MILITARY TEXT-BOOKS

8vo.

Ready.

MODERN ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD. A Description of the Artillery of the Field Army, and the Principles and Methods of its Employment. By Colonel H. A. Bethell, R.F.A. With 14 Plates and 126 Illustrations in the Text. 7s. 6d. net.

AN OUTLINE OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904, 1905. By Colonel Charles Ross, D.S.O. Volume I. Up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang. With 14 Maps. 10s. 6d. net.

OUR CAVALRY. By Major-General M. F. Rimington, C.V.O., C.B. With 8 Diagrams.

In the Press.

FROM THE BLACK MOUNTAIN TO WAZIRISTAN. Being an Account of the Countries and the Tribes controlled by the N.W. Frontier Province, and of our Military Relations with them in the Past. By Colonel Harold Wylly, C.B.

MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd., LONDON.

Military Text-Books

OUR CAVALRY

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
DALLAS · SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

BY
MAJOR-GENERAL M. F. RIMINGTON
C.V.O., C.B.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1912

COPYRIGHT

PREFACE

In this book no attempt has been made to produce an exhaustive treatise on Cavalry; it has been written principally for junior officers of all arms.

M. F. R.

CONTENTS

DIAGRAMS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

“We study the past to foresee the future.”

In these bustling days of headline-up-to-date newspapers, one shrinks from reminding one’s readers that Xenophon gave excellent advice to cavalry trainers and leaders—advice which a cavalryman will recognize is quite as applicable to-day as it was in those distant ages; since details with regard to grooming horses on hard stones, exercising cavalry in rough ground, and so on are by no means out of date. There is every reason to believe that Alexander, and later Rome and Carthage at their zenith as military nations, had proportionately as highly-trained cavalry as is possessed by any nation of to-day. Those who have fought in rearguards and running fights realize that the Parthian method of fighting must have required the highest training and moral. The cavalry of the predominant nations were drawn from those who kept horses for their own sport and amusement, and for the gratification of their pride, and who felt they were better fighting men on a horse. The descendants of the horse-lovers of those ages are with us to-day; they are those who love danger, excitement, and pace, and who find in the blood-horse an animal which shares their love for these, and will generously sacrifice its life or limbs in the co-partnership.

Those who have never felt the sensation of a really good horse bounding and stretching away under them, and the consequent elation, the wonder as to “what could stop us?” cannot grasp what a cavalry soldier’s feelings are in the “Charge.”

Following the centuries which saw the final success of the ordered phalanx of Rome, time after time the more savage races of horsemen—Attila with his Hunnish squadrons or Abdur-Rahman with Moslem hordes—drive all before them, anticipating the flight of peace-loving, easy-going farmers and traders, living on the country and carrying off what pleases them.

Then held sway

The good old rule ... the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.

Ages roll by, the picture changes. The days of Norman chivalry animate and fire the imagination. The hunter warriors, knights, and squires lead their troops in battle array, throwing them into the combat at the decisive moment.

Broken bones incurred whilst unhorsing a friend, or a shrewd spear-thrust when cleaving to the chine a foe, in single combat, were adventures by no means to be declined or avoided.

Chivalry or enthusiastic religious zeal qualify the rougher side of their devotion to arms and horsemanship.

In all ages the horse-lovers, the best-mounted nations, have carried all before them. Ceteris paribus this is true to-day. Then came the days of “villainous saltpetre,” and many began to doubt and to number the days of cavalry; and always after a time there rises the cavalry leader who, emerging from the dangers of a youth spent in war and sport, sees that pace, weight, moral, and the “àpropos” make up for all the odds, if only leaders, men, and horses are trained, and their weight and pace rightly applied.

Next in order come Gustavus Adolphus; Cromwell, our great cavalry leader, and his Ironsides riding knee to knee, and rallying immediately after the shock; Frederick the Great, and his captains, Ziethen and Seydlitz, and their ordered application of masses of cavalry. Then grand old Blücher,[1] and his antagonists of the Napoleonic era, Murat, Lasalle, Curély.

Certain fixed principles keep cropping up which appear to have guided these heroes in their movements and dispositions. They are:—

• A. Cohesion in the ranks, or knee-to-knee riding.
• B. The moral effect of advancing horsemen.
• C. The flank march.
• D. The “àpropos” charge ridden well home.
• E. Surprise.
• F. The immediate rally.
• G. The necessity of a reserve.
• H. Training of the individual man and horse.
• I. Care of the horse’s condition.

The more we are able to read and learn of their views of training, leading, and applying the shock of cavalry, the more we see how little which is new can be written on the subject.

The same view may be taken of the fire action of cavalry. The best cavalry leaders have always recognized its great value, where not put forward as an alternative to the “àpropos” charge, and when not substituted by the “weakening” leader for the dangerous but more decisive shock action—that action in which we must have “no half measures, no irresolution.”[2] But the very fact that they may themselves have at some time weakened to the extent of shooting at the enemy from afar, instead of resolutely going in at the unknown, must have made these leaders recognize that the “charge” must be kept in the front as our ideal.

Those who cannot understand the predilection of the most advanced and thoughtful cavalry soldiers for l’arme blanche should ponder on the success of the Zulu dynasty. Its founder insisted that his men should be armed only with the stabbing assegai and would not allow them to throw their assegais. He knew what shock tactics meant and the moral inspired by their successful adoption.

A study of history shows the advocacy of ballistics from the horse at a charging enemy to have been periodic during the last 2000 years in peace time, and also that failure has invariably followed its adoption in war. It is not now seriously considered by any nation.

Whatever the cost, whatever the method, he who tries first to “handle” his enemy is the one with whom “moral,” that incalculable factor, will rest. Hear what a great trainer of cavalry, writing probably over fifty years ago, said:—[3]

It cannot be too often repeated that the main thing is to carry out the mission at any price. If possible this should be done mounted and with the arme blanche, but should that not be feasible, then we must dismount and force a road with the carbine. I am convinced that cavalry would not be up to the requirements of to-day if they were not able under certain circumstances to fight on foot, nor would it be worth the sacrifice that it costs the state.

But if the croakers were alarmed at a sputtering rifle fire, what will the faint-hearted of our time say to the new and alarming factor which has now been introduced. Batteries of horse artillery, firing up to sixty or more low trajectory shells per minute, must now be reckoned with. These shells contain 236 bullets, weighing 41 to the pound.

If the de Blochs and other theorists paused and wondered what would happen to cavalry when magazine rifles were invented, what will be their attitude now? Let them be reassured. But the words of those who reassure them must ring true and be purified from the dross of the first thought, “How can we do this and save our own skins?” Let them be born of the stern resolve, “At all costs we will kill, capture, or put to flight our enemies.” We must evolve tactics which will enable us to use every new factor and to deny them to the foe.[4]

Leave them to judge whether the plan of those tactics will be dashed off by the pen of the ready-writer as a result of experiences gained during a Whitsun-week holiday on some suburban training ground, or whether the soldier who has felt the sharp stress of an enemy’s victory, the heavy hand of adversity and the rough lessons of retreat, who has seen the barometer of his men’s fate rise and fall under cyclonic conditions, will painfully and doubtfully elaborate it.

Cromwell, Frederick, Galliffet, these with bitter experience of the everyday imperfections of human nature, and a well-weighed determination to insist on tactics which will override those weaknesses, did not attempt to avoid or shirk the difficulty of losses. A cool contempt for the contingencies is the primary qualification in the search for successful methods in cavalry tactics, as well as in the encounter itself.

Turning now to the detached duties of cavalry, of security and information, no less do we see the recurrence of the same ideas. The Curélys and de Bracks, the Mosbys, the cavalry who, “like a heavy shower of rain, can get through anywhere,” such come right down to us from ancient history.

The daring hearts who, trusting in a good horse and a knowledge of woodcraft, torment the enemy, whether in camp, bivouac, on the march, or on the line of communication, are a product of all campaigns, ready to the hand of those who know where to find them, and how to inspire them aright so as to get the very best out of them. And what will good men not dare and undergo for a word of praise or encouragement from one whose soul is in what he says?

