Marriage and Divorce
Laws of the World

Edited by
HYACINTHE RINGROSE, D. C. L.
Author of “The Inns of Court”

“Marriage is the mother of the world, and preserves kingdoms, and fills cities, and churches, and heaven itself.”—Jeremy Taylor

THE MUSSON-DRAPER COMPANY
LONDON NEW YORK PARIS
1911

Copyright, 1911, by
HYACINTHE RINGROSE
All rights reserved

PREFACE

The purpose of this volume is to furnish to the lawyer, legislator, sociologist and student a working summary of the marriage and divorce laws of the principal countries of the world.

There are no geographical boundaries to virtue, wisdom and justice, and no country has as yet monopolized all that is best in creation. The mightiest of the nations lacks something which is possessed by the weakest; and there is no branch of comparative jurisprudence of more general consequence than that treating of marriage, which is the keystone of civilization.

By “civilization” we do not mean community life according to the standard of a single individual or nation, but in its broader and better sense, meaning the civil organization of any large group of human beings.

This book is not a brief in favour of, or against, any particular social system or legal code, nor has it a mission to assist in the reformation of any country’s marriage and divorce law. In the compilation which follows our endeavour is simply to set forth positive law as it exists to-day, leaving its correction or development to the proper authorities.

The editor has lived among the books of the British Museum, the Bibliothèque Nationale and other great libraries for years, seeking in vain for just such a compilation as is here humbly presented. We hope, therefore, that whatever may be its imperfections the book is justified, and will be welcomed as the first of its kind.

In its compilation we have been pleased to observe that the evident trend of modern legislation is toward uniformity among the nations of Christendom on the vital subjects of marriage and divorce. In fact, modernity brings uniformity in every department of public and private law—a consummation devoutly to be wished for by those who feel that, no matter how short may be the individual’s life, he is nevertheless a kinsman to all of the race who have gone before or are yet to come.

A study of the marriage laws of the world has also brought the happy conviction that the wholesome view of marriage as the union of one man and one woman for life, to the exclusion of all others, is the one triumphant fact of human history which can never lose its prestige.

The surest sign of the general betterment of the world’s law is that woman everywhere is more and more being allowed her natural place in the community as man’s equal and associate. That nation is most enlightened which treats its womankind the best. All the legislation of the past century bearing on the subject of marriage has elevated men by giving more justice to women.

When the next Matrimonial Causes Act predicated upon the labours of the present Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce is passed by the British Parliament, women will be given equal rights with men in our courts of law. The jurisprudence of England was not built for a day, and we are a people singularly bound by precedent, but when John Bull moves it is always in a straight line, and he never turns back.

H. R.

CONTENTS

Marriage and Divorce Laws of the World

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

Marriage is the oldest and most universal of all human institutions. According to the Chinese Annals in the beginning of society men differed in nothing from other animals in their way of life. They wandered up and down the forests and plains free from the restraint of community laws or morality, and holding their women in common. Children generally knew their mothers, but rarely their fathers.

We are told that the Emperor Fou-hi changed all this by inventing marriage. The Egyptians credit Menes with the same invention, while the Greeks give the honour to Kekrops.

In the Sanscrit literature we find no definite account of the institution of marriage, but the Indian poem, “Mahabharata,” relates that until the Prince Swetapetu issued an edict requiring fidelity between husband and wife the Indian women roved about at their pleasure, and if in their youthful innocence they went astray from their husbands they were not considered as guilty of any wrong.

The Bible story of the institution of marriage is contained in the Second Chapter of Genesis, 18th to the 25th verse. It is not within the purpose of this treatise to argue for or against the acceptance of the Bible narrative, so we call attention without comment to the extreme simplicity of the wedding ritual as stated in the 22d verse:

“And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and he brought her unto the man.”

Among primitive men marriage was concluded without civil or religious ceremony. Even in modern Japan a wedding ritual is considered all but superfluous.

The principal marriage ceremonies have been derived from heathen customs; they were: the arrhae, or espousal gifts, an earnest or pledge that marriage would be concluded; and the ring betokening fidelity.

Among the ancient Hebrews marriage was not a religious ordinance or contract, and neither in the Old Testament nor in the Talmud is it treated as such.

As with the Mohammedans it was simply a civil contract.

Under the old Roman law there were three modes of marriage: 1. Confarreatio, which consisted of a religious ceremony before ten witnesses, in which an ox was sacrificed and a wheaten cake was broken by a priest and divided between the parties.

2. Coemptio in manum, which was a conveyance or fictitious sale of the woman to the man.

3. Usus, the acquisition of a wife by prescription through her cohabitation with the husband for one year without being absent from his house three consecutive nights.

But a true Roman marriage could be concluded simply by the interchange of consent.

There was an easy morality of the olden times which according to present standards was akin to savagery. The Greeks even in the golden age of Pericles held the marriage relation in very little sanctity. It was reputable for men to loan their wives to their friends, and divorce was easy and frequent. Hellenic literature attempted to make poetry of vice and marital infidelity, and adultery was the chief pastime of the gods and goddesses.

The Romans had more of the moral and religious in their character than the Greeks, but still we read of Cato the younger loaning his wife Marcia to Hortensius and taking her back after the orator’s death.

In the Second Chapter of the Gospel according to St. John we find that Jesus was a guest at a marriage in Cana of Galilee. His attendance at the wedding feast is not notable for His having on this occasion given the marriage contract the character of a sacrament, for nothing in the record even hints at this. The account is principally noteworthy as the history of His first miracle, that of turning water into wine.

It was from the Fifth Chapter of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians that the dogma that marriage is a sacrament was gradually evolved. In this chapter the Apostle points out the particular duties of the marriage status, and exhorts wives to obey their husbands, and husbands to love their wives. “For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh.”

However, the early Christian Church did not treat marriage as a sacrament, although its celebration was usually the occasion of prayers and exhortations.

It was not until the year 1563, by an edict of the Council of Trent, that the oldest branch of the Christian Church, namely, that governed by the See of Rome, required the celebration of marriage to be an essentially religious ceremony.

The general marriage law of the European continent has been derived and developed from the edicts of the Roman emperors and the decrees of the Christian Church. This historical evolution is strikingly apparent when we read the definition of marriage as given in the Institutes of Justinian: Nuptiae autem, sive matrimonium est veri et mulieris conjunctio, individuam vitae consuetudinem continens. Marriage is the union of a man and a woman, including an inseparable association of their lives.

