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HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR

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WAR BOOKS

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HOW THE WAR BEGAN
By W.L. COURTNEY. LL.D., and J.M. KENNEDY

THE FLEETS AT WAR
By ARCHIBALD HURD

THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
By GEORGE HOOPER

THE CAMPAIGN ROUND LIEGE
By J.M. KENNEDY

IN THE FIRING LINE
By A. ST. JOHN ADCOCK

GREAT BATTLES OF THE WORLD
By STEPHEN CRANE
Author of "The Red Badge of Courage."

BRITISH REGIMENTS AT THE FRONT
The story of their Battle Honours.

THE RED CROSS IN WAR
By Miss MARY FRANCES BILLINGTON

FORTY YEARS AFTER
The Story of the Franco-German War. By H.C. BAILEY.
With an Introduction by W.L. COURTNEY, LL.D.

A SCRAP OF PAPER
The Inner History of German Diplomacy.
By E.J. DILLON

HOW THE NATIONS WAGED WAR
A companion volume to "How the War Began," telling how the world faced
Armageddon and how the British Army answered the call to arms.
By J.M. KENNEDY

AIR-CRAFT IN WAR
By S. ERIC BRUCE

FAMOUS FIGHTS OF INDIAN NATIVE
REGIMENTS

THE TRIUMPHANT RETREAT TO PARIS
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE

OTHER VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

PUBLISHED FOR THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
BY HODDER & STOUGHTON, WARWICK SQUARE,
LONDON, E.C.

HOW THE NATIONS
WAGED WAR

A companion Volume to "How the War Began" telling how the World faced Armageddon, and how the British Empire answered the call to arms

BY

J.M. KENNEDY

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV

CONTENTS

[CHAPTER I]

The "Scrap of Paper"—Sir Edward Grey's further Statement—The Houses of Parliament and Belgium—Indian Troops—The German White Book.

Since the first volume of this series appeared, additional particulars respecting the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war have been made known; and to these, with some further details which have not hitherto been sufficiently emphasized, the attention of the public may now be usefully directed.

On August 27th, the Foreign Office issued an important dispatch from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government. It is dated London, August 8th, and contains a complete account of the Ambassador's final interviews with Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister; with Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State; and with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor. It was in the course of the interview with the latter that the Chancellor referred to the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, in a phrase which had become notorious, as a "scrap of paper." The document giving Sir E. Goschen's dispatch is as follows:

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th inst.,[1] I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.

It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,[2] and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office, and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and, pointing out that you had mentioned twelve o'clock as the time when his Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequence which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same.

I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.

As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread, and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the Embassy, and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before nine p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never dispatched.[3]

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well as or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that his Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by twelve o'clock that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr von Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr von Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before his Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the Embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble-stones into the drawing-room where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances.

It was the "pestilential Tageblatt," which had somehow got hold of the news, and had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the Embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

Another remarkable passage in the Dispatch is that in which Sir E. Goschen describes the Kaiser's indignation and his resolve to divest himself of his English titles:

On the following morning, August 5th, the Emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message: "The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of these titles."

This resolve was made known in a manner which indicated that the attitude of the English Government was keenly felt at Potsdam. "I would add," remarks the Ambassador, "that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery."

The Dispatch continues:

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about eleven o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night, as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow, couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the Embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds, which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped, from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside, and inside, hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the Embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us, and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

At the sitting of the House of Commons on August 26th, Mr. Keir Hardie exhibited a tendency to quibble and to show his own country in a wrong light. His interference on this occasion was, from his point of view, fruitless; but it had the advantage of enabling the Foreign Secretary to make an effective reply. In his statement, Sir Edward Grey dealt with a few points which, although not at all obscure, were all the better for emphasizing. The temper of the House is sufficiently well indicated by the cheers and interruptions recorded in the following report:

Mr. Keir Hardie (Lab., Merthyr Tydvil) inquired of the Foreign Secretary whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador, together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own, which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected.

Sir E. Grey: These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on August 1st, and without authority, to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85, in the White Paper.[4] The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is Sunday, August 2nd—the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. The German Chancellor had already been told, on July 30th, that we could not bargain that away.

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House, accordingly.[5] I had seen the German Ambassador again, at his own request, on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation. Therefore, it does not appear in the White Paper; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition—(loud cheers)—without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153 in the White Paper, about the neutrality of Belgium.[6] Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the White Paper was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the White Paper.[7]

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd.[8] If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, I must have referred to No. 85—the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently.[9] This would have made the case against the German Government much stronger—(cheers)—than I did make it in my speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace, but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany, on the basis of the suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?

Sir E. Grey: The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative, and without authority, asked whether we would formulate the conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and the conditions were stated in the House and made known to the German Ambassador. (Cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie (who rose amidst cries of "Order," "Oh, oh!" and "Sit down"): May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated these suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put forward by their Ambassador? (Cries of "Don't answer.")

Mr. T.M. Healy (Ind. Nat., Cork, N.E.): Before the right hon. gentleman answers that, may I ask him if the Socialists in the Reichstag are asking any questions like this? (Loud and prolonged general cheers.)

Sir E. Grey, who was greeted with cries of "Don't answer," said: I should like to have no misunderstanding on this. (Loud cheers.) The German Ambassador did not make to us suggestions different to those which his Government made. He never suggested to us that the German Government would be able to agree to the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. On the contrary he did suggest to me that we should not put that condition forward because he was afraid his Government would not be able to accept it. (Cheers.)

Mr. Pringle (R., Lanarkshire, N.W.): Is my right hon. friend aware that Mr. Keir Hardie is constantly representing in the country that these proposals were actually made by the German Government to England? (Hear, hear.)

Sir. E. Grey: That was one of the reasons why I thought it very desirable to answer very explicitly. (General cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: On a point of personal explanation I entirely repudiate the statement made by Mr. Pringle.

Mr. Pringle: I have to say in answer to that personal imputation that my authority is a letter written by Mr. Hardie in the Ardrossan and Saltcoats Herald last Saturday. (Cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie: Those who cheer have not seen the letter. (Cries of "Sit down.")

Mr. Pringle: Coward.

Mr. King (R., Somerset, N.) asked the Foreign Secretary whether he intended to lay upon the table copies of the German memorandum and the official statements of other foreign Governments showing the different explanations of the origin of the war which had been published by the various Governments concerned in the European war.

Sir E. Grey: I have received no official explanation of the nature referred to, except such as appear in our White Paper recently published.

Mr. King also asked whether Sir E. Grey was aware that the German Government had presented gratis to certain American citizens copies of a pamphlet, written in English, called "Germany's Reasons for War with Russia"; and whether, with a view of permitting an answer to this publication, he would obtain a copy and place it in the Library.

Sir E. Grey replied that he had given instructions for a copy of the document in question to be placed in the Library at the disposal of members.

On page 147 of this volume appears a reference to the German White Book, which was issued at Berlin on August 3rd. This White Book was intended to show that war with Russia was inevitable, and it was brought down to August 1st. In other words, while it dealt more or less adequately with the situation as between Russia and Germany, it threw no light on the ultimate causes which led to war with this country. The Memorandum of this German White Book has already been summarized (p. 147-8) and two telegrams—one from the Kaiser to the Tsar on July 31st, and the Tsar's reply of the same date—have been quoted on p. 148-9. The Manchester Guardian of August 24th contained translations of telegrams which had been exchanged previously by the two Emperors on the preceding days, i.e., from July 28th to July 30th, as follows:

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 28th, 10.45 p.m.

I hear with the utmost disquietude of the impression created in your realm by Austria-Hungary's proceedings against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has for years been carried on in Servia has led to the appalling crime of which the Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which animated the murder of their own king and queen is still supreme in that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that we two, that you as well as I, and all sovereigns have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for the hideous deed should receive the punishment they deserve.

On the other hand, I am far from overlooking the difficulties you and your government may find in opposing the tendency of public opinion. Remembering the hearty friendship which for long has bound us two securely together, I am throwing the whole of my influence into the scale to induce Austria-Hungary to seek for an open and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I confidently hope for your assistance in my endeavours to put aside all the difficulties that may arise.

Your sincerely devoted friend and cousin,

(Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser.

