urrutia, the ex-captain-general, was tendered his salary and the considerations due his rank and former office if he would formally recognize the independence.[III-4] He declined with thanks, departing for Habana soon after. At the time of the adoption of the acta, peaceable persons were assured of protection to their persons and property, which pledge was faithfully fulfilled. No opponent of independence was molested. Officials desirous of returning to their country were allowed to do so.[III-5]

The junta, which bore the compellation of excelentísima, unanimously appointed Gainza captain-general, with the salary of $10,000 a year, decorating him also with a three-colored scarf, commemorative of the three guarantees. A gold medal was voted to the members of the ayuntamiento, who made the solemn declaration of independence on the 23d of September.[III-6] Committees were next appointed to study and report to the junta on public instruction, safety and defences, statistics, industry, and finances. José del Valle was instructed to form a plan of government.[III-7]

Several financial measures engaged the attention of the junta. One of them proposed to levy a duty of ten per centum on gold and silver exported to Spain. This was never strictly enforced. Restrictions to foreign commerce, and monopolies existing under the Spanish government, were abolished. Liberal principles were introduced, including freedom of the press, which had been guaranteed by the Spanish constitution, and was now continued in force.[III-8]

SALVADOR INDEPENDENT.

In Salvador absolute independence had been declared by the ayuntamiento on the 21st of September, and proclaimed eight days after. Pedro Barriere, who as teniente letrado was temporarily acting as chief civil authority, together with the ayuntamiento of San Salvador, decreed the election of seven persons to form a "junta subalterna económica y consultiva." There was great commotion stirred on the one hand by the vicar Ignacio Saldaña, and on the other by the liberals, Arce, Ramirez, and others. The next day, the people being assembled to effect the election, Barriere, pretending that his friends, the so-called serviles, were in peril, retracted his former action. His words enraged the populace. Then he called out the troops to disperse the crowds, and arrested the republican leaders Arce, Rodriguez, and Domingo Lara.[III-9] But on the news of his course reaching Guatemala, Delgado was despatched to Salvador as a peace-maker, clothed with ample powers. On his way to the capital he liberated prisoners, all of whom joined his following and entered the city with him. Barriere was sent out of the province; the troops were disarmed; peace was restored; a subordinate junta consultiva was installed, and Delgado continued at the head of the government.[III-10]

In Honduras, on the receipt at Comayagua of the news that Guatemala had seceded from the Spanish crown, the governor-intendente, Brigadier José Tinoco de Contreras, and the diputacion[III-11] refused to recognize the government constituted in that city, and took an oath to support the plan of Iguala. This was a virtual annexation of Honduras to the Mexican empire. The partidos of Tegucigalpa and Gracias, and the ports of Omoa and Trujillo, would not accept as valid the act of the authorities at Comayagua, and maintained relations with those in Guatemala. The independence from Spain had been declared on the 16th of October.

Tinoco took the two ports above named, which were treacherously surrendered to him.[III-12] He also fitted out a force to march on Tegucigalpa. A counter-revolution, however, on the 1st of December, supported by an approaching Guatemalan liberal force, set aside Tinoco's control and restored that of the junta consultiva.[III-13]

LIBERTY IN NICARAGUA.

Nicaragua had, since 1813, a diputacion provincial, under the decree of the Spanish córtes of May 24, 1812. Its jurisdiction extended over the districts of Leon, Granada, Segovia, Nicaragua, and Matagalpa. Under the new system, established in 1821, and since Urrutia's retirement, constant questions of jurisdiction arose between the intendente and the superior jefe político.[III-14]

On the 3d of October Colonel Crisanto Sacasa, commandant at Granada, issued a general order to the officers to report with their troops next morning, and take the oath to support national independence, pursuant to the instructions he had received from Captain-general Gainza. Intendente Saravia had been at enmity with Gainza, and when the first steps were taken in Guatemala for independence, he threw off his authority. In this he had the aid of Bishop Jerez and Colonel Joaquin Arechavala, commander of the militia, all three being natives of old Spain. They induced the diputacion and the ayuntamiento, by an act of the 11th of October, to declare Nicaragua seceded from Guatemala.[III-15] This action occurred in Leon. But Granada refused to concur, and sent its representatives to the congress called to meet in Guatemala. Later, October 21st, the authorities in Leon formally accepted the Iguala plan, thereby annexing the whole province to the Mexican empire. The country was accordingly divided into two antagonistic parties, the imperialist and the republican.[III-16]

Gainza said to the diputacion at Leon, on the 22d of October, that neither they nor the junta consultiva, nor any other body of men then existing, could decide upon the future of the country; none had a legal right to declare for or against annexation to Mexico. This could be arrived at only by the representatives of the people in the general congress.[III-17] He appointed Colonel Sacasa comandante general of the forces in Nicaragua, and directed him to install in Granada a subordinate junta gubernativa of five members, clothed with the functions of a jefe político, and which was to continue in power till the status of the country should be fixed.[III-18] Sacasa frankly notified the rulers in Leon of what he was to do, and took steps to carry his orders into execution. But Saravia, with the bishop and the diputacion, determined that no such junta should be installed. The diputacion, on the 1st of December, by a special act, forbade its organization, declaring all attempts toward it subversive of good order and hostile to the Mexican empire, to which they owed allegiance; and warning all citizens to abstain from such efforts.

COSTA RICA NEUTRAL.

Sacasa had every right to expect that Gainza would support him against attacks from Leon, but he was disappointed. The captain-general wrote him, on the 22d of December, that it was doubtful if Central America could maintain a government separate from Mexico, many towns having already attached themselves to the empire; and that he had expressed the same opinion to Saravia. Whereupon Sacasa, though a republican, made no further opposition to the powers at Leon.

Costa Rica was privileged by distance to keep aloof from political troubles threatening the other provinces. She had seceded from Spain on the 27th of October, and set aside the governor, Juan Cañas; but when called upon to adopt the plan of the capital or that of Leon, she declined both, preferring a neutral attitude.[III-19] A meeting of notables confirmed the act of secession, and set up a provisional government entirely detached from that at Leon, which was to reside alternately in Cartago, San José, Heredia, and Alajuela. But this was found inconvenient, owing to rivalries between the two first-named towns; and finally it was decided, on the 27th of November, to place public affairs in the hands of Manuel Peralta, Rafael Osejo, and Hermenegildo Bonilla, who were to reside at the provincial capital, Cartago. Under this arrangement peace was preserved, and the province never was really under the imperial rule.[III-20]

Dissensions had now brought the country to the brink of civil war, and no time was to be lost in averting it. Measures were adopted to hasten the meeting of congress. With the view of restoring peace between the sections, and of rendering harmless disturbing elements without resort to arms, the junta at Guatemala concluded to despatch trusty commissioners to the provinces where secession was rife, who were to prevail on them to send deputies to the general congress. Other agents were to be despatched to Mexico to watch the turn of events at the capital.[III-21] What good results those agents might have accomplished, it is impossible now to say. They had no occasion to try their efforts. Events in Mexico succeeded one another with such rapidity, and their influence on Central America was so powerful, that, even among the best patriots, many made up their minds to coöperate toward the union, carried away by the idea that only under the ægis of the northern empire could peace, safety, and stability be secured.

Costa Rica, we have seen, was in fact out of the field; at any rate, it had no share in the political strife. The provinces of Guatemala proper and Salvador were the only ones, at present, which together with Granada, in Nicaragua, and some portions of Honduras, attempted to preserve an independence from Mexico under whatever form of government might be adopted in that country. The idea of annexation to Mexico had been, however, growing popular from day to day in Guatemala. The important section of Quezaltenango adhered to the scheme, on the 13th of November, inviting Suchitepequez, Sololá, and Antigua Guatemala to follow the example, which they did soon after. And Cirilo Flores and Antonio Corzo, who in later years figured as most prominent champions of democracy and suffered martyrdom for their cause, then supported the action of Quezaltenango.

It was contended that Central America, after throwing off the Spanish yoke, acquired, with independence, the right of forming such associations as might be mutually beneficial. This doctrine was warmly advocated by a large portion of the reflecting class. Under such circumstances, Guatemala and Salvador, hemmed in as they were between provinces that had already become annexed to Mexico, could not maintain an absolute independence.

ITURBIDE'S EFFORTS.

Iturbide had large ideas of imperial sway, and was bent on the acquisition of entire Central America, aided efficiently, as he was on this side, by the aristocrats and other dissentient elements, who, perceiving the insignificance they would come to if the nation finally became constituted under a democratic government, which their opponents were aiming at, labored with might and main to defeat the plan.[III-22] They won over with money and fair promises a part of the people, and with Gainza, who expected high rank and offices from the new empire, bound Central America hand and foot, as will hereafter be seen.

The junta consultiva was much perplexed in view of the situation. The imperialists daily became more insolent and exacting. At this critical time—November 28th—Gainza laid before it a letter[III-23] from the generalissimo, making allusion to the much abused second article of the acta de independencia, and declaring that Guatemala was not able to occupy as yet a place in the family of nations, and should therefore link her fate with Mexico.[III-24] Whereupon the junta, at the suggestion of the marqués de Aycinena, hastily answered that the popular wishes must be ascertained before adopting any action; promising to send the proposal at once to the ayuntamientos and local authorities, with instructions to call on the people to give a formal expression of their will on the subject. This promise was kept in a measure—the ayuntamientos, not the people, were given one month's time to manifest their preference.[III-25]

Soon after the arrival of Iturbide's messenger, the persecution of republicans was begun. The rough element of the population, instigated by their adversaries, during the night insulted them at their homes.[III-26] Any one who either by word or writing opposed the plan of annexation was treated as seditious. At last the opposing parties had a scuffle in the streets, on the night of November 30th, which ended in the discomfiture of the republicans engaged in it.[III-27] Barrundia and Molina were present and exhibited much energy. The latter was in great peril of losing his life.

VOTE OF THE AYUNTAMIENTOS.

On the day appointed for the receipt of the returns from the several ayuntamientos—namely, the 31st of December—the junta provisional consultiva proceeded to the count. The result was as follows: 21 ayuntamientos declared that none but the general congress had authority to decide for or against the union with Mexico; 104 favored the annexation at once and unconditionally; 11 approved of the union, provided certain terms, which they appended, were stipulated in the act of incorporation; 32 left the matter wholly to the provisional government; and two declined the connection in toto.[III-28] Many others had not, for some reason, returned any answers; or if they had, the government in Guatemala failed to receive them on the appointed day. The result was made known to the regency in Mexico on the 3d of January, 1822, and on the 5th the subject was discussed in all its bearings. Valle moved that the decision should be postponed until the receipt of the returns of the 67 ayuntamientos not yet heard from. Rivera, Calderon, and Alvarado objected to any action. Gainza advocated the acceptance of the aid and protection tendered by Mexico.[III-29] The junta, disregarding all objections adduced, and the marked differences in the opinions of the ayuntamientos, decreed on the same day, January 5, 1822, that the whole of Central America should be annexed to the empire of Mexico, without other conditions than the fulfilment of the plan of Iguala and the treaties of Córdoba.[III-30] In a manifesto of that date, it assured the people that, after obtaining the votes of all the authorities, corporations, and prominent persons, and in view of the census of population formed in September 1821, it was evident that the vote for the union with Mexico had reached a majority in Guatemala proper; and including the votes of Nicaragua, Comayagua, Ciudad Real de Chiapas, Quezaltenango, Sololá, and other towns which had a few days previously declared themselves for annexation, it would be found that almost the whole population had expressed itself in favor of connection.[III-31] No member failed to record his name in favor of the loss of nationality, though some had, as before stated, suggested that certain guarantees should be required previous to the completion of the surrender.