There are as many definitions of marriage as there are views concerning it, but none of them improve very much upon that given in the Institutes.

It is also worth noting that the impediments to lawful marriage were very nearly the same under the Roman Empire as they are to-day in most civilized countries. The 18th Chapter of the Book of Leviticus appears to have set the standard. There are three principal forms of marriage, namely, monogamy, polygamy and polyandry. Monogamy, or the condition of one man being married to but one woman at a time, appears to be not only the best but the most ancient and universal type. It was, according to the Bible, good enough for the first husband, Adam, for his only wife was Eve. The first polygamist on the same authority was Lamech, who was of the sixth generation after Adam, for he “took unto him two wives.” Reading in the First Book of Kings, we are informed that King Solomon had “seven hundred wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines.” A round thousand. However, polygamy, or the marriage of a man to more than one wife at the same time, was not the rule even among the ancient Hebrews. Such a trial was left to kings and other luxurious persons.

Polyandry is the condition of a woman having more than one husband at the same time. It evidently had its origin in infertile regions in the endeavour to limit the population to the resources of the district. It is almost a thing of the past, but it is still practised in Thibet, Ceylon and some parts of India.

Morganatic Marriage.—A morganatic marriage is a marriage between a member of a reigning or nominally reigning family and one who is not of either of such families. It is a term usually employed with reference to a matrimonial alliance between a man of royal blood (or in Germany of high nobility) and a woman of inferior rank.

Such alliances are sometimes called “left-handed marriages,” because in the wedding ceremony the left hand is given instead of the right.

In Germany a woman of high rank may make a morganatic alliance with a man of inferior position. The children of a morganatic marriage are legitimate, but neither they nor the wife can inherit the rank or estate of the morganatic husband.

By the Royal Marriage Act of England such an alliance has no matrimonial effect whatever.

Divorce.—Divorce is almost as ancient as marriage, and just as fully sanctioned by history, necessity and authority. In the 24th Chapter of Deuteronomy we read:

“When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man’s wife.” This rule was consistent with the patriarchal system of the Jewish commonwealth. The husband as the head of the family could divorce his wife at his pleasure. An illustration of such a divorce is furnished by Abraham’s dismissal or divorcement of Hagar. This was surely a simple divorce law with a summary procedure, much cheaper, quicker and easier than is given by the statutes of several American States. No solicitor, barrister or court was required. The husband constituted himself president of the Court of Probate, Admiralty and Divorce for the special occasion and granted himself a favourable decree. The law of divorce as stated in Deuteronomy continued to be accepted by the Hebrews until the 11th century. It was in full force when Christ was on earth, for it is recorded in the 19th Chapter of the Gospel of St. Matthew that He was questioned concerning it. Jesus had given to the Pharisees His views of marriage in answer to their question: “Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every reason?” He then stated the proposition that because of marriage a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and added: “What, therefore, God bath joined together let not man put asunder.”

Then was put to Him the question concerning the existing law: “Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?” His answer was that “Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so.”

Jesus although disapproving of the breadth of the Mosaic law did not declare against divorce; quite the contrary, for He said: “Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.”

Unless we assume that Jesus was concealing rather than expounding His views, the plain meaning is that He considered fornication to be the sufficient and only cause for an absolute divorce.

Josephus interpreted the Jewish divorce law as follows: “He who wishes to be separated from his wife for any reason whatever—and many such are occurring among men—must affirm in writing his intention of no longer cohabiting with her.”

The ancient Jewish law made of woman a chattel and a marriage derelict at her husband’s pleasure, but it gave the woman no right to divorce her husband for any cause.

The poet, John Milton, in the least worthy of his writings, relied upon the Mosaic law in his specious argument in favour of unlimited divorce.

St. Augustine contended that the question of divorce is not clearly determined by the words of Jesus, but there can be no mistake concerning the theological attitude of the Roman Catholic Church of to-day on this subject. It positively holds that no human power can dissolve a marriage when ratified and consummated between baptized persons.

If one is prepared to concede the principal dogma of Roman Catholicism, namely, the infallibility of the Church, there is no lack of logic or authority in such an attitude, even though it differs or varies from the Mosaic law or the sayings of Jesus.

We must remember, however, that modern divorce law is not founded on theological dogmas or theories, but upon practical social science and humanity.

In most countries there is no distinction between the husband and the wife as to grounds of divorce. The Mohammedan law of Egypt and the statute laws of Belgium and England being conspicuous exceptions to the rule. Usually the domicile of the husband is the place where the action must be instituted, but in the United States of America a wife may acquire a separate domicile from that of her husband if he has given her cause for divorce.

Divorces of domiciled foreigners are granted in several countries of Europe, provided the cause relied on is a cause for divorce in the native country of the parties, and in most continental countries divorces of natives are granted, whether domiciled in their native country or not, the foundation of jurisdiction being nationality, not domicile. Practically in all countries the exercise of jurisdiction for divorce is not affected by the fact that marriage was celebrated in or out of the country.

The causes for divorce are varied in kind and in number. In some countries of Europe mutual consent is a sufficient cause under certain restrictions. The number of causes for divorce in Europe vary from one in England to twelve in Sweden.

The dream of the academic lawyer is for an international law of marriage and divorce, but the differences between the existing judicial systems of the various great commonwealths of the world are much too great to make a universal law on the subject practicable. In one country only the civil marriage is legal and in another only the ecclesiastical alliance is valid; in one country divorce is allowed, and in another it is denied; in one, difference in religion between the parties is an impediment to marriage, and in another it is not; in one the canon law is controlling, and in another the civil law regulates all questions of matrimonial rights. Even in the matter of age and capacity the greatest variableness exists. As, for instance, the minimum age for marriage. In England it is fourteen for males and fifteen for females; in Germany, twenty-one for males and sixteen for females; In Austria, fourteen for both; in Russia, France, Holland, Switzerland and Hungary, eighteen for males and sixteen for females; in Spain and Greece, fourteen for males and fifteen for females; in Denmark and Norway, twenty for males and fourteen for females; in Sweden, twenty-one for males and seventeen for females; in Finland, twenty-one for males and fifteen for females; in Servia, seventeen for males and fifteen for females.

