THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D,

VOLUME THE TENTH.

MDCCCXXV.

[ PREFATORY OBSERVATIONS TO THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES. ]

[ REFERENCES TO THE SPEAKERS ]

[ DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 19, 1740. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEC. 2, 1740. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEC. 4-11, 1740. ]

[ HOUSE OF LORDS, DEC. 9, 1740. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1740. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, JAN. 24, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 3, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF LORDS, FEB. 13, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 24, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 27, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 2, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 13, 1740-1. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, APRIL 12, 1741. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, APRIL 16, 1741. ]

[ HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 1, 1741. ]

[ DECEMBER 4, 1741. ]

CONTENTS

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PREFATORY OBSERVATIONS TO THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.

The government of this country has long and justly been considered the best among the nations of Europe; and the English people have ever evinced a proportionate desire for information in its proceedings. But in the earlier days of our constitution, we shall find that much jealousy on the part of our rulers debarred the people from access to the national deliberations. Queen Elizabeth, with a sagacity that derived no assurance from the precedents of former times, foresaw the mighty power of the press, as an engine applied to state purposes, and accordingly aroused the spirit of her subjects, by causing the first gazettes to be published in the year of the armada [Footnote: See sir J. Mackintosh's Defence in the Peltier case.]: and D'Ewes's journals of her parliaments contain the earliest reports of parliamentary debates.

The first volume of the commons' journals comprises the debates from the accession of James the first, to the cessation of parliaments under Charles the first. The publication, in 1766, of a member's notes, furnished authentic debates of the session in 1621. Rushworth, in his voluminous collections, presents us with many of the debates during the civil wars. Gray's more regular debates succeeded. From these, until the times that followed the glorious revolution in 1688, we have no reports of parliamentary proceedings, interesting as they must have been, on which we can place any more reliance, than on those of Dr. Johnson, which, we shall presently see, cannot pretend to the character of faithful reports, however deservedly eminent they are as eloquent and energetic compositions. But the revolution was not immediately followed by a liberal diffusion of parliamentary intelligence, for the newspapers of William's reign only give occasionally a detached speech. That sovereign scarcely allowed liberty of speech to the members of parliament themselves, and was fully as tyrannical in disposition as his predecessor on the throne; but, happily for the English nation, he was tied and bound by the strong fetters of law.

The stormy period that ensued on William's death, is somewhat illustrated by Boyer's POLITICAL STATE. The HISTORICAL REGISTERS which appeared on the accession of George the first, may be considered as more faithful depositories of political information than Boyer's partial publication. The spirited opposition to sir Robert Walpole excited an unprecedented anxiety in the nation to learn the internal proceedings of parliament. This wish on the part of constituents to know and scrutinize the conduct of their representatives, which to us appears so reasonable a claim, was regarded in a different light by our ancestors. But the frown of authority in the reign of George the second began to have less power to alarm a people whose minds were undergoing progressive illumination. A general desire was then loudly expressed for parliamentary information, which Cave sought to gratify by the insertion of the debates in the GENTLEMAN'S MAGAZINE. The jealousy of the houses, however, subjected that indefatigable man to the practices of stratagem for the accomplishment of his design. He held the office of inspector of franks in the postoffice, which brought him into contact with the officers of both houses of parliament, and afforded him frequent and ready access to many of the members. Cave, availing himself of this advantage, frequented the houses when any debate of public interest was expected, and, along with a friend, posted himself in the gallery of the house of commons, and in some retired station in that of the lords, where, unobserved, they took notes of the several speeches. These notes were afterwards arranged and expanded by Guthrie, the historian, then in the employment of Cave, and presented to the public, monthly, in the Gentleman's Magazine. They first appeared in July, 1736 [Footnote: Gent. Mag. vol. vi.], and were perused with the greatest eagerness. But it was soon intimated to Cave, that the speaker was offended with this freedom, which he regarded in the light of a breach of privilege, and would subject Cave, unless he desisted, to parliamentary censure, or perhaps punishment. To escape this, and likewise to avoid an abridgment of his magazine, Cave had recourse to the following artifice. He opened his magazine for June, 1738, with an article entitled, "Debates in the senate of Magna Lilliputia;" in which he artfully deplores the prohibition that forbids him to present his readers with the consultations of their own representatives, and expresses a hope that they will accept, as a substitute, those of that country which Gulliver had so lately rendered illustrious, and which untimely death had prevented that enterprising traveller from publishing himself. Under this fiction he continued to publish the debates of the British parliament, hiding the names of persons and places by the transposition of letters, in the way of anagram. These he contrived to explain to his readers, by annexing to his volume for 1738, feigned proposals for printing a work, to be called Anagrammata Rediviva. This list, and others from different years, we give in the present edition, though we have rejected the barbarous jargon from the speeches themselves. A contemporary publication, the LONDON MAGAZINE, feigned to give the debates of the Roman senate, and adapted Roman titles to the several speakers. This expedient, as well as Cave's contrivance, sufficed to protect its ingenious authors from parliamentary resentment; as the resolution of the commons was never enforced.

The debates contained in the following volumes, commence with the 19th November, 1740, and terminate with the 23d February, 1742-3. The animated attempts that were made to remove sir Robert Walpole from administration, seemed, in Cave's opinion, to call for an abler reporter than Guthrie. Johnson was selected for the task; and his execution of it may well justify the admiration which we have so often avowed for those wonderful powers of mind, which, apparently, bade defiance to all impediments of external fortune.

He was only thirty-two years of age, little acquainted with the world; had never, perhaps, been in either house, and certainly had never conversed with the men whose style and sentiments he took upon himself to imitate. But so well and skilfully did he assume, not merely the sedate and stately dignity of the lords, and the undaunted freedom of the commons, but also the tone of the respective parties, that the public imagined they recognised the individual manner of the different speakers. Voltaire, and other foreigners of distinction, compared British with Greek and Roman eloquence; and ludicrous instances are detailed by Johnson's biographers, of praises awarded to Pulteney or to Pitt, in the presence of the unsuspected author of the orations which had excited such regard [Footnote: See Boswell, and sir John Hawkins.]! For Johnson confessed, that he composed many of the speeches entirely from his own imagination, and all of them from very scanty materials.

This confession he undoubtedly made from his love of truth, and not for the gratification of vanity. When he heard that Smollett was preparing his History of England, he warned him against relying on the debates as authentic; and, on his death-bed, he professed that the recollection of having been engaged in an imposture was painful to him. That this was a refined scrupulosity the most rigid moralist must allow; but, nevertheless, it is matter for congratulation, that the liberality of parliament no longer subjects its reporters to the subterfuges which we have thus briefly attempted to describe. And a comparison of this age and its privileges with the restrictions of former times, may not be without its use, if, by reminding us that we were not always free, it teaches us political contentment, suggests to us the policy of moderation, and enables us to love liberty, and yet be wise.

OXFORD, NOVEMBER, 1825.

The List of fictitious Terms used by Cave to disguise the real Names that occur in his Debates.

The List of fictitious Characters used by Cave to disguise the Places that occur in his Debates.

The List of fictitious Characters used by Cave to disguise the Names of Things that occur in his Debates.

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REFERENCES TO THE SPEAKERS

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DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 19, 1740.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATE, WITH REGARD TO THE BILL
FOR PROHIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF CORN, ETC.

On the first day of the session, his majesty, in his speech from the throne, recommended to parliament to consider of some good law to prevent the growing mischief of the exportation of corn to foreign countries.

On the fourth day, a bill for preventing, for a limited time, the exportation, etc, was read a first time in the house of commons, and the question put, whether it should be printed, which passed in the negative.

This day the agent for the colonies of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, presented a petition against the said corn bill, which was referred to the committee.

Another petition was also presented by the agent for the colony of Connecticut, in New England, setting forth that the chief trade of that colony arose from supplying other British colonies with corn, so that unless that colony be excepted from the restraints intended by this bill, both that and those which are supplied by it will be reduced to great distress, and praying, therefore, that such exception may be allowed.

The allegations in this petition were confirmed by another, from one of the provinces supplied by the colony of Connecticut.

Another petition was presented by the agent for South Carolina, setting forth, that unless the rice produced in that province were allowed to be exported, the colony must be ruined by the irretrievable loss of their whole trade, as the countries now supplied from thence might easily procure rice from the French settlements, already too much their rivals in trade.

This petition was supported by another, offered at the same time by the merchants of Bristol.

A petition was likewise presented by the agent for the sugar islands, in which it was alleged, that if no provisions be imported thither from Britain, they must, in one month, suffer the extremities of famine.

All these petitions were referred to the committee for the bill.

A printed paper was also delivered to the members, entitled, 'considerations on the embargo,' which enumerated many dangerous consequences likely to be produced by an embargo on provisions, and suggested that it was no better than a wicked scheme for private profit, with other reflections, for which the paper was deemed a libel, and the author committed to prison.

The bill being read in the committee, produced the following memorable debate.

Mr. PULTNEY spoke to this effect:—Sir, after all the attention which has been bestowed upon the bill now before us, I cannot yet conceive it such as can benefit the nation, or such as will not produce far greater inconveniencies than those which it is intended to obviate, and therefore, as those inconveniencies may be prevented by other means, I cannot but declare that I am far from approving it.

Our ancestors, sir, have always thought it the great business of this house to watch against the encroachments of the prerogative, and to prevent an increase of the power of the minister; and the commons have always been considered as more faithful to their trust, and more properly the representatives of the people, in proportion as they have considered this great end with more attention, and prosecuted it with more invariable resolution. If we inquire into the different degrees of reputation, which the several assemblies of commons have obtained, and consider why some are remembered with reverence and gratitude, and others never mentioned but with detestation and contempt, we shall always find that their conduct, with regard to this single point, has produced their renown or their infamy. Those are always, by the general suffrage of mankind, applauded as the patterns of their country, who have struggled with the influence of the crown, and those condemned as traitors, who have either promoted it by unreasonable grants, or seen it increase by slow degrees, without resistance.

It has not, indeed, sir, been always the practice of ministers to make open demands of larger powers, and avow, without disguise, their designs of extending their authority; such proposals would, in former times, have produced no consequences but that of awakening the vigilance of the senate, of raising suspicions against all their proceedings, and of embarrassing the crown with petitions, addresses, and impeachments.

They were under a necessity, in those times, of promoting their schemes; those schemes which scarcely any ministry has forborne to adopt, by more secret and artful and silent methods, by methods of diverting the attention of the publick to other objects, and of making invisible approaches to the point in view, while they seemed to direct all their endeavours to different purposes.

But such, sir, have been the proofs of implicit confidence, which the administration has received from this assembly, that it is now common to demand unlimited powers, and to expect confidence without restriction, to require an immediate possession of our estates by a vote of credit, or the sole direction of our trade by an act for prohibiting, during their pleasure, the exportation of the produce of our lands.

Upon what instances of uncommon merit, of regard to the publick prosperity, unknown in former times, or of discernment superior to that of their most celebrated predecessors, the present ministers found their new claims to submission and to trust, I am, indeed, at a loss to discover; for, however mankind may have determined concerning the integrity of those by whom the late memorable convention was transacted, defended, and confirmed, I know not that their wisdom has yet appeared by any incontestable or manifest evidence, which may set their abilities above question, and fix their reputation for policy out of the reach of censure and inquiries.

The only act, sir, by which it can be discovered that they have any degree of penetration proportionate to their employments, is the embargo lately laid upon provisions in Ireland, by which our enemies have been timely hindered from furnishing themselves, from our dominions, with necessaries for their armies and their navies, and our fellow-subjects have been restrained from exposing themselves to the miseries of famine, by yielding to the temptation of present profit; a temptation generally so powerful as to prevail over any distant interest.

But as nothing is more contrary to my natural disposition, or more unworthy of a member of this house, than flattery, I cannot affirm that I ascribe this useful expedient wholly to the sagacity or the caution of the ministry, nor can I attribute all the happy effects produced by it to their benign solicitude for the publick welfare.

I am inclined to believe that this step was advised by those who were prompted to consider its importance by motives more prevalent than that of publick spirit, and that the desire of profit which has so often dictated pernicious measures, has, for once, produced, in return, an expedient just and beneficial; and it has, for once, luckily fallen out, that some of the friends of the administration have discovered that the publick interest was combined with their own.

It is highly probable, sir, that the contractors for supplying the navy with provisions, considering, with that acuteness which a quick sense of loss and gain always produces, how much the price of victuals would be raised by exportation, and, by consequence, how much of the advantage of their contracts would be diminished, suggested to the ministry the necessity of an embargo, and laid before them those arguments which their own observation and wisdom would never have discovered.

Thus, sir, the ministers, in that instance of their conduct, on which their political reputation must be founded, can claim, perhaps, no higher merit, than that of attending to superiour knowledge, of complying with good advice when it was offered, and of not resisting demonstration when it was laid before them.

But as I would never ascribe to one man the merit of another, I should be equally unwilling to detract from due commendations, and shall therefore freely admit, that not to reject good counsel, is a degree of wisdom, at which I could not expect that they by whom the convention was concluded would ever have arrived.

But whatever proficiency they may have made in the art of government since that celebrated period, however they may have increased their maxims of domestick policy, or improved their knowledge of foreign affairs, I cannot but confess myself still inclined to some degree of suspicion, nor can prevail upon myself to shut my eyes, and deliver up the publick and myself implicitly to their direction.

Their sagacity, sir, may, perhaps, of late, have received some improvements from longer experience, and with regard to their integrity, I believe, at least, that it is not much diminished; and yet I cannot forbear asserting the right of judging for myself, and of determining according to the evidence that shall be brought before me.

I have, hitherto, entertained an opinion that for this purpose only we are deputed by our constituents, who, if they had reposed no confidence in our care or abilities, would have given up, long since, the vexatious right of contesting for the choice of representatives. They would have furnished the ministry with general powers to act for them, and sat at ease with no other regard to publick measures, than might incite them to animate, with their applauses, the laudable endeavours of their profound, their diligent, and their magnanimous governours.

As I do not, therefore, check any suspicions in my own mind, I shall not easily be restrained from uttering them, because I know not how I shall benefit my country, or assist her counsels by silent meditations. I cannot, sir, but observe that the powers conferred by this bill upon the administration are larger than the nation can safely repose in any body of men, and with which no man who considers to what purposes they may be employed will think it convenient to invest the negotiators of the convention.

Nor do my objections to this act, arise wholly from my apprehensions of their conduct, who are intrusted with the execution of it, but from my reflections on the nature of trade, and the conduct of those nations who are most celebrated for commercial wisdom.

It is well known, sir, how difficult it is to turn trade back into its ancient channel, when it has by any means been diverted from it, and how often a profitable traffick has been lost for ever, by a short interruption, or temporary prohibition. The resentment of disappointed expectations inclines the buyer to seek another market, and the civility to which his new correspondents are incited by their own interest, detains him, till those by whom he was formerly supplied, having no longer any vent for their products or their wares, employ their labours on other manufactures, or cultivate their lands for other purposes.

Thus, sir, if those nations who have hitherto been supplied with corn from Britain, should find a method of purchasing it from Denmark, or any other of the northern regions, we may hereafter see our grain rotting in our storehouses, and be burdened with provisions which we can neither consume ourselves, nor sell to our neighbours.

The Hollanders, whose knowledge of the importance or skill in the arts of commerce will not be questioned, are so careful to preserve the inlets of gain from obstruction, that they make no scruple of supplying their enemies with their commodities, and have been known to sell at night those bullets which were next day to be discharged against them.

Whether their example, sir, deserves our imitation I am not able to determine, but it ought at least to be considered, whether their conduct was rational or not, and whether they did not, by a present evil, ensure an advantage which overbalanced it.

There are, doubtless, sir, sometimes such exigencies as require to be complied with at the hazard of future profit, but I am not certain that the scarcity which is feared or felt at present, is to be numbered amongst them; but, however formidable it may be thought, there is surely no need of a new law to provide against it: for it is one of those extraordinary incidents, on which the king has the right of exerting extraordinary powers. On occasions like this the prerogative has heretofore operated very effectually, and I know not that the law has ever restrained it.

It is, therefore, sir, in my opinion, most prudent to determine nothing in so dubious a question, and rather to act as the immediate occasion shall require, than prosecute any certain method of proceeding, or establish any precedent by an act of the senate.

To restrain that commerce by which the necessaries of life are distributed is a very bold experiment, and such as once produced an insurrection in the empire of the Turks, that terminated in the deposition of one of their monarchs.