Peterhof Palace,
July 29th, 1.0 p.m.

I rejoice that you are back in Germany. I beg you earnestly to help me at this grave moment. A shameful war has been declared on a weak country, and there is immense indignation in Russia, which I fully share. I foresee that I shall very soon be unable to hold out longer against the pressure exercised upon me, and shall be compelled to adopt measures which will lead to war. To obviate such a misfortune as a European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

(Signed) Nicholas.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 29th, 6.30 p.m.

I have received your telegram, and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. But I cannot, as I said in my first telegram to you, regard Austria-Hungary's action as a "shameful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises are wholly unreliable if merely written on paper. In my view Austria-Hungary's action is to be regarded as an attempt to secure guarantees that Servia's promises shall be really translated into action. I am strengthened in this view by the declaration of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary aims at no territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense. I think, therefore, that it is entirely possible for Russia to maintain the rôle of a spectator of the Austro-Servian war without dragging Europe into the most awful war it has ever experienced. I believe that a direct understanding between your government and Vienna is possible and desirable, and, as I already telegraphed to you, my government has done all in its power to further such an understanding. Military measures on Russia's part, which Austria-Hungary could view as a threat, would naturally hasten a misfortune which we both wish to avoid, and would undermine the position of mediator which I have readily assumed in response to your appeal to my friendship and help.

(Signed) William.

The Kaiser to the Tsar.

July 30th, 1.0 a.m.

My Ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation: I said the same to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has only mobilised against Servia, and only a part of its army. If, as appears from your communication and that of your government, Russia is mobilising against Austria-Hungary, the rôle of mediator which you entrusted to me in friendly wise, and which I accepted at your express request, is jeopardised, if not rendered impossible. The whole burden of decision now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for war or peace.

(Signed) William.

The Tsar to the Kaiser,

Peterhof,
July 30th, 1.20 p.m.

From my heart I thank you for your speedy reply. I am this evening sending Tatisheff with instructions. The military measures now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago for reasons of defence against Austria's preparations. Most heartily do I trust that these measures will in no way influence your position as mediator, which I value highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria to secure an understanding with us.

(Signed) Nicholas.

The two final telegrams have been given on pp. 148-150 of "How the War Began."

On July 28th, a confidential communication was sent by the Imperial Chancellor to the Governments of the various Federal States of Germany. After recapitulating the story of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, it proceeds as follows:

There are certain Russian voices accordingly who hold that it is a self-evident right and the business of Russia to intervene actively on Servia's behalf in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. The Novoye Vremya actually thinks that the responsibility for the European conflagration that would result from such action on the part of Russia can be thrown upon Germany, in so far as Germany does not cause Austria-Hungary to give way. But here the Russian Press is looking at things upside down. It was not Austria-Hungary which started the conflict with Servia, but Servia, which, by its unscrupulous encouragement of Greater Servian aspirations, even within Austria-Hungary, endangered the very existence of the Monarchy, and created a condition of things which finally found expression in the atrocious deed of Sarajevo. If Russia believes it must intervene in the conflict on behalf of Servia, its right is no doubt good, so far as it goes. But in doing so it must know that it thereby takes over as its own all Servia's endeavours to undermine the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that on it will rest the sole responsibility if the Austro-Servian business, which all the other great Powers desire to localise, leads to a European war. Russia's responsibility is clear, and the heavier in that Count Berchtold has officially informed Russia that there is no intention of territorial acquisition at Servia's expense, or any tampering with the continued existence of the Servian kingdom—merely a desire for peace from the Servian machinations which imperil its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clear. The final goal of the agitation carried on by the Pan-Slavists against Austria-Hungary is, by breaking down the Danube Monarchy, to burst or weaken the Triple Alliance, and subsequently to isolate the German Empire completely. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the duty of preserving Europe, so far as may be possible, from universal war, likewise directs us to support the endeavour to localise the conflict, thereby adhering to that straight line of policy which we have now pursued with success for forty-four years in the interest of the maintenance of European peace. If, however, contrary to what we hope, the interference (Eingreifen) of Russia causes an extension of the conflagration, faithful to our alliance, we should have to support the neighbour Monarchy with the whole might of the Empire. Only under compulsion shall we grasp the sword, but if we do, it will be with the calm consciousness that we are guiltless of the disaster which a war must bring upon the peoples of Europe.

This "calm consciousness" does not seem to have been disturbed by the reflection that in the spring of 1913, when Europe appeared to be settling down to a period of peace and prosperity after the Tripoli and Balkan wars, the German Government suddenly startled the whole world by imposing a special war levy of £50,000,000, and by increasing the peace strength of the German army to 870,000 men. Under the Quinquennial Army Law of 1905, the peace footing of the German army was largely increased and reached a total of 505,839 men in 1911. A new Quinquennial Law was voted by the Reichstag in 1911, and if it had been carried into effect the army would have had the strength of 515,221 in 1915-6. This, one would have thought, was surely a sufficient peace establishment; but in 1912 a still further Army Law provided for new units and also for increases in the peace effective. Hardly were the provisions of this law being applied when the special measure of 1913 was passed. The German army, in other words, rose from a peace strength of 505,000 men (excluding the one-year volunteers) in 1911 to a peace strength of about 512,000 in 1912, and a peace strength of 870,000 in the spring of 1914. There were no corresponding increases in any European army to call for this drastic strengthening of the German forces. Indeed, the French army had rather become reduced in numbers in consequence of the two years' service; and the Balkan States were exhausted. The Servia which had advanced against Turkey in the autumn of 1912 was a very much more powerful country than the Servia with which Austria picked a quarrel in 1914.

We were never told why this great increase in the German army was rendered necessary; nor did we learn why, at almost the same time, the Austrian Government voted huge sums for enlarging its land and sea forces. There was a vague reference in the Reichstag to the balance of military power. But, if the Balkan war had altered the military power of Europe, it had altered that power to the advantage of the Triple Alliance. The Balkan States, the perpetual menace of the Danube Monarchy, if we are to credit the statements made at Vienna, were exhausted after their campaigns, first against Turkey and then against one another. Austria herself had had her way with regard to Albania, and Russia had given up her project of securing an outlet on the Adriatic for Servia. Italy, the third partner in the Triplice, was beginning to recover from the effects of the Tripoli war; and France and England wished for nothing better than to be let alone.

If we received but little information regarding the strengthening of the German army, assuredly we had been receiving less for years previously regarding the construction of strategic railways on the German border where it meets Belgium and Luxemburg. An examination of a detailed map of this district will show the most careless observer that the strong German fortresses and garrison towns of Cologne, Coblenz, and Germersheim, are connected with the western frontiers by railway lines the only possible use of which must have been the transportation of troops and munitions of war. There is certainly no trade in western Germany demanding such a large number of tracks running east and west; and it was only by means of these railways that Germany was able to throw a million men across the frontier in less than forty-eight hours after war broke out. The pacific intentions of France may be judged from the fact that the lines on the French side of the frontier run for the most part north and south.

One or two such items may pass. But when we consider them seriatim, we are bound to admit that Germany has shown consistent provocation for more than a decade. We may leave out of account, perhaps, the Kruger telegram and the German desire to assist Spain against the United States in 1898, not to mention the attitude of Germany at the time of the Boer war. There remains an entire series of provocations; the preamble to the first German Navy Act (1900), in which England as the enemy is all but mentioned by name; the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier; the bullying indulged in by the German representatives at the Algeciras Conference; the trouble almost forced on France over the Morocco question in 1907; the determined attitude taken up by the Kaiser against all Europe at the time of the Turkish revolution and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, in 1908-9; the stringent terms of the Potsdam Agreement with Russia in 1910; the sending of the Panther to Agadir in 1911; the intractable attitude of the Wilhelmstrasse over the settlement of the Balkan question in 1912-13. With some effort, perhaps, any one of these incidents—and these are only a few of the more important—might be explained away with a veneer of plausibility; but, taken together, they are overwhelming in their proof that the German Empire has been a hotbed of unrest in Europe, not merely for the last two or three years, but for the last twenty. Where Germany led Austria followed; and numerous were the threats and imprecations levelled at Italy through the pliable medium of the semi-official Press because Rome did not always see eye to eye with Berlin and Vienna.