Again and again, what is learnt in the hard school of campaigning, and generally where that campaign has been lost, carries the best lesson. Has any nation set itself more resolutely to correct the faults of its cavalry[5] than the French nation after the 1870 war?

Conversely, the nation that wins, learns little or nothing; no lesson is worse than that of easy success in small wars. Witness the Russian successes in Central Asia for a series of years, followed by the débâcle of their cavalry action in the Manchurian War when pitted against an enemy whose cavalry was scarcely “in being,”[6] and the erroneous conclusions arrived at in regard to cavalry by those who only saw the first portion of the operations in South Africa 1899–1902.

Von Moltke is credited with saying: “People say one must learn by experience; I have always endeavoured to learn by the experience of others.”

The real lessons learnt from war are extremely difficult to impress on the taxpayer, who, in modern Great Britain, only reads of them in the newspaper, and who at best does not wish to pay for one more cavalry soldier than is absolutely necessary.

The cavalry leader must recognize that the arm is expensive, therefore it cannot afford to be inactive; it is the hardest arm to replace, therefore it must be used to the full.

In all ages cavalry[7] have been expensive, and one may well wonder if the frugal mind of the taxpayer balances them against who can say what pictures of dead and wounded, indemnity, pillage, lost trade, and damaged prestige, or whether he looks at one side of the balance-sheet only, and forgets that from which they may save him.

Ignoring these mundane views, it is still the duty of the cavalry leader who has patriotism in his soul, to keep his heart young and his muscles trained, and to leave no stone unturned in peace time in his preparation, as a sacred duty, for war; just as in war it is his duty to sacrifice his men, his reputation, his horses, everything, in order to turn the tide of battle or render the victory decisive.

Let officers of cavalry remember that he who in peace time cannot sacrifice his pleasures to his duty, will in war find it much harder to give up his life or aggrandisement, possibly in accordance with an idea or order with which he does not agree, or in which he sees no sense.

This is the serious side; mercifully there is a lighter side to war, and it is well known that the hair-breadth escapes of themselves or others, and the “hard tack” form the most amusing and abiding recollections of a war to those who have participated in it.

Against ill chances men are ever merry.

Withal no cavalry leader is likely to succeed unless there is something of the gambler’s spirit in him, the gambler who can coolly and calmly put down his everything on the cards:—

He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
That dares not put it to the touch,
To gain or lose it all.

CHAPTER II
ARMAMENT

“Quot homines tot sententiae.”

Armament also figures largely amongst conditions of success.... There can certainly never be complete disparity between the armament and the moral of an army, since the latter includes intelligence which takes care to provide good weapons. The want of good armament immediately reacts upon the confidence of the soldier. Defeat would thus appear excusable, and success cannot have a worse enemy than this feeling.—Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms, p. 147.

The many changes through which regiments of cavalry go in this respect are hardly credible, although in our case allowance must be made for the many different enemies which a British cavalry regiment meets. The lance will be adopted instead of or in addition to the sword, and six or seven years later the sword alone, or perhaps even rifle alone, will be carried.[8] It may be regarded as a certainty now that for some years to come, as in the past, the Germans will arm both ranks with the lance. One has hardly written this before one reads that the bayonet may be substituted for the sword in the armament of German cavalry regiments, for use in night attacks and in the attack of unturnable small positions, or when occasion may arise.

The bayonet on trial is straight, 14 inches long, with one cutting edge, the back being flat. All under-officers and one-tenth of the troops will carry a bayonet furnished with a saw edge.

History repeats itself. In 1805, Napoleon organized dragoons who carried a bayonet as well as a sword. There may have been a reason for this, as their usual fate was to be dismounted and their horses given to remount more highly-trained cavalry.

Von Bernhardi[9] sums up the question of this new armament of the German cavalry as follows: “The hand-to-hand fight on foot must be exceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily rôle for the sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great mistake,” etc.

When we come to the pattern of swords, the purely cutting sword has its strenuous advocates, whilst as many more will beseech one to trust to no personal weapon except the pointing sword. Authoritative quotations will be given from well-known leaders advocating one or other form of sword.

It seems to be allowed that a scimitar or tulwar pattern, with its curved blade, is unsuitable for pointing,[10] and also that the best patterns of rapier-pointing sword are difficult to cut with. One may read in Sir Montague Gerard’s book how he killed several Afghans. He says:—

“One had but to make a feint of employing the obsolete cut No. 7, and up would fly their guard over the face, when dropping your point you went clean through your man.... The fourth man I tackled fired at me just as I closed, and I felt a blow on my side, but next moment my sword went through something hard, and the weapon was twisted out of my hand and hung by the sword-knot. The blade, which was a straight rapier, one by Wilkinson, got a slight but permanent wave in it, and I can only account for receiving such a wrench by having taken my opponent through the headpiece as he crouched and tried to stab the horse from below.”

Pages 255–256: “We counted sixty odd bodies, whilst our casualties amounted to six men and seven horses.” And on page 257 he adds: “The lance giving our Sowars a preponderating advantage.”[11]

Perhaps of all those who have given their opinion on this subject, that one to whom we would give most credence is a swordsman of the 11th Hussars of Marlborough’s time, who fought many duels and lived by his prowess with the sword. His final dictum is: “One point with the smallsword is as deadly as forty cuts with the broadsword.”

Verdy du Vernois[12] says: “Experience has proved that a sword-cut seldom, but a point with the sword always, throws a man off his horse. The latter should therefore be chiefly practised at sword drill.”

From the bolas of the South American to the tomahawk of the Red Indian or the revolver of the cowboy every weapon has had its advocates.

Royal Artillery Mounted Rifles were seen charging on horseback with fixed bayonets[13] a few days after joining a South African column; thus imitating the Australian contingent in the column, who invariably did so—and very formidable they looked.

A conclusion which experience forces upon us, as regards both the armament and tactics of horsemen, is that when they attain a high standard of horsemanship or when they are good horsemen from youth, such as many Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, and Canadians undoubtedly are, a short training will bring them almost level with the regular cavalry and enable them to employ shock tactics. Then they should be armed in addition to their rifle with sword or lance, as the rifle and bayonet are not the best weapons for this purpose. As trained cavalry thus armed they are equal in value to twice if not three times their number of mounted rifles on the battlefield, if they have trained troop, squadron, and regimental leaders in command of them.

The oft-advanced theory that it is not the nature of such and such a race to use the point is quite unfounded. It has been conclusively proved that a recruit who has been allowed only to point with a sword, can hardly be induced to cut, even if a good opportunity offers.

The lance is undoubtedly the “queen of weapons,” but it has its drawbacks. But first its great advantage is that it is formidable, and so much so that lancers claim that regiments armed with the sword will not face those armed with the lance. It is undoubtedly easier to use against crouching men on foot. The Inniskilling Dragoons after a charge at Zulus, who crouched down under their shields, sent for all available tent-pegging spears.

On the other hand, the lance’s shaft is difficult to withdraw from the body of a man, and a lancer may have to leave it there. Then he will draw his sword. But that entails another weapon. In a close mêlée the lance is a clumsy weapon.[14] In the mêlées which occur after a charge, men and horses are so intermingled that even the use of the sword is difficult. But obviously the cure for this is to teach the men to rally instantaneously and not to indulge in mêlées. The officers of the 9th Lancers in the Afghan War had a short spike put into the hilt of their swords, so that a blow from the hilt in the face was decisive.

The weapon which (1) entails least weight and is easiest to carry, and (2) is deadly, and (3) is most likely to be useful on all occasions, is the straight sword or rapier.

But this obviously must be made of the best steel, whereas a quite serviceable cutting sword can be made of inferior iron. That the cutting sword has been so much used is most probably because good steel was difficult to obtain. Napier says to arm cavalry sepoys with heavy English swords of one weight, one length, one shape is a mistake. The cutting sword is not a deadly weapon, often it does not penetrate clothes or accoutrements. The mamelukes, formidable antagonists to Napoleon’s regular cavalry in Egypt, 1798–1801, carried a cutting sword very considerably curved back, with which weapon they are said to have inflicted terrible wounds; in addition they carried a poniard and two pistols in their sash and another pair of pistols in their holsters. A syce carrying a lance for them followed on foot.