GAINZA'S EDICT.

Gainza issued a manifesto full of generalities, declared there was no further need of electing deputies to congress, and assured the people of a liberal government, and future peace and prosperity.[III-32] Erelong events came to show how delusive were the promises thus held out by the incoming régime. It was preposterous on the part of an unconstituted country, as Mexico then was, with a government whose existence was precarious, to undertake the task of affording protection to the people of Central America—to a people that had been brought under the yoke of the so-called empire in such an unprecedented manner.

Forgetting, after a few days, the honeyed words of his manifesto, Gainza,[III-33] on January 9th, issued a stringent edict, countersigned by José María Celaya as secretary, giving renewed force to his former edicts of September 17th and December 1st, and forbidding, under the penalties provided by the laws against sedition, that any one should, either by tongue or pen, censure or refute the action adopted as the will of the majority. Conversations on the subject in the streets or public places were prohibited, and citizens were enjoined to report at once to the authorities any attempted conspiracy against the new government which might come to their knowledge. Constitutional alcaldes and other local authorities were charged with the execution of this decree.

Gainza and his junta thus gave way to the wishes of the would-be oligarchs and the clergy, ignoring the fact, formerly recognized by them, that to the representatives of the people in congress exclusively belonged the decision of the question on the future status of the country.[III-34] The aristocrats and clericals brought about difficulties to prevent the election of representatives, and took advantage of them to carry out their designs. The truth is, that the device resorted to, of acting upon the opinions of ayuntamientos which they well knew had no authority in the premises, was illegal. And, indeed, could a population of upwards of one million, scattered over 75,000 square miles of territory, have duly considered so vital a matter as the abdication of their national autonomy within the short period of thirty days? The whole secret of the aristocratic success lay in the pressure brought to bear on the country with a military force sent by Iturbide to support his pretensions.[III-35] The following facts appeared in the imperial gazette of Mexico: The regency announced on the 12th of November to the junta soberana that Chiapas, as well as the towns of Guatemala, had signified a wish to be received as a part of the Mexican empire, asking for military aid to uphold its acts. The regency added, that the military aid must then be quite near Chiapas, under the orders issued beforehand by the generalissimo, 5,000 men having already, under the conde de la Cadena, crossed the Tehuantepec River. The junta graciously assented to the so-called wishes of the people of Chiapas and Guatemala, giving them the rights of Mexican citizens.[III-36]

A division under Brigadier Vicente Filisola, with Colonel Felipe Codallos as his second in command,[III-37] began its march in November 1821; but a large portion of the men deserted on the way, and the ranks had to be recruited in Chiapas; and yet Filisola finally arrived in Guatemala with only 600 men.[III-38]

TROUBLES IN SALVADOR.

The junta provisional, after its action of January 5th, had no further reason for continuing, and so dissolved itself on the 21st of February. Gainza, retaining the offices of jefe superior político and captain-general, called into life a diputacion provincial.[III-39] His authority, however, was not regarded in Chiapas, Honduras, Nicaragua, nor a great part of Salvador. Costa Rica still remained aloof and was unmolested.

During Iturbide's occupation of his rickety throne, Central America had deputies in the imperial congress,[III-40] and the orders of the emperor's government were generally obeyed. Nevertheless, plucky little Salvador kept up the struggle against foreign domination. Nearly a majority of its ayuntamientos, together with the priest Delgado, the acting political chief, had signified their wish to await the action of congress; and on hearing of the surrender to Mexico by Gainza and his junta, entered a protest and seceded, resolving to remain independent till the representatives of the whole people of Central America should decide the question of nationality.[III-41]

But even here dissensions fostered from Guatemala had their pernicious effects. Santa Ana and San Miguel had voted for annexation to Mexico, and to uphold this action, seceded from their own province, which in that year led to a war between Salvador and Guatemala. The government at San Salvador gave the chief command of its forces to Manuel José Arce, with orders to bring the people of Santa Ana to reason, peaceably if he could, forcibly if he must.[III-42]

Arce marched on Santa Ana, when Padilla, commanding a portion of the Sonsonate force which had been stationed in that city, retreated within its own territory. After compelling the town to revoke its act of secession, Arce went in pursuit of Padilla, occupied Ahuachapam, then an annex of Sonsonate, and finally routed that officer in the hacienda El Espinal.[III-43] This was the first act of a bloody war, which will be treated in another chapter.

Defeat of Padilla.

In Honduras, the districts of Tegucigalpa and Gracias, together with the ports of Omoa and Trujillo, repudiated the union with Mexico.[III-44] Brigadier Tinoco, on hearing that a Salvadoran force had entered Honduras, resigned his office of governor. Comayagua, however, continued recognizing the authority of Mexico, but not that of Guatemala.[III-45]

NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA.

In Nicaragua, the city of Granada disregarded the authority at Leon, and held relations with Gainza, even after Colonel Sacasa had placed himself under the orders of the former.[III-46] Sacasa had surrendered his charge in Granada to Cleto Ordoñez,[III-47] who thus became the leader of the liberal party in Nicaragua. After the act of annexation to Mexico, and Salvador's act of secession, both Sacasa and Ordoñez supported the independents.

Ordoñez, finding himself in possession of irresponsible power, soon gave a loose rein to his bad instincts. He began to seize private property, not excepting even that of foreigners. Sacasa's person and property did not escape.[III-48]

Costa Rica did not fail, though maintaining a neutral attitude, to manifest her discontent with the course of Guatemala.

CHAPTER IV.
CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFEDERATION.
1822-1825.

Secession from Mexico—Arzú's Campaign—Prevarication of Salvador—Filisola's Victory—His Subsequent Course—Liberal Triumph in Costa Rica—Honduras Favors Union—National Independence Secured—Labors to Organize a Nation—The Constituent Assembly—Provincias Unidas del Centro de América—Abolition of African Slavery—Provisional Government—Moderados or Serviles—Liberales or Fiebres—Principles and Aims of Parties—Mexican Forces Retire—Seditions Begin—Salvadoran Force in Guatemala—Confederacion de Centro América—Fundamental Law—Finances—Adjournment of the Constituent Assembly.

DEFEAT OF ARZÚ.

Arce's invasion of territory occupied by Guatemala afforded the latter a sufficient pretext, if any were needed, to declare war against her high-spirited and troublesome neighbor. Colonel Arzú was thereupon despatched on the 19th of March, 1822, at the head of a force, which in a few days had been increased to 1,000 men, to bring Salvador under subjection. Arzú's dilatory movements, however, defeated the object of the expedition.[IV-1] He lost two months and more waiting for reënforcements and artillery, and by indecision as to whether or not he should heed the protestations of the Salvadorans.[IV-2] The latter employed the time thus gained in fortifying their city, though short of arms to equip a sufficient garrison. Aroused at last by Gainza's positive commands, Arzú continued his march,[IV-3] and avoiding the fortifications of San Salvador, entered the city on the 3d of June, taking its defenders by surprise.[IV-4] Having now every advantage, Arzú might have made himself master of the place had he not carelessly permitted his troops to disband for purposes of plunder. The result was, that the Salvadorans had time to rally, and a street fight ensued, ending with the total discomfiture of Arzú and his force, who with the loss of their arms were driven from the city.[IV-5] Had the victors made the most of their success, they might have annihilated the invading force; but they failed to conduct the pursuit with any skill.[IV-6]

Arzú's defeat produced a deep impression in Guatemala, where such a result had been unexpected, the expedition having been fitted out with the utmost care. Fears began to be entertained that the Salvadorans might become aggressors and invade Guatemala. The friends of Mexico were therefore much pleased on hearing that the Mexican commander, Filisola, had been ordered to supersede Gainza, who was summoned to Mexico.[IV-7] With about 600 men Filisola arrived in Guatemala on the 12th of June, 1822, and ten days later took possession of the government. He inaugurated a comparatively good state of affairs; for though as a supporter of the Mexican cause, and specially of the empire, he aimed at consolidation, yet his policy was a conciliatory one.[IV-8] He endeavored to obtain the assent of Salvador to union with Mexico without resorting to force. At first his course presented a promising aspect, inasmuch as the representatives of the former apparently made little objection; and on the news of Iturbide's call to the Mexican throne, among the many congratulations received by Filisola were those of Salvador, delivered by a special deputation. But the object, as it turned out, was merely to gain time. The negotiations were continued several months, hostilities having been suspended by both belligerents, till early in September it was agreed that further negotiations should be carried on directly with the executive and congress of Mexico.[IV-9] This agreement was not carried out, however, owing to new difficulties raised by San Salvador. Filisola, who evidently would not assume the responsibility of war, referred the whole matter to Mexico for instructions. Iturbide, who had just dissolved the Mexican congress for its opposition to his plans,[IV-10] felt no inclination to permit little San Salvador to dictate the terms of union, and disallowing the armistice concluded by Filisola, ordered him to begin hostilities forthwith if unconditional submission were refused.[IV-11]

FILISOLA'S CAMPAIGN.

Leaving his second officer, Colonel Codallos, in charge of the government at Guatemala, Filisola began the military operations toward the end of November, taking possession of Santa Ana and marching[IV-12] upon the city of San Salvador, after having routed several small hostile detachments which attempted to check his progress. At the same time he published the decree of the Mexican government of November 4th, making of Central America, or the former captain-generalcy of Guatemala, three comandancias generales, namely, those of Chiapas, Sacatepequez, and Costa Rica, the capitals being respectively Ciudad Real, Nueva Guatemala, and Leon in Nicaragua.[IV-13] The government of San Salvador was in a precarious situation; although disposing of an army whose numerical force and equipment were not inferior to Filisola's, yet it had neither discipline nor experienced officers. The few encounters which had already taken place between the two forces had made it evident that the Salvadorans could not cope with Filisola's military skill. Under the circumstances, the authorities of San Salvador resolved upon incorporation with Mexico, and demanded that Filisola should proceed no farther. They declined to inform him of the terms under which they would submit to annexation, though offering to lay them before the congress in Mexico. They based this action on the ground that if their purpose became known in Salvador a revolution would certainly follow.[IV-14]

The Mexican commander paid no heed to these ambiguous statements, which he considered devices to gain time, and continued his march.[IV-15]

FALL OF ITURBIDE.