The remaining telegrams and other documents quoted by the Manchester Guardian need not detain us long. From the dispatches of the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to his Government at Berlin, it is clear that the Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonoff, laid the entire blame at the door of Austria. No impartial statesman, as we can see from our own White Paper, attempted to justify an ultimatum that demanded a reply within forty-eight hours. The following messages, however, are worth noting, and they help to complete our own official documents:

From the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

July 27th.

The military attaché reports conversation with War Minister:

Sazonoff has asked the latter to explain the situation to me. The Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no mobilisation order had as yet been given. Certain preparatory measures had been taken; that was all: no reservists had been called up, no horses commandeered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier mobilisation would take place in the military districts touching upon Austria: Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan. Under no circumstances in those on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was earnestly desired. On my inquiry as to the purpose of mobilisation against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to diplomacy. I said to the Minister that we did justice to their friendly intentions towards us, but that even mobilisation directed solely against Austria would be regarded as highly threatening.

On July 28th—by which date Germany must have nearly completed her arrangements for invading France through Belgium—we find the Foreign Minister informing the Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, that Germany is ready to co-operate with the other Powers in mediating between Austria and Russia; and on July 29th France is warned that Germany may be compelled to declare martial law. On July 31st the ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg and a similar warning to Paris.

The following message was sent to St. Petersburg on August 1st:

In case the Russian Government should not give a satisfactory answer to our demand, your Excellency will at five o'clock this afternoon (Central European time) hand it the following declaration, in French: "Since the beginning of the crisis the Imperial Government has endeavoured to bring about a peaceful solution. In conformity with the wish expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in agreement with England, was endeavouring to act as mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without waiting for the results of his efforts, proceeded to mobilise the whole of its land and sea forces.

"As the result of this threatening step, for which no motive was afforded by any miltary preparation on Germany's part, the German Empire found itself face to face with a serious and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to parry this danger it would have compromised the security and even the existence of Germany. Consequently the German Government found itself compelled to address the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to insist on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having refused the satisfaction of this demand, and having shown by this refusal that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honour to inform your Excellency, by my Government's command, as follows:

"His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, raises the gage in the Empire's name and regards himself as in a state of war with Russia. (Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relève le défi et se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.)

"Please demand your papers and protection and put your affairs under the protection of the American Embassy."

Among the numerous indications of loyalty which reached Great Britain from her oversea dominions and colonies, those from India were not the least striking and demonstrative. As many of the Indian princes offered not merely money, but also men, it was decided that representative contingents of Indian soldiers should take their places on the battlefield side by side with their fellow-subjects from these Islands and the Dominions. The announcement was made in the House of Lords on August 28th by Earl Kitchener in the following words:

"In addition to reinforcements that will shortly proceed from this country, the Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India.

"The first division of those troops is now on its way. I may add that all wastage in the Army in France has been immediately filled up, and there are some 12,000 men waiting for that purpose on the lines of communication."

To Lord Kitchener's brief announcement the Secretary for India added an explanation which the public welcomed with feelings of gratification.

"It has been deeply impressed upon us," he said, "from what we have heard from India, that the wonderful wave of enthusiasm and loyalty which is now passing over that country is, to a great extent, based upon the desire of the Indian people that Indian soldiers should stand side by side with their comrades of the British Army in repelling the invasion of our friends' territories and the attacks made upon them."

Hardly less enthusiasm had been aroused on the previous day, August 27th, when Mr. Asquith moved:

"That an Address be presented to his Majesty praying him to convey to his Majesty the King of the Belgians the sympathy and admiration with which this House regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and people to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of the determination of this country to support in every way the efforts of Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the public law of Europe."

In supporting his motion the Prime Minister delivered an eloquent and moving speech, in the course of which he said:

"Very few words are needed to commend to the House the Address the terms of which will shortly be read from the Chair. The war which is now shaking to its foundations the whole European system originated in a quarrel in which this country had no direct concern. We strove with all our might, as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when that was no longer possible to limit its area. It is all-important, and I think it is relevant to this motion, that it should be clearly understood when it was and why it was that we intervened.

"It was only when we were confronted with the choice between keeping and breaking solemn obligations, between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless subservience to naked force, that we threw away the scabbard.

"We do not repent our decision.

"The issue was one which no great and self-respecting nation, certainly none bred and nurtured as ourselves in this ancient home of liberty could, without undying shame, have declined. We were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to assert and maintain the threatened independence of a small and neutral State. Belgium had no interest of her own to serve, save and except the one supreme and over-riding interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the name, the preservation of her integrity and of her national life.

"History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining the great principle, which is, after all, the well-spring of civilisation and of progress, has fallen once and again at the most critical moment in the past to States relatively small in area and in population, but great in courage and resolve, to Athens and Sparta, the Swiss cantons, and not least gloriously three centuries ago to the Netherlands. Never, sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and bravely acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously and heroically discharged than during the last weeks by the Belgian King and the Belgian people.

"They have faced without flinching, and against almost incalculable odds, the horrors of an irruption, devastation, of spoliation, and of outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully arrested the inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and overwhelming force. The defence of Liège will always be the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immortal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their alliance and their friendship. We salute them with respect and with honour. We are with them heart and soul, because by their side and in their company we are defending at the same time two great causes—the independence of small States and the sanctity of international covenants—and we assure them, as I ask the House in this Address to do, in the name of this United Kingdom and of the whole Empire, that they may count to the end on our whole-hearted and unfailing support."

The reception which this speech met with was unmistakable; and the motion was voted unanimously.

Mr. Bonar Law, in seconding, spoke with great feeling of the shameful atrocities committed upon the Belgian people by the German soldiery, and, in the Upper House, Lord Crewe, referring to the same theme, observed that no country ever outraged humanity without sooner or later paying for it: "It must be our part to see that the sword is not sheathed till these great wrongs are redressed to the full."

Lord Lansdowne spoke of the "incalculable value" of the two or three weeks gained by the heroic defence of Belgium; and Mr. Redmond, in a few glowing sentences, bore witness to the generous enthusiasm which had been excited in Ireland. There was no sacrifice, he said, which Ireland was not willing to make for Belgium, and he suggested that, instead of the loan of £10,000,000 which had been proposed, the Belgian people should be asked to receive the money as a gift.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In this telegram, which is quoted in full on p. 178 of "How the War Began," Sir Edward Grey reproduced the appeal of the King of the Belgians to King George for diplomatic intervention, and asked for an assurance that the German demand on Belgium for permission to pass troops over Belgian territory would not be persisted in.

[2] This was the British ultimatum, in which Sir Edward Grey recapitulated the circumstances connected with the German occupation of Belgian territory and demanded an answer by midnight. Quoted in full on page 180-1 of "How the War Began."

[3] This telegram, says a footnote to the dispatch, never reached the Foreign Office.

[4] This letter has been quoted in full on p. 106 of "How the War Began."

[5] Sir Edward Grey's speech appears ibid., p. 150 foll.

[6] This refers to Sir Edward Grey's telegram to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, which is given on p. 178 of "How the War Began."

[7] Sir E. Goschen's report has been given at the beginning of this chapter.

[8] Quoted on p. 136-7 of "How the War Began." In this dispatch to Sir E. Goschen, Sir Edward Grey states that he refused to give any undertaking even if the French colonies were respected, saying that England must keep her hands free.

[9] See footnote No. 1.

[CHAPTER II]

German Press Campaign—Disseminating False News—The Secret Press Society—Sir E. Goschen's Report—A Suppressed Telegram.

It has been indicated in the preceding volumes in this series that the plans of the German Government had been very well thought out before the campaign was undertaken. When hostilities had been engaged only a few weeks, evidence came to hand from many parts of the world that the determination of the Kaiser and his advisers to wage war was no sudden whim, no definite stroke of policy dependent upon unexpected circumstances. For example, the proclamations issued by the German consuls in South Africa summoning reservists to the colours had been printed in Germany, it was ascertained, and sent out about the end of April or the beginning of May—in other words, some two months before the assassination of the heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, which was the nominal cause of the dispatch of the Austrian Note and consequently of the general European War.

