Jas. Braidwood

FIRE PREVENTION

AND

FIRE EXTINCTION.

BY

JAMES BRAIDWOOD,

FIRST SUPERINTENDENT OF THE LONDON FIRE-BRIGADE, AND ASSOCIATE OF
THE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ENGINEERS.
INCLUDING
FIRE-PROOF STRUCTURES, FIRE-PROOF SAFES, PUBLIC FIRE BRIGADES, PRIVATE
MEANS FOR SUPPRESSING FIRES, FIRE-ENGINES, FIRE ANNIHILATORS,
PORTABLE FIRE-ESCAPES, WATER SUPPLY

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, MEMOIR, AND PORTRAIT OF THE AUTHOR.

LONDON:
BELL AND DALDY, 186, FLEET STREET.
1866.

[The right of Translation is reserved.]

CONTENTS.

ILLUSTRATIONS.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

The appearance at the beginning of last year, in the Annual Report of the Institution of Civil Engineers for 1861 and 1862, of a short memoir of Mr. Braidwood, suggested the publication of a more extended account of the life of the late head of the London Fire Brigade, combined with his opinions upon the subject of his profession.

These opinions are comprised in a work on "Fire Engines, and the Training of Firemen," published in Edinburgh in 1830; two papers upon cognate subjects read before the Institution of Civil Engineers, two similar papers read before the Society of Arts, and in a variety of reports upon public buildings, warehouses, &c. While regretting the great loss that the public has sustained, in being deprived by Mr. Braidwood's sudden death of a complete record of his long and varied London experience, it has been considered advisable to republish the above materials arranged in a systematic form, omitting only such parts as the Author's more matured experience rendered desirable, but confining the whole to his own words.

London,

June, 1866.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

To his work "On the Construction of Fire-Engines and Apparatus; the Training of Firemen; and the Method of Proceeding in cases of Fire," published in Edinburgh, in 1830.

Not having been able to find any work on Fire-Engines in the English language, I have been led to publish the following remarks, in the hope of inducing others to give further information on the subject.

For the style of the work I make no apology; and as I presume no one will read it except for the purpose of gaining information, my aim will be obtained if I shall have succeeded in imparting it, or in directing the public attention to the advantage which may be derived from the systematic training of Firemen.

MEMOIR

OF

JAMES BRAIDWOOD.

The history of mankind, from the earliest times, has been one of alternate peace and war with fire. The immeasurable value of its obedience, and the fearful consequences of its insubordination, have, in all ages, made its due subjection one of the most important conditions of even human existence itself. As camps and trading stations grew into populous cities, the dangers of fire were both multiplied and aggravated. Its ravages in the ancient capitals of the world are matters of history; and it is established that something like organization was extended to the means then employed for suppressing conflagrations. Even the fire-engine itself, in a practicable, although imperfect form, was described and illustrated by a sectional working drawing, by Hero of Alexandria, in a book written by him more than one hundred years before the Christian era. In its many translations, from the original Greek into Latin and into modern tongues, Hero's book, with its remarkable series of drawings, still occupies a place in the mechanical literature of our own time. But, although the construction of the fire-engine was thus known two thousand years ago, we have no actual evidence of its use until within the last two centuries; and within the whole compass of English history, at least, we know that nothing like discipline and organization, in the modern sense of the terms, were introduced into the management of fire apparatus until a time quite within the recollection of the middle-aged men of our own day. If there be anything apparently improbable in this fact, we need only recollect that many of the grandest triumphs of human genius, with which we are already so familiar, are not yet forty years old. The modern system of English fire brigades belongs wholly to the period of railways, steam navigation, and electric telegraphs, and it owes nearly all to the genius and disciplined heroism of a single individual, James Braidwood, who, but little more than four years ago, fell—as nobly for himself as sadly for others—at his chosen post of duty. What, when he first gave his energies—indeed, his whole heart to it, was but the rough and unskilful employment of the fireman, became under Mr. Braidwood's command and his infusing spirit of order and intelligence, as distinguished from reckless daring, a noble pursuit, almost rising in dignity to a profession, and indeed acknowledged as such by many, and significantly, although indirectly, by Royalty itself.

Until the year 1833, not only the parish engines of the metropolis, numbering, as they did, about three hundred, but the engines also of the Fire Insurance Companies, were comparatively inefficient and often out of order, while they were also under the most diverse, if not irresponsible management. There were no really trained firemen, and those who controlled and worked the engines were oftener in antagonism with each other than acting in concert. The parish engines were in the care of the beadles, and in one case a beadle's widow, Mrs. Smith, for some years commanded one of the city engines. The energies of each band of firemen were commonly reserved for the protection of property only in which their own insurance company or parish was immediately interested. As a rule, whatever water was thrown upon a burning building was dashed against the walls, windows, and roof from the outside only, very little if any really reaching the actual seat of the fire within. As a consequence, fires, which are now quickly "got under," were then left to burn themselves out, the spreading of the fire being prevented either by deluging the contiguous buildings with water, or by pulling them down altogether.

James Braidwood was born in Edinburgh in the year 1800. His father was a well-known upholsterer and builder, who appears to have chosen for his son the profession of a surveyor. To this end he was entered at the High School, then under the rectorship of Mr. (afterwards Professor) Pillans, and here, and subsequently under private masters, the youth received a sound education in the branches most appropriate to his intended pursuit in life. He was for some time engaged in his father's business, and thereby gained an amount of practical knowledge, which was of, perhaps, as much service to him in his subsequent career as a fireman, as it would have been had he adopted the profession originally chosen for him. Young Braidwood was an apt student, a fact, perhaps, sufficiently attested afterwards by his successful authorship, at the age of thirty, of the only English work then extant upon the fire-engine and its proper management. He read much, wrote well, was a good draughtsman, and had a sound knowledge of mechanics. But whether his powers required wider scope than a surveyor's practice could offer, or whether, more than forty years ago, and in Edinburgh, the chances of professional success were very much less than now, James Braidwood soon turned his mind to what became the great work of his life. He was becoming known for activity and a high order of personal courage, and there were those in place and power who saw in him the other elements of character which go to make a successful leader of men. He was soon, and when but twenty-three years of age, made the superintendent of the Edinburgh fire engines, and he almost as soon began to reform their inefficient and vicious system of management. He had held his post but three weeks, however, when the series of fires broke forth which still bear the name of the Great Fire of Edinburgh. Many of the old and lofty houses in the High Street were destroyed, between four and five hundred families were made houseless, ten persons were either killed outright or fatally injured, and for several days nearly the whole of the High Street, if not the larger part of the old town, was threatened with destruction. Never were the consequences of want of organization more conspicuous. There was no real command, for there were none to obey; and while those who might have stopped the flames at the outset, wasted their own energies in random efforts, or, perhaps, fell to quarrelling among themselves, the fearful devastation rolled on. The occasion was sufficient to induce the authorities and insurance companies to listen to and profit by Mr. Braidwood's recommendations. They consented to bear in common the expenses necessary to organize and maintain an efficient brigade. This was soon formed of picked men, who, although daily engaged in their former ordinary occupations, were regularly inspected, trained, and exercised early in one morning of every week. Fires were becoming more and more numerous year by year; but the influence of the improved system was soon felt. The men were taught to improve to the utmost the first few minutes after an alarm was given, and by constant emulation and discipline, a spirit of wonderful readiness was cultivated in them. They were trained to seek out and follow up the source of a fire before it had had time to spread, and to throw the water from the engines directly upon it, instead of wastefully, if not injuriously about. The result was, that while out of forty-eight fires which happened in the first year of the history of the brigade, eleven proved total losses, and twelve "considerable" losses, the number of total losses decreased rapidly, year by year, while the whole number of "calls" was almost as rapidly increasing. Thus in the second year of the brigade there were eighty "calls," of which seven were total, and eighteen considerable losses. In the next three years, with from ninety-four to one hundred and ninety-four "calls" yearly, there was but one total loss in each year, and but from nine to eighteen "considerable" losses.

Mr. Braidwood was meanwhile improving the fire-escapes, and when new engines were added to the force, he procured better workmanship. By his personal influence, also, more than by the mere advantage of official position, Mr. Braidwood secured the constant co-operation of the police in giving the earliest alarms of fire, and in facilitating the labours of the firemen when actually on duty. As has just been shown, the results of method, applied skill, and of a personal devotion cultivated under the high impulse of immediate public observation and approval, were soon manifest. To this vast improvement the Edinburgh Mercury, as representing the opinion of the citizens of the Scottish capital, bore public testimony in its issue of August 14, 1828, when the Fire Brigade of that city had been tested by nearly five years of constant trial, and with conspicuous success. Referring to the excellent organization of the establishment, it was remarked that there were then but few, if any, serious fires in Edinburgh, for when a fire broke out—and the alarms were as frequent as ever—it was speedily checked. Said the writer:—

"Not only is the apparatus constructed on the best possible principles, but the whole system of operations has been changed. The public, however, do not see the same bustle, or hear the same noise as formerly; and hence they seem erroneously to conclude that there is nothing done. The fact is, the spectator sees the preparation for action made, but he sees no more. Where the strength of the men and the supply of water used to be wasted, by being thrown against windows, walls, and roofs, the firemen now seek out the spot where the danger lies, and creeping on hands and feet into a chamber full of flame, or smoke, often at the hazard of suffocation, discover the exact seat of danger; and, by bringing the water in contact with it, obtain immediate mastery over the powerful element with which they have to contend. In this daring and dangerous work men have occasionally fainted from heat, or dropped down from want of respiration, in which cases the next person at hand is always ready to assist his companion, and to release him from his service of danger."

In a fire which happened while Mr. Braidwood was at the head of the Edinburgh Brigade, he won great admiration by bringing out from the burning building a quantity of gunpowder which was known to be stored there. He would not ask any of his men to undertake this dangerous feat, but, amidst the breathless suspense of thousands of spectators, he coolly searched for and safely carried out, first one, and then a second, cask of this explosive material. Had the fire reached the powder, it was known that the worst consequences of the conflagration would have been immensely increased.

The fame of the Edinburgh Brigade rapidly spread throughout the kingdom, and it gradually became regarded as a model to which all other organizations for the suppression of fires would ultimately be made to conform. As a response to constant inquiries from a distance, Mr. Braidwood, in 1829, forwarded to the Society of Arts, London, a description of his chain-ladder fire-escape. For this invaluable apparatus, which had already effected a considerable saving of life, the Society's Silver Medal was awarded, and, accompanying the award, the Council of the Society extended an invitation to the author to "give a complete account of his mode of drilling firemen, and combining the use of fire-escapes with the ordinary fire-engine service." Responding to this invitation, Mr. Braidwood in the following year published his work "On the Construction of Fire-Engines and Apparatus, the Training of Firemen, and the Method of Proceeding in Cases of Fire." From this work, which may still be regarded as an authority, extensive extracts have been made in the subsequent chapters of the present volume, and it need not, therefore, be further referred to here than to say that it formed a thoroughly original account of an original system, and that its illustrations, which were especially clear, were drawn by the author's own hand. This work attracted much attention from municipal bodies and insurance companies throughout the kingdom, and more than one official deputation visited Edinburgh to learn from Mr. Braidwood himself the details of a system which was already working such important results. In London, especially, three West India warehouses had been burnt in the year 1829, with a loss of 300,000l.; and with the extending use of gas, the increasing frequency of fires, and the conspicuous inefficiency of the parish engines, and the want of unity of action among the insurance companies, it was felt that what had answered so well in Edinburgh would prove still more valuable in the metropolis. The general estimation in which Mr. Braidwood's services were then held may be considered as expressed in the following, among other contemporary reviews of his book:—

"The Edinburgh Fire-engine Establishment is now all but perfect. A unity of system has been accomplished, and a corps of firemen mustered, who, in point of physical vigour and moral intrepidity, are all entitled to be denominated chosen men. At the head of this band stands Mr. Braidwood, an individual who has on several occasions given abundant evidence of promptitude in extremity, and a noble contempt of personal danger, and whose enthusiasm, in what we may call his profession, could not have been more strikingly exemplified than by his illustrating it in the manner we now see before us. It is the only book we are acquainted with that treats of the systematic training of firemen; and from the perspicuity of its details, it must necessarily become the manual of all such institutions, and ought to find a place in every insurance office in the United Kingdom."

It had been from time to time attempted to bring the fire apparatus of the London Insurance Companies under a single management; but it was nearly ten years after the establishment of the Edinburgh Fire Brigade, and only when Mr. Braidwood himself had been invited to come to London, that this was at last effected. As for the parish engines, they were wholly neglected under this arrangement, and, indeed, a great number of them had been already allowed to fall into disuse, as far as could be permitted without incurring the penalties of the Statutes of 1774. On the 1st January, 1833, at the instance of Mr. Ford, of the Sun Fire-office, eight of the insurance companies formed an association of fire-engines and firemen, each company withholding its own distinctive name and badges from the united force. This was known as the London Fire-engine Establishment. It was supported by the companies in common, each in proportion to the premiums received from its business in London, a minimum rate being fixed. Each company contributing to the support of the establishment nominated one member of the committee of management. This association existed for thirty-three years, when on the 1st of January, 1866, the Metropolitan Board of Works took charge of the fire-engines and the general fire establishment of the metropolis. Mr. Braidwood took the command of the London Brigade thus formed at the onset. The Edinburgh Fire-engine Committee, on accepting his resignation, presented him with a gold watch, and a vote of thanks, "for the singularly indefatigable manner in which he had discharged the duties of his important office, not merely by his extraordinary exertions on occasions of emergency, but for the care and attention he had bestowed on the training of the firemen, whereby the establishment had been brought to its present high state of efficiency." He had previously received from the men under him a handsome silver cup, bearing the following inscription:—"Presented to Mr. James Braidwood, by the City of Edinburgh Firemen, as a token of their admiration of him as their leader, and of deep respect for him as a gentleman."