It was at this critical moment that the congress of San Salvador, carried away by hatred to Guatemala and Mexico, resolved upon a singular step. On the 2d of December, 1822, the act of incorporation with Mexico was repealed, and the state was placed under the protectorate of the Anglo-American states, as an integral portion thereof. Solemn protests were made in the name of that republic against Filisola's hostile acts. A member of the congress, Juan Manuel Rodriguez, was commissioned to make known the incorporation to the government of the United States.[IV-16] For a short time it seems that hopes were entertained of an armed protection on the part of the northern republic in favor of the new acquisition; but soon the folly of such expectations became apparent. Filisola disregarded the protests,[IV-17] and after several victorious encounters, routed the Salvadorans under Arce at Mejicanos,[IV-18] and entered the city of San Salvador without further opposition on the 9th of February, 1823. Filisola fulfilled the promise he had made the preceding day to the ayuntamiento, that he would respect all rights, and not treat the town as a conquered country. The only Salvadoran force remaining was compelled, on the 21st of February, to surrender at Gualcince, a town on the other side of the Lempa River.[IV-19] This was the end of the war.[IV-20] Arce, who departed for the United States, wrote Filisola from Belize a letter full of firmness and dignity, meanwhile thanking him for his humane conduct. Delgado remained at his hacienda. The local authorities swore allegiance to the Mexican empire. Filisola now returned to Guatemala,[IV-21] where he arrived about the 6th or 7th of March. He had already received the news of the movement in Mexico resulting in the overthrow of Iturbide. It was this that hastened his return to Guatemala, and induced him to adopt a course opposed to his last instructions from Mexico. Granada, in Nicaragua, had not been reduced to obedience. Governor Gonzalez Saravia had asked for troops to accomplish it, but Filisola declined to employ coercion; and after informing him and Juan Fernandez Lindo, governor of Honduras,[IV-22] as well as other officials in the provinces, of the state of affairs in Mexico, assured them that he would take no important step without first obtaining their assent. Indeed, after he convinced himself that the imperial government had fallen never to rise again, he arrived at the conclusion that he had no right to keep annexed to Mexico the Central American provinces; as the annexation had been made solely, as claimed by Mexico and her supporters, for the sake of securing stability to their government, and the respect which would be afforded it from a long distance by a great and wealthy country. All this prestige had disappeared, owing to the revolution at Casa Mata in Mexico,[IV-23] the paper money, and other arrangements made by Iturbide with reference to these provinces.

Being asked to summon a congress of all the provinces of Central America, he complied, issuing a decree on the 29th of March, 1823, with the view of carrying out the acta of September 15, 1821, which had been annulled by the incorporation of the country with Mexico. This was tantamount to a recognition of the independence of Central America from Mexico.[IV-24] His decree was hailed with joy by the party friendly to absolute independence. The Mexican or imperialist party was vanquished, and the people were ready to take an active part in the coming elections. Peace was not only temporarily restored in Guatemala and Salvador, but in Nicaragua and Costa Rica party struggles were brought to a close.

In Granada, Ordoñez had continued committing many outrages.[IV-25] He had successfully repulsed Saravia, who had come against him from Leon. The latter was in the act of preparing another expedition, when Filisola's decree was promulgated, and he was summoned to Guatemala. Nicaragua subsequently constituted a junta gubernativa of its own.[IV-26]

In Costa Rica, Saravia, with the aid of Bishop Jerez, attempted to force the province into the union with Mexico, and with that view endeavored to overthrow the provincial government established at Cartago. A conspiracy was planned there, and its authors, seconded in Ciudad Vieja, openly espoused the cause of Iturbide on the 29th of March. The men of the liberal party fled to San José, and after strengthening their ranks there and at Alajuela, attacked the imperialists on the field of Las Lagunas, near Cartago, and defeated them.[IV-27] The town had to surrender, and was occupied by the victorious independents, but the seat of government remained in San José.[IV-28]

In Honduras, the provincial assembly resolved on the 10th of May to enter into the union with the other provinces of Central America, with the view of constituting an independent nation.[IV-29]

SEPARATION FROM MEXICO.

Central America then, after a fifteen months' connection with Mexico, was again in the same position it had occupied at the time of separation from Spain. No advantages had been derived from that union; but, on the contrary, numerous heavy taxes had exhausted the country, though the treasury was invariably empty. The whole country was suffering from other consequences of the internal wars, in the form of abuses on the part of unscrupulous political parties and military chiefs; none worse, however, than the military sway imposed by Mexico.[IV-30] There have not been wanting those who believe the separation from the northern republic was a false step.[IV-31] The people had for centuries lived under the same superior government, subject only to the Spanish crown. Then followed a period when they often faced one another as foes. Now they were invited to sit side by side and discuss measures for the benefit of the great family to which they all belonged. The elections were conducted with enthusiasm on the part of the republicans, the field having been left to them by the imperialists.[IV-32]

Congress assembled on the 24th of June, 1823,[IV-33] under the presidency of José Matías Delgado,[IV-34] the installation being graced by the presence of Filisola and the municipal council of the city.[IV-35]

On the 2d of July following it assumed the name of Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. The body was in session nineteen months, closing its labors on the 23d of January, 1825. Its work was momentous, having to organize a government imbued with the prevailing liberal spirit; to improve the imperilled finances; to establish relations with foreign powers; and, what was of the highest importance, to bring unity out of chaos. The first step toward the accomplishment of these purposes was taken on the 1st of July, 1823, with the adoption of the ordinance which declared the provinces of the former captain-generalcy of Guatemala to be free and independent states, confederated into a nation under the name of Provincias Unidas del Centro de América.[IV-36] Inasmuch as a considerable number of representatives had not arrived on that date, the ordinance was subsequently ratified on the 1st of October.[IV-37] The new confederation was recognized by Mexico only a little more than a year after.[IV-38]

ORGANIZATION.

Shortly after independence was proclaimed, a division of the powers of government into three branches was resolved on; namely, the legislative, to be vested in the asamblea; the executive, composed of three members, to be elected by and to be subject to that body; and the judicial, to be exercised by the existing courts.[IV-39] The executive, as then constituted, was to be merely provisional, and until a fundamental code should give it a permanent organization. The public debt was recognized; the catholic religion was declared to be that of the state; and freedom of the press decreed.

From the moment that the choice of the executive occupied the attention of the assembly a division of parties became manifest. The friends of absolute independence formed a large majority; those of the former Mejicanistas were few in number. The larger portion of the deputies was composed of the best men of the country, whatever their party affiliations, and their intentions were upright. Those of moderate views from all sections formed themselves into one party, and went by the name of moderados; their opponents applying to them the epithets of servil and aristócrata.[IV-40] The radicals formed another organization, and were called fiebres and liberales, their enemies also giving them the appellation of anarquistas.

The liberal party advocated the establishment of a federal republic, and as a rule was guided by a liberal patriotism, and a desire to see the abolishment of unjust privileges and antiquated vices in the government. Its opponents, in favor of a centralized government and the continuation of the old fueros, struggled against the restrictions that were being put to the influence of Guatemala. Nevertheless, a liberal spirit predominated for a time, and three well-known liberals were chosen to constitute the executive authority, namely, Manuel José Arce,[IV-41] Doctor Pedro Molina, and Juan Vicente Villacorta.[IV-42] It must be acknowledged that this government was not a strong one, the only man of superior talent in it being Molina, and he had little experience wherewith to found a republic and manage its affairs at such a critical period.

A constantly increasing coolness between the government and Filisola became intensified when the deputies from Costa Rica and Nicaragua refused to occupy their seats in the assembly while a Mexican army had virtual sway over the capital. Complaints also came from various quarters, of abuses committed by the Mexican soldiers,[IV-43] and demands were made for their departure. Some time elapsed in discussions and negotiations, partly because of difficulty in raising the needed funds. But finally, all obstacles being removed, Filisola departed with his force on the 3d of August, 1823, leaving behind him a good name, which was little affected by charges preferred against him at a later date.[IV-44]

The liberals now were at greater liberty to carry out their plans, which involved, among other things, the disappearance of old practices, including titles and compellations,[IV-45] not even the hackneyed 'don' escaping the general reformatory tendency.[IV-46] A coat of arms was likewise decreed, showing the national name in golden letters,[IV-47] as also a flag, the latter consisting of three horizontal stripes, the middle one being white, with the national coat of arms about half-way from the mast, and the other two blue.

Seal of Central America.

DECREES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Among other decrees enacted by the assembly in 1823, the following are worthy of mention: One of August 21st, to annul all acts of the late imperial government affecting Central America; one of August 26th, declaring the 15th of September to be the national anniversary, and how it was to be observed—this decree was reiterated by the legislative assembly on the 15th of October, 1834; one of October 27th, directing the Central American deputies—those of Chiapas excepted—to withdraw from the Mexican congress; and one of November 15th, to form a general census.[IV-48]

ARIZA'S REVOLT.

Another measure adopted was that which authorized the executive to dismiss without formality all officials having their appointments from the Spanish or Mexican governments. Little discretion was shown in this, and discontent resulted, which was made manifest in the opposition met with by every measure of the government, even such as were generally recognized to be of public utility. Financial and military affairs were in the worst possible condition. To improve the former was a difficult task, the expenses being greater than during the colonial period, and several branches of revenue, which formerly yielded considerable resources, having disappeared with the old dependence.[IV-49] As to the army, the greater part of it had been disbanded, and only one battalion of the regular force and a few bodies of militia formed the entire defensive power of the republic. The government was almost at the mercy of a handful of men, and it was not long before they exhibited their lack of discipline and loyalty. The soldiers had for some time past shown dissatisfaction at the neglect of the government to pay them their dues. Under the circumstances, it was rather easy to prevail on them to revolt, and it was done, the leader being Captain Rafael Ariza y Torres.[IV-50] The authorities, though aware of his machinations, had taken no decisive measures to defeat them,[IV-51] other than commissioning Ignacio Larrazábal to make an investigation. Ariza, fearing that delay might cause the failure of his plan, in the evening of the 13th of September assumed the title of commander-in-chief of the forces; and the next morning[IV-52] volleys of musketry and other manifestations apprised the alarmed inhabitants of the insurrection. A scene of excitement ensued. The assembly hastily met, and amidst the confusion a messenger came from Ariza to assure the chamber of his loyal disposition toward the government, and to add in explanation that the position of commander had been forced upon him by the troops. The messenger was peremptorily ordered to retire without receiving any answer. A number of enthusiastic citizens assailed a portion of Ariza's men, only to be driven back to the university building, where the assembly held its sittings. A show of defence was made there,[IV-53] to enable the assemblymen to seek safety in flight. Few of their number remained. Negotiations were then begun to prevent the commission of outrages by the mutinous soldiers,[IV-54] and the government finally gave way, and conferred on Ariza the title of commander-in-chief; he thereupon took the official oath on that day. The concession was made only to gain time, hopes being entertained that the auxiliaries summoned from the surrounding country and other states would soon arrive.