I therefore willingly confess, sir, that I know not how to conclude: I am unwilling to deprive the nation of bread, or to supply our enemies with strength to be exerted against ourselves; but I am, on the other hand, afraid to restrain commerce, and to trust the authors of the convention.

Mr. PELHAM spoke next, to the following purport:—Sir, I am always in expectation of improvement and instruction when that gentleman engages in any discussion of national questions, on which he is equally qualified to judge by his great abilities and long experience, by that popularity which enables him to sound the sentiments of men of different interests, and that intelligence which extends his views to distant parts of the world; but, on this occasion, I have found my expectations frustrated, for he has inquired without making any discovery, and harangued without illustrating the question before us.

He has satisfied himself, sir, with declaring his suspicions, without condescending to tell us what designs or what dangers he apprehends. To fear, without being able to show the object of our terrours, is the last, the most despicable degree of cowardice; and to suspect, without knowing the foundation of our own suspicions, is surely a proof of a state of mind, which would not be applauded on common occasions, and such as no man but a patriot would venture to confess.

He has, indeed, sir, uttered some very ingenious conceits upon the late convention, has alluded to it with great luxuriancy of fancy, and elegance of diction, and must, at least, confess that whatever may be its effects upon the interest of the nation, it has to him been very beneficial, as it has supplied him with a subject of raillery when other topics began to fail him, and given opportunity for the exercise of that wit which began to languish, for want of employment.

What connexion his wonderful sagacity has discovered between the convention and the corn bill, I cannot yet fully comprehend, but have too high an opinion of his abilities to imagine that so many insinuations are wholly without any reason to support them. I doubt not, therefore, sir, but that when some fitter opportunity shall present itself he will clear their resemblance, and branch out the parallel between them into a thousand particulars.

In the mean time, sir, it may be proper for the house to expedite the bill, against which no argument has yet been produced, and which is of too much importance to be delayed by raillery or invectives.

Mr. SANDYS spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, the bill before us, as it is of too great importance to be negligently delayed, is likewise too dangerous to be precipitately hurried into a law.

It has been always the practice of this house to consider money bills with particular attention, because money is power in almost the highest degree, and ought not, therefore, to be given but upon strong assurances that it will be employed for the purposes for which it is demanded, and that those purposes are in themselves just.

But if we consider, sir, the bill now before us, it will appear yet more than a money bill, it will be found a bill for regulating the disposal of that, which it is the great use of money to procure, and is, therefore, not to be passed into a law without a close attention to every circumstance that may be combined with it, and an accurate examination of all the consequences that may be produced by it.

Some of these circumstances or consequences, it is the duty of every member to lay before the house, and I shall, therefore, propose that the inducements to the discovery of any provisions illegally exported, and the manner of levying the forfeiture, may be particularly discussed; for by a defect in this part, the regulation lately established by the regency, however seasonable, produced tumults and distractions, which every good government ought studiously to obviate.

By their proclamation, sir, half the corn that should be found designed for exportation was to be given to those who should discover and seize it. The populace, alarmed at once with the danger of a famine, and animated by a proclamation that put into their own hands the means of preventing it, and the punishment of those from whose avarice they apprehended it, rose in throngs to execute so grateful a law. Every man, sir, whose distress had exasperated him, was incited to gratify his resentment; every man, whose idleness prompted him to maintain his family by methods more easy than that of daily labour, was delighted with the prospect of growing rich on a sudden by a lucky seizure. All the seditious and the profligate combined together in the welcome employment of violence and rapine, and when they had once raised their expectations, there was no small danger lest their impatience of disappointment should determine them to conclude, that corn, wherever found, was designed for exportation, and to seize it as a lawful prize.

Thus, sir, by an imprudent regulation, was every man's property brought into hazard, and his person exposed to the insults of a hungry, a rapacious, and ungovernable rabble, let loose by a publick proclamation, and encouraged to search houses and carriages by an imaginary law.

That we may not give occasion to violence and injustice of the same kind, let us carefully consider the measures which are proposed, before we determine upon their propriety, and pass no bill on this important occasion without such deliberation as may leave us nothing to change or to repent.

Mr. EARLE spoke next to this effect:—Sir, notwithstanding the dangers which have been represented as likely to arise from any errour in the prosecution of this great affair, I cannot but declare my opinion, that no delay ought to be admitted, and that not even the specious pretence of more exact inquiries, and minute considerations, ought to retard our proceedings for a day.

My imagination, sir, is, perhaps, not so fruitful as that of some other members of this house, and, therefore, they may discover many inconveniencies which I am not able to conceive. But, as every man ought to act from his own conviction, it is my duty to urge the necessity of passing this bill, till it can be proved to me, that it will produce calamities equally to be dreaded with the consequences of protracting our debates upon it, equal to the miseries of a famine, or the danger of enabling our enemies to store their magazines, to equip their fleets, and victual their garrisons.

If it could be imagined, that there was in this assembly a subject of France or Spain, zealous for the service of his prince, and the prosperity of his country, I should expect that he would summon all his faculties to retard the progress of this bill, that he would employ all his sophistry to show its inconveniency and imperfections, and exhaust his invention to suggest the dangers of haste; and certainly he could do nothing that would more effectually promote the interest of his countrymen, or tend more to enfeeble and depress the power of the British nation.

If this would naturally be the conduct of an enemy, it is unnecessary to prove that we can only be safe by acting in opposition to it, and I think it superfluous to vindicate my ardour for promoting this bill, when it is evident that its delay would be pleasing to the Spaniards.

Mr. BURREL then spoke as follows:—Sir, if this law be necessary at any time, it cannot now be delayed, for a few days spent in deliberation, may make it ineffectual, and that evil may be past of which we sit here contriving the prevention.

That many contracts, sir, for the exportation of provisions are already made in all the maritime parts of the empire, is generally known; and it requires no great sagacity to discover that those by whom they are made, and made with a view of immense profit, are desirous that they may be executed; and that they will soon complete the execution of them, when they are alarmed with the apprehension of a bill, which, in a few days, may take from them the power of exporting what they have already collected, and snatch their gain from them when it is almost in their hands.

A bill for these purposes, sir, ought to fall upon the contractors like a sudden blow, of which they have no warning or dread; against which they, therefore, cannot provide any security, and which they can neither elude nor resist.

If we allow them a short time, our expedients will be of little benefit to the nation, which is every day impoverished by the exportation of the necessaries of life, in such quantities, that in a few weeks the law, if it be passed, may be without penalties, for there will be no possibility of disobeying it.

Sir John BARNARD spoke next, to the following purpose:—Sir, I cannot discover the necessity of pressing the bill with such precipitation, as must necessarily exclude many useful considerations, and may produce errours extremely dangerous; for I am not able to conceive what inconveniencies can arise from a short delay.

The exportation of provisions from Ireland is at present stopped by the proclamation; and the beef which was designed for other nations, has been prudently bought up by the contractors, by which those murmurs have been in a great measure obviated which naturally arise from disappointments and losses.

There is, therefore, sir, no danger of exportations from that part of our dominions, which is the chief market for provisions, and from whence our enemies have been generally supplied: in Britain there is less danger of any such pernicious traffick, both because the scarcity here has raised all provisions to a high price, and because merchants do not immediately come to a new market.

The bill, at least, ought not to be passed without regard to the general welfare of our fellow-subjects, nor without an attentive consideration of those petitions which have been presented to us; petitions not produced by panic apprehensions of imaginary dangers, or distant prospects of inconveniencies barely possible, but by the certain foresight of immediate calamities, the total destruction of trade, and the sudden desolation of flourishing provinces.

By prohibiting the exportation of rice, we shall, sir, in one year, reduce the colony of South Carolina below the possibility of subsisting; the chief product of that country, the product which induced us originally to plant it, and with which all its trade is carried on, is rice. With rice the inhabitants of that province purchase all the other necessaries of life, and among them the manufactures of our own country. This rice is carried by our merchants to other parts of Europe, and sold again for large profit.

That this trade is very important appears from the number of ships which it employs, and which, without lading, must rot in the harbours, if rice be not excepted from the general prohibition. Without this exception, sir, it is not easy to say what numbers, whose stations appear very different, and whose employments have no visible relation to each other, will be at once involved in calamity, reduced to sudden distress, and obliged to seek new methods of supporting their families. The sailor, the merchant, the shipwright, the manufacturer, with all the subordinations of employment that depend upon them, all that supply them with materials, or receive advantage from their labours, almost all the subjects of the British crown, must suffer, at least, in some degree, by the ruin of Carolina.

Nor ought the danger of the sugar islands, and other provinces, less to alarm our apprehensions, excite our compassion, or employ our consideration, since nothing is more evident than that by passing this bill without the exceptions which their petitions propose, we shall reduce one part of our colonies to the want of bread, and confine the other to live on nothing else; for they subsist by the exchange of those products to which the soil of each country is peculiarly adapted: one province affords no corn, and the other supplies its inhabitants with corn only.

The necessity of expediting this bill, however it has been exaggerated, is not so urgent but that we may be allowed time sufficient to consider for what purpose it is to be passed, and to recollect that nothing is designed by it, but to hinder our enemies from being supplied from the British dominions with provisions, by which they might be enabled more powerfully to carry on the war against us.

To this design no objection has been made, but it is well known, that a good end may be defeated by an absurd choice of means, and I am not able to discover how we shall increase our own strength, or diminish that of our enemies, by compelling one part of our fellow-subjects to starve the other.

It is necessary, sir, to prohibit the exportation of corn to the ports of our enemies, and of those nations by which our enemies will be supplied, but surely it is of no use to exclude any part of our own dominions from the privilege of being supplied from another. Nor can any argument be alleged in defence of such a law, that will not prove with equal force, that corn ought to remain in the same granaries where it is now laid, that all the markets in this kingdom should be suspended, and that no man should be allowed to sell bread to another.

There is, indeed, sir, a possibility that the liberty for which I contend, may be used to wicked purposes, and that some men may be incited by poverty or avarice to carry the enemy those provisions, which they pretend to export to British provinces. But if we are to refuse every power that may be employed to bad purposes, we must lay all mankind in dungeons, and divest human nature of all its rights; for every man that has the power of action, may sometimes act ill.

It is, however, prudent to obstruct criminal attempts even when we cannot hope entirely to defeat them, and, therefore, I am of opinion, that no provisions ought to be exported without some method of security, by which the governours of every place may be assured that they will be conveyed to our own colonies. Such securities will easily be contrived, and may be regulated in a manner that they shall not be defeated without such hazard, as the profit that can be expected from illegal commerce, will not be able to compensate.

It is, therefore, sir, proper to delay the bill so long, at least, as that we may produce by it the ends intended, and distress our enemies more than ourselves; that we may secure plenty at home, without the destruction of our distant colonies, and without obliging part of our fellow-subjects to desert to the Spaniards for want of bread.

Mr. BOWLES spoke in this manner:—Sir, the necessity of excepting rice from the general prohibition, is not only sufficiently evinced by the agent of South Carolina, but confirmed beyond controversy or doubt, by the petition of the merchants of Bristol, of which the justice and reasonableness appears at the first view, to every man acquainted with the nature of commerce.

How much the province of South Carolina will be distressed by this prohibition, how suddenly the whole trade of that country will be at a stand, and how immediately the want of many of the necessaries of life will be felt over a very considerable part of the British dominions, has already, sir, been very pathetically represented, and very clearly explained; nor does there need any other argument to persuade us to allow the exportation of rice.

But, from the petition of the merchants of Bristol, it appears that there are other reasons of equal force for this indulgence, and that our regard for the inhabitants of that particular province, however necessary and just, is not the only motive for complying with their request.

It is shown, sir, in this petition, that the prohibition of rice will very little incommode our enemies, or retard their preparations; for they are not accustomed to be supplied with it from our plantations. We ought, therefore, not to load our fellow-subjects with embarrassments and inconveniencies, which will not in any degree extend to our enemies.

It appears, sir, not only that a very important part of our commerce will be obstructed, but that it will, probably, be lost beyond recovery; for, as only a small quantity of the rice of Carolina is consumed at home, and the rest is carried to other countries, it is easy to conceive that those who shall be disappointed by our merchants will procure so necessary a commodity from other places, as there are many from which it may be easily purchased; and it is well known that trade, if it be once diverted, is not to be recalled, and, therefore, that trade which may be without difficulty transferred, ought never to be interrupted without the most urgent necessity.

To prove, sir, that there is now no such necessity, by a long train of arguments, would be superfluous, for it has been shown already, that our enemies will not suffer by the prohibition, and the miseries that inevitably arise from a state of war, are too numerous and oppressive, to admit of any increase or aggravation upon trivial motives.

The province of Carolina, sir, has already suffered the inconveniencies of this war beyond any other part of his majesty's dominions, as it is situate upon the borders of the Spanish dominions, and as it is weak by the paucity of the inhabitants in proportion to its extent; let us, therefore, pay a particular regard to this petition, lest we aggravate the terrour which the neighbourhood of a powerful enemy naturally produces, by the severer miseries of poverty and famine.

Sir Robert WALPOLE spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, nothing is more absurd than for those who declare, on all occasions, with great solemnity, their sincere zeal for the service of the publick, to protract the debates of this house by personal invectives, and delay the prosecution of the business of the nation, by trivial objections, repeated after confutation, and, perhaps, after conviction of their invalidity.

I need not observe how much time would be spared, and how much the despatch of affairs would be facilitated by the suppression of this practice, a practice by which truth is levelled with falsehood, and knowledge with ignorance; since, if scurrility and merriment are to determine us, it is not necessary either to be honest or wise to obtain the superiority in any debate, it will only be necessary to rail and to laugh, which one man may generally perform with as much success as another.

The embargo in Ireland was an expedient so necessary and timely, that the reputation of it is thought too great to be allowed to the administration, of whom it has been for many years the hard fate, to hear their actions censured only because they were not the actions of others, and to be represented as traitors to their country for doing always what they thought best themselves, and perhaps sometimes what was in reality approved by those who opposed them.

This, sir, they have borne without much uneasiness, and have contented themselves with the consciousness of doing right, in expectation that truth and integrity must at last prevail, and that the prudence of their conduct and success of their measures would at last evince the justice of their intentions.

They hoped, sir, that there would be some occasions on which their enemies would not deny the expedience of their counsels, and did not expect that after having been so long accused of engrossing exorbitant power, of rejecting advice, and pursuing their own schemes with the most invincible obstinacy, they should be supposed on a sudden to have laid aside their arrogance, to have descended to adopt the opinions, and give themselves up to the direction of others, only because no objection could be made to this instance of their conduct.

How unhappy, sir, must be the state of that man who is only allowed to be a free agent, when he acts wrong, and whose motions, whenever they tend to the proper point, are supposed to be regulated by another!

Whether such capricious censurers expect that any regard should be paid by the publick to their invectives, I am not able to determine, but I am inclined to think so well of their understandings, as to believe that they intend only to amuse themselves, and perplex those whom they profess to oppose. In one part of their scheme I know not but they may have succeeded, but in the other it is evident how generally they have failed. It must, at least, sir, be observed of these great patrons of the people, that if they expect to gain them by artifices like this, they have no high opinion of their discernment, however they may sometimes magnify it as the last appeal, and highest tribunal.

With regard, sir, to the manner in which the embargo was laid, and the expedients made use of to enforce the observation of it, they were not the effects of a sudden resolution, but of long and deliberate reflection, assisted by the counsels of the most experienced and judicious persons of both nations; so that if any mistake was committed, it proceeded not from arrogance or carelessness, but a compliance with reasons, that if laid before the house, would, whether just or not, be allowed to be specious.

But, sir, it has not appeared that any improper measures have been pursued, or that any inconveniencies have arisen from them which it was possible to have avoided by a different conduct; for when any expedient fails of producing the end for which it was proposed, or gives occasion to inconveniencies which were neither expected nor designed, it is not immediately to be condemned; for it might fail from such obstacles as nothing could surmount, and the inconveniencies which are complained of might be the consequences of other causes acting at the same time, or cooperating, not by the nature of things, but by the practices of those who prefer their own interest to that of their country.

But though it is, in my opinion, easy to defend the conduct of the ministry, I am far from thinking this a proper time to engage in their vindication. The important business before us, must now wholly engage us, nor ought we to employ our attention upon the past, but the future. Whatever has been the ignorance or knowledge, whatever the corruption or integrity of the ministry, this bill is equally useful, equally necessary. The question is now concerning an act of the senate, not of the ministry, and the bill may proceed without obstructing future examinations.