It will be observed that the different laws as to the minimum age for marriage do not flow from circumstances of climate, religion or culture, but are mainly historical and arbitrary.

CHAPTER II.

England.

Introduction.—The law of England regards marriage as a contract, a status and an institution. As a contract it is in its essence an expressed consent on the part of a man and woman, competent to make the contract, to cohabit with each other as husband and wife, and with each other only. As Lord Robertson says: “It differs from other contracts in this, that the rights, obligations or duties arising from it are not left entirely to be regulated by the agreement of parties, but are to a certain extent matters of municipal regulation, over which the parties have no control by any declaration of their will.”

As a status created by contract, marriage confers on the parties certain privileges and exacts certain duties under legal protection and sanction.

From the earliest period of the recorded history of England it has always been accepted doctrine that marriage as an institution is the keystone of the commonwealth and the highest expression of morality.

The men of the law in England were anciently persons in holy orders, and the judges were originally bishops, abbots, deans, canons and archdeacons. As late as 1857 the clergy in their ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction of matrimonial causes. They administered the Canon Law of the Western Church affecting marriage and ruled that in marriages lawfully made, and according to the ordinance of matrimony, the bond thereof can by no means be dissolved during the lives of the parties.

By the passage of the Divorce Act of 1857 the jurisdiction in matrimonial causes was transferred to a new civil tribunal, and absolute divorce was sanctioned, with permission of remarriage on proof of adultery on the part of the wife, or adultery and cruelty on the part of the husband.

It is seriously contended by some eminent churchmen that in spite of this legislation the Church of England still has as its definite existing law the old rule which obtained before the Reformation, namely, that marriage is indissoluble; that a limited divorce from bed and board may be permitted, but that an absolute divorce which leaves either party free to remarry during the lifetime of the other is forbidden. This supposed conflict between the civil and ecclesiastical laws of the realm furnishes an academic topic and engenders bad feeling, but it has no real existence.

The Church of England exists by Act of Parliament and manifestly has no power to nullify statutes enacted by the legislature which established it as the official religious organization of the Kingdom.

The civil courts of England have never considered marriage as a sacrament or religious ordinance, but have held that the dogmas and precepts of Christianity do not affect the civil status of marriage, but simply add to it a religious character. In this respect the law of England is in exact harmony with the attitude of the primitive Christian Church.

Lord Stowell tells us that “in the Christian Church marriage was elevated in a later age to the dignity of a sacrament, in consequence of its divine institution, and of some expressions of high and mysterious import concerning it contained in sacred writings. The law of the Church, the canon law (a system which, in spite of its absurd pretensions to a higher origin, is in many of its provisions deeply enough founded in the wisdom of man), although in conformity to the prevailing theological opinion, it reverenced marriage as a sacrament, still so far respected its natural and civil origin as to consider that where the natural and civil contract was formed it had the full essence of matrimony without the intervention of the priest, it had even in that state the character of a sacrament; for it is a misapprehension to suppose that this intervention was required as a matter of necessity even for that purpose before the Council of Trent.”

The English courts only recognize as a true marriage one which, in addition to being valid in other respects, involves the essential requirement that it is a voluntary union of one man and one woman for life to the exclusion of all others, which is substantially the definition of marriage given by Lord Penzance in the leading case of Hyde v. Hyde.

No marriage is recognized which is founded on principles which are in conflict with the general morality of Christendom. The term Christendom is used as a matter of convenience only. It includes all those nations generally recognized to be civilized, whatever may be their prevailing religion.

Lex Loci Contractus.—It is a well-established rule that the law of the place where the contract of marriage was concluded, that is, the lex loci contractus, or, as it is sometimes termed, the lex loci celebrationis (law of the place of celebration), alone governs the court in ascertaining whether or not the marriage is regular. All the formal preliminaries, such as publication of banns, or license, and consent of the parties entitled to give or withhold consent according to the lex loci contractus, must be complied with.

Legal Age.—The legal age for marriage in England and Wales is fourteen for a male and twelve for a female. The consent of the father of each of the contracting parties is required of those under twenty-one. If the father is dead the consent of the mother is required unless there is a guardian appointed by the father.

Formal Requirements.—There are certain formal preliminaries to a valid marriage in England, such as the publication of banns, or the procurement of a common or special license which operates as a dispensation with the banns.

Banns.—The banns must be published on three Sundays in the parish in which the parties reside, and if they reside in different parishes the banns must be published in each parish. The marriage ceremony must be celebrated in one of the churches where the banns have been published. If they are published in two different parishes the clergyman of one parish must give a certificate of publication, which must be delivered to the clergyman who solemnizes the marriage.

The parties must reside in the parish for fifteen days prior to the publication of the banns, and the marriage must take place within three months of the last publication. Where a man has procured the banns to be published in false names, or has concealed his true name, he will not be allowed to annul the marriage on that account only. A party cannot take advantage of his own fraud for the purpose of invalidating a marriage.

License.—No publication of banns is necessary in the case of a marriage under a bishop’s license. Licenses may be obtained at the offices of the bishop’s registrars, and full information as to procuring a license may be obtained through the local clergy. A license granted by a bishop is only available in his diocese, and one of the parties must have resided for fifteen days immediately preceding the issue of the license in the parish in which the marriage is to take place. The cost varies in different dioceses, but it is usually between £2 and £3. The Archbishop of Canterbury has power to issue a special license enabling a marriage to be solemnized at any time or place. The cost of this is from £20 to £30, and it can be obtained at the Faculty Office, Doctors’ Commons, London, E.C.

Certificate of Registrar.—A marriage by the certificate of the registrar of marriages may take place at a Roman Catholic place of worship, a Nonconformist chapel, or at the office of the registrar of marriages. The parties must have resided in the district at least seven days preceding the date of the notice, which must be given to the superintendent registrar, or, if they live in different districts, then notice must be given to the superintendent registrar of each district, and it must be exhibited in his office for twenty-one days. If no valid objection to the marriage is made the superintendent registrar issues his certificate and the marriage may take place within three months. The cost, including certificate, is 9s. 7d.