In the Peninsular War, whereas the English cavalry used the sword almost exclusively as a cutting weapon, the French dragoons on the contrary used only the point, which, with their straight sword, nearly always caused a mortal wound. This made the English cavalry say that the French fighting “was not fair.”

Some amateurs talk of the revolver as a weapon with which to arm the ranks in place of a sword or lance. They appear to ignore the fact that a bullet once fired off in a mêlée may hit friend or foe. Very fine horsemen, such as Arizona cowboys, who break the insulators of the telegraph wire as they gallop along with a weapon, which they have been accustomed to handle from their youth up, would probably do well in a pursuit with such a weapon, but it is not, we believe, seriously contemplated by any nation as a weapon for use in the ranks. For officers, scouts, farriers, trumpeters, and possibly others it is most useful, as it takes the place of a rifle and is light.

If any particular personal weapon is carried habitually, that weapon should be adopted; but failing that, there must be a long apprenticeship to lance or sword. Perhaps the point to which most attention should be given is that the man must be taught to have implicit confidence in his weapon; this can be attained best with the lance or with the pointing sword. A man appreciates the fact that with either of these weapons the point goes through easily; whilst with the cutting sword only the most expert can make any impression on, say, a leg of mutton covered with a sack and a leather strap or two.

In the German cavalry, stress is laid on teaching the trooper that the sight of the lance is sure to make the enemy turn and fly. In our own cavalry greater attention is now paid to practising the man in riding at a gallop at a rebounding dummy, offering resistance equal to the weight of a man. Without such practice the men sprain their wrists and lose their grip of the sword, and do not understand how simple it is to run a man through.

The Rifle

Both French and German cavalry have, during the last few years, been repeatedly urged by eminent writers on cavalry to bring themselves to a better knowledge of the use of the rifle and fire tactics. The new weapon issued to the German cavalry has been the signal for some of this literature. Calling to mind that it is but a few short years since German cavalry were armed with an out-of-date carbine, and carried only some twenty rounds of ammunition, and further reading between the lines of the latest addition to cavalry literature by General von Bernhardi, these exhortations cannot be considered as uncalled for. But to make them a text on which to lecture our regular cavalry only exposes ignorance of their present training, and makes one wonder if one is awaking from far back in the middle of the last century, when a gallant lancer regiment, on being first armed with carbines, gravely piled them on the stable-barrows and wheeled them to the manure-heap. Our British regular cavalry are at least ten, if not fifteen, years ahead of any continental cavalry in rifle shooting, fire discipline, and the knowledge of when and how to resort to fire tactics.

There are probably few of the more senior who have not come to a conclusion formed from experience that the following quotation[15] is as suitable in many respects to cavalry as it is to infantry:—

Volley firing, and limiting the range against infantry to 500 yards at most, are the surest means of providing against the want of ammunition at the supreme moment. And the sooner it is recognized that long range fire is a special weapon to be used only on special occasions, the better for the efficiency of our infantry in general.

CHAPTER III
THE HORSE

“A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!”

No apology is needed for including in a Treatise on Cavalry a chapter on the subject of the Horse. Were it demanded, it would only be necessary to point to the unfortunate ignorance in regard to horses, horsemanship, and horsemastership which, extending as it does through every gradation of rank of life in the nation, caused our bill for horses in South Africa to total twenty-two millions—that is, about one-tenth of the whole cost of the war. In fact, it may here be remarked that, following this assessment, it is quite probable that the horse question should be rated as 10 per cent in the percentage of importance of matters in preparation for war; that is, in big wars, for our thoughts are apt to be distracted by small wars from the essentials of great wars.

It is unfortunate that nowadays only at most 15 per cent of the men in our cavalry have, before enlistment, had anything to do with horses. Further, few indeed of the officers, though most of them have ridden, and in that best of schools the hunting-field, have gained sufficient experience in their early life, before joining a regiment, in the stable management and training of horses, to enable them to look after their horses well. This they will only attain to after they have had a fairly long apprenticeship under a good squadron leader.

The essentials of campaigning horse management only come to those who live with horses constantly, and have to get work out of them. Those who hand over their horse to a groom after a long day’s work, and who do not see him till they wish to ride again, cannot learn about horses.

That the ordinary hunting man in Great Britain knows very little indeed about economizing his horse’s strength is evident from the fact that not one in twenty is ever, after a sharp gallop, seen to dismount, loosen his horse’s girth, and turn his head to the wind. Ten to one, if any one does so, it is a soldier, and one who has served in South Africa.

First of all is the question, What is the most suitable animal for cavalry work? And here the mind runs into two lines: (1) There is the animal which will carry a moderately heavy man, whose weight is 11 stone, together with his saddle, arms, etc., which may total up to another 6 stone. For this the beau-ideal is the Irish horse of about 15·2 hands high. But these must be well and carefully fed and watered, and not overdone. Their recuperative power grows less also with every inch of height. (2) The other animal which will carry a lighter cavalryman is seen at its best in the modern type of polo pony about 15 hands high, and as nearly thoroughbred as possible. These latter are more able to withstand hardship than class (1).

Though the limit to the height of the horse suitable for a campaign should be 15·2 hands, it is more difficult to say how small a horse[16] is suitable to carry a cavalryman. Chest measurement is the best known test for stamina, and a good judge said truly that “a 13·2 hands pony sixty-four inches round, will do double the work of a 14·2 hands pony of equal girth.”

Whilst we do not wish for one moment to be understood to advocate unduly small horses for cavalry, we do wish the chest measurement standard to be adopted more widely. We cannot help advancing the theory that the natural height of the horse appears to be not more than 14 to 15 hands at most, and all above that are in the nature of forced exotics, obtained by selection and good food for mares and foals, and in these stamina has not been grown in proportion; take, for instance, the power of the heart, which has to pump blood farther to the extremities in a big horse.

Now, though it must be allowed that a squadron mounted on 15·2 hands horses will, in a charge, easily defeat one mounted on 14·2 hands horses, still the difficulty of maintaining the condition of the squadron mounted on 15·2 hands horses, the increased cost of food, the smaller amount of wear and tear which the horse, as it increases in height, can bear, are all factors for consideration.

It is because, unfortunately, our ideas in Great Britain are somewhat inflated in respect to the size of the horse required to mount cavalry, that we neglected at the beginning of the Boer War to collect every animal of suitable age, if only 14 hands high, for the remounting of our cavalry in South Africa, and went to other and far more unsuitable sources for our horse-supply. Had we later, as was suggested, commandeered all suitable animals in the Cape Colony, we should have obtained a most useful reserve, and incidentally deprived our opponents of a source of supply of which they took full advantage. The horse and transport animal of the country are always the most suitable for a campaign in that country. By the end of that war, many a cavalry officer had gladly exchanged his 16 hands horse for a Boer or Basuto pony of 14 to 14·2 hands high.

But this, the South African War, it should be here remarked, can only be regarded as giving us a view of one side of a great question. Campaigning in the fertile plains of Europe, where food and water are generally plentiful, where stabling may often shelter the animals, and where enormous distances, with no food beyond that carried in the waggons, are not necessarily covered, the larger horse may do his work well. But he must be treated with the greatest care and the weight carried, in his case, more rigorously reduced than in that of the smaller horse. For shock tactics he is the best animal on which to mount our cavalry, and our ideal is shock tactics.

But let the squadron leader not forget that, when long distances are to be traversed, a few ponies are perfectly invaluable (they can be driven in a mob with his second line transport and are available to mount men whose horses require a day or two’s rest, and which will, if they do not get it, “give in” and never be any more use to them).

In peace time, in the laudable desire for good appearance, these expedients of war are too apt to be forgotten; they only force themselves on us when it is too late. The animals usually described as only fit for mounted infantry are those which see the finish of a campaign, and must be available as reserves of remounts for cavalry.

No doubt it requires experience and trained intelligence to discriminate between the purchase of the large, fat, slow, hairy-heeled, podgy-muscled brute that has never yet gone fast enough to strain himself or be otherwise than perfectly sound, and the lean son of the desert or veldt whose early toil has developed wind-galls, splints, and so on, but whose conformation and muscular development are as complete as will be his ability to live and carry weight, when the other will fall down and die.

