The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Diplomatists of Europe, by M. (Jean Baptiste Honoré Raymond) Capefigue, Edited by William Monteith, Translated by William Monteith

The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE BARCLAY, 28 CASTLE STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.

CONTENTS.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The sketches now offered to the reader have most of them been already published in parts, in magazines and reviews. I have been advised to collect them into one work, in order to make their tendency and their spirit better understood.

The end I proposed to myself at the time I wrote them, was to efface the prejudices which the decrepit schools of the Revolution, and of the Empire, had cast over the vast intellects who have had the direction of the government in various countries, or who still continue to guide the state. This end, I think, was partly gained by the four sketches of the career of Prince Metternich, Counts Pozzo di Borgo and Nesselrode, and the Duke of Wellington. I have considered it the more essential to complete this publication at present, because, for some years past, people appear only to take pleasure in extolling those who have been engaged in the work of destruction. The most illustrious public bodies take pleasure in listening to the praises of those who have ruined the old state of society, and no man is considered clever, learned, or virtuous, unless he has been at least half a regicide. As for me I request a little space for the politicians who create, preserve, or add to a state,—for the men whose works still endure, and survive all those who declaimed against them. I would give all the fame of the Radicals of 1791, of the year III., or the year VIII., for the smallest portion of the abilities of Cardinal Richelieu.

It was not at random that I selected the names of the statesmen of whom an account is here to be met with; they each represent an idea—a system—a policy. Prince Metternich is the creator of the theory of the balance of power and armed neutrality, which has obtained a very exalted rank for Austria among European powers; Prince Talleyrand brought back among us the temperate diplomacy of the Empire, of the first days of the Restoration, and of the Revolution of 1830; Count Pozzo di Borgo personifies the persevering tact of European policy and the Russian system since the year 1814; the chancellor, M. Pasquier, exhibits the administration of the latter part of the reign of Napoleon, and he was, also, the moderate minister of the Restoration; the Duke of Wellington is England under arms, and the active spirit of the Tories; the Duc de Richelieu is the symbol of probity in affairs, and of great unrequited services—he is the man who delivered his country from the dominion of a stranger, and yet with whose name the present generation is, perhaps, less acquainted than with that of any orator at the hustings; Prince Hardenberg represents Prussia at first holding a neutral course, then advancing with her poetical universities; Count Nesselrode has been Chancellor of Russia for the last thirty years; and, finally, I have raised to its proper exalted position the much-belied character of Lord Castlereagh, the faithful interpreter of the views of the Tory party, the worthy successor of Mr. Pitt, and who preserved England and added to her power. These sketches, therefore, by their account of the different ministers, form a vast history of the cabinets of Europe.

Many new details will be found in these portraits, and my admiration for intellectual and powerful minds has made me strive to perfect them. Being quite unconnected with the agitations of the present times, I have not mentioned in these pages any name mixed up with the dissensions of the press and the tribune. Some of the politicians of the present day were, however, the noble friends of the Duc de Richelieu, and others afforded him the aid of their talents and sagacity. May they continue their career, without becoming weary and discouraged in the difficult paths of Conservatism and order! May they persevere, in spite of the misery of holding office in changeful times! The heart of Pitt was often deeply pained while arranging his magnificent work, and England now pronounces him the prince of statesmen. Toil and trouble are the condition of man, and nothing strong or durable ever was created, without raising a clamour of opposition from beings of inferior intellects, violent tempers, and disappointed ambition.

June 1843.

Note.—The following pages being merely a translation, the Editor has found it necessary to abstain from any observations on the work of M. Capefigue, and from offering any remarks upon the sentiments of this able writer, even where he may materially differ with him.

June 1845.

[PRINCE METTERNICH.]

The Austrian government, which is composed of old hereditary states and conquests of a later date, a sort of chequer-work of provincial privileges and immunities, may be said to be the creation of a statesman, who must be placed in a superior rank to all others.

It is not only under the aspect of a long and brilliant diplomatic career that we must regard the life of Prince Metternich, we must also look upon him as the head of the executive organisation, which includes so many various interests, and such a diversity of national characters and feelings, under the government of one sceptre.

Cast your eyes over the provinces which extend from the centre of Germany into Poland, from the extremity of Gallicia as far as Venice and Milan, from Zara on the Adriatic to Mantua, the key of Lake Garda and of the Tyrol, an assemblage of richer countries or more opulent cities cannot be met with. To Metternich belongs the honour of having already, for above thirty years, maintained his hold upon these various nations; he has realised the most difficult system of local administration and of a central government, great domestic liberty, with, at the same time, careful surveillance, an active police with very indulgent toleration, the most extensive credit with the least oppressive taxation. One might compare the Austrian government to the father of a family, anxious and rather strict with his children; the elder ones are tractable, the younger sometimes unruly, over whom he keeps a tight rein, in order that it may as seldom as possible be necessary to have recourse to chastisement.[1]

Railways and industrial establishments are becoming numerous in Austria; her navy is increasing on the Adriatic, and is a means of circulating her flourishing manufactures. Metternich has thus caused the age of labour to succeed to that of war and conquest. The ancient constitution of Germany was destroyed at the peace of Presburg, during the time of the contemptible and fragile assembly of the Confederation of the Rhine. The house of Austria then renounced the old imperial crown; but a new existence has opened for it, and, after innumerable reverses under the Republic and Napoleon, it again reared its head with a new state of political life and of military power. Since the year 1813, Austria has been constantly called upon to play a great part in the affairs of Europe, and Metternich has succeeded in giving to her politics a character of perseverance, or, rather, of immutability, the result of an idea nobly conceived, and then worked out like a mission he felt intrusted to accomplish.

The political life of a statesman is bound up in the work he has undertaken. It is not my habit as a historian to adopt the narrow views inspired by party-spirit or worn-out declamation: when a minister has achieved the greatness of an empire, resisted vassalage under Napoleon, and furnished the most extensive field for the page of history, I will not, from a weak patriotism, raise my voice against this master-mind. We may meet with enough men who destroy; we ought to feel respect for those capable of creating, and then maintaining their work.

Clement Wenceslaus, Count of Metternich-Winneburg-Ochsenhausen, was born at Coblentz, on the 13th of May, 1773, of a good German family, whose ancestors have served in former times against the Ottomans. I also find there were several officers of the name of Metternich in the company of Lanzknechts, in the time of the Reformation and of the League. His father, Count Metternich, a man of very moderate abilities, was greatly in the confidence of Prince Kaunitz, and his name is mentioned in all the business transacted concerning the Low Countries. Young Metternich received the names of Clement-Wenceslaus, after the Prince of Poland and Lithuania, Duke of Saxony, who stood godfather to him. At the age of fifteen he went to the university of Strasburg, at that time very celebrated, and the most frequented academy in Europe.

The philosophy of Voltaire, Helvetius, and Rousseau, was then in the ascendant—that empty sensualism which filled young heads with effervescing fancies. The university of Strasburg was under the direction of Koch, the celebrated lecturer upon international law; and, by a singular chance, another youth, whose name has since been well known, was also pursuing his studies at the same university; this was Benjamin Constant de Rebecque. Some degree of friendship sprung up between the students, and it is curious to observe what a different career was opened by the caprices of Fortune to the two pupils of Professor Koch. Count Metternich concluded his philosophical studies in the year 1790; the rest of his education was completed in Germany. When he reached the age of twenty he visited England and Holland, and afterwards went to live at Vienna, where he married Maria Eleonora, of Kaunitz-Rietberg.

Metternich's first entry into the diplomatic corps was merely as a secretary at the Congress of Rahstadt,—a singular negotiation, which had a most tragical termination;[2] he afterwards accompanied Count Stadion in his missions to Prussia and to St. Petersburg, and was at the latter court at the time of the alliance between Russia and Austria, which fell to the ground in consequence of the rapidity of Napoleon's military investment of Ulm, and the revolt of Bavaria,—an admirable campaign, which at once placed the French emperor in the rank of the greatest military commanders.

Even at this early period it was the opinion of Metternich that the triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Germany, would not be too much to restrain the power of Napoleon; and a striking evidence of the importance of France and of her leader had just been afforded by the battle of Austerlitz. Count Metternich was called upon to take a part in all the treaties concluded at this time; and, up to this period, his opinions appeared to belong to the same school as those of Count Stadion, who was shortly afterwards appointed minister for foreign affairs. By him Metternich was proposed as ambassador to the court of Russia; but, the treaty of Presburg having completely altered the position of Austria in Europe, Francis II. preferred sending the young diplomatist to Napoleon; and, on the 15th of August, 1806, the day of the solemn national anniversary, the ambassador presented his credentials, and first appeared before the favourite of fortune and glory.

The political system of which Count Metternich was the representative at Paris was very complicated. Since the first coalition against France, Austria had suffered the most severe reverses, having been twice deprived of the Milanese by Buonaparte, general and consul; then driven back on the banks of the Danube by Moreau, and having a second time entered the lists, after the alliance with Russia, this new coalition was dissolved by the battle of Austerlitz, and the Austrian cabinet was obliged to sign the treaty of Presburg,—a covenant submitted to through necessity alone, which broke up the old empire of Germany, and, in some measure, made an end of that of Austria.

It was the politics of this treaty, so fatal to the interests of the emperor, that Metternich was deputed to represent at Paris. The Confederation of the Rhine had overturned all the German system of affairs, which was as ancient as the Golden Bull. Wirtemberg and Bavaria, instead of being mere electorates, became kingdoms; when Bavaria received, at the expense of Austria, a territory of more than 12,000 square miles, a population of above 3,000,000 of souls, and a revenue of above 17,000,000 florins; and the aggrandisement of Wirtemberg, also prejudicial to Austria, though, no doubt, in a less degree, cost her about 150 square miles. Austria also lost the Venetian states, the Tyrol, the five cities of the Danube, Venetian Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro.

The act of the Confederation of the Rhine, which was the work of Talleyrand, Otto, and Reinhard, tore away the last remains of the old imperial mantle: and Francis II. was obliged to lay aside this ancient dignity, which would have been, in time to come, nothing but an empty title. Napoleon's system was to invade every thing, and a treaty was to him but an opportunity of launching out into fresh conquests. He had planted his family in Germany by instituting the kingdom of Westphalia; and, by means of marriages, he connected himself with Wirtemberg and Bavaria: all the stipulations in the treaty of Presburg had been insisted upon with the most inflexible haughtiness.

After these terrible reverses, Metternich considered the best means of regaining a little influence in Europe was to keep on good terms with Napoleon, or rather to preserve a strict neutrality, which might allow Austria to trace out an advantageous line of conduct for herself, should any decisive circumstance occur, as it could hardly fail to do sooner or later. The diplomatic system of Metternich was consequently one of expectation and inquiry; his special mission was, to become intimately acquainted with the most trifling peculiarities of this new and singularly constructed court, and to discover the thoughts and even the caprices of the powerful Emperor of the French.

Fresh successes had just crowned the arms of Napoleon. After some unfortunate hesitation, Prussia had cast herself headlong into the Russian alliance; and, after her subsequent defeat at Jena, the peace of Tilsit had laid the foundation of a temporary truce, for treaties with Napoleon could only possess that transitory character. Metternich received orders from his court to endeavour, by means of a respectful deference, to conciliate the favour of the great sovereign. The almost magical influence which Napoleon had obtained over the mind of Alexander at Tilsit had excited great apprehensions at Vienna: an interview was about to take place at Erfurt, and the probable consequences that might result from it were a source of serious alarm to Austria. Metternich was constantly seen at the Tuileries. He was the representative of a very ancient European court; himself a man of good birth, and with aristocratic manners, every thing was in his favour, and he was perfectly successful in his mission. At the court of Napoleon there existed much formality, a tone of society combining at once a degree of constraint with the blunt manners of the camp. It was a mere collection of puerile ceremonies; and a man of good family enjoyed an incontestable superiority there from the good taste and ease communicated by education, and the constant habit of society. The ambassador was then thirty-four years of age, his countenance was noble and intelligent; he went to all the court entertainments, and attracted universal attention by the elegance of his equipage and his expensive habits. Young, brilliant, gifted with a ready wit and an easy flow of language, with a slightly emphatic manner of speaking, Count Metternich had the reputation of being a successful gallant, and highly in favour with the Parisian ladies.

The ambassador had recourse to the pleasing species of politics which reaches the secrets of the cabinet—through the heart. His fascinating manners had gained him the good-will of Napoleon, who took pleasure in distinguishing him in the crowd of foreign ministers, and liked to converse with him, though with an occasional observation that he was very young to be the representative of one of the oldest courts of Europe. "At the battle of Austerlitz you were scarcely older than I am now!" was one day the reply of the ambassador. The Emperor was never hasty in his language to Metternich, for he considered him as the means by which an idea of the French system could be conveyed into Austria; and more than once the subject of their debate was the question of the balance of power in Europe, which assumed in the mind of Napoleon such gigantic proportions. Metternich's scheme was to represent the alliance between France and Austria as indispensable; and he spoke of the treaty of 1736, concluded under the influence of the Duc de Choiseul, as the basis of all political grandeur in Europe. The conference of Erfurt was, however, a source of constant uneasiness to him, and Napoleon had just departed for the meeting which was to reconcile the two empires of the North and the South. Promises had been exchanged between the emperors, and in these plans the sacrifice of Austria was determined upon. They were not ignorant of this at Vienna: had, then, all the efforts of Metternich in Paris been in vain? The Spanish war had just broken out, and another sovereign had been hurled from his throne. Was not this a fresh warning to the House of Austria? The alarms it inspired were confessed at the court of London, and England fed their fears in order to induce them to take a vigorous part in the war; for which purpose a report was circulated of a projected change of succession in the Austrian dynasty, favoured by Napoleon.

The peace of Presburg, by placing every where in the Germanic Confederation French principles, and almost French administration, had excited strong dissatisfaction, and the general detestation had been increased by large military contributions, and numerous vexatious oppressions indulged in by the generals and their subordinates. In every direction burst forth the anti-Gallic spirit in favour of the liberty of Germany, especially among the nobility and the secret associations, which had become formidable as early as 1808. The liberal impulse against Napoleon had been awakened in Europe, and it was not one of the least influential causes of his downfall. England encouraged these views; subsidies were promised to a government deeply involved in debt; the resistance of the Peninsula was pointed out to Austria, and the difficulties thereby opposed to the military power of Napoleon, especially after the capitulation of Baylen. Why should they not take advantage of this opportunity to burst through the conditions imposed by the treaty of Presburg? England engaged to subsidise the Austrian army, if, uniting their efforts to the common cause, they would seize that moment for declaring against France; and she also promised a simultaneous diversion in Holland and Spain. These warlike propositions soon found friends among the German nobility, and Count Stadion entered completely into the English views. The levies were immense, for the fate of the empire was at stake.

At this period the business of the young ambassador was to mask by flattering promises the military preparations that were making in Austria. His papers were full of protestations of confidence: and how could he act otherwise? Is it not the duty of a diplomatist to soften the course of events, and to moderate the first bursts of anger and vengeance of one nation against another? Austria did not wish to engage in war until Napoleon should be completely absorbed in his Spanish expedition. But as soon as the Emperor and the Old Guard had left Paris, to raise the puppet throne of Joseph at Madrid, she no longer dissembled her warlike preparations; hostilities were commenced against Bavaria, the close ally of Napoleon, and the Austrian standard was unfurled at Ulm. Napoleon, informed of this unexpected movement, made but one step back to Paris. Metternich was still there.

The ambassador was now placed in a very delicate position, for the Austrian war had really been a surprise. Napoleon thought himself the dupe of Metternich, and he commanded Fouché, the Minister of Police, to cause him to be seized, and marched from one military station to another, until he reached the frontier. The order was harsh, brutal, and contrary to all diplomatic usages. Is not an ambassador bound to obey the instructions of his government, and to serve its interests? and is it not his duty to conceal every thing that may injure his court? Fouché, with his usual regard to his own interest, and who considered what the future might bring forth, executed the orders of Napoleon with delicacy and politeness. He went to the ambassador's house, told him the occasion of his visit, and expressed the most lively regret for it. A degree of dissatisfaction had already begun to arise in the mind of this minister, who looked forward to the time when the insatiable ambition of Napoleon must have a limit, and he and Metternich expressed to each other, in mutual confidence, their feelings on the miseries of war and the rapacious spirit of Napoleon; and Fouché, whose disposition was generally communicative and incautious, went so far as to give utterance to most singular opinions concerning the probable downfall, or even death, of his master. In order as far as possible to soften the rigorous orders he had received, a single captain of gendarmerie, chosen by Marshal Moncey, accompanied the travelling-carriage of the ambassador to the frontier. Prince Metternich takes pleasure in relating the curious occurrences of this journey, which, like that of the aide-de-camp Czernicheff in 1812, was not devoid of peril.

Then the earth was shaken! The Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, fought valiantly for the defence of their country and their sovereign, and the battle of Essling menaced the fortunes of Napoleon. The disastrous event of this day was never fully published in France; but elsewhere it was perfectly known. Preussisch-Eylau, the capitulation of Baylen, and the battle of Essling on the Danube, appear to me to be the three culminating points, which first taught the world that the armies of Napoleon were no longer invincible: these battles had a great moral influence upon the affairs of Europe, and Wagram was necessary to restore the powerful effect of the Emperor's name; the field of battle on this occasion was doubtful, but nothing could be more decisive than the result; great discouragement was manifested in the councils of Vienna, and the party in favour of peace carried the day.

Victory had then decided between France and Austria, proving the star of Napoleon to be utterly irresistible. The two parties which divided the court of Vienna now became more marked, the opinion in favour of peace, represented by Count Bubna, prevailed in the Emperor's council, and Count Stadion, who had hitherto had the direction of affairs under the influence of the English system, was obliged to retire from the cabinet. The ministry for foreign affairs having thus become vacant, Francis II. thought to conciliate France by the appointment of Metternich, who had displayed great abilities during his embassy to that country. The count, having been reconciled with Napoleon, had since then carefully maintained a middle course between peace and war, and he had also begun to adopt in politics the attitude of armed neutrality, which, ever since 1813, has been the characteristic of Austrian policy. This was a period of deep humiliation for the old imperial crown. The Moniteur had announced that the House of Lorraine had ceased to reign; the Austrian monarchy had been vanquished in the struggle, its armies had experienced terrible reverses; but there still remained to the Emperor Francis the devoted affection of his people, and the indignation they felt at the prospect of French domination.

Count Metternich was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Napoleon, together with Count Bubna, and interviews took place for the purpose of treating of peace. The victor was excessively irritated at the vigorous conduct of Austria, and never were conferences attended with more violence or more fiery disputes; so that Metternich was obliged to apply all the powers of his mind towards inspiring the haughty conqueror with more moderate sentiments. If Napoleon bore in mind his silent and skilful conduct in 1809, he knew, that by favouring his elevation at the court of the Emperor of Austria, he should secure to himself an ally and a representative of his system. These motives, joined to dark hints of assassination, and to the uneasiness caused by the religious brotherhoods among the people, which were already beginning to stir for independence, all contributed to hasten the conclusion of the treaty of Vienna. Is it necessary to remind the reader that the French every where made use of their victories with the inflexible right of the conqueror?

On the occasion of this treaty, Count Metternich received the title of Chancellor of the State, with the direction of foreign affairs,—an office of immense responsibility under existing circumstances. The population was exhausted by the war; the treasury without resources, having been completely drained by the contributions levied by the French; and the monarchy was deprived of all influence in Germany, the treaty of Vienna having robbed it of the last remains of importance towards the south; so that, as I have elsewhere[3] remarked, beside her was the Confederation of the Rhine, that is to say, Napoleon; in front the Helvetic Confederation, again Napoleon; to the south the kingdom of Italy, still Napoleon. There remained but a choice of two plans to Austria, either again to try the chance of war, or to appease the Emperor of the French by the most profound submission to all his wishes. Such was the idea of Metternich, when he suggested the marriage of the archduchess, when, as it was said by the implacable Lady Castlereagh, it was necessary to deliver up a daughter of the house of Austria to satisfy the Minotaur.

If the French emperor were to choose a wife among the grand-duchesses of the house of Romanoff, the plan proposed at Erfurt would be quickly accomplished, that is to say, the formation of two great empires, around which there would be a number of small intermediate kingdoms, in some degree dependent upon them; and, to avoid this peril, Metternich hastened the marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa: by this means the house of Austria would secure a real protector in the French emperor, and the suit of a brilliant adventurer, at the feet of the daughter of a royal line, might be advantageous to the future prospects of the German crown. It is allowable in politics to calculate to what extent human passions may affect the course of affairs, and therefore the new chancellor of the state, when negotiating the union of the archduchess with Napoleon, looked forward, by means of a family arrangement, to recovering the position of which Austria had been deprived by the fortune of war. The marriage of the archduchess was arranged and concluded entirely by Metternich.

Still, however, he carefully pursued the course towards which there appeared at that time to be a general bent in Europe. In the beginning of the year 1811, certain symptoms appeared to indicate to the court of Vienna that a rupture was about to take place between France and Russia, and these suspicions were changed ere long into certainty: M. Otto, the French ambassador at Vienna, opened his mind completely to Metternich, and, acting on the principle of the late alliance, he proposed they should form a kind of league of offence and defence in the war Napoleon was about to commence against Russia. The French emperor only required a detached corps of 40,000 Austrian auxiliaries as an active force, who were to attack the eastern extremity of Gallicia, at the same time that the French army should proceed to the Vistula. This treaty farther stipulated that the Austrian possessions in Poland should remain untouched, and certain territorial cessions in favour of Austria were agreed upon, in the event of the war against Russia proving successful; thus Metternich began to reap the advantages of the French alliance.

The campaign of 1812 began. The Austrian corps of 30,000 auxiliaries was posted on the Vistula, and, if not required to take an active part in the operations, it still was a check upon the Russian army, which already threatened the flanks of Napoleon's troops. Metternich watched with extreme anxiety the movements of the invading army in Russia; its disastrous retreat was an appalling and unlooked-for catastrophe, and Prince Schwartzenberg went to oppose the Russian troops.

A new train of ideas, a new series of negotiations were now to be entertained. The retreat from Moscow had been so calamitous, that it had not spared to the French enough troops to protect the line of the Oder, far less to retain possession of that of the Vistula. If Prussia and Austria had been faithful to their alliance with Napoleon, they ought immediately to have combined their forces, and opposed all their strength to the Russians, who were already making incursions on every side. The situation of the two courts was very difficult, for the whole German nation was so unanimous in their dislike to the French, that it would have been impossible for the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to take any steps in their favour, without placing themselves in direct opposition to the people they governed; and, besides, after the deep humiliation they had both endured at the hands of Napoleon, was it not natural they should seek some motive, or, if the expression be preferred, some pretext, for delivering themselves from a state of subjection so fatal to them? Prussia, who was foremost, had no hesitation in abandoning an alliance that was so dishonourable to her. Metternich did not immediately follow her contagious example, but, a cessation of hostilities having taken place between the Russian and Austrian armies, the eyes of France fell upon the cabinet of Vienna, as the mediatorial power which was to prepare a peace, on a foundation in better keeping with the general equilibrium of Europe. In his conferences with M. Otto, the imperial chancellor gave him clearly to understand, that the Austrian government would not depart from the principles of the French alliance, but that the nature of their situation had been altered by the late military events, and, as the frontier of Austria might become the theatre of war, the cabinet of Vienna would naturally assume a more decided attitude, in order to bring to a conclusion a struggle which would for the future so closely affect the empire.

The mission of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Bubna, at Paris, was conducted in the same spirit. Without giving up the alliance, the Austrian government signified that it could no longer rest upon the same basis, in fact, that they must take a more decided part in the approaching military crisis. Metternich's object in this new negotiation was to lay the foundation for a general peace. Such a resolution was by no means disinterested on his part, for, in the new settlement of the boundaries of the different states of Europe which must ensue, Austria would obtain an accession of territory, as a consequence of the position in which the course of events had placed her. The English party was gaining ground at Vienna, and Lord Walpole had arrived with offers of subsidies and augmentation of territory; in proportion, also, as the French army met with fresh reverses, the popular feeling of Germany assumed a more decided character; still Metternich persisted in his mediatorial system, from the conviction that it would be for the real advantage of his country.

These negotiations continued all through the winter of 1812-13. In the meanwhile, M. Otto had been replaced by Count Louis de Narbonne, the representative of the family alliance. He had been appointed by Napoleon, in the hope that his presence would remind Austria that an archduchess sat upon the throne of France; and, by the decree of the senate and the emperor, this same archduchess had just been officially proclaimed regent during the absence of Napoleon: the government being placed in her hands was a fresh guarantee to Austria of the personal feelings of the emperor's son-in-law. In politics alliances are formed upon positive interests, and Napoleon had too greatly abused his victories; the decree had gone forth, the empire, which extended from Hamburg to Venice—the protectorate, which pressed heavily upon Germany, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland—the diplomatic oppression which burdened Sweden and Denmark—all must have an end: after action, a reaction must be expected.

During this time considerable levies took place in every part of the Austrian territory, for it was determined the army should be made up to its full complement of 300,000 men. Metternich justified these warlike preparations by the natural position in which Austria was placed: when the belligerents came so closely in contact with the territory of a neuter party, it appeared quite natural that the neuter should take precautions to preserve its own independence. The position which Metternich had given to Austria had made her a predominant power, with the right of insisting upon real advantages, by way of indemnity; this was an admirable change of circumstances, which left Austria at liberty to come to a definitive decision.

Baron Weissemberg then started for London, under the official pretext of bringing about a general peace, but in reality for the purpose of sounding the English cabinet upon the advantages likely to be offered to Austria, in the way of subsidies and accession of territory, in case she should declare openly in favour of the coalition, and should be willing to furnish so considerable a force as 450,000 men. Now all this occurred in the month of March 1813, and the armaments of Austria received a fresh augmentation, when the thunders of the artillery were heard at Lutzen and Bautzen; 200,000 men were already located in Bohemia: against whom could these immense bodies of troops be intended to act? At this juncture, Metternich again appeared in his mediatorial capacity, to prepare the armistice of Plesswitz, afterwards definitively settled at Nieumarch: Austria constantly declared that, as the conflicting armies occupied four hundred leagues of her frontiers, it was impossible she should any longer refrain from taking an active part in the struggle, if the belligerent powers would not agree to terms of reconciliation. A step was thus taken, from a state of alliance with Napoleon, towards a condition of armed neutrality, and how could so powerful a country as Austria long continue in this situation? In the heated state of the public mind in Germany, how was it possible to calculate the exact point where the mediation would stop for the casus belli?

It was the interest of Russia and Prussia to keep on good terms with a court capable of drawing up a body of excellent troops 200,000 strong. After some bitter and ill-advised observations, Napoleon also accepted the mediation; it was a sort of break in the military operations, an expression of the weariness felt by an army now worn out with battles. We may see how great a part Metternich had created for Austria in these negotiations, for, on former occasions, the plenipotentiaries could treat the Austrian interests as a separate concern, while in her new position Vienna became the indispensable intermediate agent in any treaty that might be contemplated. The question was, Did Austria offer her mediation in good faith, with a sincere wish for peace? or was it merely as a lure, to enable her to render her military establishment more complete? This becomes an important question for history.

It must be remembered that, after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the desire for peace was universal, even in France, and in the tent of Napoleon, in the military night-watch, as well as on the morning of battle; the troops still fought, but it was no longer with the willingness, the enthusiasm of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena. Napoleon submitted to the powerful voice of public opinion, but could his iron disposition bend to circumstances? Until that time as general and consul, and afterwards as emperor, he had been accustomed to say to the vanquished states, "These are my conditions, you have no choice but to accept them; and, if there are any alleviating circumstances, it is to my clemency alone that you will owe them." In 1813, the tables were turned: cabinets now appeared with powers quite equal to that of France, animated, too, with the ardour of battle, and burning with the desire of repairing their former humiliation, and reconquering their independence. The allied powers had signed the armistice of Nieumarch, one great inducement being the opportunity gained for carrying on a secret negotiation with the crown prince of Sweden, and also for the sake of persuading Austria to join the league. I think their anxiety for peace was less than their wish to gain the time necessary to complete their vast military arrangements, by detaching Austria from her part of mediator, and inducing her to join them in the war against the common enemy; pious Germany, having gained her feet, now wanted to make an end of her oppressor. Now, would Metternich continue to preserve this neutral position? would not the Austrian government be inclined for a change of system?

Let us not forget how Austria was at that time situated. Had she not a right to obtain, by diplomatic means, all the advantages offered by her present position? We know the heavy losses she had sustained in Italy; the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Illyrian provinces, had been successively torn from her: and was it not natural she should take advantage of her armed mediation, a favourable position in which Metternich had contrived to place her? Had she derived the expected advantages from the general peace, she would not have joined the coalition against Napoleon; failing in that, she must endeavour to recover by force of arms all she had been deprived of during the war. It was for the purpose of justifying this delicate situation that Metternich first introduced the elegant system of high and noble diplomatic language, a style of which Baron Gentz has since been the most distinguished organ—Gentz, whose life has been so busy, and so full of disappointments, who, in his old age, came to utter soft love speeches at the feet of Miss Fanny Elssler.

Metternich unfolds in his papers his ideas upon the balance of power in Europe, which tended to diminish the prodigious influence of Napoleon, to the benefit of the allied states. I am not aware of any thing written in a more remarkable style than these despatches; they are, perhaps, rather loose in their details, but all the expressions are so carefully guarded, that they never compromised either the cabinet or the writer.