As in Edinburgh, the London Fire Brigade under Mr. Braidwood's superintendence became a new force, and in every respect a remarkable organization. Where the inefficiency of the old firemen could not at once be made to yield to discipline, they were pensioned off; and within a short time a select band of active, hardy, and thoroughly trained men was formed. In 1834, the second year of Mr. Braidwood's superintendence, the Houses of Parliament were burnt; and a most destructive fire occurred also at Mile-end. The first-named fire created general consternation, and there are many persons who can still recollect that also at Mile-end. These great fires stimulated Mr. Braidwood to increased exertions, and the result was soon visible in the lessened proportion of totally destroyed premises to the whole number of fires. The brigade had, of course, no power of prevention, and alarms of fire were becoming more numerous than ever. The use of friction matches and of gas was increasing enormously; manufactures, and the steam-engines and machinery for conducting them, were being rapidly multiplied; and with the vast progress making in the production of cotton goods, the use of cotton curtains and bed-furniture was becoming common in dwellings forming a large proportion of the metropolis, but in which, not long before, such articles were either regarded as luxuries or were altogether unknown. The total number of fires attended by the brigade in the year 1833, exclusive of chimneys on fire, was 458, while in 1851 the number had risen to 928; and although London had been growing all this time, it had not doubled in size to correspond with the increased number of fires. But while the total yearly number of fires, since the formation of the brigade, has shown a large and hardly interrupted increase, the number of cases of total destruction has almost as steadily diminished. Thus, "totally destroyed" was reported of 31 fires in the year 1833, whereas in 1839 there were but 17 cases, and the average for twenty-one years, from 1833 to 1853 inclusive, was but 25-1/2 yearly, while at the present time, with all the vast growth of London, the average, under the continuance of Mr. Braidwood's system, is hardly if at all greater.

Mr. Braidwood from the first exhibited excellent judgment in his choice of men to serve under him. He chose sailors, as a rule, as being accustomed to obedience, and to irregular and prolonged duty, while also they were especially hardy and active; and where there was especial danger which must be met, he was always ready to lead, and his men had soon learned to confide in his quick and sound judgment in emergency, knowing that he would never permit them to incur needless risk. His own iron constitution, and his habits of constant vigilance, served as a high standard and incentive to those about him; and thus it was, by selection, discipline, and example, resting upon a foundation of even paternal kindness, that the men of the London Fire Brigade became conspicuous for their courage, energy, hardihood, and unalterable devotion to duty. The brigade, too, was most popular with the public, and could always count upon any necessary assistance in their labours. The system of rewards given to whoever was the first to bring a call of fire, the liberal gratuity to the policeman who first reached the burning premises, there preventing undue confusion, and by keeping the street-door closed, shutting off a strong draught of air from the flames, and the handsome pay to the ready throng of strong-armed men who worked the engines, secured every co-operation from the public, beyond that naturally springing from a general admiration of so brave and well-trained a body of men.

Mr. Braidwood's residence was at the principal station of the Fire-engine Establishment in Watling-street. To this station came all alarms of fire. He attended in person all calls from leading thoroughfares, public buildings, or localities where a serious conflagration might be expected. In the night a call was announced to him through a speaking-tube reaching to his bedside. The gas in his room was always burning, and he would quickly decide, from the known locality of the fire, and from the report given, whether he need go himself. In any case, his men were awake and quickly away. Rapidity in dressing, and in horseing and mounting the engines, was but a detail of daily drill. The moment the scene of action was reached, nothing was allowed to stand in the way of access to the actual seat of the fire, and nothing either in securing a supply of water. The inmates of the premises, if any, were quickly got out, and wherever an unhappy creature was cut off by the flames, there were always one or more firemen ready, if necessary, to brave an apparently certain death in a heroic attempt at rescue—an attempt, indeed, which but seldom failed. It is but just to say here that the firemen were always nobly seconded, if not indeed anticipated, in these attempts by the officers and men of the Royal Society for the Protection of Life from Fire—a body which has long rendered priceless services to humanity under most appalling circumstances. The men of the Fire Brigade were taught to prevent, as much as possible, the access of air to the burning materials. What the open door of the ash pit is to the furnace of a steam-boiler the open street door is to the house on fire. In both cases the door gives vital air to the flames. The men of the Brigade were trained to pursue a fire, not yet under full headway, up-stairs and down, in at windows and out through the roof, anywhere, so it could be reached directly by the water from the engines. They were made to regard it as worse than a waste to throw even a gallon of water upon a dead wall or upon a surface of slate or plaster, so long as by any means the branch pipe could be got to bear upon the seat of the fire itself. The statistics of the operations of the London Fire-engine Establishment from 1833 to the present time, show with what success the system originated and so admirably carried out by Mr Braidwood has been pursued. Of the whole number of fires not one in fifty now proceeds to the extent of total destruction of the premises.

Previous to the organization of the Fire-engine Establishment there were no official annual reports of the fires in the metropolis. No one person by himself was indeed in a position to know all of the fires that happened, any more than, but for Lloyds', could we know of all the wrecks which take place around and upon our coasts. It was impossible, under such a state of things, that either the value of insurance to the insured or its risk to the insurer could be rightly known. The general public could only know that, like fevers and certain other classes of disease, fires were always breaking out, but no one could know, even approximately, how great or how little was the real general risk. When, however, a fire establishment was formed, the engines were called to all fires, whether of insured or uninsured property. It was not now difficult to tabulate the number and localities of fires; but Mr. Braidwood went further, and extended his yearly tables to include the various causes of fires, and the classification of the premises, whether residences, shops, warehouses, manufactories, &c., where they occurred, the subdivision of these classes being extended to every variety of occupation and business. Even the hours at which the various fires broke out were carefully tabulated, and thus the particulars of London fires soon became an important branch of statistics, from which the operations of insurance have derived increased certainty, with greater economy to the insured.

Although regarding the training and discipline of firemen as of the first importance in the organization of a fire brigade, Mr. Braidwood gave a large share of attention to the improvement of fire-engines and their kindred appliances. While in Edinburgh, where the steepness of many of the streets, and the roughness of the pavements in the older parts of the town prevented the rapid and easy movement of heavy engines, he recommended and adopted a lighter description, but in London he recognised the necessity for greater power. Mr. Tilley, then a fire-engine maker in the Blackfriars'-road, ably seconded his efforts, and at length the distinctive type known as the London Fire Brigade Engine was produced, and which, weighing about eighteen cwt. when ready for service, would throw eighty-eight gallons of water per minute, and, in short trials, as much as 120 gallons in the same time. This engine was mounted upon springs, and in strength and ease of working presented a marked improvement upon those which had preceded it. Its ordinary working complement of men was twenty-eight, and larger engines, upon the same general design, have since been made, to be worked by from forty-five to sixty men. The steam fire-engine has already, to a certain extent, superseded the brigade engine, but the latter is still likely, for some time at least, to be preferred for a large class of fires, both in London and in the provinces.

Mr. Braidwood at an early date adopted the ordinary military scaling ladders to the purposes of his brigade, two being placed on each engine, and at his recommendation ladders were also placed on a two-wheeled carriage as a convenient fire-escape. He also induced the Admiralty, in 1841, to adopt hose-reels in the various dockyards, these implements having been previously in successful use in New York. In 1848 he was induced, in consequence of the large number of small fires to which his engines were called out, to adopt a small hand-pump as an auxiliary to the fire-engine. This could be rapidly brought to bear, and although worked by but one man, the value of a small quantity of water thrown directly upon the seat of a small fire was found to be greater than that of perhaps twenty times as much when thrown about in the ordinary manner. It was of great importance also in warehouses stored with valuable goods, to throw the least necessary quantity of water upon a fire. These hand-pumps still form an important part of the present apparatus of the brigade, and they have been widely adopted elsewhere.

London, unlike Edinburgh, has a vast water-side property, always exposed to danger from fire. Almost immediately, therefore, after having taken the command of the London Brigade, Mr. Braidwood directed his attention to the construction of improved floating fire-engines, to be moored in the river, where they would be always available for the protection of wharf property. Two were constructed, one being a machine of great power, with pumps made to be worked by 120 men. These machines proved of great value. In 1852, shortly after the memorable fire at Humphrey's warehouses, he persuaded the Fire-engine Committee to allow one of these engines to be altered so as to work by steam, and in 1855 a large self-propelling floating steam fire-engine was made upon a novel construction, and which, having already rendered great service at fires on the river side, still ranks as the most powerful machine in the service of the brigade. With locomotive boilers and large double steam engines, this float can steam nine miles an hour, and when in place at a fire it can throw four streams of water, each from a jet-pipe of 1-1/2 inch in diameter, to a great distance. In the great fire of 1861, this floating engine was worked with but little intermission for upwards of a fortnight. In 1860 Mr. Braidwood obtained the sanction of the Fire-engine Committee for the introduction of a land steam fire-engine, and although he did not live to witness the present remarkable development of these machines, he was enabled to employ the first one in the brigade with much advantage.

We may quote here from a brief but excellent memoir of Mr. Braidwood, which appeared in the annual report of the Institution of Civil Engineers for 1861:

"As early as 1841, the Government began to profit by his experience, the Lords of the Admiralty having in that year consulted him on the subject of floating fire-engines for the various dockyards. These were eventually constructed from his designs and under his superintendence. In the following year he inspected all the dockyards, and reported fully on each, with regard to both floating and land fire-engines, the supply of water, the alterations of buildings to prevent spread of fire, and the proper care required in dangerous trades. From this time, although not holding any appointment, he acted as Government consulting engineer on all questions relating to fire prevention and extinction, and he advised from time to time the precautions to be taken for the protection of the royal palaces and various other public buildings. This position enabled him, not without a great deal of opposition, to induce the Government to adopt in all its departments a uniform size of hose-coupling. This is the one which he introduced in Edinburgh, and known as the London Fire Brigade coupling, is now in almost universal use; its application has been found comparatively of as much utility for fire-brigade purposes, as the adoption of the Whitworth gauges of screw-bolts for mechanical engineering.

"Although so fully occupied, he never refused advice on professional matters to all who sought it. The various dock companies, public institutions, country fire brigades, private firms, &c., benefited largely by his experience. The numerous inquiries from foreign countries and the colonies with regard to the best means of extinguishing fires, also made great inroads on his time. In 1833 he became an Associate of the Institution of Civil Engineers, to which, in 1844, he contributed a valuable paper 'On the means of rendering large supplies of Water available in case of Fire, &c.,' for which he was awarded a Telford Medal; and in 1849 a second paper 'On Fire-Proof Buildings.' In 1856, a paper on 'Fires: the best means of preventing and arresting them; with a few words on Fire-Proof Structures,' was read by him before the Society of Arts.

"He took great interest in the passing of Acts of Parliament for regulating buildings in the metropolis, was consulted by the framers of these Acts, and used his utmost influence to prevent the endangering a whole neighbourhood by the erection of monster warehouses for private profit. He strongly contended for the principle of dividing buildings by party-walls carried through the roof, and restricting these divisions to a moderate cubic content. Writing to Lord Seymour, Commissioner of Woods and Forests, on the 28th June, 1851, he said 'that no preparations for contending with such fires will give anything like the security that judicious arrangements in the size and construction of buildings will do.' The wise provisions introduced through his instrumentality into these Acts of Parliament were continually being evaded, and clusters of warehouses quickly rose which he saw would, if on fire, defy all his means of extinction. In a letter to Sir W. Molesworth, First Commissioner of Public Works, dated 10th February, 1854, on the subject of a proposed warehouse in Tooley-street, he wrote 'The whole building, if once fairly on fire in one floor, will become such a mass of fire that there is now no power in London capable of extinguishing it, or even of restraining its ravages on every side, and on three sides it will be surrounded by property of immense value.' How literally this was realized, and at what cost, was shown by the great warehouse fire in Tooley-street, on the 22nd June, 1861, at which Mr. Braidwood lost his life."

The great fire at Cotton's Wharf; Tooley-street, broke out on Saturday, June 22nd, 1861, and continued to burn for more than a fortnight, consuming Scovell's, and other large warehouses, and, in all, upwards of two millions' worth of property. The fire is believed to have originated in the spontaneous combustion of hemp, of which upwards of 1000 tons were consumed, together with 3000 tons of sugar, 500 tons of saltpetre, nearly 5000 tons of rice, 18,000 bales of cotton, 10,000 casks of tallow, 1100 tons of jute, and an immense quantity of tea, spices, &c., besides many other descriptions of goods. Although discovered in broad daylight, and before the flames had made any considerable headway, the want of a ready supply of water, and the fact that the iron doors in the division walls between the several warehouses had been left open, taken in connexion with the extremely combustible nature of the materials, soon rendered hopeless all chance of saving the buildings and property. Mr. Braidwood was upon the spot very soon after the alarm had been given, and nearly the whole available force of the Fire-engine Establishment was summoned at his command. He appears to have at once foreseen that the fire would be one of no ordinary magnitude, and that the utmost that could be done would be to prevent its extending widely over adjoining property. The floating fire-engines had been got to bear upon the flames, and the men in charge of the branch pipes were, after two hours' work, already suffering greatly from the intense heat, when their chief went to them to give them a word of encouragement. Several minor explosions, as of casks of tallow or of oil, had been heard, but as it was understood that the saltpetre stored at the wharf was in buildings not yet alight, no alarm was then felt as to the walls falling in. At the moment, however, while Mr. Braidwood was discharging this his last act of kindness to his men, a loud report was heard, and the lofty wall behind him toppled and fell, burying him in the ruins. Those of his men who were near him had barely time to escape, and one person at his side, not a fireman, was overwhelmed with him. From the moment when the wall was seen to fall, it was known that whoever was beneath it had been instantly crushed to death. It is needless, and it would, indeed, be out of place, to describe here the further progress of the fire, which had then but fairly begun, and which was still burning more than a fortnight afterwards.

