PAX MUNDI.

A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS OF
THE MOVEMENT FOR PEACE
BY MEANS OF ARBITRATION, NEUTRALIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISARMAMENT

BY

K.P. ARNOLDSON

Member of the Second Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag

AUTHORIZED ENGLISH EDITION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY THE BISHOP OF DURHAM

London
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO.
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1892

Butler & Tanner,
The Selwood Printing Works,
Frome, and London.

CONTENTS.

PREFATORY NOTE.

This little work, written by one who has long been known as a consistent and able advocate of the views herein maintained, has been translated by a lady who has already rendered great services to the cause, in the belief that it will be found useful by the increasing number of those who are interested in the movement for the substitution of Law for War in international affairs.

J.F.G.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.

It is natural that the advocates of international Peace should sometimes grow discouraged and impatient through what they are tempted to consider the slow progress of their cause. Sudden outbursts of popular feeling, selfish plans for national aggrandisement, unremoved causes of antipathy between neighbours, lead them to overlook the general tendency of circumstances and opinions which, when it is regarded on a large scale, is sufficient to justify their loftiest hopes. It is this general tendency of thought and fact, corresponding to the maturer growth of peoples, which brings to us the certain assurance that the Angelic Hymn which welcomed the Birth of Christ advances, slowly it may be as men count slowness, but at least unmistakably, towards fulfilment. There are pauses and interruptions in the movement; but, on the whole, no one who patiently regards the course of human history can doubt that we are drawing nearer from generation to generation to a practical sense of that brotherhood and that solidarity of men—both words are necessary—which find their foundation and their crown in the message of the Gospel.

Under this aspect the Essay of Mr. Arnoldson is of great value, as giving a calm and comprehensive view of the progress of the course of Peace during the last century, and of the influences which are likely to accelerate its progress in the near future.

Mr. Arnoldson, who, as a member of the Swedish Parliament, is a practical statesman, indulges in no illusions. The fulness with which he dwells on the political problems of Scandinavia shows that he is not inclined to forget practical questions under the attraction of splendid theories. He marks the chief dangers which threaten the peace of Europe, without the least sign of dissembling their gravity. And looking steadily upon them, he remains bold in hope; for confidence in a great cause does not come from disregarding or disparaging the difficulties by which it is beset, but from the reasonable conviction that there are forces at work which are adequate to overcome them.

We believe that it is so in the case of a policy of Peace; and the facts to which Mr. Arnoldson directs attention amply justify the belief. It is of great significance that since 1794 there have been "at least sixty-seven instances in which disputes of a menacing character have been averted by arbitration"; and perhaps the unquestioning acceptance by England of the Genevan award will hereafter be reckoned as one of her noblest services to the world. It is no less important that since the principle of arbitration was solemnly recognised by the Congress of Paris in 1856, arbitral clauses have been introduced into many treaties, while the question of establishing a universal system of international arbitration has been entertained and discussed sympathetically by many parliaments.

At the same time Mr. Arnoldson justly insists on the steady increase of the power of neutrals. Without accepting the possibility of "a Neutral League," he points out how a necessary regard to the interests of neutrals restrains the powers which are meditating war. And I cannot but believe that he is right when he suggests that the problems of the neutralization of Scandinavia, of Alsace and Lorraine, of the Balkan States, of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, demand the attention of all who seek to hasten "the coming peace."

It would be easy to overrate the direct value of these facts; but their value as signs of the direction in which public opinion is rapidly moving can hardly be overrated. They are symptoms of a growing recognition of the obligations of man to man, and of people to people, of our common human interests and of our universal interdependence.

I should not lay great stress on the deterrent power of the prospect of the ruinous losses and desolations likely to follow from future wars. A great principle might well demand from a nation great sacrifices; and the very strength of a policy of Peace lies in the postponement of material interests to human duties. But none the less the wide expansion of commercial and social intercourse, joint enterprises, even rivalries not always ungenerous, exercise a salutary influence upon the feeling of nation for nation, and make what were once regarded as natural animosities no longer possible.

Under the action of these forces we are learning more and more to endeavour to regard debated questions from the point of sight of our adversaries, to take account of their reasonable aspirations, to make allowance for their difficulties, even to consider how they can best render their appropriate service to the race, while we strive no less resolutely to keep or to secure the power of fulfilling our own. We could not regard our enemies as our grandfathers regarded theirs. Already the conviction begins to make itself felt that the loss of one people is the loss of all.

Meanwhile the growth of popular power and popular responsibility brings a wider and more collective judgment to bear upon national questions. The masses of peoples have more in common than their leaders, among whom individual character has fuller development. The average opinion of men, when the facts are set forth, responds to pleas of fellowship and righteousness, and tends to become dominant.

Such influences in favour of international Peace spring out of steady movements which, as they continue, will increase them. The past does not limit their power, but simply reveals the line of their action. Above all, they correspond with that view of our Christian faith which the Holy Spirit is disclosing to us by means of the trials of our age. Through many sorrows and many disappointments we are learning that the fact of the Incarnation assures to us the unity of men and classes and nations; and a wider study of history, which is now possible, shows that the course of events makes for the establishment of that unity for which we were created.

I cannot therefore but hope that the Essay of Mr. Arnoldson, which gives substantial evidence of the reality and growth of this movement towards Peace, will confirm in courageous and patient labour for an assured end all who join in the prayer that it may please God "to give to all nations unity, peace, and concord."

B.F. Dunelm.

Auckland Castle,
October 14th, 1891.

PAX MUNDI.

[INTRODUCTION.]

It was the small beginning of a great matter when, on December 22nd, 1620, a hundred Puritans landed from the ship Mayflower upon the rocky shore of the New World, having, during the voyage, signed a constitution to be observed by the colonists.

These pious pilgrims were guided by the conception of religious freedom which should construct for them there a new kingdom. They had, say the annalists of the colony, crossed the world's sea and had reached their goal; but no friend came forth to meet them; no house offered them shelter. And it was mid-winter. Those who know that distant clime, know how bitter are the winters and how dangerous the storms which at that season ravage the coast. It were bad enough in similar circumstances to travel in a well-known region; but how much worse when it is a question of seeking to settle on an entirely unknown shore.

They saw around them only a bare, cheerless country, filled with wild animals and inhabited by men of questionable disposition and in unknown numbers. The country was frozen and overgrown with woods and thickets. The whole aspect was wild; and behind them lay the measureless ocean, which severed them from the civilized world. Comfort and hope were to be found only in turning their gaze heavenward.

That they did conquer that ungrateful land and open the way for the boundless stream of immigration which for wellnigh three centuries has unceasingly poured in, must find its explanation in the faith that upheld their ways amid the dangers of the wilderness, amid the hunger, cold, and all manner of disheartening things, and gave them that power which removed mountains and made the desert bloom.

These Puritans, strong in faith, were the founders of the New World's greatness; and their spirit spoke out to the Old World in the greeting with which the President of the United States consecrated the first transatlantic telegraph cable in 1866:—

"Glory be to God in the highest, and on earth peace, goodwill to men."

When this message came to us, the roar of cannon was but newly hushed, and the man of "blood and iron" had victoriously set his foot upon one of Europe's great powers; the same Austria which since then has, by the Triple Alliance, united its warlike strength with Germany.

But that message has not been an unheeded sound to all; especially to those whose warning voices the people never listen to before the misfortune falls, but who are always justified after it has struck. Yes! perchance in the near future it may again appeal to their reason, and find a hearing only when Europe has fallen into untold miseries after another war.

While menacing forebodings of this long expected war were spreading in the summer of 1887 through various parts of our continent, a little company of courageous men, strong in faith, like the pious pilgrims of the Mayflower, gathered together for the voyage across the sea to the New World, there to lay the foundation of a lasting work for peace.

Their first object was to present to the President of the United States and to Congress an address aiming at the establishment of a Court of Arbitration, qualified to deal with disputes which might arise between Great Britain and the United States of North America. In that address, signed by 270 Members of the British Parliament, allusion was made to the resolutions on peace which from time to time had been brought into Congress; and those who undersigned it declared themselves ready to bring all their influence to bear in inducing the Government of Great Britain to accept the proposition which should come from the Congress. Amongst those who signed it were, besides many distinguished Members of the House of Commons, several peers, including some of the bishops.

The address was presented to President Cleveland on October 31st, by a deputation of twelve Members of Parliament, whose spokesman, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, in his introductory speech, said: "Few events in the world's history would rank with the making of such a treaty. Perhaps only two in our own country's history could fitly be compared with it. Washington's administration established the republic; Lincoln's administration abolished human slavery. We fondly hope, sir, that it may be reserved for yours to conclude a treaty not only with the government of the other great English-speaking nation, but with other lands as well, which shall henceforth and for ever secure to those nations the blessings of mutual peace and goodwill. The conclusion of such a treaty will have done much to remove from humanity its greatest stain—the killing of man by man. And we venture to hope, that if the two great nations here represented set such an example, other nations may be induced to follow it, and war be thus ultimately banished from the face of the earth."