Again, certain German merchant vessels in Australasian waters were observed on July 30th—i.e. the day before Germany declared war on Russia—to begin conveying wireless messages to one another in code. It was commented upon at the time that this was an unusual practice, especially as these steamers, with equal suddenness, refused to answer the wireless messages of British vessels. In other words, two or three days before the campaign was actually opened, means were found of notifying German vessels on the other side of the world that peace was about to be broken.

Nor were these the only preparations. Those who are interested in modern German history will well remember that practically every book relating to Bismarck's career emphasises time and again the use he made of all sections of the Press, independently of party and even of country. His agents, even before the war with Austria in 1866, and, of course, for long afterwards, were at all times endeavouring to bribe, cajole, or persuade newspaper editors in Germany, Russia, Italy, France, England, America and even Turkey and the Balkan States, to insert this or that article or paragraph, tending to assist in some way the achievement of the aims for the time being of the Monarch's most trusted adviser. Bismarck carried this employment of the Press to a very high degree of perfection; and readers of Busch's anecdotes in particular will recollect how often the unfortunate amanuensis was scolded for not writing what he had been told to write in the manner of the particular paper for which his article was intended.

This was one of the most useful diplomatic and political legacies bequeathed by the great Chancellor to the Germany of our own generation, and it is hardly necessary to add that both before and during the present war full advantage has been taken of it. It is no exaggeration whatever to say that in every country of importance throughout the world the most strenuous endeavours were made by the German Press agents to disseminate Germany's point of view—to show at the beginning that both Germany and Austria, particularly Germany, were two innocent but ill-used countries which were reluctantly compelled to go to war with their powerful neighbours, as, if they had remained inactive a day longer, they would have risked their very existence as independent States; and to show later on that, with the help of Providence, the German armies were winning remarkable victories all along the line.

Indeed, if we were to believe the German Press Bureau, the mere fact that the Fatherland had entered the lists was sufficient to cause panic among her enemies. Before the campaign had been in progress three days, the world was solemnly informed from German sources that a revolution had broken out in Paris, and that the President had fled from the city; that a similar revolution was breaking out in Russia, and that the Tsar's throne was in danger; and that the British Expeditionary Force could not be landed in France as the Channel was held by German warships and submarines. Subsequently we were told that Lord Kitchener's appeal for half a million men had utterly failed; that the British Fleet dare not venture to leave the coast on account of German warships and German mines, and that innumerable British merchantmen had been captured or sunk by German cruisers in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the Mediterranean.

If these idle stories seem to us to be merely ridiculous, let it be remembered that they were retailed as solemn facts to newspapers in Italy, the Balkans, Turkey, Egypt and South America. Fully aware of the power of the newspaper, and determined that Germany's prestige should not be lost, the Berlin Government made the most complete preparations for fighting with the pen as well as with the sword; and it is rather unfortunate that this very common-sense example was not followed or had not been thought of by England, France, or Russia. One example may be given. As we now know, and as even the Germans themselves have admitted, the fighting which took place on the Mons-Charleroi line resulted in stalemate. The Germans were practically fought to a standstill, and the allied forces, in accordance with their own pre-arranged plan of campaign, effected gradually and in good order their retreat to their original base. German prisoners admitted that the small British force which had the noble but exceedingly arduous task of defending the left wing of the French army inflicted damage on the enemy out of all proportion to their numbers. The coolness of the British soldiers under a heavy fire, their intrepidity in hand-to-hand fighting, and the almost incredible accuracy of their markmanship were commented upon no less by their allies than by their foes.

Contrast this with the German version, which was circulated wherever a newspaper could be induced to print it. It was said that a great battle, lasting several days, had taken place in the neighbourhood of Mons, that the French had been driven back several miles with heavy loss, and that the "contemptible" British Expeditionary Force had been all but annihilated. This version was communicated to the Italian Press, and a suitable correction did not make an appearance until five days had elapsed. When the correction did appear, one Italian newspaper headed the news with the significant announcement: "Telegrams from London reach us in four days; telegrams from Berlin in two hours."

The result of this feature of this Press campaign was that many countries with which the Allies wished to stand well, such as Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Servia, continually received the impression that the German cause, German might, and German organisation were about to triumph in 1914 as they had in 1870. To some extent the scheme did not succeed. When, for instance, unrest was noticed among the natives in the French sphere of interest in Morocco, the Spaniards in the neighbouring sphere offered voluntarily to put it down, as France had withdrawn many of her troops. In Italy, again, the feeling in favour of the Allies had been so pronounced from the very beginning that not even telegrams from Berlin could shake it. In Turkey, on the other hand, it was difficult, if not, indeed, impossible, to have the German "news" corrected; and the utmost endeavours were openly made by German agents to induce the Turks to strike at the Allies either by an invasion of Egypt, an attack on Suez Canal shipping, or a raid into Southern Russia. It is significant enough that when the German battleship Goeben eluded the British squadron in the Mediterranean, she sought shelter, not in any of the ports of Germany's ally, Austria—which at the time were not beyond her reach—but under the shelter of Turkish forts in the Dardanelles. This incident is referred to in a subsequent chapter.

Although small and not very important items of news appeared from time to time in the British and French Press respecting the operations of the German Press Bureau (a department of the Foreign Office), it was not until early in September that anything like a complete account of the ramifications of this Bureau was made known. On September 3rd a White Paper was issued containing dispatches from Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. These communications began in February, 1914, and continued until June. They showed conclusively that a secret undertaking had been entered into which had for its object the influencing of the Press of foreign countries, partly in the interest of German exporters and partly in order that German influence generally might be spread. It is, of course, impossible to quote at all fully from these very interesting dispatches of Sir E. Goschen, but one or two of them may be mentioned. In his first dispatch, sent on February 27th, our Ambassador at Berlin enclosed the following report:

For some time past a variety of schemes had been ventilated in the Press with the object of improving German prestige abroad. It was said that in certain foreign parts Germany was being persistently and wrongfully abused, that she could obtain no fair hearing because the Press of those distant countries was in hands hostile to any German enterprise, and because the telegraphic agencies serving those countries were equally biassed. An "Association for World-Commerce" was to have remedied this evil by a persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most bitterly complained of. It was hoped that the necessary funds could have been raised by contributions from all the trading and industrial societies interested in the German export trade, and, in view of the supreme importance to Germany of her export trade, it was intended that agents of the Association should be sent and stationed abroad to assist the exporting industries by timely advice and an active policy generally, such as private individuals could pursue more effectively than officials. The opportunity for realising this scheme seemed to offer itself under the following circumstances. A plan was being prepared to start a German-American Economic Society. Similar societies with an application to other countries already exist—e.g., a German-Argentine Society, a German-Canadian Society, a German-Russian Society, etc. The foundation of a German-American Society had been advocated in connection with the revision of the American tariff which gave German industries new chances of an intensified export to the United States. As was natural in any matters dealing with German-American affairs, M. Ballin, of the Hamburg-America Line, was approached to take the matter in hand. He consented. Under his inspiration the idea of a German-American Society was abandoned and the idea of a World Society was substituted. A preliminary meeting was held at which the various German-foreign societies were represented; there were present also representatives of the "Central Association of German Industrials," and of its great rival, the "Federation of Industrials," as well as of most of the leading industrial firms. Internal dissensions, however, soon appeared, and several important members sent in their resignations. The details of the foundation were to have been settled at a meeting convened for February 26th; to-day the whole scheme stands prorogued sine die. If it is ever realised its plan will have to be considerably altered. In the meantime the original plan of a German-American Society has been revived. This society is, in fact, to be constituted in Berlin early in March in the form originally intended.

It would seem strange had M. Ballin so readily accepted defeat. The explanation lies in the fact that, at the request of a very highly-placed person, his interest has been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organisation, devised to undertake those duties of M. Ballin's would-be "Weltverein," which concerned the German reputation abroad. A short time ago, a meeting, of which the secret has been well kept, was convened in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of which Dr. Hamann, the notorious head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, was the originator and at which the Foreign Secretary himself was present. The meeting was attended by members of the leading industrial concerns of this country: the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Allgemeine Electrizitätsgesellschaft, Siemens and Halske, the Schuckert Works, Krupp, the Cruson Works, etc. They formed a private company with the purpose of "furthering the German industrial prestige abroad"—a conveniently vague purpose. The company will be financed by private subscriptions and by a Government grant. The sum at first suggested as a necessary revenue from private subscription was £12,500, but the company present at the first meeting was so enthusiastic that it definitely promised annual subscriptions amounting to £25,000. The Government will add £12,500 per annum—the whole Secret Service Fund, in fact, at the disposal of the Imperial Foreign Office for similar purposes (e.g., for the payment of subsidies to certain papers abroad). The company has entered into an agreement with the Agence Havas that the latter will in future only publish news concerning Germany if supplied through Wolff's Telegraphen-Bureau. The latter will receive its German news exclusively from the new company.