Great as was the general consternation at so terrible a conflagration, it is doubtful if the public were not still more impressed by the dreadful death of Mr. Braidwood, and by a feeling that his loss was a public misfortune. Her Majesty the Queen, with that ready sympathy which she has ever shown for crushed or suffering heroism, commanded the Earl of Stamford to inquire on the spot, on Monday, whether the body had yet been recovered by the firemen, and Her Majesty's sympathies were also conveyed to Mrs. Braidwood. It was not, however, until the following morning, that after almost constant exertions, under the greatest difficulties, the crushed remains were rescued. An inquest was necessary, not merely to ascertain what was already well known, that death had been instantly caused by accident, but to know whether culpable carelessness of any kind had indirectly led to the sorrowful event. None, however, appeared. The remains of the fallen chief were afterwards borne to his late residence in Watling-street. The members of the committee of the London Fire-engine Establishment, formed of representatives from all of the twenty-five insurance companies of London, had already met to express, by a formal resolution, their sincere condolence with Mrs. Braidwood and her family. It was known that the funeral would take place on Saturday, June 29th, and it was widely felt that a general expression of sorrow and respect should be made, in view of the common loss of so valued a public servant, as well as for the noble qualities for which he had been so long and so well known. On the occasion of the funeral this was shown not more by the great length and marked character of the cortége itself than by the general suspension of business in the leading thoroughfares of the city through which it passed, and by the hushed demeanour of the countless multitude who pressed closely upon the procession throughout its entire course. Among the thousands who sadly led the way to the grave were the London Rifle Brigade, about 700 strong (and of which Mr. Braidwood's three sons were members), the Seventh Tower-Hamlets, and other rifle corps, upwards of 1000 constables of the metropolitan police force, besides nearly 400 members of the city police, the superintendents and men of the various water companies, the secretary and conductors and the band of the Royal Society for the Protection of Life from Fire, a large number of private and local fire-brigades, and the members of the London Fire-engine Establishment. The pall-bearers were six of Mr. Braidwood's engineers and foremen, some of whom were at his side when he fell, and who had barely escaped with their own lives. Following the chief mourners were the Duke of Sutherland, the Earl of Caithness, the Rev. Dr. Cumming, and a large number of relatives and friends of the deceased, and the committee of the London Fire-engine establishment. The procession was nearly one mile and a-half in length, and was about three hours in its progress from Watling-street to Abney Park Cemetery, where the solemn service of the dead was conducted by the Rev. Dr. Cumming, of whose congregation the deceased had long been a member. With the exception of the great bell of St. Paul's, which tolls only on the occasion of the death of a member of the royal family or of a lord-mayor in office, the bells of all the churches in the city were booming slowly through the day, and so evident was the general sorrow that it could be truly said that the heart of the nation mourned.

On Thursday, July 4th, a public meeting was held at the Mansion House, when resolutions were passed for the collection of subscriptions towards a memorial to Mr. Braidwood's long and arduous public services. This memorial, it was felt, should take the form of a permanent provision for his family, for the post of Fire Brigade Superintendent had never been a lucrative one. Before, however, the collection of subscriptions had extended beyond a few hundred pounds, it was made known that the insurance companies had promptly settled upon Mrs. Braidwood the full "value"—speaking in an insurable sense—of her husband's life. Mr. Braidwood had for many years supported two maiden sisters, and the public subscription was applied, therefore, to the purchase of small annuities for each of them.

It will be remembered that the London Fire-engine Establishment was from the first controlled only by the insurance companies, upon whom of course, fell the whole cost of its maintenance. Their interest in the suppression of fires, although direct and unmistakeable, was not the same as that of the public. Thus, it would be to the public advantage that no fires should happen, whereas such a result would be fatal to the insurance companies, since no one in that case would insure. Although the protection of the Establishment was in practice extended alike to both insured and uninsured property, the real object for which it was formed and maintained was undoubtedly that of protecting insured property only. It was the interest of the companies to incur as little expense as would, on the whole, fairly effect this purpose, and it was not their interest to effectually protect the whole of the metropolis from fire. Thus it was that, with all the excellence of the organization and discipline of the Fire-engine Establishment, it was greatly inferior in extent to what was requisite for the proper security of the first city in the world. Mr. Braidwood had long felt this truth, but, acting for a private association, he could only go to the extent of the limited resources at his disposal. It was, more than anything else, the great fire at Cotton's Wharf that first directed public attention to the necessary insufficiency of any private establishment for the general suppression of fires, and that has led to the legislation under which the Fire-engine Establishment was, on the 1st of January last, taken over and extended by the Metropolitan Board of Works. London will now, it is hoped, be better protected from fire, because of the increased extent of the means of protection; but it can hardly be expected that the discipline of the brigade will be improved.

Apart from the public value of Mr. Braidwood's career in increasing the common security against a common foe, there was much in his personal, intellectual, and moral qualities worthy of admiration. He was a man of strong and commanding frame, of inexhaustible energy, and of enduring vitality. The constitutions of but few men could have withstood such long continued wear and tear as fell to his. He braved all weathers, all extremes of heat and cold, could sleep or wake at will, and could work on long after others would have given way. He was always at his post, and in no moment of difficulty or danger did his cool judgment or his steady courage forsake him. It was this, together with his considerate bearing, and on occasions of special trial his almost womanly kindness to his men, that inspired them with unlimited confidence in him and in his plans. Beyond this, he was a man of superior mind, with strong comprehensive and generalising faculties. His various published papers, and a correspondence of which but few could know the extent and importance, as well as his ready, clear, and exact manner in stating his views before committees and before those in authority, who so often consulted him, all attest an order of mind which, in a different sphere, would alone have won distinction for its possessor. His profession was one in which it happens that almost every person thinks himself competent to give advice; yet, without any assumption of authority, Mr. Braidwood could make it felt wherever he pleased that he was a master in the art of extinguishing fire. But he was not on this account the less ready to listen to suggestions, and there are numbers who can bear testimony to the patient, honest, and appreciative manner in which he considered the many and diverse propositions submitted to him as the head of the Fire Brigade of the first city in the world. The soundness of his views and opinions is sufficiently attested by the success of his practice—a success which, but for the Government tax upon fire policies, would have long since made fire insurance in London almost the cheapest of all the forms of protection of property from danger. The London Brigade was insignificant in numbers and tame in display when compared with the eight hundred sapeurs pompiers of Paris, with their parade and all their accessories of effect—insignificant and tame, too, after the glittering apparatus, imposing paraphernalia, and deafening clatter of the "Fire Department" of New York; but Mr. Braidwood's chosen men knew how to do their duty, and considering the differences in the mode of building and of heating, and in the extent of lighting in the three great metropoli just named, it is an easy matter, on reference to statistics, to prove that none others have done better.

Above all, Mr. Braidwood was a gentleman of deep Christian feeling; and those who knew him best had never doubted that, had it been his lot to linger long in pain, knowing the end that was to come, his calm but unwavering faith in a better future would have sustained him through all. Brought up from childhood in the faith of the Scotch church, he was a regular attendant upon the ministrations of the Rev. Dr. Cumming. In his own quiet way he did much good in the poorer districts of London, and he took a special interest in the ragged schools of the metropolis. What he was in his own home may be best inferred from the crushing force with which his dreadful yet noble fate fell upon those who were dearest to him. His family had already too much reason to know the dangers which had always attended his career. A step-son had fallen, five years before, in nearly the same manner, and now lies buried in the same grave. Eleven members, in all, of the brigade, had perished in the discharge of their duty during the time Mr. Braidwood had commanded it: a fact which, taken with daily experience, pointed to other victims to follow. Such consolation, then, as a stricken widow and a mourning family could have, next to an abiding faith in the goodness of God, was in the recollection of the virtues and noble qualities of the husband and father, and in the spontaneous sorrow with which a great people testified their sense of his worth and of their common loss.

To show the universal as well as national esteem in which Mr. Braidwood was held, two extracts are here given from the numerous letters of condolence addressed to his bereaved family, from all parts of the world. Mr. G. H. Allen, Secretary to the Boston (America) Fire Department, writes: "It gives me pleasure to unite with the Board in testimony to the extreme kindness of Mr. Braidwood in the conduct of our correspondence, whereby we have been greatly benefited and received extensive information. Allow me also to extend our sympathy to those who have lost one who will ever be remembered as standing at the head of the most valued arm of the Government, and one that you can hardly expect to be replaced, except by years of experience and great natural ability." Mr. T. J. Bown, Superintendent of the Sydney (Australia) Fire Brigade, in a letter dated 22nd August 1861, says, "On receipt of the sad news, our large fire-bell was tolled, the British ensign hoisted half-mast high, and crape attached to the firemen's uniform, as a token of respect for one of the noblest and most self-denying men that ever lived, who spent and lost his life in the service of his fellow-creatures."

A TRUE HERO.

James Braidwood.—Died, June 22nd, 1861.

By the Author of
"John Halifax, Gentleman."

Not at the battle front,—
Writ of in story;
Not on the blazing wreck,
Steering to glory;

Not while in martyr pangs
Soul and flesh sever,
Died he—this Hero new—
Hero for ever.

No pomp poetic crown'd,
No forms enchained him,
No friends applauding watched,
No foes arraigned him:

Death found him there, without
Grandeur or beauty,
Only an honest man
Doing his duty:

Just a God-fearing man,
Simple and lowly,
Constant at kirk and hearth,
Kindly and holy:

Death found—and touched him with
Finger in flying:—
So he rose up complete—
Hero undying.

Now, all mourn for him,
Lovingly raise him
Up from his life obscure,
Chronicle, praise him;

Tell his last act, done midst
Peril appalling,
And the last word of cheer
From his lips falling;

Follow in multitudes
To his grave's portal;
Leave him there, buried
In honour immortal.

So many a Hero walks
Daily beside us,
Till comes the supreme stroke
Sent to divide us.

Then the Lord calls His own,—
Like this man, even,
Carried, Elijah-like,
Fire-winged, to heaven.

Macmillan's Magazine, Vol. IV., page 294.

FIRE PREVENTION

INCLUDING

FIRE-PROOF STRUCTURES.

To prevent fires it is necessary to consider what are the principal causes of such calamities. These may be classed under several heads:—

1. Inattention in the use of fires and lights.

2. Improper construction of buildings, &c.

3. Furnaces or close fires for heating buildings, or for mechanical purposes.

4. Spontaneous ignition.

5. Incendiarism.

As almost all fires arise from inattention in one shape or another, it is of the utmost importance that every master of a house or other establishment should persevere in rigidly enjoining and enforcing on those under him, the necessity of observing the utmost possible care in preventing such calamities, which, in nineteen cases out of twenty, are the result of remissness or inattention. Indeed, if any one will for a moment consider the fearful risk of life and property, which is often incurred from a very slight inattention, the necessity of vigilance and care will at once be apparent. Immense hazard is frequently incurred for the most trifling indulgences, and much property is annually destroyed, and valuable lives often lost, because a few thoughtless individuals cannot deny themselves the gratification of reading in bed with a candle beside them.

Some years ago, upwards of 100,000l. were lost, through the partner of a large establishment lighting gas with a piece of paper, which he threw away, and thus set fire to the premises, although it was a strict rule in the place that gas should only be lighted with tapers, which were provided for that purpose. In one department of a great public institution, it was, and is still, a rule that only covered lights should be carried about, and for that purpose four lanterns were provided; yet, on inquiry some time back, it was found that only one was entire, the other three being broken—one having lost two sides and the top; still they were all used as covered lights.

The opportunities for inattention to fires and lights are so various, that it is impossible to notice the whole.

One of the prevailing causes of fire is to be traced to persons locking their doors, and leaving their houses to the care of children. I believe one-half of the children whose deaths are occasioned by accident suffer from this cause alone: indeed, almost every week the newspapers contain some melancholy confirmation of what I have here stated. Intoxication is also a disgraceful and frequent cause of fire. The number of persons burned to death in this way is really incredible. It is true that it does not always happen that a fire takes place in the house, in either of the above cases, although the unfortunate beings whose clothes take fire, rarely escape with their lives; but the danger to the neighbourhood is at all times considerable, if persons in a state of inebriety are left in a house alone. When there is reason to apprehend that any member of a family will come home at night in that state, some one should always be appointed to receive him, and on no account to leave him till he is put to bed, and the light extinguished.