The rebellious captain had in the mean time begun to realize his awkward position. Assuming a submissive tone, he protested his readiness to obey the government; whereupon he was commanded to leave the city and retire to Antigua, where his force dispersed before any coercive action on the part of the government and its allies became necessary. Ariza himself escaped by flight the punishment which his reckless behavior deserved.[IV-55]

But the difficulties were not yet over. The feeble conduct of the government, and the humiliating concessions it had made to the rebel, reflected so much discredit that the labors of the moderado party for the election of a new executive now gave promise of fruitful results.[IV-56] On the 4th of October congress reassembled, and the same day Villacorta, Molina, and Rivera tendered their resignations, which were accepted; and in their stead, on the 4th of October, Manuel José Arce was again elected, together with José del Valle and Tomás O'Horan,[IV-57] and as substitutes for the two first, then absent, José Santiago Milla and Villacorta, the same person who had resigned.[IV-58] The new government found at once its attention engrossed by the troublesome situation, which had arisen from the coming of a Salvadoran force, called to help against the revolting soldiers. Although forbidden to approach the city, and ordered to return home, it refused to comply,[IV-59] and on the 12th of October entered the city of Guatemala, all remonstrances to the contrary having proved unavailing. The Salvadorans occupied the capital three weeks, during which rumors were rife of their plans to pillage the place in retaliation of Guatemalan troops having occupied San Salvador the previous year. Brawls and fights between them and soldiers from other provinces were of daily occurrence.

The regular garrison and all the inhabitants breathed more freely when at last, on the 3d of November, the unwelcome guests departed.[IV-60] The same day the auxiliary troops from Quezaltenango, who had been of good use in keeping others somewhat in check, also returned home.

A CONSTITUTION.

The labors of the assembly had been continued in the mean time, and on the 17th of December, 1823, were decreed and published the bases of the constitution for the republic,[IV-61] adopting a popular, representative, federal form of government. Each one of the five states, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, which were to form the confederation of Central America, was to have the same division of powers, and with the same functions, in its internal administration, as the general government with respect to the whole republic.[IV-62]

The labors of framing the constitution lasted a year longer, and were terminated only on the 22d of November, 1824, when the fundamental law of the Central American republic was promulgated, strict obedience thereto being solemnly sworn on the 15th of April, 1825,[IV-63] and ratified by the national congress five months later, namely, on the 1st of September. While discussing the constitution, both the liberal and moderado parties used their best efforts for the adoption of their respective principles. The former triumphed, being especially strong in the provinces, whereas its antagonists resided chiefly in the capital. Although a number of good and able men were among the members of the congress, their good purposes were repeatedly balked by party spirit; and thus only an imperfect result was obtained in the constitution adopted November 22, 1824.[IV-64] It was the first effort to define the rules for the government of a country which at that time was beginning the life of an independent nation. The constitution of the United States had been taken as a model; but it had not been borne in mind that a difference existed between the people of the northern and Central American republics at the time when they respectively gained their independence. However good the intentions of the framers of the Central American constitution, they fell short of their object; for in adopting certain forms, altogether inappropriate, they also introduced contradictory clauses. No provision was made for a federal district to hold the national capital. Thus Guatemala, where the federal authorities then and afterward resided, became also the seat of the state government, and in the course of time collisions were unavoidable.[IV-65] The constitution further defined the rights of property and liberty of thought, as well as freedom of the press, and placed the chief authority of the republic in the hands of congress,[IV-66] in addition to the legislative power with which it was vested. Laws were to be enacted by the two houses forming the congress, one of which was the senate, whose members were also elected by the people, two for every state. This body acted as an executive council, with a general supervision to see that the different high officials and magistrates faithfully discharged their duties. Its president was ex officio vice-president of the republic.[IV-67] A supreme court of justice was also created, the members being, like those of congress and senate, chosen by popular vote.[IV-68]

SLAVERY ABOLISHED.

Among the most important laws enacted were those of December 31, 1823, and April 17 and 24, 1824, which emancipated all slaves, and made free slaves of other countries coming to Central America.[IV-69] The slave-trade was prohibited, under the penalty of forfeiture of the rights of citizenship.[IV-70] Of all the nations of North America, to the Central American republic belongs the honor of having first practically abolished slavery.[IV-71]

The new republic also took a deep interest in a project for the union of all the American states.[IV-72] The project failed, because of its impracticability. The particulars of this subject are given in treating of the famous Panamá congress of American nations.

The exhausted condition of the treasury appearing to be the chief impediment to all projected improvements, the remedy was looked for in a foreign loan, about $7,000,000 being borrowed on rather favorable terms from a London firm.[IV-73] The tobacco and customs revenues were pledged toward its repayment.[IV-74] It is understood that a portion of the money was applied to strengthening the fortifications, and the remainder was distributed among the states for their local requirements.

The initiation and execution of the different measures I have made mention of, and others of less magnitude, were the work of the constituent assembly, which closed its session on the 23d of January, 1825. If all its resolutions were not wise ones, allowance must be made for the many difficulties that were in the way, and a full recognition given its members of the good faith and assiduity with which they performed their work.[IV-75]

CHAPTER V.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
1825-1830.

General Elections—Meeting of the First Congress—Manuel José Arce, First President of the Republic—Foreign Relations—Arce's Prevarications—Conflict with Guatemala—Party Bickerings—Liberals Quarrel with Arce—He Joins their Opponents—Bitterness Engendered—President versus Guatemalan Rulers—Arrest of Jefe Juan Barrundia—Riots at Quezaltenango—Murder of Vice-jefe Cirilo Flores—Arce as Dictator in Guatemala—War against Salvador—Arce Defeated—He Gives up the Presidency, and Cannot Recover It—Bloody War of 1826-9—Morazan the Victor—José Francisco Barrundia, Acting President—Liberal Measures—Peace Restored—Spanish Schemes.

The first constitutional congress of the Estados Federados de Centro América was installed on the 6th of February, 1825, Mariano Galvez being chosen president,[V-1] as well as the leader of the liberal party. A number of the old delegates had been reëlected for the new body,[V-2] whose principal duties were the election of a president, and the ratification of the constitution. The latter, as we have already seen, was on the 1st of September; the former proved a more difficult task, and was achieved amidst contradictions and stormy discussions. The provisional executive power elected in 1823 had not been harmonious. Arce and Valle assumed their duties soon after their election, and before many days had serious differences, which ended in Arce's resignation of the presidency of the triumvirate. Being replaced by José Manuel de la Cerda, he departed for Salvador and Nicaragua, exerting himself in the pacification of the latter. His services in this direction won him much good-will, and it was proposed to make him the first constitutional president of the republic, a proposition that met with popular favor. Meanwhile his opponent, Valle, was also working.[V-3] Since May 1824 the congress had been convoked. Both liberals and moderados had untiringly worked for their respective candidates. The latter seemed to have every prospect of victory; of the 79 votes cast, 41 being for Valle, their candidate.[V-4] As 42 votes were necessary for a choice under the constitution, congress assumed the right of selecting one of the two candidates. A compromise between the contending parties was effected, Arce pledging himself to remain neutral on certain questions upon which the other party was much disturbed.[V-5] The moderados then voted for Arce, and congress, on the 21st of April, 1825, declared him to have been duly elected by a majority of twenty-two votes against five for Valle. The latter was recognized as the vice-president, and having declined the position, Mariano Beltranena was chosen in his place.[V-6] The justices of the supreme court were elected at the same time, and on the 29th of April[V-7] took possession of their offices.

RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES.

The recognition of the Central American republic as an independent nation had engaged the attention of the supreme authorities at the same time that the internal organization was proceeding. The first treaty concluded by the new republic was on the 15th of March, 1825, with Colombia, Pedro Molina acting as its plenipotentiary at Bogotá.[V-8] A few months later, at Washington, on the 5th of December, 1825, a treaty was entered into with the United States of America, with which power there had been formal relations since the beginning of the year.[V-9] Antonio José Cañas represented Central America as her plenipotentiary. The United States soon after accredited William Miller as chargé d'affaires near the new republic. Diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the Netherlands were opened early in 1825. Spain continued refusing to recognize the independence of Central America, and the pope followed in her footsteps, as he had done in regard to Mexico.[V-10]

The republic being now fairly launched, had Arce possessed the ability all might have gone well. But he either overestimated his administrative powers, or underrated the magnitude of his task; and after decreeing some wise measures upon the military defences, he began to sow dissatisfaction by his vacillating policy. A member of the liberal party from the first day that he took part in the political affairs of the country, he now committed the serious error of abandoning the ground upon which he might have trod with safety. In his endeavors to please both parties, he succeeded in offending the liberals without securing the confidence of their opponents, who, though willing enough to admit him to their ranks, declined rendering implicit obedience. His former friends now openly assailed him.[V-11]

A conflict sprang up, also, between the federal government and the local authorities of Guatemala City, because the latter refused to take part in celebrating the anniversary of the installation of the first assembly on the 24th of June, and force was at last brought to bear upon them.[V-12]

ARCE, RAOUL, AND VALLE.

The ill-feeling against Arce became intensified when the state government soon after decreed a transfer of its seat to Guatemala, and for want of accommodations in public buildings, took possession of the property of private citizens without their consent. The owners claimed protection from the federal congress, and serious disturbances were averted only by a compromise. During this episode the moderados or serviles kept fanning the flame of discord between Arce and the liberals, extolling his measures. When the first congress closed its session, on the 25th of December, 1825,[V-13] the political features of the country had notably changed. But fortunately the danger to the republic from the action of the serviles was avoided, because, upon lots being cast on the 1st of October for the renewals of members of congress,[V-14] the retiring members happened to be chiefly of districts where the servile party had majorities before, and were now replaced by liberals, the preponderance of the latter being thus increased. The second constitutional congress assembled on the 1st of March, 1826. Among its members was Valle, who, bent on revenge, erelong made common cause with the liberals,[V-15] though he was not allowed to exercise a predominant influence in their counsels.

On the day congress opened, the president delivered his message detailing the condition of the country, but most of it had reference to the relations with foreign powers.[V-16] The impending rupture was finally hastened by the president's course toward Colonel Nicolás Raoul, a French officer who had recently arrived from Colombia, and had been made commander of the artillery and a member of the council of war.[V-17] Notwithstanding the considerations and favors conferred on him by Arce, no sooner had he received his appointment than he openly sided with the liberals and gave utterances against the government. Therefore, when Raoul was summoned by congress to aid in the organization of the federal troops, the president, to get rid of him, sent him to explore the northern coasts.[V-18] Arce then undertook to increase the federal army to 4,000 men, under the pretext that such a force was needed for the pacification of Nicaragua, and the defence of the country against a Spanish invasion, rumors of which were circulating. In order to facilitate the operation, he proposed that the members of congress should stir up public enthusiasm in their respective states; but instead of acceding to his recommendation, several persons known to be hostile to the government, among them Raoul, were selected by that body. All remonstrances to the contrary on the part of Arce[V-19] had no other effect than to imbitter the liberals against him. Charges were accordingly brought forth, such as his neglecting to lay before congress an account of expenditures during his administration, and his having squandered a considerable portion of the money raised by loan in London. The outcry against his conduct was growing louder from day to day.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs determined Arce to dissolve congress. Still he was loath to use violent means, and in fact, there was no need of it. One of the clauses of the constitution allowed the admission of substitutes for the deputies to congress in certain cases, and both parties had taken advantage of it without opposition. However, when the question of calling the president to account arose, the serviles protested against the presence of the liberal substitutes which gave to that party the majority.[V-20] On the 2d of June the deputies from Salvador, under instructions from their government, which was friendly to Arce, abandoned their seats, their example being followed by those from Costa Rica and most of the serviles, thus leaving the chamber without a quorum.[V-21] The session was reopened, however, ten days later, upon the liberals pledging themselves not to introduce any motion against the president or the serviles, and thenceforth the discussions were confined to matters of a general character till the 30th of June, when the session was closed; but the deputies of Salvador and Costa Rica had not resumed their seats.