In the President's favourable answer he mentioned that no nation in its moral and material development could show more victories in the domain of peace than the American; and it appeared to him that the land which had produced such proofs of the blessings of peace, and therefore need not fear being accused of weakness, must be in a specially favourable position to listen to a proposal like the present; wherefore he received it with pleasure and satisfaction.

A week later, Nov. 8th, the son-in-law of Queen Victoria, the Marquis of Lorne, presided over a great meeting in London, at which many eminent men were present. The chairman emphatically remarked in his speech, that the settlement of international disputes by a Court of Arbitration has the advantage that, through the delay which is necessary, the first excitement has time to cool. The meeting declared itself unanimously in favour of the proposed memorial. Thereupon followed many similar expressions of opinion in England, whilst simultaneously in twenty of the largest cities of North America mass meetings were held, which with unanimous enthusiasm gave adhesion to the cause, and petitions of the same character flowed in to the President and Congress from the various parts of the great republic.

Encouraged by these preparatory movements amongst the two great English-speaking peoples, M. Frédéric Passy, with other Members of the Legislative Assembly of France, placed himself at the head of a movement to petition the French Government, requesting that it should conclude an Arbitration Treaty with the United States.

Such a memorial, bearing the signatures of 112 deputies and 16 senators, was received with much interest by the President.

On April 21st, 1888, Passy and forty-four other deputies moved a resolution in the Chamber to the same effect; and the idea has been carried forward in many ways since then, especially by a petition to the President of the United States from three International Congresses held in Paris, June 23rd-30th, 1889.

[ARBITRATION.]

Should these efforts lead in the near future to the intended result, International Law would thereby have made an important progress.

It can no longer be denied that International Law does actually exist; but we undervalue its significance because we are impatient. We do not notice the advances it has made because they have been small; but they have been numerous; and slowly, step by step, international jurisprudence has progressed. This affects not only the awakening sense of justice and acknowledged principles, but also their application, which from the days of Hugo Grotius, 250 years ago, down to Martens, Bluntschli, Calvo, and other most distinguished jurists of our day, has been the subject of great scholarly activity, by means of which the various regulations of jurisprudence have little by little been pieced together into a foundation and substance of universally accepted law.

What has been most generally done to gain the object in view has been the Insertion of Arbitral Clauses in treaties which were being concluded or had already been concluded in reference to other questions. In this direction Signor Mancini of Italy has been especially active. As during the time he was Minister of Foreign Affairs he had the concluding of a great number of treaties between Italy and other countries, he made use of the opportunity to insert into almost all—in nineteen instances[1]—an arbitral clause.

We have examples of treaties with such clauses in the commercial treaty between Italy and England, 1883; Norway, Sweden, and Spain, by a supplement in 1887; also England and Greece, 1886. According to the first two agreements, all disputes about the right understanding of the treaties shall be settled by arbitration, as soon as it becomes apparent that it is vain to hope for a friendly arrangement. In the Greco-English treaty it is further stipulated that all disputes which directly or indirectly may arise in consequence of that treaty always shall, if they cannot be amicably arranged, be referred to a committee of arbitration, which shall be nominated by each party with a like number of members; also that if this committee cannot agree, there shall be appointed a tribunal of arbitration, whose decision both nations bind themselves to accept.

The idea of concluding distinct Treaties of Arbitration, or of giving a widely extended range to arbitral clauses, so that they should affect the whole relation of the contracting parties to one another, is comparatively new.

So far as I know, Mr. William Jay was the first who in modern times advocated this idea, in a work which came out in New York in 1842, and in which he proposed: that in the next treaty between, for example, the United States and France, it should be stated that in case any dispute should arise between the two nations, not only in respect of the interpretation of that treaty, but also in respect of any other subject whatever, the dispute should be settled by means of an arbitration by one or more friendly powers.

A similar proposition was presented to Lord Clarendon in 1853. By sending a deputation to the plenipotentiaries at the Congress at Paris in 1856, the English "Peace Society" succeeded in inducing them to introduce into, one of the protocols a solemn recognition of the principle of Arbitration. In the name of their governments they expressed the wish that the states between which any serious misunderstanding should arise, should, as far as circumstances permitted, submit the question to the arbitration of a friendly power before resorting to arms. This proposition, which was unanimously adopted, was made by Lord Clarendon, the representative of England, and supported by the emissaries of France, Prussia, and Italy,—Walewsky, Manteufel, and Cavour.

But the first movement in favour of independent Treaties of Arbitration came up in a petition in 1847, from the English Peace Society to Parliament.

The next year this subject was discussed in the Peace Congress at Brussels.

A few months later, Cobden brought forward in the House of Commons an address to the Government, with the request that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be charged to invite foreign powers to enter into treaties with this object. The proposal was in the beginning received with astonishment and scorn; but called forth later an earnest and important debate.

About six years later, Henry Richard drew the attention of many influential members of the American Congress to the relations which were felt to be favourable for trying to arrange a treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States. American statesmen, less bound by the old traditions of European diplomacy would, it was thought, be able with greater freedom to attempt such a novelty. The replies to this application were very favourable and encouraging, and in various ways since then attempts have been made to realize the idea.

In many Parliaments from time to time propositions in this direction have been brought forward and approved.

On July 8th, 1873, Henry Richard brought before the English Parliament a proposition requesting the Government to invite negotiation with foreign powers for creating a universal and well-established international system of arbitration. The then Prime Minister, Gladstone, expressed himself as favourable to, the proposal, but advised its being withdrawn. Richard, nevertheless, persisted that it should be dealt with, and obtained the remarkable result, that it was carried with a majority of ten.

This example was followed by the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Nov. 24th of the same year; and again on July 12th, 1890;[2] by the States General of Holland, Nov. 27th, 1874; by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Dec. 19th, 1875; and shortly after by the Senate of the United States of America, and Congress also, June 17th, 1874; and April 4th, 1890.

The last-named resolution of Congress had been accepted by the Senate, Feb. 15th of the same year, being recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and runs thus:—

The President be, and is hereby requested to invite from time to time, as fit occasions may arise, negotiations with any government with which the United States has or may have diplomatic relations, to the end that any difficulties or disputes arising between them, which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency, may be referred to arbitration, and be peaceably adjusted by such means.

On May 9th, 1890, Don Arturo de Marcoartu moved in the Spanish Senate that the Spanish Government should enter into relations with other European powers to bring about a permanent tribunal of arbitration in Europe. In the first place, the mover proposed that the states should come to an agreement upon a general truce for five years. In that interval a congress of emissaries from all the European Governments and Parliaments should be called together. The business of the congress should be to work out a code of international law. The proposition was urged, especially with regard to the necessity of finding a reasonable solution of the great social question, since all effort in that direction appears to be hopeless so long as the savings of the nations are swallowed up by military expenditure. The Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the Senate to take the proposition into serious consideration, and on June 14th the Senate resolved to authorize the Government to enter into negotiations with foreign powers for the object indicated.

Neither are the Scandinavian Parliaments unaffected by this movement.

As far back as 1869 the question of arbitration was mooted in the Swedish Parliament by Jonas Jonassen. In 1874 he proposed in the second chamber that Parliament should submit to the King "that it would behove his majesty on all occasions that might present themselves to support the negotiations which foreign powers might open with Sweden or with each other with reference to the creation of a tribunal of arbitration for the solving of international disputes." The committee which dealt with the proposition advised its acceptance. The Lower House passed it, March 21st, by seventy-one votes against sixty-four; but the Upper House rejected it.

The miserable dealing of the Parliament of 1890 with the question I shall have occasion to refer to further on.

In the same year, the question made surprising advance in Norway. On March 5th the Storting voted on the motion of Ullmann and many others, by eighty-nine votes against twenty-four, an address to the King, which begins thus:—

"The Storting hereby respectfully approaches your Majesty, with the request that your Majesty will make use of the authority given by the constitution in seeking to enter into agreements with foreign powers, for the settling by arbitration of disputes which may arise between Norway and those powers."

And concludes with these words:—

"In the full assurance that what the Storting here requests will be an unqualified benefit to our people, it is hereby submitted that your Majesty should take the necessary steps indicated."

A similar resolution was very near being voted by the Danish Folketing in 1875. The proposition as brought forward was, May 13th, unanimously recommended by the committee in charge, but on account of the dissolution of the House two days later, could not be acted upon.