After signing the armistice of Nieumarch, Napoleon had fixed his head-quarters at Dresden. Successive despatches, from the French cabinet, requested the Emperor Francis II. to affix his signature to the preliminaries of a treaty of peace; at last, Metternich, bearing an autograph letter from his sovereign, in answer to the overtures that had been made to him, repaired to Dresden, commissioned to find out what might be the definitive intentions of Napoleon with regard to peace. The conference lasted nearly half a day; the emperor, in his military dress, strode hastily up and down the room, with flashing eyes, and sharp, hurried gestures: he took up his hat, then laid it down again, and threw himself into a large easy chair, while the perspiration started on his brow; he was evidently disturbed in mind, for he burst forth, in no measured terms, to Metternich: "Your government," said he, "wants to take advantage of my perplexed situation; and the question with you is, whether you can exact so much from me without fighting, or whether you must decide in ranging yourselves among my enemies? Well, let us see! Let us negotiate—I am perfectly willing. What do you want?"

To this abrupt sally, to this demand so little in accordance with the usual diplomatic forms, Metternich merely replied, "That Austria was desirous of establishing an order of things, which, by the wise distribution of power, should place the preservation of peace under the protection of an association of independent states; that the object of the cabinet of Vienna must be to destroy the sole predominancy of the Emperor Napoleon, by substituting to his colossal influence a balance of power, which should establish Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on a footing completely independent of the French empire." As a summary of these conditions, Austria claimed Illyria, and a more extended frontier towards Italy; the Pope was to be reinstated in his dominions; Poland to be subjected to another partition; Spain and Holland were to be evacuated by the French army; and the Confederation of the Rhine and the mediation of Switzerland were to be given up by the Emperor, who was already overwhelmed with ill-fortune.

Thus was to be accomplished the dismemberment of the gigantic work erected by the toils and victories of Napoleon. Shall I venture to describe this scene as it has been depicted to me by the sole eye-witness, Prince Metternich himself? As the Austrian plenipotentiary unfolded the views of his cabinet, the sallow complexion of Napoleon gradually assumed a crimson hue; at last he exclaimed, "Metternich, do you attempt to impose such conditions upon me without drawing a sword? These demands are most insulting! And it is my father-in-law who agrees to such a plan! What kind of position does he wish to place me in with regard to the French people? Ah, Metternich! how much has England given you to play this part against me?"

To this offensive language, Metternich, retaining his calm and dignified demeanour, replied not a word; and Napoleon, in the violence of his gestures, having let fall his hat, the Austrian minister did not stoop to pick it up, as politeness would have induced him to do under any other circumstances. There was a silence of half an hour.[4] Afterwards the conversation was resumed in a cooler and calmer tone; and, in dismissing Metternich, the Emperor, taking his hand, said to him, "After all, Illyria is not my last word, and we may be able to arrange better conditions."

This dialogue is of importance to history, for it decided the fate of Napoleon.

The Emperor's habits of command made his language hasty and his summons for an answer abrupt; and, when he addressed himself thus to a person in an elevated position, it naturally gave great offence. Metternich retained the strongest resentment for his behaviour—he had been deeply insulted; and, besides, so experienced a minister could not fail to discover the secret thoughts of the Emperor, and must have been well convinced that, with such a character as his, there was but little reason to hope for the re-establishment of the balance of power in Europe.

Nevertheless, Austria consented to the conferences at Prague, and, by a fresh agreement, the suspension of hostilities was prolonged till the 10th of August. Metternich, as the representative of the mediatorial power, was by right president of the congress, in the same manner as it had fallen to the Swedish minister at the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick. M. Maret first raised difficulties on the score of etiquette, because Baron Humboldt and Baron d'Anstett, the representatives of Russia and Prussia, were only ministers of the second rank, while M. de Caulaincourt and M. Maret belonged to the first. They next discussed the order of precedence and little questions of detail; they considered whether the negotiation should be carried on in writing or viva voce, and the forms of the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick were called for. The object of each party was to gain time, in order that hostilities might recommence. At last, Metternich, seeing the indefinite turn affairs were taking, resolved to join the military Congress of Trachenberg, where the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte, was employed in tracing out the vast plan of the campaign of the allied armies against Napoleon. They decided upon marching straight upon Paris, without a moment's hesitation, and making an appeal to the people, dissatisfied with the Emperor. At Trachenberg, Russia and Prussia received all the propositions of the Austrian minister without the slightest difficulty; they agreed, whatever might be the personal pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, that the general command of the allied troops should be conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg. The importance of securing the co-operation of the Austrian army was fully appreciated, and no sacrifice was spared to attach an additional force of 200,000 men to the coalition.

With a view to avoid this immense co-operation, Napoleon had addressed himself at once to the Emperor Francis II., recalling to his mind the alliance of their families. Maria Louisa had gone to Mayence, and her husband, taking advantage of one or two days which the armistice still left at his disposal, went to meet her there, to give his last instructions to the daughter of the Cæsars, and to confirm to her all the powers of the regency. France then would be governed by an archduchess, and, according to all dynastic ideas, could Austria fight against a country ruled by the daughter of her emperor? They were mistaken; the cabinets no longer stood in awe of Napoleon, and this was a circumstance which the French plenipotentiaries at Prague had not understood. M. Maret, in particular, had shewn his insufficiency, or, at all events, an inferior capacity, unable to bear a comparison with a statesman of the school and character of Prince Metternich. One of the greatest misfortunes of the Emperor Napoleon was, that he was surrounded by a crowd of people constantly at his feet, and dazzled with his glory: these were clerks, not statesmen.

Thus the negotiations continued to assume the character of indecision and ill-humour, which had marked their origin. The slightest proposal called forth anger, the most trifling insinuation gave offence. Metternich retained the character of mediator, which had been recognised by the other powers; he resisted all idea of overturning the French government, and, when General Moreau arrived on the Continent, the first words the Austrian minister said to M. Maret were, "Austria has nothing to do with this intrigue; she will never approve of the proceedings of General Moreau." At last, the ultimatum of the allied powers, communicated by Metternich, was as follows. The dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria (Dantzic was given to Prussia); the cities of Lubech and Hamburg were to be reinstated in their independence, the kingdom of Prussia was to be remodelled, and one frontier was to extend to the Elbe; all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste, were to be ceded to Austria, and a reciprocal guarantee was to be given, that the condition of the sovereignties, both small and great, should not be subject to alteration, except by common consent, but should continue such as they might be settled by the peace. The Emperor of the French at first refused to accede to these terms, which were afterwards modified, and at last received a reluctant and tardy assent; for Austria was then entering with all her strength into the coalition.

I have consulted upon the events of this period the two men who played the principal parts in the diplomatic transactions of the war, Count Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Metternich. I asked them, "Was there really a sincere desire for peace at Prague?" They both answered in the affirmative. Pozzo di Borgo, in his hatred for Napoleon, described to me the anxiety he felt at witnessing the hesitation of Austria; and Metternich justified himself to Europe for the indecision of his conduct by his desire to bring his diplomatic mediation to a happy issue, for the interests of Napoleon, Austria, and the general peace.

A notification from the court of Vienna announced to Count Nesselrode and Prince Hardenberg, that, for the future, Austria, as a member of the coalition, would locate 200,000 men, in large bodies, behind the mountains of Bohemia. The joy of the Allies was not to be expressed; one should have heard Count Pozzo di Borgo recount the magical effect produced by this letter of Metternich; it arrived in the middle of the night at a barn, in which were reposing the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, Count Nesselrode, Prince Hardenberg, and all the staff of the allied troops. They arose and embraced each other, as if the salvation of Europe were achieved, and Napoleon tumbled from his throne. The manifesto of Austria, which was the work of Metternich, appeared ten days later. In spite, however, of this rupture, Caulaincourt remained at Prague, and the chancellor of state still assured him he was ready to proceed with the negotiation if France would agree to the independence of the Germanic Confederation and of Switzerland, and to the reconstruction of the dominions of Prussia on a scale of greater importance. Napoleon, still unwilling to give in, applied to Count Bubna, in the persuasion that he would be able to exercise a favourable influence over his father-in-law, the emperor; at last, on the 14th of August, he gave his consent to the proposals of the Austrian cabinet, and his answer was despatched to Prague; but it was too late. Metternich declared the impossibility of entering into a separate treaty, and said it would be necessary to refer simultaneously to the three courts whose political interests were henceforth inseparable.

Still Napoleon did not abandon all hope of drawing Austria over to his interests, and he proposed entering into a negotiation, even after the commencement of hostilities, when the Austrian army was actually in motion. 200,000 Austrians came forth from the mountains of Bohemia, and turned the flank of the French army. Then the general rising in Germany took place; a transitory lustre was conferred by the admirable battle of Dresden, but Leipsic witnessed the last expiring gleam of the French glory. By the end of 1813, the line of the Elbe was lost, and even that of the Rhine was compromised. All Germany was in arms, and the whole of Europe had assumed a threatening posture.

Austria had hardly joined the coalition before difficulties arose in this vast body, agitated by so many different interests. Some jealous feelings had already been entertained concerning the title of generalissimo of the armies, which had been conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg, and other questions were subsequently started as to the object of the campaign. As long as the French occupied Germany, the most pressing anxiety was to get rid of this heavy yoke. Having once reached the Rhine, there was no confederation, no imminent danger; the soil was covered with the wrecks of Napoleon's empire, and Germany had recovered her ancient independence. The sole remaining possessions of the French in that country were some fortresses, which, after a siege of longer or shorter duration, must revert to their ancient sovereign. The house of Austria had ceased to be afraid of France, but had begun to entertain some apprehensions with regard to Russia. The Russians had been taught the road towards the south of Europe, and they were likely to remember it.

In the opinion of Metternich, France, with a certain degree of power and a definite extent of territory, was necessary to the balance of power in Europe; and he took care this should be mentioned in the manifesto published by the allied armies on the Rhine. This manifesto, of which the idea belonged to Metternich, was executed by Gentz. Austria, being now free from danger in Germany, could, without risk, lend assistance to the threatened empire of France. The family connexion with Napoleon was not yet broken; his moral influence, it is true, was greatly weakened; but his powerful mind was in its pristine vigour, and he was still capable of making some daring attempt. These long-sighted views were clearly displayed in the conversation between Metternich and M. de St. Aignan. Austria, already embarrassed by her position with regard to France and Russia, would gladly have withdrawn from a war which no longer closely affected her own interests; but a principle, fatal to Napoleon, had been admitted,—the allied powers were no longer at liberty to enter into a treaty the one without the other. When Lord Castlereagh arrived on the Continent, he gave additional solidity to this tendency to unite in a common cause; and the implacable enemy of Napoleon, Count Pozzo di Borgo, had been despatched to London to request the presence of the prime minister of England on the Continent. They were desirous of rendering the alliance incapable of future alteration, for the first successes beyond the Rhine had naturally given birth to two separate questions: one relating to territory in the new settlement of the boundaries in Europe; the other, a moral question, as to the form of government which should be established in France in case the allied armies should take possession of Paris. The interests of England and Austria were differently affected from those of Russia and Prussia by the arrangements that might be entered into.

In the first place, what would they do with the most important conquests? Russia was in possession of Poland, Prussia of Saxony, and Austria of a great portion of Italy. Should the Emperor Alexander attempt to set up a sort of kingdom in Poland, the interests of Austria would suffer. Again, could Prussia be permitted to enlarge her dominions by the addition of Saxony? All these questions were already subjects of debate in the diplomatic body, which, to all outward appearance, was still perfectly united; the most unlimited confidence in each other was expressed by all parties, but, in reality, interest and selfishness were the prevailing feelings. Lord Castlereagh shewed great ability at this juncture by constituting himself the general bond of union of the coalition.

With regard to the questions connected with the government of France, it was hardly possible to suppose Austria would agree to a project of a change of dynasty, when an archduchess held the reins of government as regent. The Emperor Alexander had entered into a private contract with Bernadotte, whose feelings against Napoleon were very bitter. Alexander would agree to any form of government that might be proposed, but in the conference at Abo all possibilities had been discussed, even one which might place Bernadotte at the head of affairs in France. England, though well inclined towards the Bourbons, did not make their restoration so indispensable a condition as to render debates upon matters of more personal interest subordinate to it. Lord Castlereagh had explained this to the exiled princes; they had not yet been permitted to land upon the Continent, and the Comte d'Artois did not arrive at Dole until January, 1814.

It is particularly in this point of view that the history of the Congress of Chatillon is deserving of a serious study. At this meeting there was still an evident desire on the part of Austria to conclude a treaty on the basis of the balance of power in Europe; but, from the very commencement, Metternich must have discovered that the position of Austria was no longer the same as at the beginning of the campaign. All moral influence had now passed over to the side of the Emperor Alexander, who had become the arbiter of the destinies of the coalition; Prussia and Austria only appeared in the light of useful auxiliaries, the principal influence and popularity rested with the czar; he alone was talked of, and the negotiations were especially addressed to his cabinet. The military treaty of Chaumont, which fixed the number of troops to be furnished by the coalition, was dictated by Lord Castlereagh, who was afraid of a dissolution of the alliance. It was then declared that the allied powers would never sheathe the sword till they had reduced France within the limits it occupied in 1792; and, for this purpose, each cabinet promised a contingent of 150,000 men under arms, England agreeing to furnish a subsidy.[5]

From this period Metternich found himself in a very delicate position. As the events of the war gradually brought the allies nearer to Paris, the Emperor of Austria could not with any degree of propriety take a part in military operations whose object was the capture of a metropolis governed by the archduchess. Metternich, who was in correspondence with Maria Louisa, could no longer control the course of events, and, perhaps, this princess, weary of seeing herself surrounded by so much littleness of mind, avidity, and folly, as were exhibited by the relations and supporters of Napoleon, when the regency was at Blois, might not have been sorry to get rid of her fictitious dignity. The Emperor Francis II. remained at Dijon, while the bold advance of Schwartzenberg laid Paris at the mercy of the allies.

A reproach has constantly been cast upon Metternich for his conduct upon this occasion; how, it is said, could he sanction a proceeding which rent the imperial crown from the brow of Maria Louisa? I believe, at this time, all idea of the continuance of the empire had been abandoned, its time had passed away: there are seasons when the force of public opinion carries every thing before it, and now there was a sort of weariness of mind, people were tired of Napoleon and his military system, the string drawn too tight had snapped asunder. A retrospect must be taken of that time, and it will explain the resolution of the allies. It would have been difficult to maintain even the regency of the empress, and at the same time carry out the military engagements entered into at Chaumont. In France all were tired of the war, a general rising had taken place in Europe, nor would Napoleon have submitted to the degradation of a kingdom bounded by narrower limits than the Rhine. No doubt the regency would have been the most complete triumph of the Austrian system, but what would have become of Napoleon under the regency? would he have resigned himself to so humiliating a situation? would he not have been stifled in the small kingdom of France? The proceedings in Paris were quite independent of Metternich, who was not even present at them. The Emperor Alexander had acquired so overwhelming an influence in the senate with the patriots of 1789, that no cabinet, even of the first order, would have contended with it. The archduchess had been conducted from Blois to her father, Francis II., without any discussion taking place concerning the regency or the empire. Talleyrand had said, "The restoration of the Bourbons is a principle; every thing else is an intrigue:" and this expression put an end to all negotiations that had not the return of Louis XVIII. for their object. The diplomatic corps were occupied with the Treaty of Paris, which produced the re-establishment of order, the general peace, the restoration of the Bourbons, and the settlement of the boundaries of the French territory, which had been the principal object and most important result of the campaign. But this was not all; the immense empire of Napoleon was in ruins, and how should these important fragments with which the world was overspread be divided? Might Francis II. resume the old imperial crown, which he had resigned at the treaty of Presburg? In spite of the strong predilection then entertained for ancient customs, Metternich felt that the crown of Charlemagne would be merely an empty title unsupported by any real influence, and it would have been a cause of offence to Prussia, whose jealousy would have been roused by the existence of a German empire in close contiguity with her own kingdom, which embraced nearly a third of the population of Germany. With the strong instinct which forms part of his character, Metternich felt that, for the future, Austria, while retaining a great general influence over Germany, had better strive to become a southern sovereignty, having Gallicia at one extremity, and Dalmatia at the other, and including the Lombardo-Venetian territories, under the ancient and magnificent iron crown. He carried this idea into the Congress of Vienna, when the new constitution of the European sovereignties was to be established on a general basis, and he took care to bring it forward again upon every occasion in which the diplomatic system of Austria was displayed. This alone affords an explanation of the extreme and constant solicitude evinced for the possession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and the constant tendency, both by means of conquest and commerce, towards the shores of the Adriatic.

At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich exercised a prodigious influence. The Emperor Francis had made a great family sacrifice, by abandoning the cause of Maria Louisa, and, in honour of this conduct, Europe fixed the assemblage of the sovereigns at Vienna. In the midst of balls, elegant amusements, and entertainments, Europe was to be remodelled on a different basis; the long conferences, which were to decide the fate of nations, were intermingled with flowers and pleasure. Prince Metternich, then in his forty-first year, saw the object of his anxieties and wishes fully accomplished; Vienna afforded the most brilliant spectacle; the sovereigns were assembled there, accompanied by a myriad of persons of princely rank, with their families, their courts, and their numerous suites. Love intrigues contended with the more serious business of this Congress, which had become the rendezvous of all the most distinguished characters in Europe. In the evening people assembled at the Royal Theatre, or in the brilliantly illuminated saloons, where, at the gaming-table, Blucher was employed in completing the ruin of his affairs, which he had begun in Paris.

Prince Metternich had the direction of the diplomatic party, while the empress, wife of Francis II., received the august strangers with the grace and dignity she was so well known to possess. The splendours of the Congress of Vienna left a strong impression upon the minds of the diplomatic characters who were present at it; they are associated in their memory with the fresh and pleasing recollection of the days of their youth, and, when you converse upon the subject with those whom death has spared, they speak in enthusiastic terms of the chivalric entertainments, the fancy balls of the empress, and the galanteries of the sovereigns. What brilliant parties were those of Lady Castlereagh, a female diplomatist, as active as the English prime minister in all negotiations relating to the management of the world!

In walking through the streets of Vienna, it was no uncommon sight to meet the three sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, shaking hands, and giving each other marks of mutual confidence, and yet the most serious dissensions already prevailed in the Congress concerning the territorial arrangement of Europe. The quadruple alliance, as it had been settled in the treaty of Chaumont, was nothing but a military convention, intended to overturn the power of Napoleon; more a kind of plan of battle, or strategic stipulation, than a regular and political negotiation. After the fall of Napoleon, the allied powers resumed their natural interests. Thus, on the question of German supremacy, Prussia would naturally be inclined to side with Russia, and draw off from Austria; England, to oppose Russia in every thing relating to the sovereignty of Poland, which the Czar had already appropriated to himself; and France, though so terribly shaken by the late invasion, must endeavour to regain some degree of credit in Europe, by keeping on good terms with England and Austria. I must say, to the honour of the eldest branch of the Bourbons, that it always exhibited the most perfect dignity in its foreign relations, and perhaps the critical situation of our internal affairs was only produced by a fatal reaction of foreign dissatisfaction upon ourselves. From the first assembling of the Congress, private conferences had taken place between Lord Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand, to take into consideration the conditions of a treaty which might afford a counterpoise to the immense ascendancy Russia had obtained during the invasion of France and the events of 1814. By this treaty, which was signed in the month of March 1815, subsidies were agreed upon in the event of certain occurrences, and an engagement was entered into, that a fixed number of troops should always be in readiness for the casus belli, should Russia and Prussia attempt to disturb the equilibrium established among the European powers, and, according to a despatch of M. de Talleyrand, France was to maintain a half war establishment.

Metternich was the principal author of this secret treaty, because, after things had been replaced in their original state by the restoration of Louis XVIII., he began to be afraid of Russia and her immense weight: the question of Poland was the pretext. France manifested particular anxiety for the re-establishment of the King of Saxony, whose territory Prussia was desirous to absorb; while England, on the other hand, but little inclined to favour Russia, considered it indispensably necessary that Prussia should possess very extensive territorial strength, that she might serve as a constant barrier against northern invasion. It was necessary Metternich should combat this opinion for the sake of Saxony, and he did so in a series of papers opposed to those of Prince Hardenberg and Baron Humboldt. On the Polish question he perfectly agreed with England: at the bottom of Alexander's good-will towards the Poles, there lurked an idea of political aggrandisement; for, by making a kingdom of Poland, he well knew that the portion of that country that had accrued to Austria, as well as what had fallen to the share of Prussia, would sooner or later all unite under one sceptre. On no account would Alexander resign his paramount influence[6] over Warsaw. Things reached such a pitch, that Metternich issued orders that the Austrian armies should be maintained upon a war establishment, while Russia kept her troops in readiness, and appealed to the Poles to stand by their country. Whilst Metternich warmly opposed the establishment of Russian Poland as a kingdom under any circumstances, England was desirous it should be placed on so firm a foundation, as to serve as an obstacle to the encroachments of the Russian cabinet.

Serious events already obliged Metternich to turn his attention towards Italy, and here we must look back upon events of a rather earlier date. As far back as the month of February 1813, England had taken advantage of some dissatisfaction entertained by Murat, and still more by Caroline, Napoleon's own sister, to hasten the downfall of the French empire. All the good people of Buonaparte's family appear to have taken their royalty in good earnest, and to have fancied they possessed some consequence of their own, and might remain kings and queens independent of the great emperor. England, clever at taking advantage of these little absurdities, reminded Murat of the example of Bernadotte, and suggested the possibility of his becoming king of all Italy. While Napoleon was abusing his brother-in-law in his haughty and violent letters, reminding him that "the lion was not dead," the English cabinet soothed with the most flattering hopes the imagination of Murat, who had but a poor head for politics, and every thing was brought into play that could flatter the vanity of the most theatrical soldier of the imperial era.

At the close of the year 1813, Murat was already in the occupation of the Roman States, making an appeal to the patriots, for it was the custom of Europe at that time to march forward invoking the liberty of the people. To detach him from a bad cause, Metternich had particularly recourse to a gentle and tender influence, a pleasing reminiscence of his embassy in Paris, and he guaranteed to Murat the peaceable possession of the kingdom of Naples. After the re-establishment of the Bourbons in France gave rise to the strongest uneasiness in his astonished mind, King Joachim deputed the Duke of Serra Capriola to the Congress of Vienna, pleading his treaties with Austria and England; but his envoy was not admitted to the assembly, for a negotiation was on foot to replace the old dynasty of Sicily upon the throne, a negotiation conducted by Prince Talleyrand. Louis XVIII. had recommended the interests of his family to the Congress of Vienna, and M. de Talleyrand was to receive from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons a rich equivalent for his sadly compromised principality of Benevento. Austria was a little unmindful of her promises, and defended her engagements with Murat but very feebly; indeed, the general bent towards the restoration of the former order of things was so strong, that he who had usurped the crown of Naples was actually declared guilty of treason. In the English House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh read a private correspondence, carried on with Napoleon at the very moment when Murat was negotiating with the Alliance, which afforded evidence of a double policy having been pursued. Having become uneasy concerning the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna, he made vast military preparations, in concert with the patriots and the secret societies, with the intention of assuming the great crown of Italy. Metternich caused the Austrian armies to assemble en masse in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, where they awaited under arms the coming events.

The storm soon burst.

Napoleon then landed in the Gulf of Juan to attempt his heroic exploit of the Hundred Days. Matters were in a strangely complicated state at the Congress of Vienna, and Napoleon, looking at the affairs of Europe under one point of view only, had formed a fair judgment of the condition of the allied powers with regard to each other, without, however, comprehending that his presence on the Continent would unite them all in a terrible coalition. The very name of Buonaparte filled the old European sovereignties with so much alarm, that they recovered themselves with the utmost haste, in order to take measures for the general safety.

They owed to the activity of Talleyrand and Metternich the official declaration of the Congress of Vienna, which placed Buonaparte at the ban of Europe, simultaneously roused against the common enemy. The mystic spirit of Alexander entered willingly into the idea of a Christian alliance and a European crusade, and Metternich, after the system he had adopted ever since the rupture in 1813, could not depart from the military agreement entered into at Chaumont. Napoleon was declared at the ban of the empire by a revived custom of the ancient assemblies of the German Diet.

The pretended agreement between Napoleon, Austria, and England, at the time of his landing in the Gulf of Juan, was a romance invented afterwards by the imperialist party. Napoleon, who was well informed concerning the diplomatic state of things, might imagine a separation of interests among the cabinets a probable thing, but beyond this there was nothing. One of his first steps was to endeavour to place himself in communication with Metternich, and we again find Fouché in correspondence with the chief of the Austrian cabinet: they had never lost sight of each other since their memorable conference in 1809, and their acquaintance was renewed in 1813, when Fouché was appointed Governor-General of Illyria. I have reason to believe, that they had even then spoken to each other in confidence concerning the decline of power of that man, as the disaffected called Napoleon, and of the possibility of a regency under Maria Louisa; in 1813 the subject they would select for their conversation would probably be the abdication of the Emperor, which was one of the favourite ideas of the senatorial party. At the same time Napoleon wrote to Maria Louisa, he despatched, by means of some secret agents, confidential letters from intimate friends of the minister, and even from a princess of the imperial blood, between whom and Prince Metternich a tender feeling had existed: and finally, in order to sow dissension throughout the whole of Europe, he transmitted to the Emperor Alexander a copy of the treaty of the triple alliance, concluded against Russia in the month of March 1815, and signed by Lord Castlereagh, Talleyrand, and Metternich: his primary object was to break the powerful union among the sovereigns.

At this period, the Austrian armies had marched into Italy against Murat and the Neapolitans, and General Bianchi had obtained the most brilliant victories over the wavering and ill-organised troops of Joachim. Metternich caused all the fortresses of the kingdom of Naples and the Roman States to be garrisoned by Austrian troops; for he had decided, in concert with the French legation, upon the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon at Naples as completing the scheme of the government of Europe.

While Fouché was negotiating with Metternich a plan for substituting the regency under Maria Louisa to the empire, organised as it had been during the hundred days, French agents were contriving means of carrying off the child who had been saluted in his cradle with the title of King of Rome. A great deal of mystification went on in all this; there was even one of these gentlemen, otherwise, too, a man in good society, who received a large sum of money, but who had in reality no other object than that of joining M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. Napoleon had promised that his wife and son would be present at the Champ de Mai, but Metternich's police baffled the intentions of the French agents, and, with the politeness which characterises all his actions, the minister conducted the daughter of the emperor and the Duke de Reichstadt to the palace of Schönbrunn, under an escort of the most trustworthy servants of the house of Austria. It was one of the most delicate circumstances that occurred during the life of Metternich, a man, too, always remarkable for his attention to propriety; for Maria Louisa did not at that time feel the cold indifference for Napoleon which she afterwards exhibited, and she was a party to the project formed for carrying her off, by some attendants who had remained with her, but who now all received an order to quit Schönbrunn.

The Austrian armies proceeded from Italy across the Alps, and took a part in the melancholy invasion of the south of France; they afterwards occupied Provence and Languedoc as far as Auvergne, their head-quarters being at Lyons and Dijon. On the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, after the second fall of Napoleon, Metternich repaired to Paris, to be present at the conferences which were to precede the treaty of November 1815. Prussia and England had been victorious at Waterloo, and their interest had proportionally increased. In the negotiations of Paris, the two cabinets of Berlin and Vienna acted in concert to represent the interests of Germany, which were very hostile to the French nation. The German population had been greatly irritated during the gigantic efforts that Europe had made against Napoleon; the secondary princes on the banks of the Rhine demanded Alsace and a portion of Lorraine, marked upon a map drawn in 1815 (which now lies before me), under the name of Germania, as the representation of Germany. There was a terrible reaction in that country against France, one of those refluxes of the people and the national feeling by which various periods of our history have been distinguished.

Nevertheless, what organisation, exterior or interior, did they intend to establish, to form a general constitution in Germany? How could they restore to the Emperor Francis the influence in that country which he formerly possessed, but of which he had been deprived by Napoleon? Germany had arisen with the double cry of liberty and unity on her lips. Unity! how was it to be established among principalities of which the power and the population varied so greatly, and who still maintained the feudal principle in the midst of civilised Europe? And liberty! it was an indefinite expression; how could it be applied to so many different systems of government, and to so many various localities whose interests were so distinct from each other? The scheme of the Confederation of the Rhine had been formed by Napoleon solely with a view of increasing the importance of all the petty states, and of inducing them to enter into a coalition hostile to Austria and Prussia. Now circumstances were altered; Austria and Prussia were the great predominant powers, whose business it was to establish their own influence, and govern the whole confederation by means of a protectorate, more or less clearly defined; Prussia assuming the power in the northern provinces, Austria to the south. It was necessary, when the fatherland should be threatened, that its mixed population should be capable of being called forth to serve indifferently in the armies of Prussia and Austria. The unity of the German states was thus opposed as a barrier against Russia and France, and served equally as a protection against both those nations.