Stamina has been mentioned above; it is obviously the first essential in a cavalry horse. Next in rank to it comes good temper, usually accompanied by good digestion and boldness, and marked by a full kind eye and a broad forehead.

Xenophon recommends us to test a horse’s courage by unaccustomed sounds and sights before purchasing him as a war horse, and we recommend this practice to cavalry officers.

The Arabs, who have bred horses with a view to war for many generations, have handed down a great deal of old-world wisdom on the subject of the horse suitable for war.[17] The best Arabian horses are undoubtedly the outcome of centuries of breeding to a type, and that the type suitable to carry a light man throughout a long campaign, to face danger courageously, to possess fair speed, immunity from disease and sickness, especially pulmonary complaints, and to bear the jar of galloping on hard ground.

Our own British horses and the Australian Walers have unfortunately been bred for size, speed, and—in the case of the former—ability to carry a man in a burst over a big hunting country, and with, for the last fifty years, a disregard for stamina and temper which has gone far to remove many of them from the type of animal suitable for cavalry.

Situated as we are in regard to knowledge of horses, and hampered as we are in our preparation for war by the difficulty of teaching the essentials of campaigning horse management during peace time, we shall always find that it is in the early part of a war that our cavalrymen will fail to comprehend the necessity for nursing the strength of their horses, for discarding all unnecessary impedimenta, and limiting the task to what is absolutely necessary. In peace time, horses which are in regular work are not appreciably affected by their rider sitting on their backs for five or ten minutes at a halt instead of dismounting, or by his not allowing the horse to pick a few mouthfuls of grass twenty or thirty times in the day, or by his not watering him at every chance.

In peace time the horse will get food and water on his return home; but in war these little things in the aggregate matter greatly. They are like the snatches of sleep which a tired man gets when he can; they keep him going. The man can sustain himself by the hope of sleep at a future time. The man has certain traits in his nature which carry him through.

It is said that Murat, in Napoleon’s Russian campaign, though he crossed the Niemen with 43,000 horses, could only put 18,000 in the field two months later. Murat had worn them out by keeping them saddled up sixteen hours a day, by giving them insufficient food, and by chasing wisps of Cossacks. À propos of this, Nansouty said to Murat: “The horses of the cuirassiers not, unfortunately, being able to sustain themselves on their patriotism, fell down by the roadside and died.” Tired men soon express their feelings, the horse is unable to do so. Verb. sap.

Intimately connected with this question is the feeding of the horses. We know that no concentrated ration can constitute a substitute for bulk for continued periods, but it is not generally known how many articles of diet a horse will relish when hungry. In the Pamirs the ponies eat the offal of game which is thrown aside, thus recalling the story of our childhood of Black Bess, Dick Turpin’s celebrated mare, who had a beefsteak tied round her bit on the ride to York.

Ruskin once said in a lecture to the cadets at Woolwich:

Whilst all knowledge is often little more than a means of amusement, there is no science which a soldier may not at some time or another find bearing on the business of life and death; your knowledge of a wholesome herb may involve the feeding of an army, and acquaintance with an obscure point of geography the success of a campaign.

This is applicable to the cavalryman and his horses.

De Brack devotes eight pages of his valuable work, Cavalry Outpost Duties, to a chapter on “Forage and Subsistence,” every word of which should be known to any cavalry officer who may have to serve in Europe or elsewhere.

The theory of horse management is brought now to a very high standard by our Veterinary Department, and their publication of an excellent book on Animal Management marks a step forward which must be appreciated by all who are in agreement with the theory expressed earlier in this chapter, that the horse question is one-tenth in war. It is little different from Frederick the Great’s saying that “Victory lies in the legs.”

One word of caution is necessary for those who command cavalry in war. They must metaphorically keep a finger on the equine pulse, and this is, most of all, necessary when working horse artillery in heavy ground, or horses fed on anything less than full rations, or horses in bad weather. Wet saddle-blankets put next a horse’s back act like a poultice. There is no alternative in wet weather in a bivouac but to keep the blanket dry, or dry it before a start is made. Further, since the health of their horses is vital to the efficiency of cavalry, their leader must be willing to take risks in grazing, off-saddling, and foraging for food. Against surprise on these occasions long range rifles and our guns now confer on us great advantages.

In this matter of attending to the welfare of the horse, however, it must be fully realized when it is permissible and when the horse must be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation.

An instructive example of what far-reaching results may come from ill-judged watering of horses is given in the American Civil War, by General Alexander. In June 1864 Grant, after his encounter at Cold Harbour with Lee, undertook the bold step of moving south across the James River and attacking the Confederate right flank. For three days, though the movement was reported to Lee, he would not believe it.

On the 15th of June the Federal General Smith, with 1600 men, was moving on Petersburg, a vital point on Lee’s right. Beauregard, the Confederate commander, then had only about 2500 men to hold his extended lines with; he, however, expected reinforcements by night. Every hour’s delay of the Federal advance was therefore invaluable. With one cavalry regiment and a battery he delayed Smith’s column for three hours, and it was not till 5 P.M. that that General had completed his reconnaissance of Beauregard’s position. By 6 P.M. everything was ready for the attack; but it was then found that the Chief of Artillery had sent all the artillery horses to water. This delayed the attack till 7 P.M. It was partially successful, and a portion of the Confederates’ lines were captured; but night came on, and with it the Confederates’ reinforcements. “Petersburg was lost and won by that hour.” That was on the 15th June 1864, and Petersburg did not fall into Federal hands till April 1865.

The question, whether the present day greatly-extended rôle of cavalry on the battlefield, hitherto entirely confined to theory, will answer in practice, is a burning one for the horse-master. Without an enormous force of cavalry will there be squadrons available for these services?

In Frederick the Great’s army the horses were a first consideration, and he got the greatest results. In Napoleon’s campaigns there is not much evidence of the horses being considered.

Frederick saw that the task suited the horse. Napoleon made the horse suit the task or perish in the attempt. The latter’s lost campaigns teach lessons about cavalry which we cavalrymen cannot afford to ignore. Cavalry worn out in the first week of a campaign, with scores of horses scattered along a line of communication in vain efforts to effect some coup, entail a bitter retribution.

Campaigns of three weeks’ duration are not the rule, and every extra exertion for which horses are called upon has its price. It is only in the pursuit that we can afford to disregard our horses.

CHAPTER IV
TACTICS OF CAVALRY V. CAVALRY

For the purposes of making this subject plain, the Squadron, the tactical unit, will be first considered.

Let us picture, then, a squadron led at a trot with absolute cohesion (that is, every man’s knees close against those of the next man,[18] but not so as to prevent the pace being increased to such a gallop as is compatible with that of the slower horses in the squadron). This squadron being led till they are within 50 to 100 yards of their opponents, and then at a command breaking into the full pace of the charge with a crashing, ear-splitting yell rather than a cheer, will, it is universally allowed, go through, break up, and cause to turn an opposing squadron which has any intervals in its ranks.[19] In the latter, men and horses can, since there is room, turn or pull round; and they will do so. Your men and horses cannot turn; there is no room. Weapons in this case may be ignored, the horses’ weight and momentum is the weapon. Horse and man total upwards of a thousand pounds in weight, they represent 9 feet in height by 3 feet in width. The front extends for, say, 70 or 80 yards. The pace is 10 yards per second. It is a rushing wall, there is nowhere any gap.

The opposing squadron has started out with equally gallant intentions, but before they reached the charging point, or even later, something has occurred to prevent them appearing like a wall; more often than not their direction has been changed, and, whilst shouldering, these on the hand turned to may be closed up well enough, but those on the outer flank have not had time to gain the direction; pace may not have been uniform; a direction may not have been given by the leader; or his order may have been mistaken. No matter what it is: fifty things may happen. It is just enough to prevent that squadron being the more compact, well-built wall of the two. And what follows? They are defeated and disgraced. They will not, as a squadron, again face the cavalry of the enemy whose squadron defeated them. Better, far better draft the squadron and send the leader to another arm or work if, unfortunately, he has survived. Why be so severe? Why treat them thus? Because the heart, the moral of the defeated squadron has lost two-thirds, whilst the winning squadron is elated, believes in itself and its leader, and despises the enemy. It will charge three squadrons next time and will not turn. Still keeping before us the idea of a wall moving at speed, let us consider what better fortune it may have; it may catch the enemy on a half flank, or full in flank.