Several years ago a petition was circulated in the various districts of Denmark, by which Parliament was urged to co-operate as early as possible in bringing about a permanent Scandinavian treaty of arbitration.

In such a treaty, binding in the first instance for thirty years, the petition affirms that the three northern kingdoms will have an efficient moral support when there is occasion to withstand the efforts of the great powers to entice or to threaten any of them to take part in war as allies on one side or the other. Such a treaty will, therefore, in great measure serve to preserve the neutrality of the northern kingdoms, and thereby their lasting independence.

This petition was dealt with in the Folketing, March 27th, 1888. After a short discussion, the following motion of F. Bajer was passed by fifty votes against sixteen.

"Since the Folketing agrees with the wish expressed in the petition, provided it is shared by the other States without whom it cannot be carried out, the House passes on to the order of the day."

In his little paper: On the Prevention of War by Arbitration, F. Bajer writes:

"It may certainly be granted, that a little State like Denmark cannot well work at the creation of a European tribunal of arbitration, so far as that means setting itself at the head of a movement for inviting the other European States to a Congress by which its creation shall be adopted.

"But a little State like Denmark can always do something in the direction of arbitration between States. It can bring the matter a practical step forward by applying first to the other small States, especially to the neighbour States of Sweden and Norway, and proposing to them that mutual disputes shall in future, as far as possible, be settled by arbitration when other means have failed. The relations between the three northern kingdoms are indeed now so friendly that a war between them can hardly be thought of for a moment. But—as was said in confirmation of the resolution in the first northern Peace Meeting, respecting a permanent arbitration treaty between the three kingdoms—they have carried on many bloody internecine wars, which have only benefited their powerful neighbours, but have been in the highest degree injurious to themselves; and the possibility of war between the three northern kingdoms is not excluded so long as they are not simultaneously neutralized, or in some other way engaged to carry out a common foreign policy. It is no longer ago than 1873 that the so-called "pilots' war" in Oeresund caused much bad blood among relatives on both sides of the sound. That that was settled authoritatively by the mutual declaration of the 14th of August is due to circumstances on whose continuance for the future it is not possible to reckon. Had a strained relation at the same time obtained between one or more of the great powers within or without the Baltic ports, and had these endeavoured to sow discord between the coast powers, that they might fish in the troubled waters, and feather their own nests by getting these small states as their allies; and if one power had got Denmark, but its enemy got Sweden-Norway as an ally—a new northern fratricidal war would have broken out. Even if such a future possibility cannot be entirely eradicated by a mutual arbitration treaty amongst the northern nations, a new guarantee for peace would be secured." (Bluntschli's expression.) "For the small northern kingdoms would by such a treaty acquire an excellent moral support when it came to withstanding the attempt of the great powers to entice or threaten them into taking part in wars as their allies. Such a participation is always a dangerous game, because, as history shows, the small States lose rather than gain. The small States are used as counters for the great ones to play with."

At this point we may remark, that as far back as 1848, the same year that the Peace Congress was held in Brussels, Feb. 2nd, a treaty (the Guadaloupe-Hidalgo Treaty) was concluded between the United States of America and Mexico, containing a clause that a committee of arbitration shall settle, not only such differences as may arise directly concerning that treaty, but also shall, as the highest authority, adjudicate as far as possible all disputes which may arise between the high contracting States.[3]

Switzerland concluded, July 20th, 1864, a similar treaty with the Hawaian Islands, and on October 30th with San Salvador.[4]

Siam, whose monarch has given many proofs of sympathy for Oskar II., concluded a similar treaty, May 18th, 1868, with the United Kingdoms, and also with Belgium, Aug. 29th of the same year.[5] The Central and South American Republics, Honduras, and the United States of Colombia did the same when on April 10th, 1882, they signed an arbitration treaty between themselves.[6]

Since that time this vigorous idea has grown into the Central and South American Arbitration League, and is now making good way towards being applied to the whole of America.

The question now is, whether the value of peace treaties, in general or in particular, which are established between mutually distant small States can be estimated as highly as the good intention of their creation, which is habitually acknowledged to be good? Are they something to be depended upon? Will they be carried into effect?

That depends in the first place upon what is meant by peace treaties.

If reference is made to certain international settlements which the conquered, with hatred in their hearts, bleeding, upon their knees were forced to accept, we may at once grant that they imply no security for peace, but, on the contrary, are a fresh source of warlike complications.

Thus, for example, the conclusion of peace which France was forced to sign at Versailles, Feb. 26th, 1871, and by which Alsace-Lorraine was torn from France, became a volcano which now for nineteen years has held the nations in suspense and unrest, and still threatens to ruin Europe.

Neither would it be advisable to set much store on such obligations as the Western Powers undertook in the agreement which goes by the name of the November Treaty, to help us to defend the northern part of our peninsula against Russia; because a guaranteed neutrality implies in reality more danger than safety, if the guarantee is not mutual; that is, in this instance, if our eastern neighbour is not included in the guarantee; which is so far from being the case that the treaty, on the contrary, is a source of menace and distrust to him.[7]

With respect to certain treaties of alliance, whose object is to collect the greatest possible number of bayonets as a mutual security against other powers, who, on their side, seek to protect themselves by uniting their forces, nobody can see in them anything else than a guarantee for an armed peace, which, by the necessity of its nature, leads to war.

If, on the contrary, by peace treaties are meant such international contracts as are not written in blood; such as relate to trade and commerce, industry, art, science and so on, it would be in vain to seek for a single instance of the breach of contract, either on the side of the weaker or the stronger.

Neither can any example in our time be pointed to of open violation of the rights of a small country in its quality of an independent State, as long as these rights have stood under the mutual guarantee of the great powers.

As evidence to the contrary, the London treaty of May 8th, 1853, has been adduced, which was intended to secure Denmark's neutrality; the Treaty of Paris, April 14th, 1856, respecting the Black Sea; and the fifth article of the Peace of Prague in 1866. But here the fault lies in a misunderstanding.

What the Treaty of London established was not the indivisibility of Denmark, but of the Dano-German monarchy. The German territory was to be fast linked to the Danish. This was admitted, as a principle, by the treaty to be fitting and right, but the treaty contained no trace of stipulations as to guarantee.

With respect to Russia's breach of treaty of the stipulations as to her banishment from the Black Sea as a military power,[8] it must be remembered that the representatives of the powers, and of Russia also, on January 17th, 1871, signed a protocol, whereby it was settled as an essential axiom in international law, that no power can absolve itself from the obligations which are entered into by treaty without the consent of the contracting parties. Therefore Russia openly acknowledged that her declaration of not choosing to abide by the injunctions stipulated for in the Treaty of Paris respecting the Black Sea, was precipitate, and that, consequently, the treaty was permanently in force until it was formally abrogated. This took place in the new treaty of March 3rd, of the same year. Besides, here comes in what was said above about the value of such treaties as are concluded after brute force has determined the issue. And this not only was the case in the Black Sea stipulations, but also with respect to the unfulfilled promises of article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, whereby the Danish people was to be given the opportunity for a plebiscite in determining upon their reunion with Denmark. As to the peace treaties between the lesser States, which certainly have important trade relations one with another, but which, on account of their mutually distant position, cannot reasonably be expected to go to war with each other, it is true that one cannot in general attribute any special importance to them. Nothing is gained by over-estimating their value. But they deserve to be brought forward as enrichments of international law and guide-posts for other States. And that the small States need not wait until the great ones are ready to unite appears just as much in accordance with the nature of the case as with the interests of their own well-being.

Calvo, undeniably the first authority in these matters, emphasizes as a significant fact, that no single example can be pointed to in which States, after their mutual disputes have been referred to the consideration or judgment of arbitrators, have sought to withdraw from the operation of the decision. And according to Henry Richard and other authorities, by allowing international questions to be settled by arbitration, at least in sixty-seven instances, disputes of a menacing character have been averted.

I shall not here give a detailed account of all these instances, but only with the greatest conciseness refer to some of them.

In 1794 a contest between England and the United States of America respecting St. Croix river was settled by arbitration; in 1803 France was in the same way condemned to pay 18 million francs to the United States of America for unlawful seizure of vessels; in 1818 a threatening dispute between Spain and the United States of America was settled by arbitration, and a contention between these and England was arranged by the Emperor of Russia, who was chosen as arbitrator, etc.

The best known of such disputes was the so-called Alabama question, which threatened a desolating world-war. This affair sprang out of the North American civil war 1861-65. The Southern States had privateers built in England, among which the Alabama especially wrought great mischief to the Northerners. The Government of the Union considered that England had broken her neutrality in allowing the equipment of the privateer, and requested compensation.