Metternich, when he gave up the old imperial mantle in the name of the emperor, obtained for him a more real advantage as president of the diet; a number of votes were awarded to Austria and Prussia, in proportion to the importance of their position; and either by means of their command of the army of the confederation, or by their influence in the diet, these two countries held undisputed sway over the deliberations and the employment of the troops. No doubt, many little acts of injustice were committed, and some caprice was exhibited in the repartition of the states and of the contingents. Sovereignties were sometimes aggrandised because they were protected by the Emperor Alexander, and, sometimes, even by Metternich; but where are the human operations over which perfect justice presides? Since they were desirous of unity, this sacrifice of some to the cause of all was the natural consequence of it; and should it now be asked, what is to be the result of this confederation, I reply, that Austria has reason to fear lest Prussia should assume a constantly increasing importance in Germany. The destiny of Austria henceforth is elsewhere, her future lies in the south; Prussia is too singularly situated not to strive to agglomerate her dominions; she will undoubtedly do so, either in point of fact, by means of conquest, or morally, by the influence she will exercise. It is towards the shores of the Adriatic that Austria will find herself indemnified for the diminution of her influence in central Germany.

The cry of liberty had been raised in Germany when it roused itself against Napoleon; and the secret societies of Schill and Stein still had representatives in old Blucher and General Gniesenau. What did the government propose doing for the liberty they demanded? Constitutions had been promised, and representative states were granted to some principalities, but, the victory being once obtained, there was hesitation about proceeding any farther.

Now that experience has made us perfectly acquainted with the spirit of revolutions, it is easy to understand how, in the rapid alteration of political situations, the promises of to-day are violated to-morrow. It is in vain to imagine that these periods of transition, when the people struggle for crochets of sovereignty, can bear a comparison with seasons when the proceedings of the government are calm and regular; after victory the popular excitement shews itself unreasonable, and wants to insist upon promises the government is no longer able to perform.

In 1813, during the period of battles and revolutions, many things had been promised to Germany; but was it possible to perform them in 1815 and 1816? Suppose that in Germany, that country of excitement and mystical spirit, the utopias of the secret societies had been realised,—a political existence given to the universities, and a turbulent representation to all the states,—that they had granted them the liberty of the press and an organised democracy,—would Germany ever have reached the high degree of prosperity and public tranquillity she now enjoys? We must take customs as they exist, and minds with the habits they have formed; we must not give a people institutions which would be a torment to their existence without increasing their well-being. I do not say that the governments of Austria and Prussia acted rightly in not fulfilling their promises—I merely say, that time alone can shew whether this conduct proceeded from prudence, or from a calculating spirit of selfishness. The events of 1814 and 1815 had considerably increased the possessions of Austria in Italy, and, as this was really a country obtained by conquests, it was natural and necessary that an armed surveillance should be established in the Lombardo-Venetian territory, as well as a police capable of controlling the provinces united to the Austrian empire. The utmost ability will be required to slacken successively the springs of this police, in proportion as the victors may be more firmly established in their foreign possessions. To have granted free constitutions to the people would have been an imprudent generosity, for this conquest, like those of Napoleon, could only be maintained by military occupation, which it was desirable to render as little oppressive as circumstances would permit. The Italians, a hot and enthusiastic people, had driven out the French in the day of their calamity; the Austrians should endeavour to avoid a similar misfortune, and keep carefully upon their guard.

Here begins the melodrama which has been cast around the person of Prince Metternich, with the picture of the cruel prisons and Piombi of Venice. I appeal to the Christian sincerity and good faith of Silvio Pellico, whether there be one word of real truth in his book, Le mie Prigioni. Does he call to mind the terrible Piombi of Venice, which, in his case, consisted of a room on the fourth floor in the ducal palace, commanding a most extensive view over the Great Canal, and for which Lord Byron would have paid some hundreds of sequins? He was deprived of his liberty, it is true; and this is, no doubt, a deplorable misfortune: but had he engaged in a conspiracy?—had he attempted to overturn the established government? He avows that he had done so, and in attempts of this kind a man sets his liberty and

"Life upon a cast,
And he must stand the hazard of the die."

The Austrian cabinet, no doubt, takes ample precautionary measures, but there is no cruelty or oppression in its system; and whoever has had an opportunity of conversing with Prince Metternich ought to ask himself, whether it is possible a man of so calm and reasonable an intellect should be guilty of an act of barbarity without even a motive for his conduct?

The strict repressive measures upon which the system of Prince Metternich in Germany and Italy is founded occasioned a movement of reaction; for liberty, that master passion of the mind, does not allow itself to be crushed without making some despairing efforts. Far from the secret societies having been dissolved in Germany, they were regularly organised in the universities among the students, and the heated state of their minds was encouraged by the influence of poetry and the political writings, which called upon the courage and patriotism of all those who possessed noble hearts to lend their assistance to the German unity. This unity, so loudly appealed to by the young generation, was in reality only a sort of federative republic, in which all the states, while enjoying their individual freedom, were to be united by the practice of virtue, and would thus tend to the general happiness of mankind. The old German sovereignties were obliged to curb these associations, which burst forth in the assassination of Kotzebue.

Metternich had just been travelling in Italy when the universities distinguished themselves by this sanguinary crime. He was loaded with the benefits of his sovereign; he now bore the title of prince, and stars of almost all the orders of knighthood in Europe glittered on his breast. The state of fermentation which existed in Germany had not escaped his statesmanlike penetration, and it was solely at his suggestion that a congress took place at Carlsbad, where severe and distrustful measures were adopted against the organisation of the public schools in Germany. The conduct of the universities, the repression of seditious writings, the establishment of a political police,—nothing was neglected in this regular crusade, undertaken by the government against the revolutionary feelings by which the heated imaginations were then inflamed. After great disturbances have taken place in a state, the sole anxiety of the government is to check any disposition to disorder, and they are excited to do so by public opinion, and by the middle classes, who entertain a dread of fresh revolutions, and with good reason.

In the year of the Congress of Carlsbad, the Propaganda menaced the kingdoms of Europe with a fresh revolution. Let us observe accurately their situation in 1820. Towards the south there was the insurrection of Spain and the Cortes, and the proclamation of a government more liberal than even that of England; at Naples, almost by a magical echo, the constitution was also proclaimed; from Naples the cry of liberty was heard in Piémont, and the king was deprived of his throne. In Paris the disturbances were so great that the government was exposed every evening to a change in its political system. This year of 1820 might be considered as the first edition of the stupendous event of July, which took place ten years later with all the fracas of an insurrection.

Austria was particularly endangered by these revolutions, for the extremities of the kingdom of Naples and Piémont came in close contact with her Italian possessions. The people had declared themselves; the sovereigns then became aware of the danger, and roused themselves for their defence; congresses were held at Troppau and at Laybach, and Metternich, without hesitation, urged the adoption of powerful measures to quell the revolutionary spirit now manifested; he was so deeply convinced of their indispensable necessity, that he opposed every kind of delay, and only required the moral support of Prussia and Russia, declaring at once that an Austrian army was about to march into Italy and occupy Naples and Piémont. The Emperor Alexander, whose mind was full of the dread of secret societies and plots in Europe, lent his support to Metternich. There was but one single instance of opposition with regard to Piémont, and it is known from whence proceeded these objections. To such a degree has history been disfigured! It proceeded from the dignity of Louis XVIII., and the despatches of the Duc de Richelieu and M. Pasquier. The revolutionary spirit was breaking out in the streets of Paris in 1820, and the restored sovereign declared to Metternich, that if the Austrian army entered Piémont their occupation could not be of long continuance, as France could not allow of the Austrians upon the Alps.

In this wrestling, to use the old expression of M. Bignon, the cabinets had the advantage over the people. Naples was overcome in a few marches, and Piémont was occupied by the Austrian troops. The repressive impulse being once given, a combined system was every where manifested with the design of suspending political liberty. War was declared by the cabinets against all forms of government which owed their birth to military excitement or to an exclusively revolutionary spirit. Metternich was present at the Congress of Verona, a meeting which appears to me to have been the final expression of the will of Europe regarding the spirit of insurrection. France was charged with the suppression of the Spanish Cortes, as Metternich had executed by force of arms the will of the allied powers against Naples and Piémont. Here the cabinets were again successful, the revolution was completely suppressed, as far as regarded its power of action, and only kept a place in the disordered imagination.

All these acts of government, and all the proclamations which followed the assembly of the Congress, were the especial work of Prince Metternich. The Chancellor of Austria possesses a remarkable flow of language, a pure taste, and a noble manner of expressing his ideas, even in a diplomatic despatch, where the sense is almost always hidden under technical, and, it may be added, heavy modes of speech. To him is owing the style distinguished by the elevation of ideas, which always appeals to posterity and to the justice of future times, from the opinion formed by contemporary passions. He even allows himself to be carried on too far by his anxiety to express his meaning, and by the literary ornament he is desirous of conferring upon the most trifling despatch that leaves his cabinet; he takes the principal part in their composition, he writes in French with extreme elegance and precision, and he reads all the newspapers regularly, even to the part which contains merely literary and theatrical critiques. Those who saw him in 1825, when the unfortunate illness of his wife obliged him to visit Paris, were surprised to find him possessed of the most exquisite literary taste. He was acquainted with all our good authors, and shewed remarkable sagacity in the judgment he formed of the writers of our own times. One could hardly imagine how a politician, whose life had been spent in affairs of so much importance, could have found time to study the most trifling productions of literature.

Affairs were now settled in Europe. The governments began to emerge a little from the undecided political condition proclaimed by the Holy Alliance. From the beginning of the year 1827, Metternich had felt some uneasiness concerning the proceedings of Russia with regard to the Ottoman Porte, which was likely to be productive of extreme danger to the Austrian influence. If the Russian projects were realised, Austria would see herself deprived of her ascendancy over the Porte, which was nearly as old as that of France. At this time Metternich caused the French ministry to be sounded, but he was hardly listened to, for the most decided negotiations were in progress between the three cabinets of Russia, London, and Paris, on the Greek question; and here it is well to explain the refusal of Metternich to interfere with the transactions which led to the treaty of July 1827.

Since the year 1824, the cause of the Greeks had assumed a degree of consistency and a European character. Every era has its policy of sentiments, and people were now infatuated with a classic fanaticism for the Greeks. No doubt there was something glorious in the heroism which strove to burst the chain of the barbarians; but the enthusiastic declarations of Russia, her strong and pressing despatches in favour of the Greeks, were, in their main object, less the expression of a religious sympathy than the proceedings of a skilful policy, which sought to abase the Ottoman Porte, in order subsequently to reduce it into a state of vassalage. Russia, therefore, applied to Charles X., by speaking of the cross which had brought salvation to the world. In England it roused into action the Greek committee, and it was under the influence of these philanthropic prepossessions that the treaty of July 1827, and the battle of Navarino, which was the consequence of it, led to serious uneasiness on the part of Metternich. This minister instantly divined the full consequences of this shortsighted policy. The battle of Navarino, by crippling the power of the Porte, killed it, in a political sense, for the advantage of Russia: it was the prelude to the campaign of 1828 to the Balkan. Russia had succeeded in getting M. de la Ferronays placed at the head of foreign affairs in France: he was an honest man, but rather Russian in his inclinations and habits; consequently, Metternich could not draw France into a scheme of confederation and armed league against Russia. He was more fortunate in England with the Duke of Wellington, who acknowledged the mistake into which Mr. Canning had fallen, and pronounced the battle of Navarino an untoward event. England had thus returned to a perfect understanding of which were her real interests.

People may ask, why did not Metternich at this time decide upon war? how came it that he did not at once take part with the Ottoman Porte? It was in consequence of the fixed system of the Austrian chancellor; he has gained every thing through peace. The conquests of Austria are owing to her pacific principles—to the species of armed neutrality which is always ready at the proper moment to obtain some advantage. A war would have compromised its general position in Europe. Being on good terms with England, and in concert with that nation, the Austrian cabinet stayed the victory; it was gaining something during the Russian expedition of 1829, but it was not enough.

During this time events were advancing in France towards an unavoidable crisis; the ministry of M. de Polignac had just been formed. Under a merely political point of view, this was an advantage for Austria, for the Russian system had been abandoned, and they had entered into all the English ideas concerning the Eastern question; still a mind possessed of so much penetration could not fail to entertain great anxiety while watching so earnest a struggle between the political powers in a country like France, which had been accustomed to give an impulse to the rest of Europe. It is said that Metternich advised a coup-d'état: does this idea evince an acquaintance with the spirit of moderation and the capacity of the prime minister of Austria? A coup-d'état is too decided and too noisy a step ever to enter into the mind of Prince Metternich: when a difficult situation occurs, he does not attack it in front—he turns it; and, when he shews himself very determined in a strong and firm resolution, it is because people's minds are already made up, and there is no longer any risk in having recourse to it. The Chancellor of the Empire was too well aware of the folly of M. de Polignac, and of the want of firmness of Charles X., to be ignorant that they were incapable of conducting a perilous undertaking to a prosperous termination. In the Foreign Office there is a despatch on this subject from M. de Rayneval, then ambassador at Vienna, who details one of his conversations with Prince Metternich, precisely upon these coups-d'état; it was much the subject of conversation at Vienna, and the uneasiness entertained concerning the system followed by M. de Polignac is revealed in more than one despatch addressed to M. d'Appony, the Austrian ambassador at Paris.

Then broke out the revolution of July, an event of prodigious importance. Europe had never been in so much danger; for what were the ideas that led to the eruption? Was it not the spirit of the secret societies?—republicanism again triumphant in France, the country which, for the last forty years, had been accustomed to give the general impulse to continental Europe? The Propaganda principles had for their leader that old and obstinate spirit, General Lafayette, who again went to make an appeal to the independence of the people, as he had done in 1792. A few Frenchmen, and the tricoloured flag displayed every where, might have caused a general conflagration. What was to be done? A young, ardent, and inexperienced minister would, perhaps, have engaged in a war; what a happiness it was for the friends of peace that Prussia was governed by a wise king, whose mind was rendered moderate by age, and Austria by a minister who had witnessed so many storms without being frightened by them! One of the principal traits of Metternich's character is his perfect freedom from prejudice, either against or in favour of persons or events, so that he forms a judgment of them all with a degree of superiority. He therefore awaited the event of the revolution in a posture of defence; Austria merely held herself in readiness, and military precautions, combined with the renewal of political alliances, enabled her to oppose a barrier to all the invasions of a revolutionary spirit. This moderation was carried so far, that, as soon as a regular government was established in France, Metternich hastened to recognise it, without expressing either dislike or predilection, solely upon the principle that a regular government is always a protection to order and public peace. Since this time, Metternich has appeared to follow three rules of conduct, which govern the whole tenour of his political life. First, to enter into a close alliance with Russia and Austria for the suppression of all disturbances in Europe, and, consequently, to renew all the military contracts entered into at Chaumont in 1814, and Vienna in 1815; secondly, to combat the spirit of Propaganda, under whatever form it may appear; and this was a very laborious task, for the revolution of July had not only dispersed mischievous principles in Europe, but its money, its emissaries, its flag, and its hopes, had been circulated in every direction; and, thirdly, the Propaganda spirit having been every where diffused, Metternich had felt the necessity of augmenting both the military forces of Austria, and also her vigorous police establishment. The executive government has every where become more severe, because it was exposed to more danger. Liberty has sometimes been confounded with a revolutionary spirit in the system of strict repression that has been adopted; and it was unavoidable, perhaps, even necessary, in the complete overthrow of every thing that had been contemplated.

The empire of Austria is composed of so many different nations, that political unity would be as impossible in that empire as in the Russian, which extends over the half of two hemispheres. All that can be looked for is liberty in their local constitutions, and in establishments quite in accordance with the spirit of the States, and more especially with their situation with regard to the Austrian government. The most prejudiced people agree that no country can be more peaceably governed than the hereditary states; the other provinces which have been successively attached to it require more active precautions and a more watchful police; but civil liberty, which is, indeed, the first of all, is even there complete and entire. Let us not exaggerate; I do not propose the Austrian government as a model—I am too great an admirer of liberty and of the institutions of my country not to remain deeply attached to them, but I also give their due to the manners and customs of the people; and we well know that there are some countries that require to be governed, because they are utterly incapable of governing themselves. When travelling in Italy, I have often asked myself whether all these nations, indolently at variance with each other, who possess more genius than national vigour, more liveliness and intelligence than strength and reason, could ever aspire to a laborious liberty under the dominion of the greatly extolled Unity, which must have been obtained sword in hand—in fact, if this rich and lovely Italy, like a charming coquette, was not under the necessity of submitting to the rule of some one, because she has not sufficient energy to master either her love or her hatred.

The administration of Prince Metternich appears to be deeply imbued with this sentiment, which has been severely put to the proof by him, that if civil liberty is necessary to all, political liberty is only desirable for a few, so far as it does not affect the character and the safety of government. Protection should be granted to talent, but it ought to be serious talent, which will not evaporate in pamphlets; improvement, no doubt, is desirable, but it should take place without turbulence. The house of Austria has a great dread of noise, she is afraid of being talked of; never striving after éclat or clamorous liberty, she resembles those German professors who amass a store of erudition and science in some dusty corner of the university, and who only publish a few scarce copies of their works for the use of the learned.

The private life of Prince Metternich has been repeatedly visited with domestic affliction. Mourning has darkened his dwelling, and the distractions of the busy world have not always been able to mitigate his grief. In private society his manners are affable, and he enjoys the repose of home after the fatigues of his vast ministerial duties. A clever writer has observed that he spends great part of his time in conversation; it is a propensity indulged in by men who have seen every thing—they take pleasure in talking history in their fireside conversations, which are carefully preserved by their auditors. And who has not listened with delight to M. Talleyrand, when he used to give vent to his recollections? Prince Metternich has written long and curious memoirs, full of justificatory notes, for he considers himself at the bar of posterity. His work is a great one, and, as I said at the commencement of this sketch, all the glory and all the responsibility of it will rest with him. When we look back upon what Austria was after the peace of Presburg, and that we contemplate her now, greater than she had ever been, with her public credit, her ascendancy among the European states, the peace and the government of her provinces, her civil and military organisation, and then consider that all this is the work of one minister, who has governed the empire for the last thirty years, we may easily form an idea of some of the judgments of posterity. We are ourselves surrounded by ruins, both of men and things; government, administration, ministry, every thing, has fallen to pieces, and when, from the midst of the wreck the revolutions have brought upon us, we turn our eyes upon a countenance which has remained unmoved among all the ravages of time, it appears as if it did not belong to the present period; we look back upon Richelieu, upon those ministers who laid down a system, and then carried it onward to its completion.

Prince Metternich has reached an advanced age, yet he preserves all his faculties perfectly, with a ready wit that is admirable, and a freshness of recollection, which turns with extreme pleasure to the time of the French Empire and his embassy to Paris during the reign of Napoleon. We have all some favourite period of our lives, and we love particularly to dwell upon the days of our youth, before the illusions which charmed us had entirely faded away. He always speaks with great respect of the Emperor Napoleon, whose noble countenance exercised an unspeakable influence over his future life. Wherever that great genius passed, it left an indelible impression; and it was by the desire of Metternich that the remains of the Duke de Reichstadt were placed beside those of Maria Theresa and Francis II. in the vault of the Capuchin Church. It is a fine idea of the emperors of Austria to choose their last abode in the church of the most lowly of religious orders, to humble their greatness before the poorest brethren of the Christian church. The Capuchins have every thing in common, among them there is no property, no distinction between mine and thine. Babœuf was only a plagiary from them without the moral idea of heaven, which purifies and sanctifies every thing.

The house of Austria is accustomed to be governed by old ministers, and its traditionary spirit takes pleasure in it. In politics it is often better to do well than to do a great deal, to act after due deliberation than to act hastily, and then return to deliberate. Prince Metternich is not an enemy to any form of government that has order for its basis; and this offers an explanation of his conduct since the revolution. When the Propaganda was heard every where, he decided strongly in favour of war, and his expression to the French ambassador at Vienna is well known: "If we must perish, it is just as well to die of apoplexy as to be suffocated with a slow fire; we will declare for war."

The wisdom of the French government, its salutary repression of every Propaganda spirit, maintained peace. Since that period the Austrian minister, in all questions of any importance, has preserved the position of an armed mediator, with the invariable desire of preserving peace, and what he terms the European status quo. He does not consider the present time requires agitation, war, or conquest. According to him, it is a season of organisation, and, by the position he gives to his monarchy, he holds the balance even, so as to prevent any conflict between the north and south of Europe. He said to me wittily one day: "I am, to a certain degree, the confessor of all the cabinets; I give absolution to those who have committed the fewest sins, and I thus maintain peace in their souls."

In this situation it is easier for Metternich to employ himself in particular improvements. Austria is in a remarkable state of prosperity; we ought to be proud of our France, and it undoubtedly is a fine country, but, with our national pride, we form singular ideas upon the state of other people; and yet, among them also, we may every where observe signs of very forward civilisation, commerce, industry, railroads, with pleasing and kind hospitality, all are to be met with in the Austrian states; without speaking of the intellectual movement more sober, and as far advanced as in our country of little romances, novels, theatrical, and literary critiques.

Men who like to bring circumstances together have sometimes instituted a comparison between Prince Metternich and Prince Kaunitz, who was so long at the head of the Austrian government. Although these parallels are always rather arbitrary, and that the different shades in the human character are innumerable, we may safely affirm in this instance, that there never existed two minds more completely opposed to each other; the only point of resemblance consists in the duration of their administration. Prince Kaunitz, altogether weakened by the ideas of the eighteenth century, allowed the Austrian empire to degenerate into a state of supineness and indolence. Prince Metternich, on the contrary, has reconstructed and consolidated this monarchy; he has retained nothing of Prince Kaunitz's system, except its extreme moderation, and the traditions of status quo, adopted after the great reign of Maria Theresa. After Metternich, will Austria follow a different system? Will the statesman that appears likely to succeed him adopt a less prudent and more advanced plan? We do not believe it. It is in Austria with the ministers as with the heirs of the throne in England; before their accession they aim at popularity, and, when once at the head of the government, they continue the proceedings of the former reign, because reason and experience are of some value, and that the magnificent part of Austria is to place itself as an idea of pacification between empires which would strike against each other with too much violence.

[M. DE TALLEYRAND.][7]

One of the torments of a statesman who has played a great part in politics is to see his conduct subjected to the judgment of ignoble minds and the discussions of people incapable of forming a just estimate of it. How much has been written concerning M. de Talleyrand! how many bons mots, and how many rude sayings have been attributed to him! His biography has been made a sort of Ana, for the amusement of idle people; he has been represented as a kind of facetious personage, almost a mountebank, abounding in all the little wit of society, and of provincial towns. Few men have pierced through the mysteries of that long existence; still fewer have read in the wrinkles of this old man, and in his eyes, still sparkling under his slightly contracted brows, the secret thoughts, the powerful motives that swayed his life, which was one of unity and system.

If you have ever travelled in the southern part of France, you must have lingered in the Périgord, the province which still comprehends the best and the most numerous nobility of very ancient descent in the whole kingdom. There you will on every side meet with memorials of the Bosons and the Talleyrands, the sovereign princes of the province of Quercy: the keepers of the old records will recount to you the exploits of the Bosons of Périgord, under the Wolf dukes during the Carlovingian dynasty, who received this name from their wild exploits in the forests. The families of Talleyrand and Montesquiou-Fezensac disputed with each other the precedence over all the southern nobility. M. de Talleyrand sprang from the younger branch of the Grignols, who were of the stock of André de Talleyrand, Comte de Grignols, the youngest branch of the Périgord family; the eldest branch became extinct upon the death of Marie Francoise, Princess of Chalais, and Marchioness of Exideuil.[8]

I have been particular in dwelling upon the high nobility of his origin, because it greatly assisted his position in diplomatic affairs. Noble birth, however people may declaim against it, facilitates negotiations with European powers. Be it a weakness, be it a habit, when a man takes his place as a titled nobleman, among so many foreigners of illustrious birth, it is an advantage to his position; he treats on a footing of equality, he obtains more because he is among his peers, misfortune does not upset him, because he preserves his name in spite of every thing; he cannot be degraded, for revolutions no more deprive him of the nobility of his race, than the royal confiscations that formerly took place could destroy the old family coat-of-arms.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was born at Paris in the year 1754; his maternal grandmother was the clever and witty Princess des Ursins, that eminent person who directed the councils of Philip V. of Spain, as her friend Madame de Maintenon governed the mind of Louis XIV. M. de Talleyrand, being the youngest of the family, was intended for holy orders, according to the custom of the nobility, who devoted themselves to the profession of arms, to the church, or the manor; an active life was necessary to men of family. There had always been a high prelate of the house of Talleyrand, and this ecclesiastical dignity was intended for the young Abbé of Périgord, who was accordingly sent at the age of fourteen to the seminary of Saint-Sulpice. One ought to have heard Talleyrand himself, in his hours of gaiety and unreserve, recount the pranks and first love-affair of the young abbé; his scaling the walls, his visits to the roof of the house,—all of them things little suitable to the serious profession for which he was intended by his family. I think that in reading his Memoirs in the year 1827-28, at which time he was out of favour, he made some concessions to the little philosophers of the eighteenth century, who surrounded him under the Restoration.

His ecclesiastical studies were limited; he occupied himself but little with theology, but already very much with business. The situation of general agent for the clergy was given him by the custom of his family, which was a very lucrative appointment, for he might be considered as the chargé d'affaires of that great body, and he exhibited great method and remarkable judgment in the skilful application of the revenues of the church, which amounted to above one hundred and thirty-six millions of livres. The clergy met in a chapter every year, and the Abbé de Talleyrand gave an account of their revenues, of the steps he had taken, and the duties he had performed with regard to the court; his reports are remarkably exact, with a clearness of style that is very uncommon.

At the age of five-and-thirty, after having attained the majority required by the Church, he was raised to the bishopric of Autun,—a fine appointment, which would afterwards lead to the archbishopric of Rheims and a cardinal's hat. The revenue of the see amounted to 60,000 francs, a magnificent situation for a young bishop, but such was the custom of the nobility; nevertheless, the bent of his inclinations led him to belong to the philosophical society, and the followers of the English school, which began to appear upon the horizon in 1789; among these were Mirabeau, Cabanis, Lally-Tollendal, and Mounier, in fact all the men who were dreaming of a reform in France. People said wittily that M. de Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, with his prebend and his bishopric, looked upon himself as an abuse. At this time people were animated with a glorious passion for suppressing themselves; and when one recollects that the proposal to abolish the titles of nobility was made by De Montmorency, De Montesquiou, La Rochefoucauld, De Talleyrand, and Clermont-Tonnerre, those illustrious elders of the French nobility, one must honestly confess that an incomprehensible spirit of vertigo had taken possession of the French society. There was in this something so insane, so eccentric, that I imagine the ancient nobility must have been led by an interested motive towards the suppression of titles: during the last three centuries so many patents of nobility had been conferred, that the really illustrious families were no longer distinguished: there were too many titled plebeians. Now, if all titles were abolished by a decree, all this nobility of a modern date would be entirely suppressed, for it depended solely upon royal grants and letters patent written according to the caprice of the sovereign; whilst those who bore a historical name, as the Rochefoucaulds, the Montmorencys, and the Montesquious, had no need of deeds to prove their genealogy; it was part of the soil.

The Abbé de Talleyrand was in possession of his rich bishopric of Autun when the States-General were convened, and he was appointed deputy of the clergy of his diocese to the Constituent Assembly, so remarkable from its adventurous spirit, the boldness of its conceptions, and its total want of connexion, and absence of all kind of unity or method, either moral or political. The Constituent Assembly was a great chaos, where the opinions of men of talent clashed with each other, where all sorts of extravagances were proposed in the executive government, and all the ideas most fitted to overturn the monarchy and the society of France were encouraged; Rousseau's social contract was applied to a people already old in its customs and civilisation.

The Bishop of Autun shewed himself the most zealous protector of all these innovations; he proposed the abolition of titles, and vehemently advocated the civil constitution of the clergy; he also introduced into the public system of education all the ideas of false and mischievous philosophy which the eighteenth century had diffused in human minds. Along with the Marquis of Condorcet, and Cabanis, he was one of the adepts, and of the friends of Mirabeau, whom that statesman and popular orator used to employ for the furtherance of the interests of his intellectual dictatorship. They were accustomed to meet in the evening at Mirabeau's house, to prepare the projects which would resound the next day from the tribune of the assembly. Without being very well educated, the Bishop of Autun was gifted with an extremely fluent style, and a mode of expression remarkable for its clearness, and its elegant precision: the ancient high nobility certainly always possessed great natural talents; they had but little information, and yet they were eminently gifted with the power of expressing what they wished to say.

The solemn festival of the confederation took place at this period, a singular proceeding of which the spirit has been greatly misrepresented: it was theatrical, for such is always necessary in France. In the Champ de Mars an altar was erected, surmounted by tricoloured flags, upon a scaffolding fifty feet high, ornamented with ribands, also of the national colours. Then came M. de Lafayette, at that time a very handsome man, with his courteous and somewhat hypocritical countenance beaming with smiles, mounted upon his snow-white, slender, prancing steed, and wearing the uniform of the National Guard with long skirts and a three-cornered hat on his head, as it was the fashion at the time of the American War. He was then trying on his royal dignity. Around him crowded the deputations from the Departments with their flags; there were many drunken people, as it was natural there should be, and others tired with having wheeled earth from the Champ de Mars; and there was a plentiful exchange of kisses and embraces, according to the system so approved by Lamourette. At the foot of the altar of which I have spoken appeared M. de Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, dressed in his pontifical habits, his mitre on his head, a crosier in his hand, and with manners as elegant, as much refinement, and as studiously dignified a demeanour, as he afterwards discovered when carrying his crutch stick into the assembly of the corps diplomatique: kneeling beside him was the Abbé Louis (afterwards Minister of Finance) one of the curates, in his alb and surplice.