Registrar’s License.—A marriage by registrar’s license may take place either at his office or at a Roman Catholic or Nonconformist place of worship. Notice must be given by one of the parties to the superintendent registrar of the district in which he or she has resided for at least fifteen days, and he will then issue his license at the expiration of one day. The marriage can then immediately take place, or it may take place any time within three months. The cost is £2 14s. 6d.

No marriage license will be issued to parties, either of whom is under twenty-one years of age, unless one of the parties makes oath that the consent of the proper persons has been obtained, or that there is no person alive whose consent would ordinarily be necessary.

A marriage may be legally concluded without a marriage license if banns are duly published.

Hours for Marriage.—Marriages can only be solemnized between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., except in the case of marriages by special license and Jewish marriages.

False Names.—Where both parties conspire to procure banns to be published in a false name or names or to practise a fraud with the object of obtaining a license the marriage may be annulled, but if the one party only is guilty the marriage will be valid.

Marriage by Reputation.—In most cases it is necessary to produce clear evidence of a marriage ceremony, but in some exceptional instances a marriage may be proved by long reputation—e.g., if two persons have lived together as man and wife for many years, and if they have always been regarded as such by their friends and neighbours, the Court will presume a legal marriage unless evidence is produced to prove that the parties were not lawfully married.

Certificates of Marriages—Marriage Lines.—A marriage certificate (marriage lines) can be obtained at the time of the marriage for 2s. 7d. If applied for subsequently the cost will be 3s. 7d. A certificate can be obtained at the church, chapel, synagogue or meeting house where the ceremony was performed, or at the General Register Office, Somerset House, or at the office of the superintendent registrar of the district where the marriage took place. The entry in the register at either of these places may be inspected on payment of 1s. A certificate of a marriage entered into in England or Wales prior to July 1, 1837, should be obtainable either from the registrar general or from the church where it was solemnized.

Impediments—Prohibited Degrees.

A man may not marry his:

1 Grandmother.

2 Grandfather’s Wife.

3 Wife’s Grandmother.

4-5 Father’s Sister, Mother’s Sister (i.e., aunt by blood).

6-7 Father’s Brother’s Wife, Mother’s Brother’s Wife (Uncle’s Wife, i.e., aunt by affinity).

8-9 Wife’s Father’s Sister, Wife’s Mother’s Sister (Wife’s Aunt).

10 Mother.

11 Stepmother.

12 Wife’s Mother (Mother-in-law).

13 Daughter.

14 Wife’s Daughter (Step-daughter).

15 Son’s Wife (Daughter-in-law).

16 Sister.

17 Brother’s Wife (Sister-in-law).

18-19 Son’s Daughter, Daughter’s Daughter, (Granddaughter).

20 Son’s Son’s Wife (Son’s Daughter-in-law).

21 Daughter’s Son’s Wife (Daughter’s Daughter-in-law).

22 Wife’s Son’s Daughter (Stepson’s Daughter).

23 Wife’s Daughter’s Daughter (Stepdaughter’s Daughter).

24-25 Brother’s Daughter, Sister’s Daughter (niece).

26-27 Brother’s Son’s Wife, Sister’s Son’s Wife (nephew’s wife).

28-29 Wife’s Brother’s Daughter, Wife’s Sister’s Daughter (niece by affinity).

A woman may not marry her:

1 Grandfather.

2 Grandmother’s Husband.

3 Husband’s Grandfather.

4-5 Father’s Brother, Mother’s Brother (uncle by blood).

6-7 Father’s Sister’s Husband, Mother’s Sister’s Husband, (Aunt’s Husband, i.e., uncle by affinity).

8-9 Husband’s Father’s Brother, Husband’s Mother’s Brother (husband’s uncle).

10 Father.

11 Stepfather.

12 Husband’s Father (father-in-law).

13 Son.

14 Husband’s Son (stepson).

15 Daughter’s Husband (son-in-law).

16 Brother.

17-18 Husband’s Brother, Sister’s Husband (brother-in-law).

19-20 Son’s Son, Daughter’s Son (grandson).

21 Son’s Daughter’s Husband (son’s son-in-law).

22 Daughter’s Daughter’s Husband (daughter’s son-in-law).

23 Husband’s Son’s Son (stepson’s son).

24 Husband’s Daughter’s Son (stepdaughter’s son).

25-26 Brother’s Son, Sister’s Son (nephew).

27-28 Brother’s Daughter’s Husband, Sister’s Daughter’s Husband (niece’s husband).

29-30 Husband’s Brother’s Son, Husband’s Sister’s Son (nephew by affinity).

Grounds Or Causes for Divorce.—A husband is entitled to a divorce if his wife has committed adultery, but a wife is not so entitled unless her husband has committed incestuous adultery, bigamy, rape, sodomy, bestiality, adultery coupled with cruelty, or adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or more. Incestuous adultery is adultery with a woman within the prohibited degrees.

A wife will not be granted a decree of divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery coupled with cruelty unless the cruelty relied on consists of bodily hurt or injury to health, or a reasonable danger or apprehension of one or the other of them. There must be at least two acts of cruelty on the part of the husband.

The communication of venereal disease when the husband knows of his condition is an act of cruelty.

Procedure.—The application for a divorce is made by a petition to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice.

The party seeking relief is called the petitioner, and the party against whom the petition is brought is called the respondent. The party with whom a husband alleges his wife has committed adultery is called the co-respondent. The person with whom a wife alleges her husband has committed adultery is not a party to the suit. However, a woman implicated in a divorce suit may, upon proper application, secure an order permitting her to attend the proceedings as an intervener.

Divorce proceedings in England are very expensive; the costs in an ordinary uncontested suit amount to from thirty to forty pounds sterling.

A petitioner or respondent who is not worth twenty-five pounds after payment of his or her debts, exclusive of wearing apparel, may sue or defend in forma pauperis. A person whose income exceeds one pound a week cannot, except in special cases, sue or defend in forma pauperis. A party desiring to sue or defend in forma pauperis must as a preliminary measure prepare a written statement of his or her case, setting forth the facts relied upon as a cause of action or defence, and obtain thereon an endorsed opinion of a barrister-at-law setting forth his professional opinion that the cause of action or defence as stated is good in law. The applicant must then make an affidavit, attaching the statement and the barrister’s opinion. This affidavit is then filed in the Divorce Registry of Somerset House, where two days later, if a proper case is made out, an order is issued granting the applicant leave to sue or defend in forma pauperis. No fees are charged in respect to this application nor upon the subsequent proceedings in court. No solicitor or barrister is assigned to the party proceeding in this form.