A bitter feeling grew up and war appeared inevitable. But on January 24th, 1869, an agreement was happily entered into, which, with fresh negotiations, led to the Washington treaty, May 8th, 1871. In harmony with this the dispute was referred for settlement to a Court of Arbitration consisting of five members, of which England and the United States each chose one, and the neutral states of Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil, likewise each chose one. These five met on December 15th, 1871, as a tribunal of arbitration, at Geneva, and delivered their judgment on September 14th following (four votes against England's one), that the English Government had made a breach in its duty as a neutral power with respect to some of the privateers under consideration, and therefore England would have to pay an indemnity of 15½ million dollars to the United States.[9]

England bowed to the award and fulfilled her duty.

In the same way the powerful insular kingdom voluntarily submitted to settlement in the weary contention regarding the possession of Delagoa Bay and the surrounding region on the east coast of Africa. The dispute was entrusted for settlement, in 1874, to the President of the French Republic, MacMahon, and he decided in July, 1875, in favour of Portugal. That the new contention between these two States, which for some time now has excited an inflammable spirit, not only in Portugal, but in other countries as well, will be arranged in the same friendly manner, there is but little doubt.

The claim of Portugal is much older than that of England. Its special ground is the discovery of the coast which was made by Portuguese mariners three hundred years ago. The Portuguese urge, that since the coast is theirs, they have a right to go as far inland as they choose and place the country thus entered under their dominion. They say further, that they have made a treaty with a native ruler over a kingdom which stretches far inland, and that ruined fortresses are still to be found which show that they once had this distant region in possession. To this assertion Lord Salisbury answers, that where ruined fortresses are found they only testify to fallen dominion. The English Government could not recognise Portugal's construction of the contested question; according to that construction the question would virtually turn upon the possession of Shireland and Mashonaland (the inland country north and south of the Zambesi). It denied Portugal's claim to this territory as so entirely groundless that it could not enter into such a question; but has on the other hand made a peremptory claim, arising from Portugal's violence towards the natives who are under England's protection, for dishonour to the English flag, and for other international offences, etc.

The right of possession of the regions in question can no longer be regarded as doubtful, since Portugal had set aside the general international axiom, that the claim for possession according to colonial usage can only be held valid when colonization is actually carried out to the furtherance of civilization and public safety. Portugal's assertion that the signatories of the Congo Act would be the right adjudicators of the question was denied, upon the ground that Portugal had delayed to make her claim valid when Nyassaland was declared to belong to the sphere of England's interests. On July 1st, 1889, the Under-secretary, Sir James Fergusson, in the Lower House, explained that the Portuguese Government had been informed that they would be held answerable for all loss which Englishmen might suffer by the annulling of the Delagoa railway convention. The same day Lord Salisbury informed the Upper House that the English Government would send three war-ships to Delagoa Bay, to be ready in case of need. Portugal's conduct was, in his opinion, unjustifiable.

Then came the noble lord's ultimatum, with the demand that Portugal should recall all Portuguese officers and troops from the territory which stands under the sovereignty of England or lies within the sphere of England's interests, and give an answer within twenty-four hours; otherwise England would be compelled to break off her relations with Portugal. This threatening manner of procedure, by which a weaker nation was humbled by superior power, roused bad blood in Portugal and was sharply censured in many parts of Europe; yes, even in England, and in Parliament, in the press, and at many great public meetings. At one of these meetings, composed of 700 workmen delegates from various parts of England and 130 Members of Parliament, in quality of vice-presidents, it was unanimously resolved to protest against Lord Salisbury's conduct as at variance with the dignity of the British nation; and to request that the dispute should be settled by arbitration—so much the rather, as the more certain one is of being in the right, the more confidently can one's cause be placed in the hands of an impartial tribunal. Later on the English Government, together with the North American virtually resolved on this expedient for solving, the difficulties relating to Delagoa Bay. Portugal made difficulties and delays, but at length declared herself willing to enter into a proposal for arbitration.[10] All three States were now united in asking the Government of Switzerland to choose three of her most distinguished jurist officials as arbitration judges.

At the time when the first Anglo-Portuguese contest was settled by the President of the French Republic there occurred a second example of both importance and interest. For many years there had been a menacing boundary dispute between Italy and Switzerland, just a little seed of quarrel, such as formerly always broke out into bloody strife, since according to the traditions of national honour not an inch of a patch of ground must be given up except at the sword's point. But the two kingdoms decided to commend the case to an arbitrator, viz., the United States minister in Rome, P. Marsh, who, after a careful study of the claims of the contending parties, declared judgment in favour of Italy, and so the contention was adjusted.

Two dangerous disputes, which in 1874-75 and 1880 threatened an outbreak of war between China and Japan, but were happily solved by arbitration, might be named, but for fear of being prolix I dare not go more particularly into them, instructive as they are.

The first arose as a result of a murder of some Japanese on the island of Formosa, and was settled by the English minister in Pekin, who was chosen by both parties as arbitrator, who decided that China should give Japan in redress a large sum of money, which was done.[11]

The second of these disputes concerned the sovereignty of the Liu Kiu Islands, and was adjusted by a compromise brought about by ex-president Grant, who in a conversation with the Chinese Minister uttered these memorable words: "An arbitration between two nations will never satisfy both nations alike; but it always satisfies the conscience of humanity."[12]

Not to be tedious, I pass over here many other remarkable instances in which war and lesser misfortunes have been averted by arbitration; and will now name further only some of the latest date.

In 1887 a lengthened dispute about boundaries between Chili and the Argentine Republic was adjusted by arbitration, through the mediation of the United States Ministers in the two countries. After a complete and precise fixing of the boundary line, an agreement was added: That the Straits of Magellan shall for ever be neutralized; free passage shall be secured to ships of all nations, and the erection of forts or other military works on either of its shores shall be forbidden.

Fresh in the memory is the passionate quarrel between Spain and Germany about the Caroline Islands. That was submitted, on Prince Bismarck's proposal, to Pope Leo XIII. for settlement, and was adjusted by him.

Most people now living remember the Afghanistan boundary question, which was happily solved by the friendliness on both sides of the Russian and English Governments. The whole world followed for a while that dispute with anxiety and disquietude. The press unhappily, as usual, employed its influence in stirring up the national passions in both countries. But before it had gone too far, fortunately the feelings were quieted by the public being reminded that both England and Russia had taken part in the resolution of the Paris Congress, which declared that when any serious dispute arose between any of the contracting powers, it should be referred to the mediation of a friendly power. Upon this ground the English Government proposed to the Russian that the "dispute should be referred to the ruler of a friendly State, to be adjusted in a manner consistent with the dignity of both lands." This proposal was accepted, but did not come into practice. It was not needed. The Afghanistan boundary commission itself carried out its duties to a successful issue.

Still later many smaller international disputes have been solved by arbitration; for instance:—

Between Italy and Colombia in South America, respecting Italian subjects who had suffered loss through the last revolution in Colombia, in which Spain as arbitrator decided in favour of Italy.

Between Brazil and Argentina respecting their boundaries, a dispute in which both parties appealed for a settlement to the President of the United States of America, and which was adjusted by him.

Between the United States of North America and Denmark, in which the latter was, by the chosen arbitrator, the English Ambassador at Athens, Sir Edward Monson, after long delay freed from the obligation to pay compensation to the Americans, because the Danish authorities had fired at an American ship which in 1854 was escaping out of the harbour of St. Thomas, and which was suspected of carrying supplies to Venezuela, at that time in insurrection.

In conclusion it can be urged,—

That France and Holland agreed to have the boundary between their possessions in Guiana determined by arbitration.[13]

That the international committee which met in Washington to arrange the impending fishery question between Great Britain, Canada and the United States, decided to recommend the creation of a permanent tribunal of arbitration for adjusting future disputes respecting these relations; also:

That the council of the Swiss Confederation, at the combined request of Portugal and of the Congo State Government has undertaken to arbitrate the possible disputes which may arise respecting the regulation of boundaries amongst their African territories.

Besides these and other instances which I am acquainted with, many others have certainly taken place, though attracting less attention.

The idea of arbitration goes peacefully and quietly forward, and the world therefore takes little notice of it.

It is quite otherwise with the crash of war, whose external show of greatness and glory, and whose inward hatred and crime, are desolating the happiness of the nations and are accompanied by distress and gloom.

The one is a fearful hurricane which rends the mountains and breaks in pieces the rocks.

The other is the still small voice, mightier than the devastating storm, since it speaks to us in the name of everlasting righteousness, because it is the voice of God.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Mazzoleni, in his "L'Italia nel movimento per la Pace," gives twenty instances. See pp. 58, 59. trans.