Place a row of books standing quite an inch or two apart from each other, hurl a spare book at the end book, and see what happens. At least four or five will fall down. “Ten men on the flanks and rear (of the enemy) do more than one hundred riding in front.”

Trusting that this idea of a knee-to-knee charge, the cardinal point, has been made clear, let us consider the other matters which a squadron leader should keep before him when opposed to cavalry. He must utilize surprise, what Galliffet refers to as “the horrible and unexpected”; he should always be “the first to attack, always take the initiative, and charge resolutely.” Again, our leader must utilize the ground: first, its hollows and ridges must be accommodated to his tactics; secondly, he should try to give the enemy bad ground, ground which will tire or disintegrate them whilst he himself uses the best, since a ditch, narrow drain, or small nullah diagonal to his front, a fallen tree, a patch of boggy land, a few rabbit holes, some thorns or rocks may mean two or three men and horses down or out of place.

It is certain that an enemy who sees your squadron disappear in a hollow, as you advance towards him, will, nine times out of ten, expect it to continue its direction towards him; here, then, a wheel to the flank, a gallop of a hundred yards or so, followed by a change of direction, and later a wheel into line, may give the opportunity of a lifetime.

These may appear small things, but they must be second nature to a cavalry leader as they are to some, and those the most dangerous, wild animals; for in the skilled utilization of these small things lies his honour and hopes of success.

Watch the cat tribe: deliberate preparations, every advantage taken of cover in the stealthy advance, then the gathering of the limbs under—for the rush. From a fighting point of view we want every instinct of this kind; with the cavalry there is no place for “Gentlemen of the Guard, fire first”—cunning, nerve, unflinching resolution, reckless, bloody-minded intrepidity, and with all this the power to inspire your command, even those of doubtful courage, with the certainty of success; though they must know some cannot come back, still they like to be deceived, to die, or to be maimed, fierce, high-hearted, happy, and elated. The sight of the enemy’s backs makes them all brave.

And then we re-formed and went at them once more,
And ere they had rightly closed up the old track,
We broke through the lane we had opened before,
And as we went forward e’en so we came back.

Lindsay Gordon.

The Rally

An endeavour has been made, then, to show that the success of the charge lies: first, in the ordered momentum of the unit; second, in the suitable application of this by the leader. Disciplined experience turns the scale. First, the impact, lessened in degree as one side turns sooner or later. Then the mêlée. These beaten back, the others victorious; these looking for safety, the others for victims. Now, at this moment the wild man’s first instinct is to pursue “all out,” without a reserve, to kill, perhaps, a weaker instinct, to capture, or to plunder. A new element of disorder follows on this mad desire to cast prudence to the winds and pursue, l’épée dans les reins.

Once more the governing mind of the leader must assert itself, his foresight and knowledge must reign supreme and repress the natural instinct of the many; he by voice and example must rally his squadron. Failing this, or a portion of his squadron held in reserve, his horsemen are a prey to the first formed body which attacks them, though of inferior strength.[20] “That side which is able to throw in the last-formed body will win.” So excited is his command and so irregular their course of action, that he will have great difficulty in getting them to obey him. Cavalry Training, p. 128, realizes this:

As the pursuers will be in disorder and consequently at the mercy of any fresh body of the enemy’s cavalry, the necessity of organizing a support without delay is imperative.

Here let us remember that we have glorious traditions. The name of Cromwell inspires very diverse thoughts in the British Isles. To the Irish, battered walls; to the Scots, ruthless discipline; to the English, a constitution upheld or a monarchy overturned. Suitable memories of our great cavalry leader.[21] To the cavalryman what does this man, who can still inspire such diverse thoughts in nations, represent?

The highest attribute in a general is that he should be able to order the elements of disorder. War is the acme of disorder. The instant conversion of the available remnants out of disorder, chaos, a hundred wishes, shouts and orders, broken legs, loose horses, dead or wounded, men fierce and reckless, constitutes the triumph of discipline and the guiding foreseeing mind.

In minutes, perhaps seconds, the enemy’s support or reserve, taking advantage in turn of our disorder, will be upon us; we who have ceased to be a wall, and are now scattered masonry, must be built up, so as at any rate to look formidable and to make those of the enemy, who as individuals still bravely dispute the ground, turn and fly, and perhaps throw into disorder the ranks of those who are coming to their support. More than this, we must move in the direction of the enemy, as though we still wished to fight. As wind is caught, stunned men regain their senses, disabled horses exchanged for sound ones captured at hazard, broken weapons replaced, the ranks refill, order at last prevails.

We have laid stress on the rally of the squadron,[22] but hardly less important is the maxim that the victory rests with those who can last throw a formed body into the combat. This may be the support of which De Brack says:[23]

Almost all the failures of charges are due to the slowness or ignorance of the supports. A charge badly supported, no matter how bravely begun, becomes only a bloody affray, whilst one well supported is always victorious and decisive.

Let us, then, for our guidance, and before considering larger forces, formed of many squadrons and supplied with another element of offence in their horse artillery, consider what conclusions are arrived at from the fight of squadron v. squadron. They appear to be:—

1. Provided that there is space to manœuvre and fight, that cavalry which can manœuvre with cohesion at the greatest pace will win.

2. The element of surprise affects the result.

3. The utilization of terrain is a sine qua non.

4. A flank attack is the object to be aimed at.

5. On the quickness with which the rally is carried out much depends.

6. A skilled direction of the support influences the action.

CHAPTER V
CAVALRY V. CAVALRY

Forming to the Flank

“When you charge make a change of front and attack them in flank. This manœuvre can always be successfully practised against an enemy like the English, who make a vigorous and disunited charge, whose horses are not very manageable, and whose men, brave but uninstructed, begin their charge too far away from the enemy.”—De Brack.

“Ten men on the flank do more than 100 in front.”—Von Schmidt (p. 90).

I. The Squadron

1. In the mounted attack of cavalry on cavalry that side will win which makes use of a wall of mounted men, advancing knee to knee with no intervals showing. Two means of quickly forming and launching this wall are as follows: 1st. The head of the squadron column is directed towards the enemy, and line is formed to the front. 2nd. The head is led obliquely to the enemy’s advance, and at such a distance as will enable the troops to wheel into line, get up pace, and attack.

2. Forming to the Front or to the Flank.—The first plan is that which the beginner almost invariably adopts; the enemy’s squadron has a fatal attraction for him; he distrusts himself and imagines that there is not time to manœuvre. This attack generally “leads to undecided cavalry duels.”

The second plan is that which is always advocated, as, though it demands more sang-froid, practice, and experience on the part of the squadron leader. Its advantages are considerable; they are as follows: (a) It gives more space and consequently more time to the leader. (b) The enemy’s squadron, if already formed, will usually shoulder towards the attacker, and thus become disintegrated. (c) The movement does not entail the disorder consequent on front forming; on the contrary, a wheel into line generally ensures well-ordered and cohesive ranks. (d) The squadron is usually successful in striking the flank of the enemy.

Von Schmidt says:

An attack direct to the front must be an exceptional thing; to advance and at the same time gain ground to a flank must be the rule.

General Sir D. Haig says:

The efficacy of flank attack is so universally admitted as to need no argument to support it. A more difficult question is—how should we protect our own flanks from attack?

3. Defensive and Offensive Flanks.—Usually the best protection is afforded by either a defensive or an offensive flank; that is, a portion of the unit, say, a troop from a squadron, a squadron from a regiment, should drop back or be ready to drop back in echelon; or, on the other hand, should be thrown forward. The duty of the defensive flank is to act against an enemy overlapping or taking in flank the unit in front. The object of the offensive flank is to threaten even more completely than with the remaining force the flank of the enemy, who will be tempted to edge across to meet it.

What is true for a squadron is true for a regiment, and is still more true for a brigade, because with this comes in the question of artillery fire.