STATE AND NATION.

It was now evident that a collision was unavoidable. The state government, controlled by the liberals, became fearful that the serviles, in their endeavor to support the president, might also attack the authorities of Guatemala, and under the pretext of an invasion threatening from Chiapas, secretly began to make military preparations. Salvador and Costa Rica, on the other hand, offered aid of troops to the federal government. Both parties precipitated the crisis: the liberals by their heedless attacks on the clergy,[V-22] and specially by ridiculing its members; the serviles by fanning, jointly with the clericals, ill feeling among the low, ignorant classes, whom it was easy to persuade that the liberal party aimed at the destruction of their religion. This had now become a matter of greater ease, owing to the irritation already existing, caused by the forced loans and recruiting for the army decreed by the state government. Strange though it may appear, the serviles had no suspicion that the federal authorities were aware of their intrigues. The clash came in May 1826, when Raoul, without having fulfilled his commission on the northern coast, tendered his resignation, accompanied with a number of invectives against the executive, which he subsequently repeated in a second letter.[V-23] He was arrested on the 17th of July, and subjected to the action of a court-martial for disrespect and insubordination. This raised a storm of fury in the local legislature, where Raoul's arrest was considered as an encroachment on the state's authority. An order of arrest was issued against Captain Espínola, the officer who had carried out the commands of the federal executive, and the jefe, or chief of the state, Juan Barrundia, was authorized to raise a sufficient force to seize Espínola's person,[V-24] and the pecuniary contingent of the state for federal expenses was withheld.[V-25]

The troops despatched to arrest Espínola numbered 300 men, and were commanded by Cayetano de la Cerda, who encountered his man near Acasaguastlan. To avoid bloodshed, a capitulation was agreed upon by both parties until they should obtain further orders from their respective governments.[V-26]

When news of this agreement reached Guatemala, a few days later, simultaneously rumors came to the ears of Arce that a coup-de-main was contemplated by Barrundia, with the evident intent of effecting his removal. To anticipate the blow,[V-27] on the 5th of September Arce secretly ordered the commander of the federal forces to arrest Barrundia at an early hour the following morning, and disarm the state troops, using force if necessary.[V-28] This was done, the officer meeting with no resistance.[V-29] The liberals had no suspicion of Arce's resolve till after its execution. The vice-jefe of the state, Cirilo Flores, then forthwith assumed the government, and being tendered the aid of federal troops to support his authority, proudly rejected it.[V-30]

ARREST OF BARRUNDIA.

On the following day the chiefs of the other states were apprised of Barrundia's arrest, in a circular from Arce defending his course, which he declared to have been pursuant to duty under the constitution.[V-31] Such was the position assumed by his friends and by the serviles in general; while the radical liberals, taking a different view, denounced him as a violator of the constitution.[V-32] However, the energy thus displayed by Arce was rather favorably looked upon, perhaps from a feeling of relief arising from the supposition that party bickerings had been brought to an end, more than from any sympathy for Arce. The president might now have strengthened his party, but did not, and went on committing serious mistakes. Instead of turning the imprisoned Barrundia over to the state assembly, as prescribed by the constitution, to be tried upon the several charges that had been ostentatiously preferred against him, he allowed the legal time for prosecution to elapse, and then released the prisoner under bonds.[V-33]

The second constitutional congress was to meet on the 1st of October, 1826, and the liberal party had, since September, industriously worked to secure a majority. But on the appointed day there was no quorum, the members of the opposition having refused to take their seats, evidently to prevent the adoption of any measures against the president.[V-34] It was rather suspicious that the government at San Salvador, always friendly to Arce, had forbidden its delegates to occupy their seats in congress unless it were to discuss the expediency of transferring the federal authorities to some place distant from Guatemala.[V-35] It soon became apparent that the president's aim was to have his own assembly, for on the 10th of October he convoked an extraordinary congress.[V-36] This was open violation of the constitution, which vested in the senate the authority for convoking, and moreover limited representation to only one delegate for every 30,000 inhabitants. Much indignation was felt by the members of congress, who had constituted themselves into an organizing commission, but dispersed on the same day that Arce's decree was published.[V-37]

MURDER OF FLORES.

Exciting events now followed in quick succession. The vice-jefe Cirilo Flores and the state authorities had retired on the 8th of October to Quezaltenango, where he was murdered a few days afterward—on the 13th—by a mob of fanatical Indians.[V-38] The act was attributed to Arce and his immediate friends, but apparently without much reason,[V-39] though it must be admitted that intrigues of the servile party and the preaching of hostile priests aroused the fanaticism of the populace to such a degree that the slightest cause would bring about the commission of outrages. The trouble did not end with Flores' death, for many members of the assembly and representative council were compelled to flee for their lives.

The state was now powerless, for even its military forces disappeared before the federal troops. The liberals in the state and republic saw their hopes dashed, and many emigrated.[V-40] Arce held the executive authority of both the federation and the state of Guatemala; and acting upon the advice of Salvador, he began reorganization, decreeing on the 31st of October the election of a new executive and legislature for Guatemala, from which the inhabitants entertained hopes of a final restoration of peace throughout the republic. But those hopes were frustrated by a sudden change of policy on the part of the Salvador government, which surprised everybody, all the more from the fact that it had heretofore firmly supported the president.

ARCE'S VICTORY AND DEFEAT.

Pedro Molina arrived at San Salvador from Panamá when Arce had in his charge the affairs of Guatemala, and had decreed the new elections for the state. Being a political opponent of the president, Molina refused to go to Guatemala to report the action of the Panamá congress. It was not a difficult matter for him to find congenial spirits for an intrigue against the federal executive. An estrangement had occurred between Arce and Delgado, who aspired to be bishop of San Salvador,[V-41] and was a man of great political power. Moreover, it so happened that the jefe of Salvador, owing to ill health, had to turn over his office to the vice-jefe, Mariano Prado, who was under the influence of the discontented party. His first act was to repeal Arce's decree of October 10th convoking an extraordinary congress at Cojutepeque.[V-42] Then simultaneously forces were levied in Salvador, ostensibly to protect congress when assembled at Ahuachapan. Internal difficulties in Honduras led the federal government to interfere;[V-43] and thus, at the end of 1826, there were a number of forces at work to drive Arce from the presidential seat. This state of affairs continued till February 1827, when rumors of an invasion began to circulate in Guatemala. The next month Salvadoran forces, under Trigueros, started on their march toward the capital. All doubts about the plans of the invading army having ceased, Arce displayed unusual activity in his preparations to meet the enemy. With the aid of the newly chosen jefe of Guatemala, Aycinena, he increased the garrison to 2,000 men, and leaving the executive authority in charge of Vice-president Beltranena, took personal command of the troops. He made an effort, however, to avert an encounter, but without avail;[V-44] and they fought, a few days later, at Guadalupe, a short distance from Guatemala, the invaders being repulsed, and the following day, March 23d, utterly routed at Arrazola.[V-45] This victory caused great exultation in Guatemala, and Arce's prestige grew rapidly. Money and reënforcements were cheerfully placed at his command, and he allowed himself to be carried away by evil counsels to pursue an aggressive policy and punish Salvador.[V-46]

CÁSCARAS IN SALVADOR.

The federal army marched in April into the state of Salvador, and reënforced from Sonsonate and Santa Ana,[V-47] reached Nejapa without opposition, that place being about twelve miles from the city of San Salvador. After certain negotiations for peace, which had no satisfactory result, Arce attacked the city on the 18th of May, at the head of 2,000 men, and was repulsed with heavy loss. His slow movements had given the Salvadorans time to act.[V-48] His retreat was in good order to Santa Ana; but from this place, desertions having greatly diminished the force, it degenerated into flight, of which the pursuing Salvadorans failed to take advantage. Arce reached Cuajiniquilapa toward the end of May, with only 300 men. This early failure of a war from which were to flow such great results brought odium on Arce; but by the efforts of friends, confidence in him was restored, and about 700 men were obtained to resume operations by taking Santa Ana.[V-49] For several months no events of importance occurred. The time was employed by Arce in strengthening his force, with which he made a fruitless attempt to intercept a Salvador division that assailed Sonsonate. Overtures for peace were again made by Salvador, but though not absolutely rejected, no understanding was arrived at. They gave rise, however, to a discussion as to whether the federal president was, as he thought himself, authorized to decide upon the question of peace or war without consulting the state government of Guatemala.[V-50] Piqued at the opposition he had met, which he supposed to arise from want of confidence, Arce received with pleasure a request from Vice-president Beltranena to give up the army and return to Guatemala and take charge of the government.[V-51] Brigadier Francisco Cáscaras was thereupon made commander of the army on the 12th of October, 1827. Soon after Arce's return to Guatemala he took steps to restore peace, and issued, on the 5th of December, a decree to convoke a new congress,[V-52] and at the same time ordered a suspension of hostilities. But his commissioner, Juan de Dios Mayorga, who was to notify the authorities at San Salvador of his measures, was not allowed to proceed to that city, the Salvadorans, now reënforced with officers exiled from Colombia,[V-53] being more than ever opposed to conciliation. Hostilities were resumed and conducted with alternating success;[V-54] but on the whole, disadvantageously for the federal force, owing to Cáscaras' lack of strategy, and the temporizing policy of the enemy; for the latter, whenever pressed, would make overtures of peace, protesting a willingness to terminate the war, though breaking their promises as fast as they were made.[V-55] Cáscaras' situation was daily becoming perilous, on account of the numerous desertions of his troops. At last, on the 17th of December, a bloody encounter took place in the streets of Santa Ana, which terminated in a capitulation, under which both forces were to leave the place the next day. Cáscaras left it as stipulated, but Colonel Merino with the Salvadorans remained.[V-56] Cáscaras returned to Guatemala toward the end of December, the Salvadorans having regained possession of Santa Ana, and of all the other places formerly occupied by the federal army.