If the bill, sir, now before us be so far approved as to be conceived of any real benefit to the nation, if it can at all contribute to the distress or disappointment of our enemies, or the prevention of those domestic disturbances which are naturally produced by scarcity and misery, there is no need of arguments to evince the necessity of despatch in passing it. For if these effects are to be produced by preventing the exportation of provisions, and a law is necessary for that purpose, it is certain that the law must be enacted, while our provisions are yet in our own hands, and before time has been given for the execution of those contracts which are already made.

That contracts, sir, are entered into for quantities that justly claim the care of the legislative power, I have been informed by such intelligence as I cannot suspect of deceiving me. In one small town in the western part of this kingdom, fifty thousand barrels of corn are sold by contract, and will be exported, if time be allowed for collecting and for shipping them.

A few contracts like this will be sufficient to store an army with bread, or to furnish garrisons against the danger of a siege; a few contracts like this will produce a considerable change in the price of provisions, and plunge innumerable families into distress, who might struggle through the present difficulties, which unsuccessful harvests have brought upon the nation, had we not sold the gifts of providence for petty gain, and supported our enemies with those provisions which were barely sufficient for our own consumption.

I have not heard many objections made against the intention of the bill, and those which were offered, were mentioned with such diffidence and uncertainty, as plainly showed, that even in the opinion of him that proposed them, they were of little weight; and I believe they had no greater effect upon those that heard them. It may, therefore, be reasonably supposed that the propriety of a law to prevent the exportation of victuals is admitted, and surely it can be no question, whether it ought to be pressed forward, or to be delayed till it will be of no effect.

Mr. FAZAKERLY spoke next, to this effect:—Sir, as the bill now under our consideration is entangled with a multitude of circumstances too important to be passed by without consideration, and too numerous to be speedily examined; as its effects, whether salutary or pernicious, must extend to many nations, and be felt in a few weeks to the remotest parts of the dominions of Britain, I cannot but think, that they who so much press for expedition on this occasion, consult rather their passions than their reason, that they discover rather enthusiasm than zeal, and that by imagining that they have already traced the effects of a law like this to their utmost extent, they discover rather an immoderate confidence in their own capacity than give any proofs of that anxious caution, and deliberate prudence, which true patriotism generally produces.

There is another method, sir, of proceeding, more proper on this occasion, which has been already pointed out in this debate; a method of exerting the prerogative in a manner allowed by law, and established by immemorial precedents, and which may, therefore, be revived without affording any room for jealousy or complaints.

An embargo imposed only by the prerogative may be relaxed or enforced as occasion may require, or regulated according to the necessity arising from particular circumstances; circumstances in themselves variable, and subject to the influence of a thousand accidents, and which, therefore, cannot be always foreseen, or provided against by a law positive and fixed.

Let us not subject the commonwealth to a hazardous and uncertain security, while we have in our hands the means of producing the same end, with less danger and inconveniency; and since we may obviate the exportation of our corn by methods more speedily efficacious than the forms of making laws can allow, let us not oppress our fellow-subjects by hasty or imprudent measures, but make use of temporary expedients, while we deliberate upon the establishment of a more lasting regulation.

Mr. CAMPBELL spoke to the following purpose;—Sir, that an embargo on merchandise or provisions may, upon sudden emergencies, or important occasions, be imposed by the prerogative, cannot be doubted by any man whose studies have made him acquainted with the extent of the regal power, and the manner in which it has been exerted in all ages. The chief use of the prerogative is to supply the defects of the laws, in cases which do not admit of long consultations, which do not allow time to convoke senates or inquire into the sentiments of the people.

For this reason, in times of war the imperial power is much enlarged, and has still a greater extent as exigencies are more pressing. If the nation is invaded by a foreign force, the authority of the crown is almost without limits, the whole nation is considered as an army of which the king is general, and which he then governs by martial laws, by occasional judicature, and extemporary decrees.

Such, sir, is the power of the king on particular emergencies, and such power the nature of human affairs must, sometimes, require; for all forms of government are intended for common good, and calculated for the established condition of mankind, but must be suspended when they can only obstruct the purposes for which they were contrived, and must vary with the circumstances to which they were adapted. To expect that the people shall be consulted in questions on which their happiness depends, supposes there is an opportunity of consulting them without hazarding their lives, their freedom, or their possessions, by the forms of deliberation.

The necessity of extending the prerogative to the extremities of power, is, I hope, at a very great distance from us; but if the danger of the exportation of victuals be so urgent as some gentlemen have represented it, and so formidable as it appears to the whole nation, it is surely requisite that the latent powers of the crown should be called forth for our protection, that plenty be secured within the nation, by barring up our ports, and the people hindered from betraying themselves to their enemies, and squandering those blessings which the fertility of our soil has bestowed upon them.

Sir Robert WALPOLE replied in the following manner:—Sir, it is so unusual among the gentlemen who have opposed my opinion to recommend an exertion of the regal authority, or willingly to intrust any power to the administration, that, though they have on this occasion expressed their sentiments without any ambiguity of language, or perplexity of ideas, I am in doubt whether I do not mistake their meaning, and cannot, without hesitation and uncertainty, propose the motion to which all their arguments seem necessarily to conduct me; arguments of which I do not deny the force, and which I shall not attempt to invalidate by slight objections, when I am convinced, in general, of their reasonableness and truth.

The necessity of that despatch which I have endeavoured to recommend, is not only universally admitted, but affirmed to be so pressing, that it cannot wait for the solemnity of debates, or the common forms of passing laws. The danger which is every moment increasing, requires, in the opinion of these gentlemen, to be obviated by extraordinary measures, and that pernicious commerce, which threatens the distress of the community, is to be restrained by an immediate act of the prerogative.

If this be the opinion of the house, it will be necessary to lay it before his majesty, by a regular address, that the nation may be convinced of the necessity of such extraordinary precautions, and that the embargo may be imposed, at once, with the expedition peculiar to despotick power, and the authority which can be conferred only by senatorial sanctions.

Whether this is the intention of the members, from whose declarations I have deduced it, can only be discovered by themselves, who, if they have any other scheme in view, must explain it in clearer terms, that the house may deliberate upon it, and reject or adopt it, according to its conformity to the laws of our country, and to the present state of our affairs.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke thus:—Sir, whatever may be the meaning of other gentlemen, who must undoubtedly be left at full liberty to explain their own expressions, I will freely declare, that I am sufficiently understood by the right honourable gentleman, and that, in my opinion, no remedy can be applied to the present distemper of the nation, a distemper by which it is hourly pining away, by which its vitals are impaired, and the necessary nourishment withdrawn from it, that will operate with sufficient efficacy and speed, except an embargo be imposed by the prerogative.

That this opinion, if received by the house, must be the subject of an address, is in itself manifest, and the reason for which an embargo is required, proves that an address ought not to be delayed.

I cannot omit this opportunity of remarking, how plainly it must now appear that many of us have been unjustly charged with obstructing the progress of the bill for pernicious purposes, with views of raising discontents in the nation, of exposing the administration to publick hatred, of obstructing the measures of the government, or hindering the success of the war, when we have receded from our general principles, and suspended the influence of our established maxims, for the sake of facilitating an expedient which may promote the general advantage, by recommending his majesty to the affections of his people.

Mr. PELHAM here replied, to this effect:—Sir, I am far from blaming any gentleman for asserting, on all occasions, the integrity of his designs, or displaying the reasonableness of his conduct; and of what I do not disapprove I shall not decline the imitation.

It is not uncommon, in the heat of opposition, while each man is convinced of his own honesty, and strongly persuaded of the truth of his own positions, to hear each party accused by the other of designs detrimental to the publick interest, of protracting debates by artful delays, of struggling against their own conviction, and of obscuring known truth by objections which discover themselves to be without force.

These accusations, which are on both sides frequent, are, I hope, on both sides generally false; at least, it must appear on this occasion, that those who press the bill had no views of strengthening their party by a victory, of wearying their opponents by obstinacy, or of promoting any private purposes by a new law; since an expedient, by which time may be gained, and the avowed end of hastening this necessary bill secured, is no sooner proposed on one part, than received on the other.

At the close of the debate, a form of an address was proposed by Mr. CLUTTERBUCK; which, being approved by the house, was presented to his majesty: and an embargo was laid on all provisions accordingly.

On the 17th day of sitting the house proceeded on the bill for preventing exportation; and ordered an account of the corn which had been exported for six years last past to be laid before the committee.

The house also addressed his majesty to take off the embargo on ships laden with fish or rice, which his majesty had before ordered to be done.

On the 21st the corn bill was again the subject of deliberation, and some amendments were offered by Mr. SANDYS, containing not only exceptions of rice and fish, which had been before admitted, but likewise of butter, as a perishable commodity, which, if it were not allowed to be exported, would corrupt and become useless in a short time.

He proposed, likewise, that the two islands of Jersey and Guernsey might continue to be supplied, with certain restrictions, from the port of Southampton.

It was proposed, likewise, in favour of some other colonies, that they might receive provisions from Britain, lest there should be a necessity for the inhabitants of those provinces to abandon their settlements.

The penalties of this law, and the manner in which they should be recovered and applied, were likewise settled on this day.

NOVEMBER 25, 1740.

The consideration of the corn bill was resumed; and it was particularly debated from what time it should commence, which some of the members were inclined to fix on the 9th day of the session, on which occasion Mr. CAMPBELL spoke as follows:

Sir, that the laws may be observed by the nation without daily violence and perpetual compulsion, that our determinations may be received with reverence, and the regulations which we establish confirmed by the concurrence of our constituents, it is necessary that we endeavour to preserve their esteem, and convince them that the publick prosperity may be safely trusted in our hands.

This confidence is to be gained as well in high stations, as in lower conditions, by large assemblies, as by individuals, only by a constant practice of justice, and frequent exertion of superiour wisdom. When any man finds his friend oppressive and malicious, he naturally withdraws his affections from him; when he observes him advancing absurd opinions, and adhering to them with obstinacy incapable of conviction, he falls unavoidably into a distrust of his understanding, and no longer pays any deference to his advice, or considers his conduct as worthy of imitation.

In the same manner, sir, if the legislative powers shall, in making laws, discover that they regard any motives before the advantage of their country, or that they pursue the publick good by measures inadequate and ill-concerted, what can be expected from the people, but that they should set up their own judgment in opposition to that of their governours, make themselves the arbiters in all doubtful questions, and obey or disregard the laws at discretion?

If this danger may arise from laws injudiciously drawn up, it may surely be apprehended from a compliance with this proposal; a proposal that the operation of the law should commence eleven days before the law itself is in being.

I have, hitherto, sir, regarded it as a principle equally true in politicks as in philosophy, that nothing can act when it does not exist; and I did not suspect that a position so evident would ever stand in need of a proof or illustration.

We live, indeed, in an age of paradoxes, and have heard several notions seriously defended, of which some would, not many years ago, have condemned their abetter to a prison or a madhouse, and would have been heard by the wisest of our ancestors with laughter or detestation; but I did not expect that the most hardy innovator would have shocked my understanding with a position like this, or have asserted that a law may operate before it is made, or before it is projected.

That where there is no law there is no transgression, is a maxim not only established by universal consent, but in itself evident and undeniable; and it is, sir, surely no less certain, that where there is no transgression there can be no punishment.

If a man may be punished, sir, by a law made after the fact, how can any man conclude himself secure from the jail or the gibbet? A man may easily find means of being certain that he has offended no law in being, but that will afford no great satisfaction to a mind naturally timorous; since a law hereafter to be made, may, if this motion be supposed reasonable, take cognizance of his actions, and how he can know whether he has been equally scrupulous to observe the future statutes of future senates, he will find it very difficult to determine.

Mr. PELHAM rose, and spoke thus:—Sir, notwithstanding the absurdity which the honourable gentleman imagines himself to have discovered in this proposal, and which he must be confessed to have placed in a very strong light, I am of opinion, that it may, with very little consideration, be reconciled to reason and to justice, and that the wit and satire that have been so liberally employed, will appear to have been lost in the air, without use and without injury.

The operation of the law may, very properly, commence from the day on which the embargo was laid by his majesty's proclamation, which surely was not issued to no purpose, and which ought not to be disobeyed without punishment.

Sir John BARNARD spoke next, to this effect:—Sir, I cannot but be somewhat surprised, that a gentleman so long conversant in national affairs, should not yet have heard or known the difference between a proclamation and a penal law.

By a proclamation, his majesty may prevent, in some cases, what he cannot punish; he may hinder the exportation of our corn by ordering ships to be stationed at the entrance of our harbours; but if any should escape with prohibited cargoes, he can inflict no penalties upon them at their return.

To enforce this prohibition by the sanction of punishments is the intention of the present bill, but a proclamation can make nothing criminal, and it is unjust and absurd to punish an action which was legal when it was done.

The law ought, sir, in my opinion, not to commence till time is allowed for dispersing it to the utmost limits of this island; for as it is unreasonable to punish without law, it is not more equitable to punish by a law, of which, they who have unhappily broken it, could have no intelligence.

A future day was agreed to.

[!-- H2 anchor --]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEC. 2, 1740.

DEBATE RELATING TO A SEDITIOUS PAPER OF THE SAME KIND
WITH THE CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EMBARGO ON PROVISIONS.

Lord THOMSON took notice of a paper which he had in his hand, and said he received it at the door, where it was given to the members as they came in, and, complaining of it as an indignity offered to the house, desired that it might be read. Which being done, he rose up, and spoke in substance as follows:

Sir, the crime of exasperating the people against their governours, of raising discontent, and exciting murmurs in a time of general danger, and of attempting to represent wise and salutary measures, which have received the approbation of the whole legislature, as mean artifices, contrived only to raise the fortunes of some favourites of the minister, and aggrandize the officers of state, by the miseries of the people, is a crime too enormous to require or admit any aggravation from rhetorick, and too dangerous to hope for any excuse from candour and lenity.

To read or hear this paper is sufficient for a full conviction of its pernicious tendency, and of the malice of its author; a charge not fixed upon particular expressions capable of a doubtful meaning, and which heat or inadvertency might casually have produced, but supported by the general design of the whole paper, and the continued tenour of the argument, which is evidently intended to show, that an act of government, which cannot but appear necessary and seasonable in the present state of our affairs, an act ratified by the concurrence of all the powers of the legislature, is nothing but a scheme of avarice to grow rich by oppression.

Nor is this scandalous libel written with more confidence and insolence than it is dispersed. Not content, sir, with vilifying the proceedings of the state, the author has industriously published his calumny at our door: the time has been when defamation skulked in secret, and calumnies against the government were dispersed by whispers or private communication; but this writer adds insults to his injuries, and at once reproaches and defies us.

I beg leave to move, therefore, that the house do censure this paper as "a malicious and scandalous libel, highly and injuriously reflecting upon a just and wise act of his majesty's government, and also upon the proceedings of both houses of senate; and tending to create jealousies in the minds of the people." I also move, "that the author may be ordered to attend, to be examined at our bar."

[This was unanimously agreed to by the house. The doorkeeper was called in, and, being shown the paper, was asked from whom he received it? who answered, that he believed the person who delivered it to him, was then detained in one of the committee rooms, upon which he was ordered to look for, and fetch him to the bar.]

Mr. SANDYS, taking notice that the person was already in custody, said, that he should be glad to know by what authority. It was not reasonable to punish first, and judge afterwards.

Upon which sir William YONGE replied, that he had caused him to be detained, in order to know the pleasure of the house; and that he thought it his duty to secure so enormous an offender from escaping.

Soon after, the doorkeeper brought the man in, when he declared, upon examination, his name and his profession, which was that of a scrivener, and owned with great openness, that he was the author of the paper. He was then asked who was the printer, and answered that he printed it himself. Which he explained afterwards, by saying, that as he had carried it to the printer's, he might be said, in the general acceptation of the term, as applied to an author, to be the printer. He then discovered the printer, and was asked, where was the original manuscript, which he said he had destroyed, as he did any other useless paper.

It having been observed by some of the members, that it was printed in one of the daily papers, he was asked, who carried it thither? and answered, that he carried it himself. It was then demanded, what he gave for having it inserted, and he answered that he gave nothing.

[After many questions, Mr. Henry ARCHER desired that he might be asked, whether on the Friday before he was in the gallery; at which some of the members expressed their disapprobation, and the man being ordered to withdraw, the following debate ensued upon the propriety of the question.]