[2] On a motion by Ruggiero Bonghi, supported by Crispi in a speech in which he said that the future depended upon a European tribunal of arbitration.

[3] See Martens' "Nouveau recueil général," xiv. p. 32 (art xxi.), and Calvo, "Droit International," II., § 1499.

[4] According to a Manuscript by President Louis Ruchonnet, addressed to F. Bajer.

[5] See "Svensk förfaltningssamling," 1869, No. 74, page 26, and "Lois Beiges," 1869, No. 36, § 24. In the Swedish-Siamese treaty, art. 25, it is stated: "Should any disagreement arise between the contracting parties which cannot be arranged by friendly diplomatic negotiation or correspondence, the question shall be referred for solution to a friendly neutral power, mutually chosen, whose decision the contracting powers shall accept as final." Similar agreements are to be concluded between Italy and Switzerland, Spain and Uruguay, Spain and Hawaii, and between France and Ecuador.

[6] The Treaty is given word for word in the Herald of Peace, July, 1883.

[7] In this treaty, which was concluded at Stockholm, Nov. 21st, 1855, the King of Norway and Sweden bound himself not to resign to Russia, or to barter with her, or otherwise allow her to possess, any portion of the territory of the united kingdoms, nor to grant to Russia right of pasture or fishery, or any similar rights, either on the coast of Norway or Sweden. Any Russian proposal which might be made under this head must be made directly to France or England, who then by sea and land must support us by their military power. A glorious contrast to the declaration of neutrality, Dec. 15th, 1853!

[8] Conquered Russia had to bind herself, at the conclusion of peace, not to keep war ships in the Black Sea, not to have any haven for war ships on her coasts. Stipulations which were perceived by all thinking men at the time to be untenable in the long run.

[9] £3,196,874 were received by Sec. Fish, Sept. 9th, 1873. See Haydn's "Dictionary of Dates."

[10] The Arbitrator, 1890, April.

[11] The Japanese Government demanded redress, which was at first refused by China. This led to a stormy correspondence, which at last became so bitter that both sides prepared for war. The Japanese troops had already taken possession of Formosa. During this dangerous juncture, the British minister in Pekin, Sir Thomas Wade, offered to mediate as an arbiter. The offer was accepted, and led to an agreement between the Chinese Government and the Japanese ambassador in Pekin, by which China was to pay Japan 50,000 taels, and the Japanese troops were to evacuate Formosa. When Lord Derby, who was at that time Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, received a telegram from Sir Thomas Wade respecting this happy result, he answered him: "It is a great pleasure to me to present to you the expression of the high esteem with which her Majesty's Government regards you for the service you have rendered in thus peaceably adjusting a dispute which otherwise might have had unhappy consequences, especially to the two countries concerned, but also for the interests of Great Britain and other parties to treaties." Sir Harry Parkes, the English minister in Japan, wrote to Lord Derby, that the Mikado, the Emperor of that land, had invited him to an interview for the purpose of expressing his satisfaction at the result, and through him to present his warm thanks for his brave and efficient service. The Japanese minister in London also called upon Lord Derby and expressed the thanks of his Government to Mr. Wade. "He could assure me," said Lord Derby, when he repeated the words of his excellency, "that the service which has thus been rendered will remain in grateful remembrance among his countrymen."

[12] This dispute had assumed quite a serious and menacing character when the ex-president Grant, on his journey round the world, came to China. When his arrival became known, the Chinese prince, Kung, submitted to him that he should use his great influence in mediating between the two countries. A specially interesting conversation followed: "We have," said Prince Kung, "studied international law as it is set forth by English and American authors, whose works are translated into Chinese. If any value is to be set upon principles of international right, as set forth by the authors of your nation, the doing away with the independence of the Liu Kiu Islands is an injustice." Grant reminded him that he was there only as a private individual, but added, "It would be a true joy to me if my advice or efforts could be the means of preserving peace, especially between two nations for whom I cherish such interest as for China and Japan." Immediately afterwards he returned to Tokio, the capital of Japan, called upon the Emperor and his Minister, and advocated a peaceable settlement of the dispute. He wrote to Prince Kung the result of his mediation, and produced a scheme for a Court of Arbitration.

[13] At the Peace of Utrecht, 1713, it was decided that the course of the river Maronis was the boundary. But that river divides itself into two branches which embrace a large tract of land, almost a fifth part of French Guiana. Neither France nor Holland had claimed that land until gold beds were discovered there, and it had to be decided which of the two arms of the river was to be considered as the Maronis, and which as a tributary.

[NEUTRALITY.]

Side by side with the idea of arbitration, another pacific idea, already powerful, is pressing forward, and growing into an International Law, namely, the Law of Neutrality.

He is neutral, who neither takes part for, nor against, in a dispute. Neutrality is the impartial position which is not associated with either party. The State is called neutral which neither takes part in a war itself, nor in time of war sides with any of the warring parties.

In ancient times neutrality was not understood as a national right. Neither the Greek nor the Latin language has any word to express the idea. In the days when Roman policy was seeking to drag all the nations of the earth into its net, the Romans saw in other peoples only tributaries who had been subdued by their armies, subject nations who had submitted to the Roman yoke, allies who were compelled to join in their policy of conquest, or lastly enemies, who sooner or later would have to bow before their victorious legions. Neutral States there were none.

The centuries immediately following the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire were filled with constant strife. This continued long before the refining power which exists in the heart of Christianity began to show itself in the foreign relations of States.

The foundations of modern Europe were laid in war.

During the Crusades the whole of our continent was under arms. The struggle against the "infidel" was not simply a contest between one State and another, it was also a contest between Christian Europe and Mohammedan Asia. To be neutral in such a struggle would, according to the judgment of the time, have been equivalent to denying the faith. Within the European States, feudalism exerted no less a hindrance to the embodiment of the principle of neutrality. It would have been thought the gravest crime to loosen the bond of military service which compelled vassals to support with arms the cause of their feudal lords. It was only with the close of the age of feudalism, when Europe began to separate into three or four great monarchies, that neutrality in politics became a means of preserving the balance.

In later times increasing communication and trade have above all contributed to the development of neutral laws. Without the sanction of these, a naval war between two great nations would have made any maritime trade all but impossible. Down to the close of the last century, however, neutral rights were dependent either on national statutes or on special treaties concluded between one State and another. The law only gained certain international importance towards the close of the eighteenth century through the neutral alliances which from time to time were contracted between States.

In the period between 1780 and 1856 the subject gained an entrance by degrees among all maritime nations except England, who, independent of it, and always relying on her own strength, continuously sought to maintain unlimited domination at sea.

In 1854-56 begins, so far as neutrality is concerned, a new era of international law.

From this time the opposition which England raised to the practical application of neutrality in naval war may be regarded as having broken down. On the 30th of March, 1854, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, published a communication, including, amongst other things, that the neutral flag during the then begun (Crimean) war, should be regarded as a protection for all neutral and hostile private property, except contraband of war. The same day the English Government gave forth in the London Gazette a similar declaration, and on April 19th of the same year the Russian Government notified in the Official Gazette of St. Petersburg that Russia would, during that war, act upon the same rules as the Allied powers.

The provisions, which thus the Western powers on one side, and Russia on the other, believed themselves bound to observe towards neutral states, were at the Peace of Paris, 1856, solemnly ratified as International Law in force for all time. The principles which the plenipotentiary signatories of the Peace Treaty of Paris agreed upon in a proclamation of April 16th, 1856, are as follows:—

1. Privateering is and shall be abolished. 2. The neutral flag shall protect property belonging to the enemy, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, may not be seized under the enemy's flag. 4. Blockades in order to be obligatory must be fully effectual; that is, shall be maintained with a strength really sufficient to prevent approach to the enemy's coast.

The Governments which signed the treaty bound themselves also, in this proclamation, to communicate the resolutions to the States which were not called to take part in the Paris Conference, and to invite them to agree in these decisions. All the European States except Spain, and a number of powers outside Europe, declared themselves ready to carry out in practice the entire resolutions of the proclamation.

Many wars since then have shaken Europe; but under all these misfortunes the warring States have not only conscientiously observed the principles laid down in 1856, but they have gone further, in certain points, in applying them, than they by it were bound to do. Thus the Austrian Government issued an order, during the war with France and Sardinia, with respect to maritime national law, in many points far beyond what hostile or neutral powers had any ground for requesting. The Imperial decree not only charged its military and civil officers to follow strictly the injunctions of the proclamation, but Sardinian and French vessels, which lay moored in Austrian waters, were also to be permitted to load freight and proceed to foreign seas, on condition that they took on board no contraband of war or prohibited goods of any description. Immediately on the outbreak of war, the same principles were adopted by France and Sardinia. These States, however, went a step further than Austria, inasmuch as they unreservedly declared that they would not regard coal as a contraband of war.