II. The Regiment

4. Let us then picture a regiment moving in “mass” from the south to the north of the paper, map, or ground.

Our regimental commander seeing the enemy’s mass in front and bearing down on him, say, eight hundred yards away, gives the command, “Left shoulders,” and moves N.E. The first effect is that the enemy have a moving mark to hit, and to do so must “shoulder” or change direction; while at the same time they are deploying to the front.

Both forces move three hundred yards. Then our regimental commander gives the command, “Echelon attack to the Left.” The squadron nearest to the enemy wheels into line and attacks; the remaining squadrons continue their direction and wheel into line in succession and attack as required.

The attack eventuates somewhat as in the diagram.

Diagram I.

5. Advantages of the Echelon Attack.—This form of attack has the following advantages: (a) The wheel into line, the least discomposing of evolutions, takes but a few seconds to carry out, and then there is presented a formed body to charge the enemy. (b) A succession of formed bodies coming up on the unprotected flank give confidence to the squadron, which feels it is supported by other lines near enough to catch any outflanking enemy. (c) An echelon of squadrons, seen from the enemy’s point of view at a distance of three hundred yards, is practically indistinguishable from line. It is, moreover, easier than in forming to the front to abolish all intervals between squadrons; a point of the greatest importance in an attack. (d) To be the last to form the attack from a compact formation is a considerable advantage. (e) The leader may even be able to change the direction of his mass so as to attack from due east to west.

III. The Brigade

6. Training of Leaders.—Our present squadron leaders, our future brigade and divisional leaders, must be brought up to regard this forming to the flank as the only plan, as second nature; they must believe that if they act otherwise they are voluntarily tying one hand behind their back. Otherwise the maintenance of horse artillery with a view to co-operation with cavalry is almost useless.

7. Co-operation of R.H.A.—In the cavalry fight horse artillery is the only factor which has assumed totally different proportions in the last ten years (i.e. since Q.F. guns were introduced) to those which formerly obtained. Von Schmidt, p. 163, writing in the middle of last century, says:

The co-operation of horse artillery with the shock of the cavalry must be a very exceptional occurrence, as when the circumstances of the ground are very favourable, allowing it to act and at the same time protecting it.

Nor does it appear that any instance of ideal co-operation between the two arms occurred in the War of 1870. With the old guns the help which horse artillery could give was not great; and consequently co-operation was not practised in peace nor attempted in war.

Strange as it may appear, our cavalry officers still find it hard not to deserve the reproach cast upon them by the Duke of Wellington, who, writing after the battle of Salamanca, remarks: “The trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything; they never think of manœuvring before an enemy.”

8. The Two Forms of Attack.—A brigade of cavalry which moves in mass with its guns alongside it and attacks straight to its front, masking its guns by means of its squadrons’ extensions, voluntarily throws away at least ¼ of its power, i.e. its guns. It will be beaten every time by the brigade which sends its guns to one of the flanks and goes to the other itself. By this last method both gun fire and charging power are fully applied. Further, it is probable the guns will be able to enfilade the enemy’s lines before they attack. A very short experience of fighting a cavalry brigade shows this conclusively, and both sides will learn to drop their guns’ trails at a favourable opportunity and move their squadrons away from them or, vice versa, the guns moving from the squadrons. The latter may be an excellent plan, and it certainly entails less wear and tear on the squadrons. Directly the guns come into action the horses can rest.

Diagram II.

The choice between the two will usually be dictated by the ground; and in most cases there will be a combination of the two. Thus a brigade is advancing towards a crest, the brigadier ahead. He sends his guns away to the high ground on one flank, and his squadrons over or round the ridge and down to the level ground on the other.

9. When both Forces get away from their Guns.—Both sides will usually drop the trails on the same, say, the west side, and move eastwards, opposite to each other, to attack. If working along a ridge, both sides will usually keep their guns on the higher ground.

Other things being equal, the squadrons which move farthest, fastest, and in the best order will have an advantage—(1) because they will put the enemy’s squadrons between themselves and the enemy’s gun fire; (2) because they will compel the enemy’s squadrons to form so that they are fired on by artillery and very probably enfiladed.

It becomes obvious, then, that if these tactics are adopted, and the squadrons of both sides act in exactly the same way, they will meet on perfectly level terms.

10. Formations for moving to a Flank.—The point then to aim at is to bring some deciding factor in the attack. In what formation is it best to move the squadrons away to the flank?

11. Column of Regimental Masses compared with Column of Squadrons.—Let us compare column of regimental mass with column of squadrons, and let the pace be a trot. Allow thirty seconds for the shoulder of a regimental mass, five seconds for the wheel of troops. At the end of four minutes the head of the mass will have gone 820 yards; the head of the column 920 yards. But if there are twelve squadrons, with a front of 64 yards, nine intervals of 8 yards, and two of 16 yards, the last squadron will have only gone 50 yards; while in the mass the rear squadron will have gone 630 yards. It follows, then, that the leader who adopted column of regimental masses practically has all his squadrons within reach of his voice, and they have moved well away from his guns.

Column of Squadrons

1. Stationary Target for 4 minutes.

2. Difficult Target thereafter.

Column of Masses

Moving Target, able to change pace, direction or position, and to use ground if fired on.

Diagram III.

12. Relative Effect of Artillery Fire on the two Formations.—The relative effect of the guns on the two columns may be compared. For four minutes the column of squadrons affords, before it gets on the move, a stationary though every moment decreasing mark. After that the target might be taken where the column has to pass some tree or house, and each squadron saluted in succession as it reaches this place. Otherwise it is not a very easy mark, and certainly not such a large mark as column of regimental masses, but the latter moves at once, is easily hidden, and can more easily change pace and direction.

13. Column of Masses preferred.—On the whole, the column of squadrons formation compares unfavourably with the mass formation, not only as a means of moving rapidly to a flank, but also for facility of evolution when arrived there.

14. The Formation for the Attack.—If, then, we take mass as the best formation, in what mode shall we move our mass, and evolve our lines of attack from it?

We will compare two methods. One, ours, being the echelon attack from mass to a flank, and the other, the enemy’s, being an attack to the right from quarter column. Ours only involves sufficient distance being taken between regimental masses, and we are ready to attack at once. Theirs involves the formation of lines of squadron columns and then lines, and must commence at such a distance from the enemy as to allow for the time and space used up in these two formations. For our echelon attack little or no ground is consumed in the direction of the enemy; and this means late formation. Consequently our mass can go on moving away from the guns for a longer period.

Diagram IV.

Another great point, directly we see him begin to open to squadron column we can give one more change to our direction, and so gain his flank. He will either be taken at an angle, or have to shoulder his line of squadron columns. Thus we have gained the outside; he must mask his own guns, and must be taken in flank by ours.

15. Time for Horse Artillery to unlimber.—It would appear as though the leader who first dropped his guns’ trails would be likely to win; but there is a saving clause to this. If the other side see the trails dropped in an obviously good position, they will avoid the combat there, or perhaps leave a section or portion of their horse artillery to deal with these guns, and take the remainder with them to the flank. They will avoid the cavalry combat till they are well away from the enemy’s guns, and will then fight, when they have guns and cavalry, against cavalry alone. This shows that in the cavalry combat it is a very difficult matter to know just when to drop the trails, and get away to a flank and attack. It must come as an inspiration, something like Wellington’s move at Salamanca.

16. Form of Attack must be simple.—To have to decide between a great many complicated forms of attack is out of the question. The form of attack must be simple, understood by all, and only the timing of it can be left to the leader at the supreme moment.

17. Conclusions.—Our conclusions, then, are:

1st. That it is always advisable to move diagonally to an attack coming at us, even with a squadron or regiment.

2nd. That when we have to consider the combination of horse artillery and cavalry squadrons in attack, it is still more necessary.

3rd. That the mode in which we move to a flank prior to throwing in our squadrons must be carefully considered, and the plan adopted which gives us most squadrons at the critical point, and the handiest and simplest mode of evolution.

4th. That intervals between squadrons are a positive evil in an attacking line.

5th. That in an echelon the supporting body must be near enough to give confidence to the body in front, far enough to catch the enemy on the turn.