The company intends to make a similar arrangement with Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau for those foreign countries in which Reuter controls telegraphic communications. If Reuter declines, the Deutsche Kabelgesellschaft, a smaller German news agency supplying telegrams from certain countries (e.g., Mexico) and working in agreement with Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau, is to be financed by the new company to run a service in competition to Reuter's. All the concerns represented at the meeting have furthermore agreed to pay into the company's hotchpot the very vast sums which they are accustomed to spend abroad for their advertisements in foreign papers. The total of this item alone is believed to be not less than £25,000 per annum—so the annual sum available for the purpose of the new company will reach a total of £50,000 to £75,000. The company will in future issue the advertisements of its members only to those foreign papers which publish German information originating exclusively from the new company, which is to be regarded as the only authentic source of information concerning Germany and all things German. This information they are to receive free of cost or at a nominal sum—so that the willing foreign papers will derive very material benefits from their collaboration with the company, viz., lucrative advertisements and free matter written in the language of the country in which the papers are published. The foreign Press is to be watched by the company's agents appointed in the various foreign centres. Any incorrect reports are to be telegraphed home and corrected by telegrams issued by the company. The countries in which the system is to be immediately inaugurated are chiefly the South American States and those of the Far East, but the system is to embrace all countries outside Europe. The German cable rates for Press telegrams are to be reduced in the interests of the new company. It is difficult to say whether the evil which the new company is to remedy really exists, or exists to any perceptible extent, but it is certain that a very influential private company has been called into existence with every official encouragement commanding an enormous revenue for the purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda. Whether the evil exists or not—the money will be spent on secret service to popularise Germany abroad. It does not seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of international blackmail—hardly a proper way to reach the desired end.

That a reduction in cable rates was actually in contemplation is seen from the Ambassador's next dispatch on the subject, as follows:

Berlin,
April 3rd, 1914.

Sir,—In my despatch of the 27th February last concerning the secret foundation of a German society to supply the foreign Press of certain countries with news favourable to Germany and German interests, it was foreshadowed that German cable rates for Press telegrams would probably be reduced in the interests of the new society.

I have the honour now to report that, in fact, reduced rates for telegrams to the United States, Canada, Argentine, Chile, Peru, and the German colonies are to come into operation as from April 1st, 1914. These telegrams, which are to be officially known as week-end telegrams, will be admitted at a reduced rate between Saturday midnight and Sunday midnight, to be delivered on Monday or Tuesday respectively. These week-end telegrams must have reached the cable station at Emden before midnight on Saturday, but can be handed in at any telegraph office in the course of the week.

The rates, which in some cases represent a reduction to one-fourth of the usual rates fixed, are:

Negotiations are pending for extending the week-end telegram service to other distant countries.

Telegrams sent to the United States or Canada are sent at the reduced rate only to New York or Montreal respectively; thence they are forwarded either free of charge, by letter, or at the local telegram rates per word by telegram.—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

Within a month this system—for the intrinsic merits of which there is everything to be said—was extended; and Sir E. Goschen wrote to the Foreign Minister:

Berlin,
May 2nd, 1914.

Sir,—With reference to my despatch of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, according to an announcement in the North German Gazette, the system of reduced rates for what are called "week-end telegrams" is to be extended as from the 1st instant to Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, Transvaal, South and North Rhodesia, Nyassaland, British India, Burma, Ceylon, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and Labuan, under the conditions described in my above-mentioned despatch.

The rates are as follows:

—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

Early in June a remarkable article on the subject appeared in a well-known German trade organ, the Deutsche Export Revue, which not only admitted the existence of the scheme, but confirmed the previous statement of the Ambassador, that it was being largely subsidised by the Imperial German Foreign Office. On this point Sir E. Goschen's dispatch and the article he encloses are illuminating:

Berlin,
June 9th, 1914.

Sir,—I had the honour, in my despatch of the 27th February last, to explain a scheme under which a society had been founded with the object of supplying the foreign Press, by telegraph, with information favourable to Germany generally and to German industrial enterprise in particular. I have since transmitted lists of the countries to which, under the name of "week-end telegrams," the cable rates have been very considerably reduced to assist the propaganda of the said society.

I to-day have the honour to forward a translation of a cutting from the Deutsche Export Revue, of the 5th June, 1914, in which the existence of the scheme is, for the first time, as far as I know, admitted in public print.

The Deutsche Export Revue, which is published in Berlin, is a weekly periodical devoted to the interests of the German export trade. It is regarded as well informed, and enjoys a good reputation generally.

The article confirms the various particulars set out in my despatch; it confirms more especially the fact that the Imperial Foreign Office is supporting the scheme with an annual subscription of £12,500 paid out of its secret service fund. It supplies a list of the members of the society, the names of the directors, etc. The last paragraph of the article merits special attention on account of a certain refreshing ingenuousness.

I am informed that the order has gone forth from high official quarters not to reproduce or in any way to refer to this article, as its inadvertent publication is not unnaturally considered extremely inopportune and embarrassing.—I have, etc.,

W.E. Goschen.

The article is as follows:

Our readers will remember that one of the items in the programme of the German Association for World Commerce was the establishment of a news service abroad on generous lines. Whilst the other parts of the Association's programme met with hostile criticism as soon as they became known, the proposed service for the supply of news abroad was greeted with general sympathy, as such activity promised to have a useful effect on our foreign relations. The failure to organise the Association for World Commerce seemed unhappily to render it doubtful whether the organisation of the news service could be realised. It is all the more gratifying that, according to information which has reached us from well-informed quarters, the scheme for a German news service in foreign countries has by no means been abandoned, but that, on the contrary, an extensive organisation is actually doing work in the desired direction.

A German syndicate was very quietly formed a few weeks ago for the purposes of this foreign news service. It uses the organisation of a news agency already in existence; its activity is gradually to be extended over the whole globe. Its main object will be to reply in an appropriate form to the prejudiced news concerning Germany and to the attacks made upon her, and by the judicious publication of newspapers inspiring the necessary articles to spread abroad the knowledge of the true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements.

We are in a position to give the following information concerning the organisation of the enterprise. It is presided over by a directorate, consisting of three men, viz.: Privy Councillor von Borsig, "Landrath" Roetger (retired), and Herr Schacht, a director of the Deutsche Bank.

A special administrative board, the main duty of which it is to make suggestions as to the organisation and the methods of reporting comprises among others: Professor Duisburg, of the dye works, "Bayer"; Herr Hagen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Commercial Councillor Hasenclever, of Remscheid; Herr Hermann Hecht, of Berlin; Director Heineken, of the North German Lloyd; Director Helfferich, of the Deutsche Bank; Director Huldermann, of the Hamburg-America Line; Director Kosegarten, of the "Deutsche Waffen-und-Munitions-Fabrik"; Herr von Langen, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor Rathenau; Director Reuter, of the Maschinen Fabrik, Duisburg; Director Salomonsohn, of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Privy Councillor von Siemens; Herr Edmond Bohler, Hamburg, etc.

The management will be entrusted to two managers, Herr Asch and Dr. Hansen. The former has for years edited several foreign news agencies; the latter is known to the readers of the Deutsche Export Revue through a series of articles dealing with the question of a supply of news covering the whole world.

For the present the enterprise has taken the form of a loose syndicate constituted for three years, which is, later on, to be replaced by a more systematic form of organisation. The annual subscription payable by the firms which are members amounts to a minimum of £50. It is a significant fact that the Imperial Foreign Office has voted a grant of £12,500 towards the expenses of the syndicate, provided the same amount is contributed by German industrial houses. As the subscriptions and the contributions by the latter already exceed the sum of £12,500, the contribution from the Foreign Office funds seems secured. As every firm subscribing a sum of £50 has a vote, or, rather, as for every £50 subscribed the subscriber receives a vote, it may be expected that the Imperial Foreign Office will have a powerful and decisive influence upon the management of the syndicate generally and upon the development of the news service in particular.