I do not mean to say that people must be actually drunk before danger is to be apprehended from them. Indeed, a very slight degree of inebriety is dangerous, as it always tends to blunt the perception, and to make a person careless and indifferent. I may also add, that no inconsiderable number of fires are occasioned by the thoughtless practice of throwing spirits into the fire. The dresses of females taking fire adds very much to the list of lives lost by fire, if it does not exceed all the other causes put together.

Another very general cause of fire is that of approaching with lighted candles too near bed or window curtains; these, being generally quite dry, are, from the way in which they are hung, easily set on fire, and, as the flames ascend rapidly, when once touched, they are in a blaze in a moment.

It is really astonishing to find that, with daily examples before their eyes, people should persist (whether insured or not seems to make little difference) in practices which, there is a hundred chances to one, may involve both themselves and the neighbourhood in one common ruin. Of this sort are the practices of looking under a bed with a lighted candle, and placing a screen full of clothes too near the fire.

Houses not unfrequently take fire from cinders falling between the joints of the outer and inner hearths. When smoke is observed to arise from the floor, the cause should be immediately ascertained, and the inmates ought on no account to retire to rest while there is the slightest smell of fire, or any grounds to suspect danger from that cause.

Occasional fires are caused by a very absurd method of extinguishing at night the fires kept in grates during the day. Instead of arranging the embers in the grate in such a way as to prevent their falling off, and thus allowing the fire to die out in its proper place, they are frequently taken off and laid on the hearth, where, should there be wood-work underneath, it becomes scorched, and the slightest spark falling through a joint in the stones sets it on fire.

A very frequent cause of fire in shops and warehouses arises from the carelessness of the person intrusted to lock them up. It is no uncommon practice with those to whom this duty is intrusted, to light themselves out, or to search for any little article which may have been mislaid, with a lighted paper, and then to throw it carelessly on the floor, imagining they have taken every necessary precaution, merely by setting their foot upon it, forgetting that the current of air occasioned by shutting the door frequently rekindles it, and produces the most serious consequences.

In warehouses and manufactories, fires are not unfrequently caused by the workmen being occasionally kept late at work. By the time their task is finished, the men are so tired and sleepy, that the extinguishing of fires and lights is done in a very careless manner. I recollect an instance of this sort, in which the flames were issuing from three upper windows, and observed by the neighbours, while the workmen engaged at their employment in the lower floors knew nothing of the destruction that was going on above.

A very serious annual loss is also caused by want of due care in handing up or removing the goods in linen-drapers' shop windows when the gas is burning. Flues taking fire often result in mischief and it is believed that many serious fires have arisen from this cause, which can hardly be called accidental, as, if flues are properly constructed, kept moderately clean, and fairly used, they cannot take fire.

From what has been said, it will be seen that care and attention may do a very great deal towards the prevention of fire, and consequent loss of life. It is very easy to make good rules, and keep them for a time, after having been alarmed by some serious loss of property or life, but the difficulty is to maintain constant attention to the subject. The most evident plan for effecting this seems to be, for the masters thoroughly to examine and consider the subject at certain stated periods, not too far apart, and to constantly warn their domestics, workmen, or others, of the danger of the improper use of fires and lights.

One of the greatest preventives of carelessness in the use of fires and lights would be a legal inquiry in every case, as it would not only show the faults that had been committed, and thus warn others, but the idea of being exposed in the newspapers would be another motive for increased care. This plan has been adopted in New York, and the reports of the proceedings of Mr. Baker, the "Fire Marshal," show that the inquiries there made have led to most useful results. Mr. Payne, the coroner, held inquests on fires in the City of London some years ago, but the authorities would not allow his expenses, and therefore they were given up, although believed to be highly advantageous in explaining accidental and others causes of fire.

The improper construction of buildings more generally assists the spread than is the original cause of fires, although laying hearths on timber, and placing timber too near flues, are constant causes of fire, and it is believed that many melancholy occurrences have arisen from these and similar sources.

One cause of danger from chimneys arises from the communication which they often have with each other in one gable. The divisions or partitions, being very often found in an imperfect state, the fire communicates to the adjoining chimney, and in this way sometimes wraps a whole tenement in flames. I know a division of a principal street in Edinburgh, in which there is scarcely a single chimney-head that is not more or less in this condition; and I have no doubt that this is not an uncommon case. There is also great danger from the ends of joists, safe-lintels, or other pieces of timber, being allowed to protrude into chimneys. In one instance which came under my notice, a flue passing under the recess of a window had on the upper side no other covering than the wood of the floor; of course, when the chimney took fire the floor was immediately in a blaze: but there are many instances of such carelessness. It is a common practice amongst carpenters to drive small pieces of wood into walls for the purpose of fixing their work, not paying the least attention as to whether the points run into the flues or not.

In the repairs and alterations of old buildings, house-carpenters are, if possible, even more careless in this particular, than in the construction of new.

I know of two different buildings which underwent some alterations. In both of these, safe-lintels had been run into flues, and both of them, after the alterations, took fire; the one in consequence of a foul chimney, which set fire to the lintel; and although the other did not take fire from the same cause, the lintel was nevertheless very much scorched, and obliged to be removed.

Great carelessness is frequently exhibited by builders, when erecting at one time two or three houses connected by mutual gables, by not carrying up the gables, or party-walls, so as to divide the roofs. I have seen more than one instance where the adjoining house would have been quite safe, but for this culpable neglect. It is no uncommon thing, too, to find houses divided only by lath and standard partitions, without a single brick in them. When a fire occurs in houses divided in this manner, the vacuities in the middle of the partitions act like so many funnels to conduct the flame, thereby greatly adding to the danger from the fire, and infinitely increasing the difficulty of extinguishing it.

In London the Building Act forbids all such proceedings, but the District Surveyors do not seem to have sufficient power, or be able to pay sufficient attention to such matters, as they are constantly met with at fires. A very flagrant case of laying a hearth on timber was lately exposed by a fire in the City. Due notice was given of the circumstance, but no farther attention was paid to the matter than to make the proprietor construct the floor properly, although the Act gave power to fine for such neglect. The omission is to be regretted, as there could not have been a better case for warning others; it occurred in a very large establishment, and the work was done by one of the first builders in the City. Had this fire taken place in the night and gained some head, it would have been very difficult to have ascertained the cause. As the premises were situated, a serious loss of life might have occurred, the apartment in which the fire originated being the only means of retreat which ten or twelve female servants had from their bedrooms.

The Metropolitan Building Acts, up to about the year 1825, by insisting upon party-walls and other precautions, were invaluable for the prevention of the spread of fires. By them no warehouse was permitted to exceed a certain area. From the year 1842, the area has been exchanged for a specified number of cubic feet. But since 1825, a class of buildings has arisen of which there are now considerable numbers in the City, called Manchester or piece goods warehouses, which somehow have been exempted from the law restricting the extent of warehouses, on the plea that they are not warehouses, because "bulk is broken" in them, although it is thoroughly understood that the legislature intended by the Act to restrict the amassing such a quantity of goods under one roof as would be dangerous to the neighbourhood.

Manchester and piece goods warehouses have for some time past been built in London of unlimited size, sometimes equal to twenty average houses. This is pretty nearly the same as if that number of houses were built without party-walls, only that it is much worse, for the whole mass generally communicates by well holes and open staircases, and thus takes fire with great rapidity, and, from the quantity of fresh air within the building, the fire makes much greater progress before it is discovered. By this means the risk of fire in the City has been greatly increased, not only to such warehouses themselves, but to the surrounding neighbourhood, for it is impossible to say how far fires of such magnitude may extend their ravages under untoward circumstances, there being at present no preventive power in London capable of controlling them. To provide such a power would be a very costly business.

Such buildings are also against the generally received rule, that a man may burn himself and his own property, but he shall not unduly risk the lives and property of his neighbours.

The new Building Act is likely to repress, to a certain extent, this great evil, unless its meaning be subverted by some such subterfuge as destroyed the efficiency of the last one. But what is to be done with those which are already built? It may seem tedious to dwell so much on this subject, but it appears to be a risk which is not generally much thought of, though it is of the most vital importance to the safety of London. It is very desirable that the metropolis should take warning by the experience of Liverpool, without going through the fiery ordeal which the latter city did.

From 1838 to 1843, 776,762l. were lost in Liverpool by fire, almost entirely in the warehouse risks. The consequence was, that the mercantile rates of insurance gradually rose from about 8s. per cent. to 30s., 40s., and, it is said, in some cases, to 45s. per cent. Such premiums could not be paid on wholesale transactions, therefore the Liverpool people themselves obtained an Act of Parliament, 6 and 7 Vic., cap. 109, by which the size and height of warehouses were restricted, party walls were made imperative, and warehouses were not allowed to be erected within thirty-six feet of any other warehouse, unless the whole of the doors and window-shutters were made of wrought iron, with many similar restrictions. This Act applied to warehouses already built as well as to those to be built, and any tenant was at liberty, after notice to his landlord, to alter his warehouse according to the Act, and to stop his rent till the expense was paid. Another Act, 6 and 7 Vic., cap. 75, was also obtained, for bringing water into Liverpool for the purpose of extinguishing fires and watering the streets only. It is supposed that the works directed, or permitted, by these two Acts, cost the people of Liverpool from 200,000l. to 300,000l. Shortly after these alterations had been made, the mercantile premiums again fell to about 8s. per cent.

There is another very common cause of fire, which seems to come under the head of construction—viz., covering up a fireplace when not in use with wood or paper and canvas, &c. The soot falls into the fireplace, either from the flue itself, or from an adjoining one which communicates with it. A neighbouring chimney takes fire; a spark falls down the blocked-up flue, sets fire to the soot in the fireplace, which smoulders till the covering is burned through, and thus sets fire to the premises.

In theatres, that part of the house which includes the stage and scenery should be carefully divided from that where the spectators assemble by a solid wall carried up to, and through the roof. The opening in this wall for the stage should be arched over, and the other communications secured with iron doors, which would be kept shut while the audience was in the house. By this plan, there would be abundance of time for the spectators to retire, before fire could reach that part of the theatre which they occupy.

The danger from furnaces or close fires, whether for heating, cooking, or manufacturing purposes, is very great, and no flue should be permitted to be so used, unless it is prepared for the purpose. The reason is, that in a close fire the whole of the draught must pass through the fire. It thus becomes so heated that, unless the flue is properly built, it is dangerous throughout its whole course. In one instance of a heating furnace, the heat in the flue was found to be 300°, at a distance of from forty to fifty feet from the fire. In open fireplaces, the quantity of cold air carried up with the draught keeps the flue at a moderate heat, from the fire upwards, and, unless the flue is allowed to become foul, and take fire, this is the safest possible mode of heating.

Heating by hot air, steam, and hot water are objectionable. First, because there must be a furnace and furnace flue, and the flue used is generally that built for an open fire only; and second, the pipes are carried in every direction, to be as much out of sight as possible. By this means they are constantly liable to produce spontaneous ignition, for there appears to be some chemical action between heated iron and timber, by which fire is generated at a much lower temperature than is necessary to ignite timber under ordinary circumstances. No satisfactory explanation of this fact has yet been given, but there is abundant proof that such is the case. In heating by hot-water pipes, those hermetically sealed are by far the most dangerous, as the strength of the pipes to resist the pressure is the only limit of the heat to which the water, and of course the pipes, may be raised. In some cases a plug of metal which fuses at 400° is put into the pipes, but the heat to which the plug is exposed will depend very much on where it is placed, as, however great may be the heat of the exit pipe, the return pipe is comparatively cool. But even where the pipes are left open, the heat of the water at the furnace is not necessarily 212°. It is almost needless to say that 212° is the heat of boiling water under the pressure of one atmosphere only; but if the pipes are carried sixty or seventy feet high, the water in the furnace must be under the pressure of nearer three atmospheres than one, and therefore the heat will be proportionately increased. Fires from pipes for heating by hot water have been known to take place within twenty-four hours after first heating, and some after ten years of apparent safety.

The New Metropolitan Building Act prescribes rules for the placing steam, hot-air, and hot-water pipes at a certain distance from timber; but as it must be extremely difficult for the District Surveyors to watch such minute proceedings, it becomes every one who is anxious for safety to see that the District Surveyors have due notice of any operation of this kind.

Another cause of fire which may come under this head is the use of pipes for conveying away the products of combustion. Every one is acquainted with the danger of stove pipes, but all are not perhaps aware that pipes for conveying away the heat and effluvia from gas-burners are also very dangerous when placed near timber. It is not an uncommon practice to convey such pipes between the ceiling and the flooring of the floor above. This is highly dangerous. Gas-burners are also dangerous when placed near a ceiling. A remarkable instance of this took place lately, where a gas-burner set fire to a ceiling 28-1/2 inches from it.

Another evil of furnaces is, that the original fireplace is sometimes not large enough to contain the apparatus, and the party wall is cut into. Perhaps it may be necessary to notice at this point the use of gas, as it is becoming so very general. Gas, if carefully laid on, and properly used, is safer than any other light, so far as actually setting fire to anything goes, but the greater heat given out so dries up any combustibles within its reach, that it prepares them for burning, and when a fire does take place, the destruction is much more rapid than in a building lighted by other means. Gas-stoves, also, from the great heat given out, sometimes cause serious accidents; in one instance, a gas-stove set fire to a beam through a two-and-half inch York landing, well bedded in mortar, although the lights were five or six inches above the stone. This is mentioned to show that gas-stoves require quite as much care as common fires.