During the Dano-German War, in 1864, and the war between Austria and Prussia and Italy, in 1866, the international principles of maritime law received a similarly wide interpretation.

During the North American Civil War important questions came up, which more or less affected the principle of neutrality. The question, which became one of the greatest importance, arose in respect of the injury which the commerce and navigation of the Union suffered during the war from various privateers which were built in England on the Southerners' account.

The Alabama Question took its name from the privateer which went out from Liverpool and occasioned the greatest devastation while the war lasted. Although the executive of the Union at Washington duly directed the attention of the English Government to the fact that allowing the pirate to leave the English port would be equivalent to a breach of the peace, yet the Government took no measures to prevent the vessel leaving. The American Government, who with reason regarded this omission as a violation of the laws of neutrality, claimed from England full compensation for the property which had been destroyed in the course of the civil war by the Southern privateer which came from an English port. I have previously given more particularly the constitution and functions of the Court of Arbitration appointed to settle the threatening dispute which arose on this occasion. The arbitration award had to be adjudicated in accordance with the three following fundamental principles of international law:—

A neutral Government is bound:—

1. To guard assiduously against any vessel being armed or equipped in its ports, which there is reason to believe would be employed for warlike purposes against a peaceful power, and with equal assiduity to prevent any vessel designed for privateering, or other hostility, from leaving the domain of the neutral State:

2. Not to allow any belligerent power to make use of its ports or harbours as the basis of its operations, or for strengthening or repairing its military strength, or for enlisting:

3. To use every care within its ports and harbours and over all persons within its domain, to prevent any violation of the obligations named.

The contracting parties to this treaty agreed to hold themselves responsible for the future, and to bring them before the notice of other Maritime powers, with the recommendation that they also should enter into them.

The historical facts here produced show that the mutual interest nations have in the inviolability of the seas has effectually contributed to the development of an accepted international law.

When the necessity of making the principles of neutrality binding at sea was once understood, it was not long before the value of adopting them on land became apparent.

In the documents, for instance, by which Belgium, Switzerland and Luxemburg are neutralized, it is distinctly stated that the permanent neutrality of these States is in full accord with the true interests of European policy.

According to the actual modern law of nations, there is a permanent neutrality guaranteed by international deeds of law and treaties, and one occasionally resting upon free decisions.[14]

As instances of permanent and guaranteed neutrality, we have: The Neutralization of Switzerland. Ever since the unhappy Italian war in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Swiss Confederation has endeavoured to assure to the country the security which neutrality gives.

This neutrality was recognised and guaranteed by the great European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (art. 84 and 92), and later was further solemnly confirmed by a special act of the powers at Paris, Nov. 20th of the same year, in which it was stated:

"The powers declare ... by a permanent act that the permanent neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, as well as its independence of foreign influence, accords with the true interests of European policy."[15]

The Neutralization of Belgium. In virtue of the Treaty of London, Nov. 15th, 1831 (art. vii.), further confirmed by the powers April 19th, 1839, a permanent neutrality was awarded to Belgium.

This country, which for centuries had served as a battle-ground for foreign powers, especially for France and Germany, was hereby secured against such dangers, and at the same time the field for European warfare was materially narrowed.

Article vii. of the London protocol runs thus: "Belgium shall, within the boundaries established in art. i. and iv., form an independent State. The kingdom is bound to observe the same neutrality towards all States."[16]

During the Franco-German war 1870-1, the neutralization of Belgium was threatened with violation by France, and further guarantees were given in new protocols arranged by England.

The Neutralization of the Archduchy of Luxemburg resulted from the London protocol of May 11th, 1867.

As an evidence of the power and importance in our day of entering into agreements of neutrality, the following may be adduced:—

During the Franco-German war, 1870-1, the Prussian Government complained to the guaranteeing powers of conduct at variance with neutrality on the part of Luxemburg, and threatened no longer to respect the neutrality of the Archduchy. (Despatch of Prince Bismarck, Dec. 3rd, 1870.)

In consequence of this, Count Beust, the Austrian chancellor, in an opinion given Dec. 22nd of the same year, remarked, that upon the ground of the principle of European guarantee, it belonged to the powers who had signed the document of neutralization, to inquire into and to settle whether a violation had taken place on the part of the neutral State, and not to one of the belligerent powers.[17]

Besides the States named, a permanent neutrality has been secured to the Ionian Islands according to the treaties of London, 1863-64; and also to the Samoan Islands, in virtue of the agreement between England, Germany, and the United States of North America, whereby, amongst other things, it was settled that in case of any difference of opinion arising; an appeal should be made to arbitration; and that a supreme tribunal should be created with a supreme judge, whom the King of Sweden and Norway has been empowered to name.

One general advantage which neutralization affords is the simplification with respect to foreign policy thereby obtained.

The attitude of a neutralized State can be reckoned on beforehand by all parties.

In proportion to its military importance and position, a neutral country constitutes in many ways a security to all the powers.

It is in close connection with neutralization that in these days an ever-growing need is becoming apparent to localize wars as much as possible; that is, to confine them to those who begin them.

As a result of the extraordinarily rapid development of world-wide trade and intercourse, and the consequent community of interests, a war between two States necessarily occasions more or less derangement to the rest.

In this increasing solidarity lies the surest guarantee that neutrality will be respected.

We may already be justified in drawing the conclusion that the security of neutral States will continually increase.

Supported upon these foundations of history and of international law, a discussion was raised on the neutralization of Sweden, in the First Chamber by Major C.A. Adelsköld, and by myself in the Second, in the hope thereby not only to oppose the King's bill for the extension of the war department, but also especially to open the way for a profitable solution of the tough, old, threadbare question of Defence.[18]

Before this resolution was brought into the Riksdag, I had read it to seventy members of the Riksdag, who unanimously accepted it, as did also, later on, in the main, a majority of the [Norwegian] Storting. [19]And as soon as the purport of the resolution became generally known through the press, there came in from popular meetings all over Sweden numerous congratulatory addresses to Major Adelsköld and myself.

But from its very commencement the proposition met with an unconquerable opposition from those in power.

With great unanimity efforts were made in this quarter to depreciate the value and the historical importance of the principle of neutrality. All possible means were used with this object, to touch the tenderest fibres of the national feelings. It would be a disgrace to us, it was said, to employ any other than military power in asserting our primeval freedom. We should thereby break off from our glorious history, and draw a black line over its brilliant warlike reminiscences. There were certainly neutral countries to be found, but their neutrality was not the result of their own desire, but proceeded from the great powers themselves. Should we then, they say further, be the first people to take such a step? Would it not be equivalent to begging peace of our neighbour, and declaring ourselves incapable before the whole world? The sensible thing would be to further develop and strengthen our army. The resolution was called a political demonstration of indigence; a disgusting nihilist plot, and so on. One member of the Riksdag proposed that it should be consigned to a committee charged with arranging for sending beasts abroad. Scoffs came thick as hail; and when it became known that the mover in the Second Chamber was its author, the really guilty one, he was branded as a universal traitor,—just as the year before, when he raised a peaceable question about extended liberty of conscience.

In my defence of the resolution in the Riksdag, I sought to anticipate all objections to it which were worthy of notice.[20]

Amongst these I give special attention to the following five:—

1. "The powers will not enter into the neutralization of Sweden.

2. "But if, contrary to expectation, they did, the safety of the country would gain nothing by it.

3. "On the contrary, our independence would be diminished by a guaranteed neutrality.

4. "Without lessening our military burdens for defence.

5. "The proposition is untimely."

With regard to the first objection, viz., that the powers would not enter upon Sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances of great weight imply the contrary.

We may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult their own interests. Scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great Baltic and Western States. But it would be quite a matter of consideration, whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage of being possibly able to reckon upon Scandinavia as an ally.

A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side, and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody.

So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view, lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms and Denmark.

My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian North than around those two small continental States.

We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance with a powerful enemy of Germany.

But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia.

In the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed in many regions. As an example of the effect of these we may mention that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was 50-60 shillings sterling per ton, from the Black Sea to North Europe; but the freightage from California and Australia to Europe, now, hardly exceeds the half. A European war would exercise a paralyzing effect here. Every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will easily understand this.

Before the century closes this development will have woven a net of common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of Europe, that, for example, an injury in the foot of Italy may be said to cause pain right up to Norway.