The mass was celebrated with due solemnity by the Bishop of Autun; but there is a tradition which, for the honour and character of Talleyrand, we will believe to be unfounded, that when Mirabeau passed beside the altar the officiating pontiff addressed to him some expressions of mockery and irreligion, which must have weighed heavily upon his conscience on his death-bed. There are, unfortunately, seasons of youth and evil passions, when people give way to anti-Christian ideas, and at that time a degree of impiety was the fashion. Was it not then considered good taste to ridicule the holy and noble ceremonies of the Catholic religion? Talleyrand took a part in all the anti-religious proceedings of the Constituent Assembly upon the situation of the clergy in France, and he was commissioned to apply the civil constitution to his diocese, but the powerful opposition of his clergy did not permit him to accomplish his purpose, for the greater part of the parish priests refused to take the oath. He was present at the consecration of the first constitutional bishops, and, if this devoted conduct was considered deserving of praise by the assembly, it was regarded in a very different light elsewhere, and drew upon him the excommunication of the holy see. Pope Pius VI. published a bull against the Bishop of Autun, in which he declared him out of the pale of the Church, for having become an adherent of the civil constitution of the clergy. This step needs no explanation, such a constitution being in its very essence subversive of all Catholic faith. It was a work of the ultra-Jansenist party, and so thoroughly overstepped all the established rules, that it allowed the Jews and Protestants belonging to various districts and corporations to participate in the election of the Catholic clergy. A bishop or a schoolmaster was appointed in the same manner that a deputy was elected for the National Assembly, for the whole electoral body discharged their duties in the same manner. An absurd principle of equality had levelled every thing; the people appointed the mayors, the bishops, the parish priests, the deputies, and the municipal officers. It was disorder in equality; the levelling principle had trampled down society.

Talleyrand was the intimate friend of Mirabeau, or, to speak with more precision, the great tribune made a tool of him. They had lived together, and together had prepared their works for the Assembly. The popular orator had just been attacked by the mortal disease which carried him off in so rapid and mysterious a manner, and the Bishop of Autun was present when his friend breathed his last. It was not as a ghostly comforter affording him the consolations of his ministry, it was not as a Catholic bishop pointing to a world beyond the grave when those eloquent lips were about to be sealed in death; M. de Talleyrand sat by the bedside of the dying man as the depository of his last thoughts and of his political labours, which led to the destruction of the monarchy. Mirabeau had committed to writing a work upon the equal division of inheritance among the different members of a family, and on the right of making testamentary dispositions, it being the object of the Revolutionists to overturn civil rights as they had already destroyed political ones, because it was well known they were intimately connected. The Bishop of Autun undertook to read the discourse of Mirabeau in the name of his friend at the National Assembly, and excited the most lively enthusiasm while repeating the last words of the orator whose career was now at an end. The life of Mirabeau had been, in some respects, the reaction of a mind filled with strong passions against the persecutions he had endured as a son from the hand of a severe and inflexible father, and his discourse upon limiting the right of making a will and on the equal division of inheritance affords the most certain proof of it. The gift of eloquence was held in the most enthusiastic estimation by the Constituent Assembly, it resolved the greatest part of its business into brilliant oratorical theories, resting upon the ideas of demolition, which were the offspring of the eighteenth century, and as Talleyrand had some difficulty in ascending the tribune, he played but a secondary part at that time. He excited attention principally by his management of business and by his assiduous attendance on committees; it does not appear that he had attained, even at this period, to the reputation of taciturn ability enjoyed by the Abbé Siéyès, and I seldom meet with his name in important and brilliant discussions.

When the Constituent Assembly had concluded their work, Talleyrand quitted France for England. M. de Chauvelin was ambassador there from the unfortunate Louis XVI., and the Bishop of Autun received a commission, of which the object was to draw the two governments of France and England into a nearer resemblance to each other, by establishing a system of two legislative chambers exactly upon the model of the English houses of parliament. There was already some idea of a revolution like that of 1688, and Talleyrand might serve as an agent for the attempt, for there was a good understanding between him and M. de Chauvelin, and a still better between him and the clubs of England. But opinions travelled too fast to allow proper consideration being given to the due balance of power, and the sovereignty of the people had given rise to the scheme of a single chamber. Diplomatic business now went on in a singular manner; instead of the clever and prudent system, which since the commencement of the reign of Louis XVI. had secured so many advantages to France, so many favourable treaties, so many important annexations of territory, the diplomatic corps now amused themselves in encouraging the propaganda and spreading every where the spirit of Jacobinism. M. de Talleyrand had some interviews with the principal leaders of the Whigs, and his intimacy with Earl Grey began from this date. Shortly after this, being concerned in the intrigues of Danton, he returned to Paris on the 11th of August, and he always took pleasure in saying that his not having perished on the 2d of September was owing to the efforts of that singularly energetic man, as well as his having been able to obtain a passport for England.

As the course of events was progressing towards war, and that the trial of Louis XVI. was considered by the Tories as a total subversion of every thing, Talleyrand received an order to quit Great Britain in virtue of the alien act, and was only allowed twenty-four hours to make his arrangements. In the year 1793 people were in the midst of revolutionary excitements; he, therefore, did not return to France, but embarked for the United States, the country that was then pointed out as a model, a pattern government, which the republican party in the Legislative Assembly always cited as the most perfect that political ideas could conceive, and which M. de la Fayette never ceased to extol. At that time two schools prevailed, the American system and the revolution of 1688, both of which have been since renewed and perpetuated both in men and events.

Talleyrand settled in the United States, and during some years he devoted himself to commerce, and engaged in speculations with a considerable degree of activity. There always was something adventurous and bold in his disposition in money matters; to use a familiar expression, no one ever made his fortune oftener than M. de Talleyrand, without being particularly scrupulous as to the means he employed. His property in France was sequestered, it was, therefore, with very limited funds that he commenced his mercantile operations in the United States; and it was certainly singular enough to see a bishop of 1789, afterwards a popular orator, then a secret diplomatist acting as a spy for a party of the National Assembly, finally transforming himself into a merchant in a counting-house at Boston or New York. The shades of the ancient Bosons of Périgord, those great feudal barons, must have been horrified and have indignantly grasped their lances and their coats of arms when they contemplated their descendant seated amid bales of cotton in a republic of shopkeepers. In this manner do revolutions take hold of a man's destiny, play with it, and raise and abase it by turns; but the nobility had already accustomed France to still more extraordinary courses: had not men of noble birth in Brittany and Gascony become freebooters and buccaneers under Henry IV., Louis XIII., and Louis XIV.?

A commercial profession in a country so distant from important events did not suit Talleyrand's inclination, and when order was a little restored, he lost no time in soliciting permission to return to France, the scene of his earliest days. He had left many friends there, among the partisans of what was called the moderate republic and constitutional system; such were Chenier and Madame de Staël, belonging to the literary and philosophical portion of society under the Directory, who had regained some degree of importance after the Reign of Terror was past, for in calmer times the different shades of a party become more evident.

It was particularly to the earnest solicitations of Madame de Staël that Talleyrand owed his return, and we know that her influence was at that time very great. Chenier undertook the report, and a decree was passed revoking the rigorous measures that had been adopted in 1793 against the late Bishop of Autun; it was also declared that he had not emigrated. Talleyrand had at that time entirely left off the ecclesiastical habit, and appeared every where as a layman. He enjoyed in the world a great reputation for wit and talent; there was something noble in his countenance, without its being exactly striking; he carried his head remarkably well, and his hair fell in curls upon his shoulders. He was no longer a young man, still his reputation for gallantry and for agreeableness in society had procured for him a great ascendancy over some women of that period, in the midst of that most singular society in the time of Barras and the Directory, in which were jumbled together men of high rank, contractors, renowned characters, and courtesans. Talleyrand had brought with him Madame Grand, with whom he had become acquainted at Hamburg, and, by a whimsical contrast, it was said no woman ever was possessed of less sense or less intelligence. We know how many capital stories were told of her in the Fauxbourg St. Germain, of which even the republic was so much afraid. The reason is, that the spirit of good society possesses great influence at the time that a bad state of society prevails. Jests were uttered, and the most charming naïvetés were attributed to Madame Talleyrand, of which that regarding M. Denon and Robinson Crusoe is, perhaps, the most inimitable.

As soon as he arrived in Paris, Talleyrand joined the Constitutional Club, which used to meet at the Hôtel de Salm. Many thinking people saw the republic was gradually coming to an end, it had then but very little root in France. It was no longer possible to maintain a feeble and violent democracy, which gave way to the most fantastic and extraordinary paroxysms in the public assembly; people returned to the system of the balance of power, and to the English ideas that the school of Mounier and Lally-Tollendal had been desirous of rendering prevalent in the Constituent Assembly, and that Talleyrand had been commissioned to represent in London, in his secret mission, in which, as I before observed, there was mingled some idea of a revolution like that of 1688.

The institution of an executive directory had been the first step towards an oligarchic system, where, in default of an unity of power, a centre of action, reduced to five persons, had been established. Talleyrand applied all his credit to the support of the Directory, for, not being strong enough at that time to resist or to try to overturn the government, his only object was to draw some advantage from it. He refused steadily to join the royalist party, which, before the 18th Fructidor, was preparing the downfall of the Directory; still less would he belong to the Jacobin faction, for which he felt a strong antipathy, on account of its construction and its inclinations; accordingly, when the 18th Fructidor burst over France, with the proscription of the councils and the press, he was appointed to the ministry for foreign affairs; and the Moniteur announced that citizen Talleyrand, devoted to the interests of the republic, was about to give a powerful impulse to our relations with foreign powers. To accept office under a republic was a singular employment for the heir of the Bosons of Périgord; but then was not the heir of the Barras, a family as old as the rocks of Provence, the chief of the five directors? A curious history might be written by following the career of the old nobility during the French revolution; they assumed the position that men of gentle blood had done in former times during civil disturbances, every thing adventurous suited the younger branches of a noble family.

We must now consider what was the state of France with regard to foreign affairs. The Directory was at war with Austria, Russia, and England; Belgium was ours, we occupied part of Italy, and the rest was transformed into little republics, after the model of the executive directory; for there was at that time, as during all revolutions, a great propaganda mania. Money was the principal instrument of the Directory, every thing was accomplished by means of bribery, and people made haste to achieve a fortune, that they might afterwards spend it in miserable debauchery. When a negotiation was opened with a foreign power, the first step was to impose contributions, and to demand secret presents; and the minister for foreign affairs was a sort of agent commissioned to receive all this spolia opima, which afterwards went to fatten the friends of Barras and Siéyès, or some women who invaded the saloons of the Luxembourg, and presided over their sensual rites. It was a time when modesty was banished; the state of society resembled the Greek courtesans of the Directory, who, while they almost dispensed with clothing, covered even their feet with precious stones. Talleyrand began afresh to work at his fortune, but, no doubt, he manœuvred with too little discretion, for at the end of some months he was openly denounced by Charles de Lacroix, and was obliged to give in his resignation, after having published a rather curious pamphlet, which I have succeeded in obtaining; it bears the name of "Eclaircissements." A pamphlet written by him is a very rare book, for he has written very little in the course of his life. This little work contains an exposition of the conduct of Citizen Talleyrand, from the time of the Constituent Assembly to his appointment to the ministry for foreign affairs, and is couched in very moderate language. The ex-minister replies to his calumniators with remarkable clearness and simplicity, appealing to the testimony afforded by the past, during the whole course of his life. This pamphlet excited a vast controversy. Citizen Talleyrand was also impeached as an extortioner from the tribune of the Five Hundred, even by Lucien Buonaparte, and he was overwhelmed under the evidence produced against him, with the view of applying the principle of ministerial responsibility to his case. He had great difficulty in escaping from this unpleasant situation, in which he had been placed by rather too much avidity during his ministry for foreign affairs. I must confess, one of the defects of his character was his public indifference to all charges brought against him with regard to money; it often compromised his reputation, and sometimes placed him in a very awkward situation.

Having quarrelled with the Directory, we now find him working with all his might for the establishment of the consular government. Buonaparte had surrounded himself on his return from Egypt with all the men who possessed any political talent or any idea of order in society, and he did not disdain the extensive abilities of M. de Talleyrand. The Abbé Siéyès had no predilection for the Bishop of Autun; there was an angry feeling between them on clerical subjects; but Napoleon required them both, he indulged in no feelings of repugnance when the triumph of his ambition was at stake; he therefore employed them both, each according to his abilities, so as to render them subservient to his designs. The influence of Talleyrand over the constitutional party was not devoid of utility upon the 18th Brumaire, and when the consular government was established, the provisional commission appointed him minister for foreign affairs as a recompense for the service he had rendered, and Buonaparte confirmed him in his situation as soon as he was proclaimed First Consul.

A more extensive field was now open before him; the consular government was founded on a principle of unity, there was no longer in their relations with foreign powers the unrestrained violence exhibited by the National Convention, or the unconnected measures pursued by the Directory. It was possible to negotiate with decency and moderation, the relations of one state to another were assuming a character of regularity they had never possessed under any of the preceding governments, and then commenced the great diplomatic arrangements which were at last to bless Europe with repose.

The glorious commencement of the consulate was distinguished by numerous treaties; at Lunneville peace was concluded with Austria, at Amiens a covenant was made with England; other treaties were succeeded by peace with Russia and the Porte, and in all these negotiations Talleyrand evinced great skill and knowledge of what was proper and advisable. He placed the correspondence between governments upon an excellent footing, keeping aloof from the extravagant system which the agents of the Directory introduced into foreign negotiations during the time of the Carmagnole diplomatists, who levied so many forced contributions upon the pictures, the gold crucifixes, and the little property of the poor in the Mont de Piété.[9]

These treaties were a great assistance to the fortune of Talleyrand, being almost all followed by presents of considerable value, according to the custom observed in negotiations between one state and another.

On these occasions the minister did not exhibit sufficient modesty, I might say, sufficient discretion, for people had a tolerably good idea how much he had gained by each treaty, in money and diamonds. No doubt there was some exaggeration in the charges brought against him by discontented people, but I repeat it, one great defect of M. de Talleyrand was an inclination to play with bribery and corruption, and to establish it as a theoretic principle, even in his conversation: the stain remains upon his name. He held men in too much contempt, and this is a sentiment which society always returns with interest. It was now necessary he should lay the foundation of a new fortune; he entered boldly into various speculations: while avaricious and economical in little things, he gambled in the stocks with a perfect frenzy, and even lost considerable sums of money in them. Immediately after the peace of Amiens he had speculated upon a rise, and his gain appeared almost certain, but it happened by one of those caprices which stock-jobbing can alone explain, that the public funds fell more than ten per cent after the signing of the treaty, and he lost several millions of francs in a single turn of the stocks. These caprices of fortune occurred repeatedly in the course of his long life, and explain the necessity he was constantly under of repairing his fortune.

The late Bishop of Autun had just been entirely restored to secular life by permission of Pope Pius VII. While the negotiation concerning the concordat was in progress, the First Consul insisted M. Portalis should write to Rome, and request a brief from the pope authorising the secularisation of M. de Talleyrand; and the venerable Pius VII., who made so many sacrifices to obtain peace for the Church, consented to the act, though he rather exceeded his powers by so doing, as according to the canon the character of priest is indelible. It is said that this brief was not entirely explicit, the pontiff did not establish a principle permitting the marriage of priests; he merely, in virtue of his discretionary power, granted an act of indulgence and personal pardon to M. de Talleyrand for a deed he had already committed.

The ex-bishop had hardly laid down his crosier before he was compelled to submit to the imperious requisitions of the First Consul. Buonaparte, who piqued himself upon his strict morality, insisted he should enter the state of matrimony—a most grievous yoke to impose upon a man of wit and good taste, for, with his habitual tact, Talleyrand had been well aware of the amusement afforded to the Fauxbourg St. Germain by the silliness and ignorance of Madame Grand, and when she should be legally invested with the title of Citizeness Talleyrand, how she would expose herself to the sarcasms and the ridicule of the aristocracy! But there was no help for it, for the First Consul had decided it should be so. The marriage was accordingly celebrated at the municipality and in the church, and as people expressed it, the Bishop of Autun took to himself a wife.

The ministry of the First Consul now comprehended two men of great importance, Talleyrand and Fouché. The one represented at the court of Buonaparte the ancient aristocracy restored—he was essentially the man of diplomatic forms and traditions; Fouché, on the contrary, was the representative of Jacobinism and the revolutionary principle, which the First Consul considered as an internal malady fatal to his power. A deeply-rooted and continual competition could not fail to arise between two characters who had been led to accept office by such different ideas, and who met in the presence of Napoleon as the expression of such different systems. Both were men of incontestable ability, and were constantly informing against each other, or, at least, keeping a careful watch over the proceedings of their rival colleague; in addition to which, Fouché was very anxious to obtain the direction of Foreign affairs. Buonaparte was perfectly aware of the hatred that existed between them, but he was too wise to sacrifice one of the ministers to the other; each served as a check upon his rival, and he listened to the information they gave him, quite certain that neither would allow the treacherous dealings of the other to escape. It was in this manner Fouché delivered to Buonaparte the minutes of the secret treaty with Paul I., which Talleyrand had communicated to the court of London through the medium of one of his agents. The agent was sacrificed, but Buonaparte did not venture to touch his principal, because there was some danger in making known the treachery. Talleyrand afterwards employed the same agent in several subordinate negotiations; indeed, it is well known that he rather preferred people who were not much incommoded by scruples of conscience, men of whom he could boldly disclaim all knowledge if necessary, and who were content he should do so.

We now come to the lamentable affair of the Duc d'Enghien; and there is not the slightest doubt that Talleyrand was as well acquainted as General Savary with Buonaparte's determination to seize the prince. He denied it in vain, for positive proofs exist of the truth of our assertion; amongst others, his letter to the Baron of Edelsheim, minister of Baden, which has been preserved in an entire state. The following is an extract from it: "The First Consul has considered it necessary to order two detachments to proceed to Offemburg and to Ettenheim, to secure the authors of so odious a crime, which is sufficient to deprive the persons who have been concerned in it of the benefit of the law of nations."

After the arrest of the unfortunate prince, Talleyrand was acquainted with all the proceedings of this horrible affair, and he was present at the privy council where his condemnation was determined upon, or, at least, discussed. I dare not believe the cold and laconic reply attributed to him in the drawing-room of his old friend, the Duchess of ***, the very evening the Duc d'Enghien was tried at Vincennes. This reply was not only an atrocious expression, but it also involved a degree of imprudence which did not make part of his character. It is bad enough to have been concerned even indirectly in so fearful a crime.

In the midst of the active negotiations in which Talleyrand felt obliged to appear and to take a part, was there a political system formed in his mind, or merely a general principle? He still retained a strong bias towards English ideas, and a wish for an alliance with that country. This system, on which his earliest diplomatic plans were based, was constantly in his mind; he had not forgotten his residence in England at the beginning of the French revolution under M. de Chauvelin; he was also intimately connected with the Whig party, and considered Great Britain as the political ally of France against Russia, which last appeared to him, of all the powers in Europe, the most dangerous, as far as the civilisation of the world was concerned. He had not observed that by her situation Russia is our easiest, our most natural, and our most disinterested ally, for France and Russia do not clash either in a political or commercial point of view. But there are some early impressions which never wear out, and Talleyrand had passed some of the best years of his life in England, and on terms of friendship with Lord Grey, Lord Russell, Fox, and Sheridan.

He received the title of Grand Chamberlain at the accession of Napoleon to the throne, for which event his diplomatic correspondence had already prepared Europe, and he had also entered into a solemn justification of it to all the different cabinets. Napoleon liked to be surrounded by people of illustrious birth, and it appeared useful to the brilliancy of his crown to have a Boson de Périgord among the officers of his palace; it was in accordance with his passion for aristocratical honours, and his wish to restore the old state of society. M. de Talleyrand played a great part in the first negotiations with Germany, before and after the peace of Presburg, that peace which effected such a radical change in the political and territorial situation of the German nation. It was he who, with the assistance of M. Reinhard, contrived to bring about the Confederation of the Rhine, which made an end of the predominancy in Germany of the ancient house of Austria. After these negotiations were concluded, he received the title of Prince of Benevento, with a real feudal authority under the protectorate of France, which afforded him a revenue of 150,000 livres per annum, and made with his salary as minister for foreign affairs about 500,000 francs.[10] The peace of Presburg was certainly a most brilliant epoch in his ministry. As the representative of the magnificent military government whose grandeur overshadowed the earth, he assumed a certain degree of majesty in his manners and habits. The Prince of Benevento held a cour plénière for the German electors, who came to request from him a fief, or a portion of his supreme power. At the summit of his greatness, Talleyrand's mind still turned to the English alliance, and when Fox succeeded Pitt at the head of affairs, he again conceived the project of opening negotiations with a view to peace; he was firmly convinced that no general peace could be concluded in Europe without the concurrence of England, and he was desirous a vast system of compensation should be arranged, which might incline her towards pacific measures, for no treaty can be durable that is not based upon equity. But these projects were interrupted by one of the most serious circumstances that occurred in the whole course of his life.

It has been said that Talleyrand retired from office because he did not agree in the opinions of Napoleon regarding the war in Spain. I have deeply studied the question, and I believe this report to be utterly untrue. There is but a slight approximation of dates between his resignation and the treachery of Bayonne; it is this approximation that has been laid hold of to gild the disgrace of the minister. Talleyrand was, in fact, replaced by M. de Champagny a little before the Spanish war, but he took part with the cabinet in all the intrigues which led to the events of Aranjuez. The reunion of the Peninsula in one political system with France agreed well with his historical ideas upon the family compact, and several letters are still in existence from the Prince of Benevento which confirm his participation in all these events, as well as a curious report to the Emperor, demonstrating the advantages that would accrue from reuniting both crowns in his family, in imitation of the grand political scheme of Louis XIV.

The real cause of Talleyrand's disgrace was the active attempts he made to negotiate peace with England independent of Napoleon. The Emperor did not at all like men who acted upon their own opinion; he liked every thing to originate with himself alone. He got rid of Talleyrand as, in succeeding years, he shook off Fouché, minister of police.

There are times when men of consideration are a source of embarrassment, when advisers are no longer required: devoted servants alone are necessary. The Prince of Benevento took advantage of the circumstance, and as the Spanish war was very unpopular, he assumed the attitude of a martyr to his love for peace and moderate measures. He was always clever enough to account for his being out of favour by attributing it to some motive which might secure him a good place in public opinion, and he then profited by his situation to wage an underhand, but murderous war, against the power which had rejected him from its circle of activity. When he was no longer at the head of affairs for the purpose of directing them, he took care to bring up the rear, for the sake of causing hinderance and annoyance. Nevertheless, his dismissal was now covered with a golden mantle; he received the title of vice-grand elector, with the same salary of 500,000 francs, that he enjoyed during his ministry. The activity of his mind led him afresh into commercial pursuits, he gambled in the stocks, became a partner in a banking-house at Hamburg and in Paris, he invested considerable sums of money in the English funds, and awaited patiently the course of events. To know how to wait is a great mark of political knowledge, and it was one of Talleyrand's favourite axioms, that patience often leads to favourable situations: he never would be in a hurry.

A secret opposition was beginning to form against Napoleon, even in the highest ranks, among the heads of the senate, of the government, and of the army. Fearful of yet making itself manifest by any overt act, it only ventured upon apparently trifling remarks and half confidences; but people conspired in their minds, expressions were used, which were repeated as apophthegms and prophecies of society. "It is the beginning of the end," said Talleyrand, at the time of the disastrous expedition to Moscow; and this just appreciation had been warmly applauded. What a terrible opposition is that of the salons and the gay world! It kills with a lingering death, it upsets the strongest ideas, it destroys the best-laid plans; it would be far better to be compelled to engage in a pitched battle face to face. This opposition was gradually increasing, and the police establishment of General Savary, which tended more to the employment of brute force than the adoption of intelligent precautions, was incapable of restraining it; it was gradually appearing on every side, besides which the men who placed themselves at the head of the resisting party were of too much consequence for the Emperor to venture to touch them. Talleyrand and Fouché now did whatever they pleased with perfect impunity—they were acting against the Emperor, and he did not dare to shew his displeasure. It has always been supposed that Napoleon when at the summit of his greatness might have put down any one; yet, great as he was, there were some men too powerful for him. The day that he had touched Talleyrand or Fouché, all the officers of government would have considered themselves at the mercy of a caprice; Cambacérès, Lebrun, Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angely, feeling themselves henceforth without any security against a master whom they detested, would, perhaps, have shaken off the yoke.

As early as the beginning of the year 1813, Talleyrand had opened a communication with the Bourbons. The venerable Cardinal de Périgord, grand almoner to Louis XVIII., was his uncle, but there was a considerable degree of coolness between them; still it may be easily imagined that it facilitated an exchange of hopes and promises, against the chances of a future restoration to the throne; but all this was done secretly and in strict confidence, as the idea of the restoration was not yet sufficiently matured. Talleyrand had never ceased to maintain a communication through his agents with Louis XVIII., who was himself at that time engaged in a confidential correspondence with all the great officers of the state, even including Cambacérès himself. Paris was filled with these letters, notwithstanding which, Talleyrand was one of the council appointed to assist the regency of Maria Louisa, whom the Emperor had placed at the head of affairs. He always exhibited the greatest interest in all questions relating to the government, he attended assiduously the meetings of the council, and appeared the most zealous of the Emperor's servants: the plan of the regency also was congenial to his mind, and he would have been satisfied with it as a political idea. He still, however, carried on an underhand correspondence with Louis XVIII., who, with his perfect knowledge of mankind, engaged to maintain him in his magnificent position, to which he added a promise that he should be placed at the head of the ministry. As to the regency of Maria Louisa, it involved a project for a closer alliance with Austria, and was suggested by the most able men in the council of Napoleon, who were desirous of exciting dissensions among the allied powers by giving rise to divers interests.

The misfortunes of war had now brought the enemy near the capital; and, as the powers of Napoleon became more feeble, people learned to estimate probabilities with a greater degree of certainty: first the regency, then a provisional government, and, finally, the restoration of the Bourbons. Since the year 1812, all illusion concerning the invincible power of Napoleon was over. The burning of Moscow, the snows which had covered the grand army as with a vast shroud, the conspiracy of Mallet, all had tended to place the imperial power in a tottering condition. The negotiations of Talleyrand began to assume an indescribable boldness; the plenipotentiaries of the allied powers had fixed a congress at Châtillon, more for the sake of appearances than to discuss really diplomatic questions; and M. de Coulaincourt, whose devotion to the Emperor was undoubted, was to propose a treaty determining the limits of France under the government of Napoleon, or the regency of the archduchess. This was the moment selected by Talleyrand to despatch a secret agent to the head-quarters of the Emperor Alexander. This agent, who was, I believe, M. de Vitrolles, was commissioned to describe the condition of the metropolis, the anxiety there was to get rid of Napoleon, and, above all, the imperative necessity there appeared to be for the restoration of the old dynasty, as the only certain step that could be taken under existing circumstances. M. de Vitrolles evinced great zeal and ability in the discharge of this secret mission, which exposed him to extreme danger; he succeeded in conveying to the Emperor Alexander some letters written in cipher, and a very detailed memorial upon the state of the public mind; but—must I confess it?—the allies, who cared but little about the Bourbons, did not perfectly understand the scope of this movement, neither did they know what might be the result. It was then Talleyrand exerted himself to demonstrate that these two ideas, the ancient territory and the ancient dynasty, were correlative; and the same system had been forcibly represented at Châtillon by Lord Castlereagh.

The disaffected party continued to gain strength in Paris. Talleyrand had made friends with several of the senators who still retained some recollections of the Republic, and professed an especial hatred towards Napoleon; such were M. de Lambrechts, Languinais, and Grégoire, and the Prince of Benevento could rely upon their assistance in any rising that might be organised against the empire. At the same time he had collected around himself the Duc de Dalberg, the Abbé de Pradt, and a multitude of Royalist agents, who were in communication with MM. de Noailles, de Fitzjames, and de Montmorency, all engaged in secret machinations for the Bourbons. The time was come when the Empire must terminate—there was so much disaffection among the citizens of Paris and in the provinces. Great precaution was shewn in taking the first steps in favour of the Bourbon restoration, and the greatest secrecy was observed; as soon, therefore, as it was decided, according to the instructions of Napoleon, that the Empress should leave Paris, and establish her regency at Blois, Talleyrand hastened to declare his intention of shewing his zeal by following the regency, it being necessary he should offer a pledge to the imperialist party in order to prevent suspicion, but by a piece of duplicity, perfectly in keeping with his character and position, he apprised the allies of his pretended flight. Accordingly, Prince Schwartzenberg posted a small body of cavalry at the first stage on the road to Blois, which stopped the carriage of Prince Talleyrand, and obliged him to return to Paris, where the wily diplomatist also declared himself compelled by force to remain. By this means he was enabled to place himself as the head and the nucleus of the general rising against the Emperor; his saloon was open to all the disaffected, and he encouraged the idea of Napoleon's downfall in a manner which charmed the hearts of the Republicans; for Buonaparte's violation of the constitution was the only circumstance that appeared to occur to their minds. The ground was well chosen, and Talleyrand worked at his ease and on an extended scale at the ruin of his master; every thing had tended towards it since the year 1812, and the moral strength of the Empire was gone.