Spontaneous ignition is believed to be a very fruitful cause of fires; but, unless the fire is discovered almost at the commencement, it is difficult to ascertain positively that this has been the cause. Spontaneous ignition is generally accelerated by natural or artificial heat. For instance, where substances liable to spontaneous ignition are exposed to the heat of the sun, to furnace flues, heated pipes, or are placed over apartments lighted by gas, the process of ignition proceeds much more rapidly than when in a cooler atmosphere. Sawdust in contact with vegetable oil is very likely to take fire. Cotton, cotton waste, hemp, and most other vegetable substances are alike dangerous. In one case oil and sawdust took fire within sixteen hours; in others, the same materials have lain for years, until some external heat has been applied to them. The greater number of the serious fires which have taken place in railroad stations in and near London have commenced in the paint stores. In a very large fire in an oil warehouse, a quantity of oil was spilt the day before and wiped up, the wipings being thrown aside. This was believed to have been the cause of the fire, but direct proof could not be obtained. Dust-bins also very often cause serious accidents. In one instance, 30,000l. to 40,000l. were lost, apparently from hot ashes being thrown into a dust-bin.

These accidents may in a great measure be avoided by constant care and attention to cleanliness, and where paints and oils are necessary, by keeping them in some place outside the principal buildings. Dust-bins should, as much as possible, be placed in the open air, and where that cannot be done, they should be emptied once a day. No collection of rubbish or lumber of any sort should be allowed to be made in any building of value.

Mr. Wyatt Papworth, architect, has published some very interesting notes on spontaneous ignition, giving several well-authenticated instances.

Incendiarism may be divided into three sorts—malicious, fraudulent, and monomaniac. Of the former there has been very little in London for many years. The second, however, is rather prevalent. The insurance offices, which are the victims, protect themselves as well as they can, but an inquest on each fire is the true mode of lessening the evil. This is much more the interest of the public than at first seems to be the case. In several instances where the criminals were brought to punishment by Mr. Payne's inquests, people were asleep in the upper parts of the houses set fire to, and in one case there were as many as twelve or fifteen persons. This, however, is seldom stated in the indictment, as, if it is, the punishment is still death by the law, and it is supposed that a conviction is more easily obtained, by the capital charge being waived. Monomania is a rare cause of incendiarism, but still several well-certified cases have occurred in which no possible motive could be given. In one instance a youth of fifteen set fire to his father's premises seven times within a few hours. In another, a young female on a visit set fire to her friend's furniture, &c., ten or eleven times in the course of one or two days. In neither case could anything like disagreement or harshness be elicited, but the reverse. In other instances, it has been strongly suspected that this disease was the cause of repeated fires, but there was no positive proof. In all these cases, known or suspected, the parties were generally from fourteen to twenty years of age.

FIRE-PROOF STRUCTURES.

What is "Fire-proof Construction?" is a question which has given rise to a great deal of discussion, simply, as it appears to me, because the size of the buildings, and the quantity and description of the contents, have not always been taken into account. That which may be perfectly fireproof in a dwelling house, may be the weakest in a large warehouse. Suppose an average-sized dwelling-house 20 × 40 × 50 = 40,000 cubic feet, built with brick partitions, stone or slate stairs, wrought-iron joists filled in with concrete, and the whole well plastered. Such a house will be practically fire-proof, because there is no probability that the furniture and flooring in any one room, would make fire enough to communicate to another. But suppose a warehouse equal to twenty such houses, with floors completely open, supported by cast-iron pillars, and each floor communicating with the others by open staircases and wells; suppose, further, that it is half filled with combustible goods, and perhaps the walls and ceilings lined with timber. Now, if a fire takes place below, the moment it bursts through the upper windows or skylights, the whole place becomes an immense blast furnace; the iron is melted, and in a comparatively short time the building is in ruins, and, it may be, the half of the neighbourhood destroyed. The real fire-proof construction for such buildings is groined brick arches, supported on brick pillars only. This mode of building, however, involves so much expense, and occupies so much space, that it cannot be used with advantage. The next best plan is to build the warehouses in compartments of moderate size, divided by party-walls and double wrought-iron doors, so that if one of these compartments takes fire, there may be a reasonable prospect of confining the fire to that compartment only. Again, cast iron gives way from so many different causes, that it is impossible to calculate when it will give way. The castings may have flaws in them; or they may be too weak for the weight they have to support, being sometimes within 10 per cent., or less, of the breaking weight. The expansion of the girders may thrust out the side walls. For instance, in a warehouse 120 feet × 75 feet × 80 feet, there are three continuous rows of girders on each floor, with butt joints; the expansion in this case may be twelve inches. The tie rods to take the strain of the flat arches must expand and become useless, and the whole of the lateral strain be thrown on the girders and side walls, perhaps weak enough already. Again, throwing cold water on the heated iron may cause an immediate fracture. For these and similar reasons, the firemen are not permitted to go into warehouses supported by iron, when once fairly on fire.

Cast and wrought-iron have been frequently fused at fires in large buildings such as warehouses, sugar houses, &c., but according to Mr. Fairbairn's experiments on cast iron in a heated state, it is not necessary that the fusing point should be attained to cause it to give way.[A] He also states, that the loss of strength in cold-blast cast iron, in a variation of temperature from 26° to 190° = 164° Fahr., is 10 per cent., and in hot-blast at a variation of from 21° to 190° = 169° Fahr., is 15 per cent.; now if the loss of strength advances in anything like this ratio, the iron will be totally useless as a support, long before the fusing point is attained.

Much confidence has been placed in wrought-iron tie or tension rods, to take the lateral strain of the arches, and also in trusses to support the beams; but it must be evident that the expansion of the iron from the heat, would render them useless, and under a high temperature, it would be so great as to unsettle the brickwork, and accelerate its fall, on any part of the iron-work giving way: again, the application of cold water to the heated iron, in an endeavour to extinguish the fire, is almost certain to cause one or more fractures. The brick-arching is also very liable to fall, especially if only four and a half inches thick, independently of the weight which may be placed upon it, for it is not uncommon after a fire in a large building, to find the mortar almost completely pulverized to the depth of three inches, or four inches, from the face of the wall. When a fire occurred under one of the arches of the Blackwall Railway, on the 15th July, 1843, a portion of the lower ring fell down, and also a few bricks from the next ring.

Another very serious objection to buildings of this description, is that, unless scientifically constructed, they are very unlikely to be safe, even for the common purposes intended, independent of the risk of fire. In the Report of Sir Henry De la Bêche and Mr. Thomas Cubitt on the fall of the mill at Oldham, in October, 1844,[B] it is stated that the strength of the iron-beams was within ten per cent. of the breaking weight. Now according to Mr. Fairbairn's experiments on heated iron, already referred to, an increase of temperature of only 170° would have destroyed the whole building. It is quite clear, therefore, that so long as mill-owners and others continue to construct such buildings without proper advice, they must be liable to these accidents. In timber-floors there can be no such risk, as the strains are all direct, and any journeyman carpenter, by following good examples, can ascertain the size required; and even if he makes a mistake, the evil is comparatively trivial, as the timber will give notice before yielding, and may be propped up for the time, until it can be properly secured. In the case of fire-proof buildings, an ignorant person may make many mistakes without being aware that he has done so, and the slightest failure is probably fatal to every one within the walls. This also increases the difficulty and danger of extinguishing fires in a large building, as the only method of doing so is for the firemen to enter it with their branches, and in case of the floors falling, there is no chance of escape. On the other hand, timber-floors have repeatedly fallen while the firemen were inside the building, and they have made their escape uninjured.

In a pamphlet published by Mr. S. Holme, of Liverpool, in 1844,[C] and which contains a report from Mr. Fairbairn on fire-proof buildings, it is stated, that many people, especially in the manufacturing districts, are their own architects; that the warehouses in Liverpool may be loaded to one ton per yard of flooring; and that unless great care and knowledge are used in the construction of fire-proof buildings, they are of all others the most dangerous.[D]

The following are the principles on which Mr. Fairbairn proposes to build fire-proof warehouses:—

The whole of the building to be composed of non-combustible materials, such as iron, stone, or bricks.

In order to prevent fire, whether arising from accident or spontaneous combustion, every opening, or crevice, communicating with the external atmosphere to be closed.

An isolated staircase, of stone, or iron, well protected on every side by brick, or stone walls, to be attached to every story, and be furnished with a line of water-pipes, communicating with the mains in the street, and ascending to the top of the building.

In a range of stores, the different warehouses to be divided by strong partition-walls, in no case less than eighteen inches thick, and no more openings to be made than are absolutely necessary for the admission of goods and light.

That the iron columns, beams, and brick arches be of strength sufficient, not only to support a continuous dead pressure, but to resist the force of impact to which they are subject by the falling of heavy goods upon the floors.

That in order to prevent accident from the columns being melted by intense heat in the event of fire in any of the rooms, a current of cold air should be introduced into the hollow of the columns, from an arched tunnel under the floors.

There is no doubt that if the second principle could be carried out, namely, the total exclusion of air, the fire would go out of itself; but it seems, to say the least of it, very doubtful indeed if this can be accomplished, and if it could, the carelessness of a porter leaving open one of the doors or windows, would make the whole useless. The fifth principle shows that Mr. Fairbairn has omitted to allow for the loss of strength the iron may sustain from the increase of temperature. The last principle would not be likely to answer its purpose, even if it was possible to keep these tunnels and hollow columns clear for a number of years, which is scarcely to be expected. A piece of cast-iron pipe, one-and-a-half inch in diameter, was heated for four minutes in a common forge, both ends being carefully kept open to the atmosphere, when, on one end being fixed in a vice, and the other pulled aside by the hand, it gave way.

One of the principal objections to the kind of fire-proof buildings above described, is, that absolute perfection in their construction is indispensable to their safety; whereas buildings of a more common description are comparatively safe, although there may be some errors or omissions in their construction. Indeed, Mr. Fairbairn states in the same Report, that "it is true that negligence of construction on the one hand, and want of care in management on the other, might entail risk and loss to an enormous extent."

The following is a very clear proof of the inability of cast iron to resist the effects of fire:—

"A chapel in Liverpool-road, Islington, seventy feet in length and fifty-two feet in breadth, took fire in the cellar, on the 2nd October, 1848, and was completely burned down. After the fire, it was ascertained that of thirteen cast-iron pillars used to support the galleries, only two remained perfect; the greater part of the others were broken into small pieces, the metal appearing to have lost all power of cohesion, and some parts were melted. It should be observed, that these pillars were of ample strength to support the galleries when filled by the congregation, but when the fire reached them, they crumbled under the weight of the timber only, lightened as it must have been by the progress of the fire."

In this case it mattered little whether the pillars stood or fell, but it would be very different with some of the large wholesale warehouses in the City, where numbers of young men sleep in the upper floors; in several of those warehouses the cast-iron pillars are much less in proportion to the weight to be carried than those referred to, and would be completely in the draught of a fire. If a fire should unfortunately take place under such circumstances, the loss of human life might be very great, as the chance of fifty, eighty, or one hundred people escaping in the confusion of a sudden night alarm, by one or two ladders, to the roof, could scarcely be calculated on, and the time such escape must necessarily occupy, independent of all chance of accidents, would be considerable.

For the reasons here stated, I submit that large buildings, containing considerable quantities of combustible goods, with floors of brick-arches, supported by cast-iron beams and columns, are not, practically speaking, fire-proof; and that the only construction which would render large buildings fire-proof; where considerable quantities of combustible goods are deposited, would be groined brick-arches, supported by pillars of the same material, laid in proper cement. I am fully convinced, from a lengthened experience, that the intensity of a fire,—the risk of its ravages extending to adjoining premises, and also the difficulty of extinguishing it, depend, cæteris paribus, on the cubic contents of the building which takes fire, and it appears to me that the amount of loss would be very much reduced, if, instead of building immense warehouses, which give the fire a fortified position, warehouses were made of a moderate size, with access on two sides at least, completely separated from each other by party-walls, and protected by iron-doors and window-shutters. In the latter case, the probability is, that not more than one warehouse would be lost at a time, and perhaps that one would be only partially injured.

It is sincerely to be hoped that the clause in the last Metropolitan Building Act, restricting the size of warehouses, may be more successful than its predecessor, for it is not only property that is at stake, but human life. In many of these "Manchester warehouses," there are fifty or one hundred and upwards of warehousemen and servants sleeping in the upper floors, whose escape, in case of fire, would be very doubtful, to say the least of it.[E]

Covering timber with sheet-iron is very often resorted to as a protection against fire. I have never found it succeed; but Dr. Faraday, Professor Brande, Dr. D. B. Reid, and Mr. W. Tite, M.P., are of opinion that it may be useful against a sudden burst of flame, but that it is worse than useless against a continued heat.

In wadding manufactories the drying-rooms were frequently lined with iron-plates, and when a fire arose there, the part covered with iron was generally found more damaged than the rest; the heat got through the sheet-iron, and burnt the materials behind it, and there was no means of touching them with water until the iron was torn down; sheet iron should not, therefore, be used for protecting wood.

Even cast iron, one inch thick, laid on tiles and cement three inches thick, has allowed fire to pass through both, to the boarding and joisting below, merely from the fire in an open fire-place being taken off and laid on the hearth. This arises from iron being so good a conductor that, when heat is applied to it, it becomes in a very short time nearly as hot on the one side as the other. If the smoke escapes up a chimney, or in any other way, there may be a serious amount of fire before it is noticed.