The merchant fleet of Norway, alone, is indeed the third in rank of all the merchant fleets of the world. As is well known, the united kingdoms take an advanced place in the carrying trade by sea. According to what was told me by a distinguished merchant, the transport trade undertaken by Norwegian and Swedish ships between foreign countries is five times greater than that between home and foreign lands. Consequently, as the keen competition between steam and sailing vessels increases, the only country which can dispense with the service of our sailing vessels is England, the great power upon which we may reckon always as an ally. Most of the remaining countries, on the other hand, require our merchant fleet.

Since, now, we could not of course defend our merchant service in a war, and other and greater nations may be jeopardized as much as we, it may be assumed that they would be willing, through the neutralization of Scandinavia, to secure its fleet against the eventualities of war.

If we add such interests as affect trade and credit, civilization and humanity, to the political interests, it appears that we may plead on grounds of strong probability that the great powers would be willing to guarantee our neutrality.

According to the second objection, the country would gain no security from a guaranteed neutrality, even if, contrary to expectation, such could be obtained.

Perfect safety cannot be attained here on earth by any system. This is as true for nations as for individuals but I believe that a neutrality thus guaranteed would be a strong protection to our national independence, whilst in a not inconsiderable degree it would contribute to the preservation of peace, and gradually help to lessen the military burdens of all lands; consequently, and in the first place, of our own.

Treaties, it is said, are broken as easily as they are made. Even if it be true that this has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that it must continue to occur. New factors may come in making it more difficult to break engagements that have been entered into.

Experience shows that righteous laws have been transgressed, but no one would aver that they are therefore unnecessary. As the moral power of the law makes it possible to diminish the police force, so also treaties of neutrality make it possible to diminish the military forces.

Besides, our opponents ought to bring forward evidence that the rights of States at present neutralized have been violated. That they have been threatened is true, and it would have been a wonder if this had not happened under the lawless condition which has obtained among nations.

The idea of neutrality has, nevertheless, as I have tried to show by many examples, little by little developed into a valid principle of justice; and the growth continues. The neutralization of Scandinavia would bring it a great step forward, to the blessing both of ourselves and of other nations.

According to objections 3 and 4, a guaranteed neutrality would diminish our independence without contributing to lessen our burdens for defence.

The truth is, that international law as at present constituted does not permit another power to interfere under any pretext with the internal concerns of a neutral state, and therefore not with anything which affects its system of defence or its measures for preserving its neutrality. With these the neutral State, and it only, can deal.

As a proof of this being so, Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 upon condition that the strong fortress bearing that name should be demolished. But this circumstance, imperative for the general peace of Europe, shows on the other hand that guaranteeing powers do not willingly impose upon a State any serious duty of fortifying itself in order to defend its rights. Nevertheless the powers found it needful to make a supplementary clause to the protocol by which the congress concluded the neutrality of Luxemburg, whereby it was emphasized, as a matter of course, that the article respecting the destruction of the fortress of Luxemburg did not imply any sort of limitation of the right of the neutral State to maintain, or, if it chose, to improve its own works of defence. Belgium did indeed construct the great fortresses around Antwerp long after the country was neutralized.

In reference to what one and another has said about the value of the subject, nothing is needed beyond the fact that neutral rights have, even in its present position, been respected in all essentials. That a neutral power must abstain from mixing itself up with the policy of other powers cannot imply a greater limitation of its right to self-regulation than that a guaranteeing power shall abstain from attacking a neutralized State or from making military alliance with it. There is certainly a limitation for both parties, as far as is necessary for adopting an intelligent union between States,—a limitation of physical force and of love of war.

The neutral State has not to submit to any guardianship beyond what any man must do and does, when he subjects his passions to the control of a moral purpose.

Seeing that a guaranteeing State has no right to interfere in our internal concerns, not even in anything we think good for our defence, we shall always be free to keep up a military force, large or small. But a neutralized State is obliged to disarm the troops of other belligerent powers that may overstep its frontiers, just as of course, under the lawless condition which war is and which it entails, it has, according to its ability, to protect its boundaries with arms. But if this duty cannot exempt Switzerland and Belgium from proportionately large war burdens in time of peace, this would not at all in the same degree affect the neutralization of the Scandinavian peninsula, since there could never be a question of disarming troops which had overstepped its boundaries, but only of preventing the war-ships of a belligerent power from entering Norwegian or Swedish seas, a thing which, under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality, could not take place.

Respecting the fifth objection, which declares that the proposition is untimely, I do not hesitate to express my opinion that just now, during the truce which prevails, is the time to bring it forward. The need of a settled peace increases everywhere, and it is therefore probable that a proposition to the great powers respecting a guaranteed neutrality for the united kingdoms would meet with general sympathy in Europe.

On these and many other grounds I sought to maintain my proposition.

It was opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hochschild, amongst others, who declared that he could not possibly support it. He informed us that the whole of his colleagues in the Government took the same view of the subject as himself. He desired that the bill as well as the contingent appointment of a committee should be thrown out totally and entirely.

As the minister in this way has made the matter into a cabinet question, there could not well, under the present conditions, be any question of the adoption of the bill.

In spite of this, however, the request of the Foreign Minister was not complied with, seeing the Second Chamber adopted an amendment after fifty-three members had voted for the acceptance of the original bill.

By the amendment which was adopted, the Chamber did not accept the grounds of the committee's opinion—which the Foreign Secretary approved—but, in the hope that the Government would spontaneously carry out the chief object of the bill, accepted for the present the report of the committee that no address be sent to the King on the subject.

By reason of this result in the Second Chamber no action was taken in the First on the matter.[21]

During the debate in the Second Chamber, April 28, the Foreign Secretary remarked that I must have overlooked the fact that the European powers had, ever since 1814, looked upon the two kingdoms of the Scandinavian peninsula as a political unity in questions relating to peace and war; why otherwise should I propose from the first that the sister kingdom should have the opportunity of expressing itself on a matter which concerned Norway equally with Sweden. This objection was without foundation.

During the drawn debate, March 3, I had already taken occasion to point out that it would not be seemly for one moving a resolution in the Swedish Riksdag to act as spokesman for Norway at the same time expressing my confidence that the Storting would meet us in a friendly manner, if the Riksdag approved the bill with respect to Sweden.[22]

That the neutralization ought to include not only Norway, but Denmark too, seems to be obvious.

A highly esteemed jurist, Count L. Kamarowsky, professor of law at the University of Moscow, puts it as a matter of great importance in the interests of the world's peace that international seas and coasts should be neutralized.[23] This particularly affects Denmark in connection with the other two Scandinavian States. Such a neutralization, he says, will lead to a disarmament in the Sound and Belts. These great traffic-ways would then be accessible for the merchant and war vessels of all nations. They must not be fortified, but the freedom of navigation would be watched over by an international committee.

At the Conference at Berlin in 1885, where fifteen States were represented, just principles were adopted for the navigation of the Congo and the Niger. Free navigation and commerce on these rivers was secured to the flags of all nations. The same principle was likewise extended to their tributaries and lakes, together with canals and railroads which might in the future be constructed to get past the unnavigable portions of the Congo and Niger. Not even in time of war may the freedom of communication and commerce be interrupted. The transport of contraband of war alone is forbidden. An international commission takes care that all these international agreements are kept in force. This authority, composed of delegates from each of the States which took part in the Berlin Conference, is independent of the local authorities in Congo-land.

Now, every free people has naturally an independent right to arrange its own affairs as it chooses, upon condition that it grants the same right to every other State.

In consequence of this principle in international law, neutralization is applied in very varied ways according to the very varying conditions of those who have the benefit of it, and altogether in harmony with their wishes. Thus, for example, neutralization when it concerns a territory, consists not only in forbidding any warlike operation in the domain thus rendered inviolate, but involves a similar prohibition with respect to any marching or countermarching of armies, or smaller detachments, even of single officers or soldiers.

A canal or a strait may be so neutralized, on the other hand, that all warlike operations are forbidden in it, but nevertheless it is open for passage through, yet upon condition that no belligerent has a right, in passing through, to land upon the shores of the neutralized region.

This is the kind of neutralization which appears applicable to the Scandinavian seas.

One question which for a long time came up constantly at the congresses of Peace Societies, was the Neutralization of the Suez Canal, until it became at last solved in practice. After tedious negotiations, this burning question was settled by an agreement between England and France in the treaty of October 24, 1887, which was later entered into by the other powers interested and that important channel of communication became at all times inviolate.[24]

Upon the programme of the friends of peace questions have long been mooted respecting the neutralization of Elsass-Lothringen, and of the Balkan States, together with that of the Danube, Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, Dardanelles, and their European coasts; whereupon should follow the rendering inviolate of Constantinople; as also of the Baltic, and as a result of this, the neutralization of the Scandinavian kingdoms.