Talleyrand's grand intrigue even began in the senate. He well knew the simplicity and the instinctive repugnance felt by Grégoire, Lambrechts, and Languinais, for Napoleon, and he determined they should serve as a pivot for the new order of things. Some of them thought they were making preparations for a regency. Talleyrand promised them constitutional forms and the sovereignty of the people, those old visions of the Republic, and they welcomed all these recollections with ecstasy: there was not much difficulty, certainly, in inducing these second-rate minds to act in concert with him. The patriot party were the first to demand that the Emperor should be deposed; they enumerated all the grievances, upon which they had observed so prudent a silence in the days of his prosperity; they fell upon Napoleon, his forfeiture of the crown was pronounced by the senate in the month of April 1814, and he was thus sacrificed by the party which had obeyed his will with apparent alacrity during the ten years of the Empire. Nothing is so violent or so rancorous in its hatred as an assembly which has long been humbled under a despotic rule: it afterwards takes signal vengeance upon the fallen power.

When the Emperor Alexander entered Paris, Talleyrand's ascendancy over his mind was sufficient to induce him to inhabit the Hôtel de la Rue Saint-Florentin, an unheard-of honour, which gave an undeniable proof of the great estimation in which he was held! The czar occupied the apartments, still to be seen, with the long stone balcony at the extremity of the Rue de Rivoli. It was in the blue drawing-room in this hôtel that the plan of the Restoration was organised, according to the ideas and principles which I have depicted in a work especially devoted to that purpose.[11] Talleyrand's influence over the proceedings of that time was unbounded; he induced the Emperor Alexander to reject all proposals for continuing the regency of Maria Louisa, as well as the loyal endeavours of Marshal Macdonald. He instigated all these refusals, and had adopted a maxim admirable for its clearness and precision, which he took pleasure in repeating as a means of putting a stop to all negotiations. "The restoration of the Bourbons," said he, "is a principle; every thing else is an intrigue." In after years, he forgot none of the services he had rendered to the old dynasty, and, when out of favour under the Restoration, he took pleasure in shewing this blue drawing-room which had been inhabited by the Emperor Alexander, and would repeat in a tone of affected bitterness and ridicule, as if to brand the ingratitude of the Bourbons, "Nevertheless, gentlemen, it was here the Restoration was accomplished." And then he would describe in his admirable manner the proceedings of that time, and point out the spot occupied by each of the party in the month of May 1814. "At the corner of the table," he would say, "sat the Emperor Alexander, there the King of Prussia, and here the Grand Duke Constantine; a little farther off were Pozzo di Borgo, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg—yes, gentlemen, it was here, in this little room, that we restored the throne of the Bourbons, and the monarchy of 1400 years." And this he would repeat with a sardonic smile which marked his dissatisfaction, and perhaps was an index of some future design of overturning what he had so easily raised. When a monarchy has been restored within the narrow limits of a drawing-room, it cannot be supposed to inspire very great confidence. Such was the secret thought of this great contriver of events.

Up to the arrival of Louis XVIII. Talleyrand was at the head of the provisional government; all the responsibility rested with him, and he had cause to reproach himself with many evil actions which were connected with the spirit of that period, for there are seasons when the human mind does not belong to itself; it is hurried on by the rapid course of ideas, it is imbued with a spirit of reaction. Has the mission of M. de Maubreuil ever been perfectly explained? What was its object? Some people will tell you he received no orders, except to prevent the crown diamonds from being carried away; but other accounts tell a very different story, and assert that he was intrusted to perform a deed of blood, similar perhaps to that which had destroyed the last of the Condés. I can positively declare that M. de Maubreuil never had any direct conversation or personal interview with Talleyrand. He took care never to appear in deplorable circumstances of this kind; and all that passed was as follows: One of the confidential secretaries of the minister said to M. de Maubreuil, in perfectly plain language, "This is what the prince requires of you; here is your warrant and a sum of money, and as a proof of what I say, and of his assent, remain in the salon to-day, and he will pass through and bend his head in token of approbation." The sign was made, and M. de Maubreuil considered himself perfectly authorised to undertake the mission. What, I repeat, was its object? The time is hardly yet arrived which makes it allowable to tell and to publish every thing; I judge no man's conduct, I only repeat that there are times when people do not appear to belong to themselves.

On his arrival in Paris, Louis XVIII. appointed Talleyrand prime-minister with the direction of foreign affairs; thus leaving him the supreme charge of all diplomatic negotiations, as a mark of gratitude and a pledge of general peace. A treaty was signed, France returned to her ancient territory and her ancient dynasty, as it had been decided after the events of Paris; all diplomatic questions of general interest were afterwards to be settled in the congress of the allied powers, fixed to take place at Vienna, where Talleyrand was appointed ambassador extraordinary to represent the King of France,—a mission he was certainly fully entitled to expect. In the month of November all the French legation arrived at Vienna, and the ambassador displayed great activity. It was necessary to place France in a favourable position, which was very difficult after all the wars and the disasters she had had to encounter; and we must do justice to the great abilities and exertions of Prince Talleyrand, for, in spite of the state of humiliation to which she was reduced, he succeeded in establishing her in the first rank; it was also owing to his intervention that the younger branch of the Bourbons was restored at Naples. Louis XVIII. was the means of saving Saxony from imminent danger, and finally, towards the close of the congress, Talleyrand entered into an intimate league with Metternich and Lord Castlereagh to prevent the encroachments of Russia in Poland, and concluded in the month of February[12] 1815 a secret treaty with England and Austria, where the possibility of war was looked forward to, and the necessary arrangements made for such a contingency. I have given the curious original elsewhere.[13]

During the whole time of the Congress of Vienna, the desire for an alliance with England and a feeling of antipathy for Russia never ceased to possess the mind of Prince Talleyrand; he followed up this system of regard and hatred with the utmost tenacity; he even went so far as to write, in his secret correspondence with Louis XVIII., "that a Russian princess did not come of a sufficiently good family for the Duc de Berri, and that it ought not to be thought of, as the house of Romanof could not place itself on a level with that of Bourbon." This circumstance was never forgotten by the Emperor Alexander, who from this time forward entertained an extreme dislike for Talleyrand, and his aversion became still more violent after the events of 1815, when the secret treaty concluded in the month of March came to his knowledge.

Napoleon landed in the Gulf of Juan, and his rapid march upon Paris excited the greatest alarm in the Congress of Vienna. The activity of the French ambassador redoubled its vehemence, for Napoleon had outlawed him in his decrees dated from Lyons, and he in his turn revenged himself by causing Buonaparte to be placed at the ban of the empire. He took great pains to obtain this result, the declaration of the Congress of Vienna was his work, and it was he that induced Lord Castlereagh and Metternich to sign it. From this moment the coalition was in motion, and France was again threatened with an irruption of myriads of armed men, when the battle of Waterloo a second time terminated the sway of Napoleon. When a power is at an end, all attempts to restore it are in vain, it is merely the flash that precedes the extinction of an expiring light.

Talleyrand returned to Paris with the Bourbons, but his authority was no longer what it had been. Louis XVIII. had discovered that his plenipotentiary, and the Duc de Dalberg, in his name, had received overtures concerning the possibility of the younger branch of the Bourbons succeeding to the throne of France, and it was not likely he should forget it. The king, with his habitual sagacity and experience, would never have chosen for his minister the man who had been plenipotentiary at Vienna; but the influence of the Duke of Wellington, which placed Fouché at the head of the police, also restored to Talleyrand the direction of foreign affairs. The cabinet of July 1815 was entirely favourable to English ideas and interests.

As long as Talleyrand had only to treat with Lord Castlereagh and the Prussians, he preserved his ascendancy; but how hard were the conditions imposed by those powers! The Duke of Wellington had a regard for him as the old representative of the English alliance, and supported him with all his influence, which was very great; however, in the month of August 1815, the face of every thing was changed; the Russians joined with 350,000 bayonets; the Emperor Alexander took a part in the negotiation, and as Russia alone was kindly disposed towards the house of Bourbon, as she alone defended the integrity of our territory, and did not exact the sacrifices required by England and Prussia, she soon became the predominant power. The first condition imposed by the Emperor Alexander, before he would enter into any negotiation, was the dismissal of Prince Talleyrand. He has since pretended that he voluntarily retired from office to avoid signing the Convention of Paris, that hard necessity to which France was compelled to submit through the heavy calamities which had fallen upon her, but this fact is as untrue as his opposition to the Spanish war in 1808. He has on every occasion striven to invest his dismissal with a degree of interest, but in this instance he had unavailingly had recourse to all his influence with the Duke of Wellington and Prussia to obtain the direction of a treaty, and he only retired because it was impossible for him to carry on a negotiation. He had submitted to every thing, he had made a thousand concessions to the czar, even going so far as to recommend Count Pozzo di Borgo as Minister for the Interior; it was all in vain, Alexander never would consent to see or to treat with him. Had Russia withdrawn her influence we should have lost Lorraine and Alsace, which had been claimed by the Germanic Confederation, but when the czar took the negotiations in hand, he stipulated for better conditions than those proposed by Prussia and England. Louis XVIII. took pleasure in relating the scene, at the close of which he asked for or accepted the resignation of the Bishop of Autun, and he described it with all the malicious wit he possessed in so admirable a degree. The king was quite delighted, for he did not at all enjoy the imperative and arbitrary style of proceeding adopted by his minister, who was more apt to request he would affix his signature to the papers he laid before him than inclined to consult him upon any political business; and besides, though the king was a little of a free-thinker, he could not quite forgive the utter disregard of the laws of the Church evinced by a married priest. This feeling was so strong at court, that the Cardinal de Périgord, grand almoner of France, never would recognise any dignity but that of bishop as belonging to his nephew. The Royalist party, now very powerful, lost no opportunity of turning him into ridicule, and clever caricatures always represented him with the crosier in his hand. They wanted to get rid of him as they had already contrived to do of Fouché, the former regicide orator. One day at a party in the Faubourg Saint-Germain Talleyrand said in a loud voice to some Royalists, "But, gentlemen, you want to bring back the old order of things, and that is not possible." The caustic and clever M. de Sallaberry replied, "Why, monseigneur, who would think of making you Bishop of Autun again? It would be an absurdity." The shaft was well aimed, and it struck home. In spite, however, of personal feelings, the king gave him the appointment of Grand Chamberlain of France, with a salary of 100,000 francs, at the suggestion of the Duc de Richelieu, who had declared in the royal council that, after all the services rendered by M. de Talleyrand, the Bourbons ought to present him with a noble mark of their gratitude. One would think that Louis himself, must have remembered that he owed the defence of his dynasty to him, at a time when the Restoration was regarded with coolness by all the cabinets of Europe.

Talleyrand continued to hold the situation of grand-chamberlain during the reign of the restored family. He was not a favourite at the Tuileries, where he went every day through etiquette to fulfil his office, standing behind the king's chair with admirable punctuality; and he was received with great coolness by Louis XVIII. Charles X. was more kindly disposed towards every body, and occasionally entered politely into conversation with him on some trifling subject. He also performed his duties at the diners d'apparat. The king was seated at table, the grand-chamberlain occupying a small chair at a little distance, and while Louis was discussing a pheasant, or other game, with an excellent appetite, Talleyrand dipped a biscuit in old madeira wine. It was a scene of considerable interest, and used to pass in the most profound silence. Every now and then the king would look fixedly at the grand-chamberlain with a sneering expression of countenance, while the latter, with his impassibility so coarsely defined by Marshal Lannes, would go on soaking his biscuit and slowly sipping his madeira with a look of respectful deference towards the king his master. Not a word was addressed by the sovereign to the chamberlain during the short repast, after which Talleyrand used to resume his place behind the king's chair in a cold, ceremonious manner, that reminded one of the statue in the Festin de Pierre, only with this difference, that the grand-chamberlain's mind was filled with the most inveterate hatred, a feeling which he extended to all the members of the royal family.

In the Chamber of Peers he adopted a system of opposition, which assumed a greater degree of solemnity, from all the statesmen of the various epochs who had been engaged in the management of affairs and vast negotiations being included in it. He very rarely spoke; indeed, I believe only two speeches delivered by him are on record. The first was on the occasion of the war in Spain in 1823, when he entered rather awkwardly into the question and foretold a disastrous event to our arms, whereas they were in reality crowned with success, shewing how great a mistake it is ever to give utterance to predictions in politics. The second time was on the occasion of the law of election and the liberty of the press; he then reminded the assembly of the promises entered into at Saint-Ouen, at which he had himself been present. He appeared at this time to be held in little estimation in the upper house, and there were not above five or six peers whose votes were at his disposal. The case was very different in his drawing-room and at his toilet, where he was in the habit of receiving a great deal of company and listened to confidential communications from men of all parties, flattering in turn the liberal societies and the aristocratic coteries; for the latter, especially, he entertained a strong predilection. His fortune was now very much involved in consequence of an immense bankruptcy, by which his friend the Duc de Dalberg alone lost the sum of 4,000,000[14] francs, and he passed but little part of his time at Paris, but lived at Valençay, or at his great estates in Touraine; these were deeply mortgaged, and without the management of the Duchess of Dino, who was a woman of wonderful ability in business, he would, probably, have been obliged to part with some of them. He occasionally made an excursion to a greater distance, and once passed a whole season in the south of France, in a pleasant habitation selected for him at Hyères, in the country of fragrant flowers, of vanilla, and orange, and citron groves. His wit and noble manners are still recollected with delight in that part of the country; and, indeed, it is impossible to express the charm he infused into the evening conversations at his house.

His social existence was, in fact, passed entirely during the night. He rose late, and it was near eleven o'clock before he rang for his valet de chambre, who brought him his morning gown. He was obliged to lean upon his stick as he walked from one chair to another, until he reached the fireplace; and he breakfasted after the English fashion, making a very trifling repast. Then followed his toilet, which occupied a long time, and was almost public, according to the fashion of former times, when dressing the hair was a perfect operation. His servant put on his cravat, still worn with all the pretension of an exquisite of the Directory, and he then went out for an airing. After dinner, and to conclude the evening, he generally joined some of his old intimate friends, and played a rubber, very late and always very high. He sometimes dozed a little in an easy chair, for he possessed an admirable faculty for closing his eyes, and, perhaps, of indulging in a waking sleep. His conversation was generally brilliant and clever, sometimes very communicative, and he took great pleasure in talking over the events of his life, dwelling with especial delight upon the Congress of Vienna, which had been such a brilliant period for his diplomatic talents. Thus passed his life, full of a feeling of discontent and a constant looking forward to change; nothing was hurried, but he was constantly in a state of expectation, or carrying on one of those vast conspiracies which no one can lay hold of.

At the time of the breaking out of the revolution of July, Talleyrand was deeply irritated against the elder branch of the Bourbons, whom he termed ungrateful and forgetful of his services; and there is no doubt of his having worked industriously towards establishing a new monarchical system. He had a horror of anarchy, power was his element. The time is not yet come when we may venture to tell every thing, but it is an undoubted fact, that Talleyrand was consulted and examined on the 9th of August, and his answer was altogether favourable to the new project. Did not this revolution carry him back in recollection to the period of the Congress of Vienna in 1814, when an arrangement of this kind had been suggested by him as a possible event and a means of solving a difficulty should such occur? Some secret conferences were held on this delicate subject; Talleyrand took upon himself the negotiation with the corps diplomatique, and also the duty of setting clearly before them that the peace of Europe depended upon the establishment of a monarchy in France,—a vast undertaking, to which a prince of very superior abilities was willing to devote himself. Talleyrand succeeded in the object he had in view; the despatches of the ambassadors were all in favour of royalty, it was considered as a guarantee of the principle of order in Europe, as an efficacious means of repressing the revolutionary spirit, and maintaining the treaties already concluded—in short, as the strongest opposition to the Propaganda tendency, and the most serious scheme of general conservatism.

Talleyrand at this time refused the ministry for foreign affairs, as it would merely have added to his responsibility without increasing his power of action; but he accepted the embassy to London, which was a much more important office, as affairs of the greatest consequence would necessarily come under consideration there, it being upon the prompt decision of this cabinet that must mainly depend the consolidation of the new order of things; for, although England had been the first to recognise the events that had taken place, she had shewn some disposition to reserve regarding an alliance with the new government. The affairs of Belgium occasioned so much difficulty in the negotiations, and added so greatly to the danger of the political crisis, that it was necessary a person possessed both of talent and great consideration should be deputed to London, to secure the support of the English cabinet in the negotiations that had been begun, especially as the despatches received from Russia rendered the necessity for a good understanding with England particularly urgent.

When Talleyrand arrived in London, the Duke of Wellington was still in the ministry, and the violent Tories had the direction of the cabinet,—a state of affairs which prevented his carrying on his manœuvres as he wished; he was perfectly aware of the attachment of the Tories to the secret treaties concluded in 1815, and, therefore, used all his efforts to overturn the Duke of Wellington. He also renewed his old intimacy with Lord Grey, he sought the society of Lord John Russell, and lived in a most magnificent style.

The revolution of July had produced an effect in England; the march of opinion became too powerful for the Tories, and Lord Grey was placed at the head of the cabinet, affording a complete triumph to the moderate Whigs. The course being now clear, Talleyrand could assume the position he wished: and hard had he laboured to prepare it! He now was able to work openly for a treaty with France.

It ought to be known that, during the embassy of Prince Polignac, a conference had been arranged in London between the plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, and France, to decide upon all the questions relating to Greece; and the same course had been pursued afterwards, under the Duc de Laval. England attached great importance to it, and Talleyrand proposed its renewal, for the purpose of watching and deciding upon the general affairs of Europe, and also advised that the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia should be admitted. They were to take the Belgic question into consideration, and decide what course should be pursued, in consequence of the dismemberment of the kingdom of the Low Countries, established in 1815; and Talleyrand being personally acquainted with all these plenipotentiaries, his position soon became as brilliant in London as it had been at Vienna in 1815. He was connected with Prince and Princess Lieven by the ties of old and intimate friendship, and the families of Talleyrand and Esterhazy had also long been well acquainted: Baron Bulow, the Prussian minister, was one of the second-rate diplomatists, who all entertained the greatest respect for Talleyrand and his long experience in public affairs.

Conferences were, therefore, undertaken upon very indefinite subjects, for their principal object was to seek the opportunity of meeting and maintaining peace. No doubt there was something very undecided in the numerous protocols signed at that time upon the affairs of Belgium, and the greater part of them were never put in force. In addition to this, though they had been the result of a common agreement, the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries never received the formal assent of their governments: the conduct of Prince Lieven and Prince Esterhazy was, in the first instance, disclaimed on the part of their courts, and they were shortly afterwards recalled; but the result of these conferences in London, the happy consequences of their developement, was the maintenance of peace, whose existence had at one time been greatly threatened. In 1831, when the foreign ministers met in such close communication with each other, it was almost impossible explanations should not take place, and that there should be any misapprehension between the governments; the proceedings of Talleyrand were, therefore, successful; for his main object was the preservation of the European status quo, by preventing those conflicts among the cabinets, those clashings among people, which fill history with tales of bloodshed; and the conferences in London were of service, because the close contact into which men were brought with each other was a means of reconciling affairs.

According to his general custom, the French ambassador received a great deal of company; his entertainments were splendid; his evening parties, in particular, were remarkable for the good taste and distinguished company so much prized in England. I should not exceed the truth if I were to say that his wishes influenced certain votes in the House of Commons. No ambassador had ever before enjoyed so much consideration. But Lord Grey was aware of an approaching storm: the difficulty of his political situation had not consisted in overturning the Tory ministry—that was a simple and natural victory, for the agitation of minds and events had been sufficient to displace the Duke of Wellington, but the really dangerous part of Lord Grey's position was, on the contrary, the inevitable and powerful progress of the Whig principles, which sought to proceed to extremities; for when a nation lays its hand upon its ancient institutions, one change often leads to another. After having reformed the state, and given a greater latitude to elections, must they not reform the Church? did not the situation of Ireland require modification? The Dissenters complained, and with justice, of their grievances; it would have been an absurd attempt to set a limit to a reformed parliament, to say to the nation "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." The parliament became impatient, while religious scruples arose in the mind of Lord Grey, in the old party of which Canning was formerly the head, now represented by Mr. Stanley, and, above all, in the heart of William the Fourth.

Talleyrand was as well aware of the danger as Lord Grey himself, for he well knew the powerful influence exercised by young and ardent opinions; it soon became impossible to arrest the parliamentary agitation. The venerable Lord Grey was suddenly seized with disgust for the whole proceeding; he would not raise a sacrilegious hand against the Church; he sent in his resignation, and England well remembers the touching explanations he gave upon his own ministerial conduct in the House of Lords. From the time of the appointment of Lord Melbourne, the French ambassador foresaw the invincible tendency of affairs, the triumph of the Ultra-Whigs, and, perhaps, of Lord Durham,[15] and began to think of retiring, for he no longer played the principal part, of which he was always ambitious.

Another circumstance added to this feeling. In the revolution just encountered by the ministry, Lord Palmerston had still retained the Foreign Office, his opinions being of a less moderate cast than those of Lord Grey; and as his disposition was one rather difficult to deal with, serious dissensions had already arisen between him and Talleyrand. From the first formation of their ministry, the Whigs had felt the necessity of augmenting their consideration with foreign powers; they were not ignorant that the English nation, which preferred them for their popular opinions and their patriotic sentiments, did not feel equal confidence in their habits of business and their comprehension of the situation of Europe. Lord Palmerston considered that, after the treaty of the 8th of July, which secured such great advantages to Russia, a certain armed demonstration was inevitable upon the Eastern question, and he, therefore, proposed to Talleyrand that the squadrons of France and England should be united, and sail under the flags of both nations in the Black Sea.

Talleyrand perfectly understood the interest felt by the Whigs in this armed demonstration, but he considered it far too bold a step to be ventured upon in their actual situation. As a continental power, France might well call upon the alliance of England if necessary, or, on the other hand, afford to her all possible assistance; but then the whole of the Holy Alliance was close upon her, and this demonstration might lead to a real war. In the opinion of Talleyrand it was necessary to fortify the moral alliance, and place a barrier to resist the encroachments of Russia; but it would be a hazardous undertaking to make a direct attack on her flag in the Black Sea. He, therefore, held back from the propositions of Lord Palmerston: he explained to him that, instead of an armed demonstration, which would be of doubtful advantage, nay, possibly altogether useless, it would be desirable to prepare an act, expressive of future policy; and made it evident to him that a treaty of quadruple alliance, which would unite the south of Europe against the north, could not fail to lead to great results, even in the midst of the various but transient events of a party war. The treaty concluded between France, England, Spain, and Portugal, owed its existence to this idea, this favourite conception of Prince Talleyrand; he would, however, have been much better pleased could he have also included Austria, according to the desire he had cherished in his mind ever since 1814.

Lord Palmerston entered into Talleyrand's plans. England confined herself to a few nautical parades in the Black Sea, but from this time a coldness sprung up between the two diplomatists. The English minister is a person of very irritable temper, touchy, and of a changeable disposition, and Talleyrand took a great dislike to him; and as, on the other side, the cabinet of which Lord Melbourne was the chief was drawn on from one concession to another, he soon resolved to leave England. It was announced that his health was failing, and he went into the country to seek peace in retirement. Like Pythagoras when the thunder is heard from afar, Talleyrand preferred the desert and the echo. During his last journey to Paris he became friends with Count Pozzo di Borgo, that is to say, with the Russian idea. The two diplomatists did not venture as yet to hold any official communications, but they often met in little mysterious banquets, in a diplomatic retreat at Bellevue.

Talleyrand quitted London, popular clamour was a source of annoyance to him; it was no longer a dispute between one portion of the aristocracy and another, from henceforth it appeared to be the people against the aristocracy itself: and the stake was too great. He therefore left England definitively for Valençay, explaining, in a most dignified letter, the reason of his retirement. There is a period with politicians when they begin to live for posterity; they then all seek an opportunity of explaining themselves, of laying open their conduct, and striving to rectify the judgment of future times—they feel a desire of revealing themselves solemnly to the public; and such was the motive which induced Talleyrand to speak at a meeting of the French Institute. He said but a few words on the occasion of an éloge that had been pronounced, but those few afforded an explanation of the motives that had actuated a long and busy political life, passed in the midst of governments, passions, and parties.

After this time Talleyrand lived either in Paris or on his estates in the country, and was always consulted with the most profound veneration by all the thinking heads of government. He at one time had some idea of going to Vienna to accomplish a plan suggested by the Duchess de Dino, which would unite the two families of Talleyrand and Esterhazy. The latter, it is well known, is the richest family in Austria, and during the last seven years Madame de Dino had paid great attention to her uncle's affairs, and had been so successful in her management that his property was quite free from debt, and one of the most considerable of the present day. The fortune of M. de Talleyrand, after so many reverses, is said almost to resemble one of the fairy tales in the "Arabian Nights."

There are few political characters with whom the press has been more busy than with Prince Talleyrand, during the latter years of his life. Every step he took, every gesture, every action, was made the subject of the most contradictory reports. He had now attained his eighty-fourth year, and it was evident his faculties were beginning to suffer considerably from his advanced age. He was merely the shadow of his former self. Every now and then there would be a gleam of his powerful intellect, but they would soon disappear again in the weakness caused by extreme age, and so busy and exhausted a life. He could no longer walk a single step, but was carried about or wheeled in a chair, and the slightest jolt drew from him tears of suffering—most miserable resemblance that exists between decrepitude and childhood! In fact, his career was come to an end, though they in vain strove to prolong it by endeavouring to rouse him.

That career had indeed been marvellous, and though Prince Talleyrand be reproached with the constant changeableness of his opinions, we may observe the same principle predominant under all circumstances—the alliance with England. I have selected the Duc de Richelieu as the type of the Russian alliance, and in comparing the services of these two political characters, we shall easily discover that the duke did more service to his country during the short time that he held the reins of government than Prince Talleyrand in his lengthened career, because Richelieu had adopted a more national plan, one more favourable to our foreign interests. Talleyrand never was subservient to any particular government or doctrine. He had a sort of personal feeling which degenerated into selfishness. He did not betray Napoleon in the literal sense of the word, he only quitted him in time; neither did he actually betray the Restoration, he abandoned it when it was abandoning itself. No doubt there is a good deal of selfishness in this system, whose first thought is of its own situation and fortune, and afterwards of the government it serves; but, perhaps, it is hardly to be expected we should find in men of very great talent the degree of self-denial which leads to a blind devotion towards a person or a cause. Talleyrand was a little inclined to apply to himself the expressions he was accustomed to address to his employés when he was minister for foreign affairs: "There are two things, gentlemen, which I forbid in the most positive manner,—too much zeal and too absolute devotion, because they compromise both persons and affairs." Such was the mind of Talleyrand; with a cold heart and barren imagination, he was compared to a real tactician, judging men and parties with mathematical precision. He reserved all his activity for the decisive moments which overturned thrones and governments, when he considered prompt action as of importance. In revolutions his experience had been very great; he immediately understood the value of a situation, and decided upon it by an apophthegm, which at once struck home. His was, perhaps, the mind which was most capable of foreseeing, least able to prevent, and most skilled in deriving advantage from the different phases of empires.

But now his life was drawing to a close, and symptoms of approaching death appeared on every side. For a long time he had been afflicted with a painful complaint, which he bore with less resignation than he had exhibited under political events; the attacks were very violent, and the prince became subject to constant fainting fits—warning symptoms of the approach of his last enemy. The total decay of Talleyrand was apparent to every body; the sharpness and delicacy of his wit every now and then shot forth a dying gleam, but the man was at an end. His visits to the Tuileries were a most melancholy spectacle, a sad memorial of the nothingness of human greatness. Alas! that vast intellect was fast sinking into second childhood. His complaint was incurable; it was in the first place old age, and then, also, an old affection of anthrax, or white gangrene, for which he was obliged to undergo a very painful operation, and after it was performed the agonies of death followed in rapid succession. He was perfectly aware of the danger of his situation, and considered it a point of dignity not to appear alarmed, but went through all the proper etiquette with death. For a considerable time he had been in communication with a pious ecclesiastic in Paris; before him was the example of his family, and the recollection of his uncle the Cardinal, of blessed memory; and of late years his benefactions to the chapel of Valençay had been very great, both in magnificent donations and pious endowments. Though he had forgotten his religious obligations, he had never made an open profession of impiety, and had preserved a considerable degree of loftiness of mind, so that when the thought of death was presented to him he did not shrink from a retractation. No person was better aware of the weakness and puerile vanity of professed free-thinkers.

This retractation was not the offspring of a sudden impulse; on the contrary, it had been concerted three months before with infinite care, as if it had been a diplomatic paper sent to the church. Full of submission, yet with a mixture of dignity, the prince addressed it to the sovereign pontiff, repenting all his participation in the scandals by which his life had been stained, particularly his adhesion to the civil constitution of the clergy; and he now acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Paris, and submitted to the Catholic laws of the holy see. This was the manner in which he prepared for death. Accounts of the state of his health were incessantly despatched to Neuilly; he had rendered great services to Louis Philippe, who had often consulted him and derived the benefit of his experience, and who was now resolved to pay a last visit to the last descendant of the Périgords. When the king was announced, the prince said with a feeble voice, but without any appearance of emotion, as if the attention were due to him,—"It is the greatest honour my house has received."