In a fire at the Bank of England, the hearth on which the stove was placed was cast iron an inch thick, with two-and-a-half inches of concrete underneath it; but the timber below that was fired.

With regard to the subject of fire-proof dwelling-houses of average size, I consider that such houses when built of brick or stone, with party-walls carried through the roof; the partitions of brick, the stairs of slate or stone, the joists of wrought iron filled in with concrete, and the whole well plastered, are practically fire-proof because, as stated at the opening of this chapter, there is no probability that the furniture and flooring in any one room would make fire enough to communicate to another. The safest manner of heating such houses is with open fire-places, the hearths not being laid upon timber. Stone staircases, when much heated, will fracture from cold water coming suddenly in contact with them; but in a dwelling-house built as described above, there is very little chance of such a circumstance endangering human life, even with wooden steps carried upon brick walls, and rendered incombustible by a ceiling of an inch and a quarter of good hair mortar and well pugged, all the purposes of safety to human life would be attained.

There is a particular description of floor, which, although not altogether fire-proof, is certainly (at least so far as I can judge), almost practically so for dwelling-houses. It is composed simply of plank two and a-half or three inches thick, so closely joined, and so nicely fitted to the walls, as to be completely air-tight. Its thickness and its property of being air-tight, will be easily observed to be its only causes of safety. Although the apartment be on fire, yet the time required to burn through the floor above or below, will be so great, that the property may be removed from the other floors, or, more probably, if the means of extinguishing fire be at hand, it may be subdued before it can spread to any other apartment. The doors must of course be made in proportion, and the partitions of brick or stone.

Before closing the subject of fire-proof structures, I will add a few words upon fire-proof safes. These are all constructed with double casings of wrought iron, the interstices being in some filled with non-combustible substances, such as pumice stone and Stourbridge clay, and in others with metal tubes, that melt at a low temperature, and allow a liquid contained in them to escape, and form steam round the box, with the intention of preventing the heat from injuring the contents. Such safes I have never found destroyed; and in some cases, after large fires, the whole of the contents have been found uninjured, while the papers in common safes, merely made strong enough to prevent their being broken into, were generally found consumed.

FOOTNOTES:

[A] Vide Seventh Report of the British Association, 1837, vol. vi. page 409.

[B] Vide Report on the Fall of the Cotton Mill, at Oldham, and part of the Prison at Northleach, page 4. Folio. London: Clowes and Sons, 1845.

[C] Vide Report of W. Fairbairn, Esq., on the Construction of Fire-proof Buildings. With introductory Remarks by Samuel Holme, page 11, et seq. Tract, 8vo. Liverpool: T. Baines, 1844.

[D] The Author has been informed by Mr. Farey, M. Inst. C.E., that a fire took place, in 1827, in a mill belonging to Mr. Marshall, of Leeds, the whole of which, with the exception of the roof, was fire-proof. The upper floor was filled with flax, which took fire; the roof fell in, and the heat so affected the iron beams of the floor, as to cause them to give way.

[E] In the year 1858, when reporting to the Insurance Offices upon the Warehouses in the Metropolitan Docks, Mr. Braidwood made the following suggestions which are applicable to all large buildings. That all the party-walls where the roofs do not rise above the wall, should be 3 feet 6 inches above such roof. That all the party-walls in the valleys of the roofs should be raised to the level of the highest ridge on either side, all openings in such walls being closed by wrought-iron doors on each side of the walls, at least a quarter of an inch thick in the panels, and such openings not to exceed 42 superficial feet in the clear. That all windows which look upon other windows, or loop-hole doors in other warehouses or compartments, within 100 feet, should be bricked up, or have wrought-iron shutters at least 3/16th of an inch thick in the panels.

That all loop-hole doors similarly situated should be made entirely of wrought iron, frames included, or bricked up. That all shafts for lifts or other purposes, should be of brick, with wrought-iron doors where necessary to receive or deliver goods, and that all openings whatever for machinery should be included in such shaft. That every hatchway or opening in the floors for "shooting" goods from floor to floor should have a strong flap hinged on to the floor, to be closed when not in use, especially at night.

That there should be direct access to every room, of every compartment, of every warehouse, from a fire-proof staircase, by iron doors, and that all such staircases should enter from the open air, as well as from under any warehouse on the quay; in the latter case the doors must be of iron only.

All the windows in the entresol and ground floors to be bricked up, or have iron shutters, and the doors and frames to be of iron.

Wherever the warehouses face each other within 100 feet, the front parapet walls to be carried up to the level of the ridge of the roof.

When it is stated in this report that the windows or loop-hole doors should be bricked up, it is not meant to exclude the use of thick glass, three or four pieces being built into each door or window space, not exceeding 6 inches in diameter or square, in the clear, and set in the mortar or cement at least 3/4 of an inch all round, the glass to be not less than 1-1/2 inches thick, flat on both sides, and so placed that no goods can be stored within 18 inches of the inner surface.

There should be a tank on the top of each staircase, with a tap from it on each landing, with six fire buckets hung near it, and three small hand pumps in every staircase; the officers and workpeople seeing these every day would be certain to run to them in case of fire, and by having a constant supply of water on every floor small accidents might be extinguished at once, and the iron doors and roofs kept cool in case of one room taking fire.

FIRE EXTINCTION,

INCLUDING

FIRE BRIGADES, FIRE ENGINES,

AND

WATER SUPPLY.

Before entering upon the subject of Public Fire Brigades, I will call attention to the course to be pursued by inmates of the house on fire, and their neighbours.

When all available means of fire prevention have been adopted, the next thing to be considered is a supply of water. In the country, or where there are no water-pipes or engines, this ought to be particularly attended to, and a hand-pump should be provided. Where no water is kept solely for the purpose of extinguishing fire, such vessels as can be spared should be regularly filled every night, and placed in such situations as may be most convenient in case of danger; and no master of a family ought to retire to rest, without being satisfied that this has been attended to. If it had no other advantage than merely that of directing the inmates of a house to the possibility of such an occurrence as fire, it would be worth much more than the trouble such an arrangement would cost; but, in addition to that, a supply of water would be at hand, in most cases more than sufficient to extinguish the fire immediately on its being discovered, and before it had become either alarming or dangerous. But when no such precaution has been adopted, when even the bare possibility of fire has not been considered, when no attention has even been paid to the subject, and no provision made for it; the inhabitants are generally so alarmed and confused, that the danger is probably over, by their property being burned to the ground, before they can sufficiently recollect themselves to lend any effective assistance.

In most cases of fire, the people in whose premises it occurs are thrown into what may be called a state of temporary derangement, and seem to be actuated only by a desire of muscular movement, no matter to what purpose their exertions are directed. Persons may often be seen toiling like galley-slaves, at operations which a moment's reflection would show were utterly useless. I have seen tables, chairs, and every article of furniture that would pass through a window, three or four stories high, dashed into the street, even when the fire had hardly touched the tenement. On one occasion I saw crockery-ware thrown from a window on the third floor.[F]

Most of these extravagances take place on the first alarm. When the engines have got fairly into play, people begin to recollect themselves, and it is at this time that most of those "who go to see a fire" arrive. By the exertions of the police there is then generally a considerable degree of order restored, and the most interesting part of the scene is over.

What remains, however, may, from its novelty or grandeur, if the fire is extensive, be still worth looking at for a little, but much of the excitement is banished with the confusion; and if the fire and firemen seem to be well matched, the chief interest which is excited in the spectators is to ascertain which of the parties is likely to be victorious. Few people, comparatively, have thus an opportunity of witnessing the terror and distraction occasioned by the first alarm of fire, and this may probably account for the apathy and indifference with which people who have not seen this regard it.

When a fire actually takes place, every one should endeavour to be as cool and collected as possible; screams, cries, and other exhibitions of terror, while utterly useless in themselves, have generally the effect of alarming those whose services might otherwise be of the utmost advantage, and of rendering them unfit for useful exertion. It is unhappily, too, at the commencement of fires, that this tendency to confusion and terror is the strongest, when a bucket of water, properly applied, is generally of more value than a hundred will be half an hour afterwards. It is the feeling of total surprise, on the breaking out of a fire, which thus unhinges the faculties of many individuals. They have never made the case their own, nay, one would almost imagine they had scarcely thought such an occurrence possible, till, coming on them almost like a thunderbolt, they are lost in perplexity and terror. The only preventive against this is to think the matter over frequently and carefully before it occurs.

The moment it is ascertained that fire has actually taken place, notice should be sent to the nearest station where there is a fire-engine. No matter whether the inmates are likely to be able to extinguish the fire themselves—this should never be trusted to if more efficient help can be had.

It is much better that an engine should be turned out twenty times when it is not wanted, than be once too late. This may cause a trifling expense; but even that expense is not altogether lost, as it teaches the firemen steadiness and coolness.

The person in the house best qualified for such duty should endeavour to ascertain, with as much precision as possible, the extent and position of the fire, while the others collect as much water as they can. If the fire be in an upper floor, the inmates should be got out immediately, although the lower part of the house may generally be entered with safety for some time. If in the lower part of the house, after the inmates have been removed, great care should be observed in going into any of the upper floors, as the flames very often reach the stair before being observed by those above. The upper floors are, besides, generally filled with smoke, and, in that case, there is great danger of suffocation to those who may enter.

This, indeed, is the principal danger attending fires, and should be particularly guarded against, as a person, when being suffocated, is unable to call for assistance. In a case of this kind the fire took place in the third floor from the street, and all the inmates immediately left the premises except one old woman. In about fifteen minutes after the arrival of the engines, the firemen made their way upstairs, and the poor woman was found dead beside a basket partly filled with clothes, which it was supposed she had been packing up for removal; had she made any noise, or even broke a pane of glass, she would, in all probability, have been saved; as the fire never touched the floor in which she was found, she must have died entirely from suffocation, which a little fresh air would have prevented. Had the slightest suspicion existed that any one was in the upper floors, they would have been entered by the windows or the roof; but as the fire took place in daylight, and none of the neighbours spoke of any one being in the house, it was thought unnecessary to damage the property, or risk the lives of the firemen, without some adequate cause. This, however, shows how little dependence can be placed on information received from the inmates of the premises on fire. Some of the people who lived on the same floor with this poor woman, and who had seen her immediately before they left the house, never mentioned her. I do not suppose that this negligence arose from apathy, or any feeling of that sort; but the people were in such a state of utter confusion, that they were unable to think of anything. But to return.

On the first discovery of a fire, it is of the utmost consequence to shut, and keep shut, all doors, windows, or other openings. It may often be observed, after a house has been on fire, that one floor is comparatively untouched, while those above and below are nearly burned out. This arises from the door on that particular floor having been shut, and the draught directed elsewhere. If the person who has examined the fire finds a risk of its gaining ground upon him, he should, if within reach of fire-engines, keep everything close, and await their arrival, instead of admitting air to the fire by ineffectual efforts to oppose it with inadequate means. In the meantime, however, he should examine where a supply of water is most likely to be obtained, and communicate that, and any other local information, to the firemen on their coming forward. If there be no fire-engine within reach, the person who has examined the fire should keep the place where it is situated as close as possible, till as many buckets of water as can be easily collected are placed within his reach.

Taking care always that there is some one ready to assist him, he should then open the door, and creep forward on his hands and knees till he gets as near the fire as possible; holding his breath, and standing up for a moment to give the water a proper direction, he should throw it with force, using a hand pump if available, and instantly get down to his former position, where he will be again able to breathe. The people behind handing forward another bucket of water, he repeats the operation till the fire is quenched, or until he feels exhausted; in which case some one should take his place. If there be enough of water, however, two, three, or any convenient number of people may be employed in throwing it; on the contrary, if the supply of water be insufficient to employ even one person, the door should be kept shut while the water is being brought, and the air excluded as much as possible, as the fire burns exactly in proportion to the quantity of air which it receives.

One great evil, and which ought to be strictly guarded against by people not accustomed to fire, is, that on the first alarm they exert themselves to the very utmost of their strength. This, of course, can last but a short time; and when they feel tired, which in that case soon happens, they very often give up altogether. Now this is the reverse of what it ought to be. In extinguishing fires, like most other things, a cool judgment and steady perseverance are far more effective than any desultory exertions which can be made.

The heat generally increases in a considerable degree when water is first thrown upon a fire, from the conversion of a portion of it into steam. This is sometimes very annoying; so much so, that the persons engaged in throwing the water, frequently feel themselves obliged to give back a little. They should on no account, however, abate or discontinue their exertions in throwing the water with as much force as possible in the direction of the fire; it will in a short time cool the air and materials, and the steam will, in consequence, be generated more slowly, while a steady perseverance on the part of those employed can alone effect the object in view.

When water is scarce, mud, cow or horse dung, damp earth, &c., may be used as substitutes; but if there seems no chance of succeeding by any of these, and the fire is likely to extend to other buildings, the communication should be immediately cut off by pulling down the building next to that on fire. Any operation of this sort, however, should be begun at a sufficient distance from the fire to allow the communication to be completely cut off, before it gains upon the workmen. If this operation be attempted so near the fire as to be interrupted by it, it must be begun again at a greater distance; and, in that case, there is a greater destruction of property than might have been necessary.

If a fire occur in a stable or cow-house, surrounded with other buildings of the same description, or with the produce of a farm, there is much danger. The cattle and horses should be immediately removed; and, in doing so, if any of them become restive, they should be blindfolded, taking care that it is done thoroughly, as any attempt to blindfold them partially, only increases the evil. They should be handled as much as possible in the ordinary manner, and with great coolness; the violent gestures and excited appearance of the persons removing them tending greatly to startle the animals, and render them unmanageable.