Mr. SANDYS spoke first, in substance as follows:—Sir, those who are intrusted by their country with the authority of making laws, ought, undoubtedly, to observe them with the utmost circumspection, lest they should defeat their own endeavours, and invalidate, by their example, their own decrees.

There is no part, sir, of our civil constitution more sacred, none that has been more revered by those that have trampled upon other forms of justice, and wantoned in oppression without restraint, than that privilege by which every Briton is exempted from the necessity of accusing himself, and by which he is entitled to refuse an answer to any question which may be asked, with a view to draw from him a confession of an offence which cannot be proved.

Whether this great privilege, sir, is not violated; whether the unalienable right of a free subject is not infringed, by the question put to the person at our bar, the house must decide. The punishment to which intruders are subject by the orders of this house, proves that his presence in the house is considered as a crime, of which, as we have no proof of it, a confession ought not to be extorted by an artful and insidious question, of which he may not discover the intention or the consequence. Such treatment, sir, is rather to be expected by slaves in the inquisition of Spain, than a Briton at the bar of this house; a house instituted to preserve liberty, and to restrain injustice and oppression.

Mr. CAMPBELL spoke next, to this effect:—Sir, I cannot but concur with the opinion of the honourable gentleman, that, in requiring an answer to this question, we shall expose a man to a punishment against whom we have no evidence, but what is extorted from himself; and, consequently, no knowledge of his crime upon which we can proceed to inflict censures or penalties, without the manifest infraction of our constitution.

It cannot be imagined, sir, that he intends to confess himself guilty of a crime of which no proof has been brought, or that he will voluntarily subject himself to punishments. It must, therefore, follow, that he is entrapped in his examination, by an artifice, which, I hope, will never find any countenance in this house.

Mr. WINNINGTON answered to the following purpose:—Sir, it is not impossible that the honourable gentlemen, having not lately looked into the orders of the house, may mistake the tendency of the question; I, therefore, move that the order may be read.

[The order being read by the clerk, he proceeded.]

It is evident, sir, that by the order now read, the serjeant at arms attending on this house, may take into custody all strangers that shall be found in the house or gallery while we are assembled; and that this order is not always put in practice, must be attributed to the lenity of the house. But that this order extends to past offences, and subjects any man to imprisonment for having been present in some former day, cannot be conceived. For how far may such a retrospect be extended? or at what time, after having intruded into the house, can any man presume to consider himself as exempt from the danger of imprisonment?

Our order, sir, only decrees present punishment for present offences, and, therefore, the question asked by the honourable gentleman, may be insisted on without scruple, and answered without hazard. Let then the honourable gentlemen reserve their laudable zeal for our constitution till it shall be invaded by more important occasions.

Mr. SANDYS replied:—Sir, what victory the honourable gentleman imagines himself to have gained, or whence proceeds all his wantonness of exultation, I am not able to discover. The question only relates to the interpretation of one of our own orders, and is, therefore, not of the highest importance; nor can his success, in so trivial a debate, entitle him to great applause from others, or produce, in a person of his abilities, any uncommon satisfaction to himself.

But, whatever may be the pleasure of the victory, it must, at least, be gained before it can be celebrated; and it is by no means evident, that he has yet any reason to assure himself of conquest.

His interpretation, sir, of the order, which he has so confidently laid before the house, seems to me to have no foundation in reason or justice; for if it be an offence against the house to be present at our consultations, and that offence be justly punishable, why should any man be exempt from a just censure by an accidental escape? or what makes the difference between this crime and any other, that this alone must be immediately punished, or immediately obliterated, and that a lucky flight is equivalent to innocence?

It is surely, sir, more rational to believe, that the house may punish any breach of its orders at a distant time, that if our censure is once eluded, it may be afterwards enforced; and, therefore, that the question put to the person at the bar ought not to be asked, because it cannot safely be answered.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, in words to this effect:—Sir, I cannot but conceive that our order may extend its influence beyond the present moment, and that intrusions may be punished by the house on another day than that on which they were committed.

I am so far, sir, from being of opinion, that, to make the execution of this order valid, the house must sit, without interruption, from the time of the offence to that of the punishment, that if the gentlemen in the gallery were to be taken into custody, I should advise the serjeant to wait till the house should break up, and seize them as they should come out.

Sir William YONGE spoke next, in the manner following:—Sir, if any such punishment were now intended, I should advise the gentlemen in the gallery to retire, indeed, but not to hide themselves like felons, or men proscribed by proclamation; for as the power of seizing any man in the house is sufficient to secure us from intrusion, there is no reason to extend it farther; and penalties are not, without reason, to be inflicted, neither has the house ever coveted the power of oppressing; and what else is unnecessary punishment?

If, therefore, an intruder is not seized in the act of intrusion, he cannot legally be imprisoned for it. And any of the strangers, who now hear this debate, may retire to a very small distance from the house, and set the serjeant at arms at defiance.

Sir Robert WALPOLE then spoke to this effect:—Sir, whether the question be proper or not, it seems very unnecessary to debate; because, however it be answered, it cannot be of great importance: the man has already confessed himself the author of the libel, and may, therefore, be punished without farther examination.

That he is the real author, sir, I am not, indeed, convinced by his assertion, with whatever confidence it was made; for so far as his appearance enables me to judge of his education and sphere of life, it is not probable that he should be much versed in political inquiries, or that he should engage in the discussion of questions like this.

There appears, sir, in the paper before us, a more extensive knowledge of facts, a more accurate attention to commerce, more artful reasoning, and a more elevated style, than it is reasonable to expect from this man, whom, without pretending to determine the limits of his capacity, or the compass of his knowledge, I am, for my part, inclined to look upon as an agent to some other person of higher station, and greater accomplishments.

It is not uncommon, sir, for gentlemen to exercise their abilities, and employ their pens, upon political questions, and when they have produced any thing, which their complaisance for themselves equally hinders them from owning and suppressing, they are known to procure some person of inferiour rank, to take upon him, in publick, the character of the author, and to stand the danger of the prosecution, contenting themselves with the applause and admiration of their chosen friends, whom they trust with the important secret, and with whom they sit and laugh at the conjectures of the publick, and the ignorance of the ministry.

This, sir, is a frequent practice, not only with those who have no other employment, but, as I have sufficient reasons to believe, among some gentlemen who have seats in this house; gentlemen, whose abilities and knowledge qualify them to serve the publick in characters much superiour to that of lampooners of the government.

Mr. PULTENEY answered in terms to the following purpose:—Sir, whether the man who confessed himself the author of the paper, has accused himself of what he did not commit, or has ingenuously and openly discovered the truth, it is beyond my penetration absolutely to decide; the frankness and unconcern with which he made the declaration, gave it, at least, the appearance of truth, nor do I discover any reason for doubting his sincerity. Is there any improbability in the nature of the fact, that should incline us to suspect his veracity? Is there any apparent advantage to be gained by assuming a false character? Neither of those circumstances can be produced against him, and an assertion is to be admitted for its own sake, when there is nothing to invalidate it.

But the honourable gentleman, sir, appears to have a very particular reason for his doubts; a reason, which will, I hope, have no weight with any but himself. By denying the paper to this man, he gives room for conjecture and suspicion to range far and wide, and wanton with whatever characters he shall think proper subjects for his amusement. An author is now to be sought, and many diverting arguments may be brought by the dullest inquirer for fixing it upon one man, or denying it to another.

The honourable gentleman, sir, has given us a bold specimen of this kind of wit, by insinuating that it is the production of some one of the members of this house; a conjecture of which I am not able to find the foundation, and therefore imagine, that raillery rather than argument was intended. But let the honourable gentleman recollect, that the chief excellence of raillery is politeness, to which he has surely paid little regard, in supposing that what has been unanimously condemned as a libel, has one of those who censured it for its author.

If I am particularly hinted at in this sagacious conjecture, I take this opportunity of declaring that I am equally ignorant of the whole affair with any other gentleman in this house; that I never saw the paper till it was delivered to me at the door, nor the author till he appeared at the bar. Having thus cleared myself, sir, from this aspersion, I declare it as my opinion, that every gentleman in the house can safely purge himself in the same manner; for I cannot conceive that any of them can have written a libel like this. There are, indeed, some passages which would not disgrace the greatest abilities, and some maxims true in themselves, though perhaps fallaciously applied, and at least such an appearance of reasoning and knowledge, as sets the writer far above the level of the contemptible scribblers of the ministerial vindications: a herd of wretches whom neither information can enlighten, nor affluence elevate; low drudges of scurrility, whose scandal is harmless for want of wit, and whose opposition is only troublesome from the pertinaciousness of stupidity.

Why such immense sums are distributed amongst these reptiles, it is scarce possible not to inquire; for it cannot be imagined that those who pay them expect any support from their abilities. If their patrons would read their writings, their salaries would quickly be withdrawn; for a few pages would convince them, that they can neither attack nor defend, neither raise any man's reputation by their panegyrick, nor destroy it by their defamation.

Sir Robert WALPOLE then spoke in the following manner:—I hope it is not expected, that the heat with which one class of our political writers have been attacked by the honourable gentleman, should engage me to undertake their defence with the same earnestness. I have neither interest enough in the question to awaken my passions, nor curiosity or leisure sufficient for such an examination of the writings on each side, as is necessary, before the superiority of any author above his brethren can he justly asserted.

It is no part, sir, of my employment or amusement to compare their arguments, or to balance their abilities; nor do I often read the papers of either party, except when I am informed by some that have more inclination to such studies than myself, that they have risen by some accident above their common level.

Yet that I may not appear entirely to desert the question, I cannot forbear to say, that I have never, from these accidental inspections of their performances, discovered any reason to exalt the authors who write against the administration, to a higher degree of reputation than their opponents. That any of them deserve loud applauses, I cannot assert, and am afraid that all, which deserves to be preserved of the writings on either side, may be contracted to a very few volumes.

The writers for the opposition appear to me to be nothing more than the echoes of their predecessors, or, what is still more despicable, of themselves, and to have produced nothing in the last seven years, which had not been said seven years before.

I may, perhaps, be thought by some gentlemen of each class to speak contemptuously of their advocates, nor shall I think my own opinion less just for such a censure; for the reputation of controversial writers arises, generally, from the prepossession of their readers in favour of the opinions which they endeavour to defend. Men easily admit the force of an argument which tends to support notions, that it is their interest to diffuse, and readily find wit and spirit in a satire pointed at characters which they desire to depress: but to the opposite party, and even to themselves, when their passions have subsided, and their interest is disunited from the question, those arguments appear only loud assertions, or empty sophistry; and that which was clamorously praised, discovers itself to be only impudence or low conceits; the spirit evaporates, and the malignity only remains.

If we consider, sir, what opposition of character is necessary to constitute a political writer, it will not be wondered that so few excel in that undertaking. He that will write well in politicks, must at the same time have a complete knowledge of the question, and time to digest his thoughts into method, and polish his style into elegance; which is little less than to say, he must be at once a man of business, and a man of leisure; for political transactions are not easily understood, but by those who are engaged in them, and the art of writing is not attainable without long practice, and sedentary application.

Thus it happens that political writings are generally defective: for they are drawn up by men unacquainted with publick business, and who can, therefore, only amuse their readers with fallacious recitals, specious sophistries, or an agreeable style; or they are the hasty productions of busy negotiators, who, though they cannot but excel the other class of writers in that which is of most importance, the knowledge of their subject, are yet rarely at leisure to display that knowledge to advantage, or add grace to solidity.

Writers of the latter sort appear but seldom, and most of our political papers are the amusements of leisure, or the expedients of want.

Whether the paper now before us is the produce of ease, or of necessity, I shall not determine; I have already offered my opinion, that the man who claims it is not the author, nor do I discover any reason for changing my sentiment: the question is a question merely of conjecture, since neither I nor the honourable gentleman attempt to offer any demonstrative proofs of our opinion. If he has any to produce in favour of his own notions, let him lay them before you, but let him always forbear to impute to me assertions which I never uttered, and beware of representing me as declaring that I believe this paper the composition of some member of this house.

[It was then debated, whether this offence should be punished by the authority of the house, or referred to the cognizance of some of the courts of judicature in Westminster hall, on which occasion Mr. HOWE spoke as follows:]

Sir, it is the duty of every part of the legislature, not only to preserve the whole system of our government unaltered and unimpaired, but to attend particularly to the support of their own privileges, privileges not conferred upon them by our ancestors, but for wise purposes.

It is the privilege of this house that we, and we only, are the judges of our own rights, and we only, therefore, can assign the proper punishment when they shall be presumptuously invaded.

If we remit this offender, who has attempted to debase the house in the opinion of the nation, to any inferiour court, we allow that court to determine, by the punishment that shall be inflicted, the importance of this assembly, and the value of the collective character of this house.

It therefore concerns us, in regard to our own dignity, and to the privileges of our successours, that we retain the cognizance of this crime in our own hands, in which it is placed by perpetual prescription and the nature of our constitution.

[The house agreed to this, and the libeller was sent to the common jail of Middlesex, by warrant from the speaker.]

Sir William YONGE then spoke to this effect:—Sir, I am pleased with finding that the malice and indecency of this libel, has raised in the house a just resentment, and that the wretch, who, with a confidence so steady, and such appearance of satisfaction in his countenance, confesses, or rather proclaims himself the author, is treated as he deserves. But let us not forget that the same degree of guilt always requires the same punishment, and that when the author of scandal is in prison, the printer and propagator of it ought not to be at liberty.

The printer of the daily news is surely the proper object of your indignation, who inserted this libel in his paper, without the fondness of an author, and without the temptation of a bribe; a bribe, by the help of which it is usual to circulate scurrility. To this man the expense or labour of aspersing the government was recompensed by the pleasure, and he could not prevail on himself to omit any opportunity of incensing the people, and exposing at once the whole legislature to censure and contempt.

Those, therefore, that have concurred in the imprisonment of the author, will doubtless join with me in requiring the attendance of his officious accomplice, and I cannot forbear expressing my hopes, that he will not meet with kinder treatment.

It is far from being the first offence of his licentious press; and the lenity of the government, by which he has been so long spared, has had no other effect upon him, than to add confidence to his malice, and incite him to advance from one degree of impudence to another.

He has for several weeks persisted in misrepresenting the intention of the embargo, by letters pretended to be written by friends of the government who are injured by it. He has vented his insinuations hitherto, as without punishment, so, as it appears, without fear. It is time, therefore, to disturb his security, and restrain him from adding one calumny to another.

Sir John BARNARD rose up hereupon, and opposed this motion in terms to the following effect:—Sir, the end of punishment is to prevent a repetition of the same crime, both in the offender, and in those who may have the same inclinations; and when that end is accomplished, all farther severities have an appearance rather of cruelty than justice.

By punishing the author of this libel, we have, in my opinion, sufficiently secured our dignity from any future attacks, we have crushed the head of the confederacy, and prevented the subordinate agents from exerting their malice. Printers can do no injury without authors; and if no man shall dare to write a libel, it is not worthy of our inquiry how many may be inclined to publish it.

But if the printer must necessarily be punished before the resentment of the house can be satisfied; if it shall not be thought sufficient to punish him without whose assistance the other could not have offended; let us, at least, confine our animadversion to the present fault, without tracing back his life for past misdemeanours, and charging him with accumulated wickedness; for if a man's whole life is to be the subject of judicial inquiries, when he shall appear at the bar of this house, the most innocent will have reason to tremble when they approach it.

Even with regard, sir, to the offence of which he is now accused, somewhat may, perhaps, be said in extenuation of his guilt, which I do not offer to gratify any personal affection or regard for him, to whom I am equally a stranger with any other gentleman in this house, but to prevent a punishment which may be hereafter thought disproportioned to the crime.

It is, sir, to be remembered, that he was not the original printer of the libel, which he only reprinted from a paper, of which he knew that it was to be dispersed at our door, and in which he could not naturally suspect any seditious or dangerous assertions to be contained. It is, therefore, probable that he fell into the offence by ignorance, or, at worst, by inadvertency; and, as his intention was not criminal, he may properly be spared.

Mr. WINNINGTON spoke, in answer, to this effect:—Sir, I cannot but think the honourable gentleman betrayed, by his zeal for the defence of this man, into some assertions not to be supported by law or reason. If it be innocent to print a paper once printed, will it not inevitably follow, that the most flagitious falsehoods, and the most enormous insults on the crown itself, the most seditious invectives, and most dangerous positions, may be dispersed through the whole empire, without any danger but to the original printer? And what reason, sir, can be assigned, why that which is criminal in one man, should be innocent in another?