We further learn that efforts are now being made to induce the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies to join the syndicate, as these societies embrace pre-eminently merchants and manufacturers interested in the German foreign trade. These societies, it is true, appear to be still divided in their opinion concerning the new enterprise—at least, so far no definite decision has been arrived at.

It is believed that an increasing membership will make it possible to establish a reserve fund out of subscriptions and voluntary contributions received, so that, later on, the interest of the reserve fund may suffice to defray the expenses of the news service. It is also hoped that the foreign Press may eventually be induced to pay for the news supplied. Finally, it is intended to send journalists to the various countries who are there to busy themselves in favour of German interests in the manner indicated above.

The task which the syndicate has set itself is in itself worthy of acknowledgment. But only the future can show whether the task can be accomplished in the manner indicated. We are of opinion that good results could be achieved, and perhaps with greater success, by utilising the German Legations and Consulates abroad, if ample funds for this purpose were placed at the disposal of the official Departments. At the same time, the joint German and Foreign Economic Societies might well, as indeed some of them already do, work quietly for a better appreciation abroad of the state of German industry and of German cultured progress. The intended despatch of journalists we believe, however, in any case to be a mistake, as it would certainly soon become common talk in the editorial offices in the several places abroad that they represent a syndicate officially supported by the German Empire. If such things are intended, it would be better to fall back upon gentlemen who are already in touch with the respective editorial offices, and who could serve German interests without attracting so much attention as would journalists sent out for the purpose.

The reference to Press agencies in Sir E. Goschen's original report brought forth prompt contradictions from those chiefly affected. On September 6th the Press Bureau in London officially issued the following important declaration on behalf of the Foreign Office:

Conclusive evidence produced by the "Agence Havas" has satisfied the Foreign Office that the statement occurring in the recently-published report forwarded by His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, that the "Agence Havas" had agreed in future to publish news concerning Germany only if supplied through "Wolff's Telegraphen Bureau," is not correct.

Such an arrangement appears to have been intended by the German organisation; but it is not one which the "Agence Havas" ever even contemplated.

It is with great satisfaction that the Foreign Office has been enabled to give publicity to this correction.

Messrs. Reuter also disclaimed all connection with the proceedings of the German Government, as will be seen from the following letter which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of September 7th:

To the Editor of "The Daily Telegraph."

Sir,—In consequence of the long connection which the Press Association has had with Reuter's Telegraph Company (Limited), I considered it my duty to at once communicate with Baron de Reuter respecting the White Paper which was published yesterday morning. I asked three questions:

(1) Whether Reuter's Company were aware that proceedings of the kind referred to by Sir Edward Goschen were contemplated by Dr. Hamann, the head of the Press Bureau of the German Foreign Office;

(2) Whether Reuter's Company had been approached either through Wolff's Bureau or in any other way; and

(3) Whether, before the publication of the White Paper, any communication had been made to Reuter's Company by the Foreign Office.

In view of the public interest attaching to this question, it seems desirable that the public at large, as well as the Press, should be placed in possession of the facts of the case. Accordingly, in agreement with Baron de Reuter, I append his reply:

Dear Mr. Robbins,—In reply to your letter of to-day calling my attention to the Parliamentary Paper issued in this morning's papers, concerning the manœuvres of the Berlin Press Bureau and the Kabelgesellschaft, I beg to say that the version put about by the said Press Bureau, and reported by the British Ambassador, does not tally with the facts within my knowledge.

In the first place, the Wolff Bureau looked on the Kabelgesellschaft as a competitor likely to supplant the older agency, because the latter had incurred disfavour with the authorities owing to its inability to induce the "Agence Havas" to publish, more particularly in South America, the news issued by the Press Bureau. So far from Havas agreeing to circulate the news, it was precisely because of the opposition to such a course by the French agency that the Kabelgesellschaft was taken under the special protection of the Berlin Press Bureau and the higher authorities in the background. In proof of this statement I have a letter from the director of the Wolff Bureau stating that the activity of the Kabelgesellschaft was aimed in the first instance at the "Agence Havas."

As for our agency, we have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Kabelgesellschaft, still less has any proposal in their name, or on their behalf, ever been submitted for our consideration. The fact, however, that for many months—I may even say years—past the German Press, at the bidding and under the inspiration of the political wirepullers, circulated unblushing falsehoods and calumnies about our agency, presumably to weaken its prestige in the contemplated competition, points to their intelligent anticipation of the refusal which any overtures from their side would have met with from us.

Finally, permit me to add that we had no knowledge of the intended publication of this Parliamentary paper.—Yours faithfully,

(Signed) Herbert de Reuter.

Yours faithfully,

E. Robbins, Manager.
Press Association (Ltd.), 14, New Bridge Street,
London, E.C., Sept. 5th.

What the German Press is really capable of when adequately inspired may be seen from a comparison of the semi-official organs the German Government published on Monday, August 31st, in places so far apart as Hamburg, Frankfurt-on-Main, and Wiesbaden. In these papers, and in identical phraseology, appeared the "report" of a speech alleged to have been delivered by Mr. John Burns in the Albert Hall, London, on August 14th. It will be remembered that Mr. Burns, with Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, withdrew from the Government early in the month, and the fabricated speech was officially given out in Germany as Mr. Burns's own explanation of his reasons for resigning. Even in its translated form the speech is remarkable in its way as showing that it must have in the first place been written by someone who was very familiar with the oratorical style of the right honourable gentleman; and attempts were made here and there to imitate Mr. Burns's occasional tendency to lapse into epigram and vigorous short sentences. For example, the phrase: "I will give it as my firm opinion that England's greatness shows itself in time of peace; her weakness in time of war," is certainly delivered in Mr. Burns's best vein, however greatly the sentiment may differ from his ideas. There would, of course, be no point in quoting from this speech, which, as was quite obvious when the English translation made its appearance, had never been delivered; but one passage should be given as an example of German thoroughness: "We destroyed Napoleon's fleet at Trafalgar; a few days later Napoleon gained his most glorious (sic) victory at Austerlitz and brought Europe to her knees. Of what use was our overthrow of Napoleon at sea compared with his unexampled successes on land? We merely pricked him with a pin—he overthrew Europe untroubled by our victories."

The argument here, it will be noticed, is exceedingly plausible; and the attributing of such an idea to Mr. Burns might almost appear to be convincing to Germans and Austrians who knew little of his eight years' record as an administrator and a great deal about his record as a Labour leader. Once again, too, there is an attempt at Mr. Burns's vigorous style. The full "speech" was reported in the English Press on September 7th, and was, of course, immediately repudiated on being shown to Mr. Burns.

If the German Press, however, can be used occasionally for reporting things that people did not say, it can be used with equal facility for suppressing important statements actually made. For example, a Reuter telegram from Copenhagen on September 7th quoted a statement taken from the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and published at Copenhagen by the German semi-official news agency. This statement dealt with Sir Edward Grey's declaration regarding his conversations with Prince Lichnowsky, the former German Ambassador to Great Britain, made in the House of Commons on August 28th:

The Norddeutsche says: "According to reports received here Sir E. Grey recently declared in the House of Commons that the correspondence exchanged between Great Britain and Germany before the war, as published by the German Government, was incomplete, that Prince Lichnowsky had withdrawn his report on the well-known telephone conversation by a telegram sent immediately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed, and that this telegram was not published. The Times, probably on this basis of official information, made the same assertion, and added the comment that the telegram was suppressed by the German Government in order to enable it to accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. We declare in answer to this that no such telegram is in existence beyond the telegram already made public.

"Prince Lichnowsky sent only the following telegrams:

(Sent at 1.15 p.m. on August 1st.)

"'Sir E. Grey's private secretary has just been here to inform me that the Minister desires to make me proposals concerning England's neutrality, even in case we have to go to war with France and Russia. I shall see Sir E. Grey this afternoon.'

II.

(Sent at 5.30 on the same afternoon.)