Shortly after, with Aycinena's assistance, another federal army was organized, but Arce took good care to give positions in it only to trusted friends.[V-57] As soon as the organization was nearly completed, detachments were sent to check the enemy's raids in Chiquimula, and then, under the command of a foreigner named William Perks, the army marched against the Salvadoran headquarters at Ahuachapan. Once more stratagem was resorted to by the wily Salvadorans, who made proffers of peace, the farce ending as usual.[V-58] In the mean time troubles broke out in the federal army, and Perks, the commander, was deposed by the field-officers and sent to Guatemala as a prisoner.[V-59] The command then devolved upon Colonel Antonio José Irisarri. Arce tried in vain to have Perks reinstalled, and his efforts in that direction only served to increase the ill feeling, which grew so strong that on the 14th of February, 1828, he turned over the executive office, though without a formal resignation, to Beltranena,[V-60] who conferred the command of the federal army on Brigadier Manuel Arzú. This officer marched at once against the Salvadorans, refusing to listen to any overtures for negotiations from their chief, Merino. The armies met at Chalchuapa on the 1st of March, and the federal troops obtained a victory, which drove the foe back to San Salvador.[V-61] Arzú followed and made an assault on that city, in which both sides gave proofs of extraordinary bravery. The assault failed; at the end of six hours' fighting the assailants had to retreat behind their intrenchments.[V-62] From this time San Salvador and San Miguel became the theatres of war. A series of encounters, none of sufficient importance to be lengthily described, followed, with varying success for either side.[V-63] The Salvadorans having besieged the remnants of the federal army under Colonel Manuel Montúfar, at Mejicanos, after eight months compelled them to surrender, on the 20th of September. Their commander and general staff were held as prisoners of war.[V-64]

GUATEMALA AND SALVADOR.

The division of the federal army that occupied the department of San Miguel, which had been defeated by General Morazan at Gualcho on the 6th of July, being intercepted on its retreat toward the Lempa, laid down its arms, under honorable terms, at San Antonio, on the 9th of October.[V-65]

The condition of federal affairs was now far from encouraging. It may be that Arce, had he been replaced, might have turned disaster; but his application had met with a refusal, and he took no further part in the political events of the republic.[V-66] After all hostile forces had been either captured or expelled from Salvador, Morazan made a triumphant entry into the state capital on the 23d of October, 1828.[V-67] Shortly before this a commission had come from Costa Rica to mediate between Guatemala and Salvador, but the latter demanded too much.[V-68] Morazan's presence in San Salvador greatly strengthened the warlike party, and the idea of invading Guatemala gained favor from day to day, till it was finally carried out. After peace overtures had been rejected by the federal authorities, Morazan began his march toward Guatemala in the latter end of November 1828.[V-69] The news struck terror into the hearts of the now defenceless Guatemalans, and no steps to meet the emergency could be taken, owing to lack of order, official rivalries, and party intrigues. It was, as a saving measure, finally decided in the assembly to detach the state from the federation, though it was never sanctioned or carried out. To increase difficulties, a revolution broke out in the department of La Antigua, placing it under the protection of Morazan,[V-70] who, at the head of about 2,000 men, assuming the title of 'ejército aliado protector de la ley,' laid siege to the city of Guatemala, assailing it from the side of the Garita del Golfo, on the 5th of February. He was repulsed after a brisk fire.[V-71] This was followed on the 15th by a sally of the garrison, which annihilated at Mixco a considerable portion of the invading army.[V-72]

SUCCESS OF MORAZAN.

In consequence of this reverse, Morazan raised the siege of Guatemala, and concentrated his forces at La Antigua. The success of Mixco was the last experienced by the federal army; for with the same neglect which had characterized its operations almost throughout the whole campaign, no advantage was taken of the victory, nor of several military errors of Morazan.[V-73] A strong division under Pacheco sallied out of Guatemala toward the towns of Zumpango and El Tejar, as if to confine Morazan in La Antigua; but Pacheco disseminated his force, and was beaten.[V-74] Early in March Morazan's troops reoccupied Mixco, and when attacked, shortly afterward,[V-75] by the federal forces at Las Charcas, signally defeated them, and the fate of the servile party in Guatemala was thus sealed.[V-76]

Through the mediation of General Verveer, minister from the Netherlands, an attempt was made to bring peace to the distracted country. Commissioners representing the several belligerents assembled, on the 27th of March, at the house of Ballesteros, and discussed the propositions laid before them, which were rejected, and they then retired. Morazan, who was anxious for a compromise, specially as he had good reasons to apprehend the dissolution of his army by the small-pox epidemic which had broken out, urged Verveer to invite the commissioners to hold another conference. It took place; and those of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua presented four propositions, which were likewise rejected by the federal and Guatemalan negotiators.[V-77] Morazan had felt certain that those proposals would be accepted, and believed them to be exceedingly generous in view of the fact that the city could no longer hold out. However, hostilities were resumed, and on the 9th of April the forces under Morazan attacked the city, and a part of it was taken and plundered.[V-78]

FALL OF GUATEMALA CITY.

Aycinena applied on the 11th to Morazan, as commander-in-chief of the allied army of Honduras and Salvador, for a suspension of hostilities, in order to negotiate a capitulation which he was disposed to enter into. Morazan replied at once that he could agree to nothing but the unconditional surrender of the city, though offering to guarantee the lives and property of all persons existing therein.[V-79] The fighting continued, and on the 12th the place capitulated. The occupation was effected on the following day,[V-80] and immediately Vice-president Beltranena and his ministers of relations and treasury, Aycinena and his secretary Piélago, and Ex-president Arce[V-81] were placed under arrest.[V-82] Morazan, assuming then all the powers of state, restored Juan Barrundia to the position of jefe of Guatemala,[V-83] whereof he had been deprived by Arce. The capitulation of April 12th was on the 20th declared void, on the ground that the federal commander had failed to comply with its terms in not giving up all the arms his forces held at the time of the surrender.[V-84] Morazan treated the functionaries, both federal and of the state of Guatemala, who had taken part in the revolution of 1826 to 1829, with much rigor.[V-85]

MORAZAN'S MEASURES.

A period of reaction, or restoration as it was properly called, was now inaugurated. During several years the servile party had held undisputed control of public affairs in Guatemala, crushing out all opposition to the best of its ability. Its policy had been one of intolerance, and its downfall was hailed with joy. Morazan seemed to have been chosen by providence to inflict condign punishment on those who had so cruelly exercised a usurped power. Surrounded as he was by so many diverse elements, the severity of the blows he dealt must not be all laid to his account. The state assembly, which had been dissolved in 1826, having again met on the 21st of April, 1829,[V-86] with its old president, Nicolás Espinosa, was practically a tool in the hands of the victorious general, and enacted several vigorous laws against the vanquished party.[V-87] On the 4th of June the assembly passed an act, which was sanctioned by the consejo representativo on the 12th, and by Jefe Barrundia on the 13th, declaring null all elections made pursuant to the unconstitutional decree of the president of the republic dated October 31, 1826, and the subsequent ones of 1827 and 1828. It furthermore stamped as revolutionists and usurpers all persons who by virtue of those decrees had obtained and held office of the federation or the state of Guatemala, and as such guilty of high treason, and amenable to the death penalty.[V-88] On the same day was issued a so-called amnesty law; but the number of exemptions from its benefits made its name a piece of irony.[V-89] The position of the prisoners taken in Guatemala at the time of the capture of said city, and others, became a more complicated one, in consequence of a decree passed by the assembly of Salvador on the 9th of June, declaring that it would not recognize in the assembly of Guatemala any authority to grant, without the assent of the other states, amnesty to the factious disturbers of public order; and that the capitulation entered into between Morazan and Aycinena having been annulled, the captives were really prisoners of war of the allied states.[V-90] A number of the prisoners were, however, permitted to go into exile within fifteen days, paying first the expenses of their support while in prison, and one third of the value of their estates[V-91] into the federal treasury, as indemnification for the damages they had inflicted on the country. That privilege was not granted to the president and vice-president and their ministers, the former chief of Guatemala, and others. In fact, it was a proscription of all the principal men who had sided with the servile party.[V-92] It was also decreed that all salaries paid from October 1826 to April 1829 should be refunded. Harsh measures were used to force a compliance.

The federal congress that was dismissed in October 1826 assembled on the 22d of June,[V-93] under the presidency of Doroteo Vasconcelos, and on the 25th José Francisco Barrundia[V-94] assumed the office of president of the republic, he being the senior senator, and having been specially called thereto by the congress, though the real power in the country was Morazan.

EXPULSION OF FRIARS.

The chief point of discussion in congress[V-95] was, what to do with the prisoners. Some members favored their execution, and though others disapproved of such a disposal of them, none had sufficient courage to openly condemn such vindictiveness. The discussions continued till July 9th, when a number of the prisoners were sent under an escort to Sonsonate, to be embarked at Acajutla and expatriated.[V-96] Two days later a similar blow was struck at the church, evidently because of the sympathy of its head men with the servile party.[V-97] During the night between the 10th and 11th of July, an armed force, acting under orders of Morazan, who issued them in accordance with the views of the acting president and the jefe of Guatemala, seized the archbishop and the friars of several orders, and despatched them to the Atlantic coast, where they were embarked for Habana. Several of the friars are represented to have died on the voyage.[V-98] Whether there was sufficient cause for so violent a proceeding is doubtful. However, the federal congress thanked the executive for his zeal. The sentence of expatriation against the archbishop was not formally issued till about a year after.[V-99] On the 28th of July the assembly of Guatemala decreed the suppression of all monastic establishments of men, excepting only the Bethlehemite hospitallers, who were allowed to remain as secular priests, and prohibited in the nunneries vows and professions in the future. All the temporalities of the suppressed convents were declared confiscated to the state. The federal congress approved this act on the 7th of September, declaring that the nation would no longer receive or recognize within its territory any religious orders.[V-100]

Peace being finally restored, the large army of Morazan was gradually dissolved, and the leader became a candidate for the presidency. The necessity of an energetic man, such as Morazan was, at the head of affairs, was quite apparent, for new difficulties were threatening from different quarters. Costa Rica, disapproving the course of Salvador, declared her secession from the union, and it was only after much persuasion that she retracted it. The federal government, and that of the state of Guatemala, now in charge of Pedro Molina,[V-101] clashed on several occasions, and specially when, in 1830, the question of constituting Guatemala city as a federal district again came upon the tapis. The state rejected the plan, as on every previous occasion.[V-102] A project of Molina to reform the confederation met with the same fate. He favored the model of the Swiss republic at that time, abolishing the expensive machinery of a federal government, which was almost continually at variance with the different states.[V-103] The failure of this scheme brought with it the downfall of Molina, who was afterward suspended on fictitious charges and tried, and though acquitted, was not reinstated.[V-104]

SPANISH EFFORTS.

The plan of King Fernando VII. of Spain for the reconquest of his former American dominions, and the steps he was taking to accomplish it, naturally caused a sensation in Central America, where that monarch would be sure to find elements favorable to his views. The so-called nobles, who had endeavored, after the downfall of Iturbide and the separation from Mexico, to establish in Central America an aristocratic republic, such as that of Genoa or Venice, had been again balked in their aims by the successes of Morazan. In their disappointment they turned their eyes to Fernando, and through special agents, as well as through Archbishop Casaus, made known to the captain-general of Cuba that the circumstances Central America was then in were most propitious for the restoration of the royal sway; for, as they asserted, all honest, right-thinking men and women in the country yearned for it, and the Indians were likewise anxious for the change. Therefore, the only opposition thereto lay in the comparatively small number of aspirants to public offices, who made revolution in order to control the public funds for their own benefit. Such reports were full of encouragement for the Spaniards who were intriguing in behalf of Fernando's interests, which were probably also their own.