6th. That no squadron must form line till it sees an enemy before it to charge. Therefore, if, as the echelon opens out, the squadron leader sees that he will be beyond the flank, he should not form to the flank, but should lead round in squadron column and look for his opportunity.

* * * * *

“Why is it,” asks Ardant du Picq, “so hard to use cavalry well?” and replies: “Because the rôle is all movement, all moral; moral and movement so closely allied, that often the movement alone without a charge, without physical action of any sort, makes an enemy retreat, and if that is followed up, causes his total rout. The latter follows from the rapidity of cavalry for those who know how to use it.”

CHAPTER VI
FIRE ACTION IN TACTICS OF CAVALRY V. CAVALRY

A very frequent question, also quite a justifiable one and one which cavalry soldiers must not shirk, but must on the other hand thoroughly understand and thresh out in their own minds, both by practical experiment and theoretical discussion,[24] is the following:—

Since cavalry are armed with an excellent magazine rifle, may they not more easily and effectually inflict loss and defeat on the enemy’s cavalry by that means rather than by employing shock action, with its gambling uncertainty, its losses in men and horses, its need of intense resolution or complete absence of arrière pensée on the part of the leader?

Those cavalry soldiers who have had experience in such affairs, who have thought the matter out and thus obtained certain guiding principles, will reply: “There are certainly many occasions when the conditions of terrain or the nature of the combat favour such action. We have only to mention a rearguard or a running fight and many instances come to mind at once in the case of those pursued.”

Intricate ground always favours fire action, and in small affairs, as a sequel to a dash at the flank of an enemy holding a position on a rough and unrideable kopje, it is obviously the right course.

Of all these occasions it is our intention to take full advantage; never to miss an opportunity. At the same time, practical experience has convinced us that we must guard against such action being adopted to the prejudice of shock action in cases where the latter is of supreme value, and we must also recognize the “inherent weakness of mounted troops who attempt to force a decision with fire action without combining it with shock action.”

In the Report on the Cavalry Division Training, 1909, by General Sir D. Haig, we find the following:—

The principles which should determine the choice between mounted and dismounted action require to be more thoroughly considered. Small units have been seen on several occasions to dismount on open ground when mounted action was the only sound course to adopt. On the other hand, squadrons have been seen to remain mounted in enclosed country when under fire at close range of dismounted men.

Further, we feel that the very fact that there are many more occasions suitable for fire action than for shock action must not make us lose sight of this, namely, that though we may use fire action when we meet the enemy nine times out of ten, it is on the tenth occasion, and then because shock action takes place, that something definite, something which affects the result of the campaign, is seen to happen. Therefore we must not let our future leaders be brought up with distorted views. We have to recognize that whilst recourse to shock action demands great resolution, fire action on each successive occasion at an increased distance is always the easy course; whilst the former decides battles and increases our moral, the latter is a sign in many cases of the leader weakening, temporizing, or waiting for orders which will never—and he knows it—come.[25]

We desire to face this question squarely, and with a just appreciation of human nature and its many weaknesses and failings. Nor do we forget the Arab proverb that victory is gained not so much by the numbers killed as by the numbers frightened. It is in view of this that we adopt certain lines in our cavalry training.

It appears desirable to give an instance of a case where shock action is decisive. Imagine two brigades of cavalry each with their H.A. Battery meeting on an open plain. Each wishes to get forward. One, Red, determining to use rifle action only, adopts the best formation he can think of, a double echelon formation with his guns either on the flanks well drawn back or in the centre. Dismounting, he prepares to attack. Blue, leaving a fraction of his force in guns and rifles to hold Red to his ground (and cavalry will credit how difficult it is for Red to break off from such an attack), moves round Red’s flank, out of easy range and at speed, and with the remainder of his brigade attacks Red’s flank, choosing the angle at which he will “go in.”

Red has of his own accord rendered his mobile force to a great extent immobile; he suffers accordingly. Blue, using gun fire just in advance of his shock action, rolls Red up.

It is the fact, that the leaders of both sides instinctively feel that they should not immobilize their commands, which will lead to “mounted combats of cavalry forces.” Scores of actual happenings have convinced those who have been present at them that there is nothing harder to hit than a galloping man and horse; further, that if the mark is men and horses approaching, the fire will be still less effectual. Whether the men firing are under shell fire and their own horses are near them, whether the enemy are armed with a personal weapon, especially a lance or long rapier, each of these factors reduces the number of hits in a way which can only have been seen to be believed.

In the case of Red, their own and the enemy’s movements are disconcerting and inimical to accuracy of fire. In the case of Blue, movement every moment is conferring increased advantages on him, and not the least of these liberty of action.

Red, since he must send his horses to some distance back, takes a long time to mount and move; and would give opportunities to Blue during his movement.[26]

As regards the difficulty of hitting a galloping horseman, the following incident in South Africa may be of interest. An officer and four good shots, with their horses close at hand, remained to observe after the squadron had been withdrawn from a debatable kopje. Occasionally they took long shots at the Boers, who in twos and threes rode strung out across the front, almost out of range. Without any warning, suddenly about seventy Boers turned and galloped straight at the kopje. “Fire steadily till I tell you to mount,” was the order given by the officer, who then fired at a man in the centre on a white horse and well in advance. No Boers were seen to fall, and with 100 yards start the five raced back to their squadron. When they came to compare notes, it was found that all had fired at the same man on a white horse, at whom some forty rounds had been discharged. The conclusion arrived at was that rifle fire is not effective against galloping individual horsemen, a conclusion which was duly acted upon.

Cavalry must have space to manœuvre and fight. Without these, cavalry lose the advantages conferred on them by mobility, and become at a disadvantage compared with infantry.

That there are very diverse opinions on the power of rifle fire against cavalry must be evident from the fact that instructions so very different in their import as the following were issued in Mounted Troops’ Manuals shortly after the war in South Africa:—

“This Memorandum is not meant for cavalry who turn their backs, but for those who, when they see the enemy preparing to charge with sabre and lance, will coolly dismount, form up, and when he gets within reach, pour in such a withering fire as will in five minutes kill as many of the enemy as the same enemy with sword and lance would kill in five hours on active service.”—Preface to Lord Dundonald’s Cavalry Training, Canada, 1904.

“If an attack of cavalry is imminent, mounted troops should, if time admits, gallop to cover or enclosed or broken ground and there repel and retaliate.”—General Hutton’s Mounted Service Manual, Australian Commonwealth.

The method is illustrated on an opposite page and shows the formation of square, horses inside. This formation offers a splendid target to H.A. or machine-gun fire for preparation of the attack which would undoubtedly be made by cavalry from a direction at right angles to that fire.

Colonel Henderson, in Science of War, page 160, sums up the situation as follows:—

It is beyond question that dealing with a dismounted force, whatever may be the amount of fire with which it is endowed, shock tactics may play an important part.

The opportunities of effective outflanking and surprise may possibly be few; but the very fact that the enemy has both the power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to charge home is bound to hamper the movements and to affect the moral of any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.

Such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make any forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at the mercy of its antagonist,[27] and it would thus be absolutely prevented from bursting through the hostile cavalry and from acquiring the information which it is its main object to obtain.

In the valley of the Shenandoah in 1864 the Confederate squadrons were armed only with rifles, while the Federals under Sheridan were trained both to fire and charge. The result is significant. The southerners, though admirable horsemen, were worsted at every turn, and their commander had at last to report that his mounted infantry were absolutely useless against the Union cavalry.

Dismounted Action of Cavalry

Objection is often raised to cavalry practising the rôle of the infantry attack, and generally with reason, for, where there is any other better plan for cavalry, it is obviously wrong for them to dismount, leave their horses far behind, and immobilize themselves in order to carry out this form of attack. But on the other hand, and especially in rearguard affairs, it is quite possible that a weak rearguard or detached force well posted in a gorge or other unturnable position will hold out till such an attack is made. Then take plenty of cartridges, carry your swords with you,[28] and “go in.” But do not imagine that this costly mode of attack should be adopted on all occasions.