"'Sir E. Grey has just submitted the following declaration, which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet: "The German Government's answer respecting Belgium's neutrality is unusually regrettable, since the neutrality of Belgium is a matter affecting the feelings of this country. If Germany could see her way to give a similar positive answer to that which has been given by France it would contribute greatly to relieve the anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public temper if Belgium's neutrality should be disregarded by one of the belligerents while the other respected it."

"'To my question whether on condition that we respected Belgian neutrality he could give a definite declaration concerning Great Britain's neutrality, the Minister replied that this was not possible, but this question would play a big rôle in the present temper of the people. If we disregarded Belgium's neutrality in a war with France a revulsion of sentiment would certainly set in, which would render it difficult to maintain friendly neutrality. For the present there was no intention of proceeding to hostilities against us. It was desired to avoid this if it were in any way possible. It was, however, difficult to draw the line marking how far we might go, before there would be intervention from here. He (Sir E. Grey) kept adverting to Belgian neutrality, and said this question would play a great rôle. He had considered whether, in case of a Russian war, we and France might not simply remain armed against each other without either one attacking.

"'I asked him whether he was in a position to declare that France would enter into a pact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor acquire portions of her territory, I believed we could enter into such an agreement which would assure us Great Britain's neutrality.

"'The Minister said he would go into the matter. He did not overlook the difficulties of restraining the military element on both sides to inactivity.'

III.

(Sent at 8.30 p.m.)

"'My opinion of early to-day is altered. Since no positive English proposal whatever is at hand, further steps along the lines of my instructions are useless.'"

The Norddeutsche comments: "As will be observed, these telegrams contain no intimation that there had been any misunderstanding, and nothing touching on the English allegations concerning a clearing-up of any alleged misunderstandings."

The above statement, added the Agency, does not meet the specific statement of Sir Edward Grey in the Commons, which was as follows:

It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible I was sure we could not secure it. It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently the Ambassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that, as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first telegram has been published; this second telegram does not seem to have been published.

This system of spreading false news was extended to the United States, and its effect there will be duly dealt with in this volume. It should be added here that a German Press Bureau was also set up at The Hague, partly in order to influence the people of Holland, and partly that German-Americans passing through Holland on their way back to America might be suitably informed. One of the special correspondents at The Hague wrote:

The bureau apparently is to be run on a most elaborate scale by very clever men. To counter this the British Consul-General has been issuing bulletins, but for such services the amount of money available in a British department is small, whereas German ventures for supplying "truths" have always limitless resources. To show how dangerous the German Press campaign in Holland already is I may mention that the German Consulate in Rotterdam has posted up throughout the town the audacious statement that "notwithstanding all reports to the contrary, it is hereby officially and openly declared that thousands of dum-dum bullets have been found on the British and French prisoners. The denials of the British Government are in contradiction to the statements of their officers, who have declared upon their word of honour that such ammunition was also issued for their revolvers." It is suggested that the names of the officers should have been demanded, but it is felt that if the British authorities here did so the Germans would not have hesitated to name several distinguished prisoners, and they would have had no chance of refuting the charge until the end of the war.

This alone shows how cleverly Germany seeks to poison the minds especially of Holland and America. The danger will increase when the Press Bureau opens. The Dutch Government, I am assured, has striven and is striving to be absolutely correct in its attitude towards England and Germany.

There may have been cases in which Belgians, driven mad by their sufferings, have been guilty of outrages, but the German charge as a whole is absolutely untrue. On the other hand, the Belgian Government at Antwerp has, I am assured, convincing proof that the German troops have been guilty of every crime and brutality.

Belgians of the highest rank who recently visited The Hague describe the spirit of Antwerp as splendid. The Belgian Prime Minister is proving himself a second Kitchener. He holds undisputed sway, and is absolutely trusted by everyone.

The same correspondent added that it would be impracticable to try to starve Germany out by blockading the Dutch Coast, as hardly any foodstuffs were being sent to Germany through Holland.

The campaign of mendacity organised by Germans in the United States was also carried into Canada. The Montreal Star stated that on August 20th a well-known Montreal lawyer received a letter from a prominent German resident of New York in which was given as an authenticated fact, which the British censors had suppressed, the story of the sinking of seven British Dreadnoughts by German torpedo-boats. A banker was assured by a German acquaintance in New York that Germany had officially announced the destruction of an English seaport—name not given—by bombs from a Zeppelin. Another lawyer was asked confidentially to suggest the best means of getting this "news" from German sources to the Montreal public.

A Montreal citizen sent to the Canadian Gazette the following paragraph from the New Yorker Staats Zeitung, as circulated in Canada:

New York, August 18th.—We have very favourable news from private letters concerning the Zeppelin airships. The question has often been asked: "Where are the Zeppelins, and what are they doing?" The following information received in a private letter speaks for itself:

"Every night the Zeppelin airships go out to the North Sea, and when they return there is an English battleship destroyed. Nineteen English battleships have been destroyed so far."

[CHAPTER III]

Position of Italy—German Intrigues—the Triple Alliance—Turkey's Activity—Plans for Attacking Egypt—A British Warning.

The war had hardly begun before Italy officially announced her intention of remaining neutral. From German sources rumours were circulated to the effect that dissension had arisen in the Italian Cabinet between Signor Salandra (the Prime Minister) and the Marchese di San Giuliano (the Foreign Minister). These rumours, however, proved to be unfounded, and certainly the Italian Government presented not only a correct attitude but a united front both to the Triple Entente and to her partners in the Triple Alliance. It may be briefly mentioned why Italy, although nominally one of the members of the Triplice—Germany, Austria and Italy—should nevertheless have chosen to remain inactive while her nominal allies were engaged in fighting Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, and Montenegro.

After her defeat by Germany in 1870, France found herself for a long time unable to exercise any great influence over European politics. Indeed, the first administrators of the Third Republic were encouraged, or rather compelled, by Bismarck to seek an outlet for their superfluous energies in other parts of the world; and it is from the conclusion of the Franco-German War that we may date the real beginning of the French colonial empire. The remarkable success of the French efforts in Algiers, Tunis, and other parts of Northern and Central Africa aroused the jealousy of the Germans very early in the present century; but two decades previously Italy had become exasperated by the French invasion and absorption of Tunis, which gave to France not merely a very strong position in the Mediterranean but the use of many safe harbours.

Eager to seize the advantage of having a powerful ally in the Mediterranean, Germany and Austria, who had just previously entered into a dual alliance, made overtures to Italy, and the dual became a Triple Alliance in 1883. The measure was merely a political one. It benefited none of the parties to it economically; and Italy, by invading Tripoli in 1911, withdrew from it by that very act. It was, of course, obvious that such a step on the part of Italy rendered her in some measure dependent upon the French goodwill. Apart from this fact, the alliance had never been popular among the Italian people, who had no very great affection for Germans and intensely disliked Austrians. Memories of the Austrian onslaught of 1866 were still very strong when the alliance was formed; and they are almost as strong to-day. There is still a powerful political group in Italy known as the Irredentists; and it may be said that at a time of political crisis, especially when Austria and Germany are involved, the whole nation becomes irredentist. The party takes its name from those fairly considerable sections of what was once Italian territory and where Italian is still spoken, but which are now in the possession of other Powers. These territories, known as Italia Irredenta ("Unredeemed Italy") include the Southern Tyrol (the "Trentino") Görz, Trieste, Istria, and Dalmatia; and also the Swiss Canton of Tessin (Ticino), Nice, Corsica and Malta.

The Italian expedition to Tripoli in 1911 caused intense dissatisfaction, which was but ill-concealed, in Germany and Austria. Both the Teutonic countries in the partnership objected to their nominal ally increasing her power in the Mediterranean—Germany because such an action would "lock up" many thousands of Italian troops in Tripoli who might be wanted elsewhere, and Austria because she feared that such a movement might indicate a desire on the part of the Italian people to expand in yet other directions. Although some of the so-called Italia Irredenta is held by England and some by France, the animosity of the Irredentists, as of the Italian nation as a whole, is directed exclusively against Austria, and in recent years cordial relations have sprung up between Italy and France. Between Italy and England, of course, relations have always been friendly, and not least so since the days of Garibaldi. The enthusiastic demonstrations held by the Italians in London and Paris after the declaration of war to show their sympathy with the Allies was a striking manifestation of the trend of Italian feeling generally.