Nor is this the only position which has been advanced contrary to the laws of our country; for it has been asserted, that the general character of an offender is a consideration foreign from that of his immediate crime; and that whatever any man's past life has been, he is only to be judged according to the evidence for the offence which is then the subject of examination.

How much this opinion is consistent with the practice of our courts, a very slight knowledge of their methods of proceeding will readily discover. Is any villain there convicted but by the influence of his character? And is not the chief question at a trial the past conduct of the person at the bar?

Sir John BARNARD rose here, and spoke thus:—Sir, I rise up only to answer a question, which is, whether properly or not, put to me, and hope the irregularity will not be imputed to me, by the house, but to the occasion which produces it.

I am asked, whether it is not the chief question at the bar of our courts of justice, what is the character of the prisoner? and cannot but feel some amazement that any man should be so ignorant of common proceedings, and so much unacquainted with the execution of our laws, as to have admitted a notion so chimerical.

The character of the prisoner is never examined, except when it is pleaded by himself, and witnesses are produced to offer testimony in his favour; that plea, like all others, is then to be examined, and is sometimes confuted by contrary evidence. But, the character of a criminal, though it may be urged by himself as a proof of his innocence, is never to be mentioned by his prosecutor as an aggravation or proof of his guilt. It is not required by the law, that the general character of a criminal, but that the particular evidence of the crime with which he stands charged, should be examined; nor is his character ever mentioned but by his own choice.

Sir William YONGE spoke next, to the effect following:—Sir, to prove the malignity of the intention with which this libel was inserted in the daily paper, it cannot be improper to observe, that the embargo has been for many days past the favourite topic of this printer, and that, therefore, it was not by accident that he admitted so zealous an advocate for his opinions to be seasonably assisted by the circulation of his paper, but that he, doubtless, was delighted with an opportunity of dispersing sedition by means of greater abilities than his own.

Nor can it be justly pleaded, sir, in his favour, that he was encouraged to publish it by the confidence with which he saw it dispersed; for it was printed by him in the morning, and not brought hither till the afternoon. I cannot, therefore, but conclude, that his intentions were agreeable to his practice, and that he deserves to accompany the author in his present confinement.

The advocate, CAMPBELL, spoke next, to this purpose:—Sir, I hope it will not be imputed to me as disregard of the government, or neglect of the honour of this house, that I declare myself, on all occasions like this, inclined to lenity, and think it necessary always to proceed by regular methods, and known forms of justice, not by capricious determinations, and orders variable at pleasure.

I opposed the imprisonment of the man who just now appeared at the bar of our house, and am still more unwilling to proceed to severities against another, who is criminal only in a subordinate degree. The loudest declaimers against these men cannot have stronger detestation of falsehood and sedition than myself; but however flagrant may be the crimes, they may be punished with unjustifiable rigour, and, in my opinion, we have already proceeded with severity sufficient to discourage any other attempts of the same kind.

Whether it will promote the advantage of the publick, and the efficacy of our deliberations, to deter any man from the common practice of giving us information by delivering papers at our door, must be considered by the house.

Nor is it less worthy of our most attentive inquiry, whether it is not more reasonable to prosecute this offender in the common forms of justice, than to punish him by any act of uncontroulable, unaccountable authority? Whether it is not more reasonable to have him prosecuted before a judge unprejudiced, and a disinterested jury, than to act at once as party, evidence, and judge? I have no desire, sir, of diminishing the privileges of this house; and yet less would I contribute to establish any precedents of unlimited power or arbitrary punishments.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL then spoke to the following effect:—Sir, whence so much tenderness can arise for an offender of this kind, I am at a loss to discover, nor am I able to conceive any argument that can be produced for exempting from punishment the printer of a paper, which has been already determined, by the vote of the house, to be a scandalous libel, tending to promote sedition.

It has been, indeed, agreed, that there are contained in the paper some true positions, and some passages innocent, at least, and perhaps rational and seasonable. But this, sir, is nothing more than to say, that the paper, flagitious as it is, might have been swelled to a greater degree of impudence and scurrility; that what is already too heinous to be borne, might, by greater virulence, become more enormous.

If no wickedness, sir, is to be checked till it has attained the greatest height at which it can possibly arrive, our courts of criminal judicature may be shut up as useless; and if a few innocent paragraphs will palliate a libel, treason may be written and dispersed without danger or restraint; for what libel was ever so crowded with sedition, that a few periods might not have been selected, which, upon this principle, might have secured it from censure.

The danger of discouraging intelligence from being offered at the door of our house, does not alarm me with any apprehensions of disadvantage to the nation; for I have not so mean an opinion of the wisdom of this assembly, as to imagine that they can receive any assistance from the informations of their officious instructors, who ought, in my opinion, sir, rather to be taught by some senatorial censure to know their own station, than to be encouraged to neglect their proper employments, for the sake of directing their governours.

When bills, sir, are depending, by which either the interest of the nation, or of particular men, may be thought to be endangered, it is, indeed, the incontestable right of every Briton to offer his petition at the bar of the house, and to deliver the reasons upon which it is founded. This is a privilege of an unalienable kind, and which is never to be infringed or denied; and this may always be supported without countenancing anonymous intelligence, or receiving such papers as the authors of them are afraid or ashamed to own, and which they, therefore, employ meaner hands to distribute.

Of this kind, sir, undoubtedly, is the paper now under our consideration, of which I am far from imagining that it was drawn up by the man who declares himself the writer, and am, therefore, convinced of the necessity of calling the printer to the bar, that whatever the lenity or justice of this assembly may determine with regard to his punishment, he may be examined with respect to the real authors of the libel; and that our resentment may fall upon him, who has endeavoured to shelter himself by exposing another.

Counsellor ORD spoke to this effect:—Sir, I am inclined to believe, that the persons associated in writing and dispersing this paper, whosoever they may be, are of no high rank, or considerable influence; as it is not likely that any man who had much to hazard, would expose himself to the resentment of the whole legislature; but let us not for that reason exert our superiority in wanton punishments, or tyrannise merely because we cannot be resisted. Let us remember that the same justice and the same humanity is due to the meanest, as the highest of our fellow-subjects; and that there is even less necessity of rigorous measures, as the attack is less formidable.

But, sir, there is one motive to moderation that has seldom been found less efficacious than the consideration of the laws of justice or humanity. We ought to be withheld by regard to our posterity, and even to ourselves, from any exorbitant extension of our privileges. We know, that authority once exerted, is claimed afterwards by prescription. And who knows by what sudden rotation of power he may himself suffer by a precedent which he has concurred to establish, and feel the weight of that oppressive power which he first granted for the punishment of another?

Mr. HOWE spoke thus:—Sir, I am always unwilling to oppose any proposal of lenity and forbearance, nor have now any intention of heightening the guilt of this man by cruel exaggerations, or inciting the house to rigour and persecution.

But let us remember, sir, that justice and mercy are equally to be regarded, and while we pity the folly of a misguided, or, perhaps, a thoughtless offender, let us not suffer ourselves to be betrayed, by our compassion, to injure ourselves and our posterity.

This house, sir, has always claimed and exerted the privilege of judging of every offence against itself, a privilege so long established, and so constantly exercised, that I doubt whether the inferiour courts of judicature will take cognizance of an attack upon us; for how can they venture to decide upon a question of such importance without any form or precedent for their proceedings.

There seems also to be at this time, sir, an uncommon necessity for tenaciousness of our privileges, when, as some whispers, which have been wafted from the other house, inform us, a motion has been made in terms which might imply the subordination of this assembly, an assertion without foundation either in reason or justice, and which I shall always oppose as destructive to our rights, and dangerous to our constitution.

Let us, therefore, sir, retain in our hands the cognizance of this affair, and let the criminal either suffer his punishment from our sentence, or owe his pardon to our mercy.

[It was agreed that the printer of the daily paper should attend next day, when, being called in, it was proposed that he should be asked, whether he printed the paper complained of. It was objected to, for the same reason as the question about the author's being in the gallery, because the answer might tend to accuse himself; and he being withdrawn, a debate of the same nature ensued, and the question being put whether he should be asked, if he be the person that printed the daily paper shown to him, which paper the house the day before resolved to contain a malicious and scandalous libel, etc. it was, on a division, carried in the affirmative, by two hundred and twenty-two against one hundred and sixty-three: accordingly he was called in again, and being asked the question, he owned that he printed the said paper from a printed copy which was left for him with one of his servants; and being asked what he had to allege in his justification or excuse for printing the said libel, he said that as he had before printed several other things which he had received from the said person, which had not given offence, he inserted part of the paper in his news, and which he should not have inserted, if he had thought it would have given offence to the house, and that he forbore to print the remainder, having heard that it had given offence. Upon which he withdrew, and the house, after some debate, on a division, one hundred and eighty-eight to one hundred and forty-five, not only ordered him into the custody of the serjeant, but resolved to present an address to his majesty, that he would be pleased to give directions to his attorney general to prosecute him at law.

The first printer of the libel was also ordered into custody. This was on the 3d of December, but the next day presenting his petition, expressing his sorrow for the offence, whereby he had justly incurred the displeasure of the house, and praying to be discharged, he was brought to the bar on the following day, received a reprimand on his knees, and was ordered to be discharged, paying his fees.]

On the 12th, lord BARRINGTON presented a petition from the printer of the daily paper, expressing his sorrow, promising all possible care not to offend for the future, and praying to be discharged.

This petition being read, a motion was made, that the serjeant at arms do carry the petitioner to some court of law, to give security for his appearance to the prosecution to be carried on against him by the attorney general; which done, that he be discharged, paying his fees.

Sir William YONGE spoke to this effect:—Sir, I know not for what reason this enormous offender is entitled to so much regard, or by what interest he has engaged so many, who, I doubt not, abhor his crimes, to pity his sufferings.

Had he been young and unexperienced, and seduced into the commission of this offence by artifice or persuasion, his act might have been reasonably considered rather as an errour than a crime, and it might have been proper to treat with lenity a delinquent neither obstinate nor malicious.

But how, sir, can this plea be urged in favour of a man, whose daily employment it has been, for these two years past, to misrepresent the public measures, to disperse scandal, and excite rebellion, who has industriously propagated every murmur of discontent, and preserved every whisper of malevolence from perishing in the birth.

The proper judge, sir, of this affair, is his majesty's attorney general, who is not now in the house. I am, therefore, for detaining him in custody, and for referring the consideration of farther proceedings against him to that gentleman, whose proper province it is to prosecute for the crown.

Mr. WALLER spoke next, to the following purpose:—Sir, it is undoubtedly the duty of every man to oppose the introduction of new laws, and methods of oppression and severity, which our constitution does not admit; and what else is the mention of a prisoner's character as an aggravation of his present offence?

It is well known, and has been already asserted, upon this occasion, that in the lower courts of justice, though the prisoner may plead his character, in his own defence, his prosecutor is not at liberty to produce it to his disadvantage. Even those who are cited to the bar for murder or for treason, are tried only by the evidence of that crime for which they are indicted.

That this house is not bound to strict forms, and is not accountable for the exercise of its power, is easily granted; but authority cannot change the nature of things, and what is unjust in a lower court, would be in us not less unjust, though it may not be punishable.

It was replied that this question had been before sufficiently discussed.

The attorney general not being present, the debate was adjourned to the next sitting.

On the next day of the session, the lord BARRINGTON proposed, that the adjourned debate might be resumed, and several members interceded for the petitioner, that he might be released; to which it was objected, that it was not proper to release him, unless an information was lodged against him, without which he could not be held to bail; and the question being put, whether he should be released, was determined in the negative.

At the sixth sitting, the author of the libel, who was committed to the common prison of Middlesex, petitioned the house to permit him to implore pardon on his knees, and promising, by the strongest and most solemn assurances, not to offend again, was ordered to be discharged the next day, paying his fees.

On the forty-seventh sitting, the printer of the daily paper again petitioned the house, representing, that he most heartily bewailed his offence, that he was miserably reduced by his confinement, having borrowed money of all his friends to support himself, his wife, and children, and praying the mercy of the house. He was then ordered to be discharged, paying his fees, and giving security for his appearance to answer the prosecution.

On the eighty-fifth day, Mr. George Heathcote offered another petition for the said printer, and represented, that the fees amounting to one hundred and twenty-one pounds, he was not able to pay them, that, therefore, he hoped the house would consider his case; but the petition was not allowed to be brought up. On which he remained in custody fourteen days longer, till the end of the session, and, the authority of the senate ceasing, had his liberty without paying any fees.

[!-- H2 anchor --]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, DEC. 4-11, 1740.

ON INCORPORATING THE NEW-RAISED MEN INTO THE STANDING REGIMENTS.

On the 4th of December, sir William YONGE, secretary at war, having presented to the house of commons an estimate of the expense of raising ten thousand men, the same was taken into consideration in a committee on the supply, and after debate agreed to. At the report of this proceeding, on the 11th, another debate happened on a motion that the new-raised men should be incorporated into the standing regiments, etc.

As in these two debates the arguments were the same, they are thrown into one, to prevent unnecessary repetitions.

Sir William YONGE opened the debate with respect to what he had delivered in the estimate, after the manner following:—Sir, as this estimate has been drawn up after very accurate calculations and careful inquiries, I hope that no objections will be raised against it, and that the sum necessary for raising the new regiments will be very readily granted by that house, which voted the war necessary for which they are designed.

I hope it will be admitted as some proof of frugality, that this estimate requires less money than one that was laid before the senate in the reign of king William; for if it be considered, that since that time, the necessaries of life are become dearer, and that, therefore, all expenses are increased, it will appear to be the effect of the exactest economy, that the sum required for the same service is less.

I have heard, indeed, sir, that in conversation, the method of raising troops on this occasion has been censured as improper, and that in the opinion of some, whose judgment cannot be entirely disregarded, it would be more reasonable to add more men to our regiments already established, than to raise new regiments with new officers.

The chief argument, sir, produced in support of their method of augmentation, is drawn from the necessity of publick frugality, a very popular topick, which never fails to produce favour and attention; for every man is naturally inclined to hear his friend, and to consider that man as performing the office of friendship, who proposes methods of alleviating his taxes.

Frugality is undoubtedly a virtue very necessary to the happiness of the nation, and such as there occur frequent occasions of inculcating to those who are intrusted with the superintendence of publick disbursements, but I am far from thinking that this estimate affords any opportunity for declamations of this kind, and am of opinion that the addition of new soldiers to each regiment, would, in reality, be more expensive.

It cannot be denied, sir, that by augmenting the regiments, there would be immediately saved to the publick the expense of the officers which are necessary in the method now proposed; but it is to be considered how much the number of officers contributes to the regularity and discipline of the troops, and how much discipline and order promote their success. It is to be considered, sir, that the most successful method of making war is undoubtedly the cheapest, and that nothing is more expensive than defeats.

If by raising the same number of men under fewer officers, we should give our enemies any advantage, if a single party should be cut off, a garrison forced, an expedition rendered fruitless, or the war protracted but a few months, where will be the advantage of this admired frugality? What would be the consequence, but the same or a greater expense, not to gain advantages, but to repair losses, and obviate the effects of our former parsimony?

In private life, sir, it is common for men to involve themselves in expense, only by avoiding it; to repair houses at greater charges than new ones might be built, and to pay interest, rather than the debt. Weak minds are frighted at the mention of extraordinary efforts, and decline large expenses, though security and future affluence may be purchased by them; as tender bodies shrink from severe operations, though they are the certain methods of restoring health and vigour. The effects of this timidity are the same in both cases, the estate is impaired insensibly, and the body languishes by degrees, till no remedy can be applied.

Such examples, sir, are frequent, and the folly of imitating them is therefore greater, for who would pursue that track by which he has seen others led to destruction? Nor need we search for remote illustrations to discover the destructive tendency of unseasonable tenderness for the publick, for I believe the whole history of the wars of king William will prove, that too close an attention to parsimony is inconsistent with great achievements.

It may be expected that I, who cannot claim any regard in this disquisition, from my own experience, should produce some decisive evidence in favour of the method which I have taken upon me to defend; this expectation I shall endeavour to satisfy, by alleging the authority of the greatest commander of later ages, whom neither his friends nor his enemies will deny to have been well versed in these subjects, and whose success is a sufficient proof of the soundness of his principles.