There was a strong aristocratic feeling in the expression, 'My house;' it signified that, though the visit was honourable to his family, there was nothing to cause surprise in it. Neither did he forget, even at that moment, the etiquette which forbids that any body should stand in the presence of a sovereign without being presented, and he immediately added, in a calm tone, "I have a duty to fulfil—it is to present to your majesty the persons who are in the room, and who have not yet had that honour;" and he introduced his physician, his surgeon, and his valet-de-chambre. This behaviour when at the point of death bore the stamp of high aristocratic manners, perfectly in keeping with the visit with which his last moments had been honoured; it was part of the decorum and ancient ceremony observed between noble families; the escutcheons of both bore the same relative rank; the youngest branch of the Bourbons went to visit the youngest branch of the Périgords. In ancient times the houses of Navarre and De Quercy had met together on the common field of battle, and the cry Re que Diou had been uttered at the same time with the war-cry of Henry IV., by the old southern nobility, the language of Oc being common to both.

People expressed surprise at the signal honour conferred upon Talleyrand, but it shewed that the customs of gentle blood were not comprehended by the spirit of inferior society. No one was more attached to his illustrious descent than the old diplomatist, and the younger branch of the Bourbons came itself of too good a stock to forget it; the two cadets of De Quercy and Navarre had met in the recollection of their race, as in their political life.

Surrounded by his family in his last moments, and assisted by the pious offices of the Abbé Dupanloup, vicar-general of the diocese of Paris, Prince Talleyrand received the sacraments of the Church, for he had been again admitted into her bosom, and, before expiring, he again uttered one of those happy expressions which were so often upon his lips. Observing one of his grandnieces dressed entirely in white, according to the custom observed before the first communion, he raised his heavy eyelids, kissed her forehead, gave her his blessing, and then turning to the spectators, he said, "See the way of the world—there is the beginning, here the end!" In a few minutes afterwards he expired, on the 18th of May, 1838, at ten minutes before four o'clock in the afternoon, having just completed his eighty-fourth year. He left a will, by which his immense fortune was well and wisely disposed of. Has he also left memoirs? I think I know; but these memoirs are deposited in the hands of his family, or of other people of whose discretion he was quite secure.

Well, then, must I confess it? I do not believe them to be in any way curious. People talk a great deal about these pretended revelations, but I still repeat that they are few in number. Talleyrand only wrote what he pleased, he only committed public transactions to paper; and it is well known that, in reading these memoirs, he used to dwell with pleasure on the mischievous pranks of the young abbé. Was it the reminiscence of his youth that he enjoyed? I am inclined to think so, for I have always observed that this feeling is very strong among statesmen. Would you wish to awaken in the mind of Pozzo di Borgo all the vigour of his intellectual powers?—speak to him of Corsica and Paoli; would you bring a ray of delight and unreserve to unbend the brow of Metternich?—talk to him of his embassy to Paris in the beginning of the Empire, those days of pleasure and dissipation.

My idea is, that the memoirs of the man who played so conspicuous a part in the political history of the world will consist principally of two parts—emotions and justifications: emotions, because people always remember them, they filter through the whole tenour of their lives, they dwell in the brain of man, and rule over his thoughts; and justifications will undoubtedly be required for the several fatal deeds committed during the life of Prince Talleyrand.

In the course of that long life too much regard was shewn to customs and ceremonies, which are merely the trappings of life, and too little to duty and conscience, which are its foundation and object. He attended too much to the outward matters of existence—to riches, to honour, to decency of behaviour, but he thought nothing of the delicacy of mind, which is the strongest pledge of an honest man employed in public affairs. I am not fonder of simpletons in politics than other people, but, for the honour of mankind, I am willing to believe men may be clever and still retain perfect probity and good faith. It would be too dreadful to suppose that one cannot be a statesman without a complete abdication of the government of one's heart. Surely a strong head and powerful abilities are not the sole requisites for regulating the affairs of a government.

[COUNT POZZO DI BORGO.]

There is no county in Europe whose national character is so ancient, so thoroughly peculiar, as the Island of Corsica. Imagine a vast landscape of Salvator Rosa's, with all the features which he alone was capable of depicting, and whose type he has sought in Calabria and the Abruzzi; add to this a people whose disposition is hardy and obstinate; whose affections, love, hatred, or jealousy, are perpetuated from one generation to another; whose proud and patriotic attachment to their native soil forms part of their earliest existence, and terminates only with their life; also cities cheerful as those of Tuscany, and wild, uncultivated, mountainous districts; you will still have but a feeble representation of Corsica, that picturesque and fertile island of the Mediterranean.

The population is divided into two distinct races; the one comprehending the old aboriginal families, the other composed of foreign colonists, the greater part descended from refugees who were compelled to fly from revolutions in Piémont, Genoa, and Tuscany, and were successively deposited in the island, like the layers of lava around a volcano. To the first of these races belong the Paolis and the Pozzo di Borgos; to the second, the Buonapartes and the Salicettis. According to the usual custom among primitive nations, each family forms a clan, and each village a community; sentiments are inherited like the patrimony of the family—it is like ancient Rome suckled by a wolf in the time of the companions of Romulus.

The family of the Pozzo di Borgos, as I have already stated, belongs to the aboriginal races; its antiquity may be ascertained by consulting the book of the statutes of Corsica, and also the history of the feudal war between the Castellans of Montechi and the city of Ajaccio, of which they even disputed the sovereignty. One of the family is mentioned in the charters as orator of the people, and at the time the island was under the dominion of Genoa, the illustrious Pozzo di Borgo is described as attorney-general for the provinces of Ajaccio and Sartene; his name, like that of the Paolis, was Pascal. His opponents, even at that period, were from the family of the Bacciochi, then merely merchants of Ajaccio; and his notary was Jerome Buonaparte, who certifies the mission of Captain Secondos Pozzo di Borgo, deputy to the republic of Genoa.[16] There is some pleasure in relating these circumstances, because the life of Count Pozzo di Borgo, during its whole course, appeared to be connected with ancient times. Nothing is forgotten on that burning soil, and we shall again meet with the Paolis, the Buonapartes, the Pozzos, the Bacciochis, and the Salicettis, engaged in the most important conflicts on the theatre of the great world, as they had formerly been in the little town of Ajaccio.

In disturbed times European diplomacy employs two powerful engines of political research; in the first place, accredited ambassadors, who examine and decide upon affairs in a regular and almost a classical manner; and secondly, active agents, the greater part of whom are military men employed to travel about in Europe, for the purpose of ascertaining accurately the strength and the resources of each power. During the time of the French Republic and the Empire of Napoleon, England and Russia considerably augmented the number of their military diplomatists, and this may be said to have been the first employment of Charles Andrew Pozzo di Borgo, before the Russian cabinets had decided upon pursuing a regular and comprehensive system. The people of the south of Europe are especially gifted with a quick, subtle, and acute understanding, and the Corsicans add to these qualities an obstinate adherence to their purpose, and a rugged sentiment of their own rights, which formed such prominent features in the character of Buonaparte. Metternich is fond of repeating, "It was not the armies of Napoleon that occasioned us the most uneasiness; it was his inventive spirit, his acute subtleties, in short, his diabolical intellect, by which we Germans were hemmed in and entangled on every side." Count Pozzo di Borgo possessed the same species of sharp and sagacious activity; in that country there was a sort of general type common to all, like the bronzed complexion and the sparkling, searching eyes.

A few leagues from Ajaccio lies a small village, which bears the name of Pozzo di Borgo (well of the city); tradition says, however, that the family of that name inhabited the little fort of Montechi among the mountains: the Pozzis, the Poggis, and the Pazzis, were all families of the middle ages. As it was in Germany with the Castellans of the Seven Mountains, so also in Corsica the nobles reckoned their pedigree from some of the highest peaks in the island, under the shelter of rocks and wild fig-trees, where so many black crosses, symbols of Vendetta, are still to be seen. When Corsica was annexed to France, the noble descent of the Pozzos was substantiated by a supreme council of the island. The subject of this memoir was born the same year as Napoleon, if we rectify a little the date assigned by chronologists to the latter event. He first saw the light on the 8th of March, 1768, and had, therefore, attained his majority at the time of the revolution, when the popular agitation produced a most startling and arousing effect upon Corsica; and as if awaking from slumber two parties started up—a national party, and one devoted to the French interests. Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo indulged in dreams of the independence of their country, but without the intervention of foreign aid. The Buonapartes, who had for a short time ranged themselves under the banner of Paoli, afterwards joined the Arenas and the Salicettis, partisans of the French and Jacobin school. Before these divisions had assumed a very decided complexion, they contented themselves with giving an enthusiastic welcome to the revolution; intoxication prevailed every where, and at the age of twenty-two years Pozzo di Borgo, secretary to the corps of the nobility, was despatched as deputy-extraordinary to the National Assembly.

This primary office afterwards led to his appointment to the definitive deputation; and as the friend of Paoli, a circumstance which at that time conferred the greatest popularity, young Pozzo took his seat in that insane convocation, which, under the name of the Legislative Assembly, and in the midst of tumults and massacres, soon made an end of the French monarchy. He was appointed one of the diplomatic committee, at the time their proceedings were conducted in so singular a manner by Brissot, under whose management despatches to foreign powers consisted of speeches borrowed from the tragedy of "Brutus," and directed against Austria and Prussia. Such language ought to have been backed by victories, but the Legislative Assembly had not as yet the internal strength of which, at a later period, the convocation became possessed, through the energy of its committee of public safety. The Legislative Assembly threw every thing into disorder: at war with the ministers of the king, governed by the idea of a republic, yet without daring openly to proclaim it, they permitted the horrors of the 10th of August, and the 7th of September, to take place before their eyes. This wretched meeting possessed neither the brilliancy of the Constituent Assembly nor the terrible authority of the Convention, but always represented a state of transition, which is invariably one of mediocrity, because men dare not undertake any thing, nor, indeed, are they capable of doing so.

Pozzo very rarely appeared in the tribune, but whenever he had occasion so to do, for the purpose of expressing the opinions of the committee, he had recourse to the favourite phraseology of the period, for which less blame is due to the orators than to the general bent of the public mind: it was the pleasure of society to be governed after that fashion. I have preserved some fragments of a speech made by him on the 16th July, 1792, with the object of inducing the assembly to declare war against Germany. It is well known that two different parties were at that time equally desirous of commencing hostilities in Europe—the court party, who, being desirous of placing Louis at the head of an overpowering public force, considered war as the most probable means of attaining a military dictatorship; while, on the other hand, the republican faction, headed by the Girondists, entertained hopes that the democratic principle would be more easily rendered triumphant in the midst of tumults and excesses. Pozzo di Borgo was the willing representative of the Girondist party at the tribune. "The German confederation," said he, "whose independence is naturally protected by France, the only power capable of preserving it from the insatiable ambition of Austria, has beheld with joy the formation of that formidable league intended to overturn your constitution: their territory is already overrun by the enemy's troops, the northern league seeks to reduce the whole of Europe into a state of servitude, and exhibits every where a menacing appearance, supported by a strong force of mercenaries covered with iron and greedy of gold, to whom all usurpations will become easy. To the French nation belongs the task of preserving the world from this terrible scourge, and of repairing the mischiefs occasioned by the shameful carelessness, or the perfidious malignity of those, who view with indifference the utter destruction of all kinds of liberty. The French nation, by combating all the common enemies of mankind, will have the glory of restoring the political harmony which will preserve Europe from general slavery. We have contracted a vast debt towards the whole world, it is the establishment and the practice of the rights of man upon the earth; and Liberty, fertile in virtues and talents, affords us abundant means of discharging it in full. Our enemies' hopes, no doubt, have been raised by the transient dissensions that disturb our unanimity; they augur from thence the disorganisation of our government, but we will not accomplish their guilty desires. We are well aware that in the present state of affairs a change in our political institutions would necessarily occasion an interregnum in the laws, a suspension of authority, licentiousness, mischief in all parts of the kingdom, and the inevitable loss of our liberty. Our vigilance will preserve without destroying; it will place the traitors in a state in which they will be incapable of injuring us; and by the stability of our government we will deprive the ambitious of all the opportunities they hope for, in the incessant changes and revolutions incident to empires. By thus uniting energy and wisdom, we may attain to perfect and glorious success."

It may be observed that in the midst of these expressions, set forth in the phraseology then in fashion, the stability of the government and the necessity for preserving order were spoken of by M. Pozzo di Borgo, both of which principles were afterwards displayed in the highest degree in his mind.

The mission of the Legislative Assembly being concluded, the deputy returned to Corsica, and was associated with General Paoli for the direction of the administration of the island. The shocks sustained by the people had added fresh energy to their patriotic character, a public spirit was aroused, a proud independence in accordance with the national feelings of the ancient Corsica. Does not every people long for liberty? The Girondists had dreamed of federalism for France; and Paoli, in his turn, took a pride in forming a republic which should be perfectly independent and detached from the surrounding sovereignties. Paoli was a man of powerful understanding, completely the child of nature, and already old in years, though young in energy. He delighted in the idea of a Corsican republic, as being in some measure a return towards primitive habits; and this motive was strengthened by the horror inspired by the revolutionary events that were taking place in France. So ardent an enthusiasm never was known as that with which he inspired the Corsican families dwelling among the most rugged peaks of that mountainous country, and whose sole passion appeared to be a vehement love of liberty, acquired by the most laborious efforts.

The families of the Arenas and Buonapartes, who were inhabitants of the plains and the cities, had sided warmly with the French party; they were connected with the clubs; and Salicetti was their organ at the National Convention, to denounce Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo as propagators of a system tending to separate Corsica from France; and as that island had been declared an integral part of the French Republic, they were both summoned to the bar of the nation to offer a justification of their conduct. In this lay one of the first germs of the deeply rooted hatred entertained by Salicetti, Arena, and Buonaparte, against Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo; from thence arose the enmity which, in their inflamed minds, overstepped the limits of the island of Corsica, and contributed, more than people suspected, to the marvellous events of the Revolution and the Empire.

When Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo received this terrible summons, they were together at Corte, the capital of the mountainous district. It was not unexpected, and they were both well aware of the consequences of a refusal to obey the commands of the Convention, for the conduct of this inexorable tribunal was that of a victor with whom lenity and forgiveness are unknown. What was to be done? To obey would be to submit at once to the yoke of the territorial unity, which sought to reduce all the various nations comprehended within it to one level. Resistance would, perhaps, be a still more dangerous course, for the French Republic had an army which they would be utterly incapable of withstanding, and it was also supported by a considerable party in Corsica. A few regiments occupied the city of Ajaccio, and a battalion formed the garrison of the fort of Corte and several posts on the sea-coast. Signals announced the arrival of a squadron bearing the tricoloured flag. Under these circumstances, the commissioners of the departments declared themselves a permanent assembly in a meeting of the people of Corte, and the tumultuous comitia of the national party unanimously invited their chief, Paoli, and Pozzo di Borgo, to continue their administration. Finally, they declared that it was beneath the dignity of the people of Corsica to trouble themselves with the two families of Arena and Buonaparte, and that they should be abandoned to their remorse and to infamy for having deserted the public cause. I here copy the expressions of the national consulta.[17]

The popular energy, which sways in all instances the first movements in favour of liberty, was here very evident. What steps did they propose taking to maintain themselves in this improvisé independence, as well as to uphold the decrees published by the assembly of Corsica? In the meanwhile fearful intelligence arrived among the mountains: Toulon, hitherto in the occupation of the English, had just fallen into the hands of the French Republic, whose orders Corsica had treated with contempt; and, to crown the whole, a young officer of twenty-six years of age, even the Buonaparte devoted to infamy and remorse by the Corsican council, had taken part in that memorable enterprise, and had been the principal cause of its success. The port of Toulon being now in the hands of the Republic, in thirty-six hours a squadron might arrive, and threaten with entire destruction the companions of Paoli.

Just at this difficult juncture the English Mediterranean fleet appeared off Ajaccio, bringing news from Toulon and tidings of the warlike preparations going on there; the admiral also offered his protection to Corsica, agreeing to recognise her independence, under the sovereignty of the king of Great Britain. Paoli went on board the squadron to treat with the admiral regarding his country, and a general assembly was convoked to meet on the 10th of June, 1794, for the purpose of determining upon the form of constitution to be established. Their plan tallied nearly with the ideas of the English Magna Charta, proposing the establishment of a parliament which should consist of two chambers, a council of state, and a viceroy supported by responsible ministers. Paoli proposed Pozzo di Borgo as president of the council. When the latter was presented to Admiral Elliott he gazed upon his swarthy complexion, his sparkling eyes, and meagre and active figure, and asked Paoli whether that was the person he proposed placing at the head of the government. "I can answer for him," said Paoli; "he is a young man as well fitted for the government of a nation as he is capable of leading his countrymen unflinchingly on the field of battle. You may place implicit confidence in him." Upon this testimony the admiral confirmed his choice.

The state-council being the executive portion of the Corsican government, the duty devolved upon Pozzo di Borgo of remodelling the institutions of his country, which was henceforward to be free. I have seen the complete code of this administration: it is a summary of the public rights of the nation, a collection of primitive laws, one of those codes which regulates the most trifling circumstances affecting the interests of the people; among us it is a great historical curiosity, for we are too far advanced in civilisation to be capable of forming an idea of the first requirements of a people of such primitive habits.

The national government in Corsica lasted, however, barely two years; the protection afforded by England was at too great a distance, and a few regiments despatched from Gibraltar did not possess sufficient influence to restrain the population of the cities devoted to France, which was at that time every where victorious, and, by its proximity, constantly held a sword suspended over the government of Paoli and Pozzo di Borgo. The latter embarked on board the English fleet when it became evident the crisis could no longer be averted, and that the standard of the French Republic was about to be planted at Ajaccio. This squadron quitted the shores of Corsica, bearing with it all the sad remains of the ruined government; it touched at the island of Elba, sailed towards Naples, and from thence again to Elba—rather a curious circumstance, which long held a place in the recollection of Pozzo di Borgo, and which may possibly have in some degree influenced the resolution of the Allies, in 1814, to confer upon Napoleon the sovereignty of Porto Ferrajo. The Corsican president completed his voyage to England in the Minerva, which formed part of the squadron of Nelson, who lost an eye in Corsica, and was afterwards so celebrated; but he was then only in the dawn of his fame, and had not attained to the renown which crowned his name at Aboukir and Trafalgar.

Pozzo di Borgo remained eighteen months in London, where he received great attention from the English ministry, who considered him to have displayed great method and ability during his short administration. Having become intimate with some old French families, he then began his career of diplomacy and secret negotiations; which, at a late period, led him into a more extended sphere of action. He was at Vienna in 1798, at the time of the campaign of Suwarof, when foreign courts were agitated by so many various projects. Tremendous shocks had been experienced in France. On emerging from the reign of terror, and the formidable system of unity proclaimed by the Convention, a strong and deeply rooted reaction towards the restoration of the royal family had taken place; the royalist colours were worn in good society, and the most extreme detestation was felt for the revolution, because it had not as yet given birth to any regular system of government. At this time Buonaparte was in Egypt, with the greater part of the brave legions who had conquered Italy and the Rhine; all our foreign conquests were lost to us; on the Alps we were hardly able to retain a few posts, and they were closely pressed; and, as a climax, Suwarof appeared with victory in his train—Suwarof, the hero and saint of the Russian army—Suwarof, around whom rallied all the hopes of the coalition! Pozzo di Borgo was engaged in all the diplomatic arrangements that accompanied the military proceedings.

The antipathy that existed between the Austrians and Russians, far more than the battle of Zurich, put a stop to the progress of the coalition, and Pozzo di Borgo remained some time at Vienna, receiving a pension there as a French emigrant of noble birth. It was at the time when one of that family of Buonapartes, proscribed by the Assembly of Corsica, was elevated to the Consulate, and being now in the position of a powerful dictator, he had established an efficient government in France, and was engaged in repairing the wrecks of the administration by means of his steady energy. The power of the laws once more became manifest; the executive administration was lodged in the hands of a few, and was active and advantageous to the people; and, by a singular chance, which the caprices of fortune can alone explain, the old friends of the Buonapartes, the Arenas of Ajaccio, were proscribed by the young Corsican, and delivered over to military law, or driven into exile. Other destinies, besides those of a city, or a population of about 100,000 souls, claimed the attention of Napoleon Buonaparte, now completely detached from his native country; but, in spite of all these commotions, his thoughts more than once turned upon his old personal enemy, Pozzo di Borgo, then on his journey from London to Vienna, and who must have shed some tears of vexation when he saw the power of the young consul extend so far as to prescribe to Europe the peace of Amiens. The shade of Paoli arose to protest against this immense advancement of the Buonapartes.[18]

When war again resounded on the earth, Pozzo di Borgo entered the service of Russia, and devoted himself to the diplomatic line. The firmness of character, the quick apprehension of facts, and the knowledge of mankind which he evinced, together with an extreme delicacy of judgment, were certain pledges of his success in the conduct of business between one government and another. He received the title of Conseiller d'Etat at St. Petersburg, and was soon despatched to the court of Vienna, charged with a secret mission. The prince whose service he had entered was that Alexander whose generous and mystical mind was sadly employed in veiling, by the uprightness of his conduct, and the exalted tenor of his life, a mournful recollection which weighed upon his heart and his conscience. The revolution of the palace, that had placed Alexander on the throne, had been directed by England; and consequently must have been inclined to favour the coalition against Buonaparte, who was about to place the imperial crown upon his heroic brow; and Pozzo di Borgo was one of the diplomatic agents charged with special and secret missions to the allied courts, once more united against France.

We now find him at Vienna; but he only remained there a few months, for the Czar was desirous of acting with great vigour, and therefore despatched him, as Russian commissioner, to the Anglo-Russian and Neapolitan army, which was about to commence operations in the south of Europe under the influence of the noble Queen Caroline, so grossly slandered in the pamphlets issued by Napoleon. This army had hardly assembled at Naples, when the artillery of Austerlitz and the shouts of victory filled the air; and, as an immediate consequence, the peace of Presburg was signed. As this treaty separated Austria from the coalition, it occasioned the dissolution of the army of Naples; and Pozzo di Borgo returned to Vienna, and from thence to St. Petersburg, where great military events were in preparation.

During the campaign crowned by the battle of Austerlitz, when Napoleon had advanced so boldly into the interior of Moravia, Prussia had hesitated whether she should join the coalition. It was impossible to deny her public conduct in that respect, and Napoleon had borne it in mind; this indecision, however, ceased after the battle of Austerlitz, and a twelvemonth afterwards the united force of the Russians and Prussians was drawn up together.

Pozzo di Borgo was called upon to accompany the emperor in this campaign, and the Czar offered him rank in the army; such being the custom of Russia, where there is no advancement except by means of military rank: he therefore received the title of Colonel in the suite of the emperor, a post which attached him to the person of the sovereign. Being, for the fourth time, despatched to Vienna, after the battle of Jena, he strove to arouse Austria from the torpor into which the peace of Presburg had plunged her, but in vain; for the Austrian cabinet was then desirous of peace at any price. Colonel Pozzo received a commission to proceed to the Dardanelles, to treat for peace with the Turks, in conjunction with the English envoy; he was received on board the Russian fleet, under the orders of Admiral Siniavim, stationed at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and off the island of Tenedos; he was present in the admiral's ship at the battle of Mount Athos, between the Russian fleet and that of the sultan, and there received his first military decoration.

Napoleon was now approaching the apogée of his glory: the French and Russian armies had bravely measured their strength, and the French emperor had so greatly risen in Alexander's estimation that, at the peace of Tilsit, Napoleon was saluted with the title of Brother, at the very time the old Russian aristocracy were accusing their sovereign of abandoning the cause of his country. In the interchange of projects which took place at Tilsit—in those friendly meetings, when the waters of the Niemen flowed beneath the two emperors, locked in each other's arms, was it possible Colonel Pozzo should not be aware that his services would henceforth be an embarrassment to Russia? Upon his arrival at St. Petersburg he held a conversation with the emperor, full of confidence and unreserve on both sides, when each party took a candid survey of his position. The Emperor Alexander declared to Colonel Pozzo that there was no reason he should leave his service, and that the ties of friendship he had contracted with Napoleon did not oblige him to make such a sacrifice. The colonel replied that he could no longer be useful to his sovereign; on the contrary, he should be a source of embarrassment to him, for Buonaparte had not forgotten the feud of his early days: sooner or later he would demand the banishment of his old enemy, the Czar would be too generous to agree to this, and his refusal would raise difficulties for his government. "Besides," said he, "the alliance between your majesty and Napoleon will not be of long duration; I am well acquainted with the deceitful character and insatiable ambition of Buonaparte. At this moment one of your majesty's hands is held by Persia, the other by Turkey, and Buonaparte presses upon your chest; get your hands free in the first instance, and then you will cast off the weight that now troubles you. Some years hence we shall meet again."

Count Pozzo requested permission to travel; and he was again at Vienna in 1808, when Austria, with her patient resignation, was preparing fresh armaments against Napoleon, and declaring the rupture that had taken place with him. I am not aware if history records a longer or more honourable struggle than that of Austria against the Revolution and the Empire. She submitted to every sacrifice, then prepared for battle; vanquished, she had recourse to negotiation; then again tried the fortune of war, until victory finally decided against her, and she was crushed under the weight of the French eagles. Patient and laborious German nation, never didst thou despair of thy cause!

Pozzo di Borgo remained at Vienna during the whole campaign of 1809, and when peace was again imposed, Buonaparte did not forget him. He had taken an active part in all the diplomatic proceedings of Austria and Russia, and Napoleon was a person who always retained the remembrance of his enemies; accordingly, after the peace of Vienna, his first step was to demand the banishment of Colonel Pozzo di Borgo from the Austrian dominions. Alexander, warmly attached to Napoleon, had the weakness to consent, and this gave occasion to the fine and energetic letter, in which Colonel Pozzo already prophesied the invasion of Russia, and said to the Czar, "Sire, it will not be long before your majesty again summons me to your presence." In order to escape the fate which awaited him if his enemy of Ajaccio should succeed in seizing his person, he took the precaution of retiring to Constantinople, the only spot which still afforded him the power of quitting continental Europe and seeking refuge in England.

He was now a proscribed man, travelling in Syria, visiting Smyrna and Malta, and from Malta proceeding to London, where he arrived in October 1810. He was already an agent of some importance, on account of the missions upon which he had been employed; and the limited intercourse between England and the Continent made her set a value upon the information to be obtained from a man of political talent and experience, who had just arrived from the principal capitals of Europe. In several conferences with Lord Castlereagh, Colonel Pozzo explained to him the hopes he still entertained of a continental rising against the colossal empire of France: in the midst of all his great qualities, Napoleon had still some vulnerable points, and nobody was better aware of them than Pozzo di Borgo, because he had studied them through the medium of his resentment. Who could be so well acquainted as he with that Buonaparte, whom he had had such opportunities of observing in the closest manner, with his infirmities, his fits of anger, his weaknesses, and his ambition?

At last the terrible war of 1812 broke out, and the French armies passed the Niemen. Russia was invaded; the battles of Moscowa and the Mojaisk drove back the armies of Alexander towards the sacred city of Moscow, and the ancient capital was reduced to ashes. During the whole of this campaign Pozzo di Borgo remained in London, and his influence was of service in promoting the union between Alexander and the English cabinet; he did not join the army of the Czar, because a revolution had taken place in the ideas of the cabinet of St. Petersburg. The fact was, that when Alexander found his finest provinces invaded, and the murderous war which was desolating his territory, he summoned to his assistance the old Russian spirit and the ancient traditions of the country; the banner of St. Nicholas was unfurled, the churches resounded with prayers and calls to arms against the invader, and the Czar placed himself at the head of the army: but this popular appeal had precisely the effect of rousing the national spirit against foreigners. Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the ideas of civilisation had favoured in Russia the influence of the Italians, the Germans, and the French, who filled many important military situations, and were raised to the first dignities of the state; and the old Russian families naturally entertained a jealous feeling regarding this influence. This colony of courtiers offended their pride, and interfered with their interests; therefore, when Alexander had occasion to invoke the shades of his country at the foot of the Kremlin, and to rouse the devotion of the Muscovite nobility, who lived among their serfs in the central provinces, he was obliged to sacrifice the strangers to their prejudices. Pozzo di Borgo was not recalled till the close of the campaign, when the impulse had ceased to be entirely Russian, but had become more eccentric and inclined towards Poland and Prussia, and he returned through Sweden just at the time when Bernadotte was becoming more nearly connected with England, and, without however openly committing himself, had begun to lend a favourable ear to the overtures of the court of London. The Russian councillor was commissioned to encourage the inclination of Bernadotte, and to strive to forward a decision which would afford his sovereign a new opportunity of taking vengeance for the invasion of his country by the Emperor of the French. This was the first beginning of his intimacy with the Crown Prince of Sweden.

The Emperor Alexander received Pozzo di Borgo at Kalisch, after a separation of five years. They had parted immediately after the interview of Tilsit, which had so greatly reconciled the Czar to the politics of Napoleon. Now, how different was the situation of affairs! Alexander had seen his empire invaded by his ancient ally, his cities in flames; and, according to the excited ideas of Alexander, it was the sainted spirits of the ancient Russians who had raised the stormy tempests, and engulfed the immense army of Napoleon in the icy floods of the Beresina. The language of Alexander to Pozzo di Borgo reminded him of his sagacious prophecies, and the colonel made great efforts to win him back to simple and positive plans against the power of Napoleon; for having been one of the patriots of 1789, Colonel Pozzo perfectly understood the importance of the conspiracy of Mallet, and of the discontent that was beginning to pervade France. He was opposed to all species of compromise, and his view of the case was to strive to effect a separation between the interests of France and her leader. Whilst Alexander, still prepossessed with the idea of the stupendous power of Napoleon, hesitated to plunge into the perils of a distant campaign, Pozzo di Borgo advised him to induce Prussia to take advantage of the secret societies, which proudly raised their heads at the cry of Germania or Teutonia, and to assemble all Buonaparte's rivals in glory under their banners, so as to occasion confusion and disorder in his preparations for war.