In connection with the neutralization of the Sound has arisen the still newer question of the non-German region north of the North Sea Canal, now in course of construction, between the mouth of the Elbe and the naval port of Kiel.

By constituting Elsass-Lothringen into an independent neutral State, a division would be made between France and Germany, and these great powers would be separated by a huge wall of neutral States which would also narrow in an essential degree the European battle-field.

The same result is hoped for from a confederacy of neutral States on the Balkan, with respect to the relations between Russia and Austria, as well as with respect to the whole of Europe.

The Sound is one of the most important arteries of the world's commerce. About one hundred vessels of all nations pass daily through this strait, but only about ten (on the average, however, certainly larger ships) pass through the Suez Canal, which in the interests of the world's trade has become neutral.

It can be nothing but a gain to Europe that the entrances both into the Baltic and the Black Sea should be rendered inviolate.

In an address upon the importance of the Sound to the North, given to the National Economic Society, Mr. Bajer pointed out that so long as the Sound and its coasts were not rendered inviolate, military devastations will be carried on in and around the strait by belligerent powers; also that the facts that the Sound is not Danish only, but Swedish also, and that Sweden has a common foreign policy with Norway, make it probable that it may the sooner be understood to be for the European interest that all three northern kingdoms should be simultaneously neutralized, and not one of them only.[25]

In consequence of Mr. Bajer's indefatigable zeal for the united co-operation of the northern kingdoms in the cause of peace, this idea has gained many influential adherents in foreign countries also; and on his proposition, two international congresses, Geneva, Sept. 16th, 1883, and Berne, Aug. 6th, 1884, unanimously accepted the following resolution, which in its general meaning was adopted by the First Northern peace Meeting at Gotenberg, Aug. 19th, 1885:—

Considering that,—

1. The geographical position of the three northern States, is such, that they might, with a larger military and commercial naval power than they now possess, hold the keys of the Baltic:

2. Whilst the very weakness of these States probably removes all danger of their using the advantages of this position against Europe, the same weakness may one day expose them, either by force or fraud, to be plundered by their powerful neighbours:

3. The inviolability of the three northern States, and their independence of every foreign influence, is in the true interest of all Europe, and their neutralization would tend to the general order.

4. Their independence, which is indeed a common right of all nations, can only be secured to the northern nations by their neutralization.

5. This neutralization ought to have for its object and legal effect:

Firstly, To place beyond all danger of war all those portions of land and sea which belong to Sweden, Denmark and Norway.

Secondly, To secure at all times, even during war, to all merchant and war-ships, whatever flag they carry, whether that of a belligerent or not, full liberty to run into the Baltic from the North Sea, or vice versâ, whether sailing singly or in fleets.

On these accounts the meeting declares,—

That Denmark, Sweden and Norway ought to be neutralized, and that this neutralization ought to include:—

1. With respect to the mainland and islands of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, that all parts of this territory shall be at all times entirely neutral.

2. With respect to the Sound and the Little Belt, that in time of war, ships belonging to any belligerent power shall be forbidden to show themselves in these seas; which, on the other hand, shall be always open for merchant craft, even those belonging to belligerent powers, as well as for war-ships belonging to neutrals.

3. With respect to the Great Belt, that this strait shall always be open for merchant and war-ships of every flag, including belligerents, whether singly or in fleets; but that these ships shall be entirely forbidden to undertake any inimical action on the coasts of the above-named strait, or in its seas, within a distance exceeding the maximum range of its artillery before sailing in or sailing out, or indeed any attack, seizure, privateering, blockade, embargo, etc., or any other warlike action whatever.

The meeting expressed its desire to see an international congress arrange and conclude a treaty which should be open for all European nations to enter into and sign, which should establish on the above-named basis, under the guarantee of the signatory powers, the neutrality of the northern States, together with the creation of a really solid tribunal of arbitration, which, as the highest court of appeal, should solve all difficulties that might arise with respect to the said treaty.

That the neutralization of the Suez Canal, so long looked upon as a pious wish, may in the near future lead to the inviolability of Egypt, will doubtless be suggested. When this is accomplished, the good understanding between France and England will be further strengthened, and a foundation thereby laid for an extended co-operation in the service of the peace of the world, in the young Congo State, with its twenty millions of inhabitants and a territory equal to half Europe; a realm founded without costing a drop of blood, from its first commencement sanctioned and declared a neutral community by the European powers unanimously, which will some day be looked upon as one of the fairest pages in the history of the human race.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] This and the following regulations are taken from Bluntschli's "Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilizirten Staatens," Nordlingen, 1872. Some of the treaty provisions and questions are grounded upon "Recueil des traités, conventions," etc., par Ch. de Martens and F de Cussy, Leipzig, 1846, and "Archives diplomatiques:"

—Since practical abstaining from war is the natural assumption of neutrality, a neutral State is bound not to assist any belligerent power in warlike purposes.

—A neutral State may not supply a belligerent power with weapons or other war material.

—If private persons furnish belligerent powers with war material as articles of commerce, they assuredly run the risk of confiscation by the contending parties of such articles, as contraband of war; but the neutral State is not to be regarded as having violated its neutrality by tolerating trade in contraband of war.

—Permission freely to purchase food even upon account of a belligerent power is not regarded as a serious concession towards that State, provided that the permission is general, applying alike to both parties.

—A neutral State may not permit the war-ships of a belligerent power to run into its ports or (with any other object than to procure provisions, water, coal, etc.) to traverse its sounds, rivers and canals.

—Belligerent powers are bound fully to respect the right of peace of the neutral States, and to abstain from any invasion of their territories.

—Where a violation of neutral territory has taken place from ignorance of the boundary and not from evil intent, the neutral State shall immediately claim redress, compensation, and the adoption of measures necessary to prevent a similar mistake in future.

[15] See in respect of this act, "Recueil des traités, conventions," etc., Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, Part iii. p. 243 Leipzig, 1846.

[16] See Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, in the above-named collection, Part iv. p. 575.

[17] Respecting the correspondence on this question, see the remainder of "Archives diplomatiques," 1871-72.

[18] Motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97.

Since the European States have settled into their present grouping, the material preponderance of the great powers over the smaller countries has more and more diminished the possibility of these defending their external liberty and independence by military power only.

There are States whose whole male population cannot equal or barely exceed the number, which a great power can command for its fully equipped army.

In olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight against a greater and more powerful neighbour. In consequence of the weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly developed art of war, it was then possible.

Now this condition is changed. As a rule we find that the military strength of a State is in direct proportion to its population and material wealth.

The consequence is that the smaller States have virtually ceased to be belligerent powers. Such examples as Germany's proceeding against Denmark in 1864, and England's against Egypt in 1882, or in general, when the stronger State only needs to consider how large a portion of its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be considered as wars, but as military executions.

As to our own country (Sweden), it certainly has, together with Norway, an advantage in its situation above other small powers. But it concerns us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time. This is not to be done by turning Sweden into a military State, because even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against our powerful neighbours.

In proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy.

In our day, not only are great and well-disciplined hosts required for carrying on war, but great material riches are equally indispensable. The relation between a nation of four or five millions, and one of forty or fifty millions, is like that between the dwarfs and the giants.

It is easily understood that patriotic feelings may bewilder the judgment, and that our nation, with its brilliant war memories, can only with difficulty perceive this simple truth, and with reluctance accommodate itself to the changed condition which modern times have created.

Let us, however, realize that we are standing at the parting of the ways; that we have before us the alternative, on the one hand, of a barren and ruinous militarism; on the other, the seeking of our defence in a neutrality guaranteed by the united powers; making it possible for us to get our defence adjusted, without any very great difficulty, and settled upon a footing so satisfactory.

The first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land, excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and wealthier nations. The second would put us into a position to confine our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds.

The clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice.

It will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us. There are two opinions about that. But in one thing we may all unite, namely, that a settled neutrality for Sweden is a thing to be aimed at. Here almost every interest of the fatherland converges.

But if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign powers.

Accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us, we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome.

This is my conviction.

In drawing attention to the subjoined, I would further bring to mind that the seat of war in Europe is limited in the proportion in which the number of neutralized States grows, a condition of things which may little by little in an essential degree impede or prevent the outbreak of war; that the peculiar situation of Sweden (greatly superior, for example, to Belgium or Switzerland) must naturally facilitate its neutralization; that, lastly, the neutrality proposed does not stand in the way of arranging our own defence, but that rather, in case Parliament rejects his Majesty's army bill, adapts itself powerfully to contribute to a right solution of the Defence question; and so much the more, as all suspicion that that old vexed question aims perhaps at something more and other than defence of the country would thereby disappear.

For this reason—and since we cannot expect that other powers should take the first step and offer us what we do not ask for—I respectfully propose:—