PUBLIC FIRE BRIGADES AND THE DUTIES OF FIREMEN.

The best public means of arresting fires is a very wide question, as the only limit to the means is the expense. Different nations have different ways of doing the same thing. On the Continent generally, the whole is managed by Government, and the firemen are placed under martial law, the inhabitants being compelled to work the engines. In London, the principal means of arresting fires is a voluntary association of the insurance companies, without legal authority of any sort, the legal protection by parish engines being, with a few praiseworthy exceptions, a dead letter.

In Liverpool, Manchester, and other towns, the extinction of fires by the pressure of water only, without the use of fire-engines, is very much practised. The advantages of this system are very great; but, to enable us to follow this system in London, the whole water supply would require to be remodelled.

In America, the firemen are generally volunteers, enrolled by the local Governments. They are exempt from other duties, or are entitled to privileges, which appear to satisfy them, as the situation of fireman is eagerly sought in most of the American cities.

Which is the best of these different modes it is difficult to say; perhaps each is best suited for the place where it exists.

It is now generally admitted, that the whole force brought together to extinguish a fire ought to be under the direction and control of one individual. By this means, all quarrelling among the firemen about the supply of water, the interest of particular insurance companies, and other matters of detail, is avoided. By having the whole force under the command of one person, he is enabled to form one general plan of operations, to which the whole body is subservient; and although he may not, in the hurry of the moment, at all times adopt what will afterwards appear to be the best plan, yet it is better to have some general arrangement, than to allow the firemen of each engine to work according to their own fancy, and that, too, very often in utter disregard as to whether their exertions may aid or retard those of their neighbours. The individual appointed to such a situation ought not to be interfered with, or have his attention distracted, except by the chief authority on the spot, or the owner of the premises on fire. Much valuable information is frequently obtained from the latter, as to the division of the premises, the party-walls, and other matters connected with its locality. But, generally speaking, the less interference and advice the better, as it occupies time which may generally be better employed.

I need scarcely add, that on no account whatever should directions be given to the firemen by any other individual while the superintendent of brigade is present; and that there may be no quarrelling about superiority, the men should be aware on whom the command is to devolve in his absence.

It has often been to me a matter of surprise, that so small a portion of the public attention should be directed to the matter of extinguishing fires. It is only when roused by some great calamity that people bestir themselves; and then there is such a variety of plans proposed to avert similar cases of distress, that to attempt to concoct a rational plan out of such a crude, ill-digested, and contradictory mass of opinion, requires more labour and attention than most people are inclined to give it, unless a regular business was made of it. In Paris the corps of military firemen are so well trained, that although their apparatus is not so good as it should be, the amount of the losses by fire is comparatively trifling. If the head-quarters of such an establishment were to be in London, a store of apparatus, constructed on one uniform plan, could be kept there, to be forwarded to any other part of the kingdom where it might be required. This uniformity of the structure and design of the apparatus could extend to the most minute particulars; a screw or a nut of any one engine would fit every other engine in the kingdom. A depôt could also be kept at head-quarters, where recruits would be regularly drilled and instructed in the business, and a regular system of communication kept up with all the provincial corps. Any particular circumstances occurring at a fire would thus be immediately reported, and the advantages of any knowledge or experience thus gained, would be disseminated over the whole kingdom. As the matter at present stands one town may have an excellent fire-engine establishment, and another within a few miles a very indifferent one, and when the one is called to assist the other, they can neither act in concert, nor can the apparatus of the one in case of accident be of the smallest service in replacing that of the other. The best might (if a proper communication were kept up) be under frequent obligations to the worst, and here, as in other matters, it is chiefly by communication that knowledge is increased. If the whole experience of the country were brought together, and maturely considered and digested by persons competent to judge, I have no doubt that a system might be introduced suitable to the nation and to the age in which we live. Instead of hearing of the "dreadful losses by fire," and the "great exertions" made to extinguish it, all the notice would be, such a place took fire, the engines arrived, and it was extinguished.

It would be useless for me to enter into the details of a plan which I have little hope of ever seeing realized. I may state, however, that a premium might be offered for the best engine of a size previously agreed upon, which, when finished, should be kept as a model.

Specifications could then be made out, and estimates advertised for, for all the different parts, such as wheels, axles, levers, cisterns, barrels, air-vessels, &c., separately. When any particular part of an engine was damaged, it could be immediately replaced, and the engine again rendered fit for service; and upon emergency any number of engines could be set up, merely by putting the different parts together. The work would also be better done; at least it would be much more easy to detect faults in the materials or workmanship than if the engines were bought ready for use. These remarks apply to all the rest of the apparatus.

It could be provided that firemen might be enlisted for a term of years. When enlisted, they would be sent to the depôt at head-quarters, drilled to the use of the engines, and carefully instructed in separating and cleaning the different parts. Here also they could be practised in gymnastic exercises, and generally instructed in everything tending to promote their usefulness as firemen. They could then be sent off to some large towns, and, after having seen a little active service, distributed over the country in such parties as might be deemed necessary for the places they were intended to protect.

The practice of keeping fire-engines at noblemen's and gentlemen's residences, and at large manufactories in the country, is by no means uncommon, and I have no doubt that many more would supply themselves in this way if they knew where to apply for information in such matters; but the great fault lies in the want of persons of skill and experience to work them when fire occurs. In the way I have mentioned, proprietors and others could have one or more of their workmen instructed in this necessary piece of duty; and I have no doubt that many gentlemen would avail themselves of the means of instructing some of their servants.

It will be observed, I do not propose that the firemen who are enlisted, drilled, and instructed in the business, should be sent to the different stations in sufficient numbers to work the engines; this part of the work can be performed by any man accustomed to hard labour, as well as by the most expert fireman, and the local authorities could easily provide men for this purpose. In small towns, where fires are rare, the novelty would draw together plenty of hands; and in large towns, where the inhabitants are not sufficiently disinterested to work for nothing, there are always plenty who could be bound to assist in cases of fire at a certain rate per hour, to be paid upon a certificate from the fireman who has charge of the engine at which they worked. The trained firemen would thus be required only for the direction of the engine, attaching the hose, &c.

I am quite aware that many people object to the training of firemen; but it would be just as reasonable to give to a mob all the "matériel" of war, and next day expect it to act like a regular army, as to expect engines to be managed with any general prospect of success, unless the men are properly trained and prepared for the duty which is expected from them. Fire is both a powerful and an insidious enemy, and those whose business it is to attack it will best succeed when they have become skilful and experienced in the use of their arms.

It is quite obvious that a fire brigade, however complete in its apparatus and equipments, must depend for its efficiency on the state of training and discipline of the firemen. Wherever there is inexperience, want of co-operation, or confusion amongst them, the utmost danger is to be apprehended in the event of fire. It is amidst the raging of this destructive element, the terror and bustle of the inhabitants, that organization and discipline triumph, and it is there, too, that coolness and promptitude, steadiness and activity, fearlessness and caution, are peculiarly required; but, unfortunately, it is then also that they are most rarely exhibited.

There should not be less than five or six men attached to each engine, who should be properly instructed and drilled, to take charge of it, and to guide the people who work at the levers.

The person having the principal charge of the engines should frequently turn over in his mind what might be the best plan, in such and such circumstances, supposing a fire to take place. By frequently ruminating on the subject, he will find himself, when suddenly turned out of bed at night, much more fit for his task than if he had never considered the matter at all. Indeed he will frequently be surprised, when examining the premises afterwards (which he ought always to do, and mark any mistakes he may have committed), that he should have adopted the very best mode of extinguishing the fire, amid the noise, confusion, and the innumerable advices showered down on him, by all those who consider themselves qualified or entitled to give advice in such matters; a number, by the way, which sometimes includes no inconsiderable portion of the spectators. He should also make himself well acquainted with the different parts of the town in which he may be appointed to act, and notice the declivities of the different streets, &c. He will find this knowledge of great advantage.

Any buildings, supposed to be particularly dangerous, should be carefully examined, and all the different places where supplies of water can be obtained for them noticed.

A knowledge of the locality thus obtained will be found of great advantage in case of a fire breaking out. Indeed all firemen, especially those having the charge of engines, should be instructed carefully to examine and make themselves acquainted with the localities of their neighbourhood or district. Such knowledge will often prove valuable in emergencies; the proprietors or tenants of the property on fire being sometimes in such a state of alarm, that no distinct intelligence can be got from them.

When an engine is brought to a fire, it ought to be placed as nearly as possible in a straight line between the supply of water and the premises on fire; taking care, however, to keep at such a distance from the latter that the men who work the pumps may be in no danger from being scorched by the heat, or of being annoyed by the falling of water or burning materials. Running the engine close upon the fire serves no good purpose, except to shorten the quantity of hose that would otherwise be required. The addition of twenty or thirty feet of hose makes very little difference in the working of the engine, and, when compared with the disadvantage of the men becoming unsteady from the idea of personal danger, is not even to be named. Indeed, if the engine be brought too near the fire, there is danger of the men quitting the levers altogether. I may also add that, both for the safety of the hose and the convenience of the inhabitants, the engine should be kept out of the way of people removing furniture.

When the hose is attached and the engine filled with water, the man who holds the branch-pipe, accompanied by another, should get so near the fire, inside the house, that the water from the branch may strike the burning materials. If he cannot accomplish this standing, he must get down on his hands and knees and creep forward, those behind handing up the hose. A stratum of fresh air is almost always to be depended on from six to twelve inches from the floor, so that if the air be not respirable to a person standing upright, he should instantly get down. I have often observed this fact, which indeed is well known; but I once saw an example of it which appeared to me to be so striking, that I shall here relate it. A fire had broken out in the third floor of a house, and when I reached the top of the stair, the smoke was rolling in thick heavy masses, which prevented me from seeing six inches before me. I immediately got down on the floor; above which, for a space of about eight inches the air seemed to be remarkably clear and bright. I could distinctly see the feet of the tables and other furniture in the apartment; the flames in this space burning as vivid and distinct as the flame of a candle, while all above the smoke was so thick that the eye could not penetrate it. The fire had already burst through three out of five windows in the apartment, yet, when lying flat on the floor, no inconvenience was felt except from the heat.

When the fire has broken through a floor, the supply of air along that floor is not to be depended on—the fire drawing the principal supply of air from the apartments below.

When the two first firemen have gained a favourable position, they should keep it as long as they are able; and when they feel exhausted, the men behind them should take their place.

The great point to which everything ought to be made subservient is, that the water on its discharge from the branch-pipe should actually strike the burning materials. This cannot be too often or too anxiously inculcated on every one connected with a fire-engine establishment. Every other method not having this for its grand object, will, in nine cases out of ten, utterly fail; and upon the degree of attention paid to this point, depends almost entirely the question as to the amount of damage the fire will occasion.

When approaching a fire, it should always be done by the door, if possible. When this is attended to, it is much easier to shift the hose from one apartment to another; and the current of fresh air, entering by the door and proceeding along the passages, makes respiration easier and safer than elsewhere.

When entrance by the door is impracticable, and access is to be gained by a window, the flames frequently burst through in such a manner as to render advance in the first instance impossible. In that case, the branch should be pointed against the window, nearly in a perpendicular direction; the water striking the lintel, and falling all round inside the window, will soon extinguish the fire at that point sufficiently to render an entrance practicable.

The old plan of standing with the branch pipe in the street, and throwing the water into the windows is a very random way of going to work; and for my own part, although I have seen it repeatedly tried, I never saw it attended with success. Indeed it is hardly to be expected that water, thrown from the street into a room three or four storeys high, can have any impression on closets, presses, or passages, divided probably with brick partitions in the centre of the house. The circumstance of having engines at work on both sides of the house does not alter the case. The fire very often burns up through the centre, and frequently, when the space between the windows is large, along the front or back wall, till it arrives at the roof, which the water cannot touch on account of the slates or tiles. On the other hand, when the firemen enter the house, the fire is almost wholly under their command. And when it happens that there is any corner which the water cannot directly strike, the fire in it may often be extinguished by throwing the water against an opposite wall or partition, and trusting to the recoil to throw it to the point required.

When the water is thrown from the street, it is impossible to say whether it touches the parts on fire or not. No one can tell anything about it, except when the flame appears at the windows.

On going with the branch inside the house, besides the advantage of the water rushing directly from the hose upon the fire, there is a great saving in the article of water itself. The whole that is thrown by the engine is applied to the right purpose. No part of it is lost; that which does not strike the burning materials falls within the house; and, by soaking those parts on which it falls, prevents their burning so rapidly when the flames approach them.

If, on entering an apartment, it be found that the flames cover a considerable space, it is of advantage, in some instances, to place the point of the thumb in contact with the water at the nozzle of the branch. By this means the water may be spread to cover any space under twenty or thirty feet, according to the pressure applied.

While speaking of the mode of entering houses on fire, I may mention that I have tried several inventions for the purpose of elevating the branch pipe and hose to the level of a second or third story window. But these, although exceedingly ingenious, appear to me to rest on a principle entirely wrong; I mean that of throwing water on the fire from the outside of the building.

Independent altogether of a mistaken principle of usefulness, one insuperable objection to all these machines, is the difficulty of conveying them with the necessary celerity, and the impossibility of packing them on the engine in such a manner that it may be worked without their being taken off, as it seems to me that every description of apparatus which cannot be conveyed along with the engine, is likely to be left behind when most wanted. It is notorious that parish fire-ladders are, for this reason, seldom or never made use of.