Further, there were at least two other reasons why Italy showed no willingness to help her partners in the war. When the Italian army was taking possession of Tripoli coast line under the protection of the Italian fleet, the Austrian Government, under various pretexts, concentrated large masses of troops in the direction of the Italian frontier. Nothing came of this move, but it caused great resentment in Italy at the time. Again, when the first Balkan War came to an end, an acute European crisis arose over the possession of Albania. In this westernmost possession of Turkey, Austrian and Italian interests predominated, and Russia's attempt to secure a pathway to the sea for Servia were ineffectual. After much argument it was finally resolved that Albania should be proclaimed an independent state, and after a long search a Teutonic nobleman, the Prince of Wied, was found willing to assume the crown.

As is well known, Albania from the very first was in a turbulent condition, and various causes rendered the tenure of the Prince of Wied's kingship highly uncertain. In the first place, the century-old jealousy among the ruling chiefs made it difficult to form a cabinet on the western model; and in the second place the Greeks felt that they had a right to the Epirus—that province of uncertain boundaries lying to the north of Greece and to the south of Albania and inhabited by people of an unmistakable Greek stamp known as the Epirotes. As soon as the independence of Albania was announced, the Epirotes, under one of their best known public men, M. Zographos, rose in revolt, and for several months carried on an intermittent warfare against the newly constituted Albanian Government.

It was openly asserted in the Austrian Press that the Epirotes were being aided by Greece, who wished to recover the province; but there was another group who held that the insurgents were deriving their assistance from Italy, who wished by this means to destroy the authority of the Austrians in the northern part of Albania. Italian interests in Albania, as had always been emphasised, converged on the important harbour known as Vallona Bay, which lies almost directly opposite Brindisi. After the outbreak of the present war, this group strongly urged that Italy was merely holding back for the time being in order that she might at a subsequent date make a raid on this part of Albania and annex the territory she desired. The importance of Vallona Bay will be shown by a glance at the map. Austria's only exit to the open sea lies through the Straits of Otranto, which are about forty-five miles wide at the narrowest points, viz: Otranto on the Italian side and Cape Glossa at the mouth of Vallona Bay on the opposite side. It is obvious that if Italy had both these points strongly fortified, it would be practically impossible for an Austrian fleet to pass through.

Whatever Italy's ultimate designs may be—and they are not clear at the time of writing—the fact remains that down to the middle of September, she had taken no steps in the direction of swerving from the neutrality which she had proclaimed at the beginning of the war.

Throughout August various hints were given as to what Italy might lose by not joining her Allies and what she might gain if she did join them. It soon became evident, however, even to the German Press, that Italy, whatever she did, would certainly not come into the firing line with Germany and Austria; and from about the middle of August onwards the inspired German Press confined itself to expressing the hope that their partner's Government would not at least join the other side. On August 14th, for example, the Vossische Zeitung said: "After several years of alliance the very minimum that Germany can demand from Italy is a neutrality, not half-hearted, but having Germany's real welfare in view." This was the tone adopted by the other semi-official organs of the Government about this time.

This change of tone in the German Press, which at first seemed to take it for granted that Italy would join her Allies enthusiastically, must have been due either to forgetfulness or to an entire misconception of the Italian nation. If, to take an inconceivable hypothesis, the Italian Government had wished to go to war on behalf of Germany against the wishes of the Italian people, and if, further, Italy, like Germany, had been composed of a powerful ruling caste and a well-drilled population, no doubt the Italian army would have invaded France. Unlike Germany, however, Italy is composed of peoples whose nature are of a more independent character, and whose form of government is entirely different.

As soon as war broke out, it was clear that the sympathies of the Italian people were wholly on the side of England, France, and Russia, and that it was the wish of the people, if it became necessary to draw the sword, to wield it in such a way as to recover Italia Irredenta, which happened to be under Austrian rule.

It should be remarked that Italy's obligations under her treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria did not compel her to take part in any war unless the war were a purely defensive one; and the Government at Rome made it clear from the first that it regarded the action of Austria towards Servia, and the action of Germany towards France and Belgium, as aggressive.

In spite of reiterated assurances of neutrality, it was persistently rumoured, particularly in Paris, that Italy would declare war on Austria at almost any moment. Although no general mobilisation order was issued at Rome, it was understood that several classes of reservists had been called up. It was indeed felt that any action which Italy might take ought to be taken soon. Well-known military and naval experts, such as Admiral Mahan, expressed the view that Italy "would do well to make her strength felt early."

On August 29th an incident was reported which seemed to show that the decisive step might come at any time. On the previous day information was received at Malta to the effect that Herr von Bitzow, who had been acting as German Consul at Tripoli, had been carrying on an anti-Italian propaganda among the natives; and it was even alleged that he had issued a secret manifesto urging them to make demonstrations. The Italian Government, with more than its usual promptitude, had the offending Consul arrested and removed to Italy, at the same time lodging a protest with the German Foreign Office. No more was heard of this incident at the time; but, as may easily be imagined if it had occurred at any other juncture it would have brought about an acute crisis within the radius of the Triple Alliance.

How the situation was developed was made clear from a long statement sent to London, by a circuitous route, by the Rome correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, and published on September 5th. He said that the Italian fleet was fully mobilised, and was ready for all eventualities. The battle fleet was concentrated at Taranto, under the able and energetic command of the Duke of the Abruzzi. No decree had been issued for the complete mobilisation of the army; but six classes of reservists had been called out. The calling out of fifteen classes would be tantamount to a general mobilisation. Very careful and very thorough preparations were being made. Troops were being slowly and methodically concentrated on the Austrian frontier. Those stationed on the French frontier, except the ordinary peace garrisons and depôt troops, had already been transferred. Any idea of Italy acting against France was out of the question; but these preparations did not necessarily mean war with Austria.

The Italian Government, clearly enough, was fully alive to the situation. Italy wished to bide her time till the psychological moment arrived. That moment had not yet arrived. In any case, the Government was anxious not to precipitate events until after the Conclave electing the new Pope had finished its labours.

All sailings of the Veloce transatlantic liners were suspended at this time. This was regarded as significant, as transports would not be needed unless Italy were contemplating landing troops either in Albania or on Austrian soil.

The correspondent added:

If Italy goes to war with Austria it will be a popular war. The Government knows well that if Germany and Austria win they will bear as great a grudge against Italy for remaining neutral as they would if she threw in her lot against them. It is most important, therefore, that Italy should see to it that Germany and Austria do not win. If, on the other hand, the Triple Entente and their allies win, all Italy can hope for on the conclusion of hostilities is the cession of Trent and the protectorate of Central Albania, with Valona as a reward for her neutrality. Whereas if Italy threw in her lot against Germany and Austria she could hope to recover Trieste and to establish a sound military reputation into the bargain. Moreover, if Italy remains neutral she is likely to experience before long grave economic and social unrest. Italy is very hardly hit by the war. There is a great deal of unemployment. All this would be forgotten if she went to war; and although the problems would recur after the peace, there is much to be said for putting off the evil hour till after the new settlement.

All these facts point to the conclusion that Italy will eventually go to war with Austria. But the moment has not arrived yet. She will have no difficulty in finding a pretext. She may find one in Albania, or in the treatment of Italians in Trieste. The Government may plead the irresistible pressure of public opinion. There is no need for Italy to feel any shame at turning against her old allies, as there is no disguising the fact that she had remained a member of the Triple Alliance for purely time-serving purposes. When she does act, she will act with vigour.

The Marchese di San Giuliano has been for some time in very poor health. He is better again now, and is back in Rome. Among a certain section of the public and of the Press he has been called upon to resign. A more decisive and clearer policy is demanded. But, as a matter of fact, he is likely to remain at his post, as it is felt that there is no man able to fill it of his experience and capacity. The country as a whole has confidence in him. The same may be said of the Prime Minister, Signor Salandra. Since he has been at the head of affairs he has made something of a reputation, and he is known to be a sound economist. The financial position of Italy is not rosy, but there is every reason to hope that the critical period through which she is now passing will be successfully negotiated. Her entry into the war would not materially augment her difficulties on this score.