Positive information was at last received from a reliable source that Spain was preparing, in Habana, an expedition to land at Omoa and march on Guatemala, where it expected to find the requisite coöperation.[V-105] This report coincided with the departure of the Spanish expedition under Brigadier Barradas to Tampico.[V-106] President Barrundia, on the 3d of September, 1829, issued a stirring address; and the congress, in October and November, with the sanction of the executive, passed an act forbidding Spaniards to enter or land in Central American territory under any pretext. The ports of the republic were closed to the Spanish flag, and to the products and manufactures of Spain, her colonies, and dependencies.

There were not a few Spaniards who, together with the self-styled nobles of native birth, desired to see the flag of the old country waving again over Central America. That anxiously wished for day had become almost the only subject of conversation in their circles, of which the assembly of Guatemala took due warning. In November it declared the sequestration of all property belonging to Spaniards who dwelt in the republic, coupled with the assurance that none should be restored till Spain had formally recognized the independence of Central America.[V-107]

CHAPTER VI.
CIVIL WAR.
1829-1838.

Revolution in Honduras—Conservatives Invade the State—Second General Elections—Francisco Morazan Chosen President—Plots of the Serviles—Arce's Invasion from Mexico—Occupation of Honduras Ports by Exiled Rebels—Spanish Flag Hoisted in Omoa, and Aid from Cuba—Salvadoran Authorities in Rebellion—Third General Elections—Morazan Reëlected—Failure of Colonization Plans—Ravages of Cholera—Indian Revolt under Carrera—His Early Life.

It is difficult for us to realize how long it takes and how hard it is for progressive man to throw away the fetters, temporal and spiritual, which in times past he stupidly forged for himself. Intellectual light breaking in on our old savagism finally tells us that the hurtful manifestations of nature are not the chastisements of offended deity; and then we wonder how we could have been so stupid so long, with our pope-worship and king-worship, and our servility to their satellites. Then when we first gain our liberty we know not what to do with it. We feel lost without the harness, the reins, the whip and spur. The people of Central America, high or low, knew little at this juncture of self-government. In times past they had observed that rulership consisted largely of personal wranglings for place, from king and pope down to the lowest aspirant; of wars, political and ecclesiastical, brother against brother, priests and people butchering and burning as if the great object of religion and civilization was to preserve upon this earth as long as possible the hell which we all hope in one way or another to escape hereafter.

Note further in regard to Central America the strange union of widely distinct classes in their efforts to sacrifice the country for self. Though from somewhat different motives, we see join hands the highest and the lowest, a self-styled aristocracy and the ignorant rabble, aided by the priests who would not see their power slip from them in the general overturnings, all spending their energies and blood in the direction of utter destruction for themselves, their families, and their country. Fortunately there were others at hand whose ideas of self-government were different; who earnestly desired that this new plant of liberty—a boon which had so unexpectedly dropped down to them from heaven—should have in their midst a healthy growth, in spite of ignorance, ambition, or superstition.

Honduras.

TROUBLES IN HONDURAS.

The legislative assembly of Honduras, pursuant to the proscriptive law enacted by the federal congress in August 1829, issued a decree of expulsion, and the government of the state transmitted to Guatemala a list of those who had come within its provisions.[VI-1] Some exiles from Honduras and other states of Central America went to Belize to carry on their plots from that quarter, and soon caused a sedition in the department of Olancho. The vice-jefe, Vijil, used his best endeavors to bring the seditious to terms peaceably, but failed.[VI-2] It became necessary then to resort to force, and Lieutenant-colonel Terrelonge was authorized to move his troops from Trujillo against Olancho. The state of Guatemala was also requested to send its force stationed in Chiquimula to Gracias, for the purpose of aiding in the preservation of order. The assembly of Guatemala, on the 24th of November, 1829, directed that 500 men, subject to the orders of the chief of the state, should repair at once to Honduras and quell the insurrection. The wording of the decree caused a disagreement between the president of the republic and Jefe Molina. The latter insisted that the 500 men to be sent to Honduras should be under his orders. President Barrundia could not accede to it, because the command of a military force operating out of the state belonged by law to the federal government,[VI-3] and through his minister of war, Nicolás Espinosa, applied to the Guatemalan legislature for a change in the decree. Espinosa's communication caused much sensation, and the assembly repealed the act of November 24th, and in its stead provided that the money needed to muster in and equip 500 men should be furnished the general government out of the state treasury.

Morazan, jefe of Honduras, and general-in-chief of the Central American forces, had marched with a division upon the departments of Olancho and Opoteca, and to him were despatched the troops newly raised in Guatemala. Colonel Vicente Dominguez was one of the chief promoters of the revolution of Honduras.[VI-4] Morazan's military reputation made easy his road to victory. He encountered no great difficulties. The year 1830 was inaugurated with new triumphs. The Olancho rebels surrendered to him at Las Vueltas del Ocote, and on the 21st of January solemnly bound themselves to recognize and obey the government.[VI-5] Morazan next, on the 19th of February, routed the insurrectionists of Opoteca.[VI-6] Morazan, after pacifying Honduras, intended marching into Nicaragua, if political measures should prove insufficient to establish regularity there. He first despatched Dionisio Herrera to the seat of Nicaraguan differences, who fulfilled his trust with zeal, and Morazan had no need of going to the state. Herrera had been chosen jefe, and was duly inducted in his office on the 12th of May.

REVOLT AND ELECTION.

The time for renewing the supreme federal authority having arrived, elections were held throughout the republic. Congress opened its session with due solemnity on the 27th of March, 1830. The supreme court of justice was likewise installed.[VI-7] The election of president of the republic had been also made. Morazan, José Francisco Barrundia, José del Valle, Antonio Rivera Cabezas, and Pedro Molina obtained votes; but by far the largest number of them had been polled for Morazan and Valle.[VI-8]

The votes were counted in June. Morazan had the largest number; but in order to ascertain if the election had been legal, it was necessary first to declare if the basis was to be the number of votes which the citizens of the republic had the right to poll, or that of the votes actually given and counted. If the former, there had been no popular election, and congress had to decide the point between Morazan and Valle; in the latter case, Morazan had been popularly elected.[VI-9]

MORAZAN PRESIDENT.

The congress consisted for the most part of friends of Morazan, and he was declared president. He made a triumphal entry into Guatemala on the 14th of September, and should have been inaugurated on the 15th; but it was decided that Barrundia should turn over to him the executive office on the 16th, in the midst of the festivities of national independence. This was done by Barrundia with that republican simplicity which had ever characterized the man. All the states sent their congratulations to Morazan, and to Barrundia for the good judgment and success of his administration.[VI-10] Mariano Prado, the distinguished citizen of Salvador, who did such good service to the liberal cause as vice-jefe of that state during the campaign that ended in April 1829, was elected vice-president.

One of Barrundia's measures that did him honor was his saving the island of Roatan to Central America. The British had driven away the few inhabitants and small garrison and taken possession.[VI-11] Barrundia made energetic though courteous remonstrances, and the island was restored after Morazan had become president.

The country now required peace. Morazan exerted himself to foster education and national industry. Agriculture and trade began to revive; but it was not to be continued long, for the demon of political strife was let loose again. The servile party, though defeated, had not remained inactive. In 1831 it prepared a plot for the destruction of the liberals, which had ramifications everywhere. Arce was to invade the republic from Mexico through Soconusco. Dominguez was to occupy Honduras with elements gathered for the purpose at Belize. Meantime, Ramon Guzman seized the fort at Omoa with 200 negroes.[VI-12] Arce effected his invasion with about 100 men, exiled and discontented Central Americans,[VI-13] and was defeated at Escuintla de Soconusco, on the 24th of February, 1832, by the forces under General Raoul. He succeeded in escaping with a few men into Mexico again.[VI-14] Guzman, being hard pressed at Omoa by the government troops under Colonel Terrelonge, hoisted the Spanish flag over the fort, and despatched, on the 10th of August, the schooner Ejecutivo, whose name had been now changed to General Dominguez, to ask assistance from the captain-general of Cuba, offering himself and those with him as subjects of the Spanish king. But the vessel was captured on her return with supplies, and the rebel garrison surrendered on the 12th of September, after a siege of five months.[VI-15] Almost at the same time that Omoa was seized by the rebels, the port of Trujillo was occupied by Vicente Dominguez, who had in his company Pedro Gonzalez.[VI-16] The Central Americans had two armed schooners at Izabal, besides two national vessels under Terrelonge, and an armed schooner at Belize. Duplessis, a Frenchman, commanding the national vessel Fénix, was captured by Dominguez, taken to Omoa, and shot in the plaza.[VI-17]

Dominguez' vanguard reached Yoro on the 7th of March, 1832, and was defeated at Tercales on the 9th, and again at Olanchito. He fled to Trujillo, leaving behind 200 muskets, other arms, some money, and other things.[VI-18] He then transferred himself to Omoa, and with 600 men, on the 26th of March, attacked the government troops at Jaitique, being defeated. He was again routed at Opoteca, pursued in all directions, captured, and taken to Comayagua, where he was put to death on the 14th of September.[VI-19] The rebel plot thus defeated was a formidable one. Archbishop Casaus from Habana moved his clergy. Bishop Fray Luis García of Chiapas favored Ex-president Arce, whose friends confidently asserted that he also had the support of the Mexican government.[VI-20] Arce's plans were also in combination with the jefe of Salvador, José María Cornejo.[VI-21] The fallen party would not admit that they had been vanquished, that their principles were antiquated and repugnant to the people; they still believed that a reaction was not only possible, but right and natural.

HONDURAS AND SALVADOR.

Cornejo's intrigues led to a disturbance of the peace in Salvador. The state assembly had been installed in February 1831, and the tendencies of its members elect, together with Cornejo's workings, had awakened mistrust among the liberals of Guatemala. The assembly of the latter state directed the executive, in congratulating the Salvador assembly upon its installation, to remind it of the necessity of harmony and of upholding liberal principles.[VI-22]

On the news of the invasion of Honduras, already described, reaching Guatemala, Morazan decided to establish his headquarters in San Salvador as a more convenient centre for future operations. His relations with the authorities of Salvador were anything but harmonious; neither could they be harmonious under the circumstances. Mariano Galvez, jefe of Guatemala,[VI-23] desiring to avoid conflicts, despatched Colonel Nicolás Espinosa with letters to Cornejo, advising him that his agent was instructed to use his best offices to settle the differences between him and Morazan. Espinosa, when near Atiquizaya, heard that orders for his arrest had been issued, and therefore went back. Galvez became justly indignant at the conduct of Cornejo's agents.

SALVADOR SECEDES.