Jurisdiction.—The Court will only entertain jurisdiction when the husband is domiciled in England. If the husband is temporarily residing abroad an action by him or his wife for divorce must be instituted in England.

The English Courts do not recognize a change of domicile which is obtained simply to enable the parties to obtain a divorce in another country, the laws of which offer greater facilities.

If the domicile of the husband is in England, and either the husband or the wife obtains a decree of divorce in the United States of America or elsewhere, the English courts will treat such a divorce as a nullity. A person’s domicile is his or her permanent home. An Englishman who lives in America for twenty-five years is not domiciled there unless by all the facts his conduct shows that he has abandoned his English domicile.

Condonation.—A matrimonial offence which is a sufficient cause for divorce may be condoned or forgiven by the spouse aggrieved, and such condonation is a good defence to the action. But subsequent misconduct will revive the offence as if there had been no condonation.

Connivance.—It is a sufficient defence to an action for divorce for the respondent to show that the adultery complained of was committed by the connivance or active consent of the petitioner.

Collusion.—Collusion is the illegal agreement and co-operation between the petitioner and the respondent in a divorce action to obtain a judicial dissolution of the marriage.

Form of Divorce Decrees.—An English decree of divorce is in the first instance nisi, or provisional. If after six months it is unaffected by any intervention by the King’s Proctor, or any other person, it can be made absolute upon proper application.

King’s Proctor.—This is the proctor or solicitor representing the Crown in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice in matrimonial causes.

In his official capacity he can only intervene in a divorce suit on the ground of collusion.

Sir James Hannen, discussing the powers of this officer, said in a leading case: “If, then, the information given to the King’s Proctor before the decree nisi does not rise to a suspicion of collusion, but only brings to his knowledge matters material to the due decision of the case, he is not entitled to take any step, and the direction of the Attorney-General would probably be that he should watch the case to see if these material facts are brought to the notice of the court. If at the trial they should be, there will be no need for the King’s Proctor to do anything more, for he would not be entitled to have the same charges tried over again unless material facts were not brought to the notice of the court.

“If, however, those material facts are not so brought to the notice of the court by the parties, he will then be entitled as one of the public, but still acting under the direction of the Attorney-General, to show cause against the decree being made absolute.”

In special cases the court has power to make the decree absolute before the expiration of six months after the decree nisi.

Until the decree is made absolute neither party can lawfully contract another marriage; and in the event of the suit being contested the parties must further wait until the time for an appeal has passed.

Alimony, Temporary and Permanent.—During the pendency of the suit the husband is liable to provide his wife with alimony or maintenance. The amount granted is within the court’s discretion, but generally it is about twenty-five per centum of the husband’s income. Upon the granting of a decree in the wife’s favour the court has power to grant the wife permanent alimony, the amount of which depends on all the facts, such as the husband’s income, the wife’s means and the social status of the parties. If a wife secures an order for alimony against her husband, he being a man of property, the court may require him to give security for its payment or direct him to make a transfer of money to a trustee or trustees for the convenient payment to the wife. Permanent alimony is usually smaller than temporary alimony, or alimony pendente lite, but no rule as to the amount can be safely stated, it resting in the discretion of the Court.

If a husband has no considerable property he will be directed to pay the alimony awarded against him in monthly or weekly instalments.

Insanity.—Insanity is neither a cause nor a bar to divorce. If an insane wife commits adultery, or if an insane husband commits adultery coupled with the other offences which make out a cause of action against him, the innocent party is entitled to a decree of divorce. So an insane party may be a petitioner for divorce, but can only appear by his or her committee in lunacy.

Husband’s Name.—A divorced wife is entitled to continue to use her former husband’s surname.

Annulment of Marriage.—An action for the annulment of marriage has for its purpose the setting aside of the marriage contract on the theory that proper consent to the marriage has never been given by both the parties.

The following are the causes or grounds for such annulment:

1. A prior and existing marriage of one of the parties;

2. Impotency, or such physical malformation of one of the parties which prevents him or her from consummating the marriage by sexual intercourse;

3. Relationship within the prohibited degrees;

4. Marriage procured by fraud, violence or mistake;

5. Insanity of one of the parties at the time of the marriage;

6. Marriage performed without legal license, or without the required publication of banns.

Judicial Separation.—By the Matrimonial Causes Act a decree of judicial separation, which is equivalent in effect to a divorce a mensa et thoro under the old law, may be obtained either by the husband or wife on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without legal cause for two years and upwards.

The defences which may be set up by the respondent vary according to the cause relied upon by the petitioner, but there is one absolute bar in suits for judicial separations brought on any ground, and that is that the petitioner has committed adultery since the date of the marriage.

Separation Orders.—Besides the ordinary suit to obtain a judicial separation which must be prosecuted in the High Court a wife can obtain speedy and inexpensive relief by making an application to a police magistrate, or a board of magistrates, for a separation order. This remedy is limited to married women whose husbands are domiciled in England or Wales.

Such separation orders are intended to furnish summary relief to the wives of workingmen, and the amount awarded for the wife’s support to be paid by her husband cannot exceed two pounds a week, no matter what the husband’s income may be.

The following are the causes for which, upon application, a magistrate or board of magistrates is authorized to grant a separation order:

1. Habitual drunkenness of the husband, which renders him at times dangerous to himself or others, or incapable of managing himself or his affairs;

2. When the husband has been convicted of an aggravated assault upon his wife, or has been convicted by an Assize or Quarter Sessions Court of an assault and has been sentenced to a fine of more than five pounds or to imprisonment for more than two months;

3. Desertion by the husband of his wife;

4. Persistent cruelty of the husband toward his wife;

5. Neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for wife or infant children.

By the Licensing Act of 1902 a husband is entitled to a separation order by a magistrate or board of magistrates if his wife is an habitual drunkard.