The illustrious duke of MARLBOROUGH was of opinion, that the whole force of the French armies consisted in the number of the officers, and that to be always equal to them in the field, it was necessary to form our troops nearly upon the same plan; to this scheme he conformed in his practice of war, and how much his practice confirmed his opinion, let Blenheim and Ramillies attest.

As I pretend not to have determined myself on this question, otherwise than by authority, and, as I know not any authority equal to that of the duke of MARLBOROUGH, I cannot discharge the trust reposed in me by my country, any otherwise, than by proposing, that, on this occasion, we agree to grant his majesty the sum calculated for raising the new regiments, as I believe that method of augmentation most likely to produce success in our undertakings, and consequently to procure a speedy conclusion of the war.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke next, to the following effect:—Sir, I have been so long accustomed to the debates of this house, and have so often attended to the eloquence of the right honourable gentleman, that I am never startled at paradoxes, nor shocked at absurdities; I can now hear with great tranquillity an harangue upon the necessity of placemen in this house, upon the usefulness of standing armies, and the happiness of a general excise.

I am no longer offended with facts quoted in opposition to history, nor with calculations drawn up without regard to the rules of arithmetick; I know that there are persons in this house, who think themselves obliged to speak, even when in their own opinion nothing can be said with weight or with propriety; who come hither prepared against the shame of confutation, and determined not to be convinced.

To reason with such men, sir, is, indeed, no pleasing task; it is to fight with enchanted heroes, upon whom the common weapons of argument have no effect, and who must be softened by a countercharm, before they can be attacked with any prospect of success.

There are some, however, of whom I am willing to believe that they dispute only for truth, and inquire with the view of attaining a solution of their doubts. For the sake of these, sir, I think it necessary to declare my sentiments, as I shall be desirous, in my turn, to hear their sentiments; but with regard to those whose opinion I know already by their posts, I should think it of great advantage to the despatch of publick affairs, if they would content themselves with voting for their pay, without any ambition of other service, or adding the praise of volubility to that of steadiness.

Having this opportunity, sir, of declaring my opinion of the measures pursued in regulating our military preparations, I shall not confine myself entirely to the present question, but lay before the house my thoughts upon some parts of the establishment, which may, perhaps, require a reform, and which are at least proper objects of consideration, though not absolutely necessary to the determination of our opinion upon the present motion.

I have long ago, sir, declared, what, therefore, it is scarcely of any use to repeat, that I know not any advantage to be hoped from a standing army, nor can discover why the ablest and most vigorous of the inhabitants of this kingdom should be seduced from the loom, the anvil and the plough, only to live at ease upon the labour of industry, only to insult their landlords, and rob the farmers. I never could find why any body of men should be exempt from the common labour of social duties, or why they should be supported by a community, who contribute neither to its honour nor its defence.

I doubt not, sir, but I shall hear, on this occasion, of the service of our troops in the suppression of riots; we shall be told, by the next pompous orator who shall rise up in defence of the army, that they have often dispersed the smugglers; that the colliers have been driven down by the terrour of their appearance to their subterraneous fortifications; that the weavers, in the midst of that rage which hunger and oppression excited, fled at their approach; that they have at our markets bravely regulated the price of butter, and, sometimes, in the utmost exertion of heroick fury, broken those eggs which they were not suffered to purchase on their own terms.

Some one, perhaps, of more penetration, may inform us of the use which has been made of them at elections, where the surly burgesses have been sometimes blind to the merit of those worthy gentlemen, whom the soldiers have known how to esteem according to their desert; nor, indeed, do I see how those can refuse their votes in favour of our troops, who are indebted for the power of giving them, to their kind interposition.

To these arguments, sir, I shall content myself with answering, that those who are versed in the history of Britain, know that we have had colliers and weavers for many years before a standing army was heard of among us, and that it is, nevertheless, nowhere recorded that any of our kings were deposed by those formidable bodies of men, or that any remarkable changes were made by them in the form of our government; and, therefore, till some reason shall be alleged, why such insurrections are now more dangerous, and our civil magistrates more impotent than in former ages, I humbly conceive, that even without the protection of a standing army, we might yet sleep in security, notwithstanding the plots of the colliers, and the combinations of the weavers.

But I must own, sir, these are not our only enemies, for there is somewhere, yet in existence, a person that lays claim to the dominion of these kingdoms, and pleads an hereditary title to dispose of our wealth, to subvert our liberties, and destroy our religion.

If any foreigner, sir, unacquainted with our affairs, were to be present at our debates, and to hear with what ardour we animate each other to an obstinate resistance of this pretender to the throne, how often he is represented as hovering over us, and how often we have caught a general panick, and imagined ourselves upon the verge of destruction, how often our most zealous patriots take opportunities of declaring their resolution to die in defence of their liberties; and how pathetically our most elegant declaimers have expatiated on the misery of that unhappy race, whom they should leave behind to groan under the oppression of absolute power, what would be his opinion of this pretender, whom he saw so perpetually dreaded, against whom so many alliances were formed, so many armies were levied, and so many navies equipped?

Would he not believe him to be some formidable tyrant in a neighbouring country, the lord of wide dominions, and the master of numerous armies and powerful fleets? Would he not imagine that he could assemble half the continent at his call, that he was supported by powerful alliances, and that nothing but a fair wind was required to land him on our coasts at the head of millions? And would he not, even on that supposition, be inclined to censure us as timorous, as somewhat regardless of the honour of our nation, and condemn us for giving way to such suspicions and exclamations, as have a natural tendency to heighten the apprehension of danger, and depress the spirits of the people?

But what would be his conclusion, sir, when he should be told, what in reality is true, that this dreadful pretender is an unhappy fugitive, driven in his infancy from this country, and by consequence without any personal interest; that he is supported by the charity of a prince whose name is hated almost by every inhabitant of the kingdom; that he has neither sovereignty, nor money, nor alliances, nor reputation in war, nor skill in policy; that all his actions are watched by British spies; and that the few friends that remain to support the farce of a court, are such only as dare not return to their native country, and are, therefore, without fortune, and without dependants?

What could a wise man conceive of a nation held in continual alarms by an enemy like this; of a nation always watchful against an invasion from a man who has neither dominions to supply, nor money to hire a single regiment; from a man whose title all the neighbouring princes disown, and who is at such a distance from them, that he cannot be assisted by them without open preparations, of which we cannot fail of having intelligence, and which may be defeated, without danger, by the vessels regularly stationed on our coasts?

Would not any stranger imagine, sir, that we were a nation infected with a general phrensy, that cowardice had perverted our imaginations, filled us with apprehensions of impossible invasions, raised phantoms before our eyes, and distracted us with wild ideas of slavery and tyranny, oppression and persecution?

I have dwelt thus long on this point, because I know the pretender is the last refuge of those who defend a standing army; not that I propose to convince any man of the folly of such apprehensions, or to fortify him against such terrours for the time to come; for if any man, in reality, now dreads the pretender, fear must be his distemper; he is doomed to live in terrours, and it is of no importance whether he dreads an invasion or a goblin, whether he is afraid to disband the army, or to put out his candle in the night; his imagination is tainted, and he must be cured, not by argument, but by physick.

But the greatest part of those who disturb our consultations with the mention of the pretender, are men of a very different character, men equally unconcerned about his designs, or his motions, with those who are most desirous of setting the nation free from the burden of an army, and very often such as we may discover, from their conduct, to be determined to comply with every government; and such as have, therefore, nothing to fear from a change of masters.

The men, for whose sake I am now speaking, sir, laugh equally with myself at the apprehensions of those whom they contribute to terrify; they know too well the impotence of the pretender to dread an invasion from him, and affect only to continue their outcries, that they may not be deprived of a topick, on which, by long practice, they have attained an uncommon facility of haranguing, which they know how to diversify with various combinations of circumstances, and how to accommodate to any emergent occasion, without the pain of torturing their inventions.

It may be useful, sir, to inform these men, that their disguise ought at last to be thrown off, because it deceives no longer, and that the nation cannot be cheated but at the expense of more cunning than they are willing, or perhaps able, to display. A mask must necessarily be thrown aside, when, instead of concealing, it discovers him by whom it is used.

Those who are attempting, sir, to deceive others, and whose character is exalted, in their own opinion, in proportion to the success of their endeavours, have surely a sense of shame, though they have none of virtue, and cannot, without pain, find their artifices detected, and themselves made the objects of ridicule, by those stratagems which they employ for the deception of others.

I hope, therefore, sir, that, for their own sakes, these declaimers on the exploded story of the pretender, will change their bugbear, that if it be necessary to frighten those whom they want art or eloquence to persuade, they will find out some other object of terrour, which, after a little practice in private meetings, they may first produce in the court, and then turn loose in the senate.

The world, methinks, allows them a sufficient choice of tyrants more formidable than the pretender. Suppose they should revive the history of the Mohocks. The Mohocks are a dreadful race, not to be mentioned without horrour, by a true lover of his country, and a steady adherent to the house of Hanover; they might then very easily increase our army, or enhance our taxes; for who would not be urged by his wife and daughter to agree to any measures that might secure them from the Mohocks?

But as an army is, at present, likely to be kept up for our defence, against an enemy less formidable, it may be more seasonable to propose the regulation than the dismission of our troops, and to mention those evils which arise from the present establishment, rather than those which are inseparable from the expense of a standing force.

If it be necessary, sir, to support soldiers, I suppose that it will not be denied by the advocates for an army, that we ought to levy such troops as may be of use; yet in their practice they seem to have paid very little regard to this principle. Our troopers are mounted upon horses which can serve no purpose but that of show, which may, indeed, wheel about in the park with a formidable air, but can neither advance upon an enemy with impetuosity, nor retreat from him with expedition; and which, therefore, though purchased by the nation at a very high price, and supported at a large expense, can only grace a review, but are of very little use in an enemy's country, and must perish in the march, or stand unactive in the battle.

Nor is much more service to be expected, sir, from their riders, than from the horses, for there are very few of them acquainted with the first elements of their profession, or who have ever learned more than a few postures of exercise, and the meaning of a few words of command, but have a number of officers with large appointments.

The French troops, sir, if they are doubly officered, are officered and maintained at a less expense, and to greater effect; for the soldiers are better instructed, and the same number of men cost not, perhaps, much more than half the charge of a British regiment.

The guards, sir, that are maintained about this metropolis, for no other purpose than to keep up the splendour of a modern court, cost the nation, yearly, such a sum as would be sufficient to support an army of Frenchmen, for the protection of their frontier towns, or the invasion of neighbouring countries.

For my part, I cannot see what injury would be done to the nation by abolishing an establishment, at the same time useless and expensive, and employing that money which is at present squandered upon idlers without effect, upon levies of useful soldiers for marching regiments, who might be employed, when occasion should require them, in the service of their country.

It will, doubtless, be objected, that the officers of this body of men, many of whom are persons of the highest merit, and who have, generally, purchased their commissions, might very justly complain of being deprived, without a crime, of that which they have bought at its full value, and to which, therefore, they imagine themselves entitled, till they shall forfeit their right by some offence against the laws, or some neglect of their duty.

I shall not, sir, at present, inquire into the justness of this plea, nor examine, whether he who purchases an employment, which he knows to be useless, and therefore burdensome to the publick, deserves that the publick should be solicitous to support him in the enjoyment of it; but I shall declare, on this occasion, with confidence, that I know many of the officers of the guards to be men of honour, who would gladly exchange their posts, so chargeable to the nation, for an opportunity of serving it, and who are not very anxious for the increase of their pay, so they may not be degraded from their present rank.

If these gentlemen, sir, might, in the regiments that should be raised by disbanding the guards, be advanced to higher commissions, though with some diminution of their pay, they would imagine themselves abundantly compensated by the happiness of becoming useful subjects, and serving that nation by which they have been, hitherto, supported only to fill up the pomp of levees, and add to the magnificence of drawing-rooms, to loiter in antechambers, and to quarrel at gaming tables.

If this scheme should not be approved, the method eligible, in the next degree, seems to be that of incorporating our new levies into the regiments already raised, that being associated with men already acquainted with discipline, they may learn their duty much more expeditiously than in separate bodies, where one officer will be obliged to attend to the instruction of great numbers, and where no man will be excited to application, because no man will see any degree of excellence which he may be ambitious of attaining.

I have, indeed, heard no reason alleged for the necessity of new levies, which appeared likely to convince even those by whom it was produced. It appears to me that our present army is more than sufficient for the publick service, without an augmentation, and that some of our regiments might immediately embark, not only without danger to the nation, but with far greater hopes of success, as our enemies would have less time to strengthen their fortifications, and collect their troops, and as disciplined forces are more formidable than troops newly levied; for discipline must be of great efficacy to the success of military undertakings, or all arguments which have been used in the defence of a standing army fall to the ground.

In answer to this proposal, we shall probably be once again intimidated with an invasion, whether from the pretender, the Spaniards, the French, or any other power, it is of no great importance. An invasion is a formidable sound; the sack of towns, the destruction of villages, the captivity of our children, the ruin of our fortunes, and the desolation of our country, are frightful images, and may, therefore, be successfully produced, on this occasion, to perplex our thoughts, and embarrass our inquiries.

To remove, therefore, this panick, and to dissipate, for ever, the phantoms of invasion, I will lay before the house the opinion of the great commander whose name has already been introduced in this debate. In the late reign, on a day when the great officers of the crown, and many of the council, were at a publick feast in the city, a report was suddenly spread that the duke of Ormond had landed in the west, with two thousand men. This account was, in appearance, well attested, and universally believed; all jollity was, therefore, at an end, the company departed, the council was summoned, and every man offered such expedients as his present thoughts, confused and oppressed with the proximity of the danger, suggested to him. One proposed, that a body of troops should be sent to a distant part of the kingdom, to restrain the seditions of the populace; another apprehended more danger from a different quarter, and advised that the inhabitants should be awed by another detachment sent thither; the most experienced easily saw the unprofitableness of the measures proposed, but could not so easily strike out more efficacious expedients, and therefore sat in great perplexity. Lord Somers, particularly, shook his head, and seemed to consider the kingdom as in the hands of the invaders, and the dreadful pretender as seated on the throne.

At last, the duke of MARLBOROUGH, who had hitherto sat silent, asked calmly, whether they were certain that any forces were really landed, and was answered, that though it might not be absolutely certain, yet they were to consult and send orders upon that supposition. Then, says he, I will lay down this great rule to be observed invariably, whenever you are invaded. Attend only to one point, nor have any other purpose in view than that of destroying the regular forces that shall be landed in the kingdom, without any regard to petty insurrections, which may be always easily quelled, and which will probably cease of themselves, when the army by which they were excited is cut off. For this end, let it be your rule, to keep your army undivided, and to make no motion but towards the enemies; fight them with the utmost expedition before they can fortify themselves, or receive reinforcements from the continent. By the observation of this plain method of operation, continued he, I will engage, without any other force than the regiments generally stationed about the capital, to put a stop to any troops that shall be landed on the coast of Britain.

So far was this great officer, who was acquainted with the whole art of war, from sinking into astonishment at the sound of an invasion, and so far from thinking it necessary that the nation should be harassed by standing troops, to preserve it from being plundered by a foreign army.

But though our troops, sir, should not be necessary to prevent an invasion, they may be useful in services of equal importance; the ministry may think the suffrages of the officers more serviceable than their swords, and may be more afraid of exposing themselves than the nation by any detachment of their forces.

Such is, at present, sir, the state of this unhappy country, that neither in peace nor war are any measures taken, but with a view of increasing or confirming the power of the ministry; for this purpose those troops whose officers have seats here, are to be retained at home, and the fate of our American settlements to be committed to new-levied forces, without military skill.

For this reason is an army to be raised without necessity, and raised in a manner that may furnish the court with an opportunity of extending its influence, by the disposal of great numbers of new commissions. By this plan every family that is burdened with a relation whose vices have ruined his fortune, or whose stupidity disqualifies him for employment, will have an opportunity of selling, for a commission, its interest at the approaching election; dependence will be propagated, and the troublesome spirit of liberty be depressed.

To little purpose will it be objected, that soldiers and officers will be equally ignorant, that discipline is not infused instantaneously, that a military dress will not make a soldier, that men can only know their duty by instruction, and that nothing is to be hoped from ploughmen and manufacturers, commanded by schoolboys. The success of the expedition is not so much considered by those who have the direction of the levies, as that of the election, and while they keep their posts, they are very little concerned about the affairs of America.