The president of the republic started from Guatemala on the 29th of December, 1831, accompanied by his ministers, and journeyed toward San Salvador without any military force other than his body-guard; consequently Cornejo had no cause to apprehend any sudden blow at his authority.[VI-24] Nevertheless, on the 6th of January, 1832, Cornejo broke out in open rebellion, commanding the national executive, then at Santa Ana, to quit the state forthwith or he would be driven away. Morazan, having no means of resistance, obeyed. This insult to the republic was followed next day, January 7, 1832, by an act declaring the suspension of the federal compact and the secession of the state of Salvador. Congress then empowered the executive to repel invasions. The jefe of Guatemala admitted the obligation of his state to aid the general government with all its means.[VI-25] The assembly of Nicaragua, backed by the jefe Dionisio Herrera, who was a stanch friend and supporter of Morazan, passed an act disallowing the legitimacy of the Salvador authorities and their acts, and providing means to support the federal government.[VI-26]

Costa Rica, through her minister of state, Joaquin Bernardo Calvo, in a note from San José of March 3, 1832, to the government of Guatemala, signified her readiness to support the laws, and with that end to place at the disposal of the federal executive all the aid in her power. A Guatemalan force was stationed on the frontier of Salvador, first under Colonel Cárlos Salazar, and afterward under Colonel Juan Prem, a distinguished officer of the campaign of 1829. Even now Galvez hoped to avert war, sending commissioners to confer with Cornejo at Ahuachapan. The latter received them, and appointed his own to continue the conferences; but they were suddenly brought to an end without results.[VI-27] Further efforts on behalf of peace were useless; the contest had to be decided by war.[VI-28]

Morazan with a force of Salvador and Honduras men marched from the river Lempa to Portillo. Cornejo had 600 men in Jocoro of the department of San Miguel. The latter were signally defeated on the 14th of March, losing 500 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.[VI-29] This was soon followed by pronunciamientos in several departments against Cornejo and in favor of Morazan. The latter lost no time in marching upon San Salvador, which he took by assault on the 28th of March, notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of Cornejo and the garrison, the assailing force being made up of Nicaraguans and Hondurans.[VI-30] The state authorities were deposed, sent to Guatemala under a guard, and subsequently tried by a special court created ex post facto, with the name of jurado nacional.[VI-31] Morazan then assumed control of Salvador until constitutional authorities should be reorganized.[VI-32] This step, illegal as it was, gave dissatisfaction, not in Salvador alone, but in the other states, which subsequently seceded from the union; and though later retractions took place, it may be said that the confederation was dissolved at this period.[VI-33]

Meantime, the federal congress had continued its sessions, striving to promote the welfare of the country by a liberal policy. Among the acts adopted at this time, and deserving special mention, was that of May 2, 1832, abolishing the exclusiveness of the Roman religion, and recognizing freedom of conscience and of worship.[VI-34] This law, though practically of little effect, inasmuch as there were but few foreigners in the country, showed that a spirit of toleration was gaining ground. Another important measure was the adoption of Livingston's Louisiana code, and trial by jury. This form of trial was not understood by the people, and fortunately fell into disuse.

ELEMENTS OF DISUNION.

Notwithstanding the acts of disunion passed by the several states, there was no serious disturbance during the remainder of 1832 or in 1833. In the middle of the latter year[VI-35] congress adjourned, and there were fair prospects of peace. Indeed, the liberals had been made to see the folly of disunion. The states, relinquishing their antagonisms, quietly returned to the confederacy. The federal government, on the 20th of April, 1833, convoked a new congress to adjust differences. But now a new element of discord appeared. This was the jealousy felt by the smaller states toward Guatemala, which being larger in extent and population, naturally had a corresponding influence in the national congress.[VI-36] These states demanded an equal voice in that body, and insisted that this right should be recognized before proceeding to the elections.[VI-37] Guatemala, heeding the anxiety of the liberal leaders, assented to the demand. Some of the states proceeded with their elections, but it soon became obvious that the plan of compromise could not be satisfactory or permanent, and it was dropped. The proposed congress accordingly did not meet.[VI-38]

Rumors were current for some time in 1833 of an intended invasion of Salvador by Arce, by sea from Acapulco,[VI-39] but they proved to be unfounded. The federal government transferred its seat on the 5th of February, 1834,[VI-40] first to Sonsonate, and later to San Salvador, which for the time being quieted the jealous feeling of the several states against Guatemala. But after a few weeks the dissensions between the federal and state governments, of so frequent occurrence when the former was in Guatemala, were renewed in San Salvador. On the 23d of June, 1834, a fight took place between troops of the two parties, and the affair ended in another overthrow of the local authorities,[VI-41] who were proscribed under ex post facto laws.[VI-42] The state government went first into the hands of General Salazar, who called himself jefe provisorio, and afterward into those of the vice-president of the republic. Neither had any legal authority in the premises. This state of affairs caused dissatisfaction in Salvador. Political disturbances were also experienced in other states. The flame of discord was fanned everywhere by the oligarchs, who found their task made easier by the extreme religious liberalism of the ruling party. Their influence was felt when, on the 7th of February, 1835, after San Salvador, together with a few surrounding towns, was constituted a federal district,[VI-43] a new constitution, based on the former one of 1824, was generally rejected.[VI-44]

ELECTION AND DEATH OF VALLE.

Elections for supreme authorities of the republic were decreed on the 2d of June, 1838. The end of Morazan's term was approaching, and his popularity was to be again put to the test. There was really but one man that could compete with him, José del Valle, who was leading a retired life devoted to scientific and political studies; but his reputation was a national one, eminently Central American, and a large portion of the people summoned him to rulership. He was elected, but died before the certificates of election were opened.

The death of Valle occurred on the 2d of March, 1834. The highest honors were paid to his memory.[VI-45] This untoward event necessitated another election to carry out the decree of June 1833, and José Francisco Barrundia having declined to be a candidate, Morazan encountered no opposition and was reëlected.[VI-46] For the office of vice-president, no one having obtained the constitutional number of votes, congress, on the 2d of June, 1834, chose from among candidates having forty votes and upward José Gregorio Salazar, to be inducted in office on the 16th. Mariano Prado, the former vice-president, had been as such at the head of the federal executive authority in 1831; but he was chosen jefe of the state of Salvador, and took charge of that office on the 25th of July following. The vice-presidency and the office of a state jefe were incompatible. He chose the latter, and was most unfortunate in the discharge of its duties. There being then no vice-president, José Gregorio Salazar had charge of the executive in 1834 as the senior senator, Morazan having for a time, and with the permission of the senate, absented himself. Upon being elected on the 2d of June, Salazar continued in charge, and it was by his order that the federal authorities transferred themselves to the city of Santa Ana during San Martin's insurrection against the national government. The day after the inauguration of Morazan for the second presidential term, congress closed its session.[VI-47]

No important event affecting the confederation occurred during the remainder of 1835, but the atmosphere was filled with folly and misrule, foreboding the storm which was to make of Central America for many a day the theatre of the bloodiest of civil wars.

It has been shown that the party in power pursued in general a liberal policy—too liberal, in fact, as later events proved. In view of the tardy development of the country in the old way, inducements were offered for foreign immigration, and an English company was organized for the purpose of fostering colonization in the department of Vera Paz.[VI-48] Settlers were sent out, and several hundred thousand dollars expended, but the scheme failed because of unskilful and dishonest management.[VI-49] Nevertheless, the servile party turned this incident to account, filling the minds of the lower classes, especially the Indians, with prejudice against the government, which it accused of an intent to exterminate the native population by throwing open the country to foreign influence, religion, and administration of justice. The innovations in this last respect had, more than anything else, imbittered the natives, and on the 6th of March led to an outbreak at Ostuncalco, where the Indians had become irritated at being compelled to work at the construction of prisons.[VI-50] An armed force was sent to quell the disturbance, out of which the judges and some officials had great difficulty to escape with life.

REVOLT AND CHOLERA.

Scarcely was this trouble over when a worse one stole in—the cholera. The scourge began its ravages in Central America early in 1837,[VI-51] and soon spread throughout the towns of the republic. The governments of the different states, and notably that of Guatemala, used the utmost efforts to relieve suffering. Physicians and medical students, provided with medicines, were despatched to the several districts. But their efforts were largely frustrated by the opposition of the servile party, which never ceased its work even in these days of awful distress. Determined to bring to an end the influence of the liberals, the servile party hesitated at nothing. All means to that end were made available. The priests made the ignorant masses believe that the waters had been poisoned in order to destroy the natives and make way for foreigners.[VI-52] Their deviltry was crowned with success. The low murmurs of hatred soon swelled to loud cries of vengeance against the government and foreign residents. Several physicians became the victims of popular fury, being put to death with cruel tortures.[VI-53] Others barely escaped death. The greatest violence was in the district of Mita, where it assumed the form of a general insurrection. The government despatched a body of troops to dissolve a large assemblage of insurrectionists. The instructions were to use gentle means to allay the disturbance, resorting to force only in case of necessity. The magistrate of the district, having imprudently left the strong body of infantry behind, had no sooner attempted to explain his mission than the mob fell upon him and his guard of forty dragoons, killing a number of them and putting the rest to flight. This was on the 9th of June.[VI-54] The leader of the mob on this occasion was Rafael Carrera, a mixed-breed, who now for the first time, at the age of twenty-one, possibly a few years older, appeared on the stage, to become afterward the bitterest foe of the liberal party, and eventually the dictator of the country.

RAFAEL CARRERA.

Rafael Carrera was a native of Guatemala, of Indian descent, of a violent, irascible, and uncommunicative disposition, base-born, ignorant, though gifted with talents, bold, determined, and persevering. From common servant he became a pig-driver, and while such obtained much influence among the lower class of Indians—an influence which was due no less to his blood connections and the force of circumstances than to his bravery and capabilities.[VI-55]

Carrera was at first a mere tool of the priests, and seemed to have been a believer of the lies they had circulated. After he became powerful, they and their allies, the so-called nobles, humored his idiosyncrasies, and often had to put up with his insults and abuse. He had upon them the heel of insane revolt.[VI-56]

CHAPTER VII.
DISSOLUTION OF THE REPUBLIC.
1837-1840.

Campaign against Carrera—Several Departments of Guatemala in Rebellion—Jefe Galvez Deposed—Carrera Takes Guatemala—Murder of Salazar—Carrera Accepts Money to Leave the City—Dictatorship Offered Morazan by the Aristocrats and Refused—Carrera's Second Rebellion—The Republic in Peril—Morazan's Efforts to Save It—Nicaragua and Honduras Forces Invade Salvador—Morazan Defeats Them—His Retreat to San Salvador—He Embarks—Is Refused Hospitality in Costa Rica—Goes to South America—The Republic is Dead—Salvador at the Mercy of Carrera.

Only a week after the success of the insurgents on the field of Ambelis, a numerous armed force was sent against them by the government, which achieved victory near Mataquescuintla.[VII-1] The revolution might have ended here but for the excesses of the government troops, which roused the Indians, and rendered reconciliation impossible.[VII-2] Henceforth the war was one of races. Carrera, upheld as he was by the priests, found no difficulty, in his visits from village to village, to induce the native population to join the revolt, which, notwithstanding the triumphant language of the military officers in their reports—calling the rebels cowards and themselves intrepid and invincible—was fast spreading. Carefully avoiding encounters with the regular army, Carrera succeeded in getting together a large force, which, though raw and undisciplined, often surprised and defeated detachments of the regulars, seeking a refuge when pursued in the inaccessible mountain fastnesses.[VII-3]