Restitution of Conjugal Rights.—Husbands and wives are entitled to each other’s society, and if, without sufficient reason, either of them neglects to perform his or her obligations the injured party may institute what is known as a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, in which the court will grant a decree directing the offending party to render conjugal rights to the other party. If the decree is not complied with, such non-compliance is equivalent to desertion, and a suit for judicial separation may be instituted immediately. If the husband is the offending party, and if he has been guilty of adultery, a suit for divorce may at once be instituted; or if he commits adultery subsequently to the date of the decree for restitution, proceedings for divorce may be taken. Furthermore, if the suit for restitution is brought by the wife, the husband may be directed to make such periodical payments for her benefit as the court may think just. If the suit for restitution is brought by the husband, and if the wife is entitled to any property, the court may order a settlement for the whole or part of it for the benefit of the husband and children of the marriage, or either or any of them, or may order the wife to pay a portion of her earnings to the husband for his own benefit, or to some other person for the benefit of the children of the marriage. A husband cannot compel his wife to live with him by force, and if he seizes and retains possession of her, she or her relatives can obtain a habeas corpus to compel him to release her, but persons who wrongfully induce a wife to leave her husband, or who detain her from his society by improper means, are liable to an action for damages by him. If a husband declines to live with his wife because he discovers that she has been unchaste before marriage she cannot obtain a decree for restitution of conjugal rights unless he knew of the fact before the marriage took place. If a husband has been guilty of cruelty he cannot obtain a decree for restitution.

Foreign Marriages.—The Foreign Marriage Act of 1892 (55 and 56 Vict. c. 23) forms a complete code upon the subject of the marriage of British subjects abroad.

Its chief requirement is that one at least of the parties to the marriage must be a British subject.

Notice of the proposed marriage must be given fourteen days before the ceremony, and it must be performed before one of the following officials, who is termed in the Act a “marriage officer”: the British ambassador, minister or chargé-d’affaires, accredited to the country where the marriage takes place; the British consul, governor, high commissioner, or official resident. The term consul in the Act includes a consul-general, a vice-consul, pro-consul, or consular agent.

If the woman is a British subject, and the man is a subject or citizen of another country, the marriage officer must be satisfied that the intended marriage would be recognized by the laws of the country where the man to be married belongs.

In 1896 there was passed the Marriage with Foreigners Act (6 Edw. 7, 3. 40), which is intended to protect British subjects who contract marriages with subjects or citizens of other countries, either at home or abroad, and to run the risk of having their marriages treated as invalid by the law of the country of the foreign contracting party. It provides for the granting of certificates by competent authority in the country to which the foreign party to the marriage owes allegiance, stating that there is no lawful impediment to the proposed marriage.

Conflict of Laws.—English courts do not recognize a decree of divorce granted by the courts of a foreign country as having any effect outside of the country where granted, unless at the time of the beginning of the action which resulted in the decree both parties were domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court which granted it.

This rule applies to divorce decrees obtained in Scotland because for all the purposes of private international law Scotland is a foreign country.

The English courts will, however, recognize as possessing extra-territorial validity a decree of divorce which is recognized as valid by the courts of the country where the parties were actually domiciled at the time of its being granted.

In the case of Gillig v. Gillig, decided in 1906, the English High Court recognized as valid in England a divorce granted in South Dakota, U. S. A., of parties domiciled in New York, because the decree in question was recognized as valid by the courts of the State of New York. It is the doctrine of English courts that an honest adherence to the principle that domicile alone gives jurisdiction in a divorce action will preclude the scandal which arises when a man and woman are held to be husband and wife in one country and strangers in another.

CHAPTER III.

Scotland.

The Act of Union between England and Scotland, A. D. 1707 (6 Anne, c. 2), which made one legislature, the present British Parliament, for the two countries, expressly provided that the existing law and judicial procedure of each kingdom should be continued, except so far as they might be repealed by the Act, or by subsequent legislation. The foundation of Scottish jurisprudence is the Roman law, and the canon law which is derived from it, consequently the law of marriage and divorce in Scotland differs from that of England. The status of marriage by Scottish law may be created in any one of three ways: First, by regular or public marriage celebrated in a church or private house by a minister of religion; second, by an irregular or clandestine marriage entered into without the assistance of a clergyman or any other third party, and, third, by declaration, or declarator, wherein the parties make a declaration confessing an irregular union, and are fined for the “offence,” and obtain an extract of the “sentence” which answers to the purpose of a certificate of marriage.

The Scottish definition of marriage is given by Lord Penzance as follows: “The voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”

Impediments.—Males under fourteen and females under twelve cannot marry, but if persons under age, called in the Scottish law “pupils,” live together and continue to do so after both have passed their nonage they are considered married, on the ground that there is evidence of a contract after the impediment has ceased to exist.

Insanity.—An insane person cannot give a valid consent and therefore the insanity of either party is an impediment.

Intoxication.—There can be no marriage if one of the parties at the time of the formal union was so intoxicated as to be bereft of reason, but a marriage voidable on the ground of either insanity or intoxication may be validated by the consent of both parties after a return to sanity or sobriety.

Consanguinity and Affinity.—As to the impediments which arise from blood and marriage, the 18th Chapter of the Book of Leviticus is practically the law of Scotland. Marriage is forbidden between ascendants and descendants ad infinitum, and in the collateral line between brothers and sisters, consanguinian or uterine, and between all collaterals, one of whom stands in loco parentis to the other. It is still an academic question whether or not the marriage of a brother and sister both born illegitimate is prohibited.

Of course, a previous marriage still subsisting is an impediment.

Gretna Green Marriages.—In order to put a stop to the Gretna Green marriages which have furnished material for much romance in books and much sorrow in actual life, it was enacted by 19 and 20 Vict., c. 96, that “no irregular marriage contracted in Scotland by declaration, acknowledgment or ceremony (after 31 Dec., 1856) shall be valid unless one of the parties had at the date thereof his or her usual place of residence there, or had lived in Scotland for twenty-one days next preceding such marriage.”

It is manifest from all the decisions that in the absence of impediments, marriage in Scotland is constituted by interchange of consent. No formal expression of such consent is necessary. If the court is satisfied, from the whole circumstances and the conduct of the parties before and after, that they have given genuine consent to present marriage, it will be held that the marriage has been validly constituted.

Husband and Wife.—By the common law of Scotland the legal status of a married woman is so merged in that of her husband as to leave her incapable of independent legal action. Recent legislation has, however, modified this doctrine.

Divorce.—The term divorce as used in this chapter means an absolute dissolution and setting aside of a legal marriage.