In defence of this method, it has, indeed, been affirmed, that it was preferred by the duke of MARLBOROUGH; but we are not informed to whom, or upon what occasion he declared his opinion, and, therefore, are left at liberty to doubt, whether his authority is not produced for a method which he did not approve, or approved only at some particular time for some extraordinary service.

It is urged, that he recommended it by his practice, and that his success is a sufficient proof that his practice was founded upon right maxims. But if it be remembered what was, in that time, the method of obtaining commissions, and who it was that had the disposal of them, it will appear not absolutely certain, that his practice ought to be produced as a decisive proof of his opinion.

If the success of troops be properly urged as an argument for the form of their establishment, may not the victories of prince Eugene afford a proof, equally convincing, that a few officers are sufficient? And if the arguments which arise from success are equal on both sides, ought not the necessity of saving the publick money to turn the balance?

War, sir, is in its own nature a calamity very grievous to the most powerful and flourishing people, and to a trading nation is particularly destructive, as it at once exhausts our wealth, and interrupts our commerce, at once drinks up the stream and chokes up the fountain. In those countries whose affairs are wholly transacted within their own frontiers, where there is either very little money, or where their wealth is dug out of their own mines, they are only weakened by the loss of men, or by the diminution of their dominions, and, in general, can only suffer by being overcome.

But the state of Britain is far different; it is not necessary to our ruin that an enemy should be stronger than ourselves, that he should be able to pour armies into our country, to cover the sea with fleets, to burn our villages by incursions, or destroy our fortresses with bombs; for he that can secure his own dominions from our attacks, to which nothing but distance and some advantages of situation are necessary, may support a war against us, and he that can fit out privateers to interrupt our trade, may, without obtaining a victory, reduce us to distress.

Our situation, sir, as it preserves us from the danger of an invasion, except from that powerful monarch, the pretender, who is, indeed, always to be dreaded, has, likewise, the effect of securing other nations from being invaded by us; for it is very difficult to transport in one fleet, and to land at one time, a number sufficient to force their way into a country where the ports are fortified, and the inhabitants in arms.

Our wars, sir, are, therefore, to be determined by naval battles, and those nations have very little to fear from us who have no trade to be disturbed, and no navies to be destroyed; if they can only fit out cruisers, which may always be done by granting commissions to foreign adventurers, they may ruin our merchants by captures, exhaust the nation by the necessity of convoys, and give neutral traders an opportunity of establishing their credit at those markets which have been, hitherto, supplied by our manufactures.

This is, indeed, far from being at present an exact account of the state of Spain, whose wide-extended dominions are liable to insults, and from whom many of her most wealthy provinces may be torn without great hazard or difficulty. The particular state of her commerce, which, being only carried on from one part of her dominions to another, can only be for a time interrupted, but is in no danger of being invaded by any rival, or lost by disuse, at least requires our consideration, and we ought to make war with the utmost frugality, against a people whom no hostilities can really impoverish, whose commerce may be said to lie at rest rather than to be shackled, as it will rise into greater vigour at the end of the war, and whose treasures, though the want of them is a present inconvenience, are only piled up for a time of security.

As the only method, sir, of reducing this nation, must be that of invading its colonies, and dismembering its provinces, by which the chief persons will be deprived of their revenues, and a general discontent be spread over the people, the forces which are levied for this expedition, an expedition on which so much of the honour of our arms and the prosperity of our trade must necessarily depend, ought to be selected with the greatest care, and disciplined with the exactest regularity.

On this occasion, therefore, it is surely improper to employ troops newly collected from shops and villages, and yet more irrational to trust them to the direction of boys called on this occasion from the frolicks of a school, or forced from the bosoms of their mothers, and the softness of the nursery. It is not without compassion, compassion very far extended, that I consider the unhappy striplings doomed to a camp, from whom the sun has hitherto been screened, and the wind excluded, who have been taught, by many tender lectures, the unwholesomeness of the evening mists and the morning dews, who have been wrapt in furs in winter, and cooled with fans in summer, who have lived without any fatigue but that of dress, or any care but that of their complexion.

Who can forbear, sir, some degree of sympathy, when he sees animals like these taking their last farewell of the maid that has fed them with sweetmeats, and defended them from insects; when he sees them drest up in the habiliments of soldiers, loaded with a sword, and invested with a command, not to mount the guard at the palace, nor to display their lace at a review; not to protect ladies at the door of an assembly room, nor to show their intrepidity at a country fair, but to enter into a kind of fellowship with the rugged sailor, to hear the tumult of a storm, to sustain the change of climates, and to be set on shore in an enemy's dominions?

Surely, he that can see such spectacles without sorrow, must have hardened his heart beyond the common degrees of cruelty, and it may reasonably be expected, that he who can propose any method by which such hardships may be escaped, will be thought entitled to gratitude and praise.

For my part, I should imagine, sir, that an easy method might be discovered of obviating such misery, without lessening that number of officers, which, perhaps, in opposition to reason and experience, some gentlemen will continue to think necessary, and hope that this may be no improper time to declare my opinion.

I have observed, that for some time no private centinel has ever risen to any rank above that of a serjeant, and that commissions have been reserved as rewards for other services than those of the camp. This procedure I cannot but think at once impolitick and unjust.

It is impolitick, sir, as it has a natural tendency to extinguish in the soldiery all emulation and all industry. Soldiers have an equal genius with other men, and undoubtedly there might be found among them great numbers capable of learning and of improving the military sciences; but they have, likewise, the same love of ease, and the desire of honour and of profit, and will not condemn themselves to labour without the prospect of reward, nor sacrifice their time to the attainment of that knowledge, which can have no other effect than to make them discover the stupidity of their commanders, and render their obedience more difficult, as it will destroy that reverence which is necessary to subordination.

It is unjust, sir, because it is not to be doubted, that some soldiers, by the natural force of their faculties, or by a laudable activity of mind, have extended their knowledge beyond the duties of a private station; and he that excels in his profession, has an equitable claim to distinction and preferment. To advance any man in the army, because his father is an orator in the senate, or the chief inhabitant of a borough, seems not more rational, than to make another man a judge, because some of his ancestors were skilled in gunnery; nor would the lawyers have juster reasons for complaint in one case, than the soldiers in the other.

It is, therefore, sir, in my opinion, necessary to the advancement of military knowledge, that, as a centinel is, for excelling in his profession, advanced to the degree of a serjeant, the serjeant, who continues his application, and performs his duty, should, in time, be honoured with a commission.

It may be objected, indeed, that serjeants, though they are skilful commanders in war, can very seldom arrive at any remarkable skill in politicks, and though they should be so fortunate as to gain estates, could never be of any use as the representatives of a borough; and to what purpose should those men be advanced, who can only serve their country, but can contribute very little to the support of the court?

This is, I own, sir, an objection, which I despair of answering to the satisfaction of those by whom it will be raised. The hardy serjeant would never cringe gracefully at a levee, would never attain to any successful degree of address in soliciting votes; and if he should by mere bribery be deputed hither, would be unable to defend the conduct of his directors.

In vindication of the present scheme, I believe few of those rugged warriours would find many arguments; they would not recommend to the nation a troop of boys, under the command of boys, as the most proper forces to be sent to make conquests in distant countries, nor would imagine, that unskilful soldiers could, under the direction of officers equally ignorant with themselves, attain the knowledge of their duty in the same time as if they were incorporated with regular troops, in which every man might receive instructions, and learn his business from his comrade.

I had lately, sir, the opportunity of hearing the opinion of one of the greatest generals in the world, on this subject, who declared, with the utmost confidence of certainty, that raw troops could be disciplined in a short time, only by being incorporated with those that had been already taught their duty, and asserted, that with an army so mixed, he should think himself sufficiently enabled to meet any forces of the same number, and should not fear to acquit himself successfully, either in attacking or defending.

Such are the sentiments of this great man, to whom I know not whether any name can be opposed that deserves equally to be reverenced. He has had the honour of defending the rights of his country in the senate as well as in the field, has signalized himself equally in the debate and in the battle, and, perhaps, deserves less regard for having hazarded his life, than for having been divested of his employments.

Since, therefore, it is apparent that great numbers of officers are by no means necessary to success in war, since they are dangerous to our liberty in time of peace, since they are certainly expensive, and at best not certainly useful; and since the greatest general of the present age has declared, that our new levies ought to be mingled with our standing forces, I shall think it my duty to vote against the present scheme of raising new regiments, and shall agree to no other supplies than such as may be sufficient for adding the same numbers to the present army.

General WADE then spoke as follows:—Sir, though I cannot pretend to pursue the honourable gentleman through the whole compass of his argument, nor shall attempt to stand up as his rival, either in extent of knowledge, or elegance of language, yet as my course of life has necessarily furnished me with some observations relating to the question before us, and my present station in the army may, in some measure, be said to make it my duty to declare my opinion, I shall lay before the house a few considerations, with the artless simplicity of a plain soldier, without engaging in a formal debate, or attempting to overthrow the arguments of others.

It is observed, sir, that for the greatest part, the farther any man has advanced in life, the less confidence he places in speculation, and the more he learns to rest upon experience, as the only sure guide in human affairs; and as the transactions in which he is engaged are more important, with the greater anxiety does he inquire after precedents, and the more timorously does he proceed, when he is obliged to regulate his conduct by conjecture or by deliberation.

This remark, sir, though it may be just with regard to all states of life, is yet more constantly and certainly applicable to that of the soldier; because, as his profession is more hazardous than any other, he must with more caution guard against miscarriages and errours. The old soldier, therefore, very rarely ventures beyond the verge of experience, unless in compliance with particular accidents, which does not make any change in his general scheme, or in situations where nothing can preserve him but some new stratagem or unprecedented effort, which are not to be mentioned as part of his original plan of operation, because they are produced always by unforeseen emergencies, and are to be imputed, not to choice, but to necessity; for, in consequence of my first principle, an old soldier never willingly involves himself in difficulties, or proceeds in such a manner as that he may not expect success by the regular operations of war.

It will not, therefore, be strange, if I, who, having served in the army, in the wars of king William, may justly claim the title of an old soldier, should not easily depart from the methods established in my youth; methods of which their effects have shown me, that they at least answer the intention for which they were contrived, and which, therefore, I shall be afraid of rejecting, lest those which it is proposed to substitute in their place, however probable in speculation, should be found defective in practice, and the reasonings, which, indeed, I cannot answer, should be confuted in the field, where eloquence has very little power.

The troops of Britain, formed according to the present establishment, have been found successful; they have preserved the liberties of Europe, and driven the armies of France before them; they have appeared equally formidable in sieges and in battles, and with strength equally irresistible have pressed forward in the field, and mounted the breach. It may be urged, that this vigour, alacrity, and success, cannot be proved to have been produced by the number of officers by whom they were commanded; but since, on the contrary, it cannot be shown that the number of officers did not contribute to their victories, I think it not prudent to try the experiment, which, if it should succeed, as it possibly may, would produce no great advantage; and if it should fail, and that it may fail no man will deny, must bring upon us, not only the expense which we are so solicitous to avoid, but disgrace and losses, a long interruption of our trade, and the slaughter of great numbers of our fellow-subjects.

Thus far, sir, I have proceeded upon a supposition that the balance of argument is equal on both sides, and that nothing could be alleged on one part but experience, or objected to the other but the want of it; but as I am now called to declare my opinion in a question relating to my profession, a question of great importance to the publick, I should think that I had not discharged my duty to my country with that fidelity which may justly be exacted from me, if I should omit any observation that my memory may suggest, by which the house may be better enabled to proceed in this inquiry.

I think it, therefore, proper to declare, that we not only, in the last great war, experienced the usefulness of numerous officers, but that we have likewise felt the want of them on a signal occasion, and that the only great advantage which our enemies obtained, was gained over an army rendered weak by the want of the usual number of officers. Such were the forces that were defeated at the fatal battle of Almanza, by which almost all Spain was recovered from us. And it is, sir, the opinion of very skilful commanders, that the Germans, only by having fewer officers than the French, did not succeed in those long and obstinate battles of Parma and Guastalla.

It is, indeed, natural to imagine, that a greater number of officers must promote success, because courage is kindled by example, and it is, therefore, of use to every man to have his leader in his view. Shame, at one time, and affection at another, may produce the effects of courage where it is wanted, and those may follow their commander, who are inclined to desert their duty; for it is seldom known that, while the officers appear confident, the soldiers despair, or that they think of retreating but after the example of their leaders.

Where there are only few officers, it is apparent that more is left to chance, in which it becomes not a wise man to place any confidence; for if the officers are killed at the beginning of the action, the soldiers must become an useless, defenceless herd, without order, without unanimity, and without design; but by the present method, if an officer happens to fall, his place is immediately supplied by another, the action goes forward, and the enemy receives no advantage from confusion or delay.

I am, therefore of opinion, that in raising troops for the expedition now intended, the established method ought to be followed, and that we ought not to hazard the success of our attempt by new regulations, of which no human sagacity can fortell the event.

Though it cannot be denied, that some addition might be made to our companies without any visible or certain inconvenience, yet the augmentation now intended is too numerous to be so incorporated without some neglect of discipline, as the officers would be charged with more men than they could properly superintend.

There is, indeed, sir, another method of incorporation, by adding new companies to each regiment; but of this method the advantage would be small, because the number of captains and inferiour officers must be the same, and the pay of only the field officers would be saved, and this trifling gain would be far over-balanced by the inconveniencies which experience has shown to arise from it. There have been regiments formed of thirteen companies, instead of ten; but it was found, that as the officers of a company may be over-charged with soldiers, a colonel may likewise have more companies than he can conveniently inspect, and the ancient regulation was restored, as the least liable to difficulties and objections.

Having thus endeavoured to vindicate the manner in which our new troops are proposed to be levied, it may be expected that I should now make some observations on the service in which they are to be employed, which I cannot think liable to any unanswerable objection. It is now, sir, in our choice whether we will send the new regiments abroad or keep them at home; and our choice may easily be determined by comparing the value of our colonies with that of their mother country. If it be not necessary to have any army here to defend us against insults and invasions, the question about the manner of raising or employing new regiments is superfluous, because none ought to be raised, as our old troops are sufficiently numerous for foreign service. But if the security of the nation requires an army, would it not be madness to send those troops to a distant part of the world, in which we can confide most! Would not those, who speak with such contempt of an expedition undertaken by boys, have a better reason for their censure, if only boys were stationed on our coasts to repel the veterans of France? Would not such measures animate our enemies, and invite an invasion?

It may, perhaps, be urged farther, that the troops which are sent into America, are more likely to succeed in their design, than any regiment of ancient establishment. The chief danger to be feared in that part of the world, is not from the enemy but the climate, with which young men are most able to contend, though they may not be equally qualified for attempts in which skill is equally necessary with vigour.

I am convinced, sir, that this war has hitherto been prosecuted with ardour and fidelity, and that no measures have been taken but such as experience and reason have supported, and therefore affirm, without scruple, that if we are not successful, our miscarriages must be imputed to the chance of war, from which no prudence can exempt us.

Lord QUARENDON spoke next, in the following manner, being his first speech:—Sir, having-but very lately had the honour of a seat in this assembly, I am conscious how little I am acquainted with either the subjects or forms of debate, and should, therefore, continue to listen to the sentiments of persons more experienced, with silent veneration, did I not observe with how much indulgence they are heard who mean well, however deficient in knowledge, or in eloquence.

As the honourable gentleman who spoke last, sir, professes to have formed his opinion rather from facts than arguments, I hope I shall be indulged by the house, in an attempt to examine those facts which he has produced, because I think them not sufficient to support his positions, which must, therefore, be established by some other proofs, before a decision of this question can be fixed by them.

With regard to his experience, to which undoubtedly no small degree of veneration is due, he confesses that we have tried only one of the two forms of establishment now in competition, and that, therefore, though he has had reason to approve that with which he is most acquainted, he has no certain proofs of the inefficacy or imperfection of the other.

But experience, sir, may be extended much farther than our own personal transactions, and may very justly comprehend those observations which we have had opportunities of making upon the conduct and success of others. This gentleman, though he has only commanded in the armies of Britain, has seen the forces of other nations, has remarked their regulations, and heard of their actions with our confederates in the last war; he has probably acted in conjunction, and though it is known that they differ from us in the proportion of soldiers and officers, he has mentioned no disadvantage which might be supposed to arise from their establishment, and therefore, I suppose, he cannot deny that their behaviour and success was the same with that of our own troops.