Many people object to going inside a building on fire on account of the danger. It ought never to be forgotten, however, that the danger increases with the delay; and that although at first there may be no danger, if the opportunity is not promptly seized, it may become very considerable.

Several of the firemen have at different times fainted, or become stupefied, from the want of fresh air; but as no one is ever allowed to enter singly, they have been, in all cases, immediately observed by their comrades, and relieved.

Another objection has been raised in the alleged difficulty of persuading men to risk their lives in this manner for the small consideration which is allowed them. The truth is, that any persuasions I have had occasion to use, have been generally on the other side.

To hold the branch is considered the post of honour; and when two engines are working together, I have sometimes difficulty in preventing the men from pressing forward farther than is absolutely necessary. This forwardness is not the result of pecuniary reward for the increase of risk, but a spirit of emulation is at work, and the man entrusted with this duty, if found drawing back, would be completely disgraced.

A retreat should in all cases be kept open, to provide against any accident that may occur; and as this may be done in almost all cases by means so easy and simple, there can be no excuse for its omission. At the same time no one but an expert fireman should be permitted to enter where there is personal danger.

The danger to which firemen are most exposed is catching cold, from their being so frequently drenched with water, and from their exposure to the sudden alternations of heat and cold. A man is turned out of bed at midnight, and in a few minutes after quitting it he is exposed to the sharp air, perhaps, of a frosty winter night; running to the fire as fast as he can, he is, from the exercise, joined to the oppressive heat inside the place on fire, in a few minutes in a state of the most profuse perspiration; and, while in this state, he is almost certain to be soaked with cold water. The smoke is sometimes so thick, that he comes under the range of the branch of the engine without being aware of it till the water strikes him. If he escape this chance, the water rushing on some other object, recoils on him, and produces the same effect; and if the fire be in the roof of the apartment, he must lie down on his back on the floor, and in this manner gets completely steeped.

A bath of this sort is neither very safe nor pleasant; and the only preventive of injury to the health is to keep the men in constant motion. When they are allowed to stand still or sit down, the danger is considerable. When the fire is extinguished, or in two or three hours after its commencement, I make it a rule to give every man a dram of spirits. If it be necessary to leave an engine on the spot, those of the men who are to remain are sent home to change their clothes.

THE LONDON FIRE BRIGADE.

The London Fire Brigade now (January, 1861) consists of one superintendent, four foremen, each being appointed to a district consisting of a fourth part of London, which he never leaves except on some very pressing emergency, and who, in the absence of the superintendent, has the sole command of all engines, or firemen, within, or who may come within, his district; twelve engineers, ten sub-engineers, forty-seven senior firemen, and forty-three junior firemen: in all, one hundred and seventeen individuals. In addition, there are fifteen drivers and thirty-seven horses, all living at the several stations, and ready when required. There is also a supplementary force of four extra firemen, four drivers, and eight horses living at the stations, pursuing their usual avocations, and only paid by the Committee when required. The mechanical appliances consist of twenty-seven large engines drawn by horses, eight small engines drawn by hand, two floating-engines worked by steam, one of forty-horse power, and the other of eighty-horse power, one land steam fire-engine, and twenty-eight hand-pumps, one of the latter being carried on each engine. When an engine is sent to a fire, only four firemen and one driver accompany it. The levers are worked by the by-standers, who are paid one shilling for the first hour, and sixpence for each succeeding hour, besides refreshments. Upwards of six hundred assistants have been thus employed at one time. The principal protection of London against fire is entirely voluntary on the part of the insurance companies, to whom the above establishment belongs; there being no law in any shape whatever to control or sustain the brigade; and with the exception of some fifteen or twenty, the parish-engines are comparatively useless at a serious fire. It must not be omitted, that the greatest possible assistance is given to the firemen by the police, of whom there are about 7000, in keeping back the crowd, &c. The fire-offices look upon the whole as a matter of private business, so that the brigade is proportioned quite as must to the amount which the offices think it prudent to spend as to the size of the place. Paris, which is not half the size of London, and the buildings of which are much more substantial, has upwards of 800 firemen. It appears to me that any success which the brigade may have attained depends, in a great measure, on the liberal pay given, by which the best men for the purpose can be obtained, the favourable view in which the brigade is regarded by the public, and the willing and able assistance given by a numerous and perhaps the best police in existence.

The firemen in London being constantly employed on weekly wages, give their whole time to their employers, and are much more under command than where men are only occasionally employed. The wages and treatment being liberal, although the discipline is severe, there are generally a considerable number of candidates for each vacancy. Thus good men are obtained, seamen being preferred, as they are taught to obey orders, and the night and day watches and the uncertainty of the occupation are more similar to their former habits, than to those of other men of the same rank in life. The large number of fires is, however, the principal cause of any advantage the London firemen may possess over those of smaller places; and it is hardly fair to compare firemen who have only an opportunity of attending one or two fires in a week, to those who attend nearly three fires a day.

The firemen are drilled first daily, and then two or three times a week, for some months; and this, with an average of three calls a day, soon makes them acquainted with the routine of their business; but it takes years of constant work to make a thoroughly good fireman.

The management of the London Fire Brigade is confided to a Committee, consisting of one of the directors or secretaries from each of the fire-offices in London.

The superintendent has the command of the whole force.

The town is divided into four districts, in each of which there are stationed a sufficient number of engines, under the charge of a foreman, with engines and firemen under him.

The districts are as follows:—

NORTH SIDE OF RIVER.

District A. From the eastward to Paul's Chain, St. Paul's Churchyard, Aldersgate-street, and Goswell-street-road.

B. From St. Paul's, &c., to Tottenham-court-road, Crown-street, and St. Martin's-lane.

C. From Tottenham-court-road, &c., westward.

D. South side of River.

The men are clothed uniformly; are distinguished by numbers corresponding with their names in the books; and regularly exercised in the use of their engines, and in such other duties as the Committee or Superintendent may direct.

The following general regulations do not contain rules of conduct applicable to every variety of circumstance that may occur to individuals in the performance of their duty, as something must always be left for the exercise of intelligence and discretion; and, according to the degree in which these qualities in members of the Establishment are combined with zeal and activity, they become entitled to future promotion and reward.

It is strongly impressed upon the minds of all persons serving in the Establishment, that one of the greatest advantages which the present system possesses above that which it superseded, is derived from the embodying the whole force under one responsible officer. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the men to render prompt and cheerful obedience to the commands of their superiors; to execute their duties as steadily and quietly as possible; to be careful not to annoy the inhabitants of houses they may be called upon to enter, and to treat all persons with civility; to take care to preserve presence of mind and good temper, and not to allow themselves to be distracted from their duty by the advice or directions of any persons but their own officers, and to observe the strictest sobriety and general regularity of behaviour.

As every man wears the uniform of the Establishment, which is marked with a number corresponding with his name in the books, he must constantly bear in mind that misconduct will not only reflect discredit upon the Establishment, but be easily brought home to himself and subject him to proportional punishment.

The men are particularly cautioned not to take spirituous liquors from any individual without special permission of the superintendent, or, in his absence, of the foreman of the district; and as intoxication upon the alarming occasion of fires is not only disreputable to the Establishment, but in the highest degree dangerous, by rendering the men unfit for duty, every appearance of it is most rigidly marked, and the foremen, engineers, and sub-engineers report immediately, for the purpose of being laid before the Committee, every instance of insubordination or intoxication, and the men are accordingly apprised that the regulations regarding the above-mentioned faults will be most strictly enforced.

All the men in the Establishment are liable to be punished by fine, suspension, reduction, or dismissal, for disobeying or neglecting any of these regulations, or for any other misconduct; and the disposal of the fines so collected is at the discretion of the Committee.

The following are the conditions upon which each man is admitted into the Establishment:—

He devotes his whole time to the service.

He serves and resides wherever he is appointed.

He must promptly obey all orders which he may receive from those placed in authority over him.

The age of admission does not exceed twenty-five, nor is under eighteen.

He conforms himself to all regulations which may be made from time to time.

He does not upon any occasion, or under any pretence whatever, take money from any person, without the express permission of the Committee.

He appears at all times in the dress of the Establishment.

If lodgings be found for him, a deduction of one shilling per week is made from his pay, if unmarried; if married, and if lodgings be found for him, an agreement in each particular case will be made.

He receives his pay weekly on such day as shall be appointed.

The pay of a Junior Fireman is 3s. per day, or 21s. a week.

The pay of a Senior Fireman, 3s. 6d. a day, or 24s. 6d. a week.

The pay of a Sub-Engineer is 26s. a week.

The pay of an Engineer, 4s. a day, or 28s. a week.

The Foremen are paid by annual salaries.

Each man contributes towards a Superannuation Fund, according to a scale determined by the Committee.

Each man receives annually—

One short frock coat, marked with a number answering to his name in the books.
A black neckcloth.
Two pairs of cloth trousers.
One cloth cap.
Four pairs of boots in three years, and

Once in three years he receives—

One great coat.

He does not quit the service without giving fourteen days' previous notice; if he quits without such notice, or is dismissed, the whole of his pay then due is forfeited.

Every man who is dismissed from the Establishment, or who resigns his situation, delivers up, before he quits the service, every article of dress and appointment which may have been supplied to him; if any of such articles have been, in the opinion of the superintendent, improperly used or damaged, the man makes good the damage or supplies a new article.

Every man in the service is liable to immediate dismissal for unfitness, negligence, or misconduct. The Committee, if they see fit, may dismiss a man without assigning any reason.

No fireman must allow to be used by any other person, nor use himself, except while he belongs to the Establishment, the button and badge given with his clothes.

In the event of sickness rendering any man incapable of performing his duties, the Committee reserves to itself the power of making a deduction from his weekly pay.

Each man, on his admission, gives to the Committee, if required, a letter of guarantee from some respectable person, to an amount not exceeding 50l., as security.

OUTLINE OF GENERAL DUTY.

One-third of the men are constantly on duty at the different engine-houses, night and day; and the whole are liable to be called up for attendance at fires, or for any other duty. In general, it is arranged as follows, viz.:—

If a fire happen in District A, the whole of the men and engines of that district immediately repair to the spot; two-thirds of the men, and one of the engines, from each of the districts B and D, also go to the fire; and one-third of the men from the district C.

If the fire happen in B, the whole of the men and engines in that district immediately repair to the fire; one engine from A, another from C, two-thirds of the men from A and C, and one-third of the men from D.

If the fire happen in C, the whole of the men and engines in that district, one engine and two-thirds of the men from the district B, and one-third of the men from A and D, go to the fire.

If the fire happen in D, the whole of the men and engines in that district, with one engine and two-thirds of the men from the district A, and one-third of the men from B and C, shall go to the fire.

If a fire happen on the boundary of a district, and it is doubtful in which district it has occurred, the whole of the engines and men of the two adjoining districts instantly proceed to the spot, and one-third of the men of the two remaining districts.

In case of emergency, the superintendent calls in such additional force as he may require.

The engines are not taken to alarms of chimneys on fire, unless the circumstances of the case should, in the opinion of the superintendent, foreman, or engineer, require a deviation from this regulation.

When any of the men from another district come to assist at a fire, if the engine to which they are attached is not in attendance, they instantly go to the foreman's engine of the district to which they come.

The engines are conveyed to fires at not less than seven miles per hour, and the men who do not accompany the engines go at not less than four miles per hour.

Any engineer or fireman who, when at a fire, is absent from an engine or a branch pipe, without orders from the superintendent or foreman, is liable to a fine.

If any of the men are sick, or absent from any other cause, their duties are performed by other men attached to their engine-station.

With a view to the men being always at hand, they are lodged as near as possible to their respective engine-houses.

The roll is called at each station every morning and evening.

No man leaves his own residence or the engine-station to which he belongs from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M. except to go to a fire, or by an order from a superior, or with written leave from the superintendent, and the senior man on duty is answerable if he does not report any departure from this rule.

Men on duty not at the engine-stations are allowed one hour for breakfast and one for dinner, as follows:—One-half of the men on duty go to breakfast from 8 to 9, and the other half from 9 to 10; also one-half go to dinner from 1 to 2, and the other half from 2 to 3. The second half in no case leave until the whole of the first half have returned, neither do the men on duty leave morning or evening until the relief has arrived. The engineer or senior man on duty is answerable for this regulation being carried into effect. And any man being absent from the premises he is watching or working in, except at the regular hours, is punished.

The men for duty individually assemble at the principal engine-house in the district before, or precisely at, the hour fixed for that purpose. Their names are called, and an inspection made by the foreman of the district, to ascertain that they are sober and correctly dressed and appointed. The foreman then reads and explains the orders of the day. At the hour for relieving the men, no one leaves his engine-house until the relief has actually arrived there; when the men are relieved, their names are called over, and they are inspected by the engineer, that he may ascertain whether they are sober, and as correctly dressed and appointed as when they went on duty. The engineer enters these inspections in a book.

The engineers deliver a written report, according to a printed form, twice each day, to the foreman of the district, who in his turn reports twice a day to the superintendent.

The whole of the men are, at all times, ready to appear at any place required, for exercise or any other purpose, and are ready (whether on duty or not) to execute whatever orders they may receive, in relation to the Establishment, from the engineers, foremen, or superintendent.

DUTIES OF SUPERINTENDENT.