The Scottish courts recognize two grounds for divorce, adultery and desertion. These grounds are open to either husband or wife. The action can only be maintained by the innocent party.

Adultery.—The evidence must be such as would “lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion that adultery has been committed.”

If the court has jurisdiction it does not matter that the offence was committed out of Scotland.

Defences.—Besides the denial of the allegation of adultery, the following are sufficient defences: 1, collusion; 2, condonation; 3, long delay in bringing the action; 4, connivance or lenocinium of the plaintiff, who is called a pursuer in Scottish procedure; 5, the honest belief that the intercourse alleged to be adultery was lawful, as when a wife enters into a second marriage in the reasonable belief that her first husband is dead.

Desertion.—Desertion or, as the Scottish lawyers put it, “non-adherence,” for a period of four years, against the will of the party deserted, is the second ground for divorce. Mere separation, as, for example, the absence of the husband on necessary business or his imprisonment, is not such non-adherence as will entitle the pursuer to a decree. The desertion must be a deliberate and obstinate withdrawal from cohabitation and companionship. If a wife refused to accompany her husband abroad, and he went alone, her refusal, and not his going away, would constitute desertion.

Foreign Divorce.—If a native of Scotland acquires a foreign domicile, and obtains a divorce while abroad, the divorce would be recognized in Scotland if granted for either of the two causes sufficient by Scottish law.

Effects of Divorce.—The judgment of divorce completely sets aside the marriage, and both parties are free to marry again. On divorce the innocent party also comes into the immediate enjoyment of all the rights in the estate of the guilty spouse, or the funds settled by the marriage contract, as if the offending party had died at the date of the decree.

Conversely, the guilty spouse loses all claim to such legal rights as he or she would have had on the death of the innocent party but for the divorce.

CHAPTER IV.

Ireland.

Ireland like Scotland has its separate judicial system, and many of its laws differ from those of all other parts of the British Empire.

The Irish law relating to marriage and matrimonial controversies is administered under the Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act of 1870. It is practically the same as the English law as it existed before 1857.

The Irish Act of 1870 transferred the exercise by the Ecclesiastical Courts prior to the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland to a court for matrimonial causes and assigned the trial of such causes to the judge of the Court of Probate.

Under the Irish Judicature Act of 1877 this jurisdiction is now vested in the Supreme Court of Judicature and is exercised by the probate and matrimonial judge.

It is impossible to obtain a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony in the courts of Ireland. The only divorce decree granted is from bed and board, and amounts in effect to what is termed a judicial separation in England.

The grounds for the limited form of divorce granted by the courts are adultery, cruelty or unnatural practices.

In order to obtain a decree of complete divorce the petitioner must promote a bill in the House of Lords to dissolve the marriage and allow the petitioner to marry again, which bill must be founded upon and follow a divorce from bed and board obtained in the Irish courts.

When a petition is presented to the House of Lords a wife must prove her husband’s adultery coupled with cruelty and a husband must prove his wife’s adultery and must, if possible, make his wife’s paramour a party by instituting proceedings against him for criminal conversation in the Irish courts.

Nullity.—An action for nullity of marriage can be maintained on the following grounds: 1. Impuberty. 2. Relationship of the parties within the prohibited degrees. 3. An existing prior marriage of one of the parties. 4. Incapacity of the parties to conclude the marriage contract, as in the event of one being a lunatic. 5. Non-compliance with marriage laws. 6. Fraud in procuring the marriage. 7. Impotency.

CHAPTER V.

The French Law of Marriage and Divorce.

Marriage.—A man cannot contract a marriage before he has completed his eighteenth year and a woman until she has completed her fifteenth year. However, the President of the Republic may grant a dispensation as to age upon good cause appearing.

A son who has not reached the age of twenty-five, or a daughter who has not reached the age of twenty-one, cannot marry without the consent of their parents; but if the parents disagree between themselves the consent of the father is sufficient.

If both the father and the mother are dead or unable to give consent the grandparents take their place.

Sons or daughters less than twenty-one years of age, who have no parents or grandparents, or only such as are in a condition which renders them incapable of giving consent, cannot marry without the consent of a family council.

Impediments.—Marriage is prohibited between all legitimate ascendants and descendants in the direct line and between persons who are connected by marriage and related in the same degree. Marriage is also prohibited between uncle and niece and aunt and nephew. The President of the Republic may, nevertheless, on good cause being shown, dispense with the prohibitions contained in the Civil Code forbidding the marriage of a brother-in-law with a sister-in-law, and the marriage between uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew.

Formalities.—A marriage must be celebrated publicly before the civil status officer of the civil domicile of one of the parties. The officer of the civil status before celebrating a marriage must publish the banns twice before the door of the Maison Commune, at an interval of eight days. The President of the Republic, and also the official whom he entrusts with this power, may dispense, for good cause, with the second publication of the banns.

Foreign Marriages.—A marriage celebrated in a foreign country between French citizens or between a French citizen and a foreigner is valid if it is performed according to the forms customary in such country, provided always that the marriage has been preceded by the publications of the banns pursuant to the code.

The record of a marriage contracted in a foreign country must be transcribed within three months of the return of the French citizen to the territory of the Republic in the public marriage registers of his civil domicile.

Voidable Marriages.—The validity of a marriage which has been contracted without the free consent of both parties, or without the free consent of one of them, can only be impugned by the parties themselves or by the party whose consent was not freely given.

When there has been an honest mistake as to the personality of one of the parties the validity of the marriage can only be impugned by the person who was misled.

Such mistakes as to personality include mistakes as to quality as well as to identity. For example, the Court of Cassation held in 1861 that where a woman had been misled into marrying an ex-convict by ignorance of the fact, the marriage was annulable.

An action for a declaration of nullity of marriage for any cause cannot be maintained by parties to the marriage, or by the relations whose consent was necessary, when such marriage has been ratified or confirmed knowingly by those whose consent was necessary, or after a year has passed since they acquired knowledge of the cause for an action without any application to the courts for relief.

Every marriage which has not been contracted publicly, and has not been celebrated before a competent public official, can be impugned by the parties themselves, by their fathers and mothers, by the ascendants, and by all who have an existing vested interest, as well as by the Public Prosecutor.