A threefold negotiation was now opened; the first with Moreau, whom they were desirous of drawing into France, to rouse the Republican party by the influence of his name; the second with Eugène and Murat, between whom they wanted to divide the kingdom of Italy; the third and last with Bernadotte, who was to join with the Swedish troops and effect a division in the French army. Pozzo di Borgo was charged with this last mission, furnished with full powers from the Emperor Alexander, while the Russians were advancing into Saxony. Without clearly explaining the views of the alliance with regard to France, or on the distinctive and positive results of the war, he was directed to suggest, in his conversations with the crown prince, all the possible events which might encourage the emulation of the old companions of the Emperor Napoleon; and he engaged, in the name of the Czar, to acknowledge Bernadotte as Crown Prince, and eventually, according to the order of succession, as King of Sweden: in the same manner he had promised to Moreau the presidency of a republic, if it should arise from the order of affairs, or from a popular anti-Buonapartist movement in Paris. One ought to have heard the ambassador himself recount all the trouble and anxiety he experienced during this negociation; the vacillations of the Crown Prince, his ill-humours and discontent. Still he hesitated. At last, when the Swedish army was embarking at Karlscrona and landing at Stralsund, the artillery of Lutzen and Bautzen were heard in thunders through the whole of Germany. These brilliant victories had astonished the Crown Prince, and the Russian army was in full retreat through Upper Silesia. Still, though his troops were already assembled, he did not dare to come to a final decision; he could not forget the star of his former master, the remembrance of his victorious eagles, the irresistible influence of his glory; the Swedes, therefore, halted at Stralsund, and awaited the course of events. Bernadotte was a powerful ally; not only did he bring into the field 20,000 brave Swedes, but also his name, like that of Moreau, might be the means of sowing dissension and uneasiness in the French army, if the invasion were to take place; when, therefore, in the interval afforded by the armistice of Neumark, Colonel Pozzo observed the hesitation he still exhibited, he hastened to Stralsund, by the desire of Alexander, to endeavour to persuade him to march at once. He had, however, the greatest difficulty in inducing him to join the military congress of Trachenburg, where the plans were laid for the campaign against Napoleon, and it was necessary he should exhibit, at the same time, firmness with Bernadotte and forbearance towards Sir Charles Stewart, afterwards Lord Londonderry, a young and rather presumptuous officer, who was commissioner from England, and was always ready to give offence to an old soldier like Bernadotte. His efforts were crowned with success; the Crown Prince had already had an interview with Moreau, and Pozzo di Borgo afterwards held a confidential conversation with both those personal enemies of Napoleon, in which they reciprocally exchanged their hopes, their present hatred, and old resentments, Pozzo against the adversary of Paoli, Moreau against the Consul, and Bernadotte against the Emperor. The plan adopted by the allied powers at the military congress of Trachenburg was very simple. Colonel Pozzo di Borgo maintained that they ought to march at once upon Paris, the central point of Napoleon's strength or weakness, where the question would speedily be settled; and this was the opinion entertained by all those military men who mingled any political ideas of the decline of Buonaparte's power and of his personal character with the question of war. Besides, in the opinion of the Russian envoy, Buonaparte and France were not synonymous terms; and it was to save France and her liberty that he so closely pursued the Emperor.

At this time the congress of Prague was assembled, which was in reality nothing more than an armistice required by all the forces. Metternich had assumed for Austria a position of armed mediation, being the commencement of a new political system, a wary and provident plan, which, in her state of relative weakness and isolation, gave her a predominant influence over cabinets far more powerful than her own. All the negotiations of this congress tended to one point only; the endeavour to detach Austria from this mediatorial system, and to induce her to decide in favour of one side or the other,—either for the coalition, or for France. In the army of Napoleon, as well as among the allies, a strong desire for peace existed, with this difference, that the victorious soldiers of the Emperor were thoroughly weary of war; for them the illusions of conquest had no longer any charms, and their generals, in the midst of the wonderful success that had crowned their arms, regretted the life of luxury and enjoyment they had been accustomed to lead in Paris. The sons of Germany, ardent in their desire for liberty, flocked to the ranks of the allied armies, under the command of old Blucher, whose mind was also full of enthusiasm for the German unity; while the general officers of the French army indulged in dreams of their hotels, in the Chaussée d'Antin, or the Rue de Bourbon, or their delightful retreats at Malmaison and Grosbois, while their brothers-in-arms were falling under the enemy's fire,—that fire which no longer respected the marshals. An unanimous cry of bitter accusation was heard among the staff, "That man will make an end of us all!" Exaggerated accounts of disaffection were brought to the Emperor. At one time some thousands of conscripts were said to have mutilated their fingers, in order that they might be sent back to their homes; at another they reported the desertion of the brave fellows who had cried "Vive l'Empereur!" under the grape-shot of Lutzen and Bautzen. The allies were well aware of this decline of military ardour in the French camp, and they knew a feeling of weakness and a disposition to discord were connected with it. The proposals for peace at Prague never were sincere on the part of Russia and Prussia, and the Emperor was thoroughly deceived in imagining them to be so.

The main object was to prevail upon Austria to declare herself openly; and here Napoleon was guilty of many faults. In the situation assumed by the cabinet of Vienna, a good deal was naturally exacted, and with perfect justice, for upon them depended the strength, and we may almost say the success, of the coalition. In offering herself as a mediator, Austria was desirous of regaining the position she had lost during the struggle with Napoleon, and the law was now in her own hands, for she could throw the weight of 300,000 men into either scale. Napoleon committed the great oversight of not acceding to the offers of the cabinet of Vienna: he went farther still; he deeply offended the minister who directed the fates of that cabinet—Prince Metternich, a man of extraordinary ability and consideration, and whose inclinations had previously tended towards France. I have elsewhere related the stormy and imprudent scene which broke up the conference between Buonaparte and the Austrian minister.[19]

The allied sovereigns awaited the decision of the cabinet of Vienna with indescribable anxiety. It was eleven o'clock at night, and they were all assembled in a barn; the ministers, Count Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and Hardenburg, in the lower apartment; the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia on the first floor: the rain descended in torrents, and it was one of those stormy nights which add even to the horrors of war, when all at once a courier arrived, bearing a letter for Count Nesselrode, which contained merely these words,—"Austria has decided, and four armies will be at the disposal of the Alliance." Imagination may picture the shouts of joy, the transports of the coalition, on thus receiving the support of 300,000 men, who were to join the rest of the army by the mountains of Bohemia. The chances of war were now clearly against Napoleon; and General Pozzo di Borgo, for he had lately been raised to the rank of major-general, was again despatched, in the character of commissioner, from the Emperor Alexander to the Crown Prince of Sweden, who at this time covered Berlin at the head of an army, composed of 40,000 Prussians, 30,000 Russians, and 20,000 Swedes.

The most glorious events recorded in the military history of France have nothing that can bear a comparison with the admirable defence of Dresden by Napoleon, when all the armies of the coalition went successively to try their strength under its walls. They were repulsed with considerable loss, and Moreau was mortally wounded on the field of battle; but this admirable manœuvre of concentration was followed by a very great fault—the division of the main body of his army, one portion being intrusted to General Vandamme, the other to some marshals upon whose deeds the star of Napoleon's fortune did not shine. At Gross Beeren, Bernadotte broke the brilliant line of the French, at the same time that the corps of Vandamme was cut to pieces or taken prisoner by the coalesced enemy, and the Emperor was obliged to retreat beyond the Elbe. I cast a veil over the mournful catastrophe of Leipsic, where so many faults were committed, and so much want of foresight exhibited, both on the part of Napoleon, and also of those who were charged with the execution of his orders; the sad disorder, the horrible confusion that prevailed, when the soldiers were decimated at once by sickness in the hospital, the steel of the enemy, and the hordes of peasants raised by Blucher along his path, and which swallowed up the French army, already perishing with hunger, without guns, and barefooted, in the midst of the cold rains of October.

The coalition was now victorious; its advanced guard had reached the banks of the Rhine. Still they could not refrain from a degree of secret terror as they approached the French territory, which was still pervaded by the presiding genius of Napoleon. The army of Bernadotte was separated from the allies to march against Holstein, invade Denmark, and prepare a rising in Holland; and General Pozzo di Borgo quitted him to proceed on a mission to Frankfort, to concert military operations with the allies. They had there a better opportunity of judging of the state of public feeling in France, and were able to study the progress that had been made by the different opinions and parties against the imperial government. The Emperor's administration had surpassed itself; the Senate had voted troops upon troops, the levies proceeded with extraordinary energy, and they sought by every means, pamphlets, songs, operas—in short, nothing was neglected to re-awaken the cry of national independence in the breasts of the French nation. But though from the powerful organisation of the empire every thing appeared clear on the surface, its stability went no deeper; there was an under-current of murmurs, complete dissatisfaction, and weariness of mind; commerce was annihilated, leaving the unemployed workmen no resource but a musket, and no choice but of seeking bread or death with the army. Secret agitations began to be whispered about every where; the legislative body had separated itself from Napoleon by a protest, executed under the influence of discontent, and of MM. Lainé and Reynouard, and it had in consequence been dissolved; the council of the regency of Maria Louisa was composed of timid, hesitating men; some, like Talleyrand, ready to abandon a falling cause; the people called for a termination of this state of affairs, and gloomy, foreboding clouds hung on the brow of Napoleon.

Existing circumstances certainly offered a favourable opportunity for invading the imperial territory; but were the allies well agreed upon the end they proposed to themselves? Were they all actuated by the same interests? Although Austria had made an effort to shake off the enormous power of Napoleon, would she be willing to ruin the son-in-law of her own emperor, Francis II., especially when the advantages resulting from it would fall principally to the share of Russia and Prussia, whose power had been already excessively augmented by the late events? Having regained the territories of which Napoleon had formerly deprived her, why should she join in the invasion of France, and aim a last blow at a nation so necessary to the balance of power in Europe? Even England, though the determined enemy of Buonaparte, could not fail to entertain some degree of uneasiness in observing the immense increase of the Russian influence, and the ministers were assailed with incessant questions as to the object and probable termination of the war. All these circumstances caused a dread that the coalition was ready to fall to pieces at the very moment its great object had been attained. This state of affairs soon became evident to the diplomatic chiefs assembled at the conference of Frankfort, and Pozzo di Borgo was despatched by the three sovereigns on a mission to the Prince Regent to request the presence of Lord Castlereagh, the English prime minister, at head-quarters, in order to strengthen the bands of the coalition and determine its object. The general lost no time in accomplishing his voyage, and arrived in London in the beginning of January 1814, while parliament was sitting, and just at the time when Lord Castlereagh had been obliged to enter into an explanation in answer to the pressing requisitions of the Whigs. He was the bearer of an autograph letter to the Prince Regent from the allied sovereigns, by which they engaged to follow the most moderate measures, and as far as possible to keep the balance of power in Europe in view, so as to remove any fears on the part of England. It was just six years since Pozzo di Borgo, as a proscribed person, had last visited that country, and under what different auspices he now returned to it! He came as the organ of the triumphant coalition, and his reception was distinguished by all the magnificence and joy inspired by the late victories. With what cordiality Lord Wellesley pressed his hand! "I believe, my dear Pozzo," said the marquess, "you and I are the two men who most earnestly desire the fall of Buonaparte." Lord Castlereagh had already begun to entertain some thoughts of the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, and he communicated his idea to General Pozzo di Borgo, who replied, "You are well aware, my lord, that we must never present any but a perfectly simple idea to the sovereigns; complicated matters do not take hold of their minds. Let us first overturn Buonaparte,—this is a thing we shall easily make the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia understand,—and then afterwards, when the coast is clear, we can return to examine the second difficulty." "Very well," said Lord Castlereagh, "whom do you wish us to send to the Continent?" "If Mr. Pitt were alive," replied the general, "I would tell him to hold himself in readiness; it is sufficient to make you understand that we are most anxious to see you in person on the Rhine, that the question may not get perplexed and confused."

It was with these opinions that Pozzo di Borgo visited the French princes, especially the Comte d'Artois. His royal highness was anxious to appear at head-quarters, and blend the idea of a restoration with the plan of the campaign of the allies, but General Pozzo strongly opposed his design. "Monseigneur," said he, "you are well aware of my devotion to your person and to your interests, but do not come to spoil our game; we still have great difficulties to overcome effecting the fall of Napoleon, when that point is gained it will be necessary to turn to something else, and your turn and your name will naturally occur."

It was a matter of some delicacy to obtain the departure of Lord Castlereagh and the full and entire adhesion of England to the coalition; they were obliged to work at it a long while with the Prince Regent and some influential members of parliament; at last, at a dinner given by Lady Castlereagh, the English minister, on rising from table, said to the emperor's messenger, "Well, my dear Pozzo, it is decided that I am to accompany you; the Prince Regent has given me an autograph letter for the sovereigns, and we shall act in concert and good fellowship with you." The two diplomatists embraced each other with delight, two days afterwards they embarked for the Continent, and in three weeks rejoined the sovereigns at Baden.

Lord Castlereagh's arrival at head-quarters strengthened the unity of the alliance and enabled them to form some resolutions for the general benefit, and also to decide upon the plan of the political campaign about to be commenced against Buonaparte. England had never recognised the Emperor of the French, and in all the acts of parliament, as well as those of the cabinet, he had no other designation than that of the common enemy, or the head of the government, a circumstance which facilitated Pozzo di Borgo's labours with Lord Castlereagh towards gaining the object he had in view, viz., the complete overthrow of Napoleon. The English minister, who was armed with full powers, laid down as the fundamental principle of all their diplomatic transactions, that France, although necessary to the balance of power in Europe, must be reduced within her ancient territorial limits, a principle which almost inevitably involved the restoration of the ancient dynasty. This, however, was only mentioned in the acts, both public and secret, of the congress, as a possibility reserved for a further consideration of the French question.

One of the most important principles laid down in the political plan of the alliance was the separation of the question concerning Napoleon from those regarding the interests of France. This line of conduct was recommended by Bernadotte, Pozzo di Borgo, and the patriot party, who were the enemies of the emperor, and it was formally announced in the public acts of Frankfort and the proclamations of all the allied troops who crossed the Rhine. Their great object was to weaken the common enemy, at the same time that they promised France that her ancient territory should remain untouched, and hinted at the possibility of establishing a constitution independent of the emperor. By adopting this plan they summoned all disaffected persons to the assistance of the coalition; and, without entering into engagements with any one party, they offered to all the hope of bringing their pretensions and wishes to a favourable issue; they even contrived to conciliate the partisans of a republican form of government as well as the advocates of the regency of Maria Louisa.

Pozzo di Borgo continued attached to the person of the Emperor Alexander during the whole of the operations of 1814, that glorious but melancholy campaign where the military genius of Napoleon shone with so brilliant a lustre—a bright ray emanating from that star which appeared but for a fleeting moment, soon to grow dim and set for ever! During the negotiations at Chatillon, General Pozzo urged the rejection of all the propositions of the French emperor, and also that the time and circumstances granted by the coalition to him whose attempts had so often been crowned with victory, should have a limit defined with the utmost accuracy. "Grant no armistice, but march en masse straight to Paris!" Such was the advice of Pozzo di Borgo, to whom some overtures had already been made by Talleybrand and the disaffected party in the capital. Had the preliminaries of peace been accepted, a treaty might possibly have been entered into at Chatillon with Napoleon and Maria Louisa; but how would it have been possible for the emperor to submit to the ancient limits of France, without exposing himself to inevitable ruin in the interior of his kingdom? M. de Caulaincourt, it is true, received orders to accede to the proposed conditions, but it was then too late. It would, however, have been impossible for Napoleon to have continued peaceably on the throne, even had pacific terms been granted him, under existing circumstances; for his government would have been overturned by an internal revolution. How could the victorious emperor, who had given laws to the world, now in his turn submit to receive laws from the whole of Europe combined against him? And, supposing he had returned to Paris with the humiliating treaties which deprived France of all her conquests and reduced her within the narrow limits she formerly occupied, would not the loss of his throne have been, sooner or later, the inevitable consequence of such a change of circumstances? Would not discontent have reared its head at every step he took? Or would his government still have retained sufficient power and influence to secure him the possession of absolute dominion? As soon as peace had been proclaimed, the adverse parties would have burst forth with violence, and Napoleon have been overcome by a republican insurrection. They would have said to the emperor, "What have you done with the conquests of the republic and with the legions it bequeathed to you?" And, to escape from the tumult of public opinion, the emperor would have been forced again to engage in some military enterprise. "The peace you grant to Napoleon," said Pozzo di Borgo, "will merely be giving him an opportunity of recruiting his strength, and in less than a year you will find him again engaged in an attack upon your territories; with the spirit of a gambler, he will stake his last crown upon his last card."

For the sake of giving a powerful unity to the alliance, the sovereigns signed the famous treaty of Chaumont, which was a general coalition of the whole of Europe against the common enemy; they declared, in the first place, that they would not separate until they had attained the objects they proposed to themselves, which were a general peace and the establishment of independence and of the rights of all the nations of Europe. In addition to this, it was agreed that each power was to keep up a standing army of 150,000 men besides those in garrison; England undertook to furnish immense subsidies; and they engaged mutually to support each other with a formidable armed contingent, in case any of the governments should be threatened. The campaign then proceeded with fresh vigour, and the advance upon Paris produced all the effect anticipated by the sovereigns. I will not describe the sad events that succeeded; they are, alas! but too well known. General Pozzo di Borgo was in the suite of the Emperor Alexander when he entered the city, and from that time forth he assumed the part of a mediator between France and the allies.

We must take a retrospect of that melancholy period of our disasters in order to form a reasonable judgment of the events about to be accomplished. The hearts of the whole nation were filled with weariness to a most painful degree. Some few soldiers might, perhaps, have been ready to range themselves around the emperor and defend his eagles which, though now abased, had so often led them to victory; but the great mass of the population was no longer desirous of war; a feeling of hatred towards Napoleon had gradually arisen among the republican party and the Royalists, who were in a state of commotion; while, on the other hand, the proclamations of Schwartzenburg, and the promises he had made at the time of his entry into Paris, had inspired hopes of repose and reasonable liberty. Pozzo di Borgo exerted all his influence over the mind of Alexander to lead him towards the liberal system, upon which his resolutions appear to have been formed. The whole idea of the constitutional charter, and all the plans breathing a spirit of liberty, were suggested at the meetings in Talleyrand's house, where the patriots used to assemble to give vent to their dissatisfaction with the conduct of Napoleon. I must here mention a curious circumstance relating to the famous proclamation of Schwartzenburg which first made open mention of the Bourbons. It was the work of Count Pozzo, and Schwartzenburg had not signed it when Alexander said to him in a meeting at the head-quarters of Bondy, "My dear prince, you have written an admirable proclamation—it is perfect; sign it, you will get great credit for it." And the prince, partly through self-love, and partly through respect for the Emperor Alexander, affixed his signature to the document.[20]

General Pozzo di Borgo had kept up his acquaintance with all the patriots of 1789, whose noble and generous principles of independence met with a sympathetic feeling in the breast of Alexander. Napoleon, the representative of a powerful and united system of government, would only be overcome by the principle of liberty. "Europe," said Talleyrand, "was then on the highroad to emancipation; it was with the name of Fatherland, with the enthusiasm for free institutions, that the people had been excited to rise against him, who was termed by the Germans the oppressor of mankind." These ideas prevailed, and Count Pozzo di Borgo was appointed commissioner from the Emperor Alexander to the provisional government.

That government certainly stood in need of the support of the friend of Paoli, who pursued with relentless perseverance the last glimmering ray of Napoleon's fortune. Some of the marshals had just made an attempt to induce the Emperor Alexander to treat with the regency, and, moved by the recollection of his ancient friendship, and by the influence which the noble countenance of Napoleon exercised over his mind, the Czar would, perhaps, have agreed to the proposal, when Pozzo di Borgo was despatched in haste by the provisional government to Alexander, to put a stop to the treaty, and he worked on the mind of the Czar by means of the same considerations he had formerly presented to his view, and of which he had acknowledged the justice. "The regency was still Napoleon, and France no longer desired his rule; to sign a peace with him was merely to expose themselves to a repetition of hostilities; if Europe was desirous of rest, they must have done with the imperial system altogether." The commissioner spent two hours in this conversation, and, by his perseverance, he obtained the important declaration of the allied sovereigns, that they would enter into no treaty with the emperor or his family. Having gained this point, he returned with speed to the provisional government, and gave vent to the picturesque expression of his triumph in his communication to Talleyrand. "My dear prince," said he, "I certainly cannot be said single-handed to have politically killed Buonaparte, but I have cast the last clod of earth upon his head."

Thus was played the drama of life between these two men: Pozzo, formerly proscribed by Buonaparte, now came in his turn to be present at the obsequies of his rival's power! Born within a few months of each other, the one had quitted Ajaccio merely with the rank of a sub-lieutenant, and had ascended the greatest throne under heaven; the other, as an exile, had traversed Europe, to rouse the spirit of war and vengeance against his compatriot, and, after unheard-of efforts, had at last succeeded in realising the plan which had always kept possession of his mind. He had his foot on his enemy's neck, and had him banished to the island of Elba, which he had himself twice sailed past, pursued by the fortune of his rival. General Pozzo never would admit the hypothesis that France and Buonaparte were the same thing; and in this respect he was as good a patriot as Moreau, Lannes, Bernadotte, Massena, Dessoles, and Gouvion St. Cyr.

As soon as the senate had decided upon the restoration of the ancient dynasty, and laid the foundations of the constitution, Pozzo di Borgo was commissioned by the sovereigns to go to London, to meet Louis XVIII. This was not only an honourable mission of congratulation to the new French sovereign; the general's special duty was to explain to Louis the real state of public opinion in France, and the necessity of adopting the constitutional forms and liberal ideas of a charter, to answer the public expectation. He went with all possible speed to London, for the provisional government were well aware that the ardent royalist party would immediately surround the French king, and it was necessary to prevent his being guilty of any imprudence; and this they hoped to effect by means of the salutary intervention of Pozzo di Borgo, especially as his being the confidential servant of the Emperor Alexander would naturally invest him with a considerable degree of influence over the mind of Louis XVIII. When the general arrived at Calais, he engaged a packet-boat for his sole use, and at the moment of his embarkation, an episode occurred, which he often related as a proof of the instability of human opinions. He was standing on the sea-shore, when a stranger accosted him, and requested a passage in his little vessel to enable him to go and meet the king. "Who are you?" asked Pozzo di Borgo. "I am the Duc de la Rochefoucauld Liancourt," replied the stranger; "and I am going to the king to resume my ancient office." One may imagine the amazement of the ambassador; the Duc de Liancourt had not only deeply insulted the Comte de Provence at the Constituent Assembly, but he had afterwards carried his offence still farther, by sending back to him, from the United States, the ribbon of his orders, as a mark of his contempt for what he called the crotchets of the old school: Louis XVIII. could not forget this contemptuous bearing in a man of noble birth.

The ambassador did not refuse a passage to the noble duke; and it was a most curious circumstance that the first step taken by M. de Liancourt when they reached the royal yacht in which Louis had embarked, was to adorn himself with the blue ribbon he had formerly sent back to the king during his sojourn in the land of equality and liberty. It is impossible to describe the despair of the duke when he found he could not be received by Louis XVIII., while Count Pozzo was welcomed in the warmest manner, and the king expressed himself in the most flattering language, with tears in his eyes. The ambassador from the allies explained the orders he had received. "Though the constitution proclaimed by the senate might have fallen into contempt, it was no reason for abandoning the principles of liberty upon which it was founded." Pozzo di Borgo remained with the king during his voyage, and assisted him in preparing the declaration issued at St. Ouen, containing the plan of such a representative system as the liberal party were desirous of establishing in France. Let us imagine that country passing from the military rule of Napoleon into constitutional principles, finding herself free, on emerging from the firm, but despotic government of the emperor, had she not already gained an immense step in securing the advantages of a public representation? The treaty of Paris was based on the diplomatic scheme determined upon at Chaumont and Chatillon: it restrained France within her ancient limits, and placed her under the government of the ancient dynasty, thus offering a pledge of peace and the maintenance of order, so necessary to the tranquillity of Europe.

General Pozzo di Borgo remained in Paris as Russian ambassador to the new French government, until the meeting of the Congress of Vienna, where all the diplomatic chiefs were summoned to attend. I will not recount the events of that period, having related them in a work especially devoted to the history of those times;[21] I will only observe, that had they listened at Vienna to the warnings, derived from the former experience of the friend of Paoli, France would never have suffered the misfortunes inflicted by the reign of the Hundred Days. The corps diplomatique received intelligence that Napoleon was seeking the opportunity of returning from exile, and reappearing in Europe, and General Pozzo, who well knew the energy of his countryman, proposed removing him to a more secure spot,—as, for example, one of the islands of the African Ocean, from whence escape would be impossible, so as to prevent any risk of his again throwing the whole of Europe into a state of danger and revolution.

At Vienna, a coldness took place for the second time between Alexander and his confidential employé, occasioned by the difference of their opinions on the question of Poland. The Czar had taken it into his head that Poland must be formed into a vast kingdom, separated by its constitution from Russia, and even comprehending its ancient provinces within its boundaries, and Pozzo di Borgo was strongly opposed to the whole scheme: he foretold the consequences of such a proceeding in an exceedingly well-written memorial, full of sound judgment, and evincing a deep and extensive consideration of the subject. "The creation of such a kingdom," said he, "would only be encouraging the spirit of rebellion, and this would eventually involve the nobility and people of Poland in a deeper slavery; for if an insurrection were to take place, it would be necessary to repress it with severity."[22] Alas, he spoke but too truly! What has been the ruin of Poland, and caused the dispersion of her generous nobility? Was it not the insane project of an impossible revolution? The Emperor Alexander withdrew for a short time his confidence from General Pozzo, to place it in Count Capo d'Istria, a man of rather a dreamy and visionary cast of mind, and whose opinion exactly coincided with his own, concerning the emancipation of Greece and Poland, under the suzeraineté of the Czar.

But all these occurrences were suddenly interrupted by the landing of Napoleon in the gulf of Juan. It was like the fall of a thunderbolt. Pozzo di Borgo, however, received the intelligence without any appearance of surprise; and when the corps diplomatique sought to remove the fears that had been excited as to the probability of war, he replied, "I well know Buonaparte; since he has landed, he will proceed to Paris, and if so, there must be no delay, no attempt at pacific measures; Europe should march at once against the common enemy." The Emperor Alexander sent for Pozzo di Borgo, to whom he restored his perfect confidence, and then despatched him to Ghent to Louis XVIII., charged with a military mission to the Anglo-Prussian army of the Low Countries. A general cry for war now arose at Vienna, and the allied powers made preparations for a fresh campaign, in spite of all the endeavours of Napoleon to separate Austria and Russia from the coalition. With this view, it is well known that he transmitted to Alexander a copy of the secret treaty concluded in March 1814, between England, France, and Austria, against Russia, relative to the Polish question; and from this point dates the extreme antipathy of Alexander for Talleyrand—an antipathy which more than once stood in the way of diplomatic transactions after the second invasion of France.

General Pozzo arrived in Belgium, now the inevitable theatre of war, as Russian commissary to the Anglo-Prussian army, which formed the advanced guard of the coalition, at the very moment Napoleon made his appearance on the frontier. The Duke of Wellington was informed of the sudden arrival of his terrible adversary, in the midst of a brilliant ball, under the thousand lustres of the palace of Laeken: the English troops were assembled in all haste, and a courier was despatched to Bulow, to desire him to quicken his march, and join the rest of the army. The Prussians, under Blucher, received a check at Ligny, and the English took up their position at Mont St. Jean. Pozzo di Borgo arrived there in a state of considerable anxiety. "How long do you think you can hold out?" said he. "I do not put much faith in the Belgians," replied the Duke of Wellington; "but I have a dozen British regiments with me, and I will engage to maintain my ground all day; but Bulow must come to my assistance before five o'clock in the evening." In the middle of the battle a note arrived from Bulow, promising his arrival in less than three hours; the news flew along the ranks, and the English army, feebly supported by the Belgians, resisted with an obstinate courage, which gained them the victory. At the funereal battle of Waterloo, Count Pozzo di Borgo received rather a serious wound.

Napoleon's last battle-field was fought and lost! still Count Pozzo felt uneasy, and with reason, for the army of Alexander had taken no part in these events, indeed it had scarcely reached Germany; and was it not probable that the Duke of Wellington and Blucher, profiting by their successes, might take upon themselves to decide alone upon the fate of France? Pozzo di Borgo sent for a young Russian officer serving in the Prussian army, and said to him, "Spare not your horses, but in forty-eight hours let the czar be informed of this victory! Your fortune awaits you at the end of your journey." Though suffering from his wound, the diplomatist followed the Duke of Wellington closely to Paris: he resumed his office of ambassador to Louis XVIII., but without the same favourable circumstances in regard to credit, as he had enjoyed in 1814. As he had foreseen, the occupation of Paris by the English and Prussian generals had rendered them all powerful there, the Fouché-Talleyrand ministry was almost entirely formed by the Duke of Wellington, and both those political characters were known to be devoted to England. Russia thus played but a secondary part, which it was very desirable should be augmented; but the arrival of the Emperor Alexander at the head of 230,000 bayonets soon changed the face of affairs.