It may be taken as a general rule that full value is not obtained from cavalry who are far distant or long separated from their horses. In the latest German cavalry regulations there is an important modification. It is laid down that the decisive dismounted action should only be attempted when the leader is convinced of possessing numerical superiority, and very rarely over ground giving the enemy a prepared field of fire. It is fatal, they say, to commit your forces with numbers insufficient for success. They further say (para. 452): “Half-hearted dismounted action contains the germs of failure”; and evidently disapprove of the view that the extent of the rôle of cavalry dismounted should be delimitated, as there is a tendency to do in our army by those who expect the cavalryman to protest if they ask him to dismount, and to argue how far he should go in attack—whereas he must be, and will be, ready to accept any rôle which aids victory.

Prince Kraft’s contribution to the discussion which followed the war of 1870–71 should be regarded, by the British army at any rate, as out of date. He wrote: “A blow is given to the true spirit of cavalry if a trooper once believes that he can fight without his horse.” This blow, duly received by the British cavalry, has proved innocuous; they have learnt to reculer pour mieux sauter, with an additional power, in the form of the rifle, of the greatest value to them, whilst at the same time they will retain the tradition that their

IDEAL IS SHOCK ACTION.

CHAPTER VII
A CAVALRY BRIGADE IN ACTION

In a cavalry attack the first objects are:—

1. To give the guns a good field of fire against the enemy’s attacking squadrons for as long as possible. This thought comes first, and the first order is accordingly that which puts the horse artillery in motion.

2. To keep our attacking squadrons from view of the enemy till the last moment.[29]

3. To make the line of direction of the cavalry attack such that it and the line of the artillery fire meet approximately at right angles on the mass of the enemy’s squadrons advancing to the attack, as already explained in the chapter on flank attack.

In order to attain a good field of fire for the guns it is often worth while to send two squadrons (not necessarily from the same regiment) to work towards the enemy en bondes, as the French expression is. For example (see [Diagram V].), “A” squadron Carbineers pushes on half a mile or so (never more than a mile) and gets into any likely artillery position.

Diagram V.

“B” squadron Dragoons pushes on past their inner flank and gets into the next likely position half a mile farther on, and so on, each moving as soon as, or perhaps a little before, the other dismounts and gets ready to use rifle fire on all scouting parties, bodies of the enemy, etc. These parties are considerably disconcerted in their work by this mode of advance.

It is a point of honour, that these squadrons should if possible get up in time for the general encounter (unless detained as escort to horse artillery, a very likely contingency for one of them). But this bounden duty to be up in the fight, if possible, is a maxim with cavalry, against whom Inaction is the greatest reproach which can be levelled, next to cowardice, for which it is liable, and justly so, to be mistaken.

Having thus got a choice of artillery positions, and having determined the position of the enemy’s cavalry, our first care is to select the best position for the horse artillery.

(a) It must have a good field of fire over the ground where the encounter is likely to take place.

(b) We do not want the enemy to locate it; therefore it may be advantageous to unlimber under cover and then manhandle the guns up, or down into action; or it may remain behind cover and come into action when it is à propos. It is quite possible that in order to bring an effective fire on the enemy’s squadrons it may have to come into action on forward slopes.

(c) It is preferable for the guns to be defiladed from the enemy’s artillery.

(d) The teams should be near the guns but under cover.

(e) The escort should be under cover from view, mounted or ready to mount, prepared to charge attacking squadrons in flank. Rifle fire against squadrons, who have nerve enough to charge a battery of Q.F. guns, is not likely to stop them.[30]

Whether we take all our squadrons away to a flank, whether we use one regiment, or wing of a regiment, as a feint or bait, how far we go to a flank, in what formation, and the hundred other possibilities, we must leave to be settled at the time. Only the broad principles can then be focussed, viz.:—

1. Utilize the ground, choosing cover for the squadrons and good ground to work over.

2. Deceive and bewilder the enemy.

3. Get well away from our own artillery.

Example

i. The regiment or squadrons A——A sent with the horse artillery (see [Diagram VI].) must not keep too near it, because the enemy’s horse artillery may get the range. Nothing shows more decidedly ignorance of the duties of escort to horse artillery than that the cavalry should hug or take into custody their horse artillery.

Diagram VI.

ii. It must not mask its own horse artillery fire against the enemy’s cavalry or upon his guns. The cavalry officer who masks his own guns by his clumsiness usually deserves to be shelled by them.

iii. The O.C. of the escorting regiment or squadrons must use his own judgment as to whether he can spare one, two, or three squadrons to help the two attacking regiments in the combat or in the rally.

iv. He must decide whether to be outside or inside the horse artillery, or in wings both outside and inside.

v. Often the O.C. the regiment or squadrons A——A may have to decide if he shall show up as bait, but in doing so he must, again, never mask the artillery. He may (in this case) move west to his left, especially if he thinks Blue cavalry is coming on and has not seen the regiments C——C and B——B making their flank movement. But usually the regiment or squadrons A——A should move up in this case more to the right, east, as this means that Blue horse artillery will come into action facing south and consequently cannot easily change front and pelt the regiments C——C and B——B.[31]

As our horse artillery will always if possible come into action on a hill or on high ground there will be some hill behind which A——A is able to manœuvre or to get cover, or to simulate (by showing up in different places) a larger force than it actually represents.

The leading of the regiments B——B and C——C will depend on the signals sent from the Brigadier (who rides wide on the inner flank—eastern side in this case—and where he can see the enemy’s advance) to the Brigade Major. These regiments B——B and C——C should make their move if possible under cover from view, and at the critical moment the order to attack should be conveyed to them.

As one of the objects of this manœuvre is to give our guns a good target, the O.C. horse artillery must direct his fire on the enemy’s squadrons, in this case, X——X and Y——Y. The enemy’s artillery, if already in action, will sustain little harm from his fire. The result of the encounter will depend on which side wins the shock action, therefore every shell which falls in an enemy’s squadron is a help. The enemy’s supporting squadrons are a special target, also the enemy’s rallying squadrons.

Let the O.C. horse artillery remember that the sight and sound of his bursting shells will often enlighten the Brigadier as to the position of the enemy’s squadrons and guide him in his attack, on which everything depends.

Before the combat, Resolution, i.e. fixedness of purpose, the instant adaptation of stratagem to the features of the terrain, an attack at the psychological moment galloping knee to knee; in the combat, constantly keeping a reserve and constantly re-forming into good order for the next effort,—these are the secrets with which to ensure coming successfully out of a cavalry encounter. “’Tis dogged as does it.” But do not let the leader imagine that he will always be making an advance, when this combat comes off.

Especially to be deprecated is the unreasoning gallop of squadrons, so commonly seen at manœuvres in an advance towards an enemy, which deprives them of any value from the reports of officers, patrols, etc.

If it is evident that the enemy has forestalled our manœuvre, and that any move to the front will place our brigade in the jaws of his attack, then, as Von Bernardi (page 147, Cavalry in War and Peace) says, the “deployment should either be on existing lines or to the rear, and should be covered by dismounted action of the advanced guard or by artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action be regained, as superior breadth of deployment is the first and perhaps the most important step towards maintenance of the initiative.”

Other cases in which it may be a positive advantage to allow the enemy some measure of initiative occur either when you are quite ignorant of his strength, or when the ground on which your squadrons stand or in their rear is most suitable for the combat from your point of view.

In the passage of defiles in the face of an enemy, say, in the case of a river or swamp, the rule is for the column, as it emerges from the far end of the defile, to move in column of troops parallel to the river or swamp. It will thus (i.) be ready to wheel into line and attack quickly, (ii.) there is no fear of the column being pushed back on to succeeding troops coming through the defile, (iii.) the head of the defile is kept clear of troops, (iv.) there is one safe flank for your column, i.e. that on the side of the swamp or river, and (v.) there is not the same danger of the enemy pounding[32] an easy mark at the mouth of the defile with his artillery. If your own artillery can occupy any ground on this side of the defile, from which the exit can be seen, the accompanying diagram shows that a considerable force of your cavalry can make the passage with comparative safety under cover of its fire. It should always be remembered that the attack against troops, in course of the passage of a defile, will usually take place when only that proportion has crossed which the enemy thinks he can beat decisively.