No one can legally claim the status of husband or wife, or the effects and privileges resulting by law from marriage, without the production of a certificate of the marriage celebration, except in the cases provided for by Article 46 of the code, namely, when no records have ever existed, or the same have been lost or destroyed. In such cases the marriage may be established by oral evidence.

The fact that by common repute the parties are married does not dispense with the necessity of producing the record of the celebration.

However, if there are children born of two persons who have lived openly as husband ind wife, and who are both dead, the legitimacy of their children cannot be assailed on the sole ground that a record of their parents’ marriage is not produced.

A marriage which has been declared a nullity has, if contracted in good faith, the civil effects of a marriage so far as the parties themselves and their children are concerned. If only one of the parties has acted in good faith the legal consequences of marriage only exist in favour of the innocent party and of the children of the marriage.

The last two paragraphs, which are virtually a translation of Articles 201 and 202 of the Civil Code, are very important to foreigners who marry French citizens.

Until a court has pronounced the marriage a nullity the marriage between a French citizen and a foreigner celebrated abroad is binding upon the parties, even though the exacting forms required by the French law have not been complied with.

If an Englishwoman in good faith marries a Frenchman in London she is entitled by French law to the civil rights of a wife, and her children the issue of the marriage would be considered legitimate, although the marriage had not been celebrated after the publication of banns in the manner prescribed by the code; or the record of such celebration transcribed within three months of the return of the French husband to France. The foreign wife would have the same rights even if she married a Frenchman under twenty-five years of age without the previous consent of his parents.

Of course, such a marriage could be declared null, leaving both parties free to marry again.

It must be always carried in mind that to constitute a valid marriage under French law which cannot be impugned by anyone all the statutory conditions imposed by the Civil Code must be complied with.

Husband and Wife.—Married persons owe each other fidelity, support and assistance. A husband owes protection to his wife. A wife owes obedience to her husband.

A wife is obliged to live with her husband and to follow him wherever he determines it proper to reside. A husband is obliged to receive his wife and to provide her with all that is necessary for the requirements of life, according to his means and condition.

A wife cannot bring a civil action without the consent of her husband, even if she is a public trader and is not married under the system of a community of goods and has separate property.

A wife cannot give away, convey, mortgage or acquire property, with or without a consideration, without her husband concurring in the document by which such transfer is made, or giving his written consent.

A woman cannot become a public trader without her husband’s consent. It is not necessary for a wife to have her husband’s consent to make a will.

Marriage Duties.—The husband and wife are mutually bound to feed, support and educate their children.

Children are bound to support their parents and other ascendants who are in want.

Dissolution of Marriage.—A marriage is dissolved:

a. By the death of one of the parties;

b. By a divorce pronounced according to law.

Second Marriages.—A woman cannot legally marry again until ten months have elapsed since the dissolution of her previous marriage.

DIVORCE

Causes for Divorce.—

1. Either party to the marriage is entitled to a divorce on the ground of the adultery of the other.

2. Either party is entitled to a divorce because of the cruelty or serious insults of the one toward the other. This includes not only such violent cruelty as endangers life, but all sorts of less serious assaults. Any acts, words or writings by which one of the parties reflects on the honour and good name of the other furnish cause for a divorce.

3. The fact that one of the parties has been sentenced to death, imprisonment, penal servitude, transportation, banishment or loss of civil rights, and is branded with infamy, entitles the other party to a divorce.

That article of the Civil Code which provided for divorce by mutual consent, owing to incompatibility of temper, has been repealed.

Divorce Procedure.—A party who wishes to institute a proceeding for divorce must present the petition personally to the President of the Court or to the judge who is acting in that capacity. If it appears that the petitioner is unable to attend in person the President of the Court or the judge acting as such is required to go, accompanied by his registrar, to the residence of the petitioner.

The judge, upon seeing and hearing the petitioner and after having made such comment as he may deem proper, will affix his order to the end of the petition, directing the parties to appear before him on a day and at the hour then fixed, and will direct an officer to serve the citation upon the defendant.

It is within the judge’s discretion to grant leave in the same order to the petitioner to reside separate during the pendency of the action from the defendant. If the petitioner be a wife, the judge may fix the place of her temporary residence.

The next step is that upon the day appointed in the citation the judge hears the parties in person. Upon such hearing it is the duty of the judge to do his best to conciliate the parties. In case the parties refuse to be conciliated, or the defendant defaults in appearance, the judge then grants an order certifying to the fact and giving the petitioner leave to issue a citation requiring the defendant to appear in court.

The judge has authority under the code to make such a provisional order respecting the payment to a wife of alimony during the action or concerning the temporary custody of the children as may be necessary and proper.

The case is prepared, investigated and judged in the ordinary form, the Ministère Public being heard. The Ministère Public is an official who performs similar duties to those of a King’s Proctor in England.

The petitioner can at any stage of the case change the petition for a divorce into a petition for a judicial separation.

Newspaper Reports.—The public press is forbidden under penalty of a fine of from 100 to 2,000 francs to publish the evidence in divorce trials.

Effects of Divorce.—Parties who have been divorced cannot become husband and wife again if either of them, after the divorce, have contracted a new marriage since the divorce and been divorced a second time.

If parties who have been divorced wish to become husband and wife again a new marriage is necessary. After such a remarriage no new petition for divorce can be entertained for any cause, except that one of the parties since the remarriage has been sentenced to a punishment which involves corporal detention and is branded with infamy.

A divorced woman cannot remarry until ten months after the divorce has become absolute.

Where the divorce has been granted on the ground of adultery the guilty party can never marry the person with whom he or she was found guilty of the offence.

Custody of Children.—The custody of the children belongs to the party in whose favour the judgment of divorce has been pronounced, unless the court in the interests of the children, upon the application of the family or the Ministère Public, directs that they be entrusted to the other party or to a third person.

Whoever may become entitled to the children’s custody, the father and mother each retain their right to superintend the maintenance and education of their children and must contribute thereto in proportion to their means.

Judicial Separation.—The same causes which are sufficient to obtain a decree of divorce are sufficient to entitle the party to a separation from bed and board.

When a judicial separation has lasted three years the judgment can be changed into a decree of divorce upon the application of either party.

A judicial separation carries with it separation of property and restores to a woman her full civil rights, so that she may buy and sell and otherwise act as if she were a single woman.

CHAPTER VI.

Italy.