Talleyrand had evidence of this from the very first steps taken towards the preliminaries of peace; the Czar had an old grudge against the French plenipotentiary at Vienna, and he would not hear of any negotiation carried on by him; still Alexander's mediation was indispensable to our interests, in the discussions preparatory to a treaty of peace. England, Prussia, and Germany, exacted the most exorbitant conditions, being apparently desirous of making the most of their victory, and vieing with each other in the pillage of our unfortunate country. Lord Castlereagh's first minutes demanded the cession of a chain of fortresses along the Belgic frontier from Calais to Maubeuge; while the Prussians and Germans claimed Alsace and part of Lorraine; who but the Czar could defend us from the greediness of our conquerors? Talleyrand tried to appease Alexander by promising a high political situation to his ambassador; he offered Pozzo di Borgo the ministry of the interior, combined with that of the police, now vacant by the resignation of Fouché, or any other appointment he might prefer; but Count Pozzo declined his offers, declaring he could only be useful to France as an intermediate agent between the two governments; a Frenchman in his affections, and a Russian in his position and duty, he would appear as a type of alliance between the two cabinets and the two nations. Talleyrand's plans fell to the ground, owing to the invincible objections of the Emperor Alexander, who persisted in his desire of seeing the ministry for foreign affairs intrusted to a man of his choice, and in whom he could place confidence; and he recommended the appointment of the Duc de Richelieu, designating him as the best of Frenchmen, and the most upright of men: Talleyrand was, therefore, obliged to give way; he gave in his resignation to Louis XVIII., who intrusted the Duc de Richelieu with the formation of another cabinet.

From this moment the influence of Russia on public affairs became clearly defined. The Czar placed himself as the intermediary in all questions regarding territory, and he had, in point of fact, some object in wishing to uphold the active power of France in the south of Europe, in order that he might hereafter meet with an ally and supporter there. Pozzo di Borgo's influence increased with that of his emperor, and he always exercised it in a kind and favourable manner towards France. Let us take a retrospective glance of that most disastrous period, when the country, invaded by 800,000 foreigners, was completely crushed under the burden of military contributions; but Alexander threw the weight of his opinion and his power into the scale, as opposed to the demands of the English, Prussians, and Germans, and the question of the cession of Alsace, Lorraine, and a great part of the northern provinces, was at an end.

In the secret conferences of the plenipotentiaries, the Russian minister pressed the necessity of not exercising too much severity in the conditions exacted from France and the new dynasty; because, when dishonour, weakness, or degradation, are imposed upon a king or a nation, a natural reaction takes place against a yoke too oppressive to be borne. The treaty of Paris, the result of these conferences, was no doubt a very hard measure; when the Duc de Richelieu signed it, the trembling of his hand shewed the pain and grief he endured, and he wrote a most noble letter, which is still extant, deploring this cruel necessity; still, compared with the conditions imposed by the Anglo-Prussians, a great step had been gained. France underwent no partition; though she lost some posts on the frontier, though she was obliged to submit to a military occupation, though a contribution of seven hundred millions[23] of francs was levied, at least she could look forward to a limit, however distant, to the evils of war, she neither lost Lorraine nor Alsace, she still was a great nation.

When the Emperor Alexander quitted Paris, he invested Pozzo di Borgo with full power to uphold the government of Louis XVIII., to watch his first proceedings and prevent his first faults. A powerful royalist reaction had taken place; the greater part of the Chamber of 1815 had decided in favour of a system of unbounded energy, in which parties, when left to themselves, are always apt to indulge in the first joy of victory. This chamber was strongly opposed to the Richelieu ministry, and made political order of impossible attainment, though it was the only means of realising the loans, and, consequently, of fulfilling the terms imposed by the army of occupation. Under existing circumstances, moderation was not merely a natural impulse of elevated minds, it was an actual law of necessity; besides which, reactions do not create real resources, they only disturb people's minds, and destroy public prosperity. Pozzo di Borgo upheld the Duc de Richelieu in the plan common to both, of endeavouring to arrest the ultra-royalist movement, which threw obstacles in the way of the fulfilment of their engagements towards the allies; and the ordonnance of the 5th of September altered the course of ideas, and political principles of the Restoration. The despatches of Pozzo di Borgo had prepared the Emperor Alexander for this change, being altogether in favour of the moderate royalist system, which the duke was desirous of following; "It was necessary," said he, "to put a stop to the reaction of 1815;" and the emperor perfectly agreed with him in opinion. The Russian minister considered this ordonnance as an act evincing the royal will, likely to be favourably received in Europe, and thus to advance the deliverance of the country from foreign occupation; the event shewed he was not mistaken, for Louis soon received letters from the Czar, congratulating him upon the act of firmness which enabled his government to pursue the path of salutary moderation.

The Russian influence continued to increase. The military occupation was still in force, and France, which had to arrange pecuniary conventions resulting from various treaties, was exposed to very severe trials: war was succeeded by famine, famine by internal disorders, and simultaneous revolts. In his despatches to the emperor, Pozzo di Borgo endeavoured to convince him of the necessity of alleviating the burden of the military contributions, unless they wished to drive to despair a nation which they might find it difficult to bring into entire subjection. I never met with a collection of documents better reasoned, or more thoroughly imbued with the desire of putting an end to the military occupation of the country; perhaps his strong and patriotic anxiety on that head often made him form too severe a judgment of the royalist party.

The influence of the Russian ambassador was favourable to all the negotiations of the French government, and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle it assumed the character of a most generous intervention. Before starting for the congress he had received full authority from his sovereign to endeavour to prevail upon the Duke of Wellington to declare himself arbiter and mediator in the delicate question regarding the debts claimed by foreigners from the French government. These liabilities exceeded all bounds; and Pozzo di Borgo, appealing to the generosity and military honour of the Duke of Wellington, persuaded him to give over the military occupation which injured and tormented France, and to make an end of these liquidations, which appeared to have neither limit nor probable termination. Though the Duke of Wellington had an interest in keeping up a command which invested him with such vast authority in France, he consented to become the arbiter of the different interests; and affairs were thus arranged beforehand, that no obstacle might arise to interfere with the resolutions already formed, and which were to be finally settled at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The result of that congress was the liberation of France, the credit and trouble attending which are due to the Duc de Richelieu; but the exertions of Pozzo di Borgo also contributed greatly to calm the fears of Alexander, which had been excited by the liberal tendency at that time so vehement in Europe.

The disposition of the Czar always evinced a greater degree of warmth and generosity than of deep reflection; a bias had been given by education, and he was also surrounded by timid people, constantly ready to be alarmed at the posture of affairs, and more especially uneasy at the excited state of the German universities. During his brief stay in Paris, after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander had entered into an explanation on this subject with the French king. According to his ideas, the principal danger in Europe at that time arose from Jacobinism, and this was an evil above all others to be avoided; it was a disorder of a new species, against which the Holy Alliance would have some difficulty in acting so as to preserve the world from its contagion. The instructions left with Pozzo di Borgo bore the stamp of the same opinions; and what must have been the disappointment of the emperor, when, upon his arrival at Warsaw, he received intelligence that the Richelieu ministry was dissolved, and that a political system more decidedly liberal had been adopted by France! The Russian ambassador felt no repugnance for General Dessole, and Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, who formed part of this administration, for they both belonged to the military opposition which had formed the basis of the restoration; but, when the choice fell upon M. Grégoire, and when the Duc de Berri was assassinated, terror and amazement took possession of the corps diplomatique, and Pozzo di Borgo was not unacquainted with the resolutions which again placed the Duc de Richelieu at the head of affairs. The influence of the ambassador was then neither very strong nor important, for a very simple reason; from the year 1815 to 1818 it was impossible the French government should act independent of foreigners; they occupied the country; it was necessary to consult their diplomatic agents, and be in a great measure decided by their opinion; but, when France was delivered from them, the influence changed its nature, there was then no material action, only a moral, and consequently limited, influence exercised by the corps diplomatique.

The revolutionary spirit began to be manifest in Europe: Spain, Naples, Piémont, had all proclaimed the constitution with arms in their hands; the assassination of Kotzebue, the excited state of the universities, the mysterious societies in the Russian army, the riots at Manchester, the commotions of the active population of Paris in the month of June 1820, all were presages of a popular movement against crowned heads. The thrones of Europe were never more shaken than in those two years of 1820 and 21; it was necessary they should defend themselves. Pozzo di Borgo, therefore, received orders to uphold the royalist system of the Duc de Richelieu's second ministry, and he entered into it with a loyal ardour which proceeded not only from the personal friendship he entertained for that minister, but also from his profound conviction that certain limits would not be overstepped. Nevertheless, from the hands of M. de Richelieu the government fell into those of MM. de Montmorency and De Villèle, the representatives of the ultra-monarchical and religious opinions, and who had a bias towards the English system. Count Pozzo felt some annoyance in viewing the triumph of men with whom he was well acquainted, and whom he had even been called upon to oppose in the ordonnance of the 5th of September; but the orders of his sovereign were imperative, and he became their organ at Paris. He approved of the occupation of Piémont by the Austrians; and his advice principally decided the question of the war with Spain, which had been suggested at the congresses of Troppan and Laybach, and finally resolved upon at Verona.

The royalist party returned in triumph from Cadiz, having replaced Ferdinand VII. on his throne. In that country, where moderation either in politics or religion is unknown, the power had fallen into the hands of Don Saez, the king's confessor; and the object of Russia being always to exercise a powerful influence in the south of Europe, in order to counterbalance that of England, Count Pozzo received orders to repair to Madrid and use all his endeavours to push M. Hirujo into the ministry, who was a man of moderate views, and consequently inclined to favour the Russian interests. A perfect understanding on this head existed between the Russian minister and M. de Villèle. M. de Hirujo, forerunner of M. Zéa, gained the ascendant at Madrid, and people could reckon upon the government of Ferdinand being conducted with some degree of order and regularity. Pozzo di Borgo then returned to Paris; he was on intimate terms with MM. Pasquier and Molé, friends of the Duc de Richelieu, and disapproved highly of the folly of the royalist party, who tormented France every year with fresh laws, still more remarkable for their silliness and want of importance than for their unpopular tendency; but the ambassador had now hardly any influence upon the government; it was almost entirely confined to the opposition formed in the diplomatic circles and in good society, which before long extended to the conduct of the sovereign. Although he approved of the law regarding the conversion of the rentes,[24] he had no hesitation in giving utterance to his opinion concerning the extreme unpopularity the measure would naturally be attended with. "The King of France," said he, "wishes to become the richest sovereign in Europe; but I greatly fear this measure will lead to some unfortunate catastrophe. People do not play with impunity with the pot-au-feu of the citizens." And the event shewed his opinion to have been well founded.

At this period the Russian ambassador lost his protector, I may almost say his friend. Alexander died on his journey into the Crimea, a pilgrimage enveloped in mystery,[25] and which was immediately followed by the revolutionary movement in St. Petersburg. Some officers were desirous of throwing the government into the hands of the old Russian nobility, always ready to enter into any measure calculated to restore the predominance of the Muscovite aristocracy, which was a sort of republic formed of the great vassals of the crown. Would the Emperor Nicholas repose the same confidence in Pozzo di Borgo that his predecessor had done? He had not like Alexander a sort of brotherhood in arms and affairs with his ambassador, but as Count Nesselrode remained at the head of affairs, he retained his situation and presented his renewed credentials to Charles X. at the time when the storms of the opposition assumed every where a menacing aspect. Two years afterwards the ministry of M. de Villèle was at an end, and the king formed a fresh administration, at the head of which he intended placing M. de Martignac and M. de la Ferronays. The latter was at that time ambassador at St. Petersburg, and enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor Nicholas, who was therefore likely to be satisfied with his appointment to the ministry, and Pozzo di Borgo considered it necessary to support him with all his power; for the interests of Russia had at that time assumed so complicated a form, that the concurrence of France was a matter of the greatest importance to her.

Russia had deeply offended the Porte by signing the treaty of the month of June 1827, which established the independence of Greece; and the Mussulmans, proud of their ancient glory, had been still further irritated by the battle of Navarino. The occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia had given rise to fresh dissensions, which ended by the Russian ambassador's quitting Constantinople. Every thing was thus progressing towards a war likely to involve Russia in considerable danger, especially if England were to take part with the Sultan: the Emperor Nicholas was determined to pass the Balkan, for he found it necessary to employ the superstitious and turbulent disposition of the old Russian nobility in active military operations, to prevent its bursting out in revolutionary attempts.

Under these circumstances Count Nesselrode commissioned Pozzo di Borgo to sound the French cabinet as to the conditions they would require,—not for an armed alliance, but simply to observe a friendly neutrality during the oriental war. Count Pozzo proposed that France should keep up a force of 100, or 150,000, to act as a check upon Austria, and augment her armaments, so as to restrain England; he also hinted that should any important advantages result to Russia from the events of the campaign, the frontiers of France might possibly be reconsidered and the natural boundary of the Rhine granted to her without expense, by arranging an indemnity for Prussia and Holland; and that indeed it was not impossible the Morea might be given her as a compensatory measure, with the same rights as those enjoyed by England over the republic of the seven islands. What a magnificent portion this would have been for France!

The first operations of the campaign were not attended with success: there were sanguinary sieges and doubtful battles. During this time Count Pozzo exhibited the utmost activity in Paris, where the checks sustained by the Russians were the general subject of conversation, and General Lamarque had even published a series of articles to prove that the destruction of the army was inevitable. General Pozzo entered much into society, and at every fresh disaster or difficulty he strove to remove the fears they excited as to the consequences of the war: "Wait, have patience," repeated he incessantly, "and then you will see." The best understanding existed between him and M. de la Ferronays, who exerted himself to calm the minds which England took equal pains to disturb.

The following year the Russian armies were more fortunate, having advanced upon Constantinople, and the position of the ambassador became less difficult; but to counterbalance this advantage, the ministerial revolution took place in the month of August, which placed Prince Polignac, and consequently the English system of precedents and opinions, at the head of affairs. Pozzo de Borgo was much annoyed at this change; the cabinet of St. Petersburg entered into an explanation on the subject with M. de Mortemart, and in proportion as the French ministry advanced in the adventurous path of coups d'état, Count Pozzo multiplied his despatches to his government to warn them of an impending catastrophe. The information he gave on this subject was so positive, that the Emperor spoke to M. de Mortemart, telling him he was well aware some foolish steps were about to be taken in Paris. "The king of France," added he, "is at liberty to act as he pleases in his kingdom, but if evil comes of it, so much the worse for him. Give him warning that he will not be supported, and that Europe will not engage in a quarrel on his account."

The Russian ambassador only became acquainted with the ordonnances of July the evening before they were promulgated; he had neither been informed confidentially, nor had he received any official intimation; only a few days before the event he said in a conference with Polignac, "Prince, I do not wish to inquire into your secrets, I do not ask you what you are about, only take precautions not to compromise Europe;" and then Prince Polignac replied with his habitual smile, so expressive of perfect security, "All we ask is, that Europe will not compromise us." At these words the ambassador turned his back upon him. When the fatal ordonnances appeared the next day in the Moniteur, Pozzo di Borgo expressed great dissatisfaction and alarm at seeing the utter carelessness of the government in the midst of so much difficulty and danger, and the total absence of any military force or precaution. "How," said he, "are there no troops? The bridges are not occupied! Have no military precautions been taken?" "Every thing is quiet," replied they, "nobody stirs." "Every thing quiet!" repeated the ambassador warmly, "yes, every thing will probably be quiet to-day, but to-morrow we shall have firing in the streets, and the next day who knows what may happen? I shall be obliged to ask for my passports."

Here was the commencement of another series of events. It is necessary to judge the conduct of the ambassador during the latter days of the government which was about to expire, and the commencement of that which succeeded to it.

The events of July were characterised by so much agitation and importance, that the corps diplomatique must have found itself placed in an embarrassing position: Charles X. had quitted St. Cloud and sought refuge at Rambouillet, and a municipal commission had restored order in the midst of the insurrection. If Prince Polignac had possessed the slightest political forethought, he would have notified to the corps diplomatique that the king proposed removing his menaced government to such and such a part of the kingdom; this resolution would have served as an official order to all the ambassadors, to accompany the sovereign who had received their credentials, and by whom they were officially accredited, and their presence at St. Cloud would have been a sort of protest against the events then taking place at Paris; it might also have facilitated the negotiation between the royal party and the Hôtel de Ville, for the provisional government would have been afraid of committing itself with Europe, and being exposed to a general war. But with the utter carelessness he displayed in the whole business, Prince Polignac, minister for foreign affairs, made no official communication to the corps diplomatique, but treated every thing with a degree of levity quite in keeping with his predestinarian character.

The ambassadors naturally hesitated what course they should pursue in the midst of so many difficulties. Should they proceed to St. Cloud? But it was necessary the translation of the government should be officially notified to them by the minister for foreign affairs; ought they to make observations, to mix themselves up with the withdrawal of the ordonnances, or the negotiations of the Hôtel de Ville and the provisional government? That was not their duty, nor had they any right to interfere. The only plan, then, they could adopt was to await the end of the struggle, and not concern themselves with the plan of the government, until it placed itself in communication with their respective courts by requiring to be recognised.

In a meeting at the residence of the Nuncio, they decided upon remaining at Paris until further orders, and taking no part in events until they should receive an official communication from Charles X. Couriers extraordinary were despatched to the different courts to keep them constantly informed of the progress of this important affair, and request further instructions; generally speaking, all the despatches blamed Prince Polignac's carelessness, and described the events that had taken place in Paris in moderate language; mentioning the order that prevailed in the midst of disorder, the appointment of a lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and the abdication of the King and of the Duke of Angoulême: they then awaited patiently the termination of the insurrection, without compromising themselves, and without either giving or receiving an impulsion.

Here we must take a general view of the life of Count Pozzo di Borgo to explain the constantly serious and temperate direction of his despatches. He had never belonged to the ultra royalist party, but being a man of moderation and principle he had restricted himself to measures, corresponding with the events brought to pass by the French revolution: in this consisted the bond of union between him and the Richelieu party, composed of Pasquier, Molé, and de Rayneval, who were all strongly opposed to coups d'état. The despatches of Count Pozzo evince at all times a spirit of forethought and moderation. In 1816 he supported the Duc de Richelieu; in 1828, the ministry of M. de Martignac and the Comte de la Ferronays; when the ministry of Prince Polignac was formed, he, like every one else, foresaw the disasters likely to ensue, and his correspondence made such an impression at St. Petersburg, that the Emperor Nicholas thought it necessary to speak to M. de Mortemart on the subject. The Czar entertained a strong dislike to the ministry of Prince Polignac, because he believed him to be devoted to the English system, and the fall of M. de Martignac appeared to him a sort of check to his eastern policy; he repeated several times to M. de Mortemart, "Are they preparing anything in Paris against the charter? Write to the King to take care what he is about; above all, let him avoid coups d'état." In considering the attitude assumed by the corps diplomatique at this juncture, it is very important to bear in mind, that in the transactions of 1814 and 1815, as well as in the minutes of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the charter and the dynasty were considered equally under the protection of Europe, and were viewed as inseparable.

They had not long to wait for the recognition of most of the various courts of Europe; England, though governed by the Duke of Wellington and the Tories, approved in many successive despatches of a revolution conducted on the plan of that in 1688; Prussia came next, then Austria, without any symptom of hesitation; and, lastly, Pozzo di Borgo received credentials from his sovereign, which he presented with confidence and dignity, one idea being constantly predominant in his mind,—that order and peace were the first requisites in an European government.

Matters were in this state when the Polish question placed Pozzo di Borgo in a situation of great difficulty; perhaps under no circumstances of his diplomatic life was more discretion required and displayed. The ardent sympathies of the mob had been roused in favour of the Poles; a commotion took place in Paris, and spread in that city scarcely recovered from the agitation occasioned by the revolution of July; the cry of "Success to Poland! Down with the Russians!" was heard under the windows of the ambassador, stones were thrown at the hôtel, and the Russian legation surrounded their chief, endeavouring to persuade him to demand his passports, a step that would have announced a complete rupture. The ambassador appeased the impatience of his legation: "Our sovereign," said he, "is just now in a ticklish situation, and we must take no rash steps with regard to France, so as to involve ourselves in a fresh difficulty; let us wait for the apologies which will soon be made us; the mob is not the government; we are not ambassadors to the street, but to a regular authority. Let us turn the popular fury, not attack it in front." The next morning the minister for foreign affairs paid an official visit to Count Pozzo, to apologise on the part of the government, and a body of troops was ordered for his protection against any violence that might still be attempted by the mob.

From his earliest youth Pozzo di Borgo had been accustomed to dwell in the midst of political crises, and he was therefore not disturbed by the symptoms of insurrection around him, especially as he had full confidence in the wisdom and decision of the cabinet; some secret conferences had also made him aware, that France would not interfere in favour of Poland, but would allow Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the free exercise of their rights over that unfortunate country. The treaties of 1815 were still more firmly established than before, a few empty words of sympathy or encouragement were bestowed upon the insurgents, and Europe viewed with satisfaction the conduct of the new government, whose moderate measures had been rendered more difficult, by the threatening attitude assumed by different parties, and the prevalence of excited opinions armed with sufficient power to make them dangerous. Is no credit due to the wisdom which was the means of preserving peace? the forethought and moderation which averted the evil tendency of party spirit? Count Pozzo was loaded with compliments and expressions of gratitude, for he had probably saved Europe from a general war by not quitting Paris. The Polish insurrection was put down, after which all the forces of Russia were available against any foreign interference; and the ambassador who had safely passed through the dangerous crisis, had great cause to congratulate himself upon results, which left the cabinet of St. Petersburg at liberty to decide at once upon the fate of Poland. That country received no assistance from France; the interference of the French Chambers was limited to some barren protests in answer to which Pozzo di Borgo represented that Poland had been the aggressor, having torn asunder the bands of the constitution by her revolt, and that the Propaganda alone would be to blame should Poland now cease entirely to exist: that great efforts had been made since the year 1815 to overcome the natural antipathy entertained by the Russians for the Poles, which was as strong as the dislike existing between the Jews and Christians in Poland. What exertion and anxiety it had cost the generous heart of Alexander to give a national constitution to Poland! it was a subject on which he had consulted rather his feelings than his understanding, and the old Russian nobility had never forgiven his conduct on the occasion.

In the midst of all these serious political occurrences, of the disturbances in Paris, the various plots both foreign and domestic, the Russian campaign against Constantinople, and the imperative,—I might almost say, the capricious orders of his court, Count Pozzo always preserved the character of a man of impartial moderation, and of a skilful statesman who conceives and works out a system, without giving way to any of the crotchets formed by prince or courtier capable of endangering more serious interests. He who had resisted the Emperor Alexander by expressing his opinion with firmness, always continued to refuse obedience to instructions irreconcilable with the rules of general policy, which form the basis and regulate the relations between one state and another. Such was the constant tenor of his despatches after the year 1830. He was convinced that France, to the rest of Europe must serve as a principle either of order or disorder, possessing either way very great influence; and to all requisitions which did not tally with these ideas, he replied by writing to his court, "You have other agents besides me for affairs of this nature; I am only fit for moderate and conciliatory measures."

When the Turkish war was concluded, the ambassador received orders to proceed to London for the purpose of forming a just estimate of the state of affairs, and the position of the Whigs and Tories; having been successful in his endeavours to prevent France from taking part against Russia, it now became equally essential to sound the Tories, and become acquainted with the bent of their views, should parliament and the march of public opinion again place them at the head of affairs. The official ambassador from Russia to London was Prince Lieven, or rather it was said Princess Lieven, a woman of great ability, whose brilliant assemblies were the favourite resort of the Tory nobility, and the centre of political intelligence. Count Pozzo had very little communication with the Whig ministry; his acquaintance was principally with the Duke of Wellington and the Earl of Aberdeen, who was minister for foreign affairs, for the Tory interest; for that party, although out of office, still retained some representatives among the ministry. The conversations between the Duke and Pozzo di Borgo, were an interchange of recollections and hopes, together with the means of regulating the probabilities of the return of the Tories into the ministry. It was already in contemplation, although public opinion had strongly opposed a premature attempt made by the Duke of Wellington to resume the direction of affairs. In political life it is a mark of great ability to know how to bide one's time.

Still a kind of slight was about to cloud the life of Count Pozzo. Hitherto whatever missions might have been assigned to him exclusive of his official functions in Paris, he had always retained the title of ambassador to the court of France, and his tastes and inclinations led him to consider that country as his own. When he was despatched to Madrid, and more recently to London, his sovereign had not withdrawn his credentials, his post was still Paris: what was the reason a different course of proceeding took place upon this occasion, and that he received the title of ambassador extraordinary to his Britannic Majesty? It would be in vain to deny that it was a mark of his being out of favour, nor was this the only occasion upon which such had been the case in the course of his life. His disposition was not one that would bend to caprices or submit to demands which did not concern him. I have heard him complain of being watched by a number of special envoys, whose employments did not fall within the range of the regular communications between two governments, two nations naturally formed to esteem each other. This somewhat haughty disposition, led to the ambassador's loss of favour; it was however covered by a purple robe, by the appointment of ambassador to London.

Count Nesselrode entered into an explanation of the duties connected with the ambassador's new appointment. It was intended he should use all his influence to support the menaced Tory interest; his intimacy with the Duke of Wellington was well known, but it was considered that a merely provisional title, would not be sufficient to confer the necessary éclat and importance upon the Russian ambassador, for which reason he was to receive the definitive and official appointment. As soon as the mission should be accomplished, when the Duke of Wellington should have been dissuaded from his inclination to unite with Austria on the Eastern question, and the Tories have been actively supported, Pozzo di Borgo was to be reinstated in his appointment in Paris, and permitted to follow his tastes and habitual pursuits in the country he considered as his home. This despatch afforded some consolation to the ambassador, who was affected by a feeling of sadness in breaking the ties that bound him to a society in which he had so many intimate friends, but in these mournful separations he was now supported by the hope of a speedy return. Every thing around was dear to him, even the palace whose gradual embellishment he had taken pleasure in watching; the verdure of the gardens, the shade of exotic trees, the fragrant flowers, the vast and well-chosen library of Italian authors, whose works he was so fond of reciting from memory, and the views of Corsica suspended in his apartments, the gulf of Ajaccio which recalled the early youth of the friend of Paoli.

When admitted to any degree of intimacy with Count Pozzo, you were particularly struck with the energy of his manners and his vigorous mode of expression; his handsome though swarthy countenance was shaded by greyish hair, always arranged in a picturesque manner, as Gerard has represented him in one of his admirable portraits. His conversation was at first reserved and guarded, but gradually became animated and full of imagery and wit which sparkled through a slightly Corsican accent; his memory resembled a vast bazaar, full of the varied recollections of a long and troubled life. If you were desirous of seeing the mind of Count Pozzo in its full glory, you had only to speak to him of Corsica, ask him questions concerning the history of Paoli, or turn the conversation upon the national republic established in the island, and the Consulta which chose him as secretary to the government, and then you would be struck with the animation of his voice and gestures; his piercing eyes seemed to seek in your mind the emotions that glowed in his own, till you actually felt as if present with him at the assembly where the Corsican people proclaimed their independence. He did not indulge in anecdotes to the degree Talleyrand used to do in his long evening conversations, but he was more serious and truthful in his reminiscences, and did not play with facts, but always took a serious view of them. Without the habitual tact that characterised him, he might have been drawn into further confessions, for he was scarcely master of himself when speaking of his early political life. He was a man whose memory was so full of facts, that they oozed out at every pore; a spirit I took great delight in consulting, because the great struggle of Europe against Napoleon was shadowed forth by him, in a very different point of view from that assumed by the bad pamphlets of the imperial school.

I saw him depart for London in the full enjoyment of his powerful faculties, retaining his eagle glance, the elevated expression of his noble brow, and his bright searching eyes, while his mouth was expressive of mildness and goodness. But he was evidently out of spirits, and he quitted Paris with the idea that some misfortune would occur before he should see it again. In London he transacted the affairs of his government with the same devotion and activity as ever, but he took no pleasure in his employment; the friendship of the Duke of Wellington, his companion in more than one battle-field, was his only enjoyment; they passed whole days together at Apsley House talking over the affairs of Europe, and their recollections; speaking, the one of the caprice of the people who broke his windows, the other of the ingratitude of a court incapable of comprehending that order, and peace with a powerful nation like France, are essential to the tranquillity of Europe.

Weary of so long a diplomatic career, he had at last obtained permission to seek the retirement he so ardently coveted, when a letter from the Emperor apprised him of the intended journey of a Czarewitch to London, and requested him to act as a guide to the young prince during his stay in England. This involved a degree of responsibility and of moral fatigue which shortened the life of Count Pozzo. How would the heir to the Russian throne be received by the English nation, so capricious both in their affections and their hatred? The trial terminated happily, but it may be safely asserted that the last remains of strength possessed by the ambassador sunk under the exertion.

I saw him on his return to Paris: what a sad alteration from his former self! and what mere worms we are in the hand of God, who disposes at His pleasure of the mind and intellects of man! He no longer found any enjoyment or ease except in the society of his nephew, Count Pozzo di Borgo, and his amiable niece, a daughter of the noble house of Crillon. Was the old ambassador desirous of shewing that he had never ceased to be a Frenchman, by quartering his Corsican coat-of-arms with the escutcheon and honourable devices borne by the brother-in-arms of Henry IV.?

[M. PASQUIER.]