The battles of Almanza, Parma, and Guastalla, which he has particularly mentioned, were lost, as he informs us, by armies not officered according to the establishment which he recommends to us: but it is observable that his argument is defective in an essential part; for though he affirms that the armies which were defeated had fewer officers than the enemy, he has neither shown, nor attempted to show, that the want of officers occasioned the defeat, or that the loss would have been prevented by a greater number.

These instances, therefore, can be of no effect on the determination of the present question; for though it is certain that at Germany, and at other places, armies with few officers have lost the battle, it is not less common for those troops that are more liberally supplied, to be overthrown by others which are differently modelled.

With regard, sir, to the troops of Germany, I have heard them praised, in many parts of Europe, as not inferiour either to those of France, or of any other nation, and have been informed, that their ill success, both at Parma and Guastalla, may be justly imputed to other causes than the want of officers.

There has, perhaps, sir, seldom been an example of firmness, discipline, and resolution, beyond that which was shown by the Germans at the action of Parma, where they attacked the trenches of the French, sustained the fire of the ramparts of the city, and though they lost their commander-in-chief and two others, towards the beginning of the action, they continued the fight for eleven hours, and at last retired only at the approach of night.

At Guastalla, sir, they attacked the French in their trenches, even with forces inferiour in number, so far were they from any diffidence in the form of their establishment; and after a fight of seven hours, in which their loss was, under all their disadvantages, not greater than that of their enemies, they retreated to their former camp unmolested and unpursued. The French, sir, were preserved in both these battles, not by the number of their officers, but by their situation, by woods, cassines, ditches, and intrenchments.

Nor do I discover, sir, what can be inferred from his observation of the influence of example in time of action, but that officers should be selected with great care, and not be promoted by favour, or interest, or caprice; for an example of cowardice in a leader must be pernicious, in proportion as that of bravery is beneficial; and as, where more officers are supposed necessary, there is less room for choice, it must be allowed that the troops, which have more officers than other forces, are in more danger of being infected with cowardice.

It appears, therefore, to me that the expense of the present establishment is a certain evil, and that the advantages are very doubtful: it appears that the present state of the nation requires frugality, and, therefore, I shall vote for the incorporation of our new levies with the old regiments.

By this incorporation, sir, our new-levied troops will be no longer distinguished from our veterans; they will be equally acquainted with discipline, and will learn, from the conversation of their associates, a spirit of enterprise, and a contempt of danger; we may then employ forces equally formidable in all parts of the publick service, and invade the dominions of our enemies, without leaving our own country desolate.

The arguments which the honourable gentleman has offered in defence of sending our younger troops to America, which may likewise be used against an incorporation, is, in my opinion, sir, far from being conclusive; for it supposes, what will not be granted, that a cold climate may be changed for a hotter with more safety by a young than an old man. I have been told, on the contrary, that superabundant heat is the great disease of youth, and that the want of it produces most of the infirmities of age; and every one has known the lives of persons languishing with age, prolonged by a removal into warm countries. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the honourable gentleman's argument is defective in all its parts, and hope that I shall not be charged with obstinacy or perverseness for dissenting from him.

Mr. HOWE spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, before I engage in a discussion of the question, I cannot but think it necessary to observe, that the honourable gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, has been very far from consulting either policy or justice in his declamation, and that he deviated from the subject only to ridicule his country, to exalt our enemies, and depress our efforts.

He has described, sir, the British youth, the sons of noble families, and the hopes of the nation, in terms too contemptuous to be heard without indignation; he has amused himself with displaying their ignorance and their effeminacy, and has indulged his imagination in a malignant kind of gaiety, which, however it may divert himself, is very far from contributing either to the reformation or prevention of those practices which he censures.

I believe, sir, it will be granted, that nothing ought to please but in proportion to its propriety and truth; and, if we try the satire that we have lately heard, by this test, it will be found to have very little claim to applause; for our armies must be composed of the youth of the nation; and, for my part, I cannot discover what advantage we shall gain over the Spaniards, by informing them how little our troops are accustomed to danger, how short a time they have been acquainted with fatigue, how tenderly they have been nursed, how easily they may be frighted, and how certainly they will be conquered, if they but meet with opposition.

Nor, sir, is such an account of the youth of Britain more true, in my opinion, than it is prudent. I am far from discovering any such remarkable degeneracy in the age, or any great prevalence of cowardice and unmanly delicacy; nor do I doubt of hearing that our youth, if they are sent upon any expedition, have shown that the British courage is not yet extinguished, and that, if they are ranged on the plains of America, they will discover themselves the sons of those that forced those passes, and those trenches, that other troops would have failed in attempting.

That the degeneracy of the British youth, is, at least, not universal, we have just now sir, received an incontestable proof from the gentleman who spoke last, and spoke with so much elegance of language, and justness of reasoning, as shows, that there are to be found, among the youth of Britain, persons very well qualified for the senate; and I have never heard that a post in the army required greater abilities.

The pleasure, however, with which I have attended to his remarks, has not so far prejudiced me in favour of his opinion, as that I shall easily consent to change that method of discipline, to which our troops have been accustomed, and of which we know by experience, that it is, at least, not less efficacious than that of any other nation. Customs, if they are not bad, are not to be changed, because it is an argument in favour of a practice that the people have experienced it, and approved it, and every change is disagreeable to those who judge only by prejudice, of whom I need not say how great is the number.

Many arguments may, sir, in my opinion, be added to our experience in favour of the present establishment. The number of officers—but I find myself unable to pursue my design, because I can no longer read my notes, which, being written by another hand, somewhat embarrass me in this decline of the light. I shall, therefore, only make some observations upon the speech of the gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, and hope that I shall be allowed to deviate from the principal question, since I do it only in pursuit of another.

He has observed, that our troopers are mounted upon horses that are of no use; a remark, sir, which I never heard from any other person, and for which, I believe, no authority can be produced: they are mounted, indeed, upon horses very different from those which are used by other nations, because scarcely any other country breeds horses of equal size and strength, and, therefore, I am informed that the French have purchased horses from this island, and believe that all the cavalry of Europe would be mounted upon our horses if they could procure them. I have been informed, that their pressure in the shock of battle is such, as no forces in the world are able to sustain; and that it was not less by the strength of our horses than the spirit of our soldiers, that the squadrons of France were, in the battle of Blenheim, pushed into the Danube.

Nor do I less disapprove his censure of the choice which has been made of the troops intended for the American service, which, though I ardently desire its success, I cannot think of equal importance with the defence of our own country; for though we may be disgraced by a defeat, we can be endangered only by an invasion; and, therefore, I think it necessary to retain those troops on which we may best rely for the security of this island, lest our enemies should take the advantage of their absence, and set the pretender on the throne.

Sir William YONGE next rose, and spoke to the effect following:—Sir, it is a standing maxim, both in private life and public transactions, that no man can obtain great advantages who is afraid of petty inconveniencies; and that he that will hope to obtain his end without expense, will languish for ever in fruitless wishes, and have the mortification of seeing the adventurous and the liberal enjoy that felicity, which, though it is within his reach, he is afraid of seizing.

When the depredations of the Spaniards became first the subject of our debates, nothing was heard amongst us but threats of vengeance, demands of reparation, assertions of sovereignty, and resolutions to obtain security: the importance of our commerce, the necessity of rigorous measures, the danger of pusillanimity, the meanness of negotiation, and the disadvantages of delay, were thundered from every part of the house. Every man seemed to imagine that there was no mean between victory and ruin, and that not to humble Spain was to betray our country to insults, ignominy, and slavery.

Far was I then, sir, from suspecting, that when the war, thus vehemently urged, should be declared, that the prosecution of it would produce any debates. I doubted not but that every man would be desirous of signalizing his zeal for the prosperity of commerce, by expediting the supplies, and forwarding the preparations; and that the only contention among us would be, who should appear the most ardent enemy of Spain.

But no sooner are hostilities begun against this insolent and oppressive nation, than those who expressed most resentment at the prudence and moderation by which they were delayed, those that accused every attempt for an accommodation, of cowardice, and charged the ministry with conniving at the rapine of pirates, begin to inquire into the necessity of the expenses occasioned by the war, to harangue on the advantages of parsimony, and to think it of more importance to ease our taxes than to subdue our enemies.

In pursuance of this new doctrine they are now endeavouring to embarrass the measures of his majesty, that they may save, according to their own computation, only thirty thousand pounds, which, in reality, I can easily show to be no more than fifteen thousand.

For the sake of this important sum, our army is to be modelled by a new regulation, and the success of the war is to be impeded, the security of our commerce to be hazarded, and our colonies are to be endangered.

Frugality is, undoubtedly, a virtue, but is, like others, to be practised on proper occasions: to compute expenses with a scrupulous nicety, in time of war, is to prefer money to safety, and, by a very perverse kind of policy, to hazard the whole for the preservation of a part.

The gentlemen, sir, who have most endeavoured to distinguish themselves as the constant opponents of the administration, have charged it, on all occasions, with giving encouragement to the Spaniards, but can charge it with nothing so likely to raise the confidence and confirm the obstinacy of the enemy, as the objections which they themselves have made to the present scheme of levying forces; for to how great a degree of poverty must they believe that nation reduced, of which the warmest patriots struggle to save a sum so inconsiderable, by an experiment of so much uncertainty? And how easily will the Spaniards promise themselves, that they shall gain the victory only by obliging us to continue in a state of war, a state which, by our own confession, we are not able to support?

Had any other argument, sir, been produced than the necessity of parsimony, it had been less dangerous to have agreed to this new scheme; but to adopt it only for the sake of sparing fifteen thousand pounds, would be to make ourselves contemptible, to intimidate our allies, and to unite all those against us, who are inclined to trample on misery, and to plunder weakness.

I am inclined to judge so favourably, sir, of the intentions of those whom I am now opposing, that I believe they have only used this argument, because they were able to produce no other, and that if either reason or experience had been on their side, the poverty of the nation had not been mentioned.

But the honourable gentleman, who has been so long engaged in military employments, has shown that all our success has been obtained by the present establishment, and that the battle in which we suffered most, was lost by our unfortunate deficiency of officers.

Nor do his reasons, sir, however modestly offered, deserve less regard than his experience, for he has shown that a greater number of officers naturally contribute to preserve discipline, and excite courage; and it is not necessary that a man should be much a soldier to discover, that discipline and courage united, must generally prevail. To the examples which he has produced in favour of his opinion, it has been objected, that victories equally wonderful have been gained with fewer officers, and, by the honourable gentleman that spoke the second on this occasion, the actions of Eugene were opposed to those of the duke of MARLBOROUGH.

That victories have been gained by troops differently regulated, I cannot deny; victories have likewise been gained, sir, under every circumstance of disadvantage; victories have been gained by inferiour numbers, and by raw troops, over veteran armies, yet no prudent general ever produced these instances as arguments against the usefulness of discipline, or as proofs that superiority of numbers was no advantage.

The success of prince Eugene, in the late war, was far from convincing the British general, that the German establishment was preferable to our own; for he required that the Hessian troops, which were paid by Britain, should be officered like our national troops. In this he could be influenced only by his own opinion; for he neither nominated their officers, nor could advance his interest at home by creating new posts to which he did not recommend; he could, therefore, only regard the success of the war, and changed their model only because he thought it defective.

The Germans themselves, sir, are far from imagining that their armies might not be made more formidable by approaching nearer to the British methods; for one of their officers, a man of great reputation and experience, has informed me, that they were convinced of their defect, and that nothing hindered them from adding more officers, but the fear of expenses; that they imputed all their defeats to the necessity of parsimony, that their men wanted not courage but leaders, and that their enemies gained advantages merely by the superiority of their opulence.

In the late war, it was common for the auxiliary troops, when they were sent upon any expedition of importance, to be supplied with officers either from their other regiments, or by the British forces; so necessary did the duke of MARLBOROUGH think a larger number of officers in time of action, that where he could not alter the establishment, he deviated from the common methods of war, and transferred his officers occasionally into troops over which they had no settled authority.

It is, therefore, most evident, sir, that the model on which our troops are formed, was, by this great commander, preferred to that which is now so warmly recommended, and I know not why we should recede from his practice, if we are desirous of his success.

Nor can I discover, sir, any better method of selecting officers than that which has of late been followed, however some may censure or ridicule it. To advance gentlemen to command, seems to be the most likely way to unite authority with rank, for no man willingly obeys those to whom he has lately seen himself equal, or whose conduct in lower stations he has, perhaps, had opportunities of examining too nearly.

The distinction of birth, however chimerical in itself, has been so long admitted, and so universally received, that it is generally imagined to confer on one man an indelible and evident superiority over another, a superiority, which those who would easily imagine themselves equal in merit cannot deny, and which they allow more willingly, because, though it be an advantage to possess it, to want it cannot be justly considered as a reproach.

For this reason, sir, men cheerfully obey those to whom their birth seems to have subjected them, without any scrupulous inquiries into their virtue or abilities; they have been taught from their childhood to consider them as placed in a higher rank than themselves, and are, therefore, not disgusted at any transient bursts of impatience, or sudden starts of caprice, which would produce, at least, resentment, and, perhaps, mutiny, in men newly exalted from a low station. The more attentively, sir, we look upon the world, the more strongly shall we be convinced of the truth of these assertions, and the more evidently shall we discover the influence which operates, in a degree scarcely credible, even to those who have experienced its power, and which is, indeed, one of the chief means of subordination, by which society is held together.

Nor are officers of birth, sir, to be preferred to men who are recommended by nothing but military service, only because they are more cheerfully obeyed, but for another reason of equal importance. It has been observed, that, in reality, they discharge the duty of commanders in a manner more likely to preserve dignity and increase reverence; that they discover, on all occasions, a sense of honour, and dread of disgrace, which are not easily to be found in a mind contracted by a mean education, and depressed by long habits of subjection.

It is not, indeed, sir, universally and unvariably certain, that a man, raised from meanness and poverty, will be insolent and oppressive; nor do I doubt but there are many now languishing in obscurity, whose abilities might add new lustre to the highest honours, and whose integrity would very faithfully discharge the most important trust, and in their favour, wherever they can be discovered, some exceptions ought to be made; but as general rules are generally to be followed, as well in military regulations as other transactions, it will be found, upon the exactest inquiry, by no means improper to advance gentlemen to posts of command rather than private sentinels, however skilful or courageous.

It is to be considered, sir, that the present state of the continent, has for many years made it necessary to support an army, even when we are not engaged in an actual war; that this army, though of late it has, for the ease of the people, been sometimes encamped during the summer, is, for the greatest part, quartered in towns, and mingled with the rest of the community, but governed, at the same time, by the officers, and subject to the martial law. It has often been observed by those who have argued against standing forces, that this difference of government makes different societies, which do not combine in the same interest, nor much favour one another; and it is, indeed, certain, that feuds are sometimes produced, that when any private quarrel happens, either by drunkenness or accident, or claims really disputable, between a soldier and any other, person, each applies for support and assistance to those in the same condition with himself, the cause becomes general, and the soldiers and townsmen are not easily restrained from blows and bloodshed.

It is true, likewise, that the rhetorick of the patriots has been so efficacious, that their arguments have been so clamorously echoed, and their weekly productions so diligently dispersed, that a great part of the nation, as men always willingly admit what will produce immediate ease or advantage, believes the army to be an useless burden imposed upon the people for the support of the ministry; that the landlord, therefore, looks upon the soldier as an intruder forced into his house, and rioting in sloth at his expense; and the farmer and manufacturer have learned to call the army the vermin of the land, the caterpillars of the nation, the devourers of other men's industry, the enemies of liberty, and the slaves of the court.

It is not to be supposed, sir, that the soldiers entertain the same ideas of their profession, or that they do not conceive themselves injured by such representations: they undoubtedly consider themselves as the bulwark of their country, as men selected for the defence of the rest of the community, as those who have engaged, at the hazard of their lives, to repel invasion, and repress rebellion, and who contribute more than their part to the general felicity, by securing property, and preventing danger.

It is not to be doubted, sir, but sentiments so widely different, must produce an equal contrariety of claims, and diversity of conduct: the trader imagines, that the man who subsists upon the taxes which are raised only from his labour, ought to consider himself as his inferiour, at least, if not as his hireling and his servant; the soldier wonders how he can ever conceive himself sufficiently grateful to him that has devoted his life to his defence, and to whom he must fly for protection whenever danger shall approach him, and concludes, that he has an incontestable right to the better part of that, of which the preservation of the whole depends upon him.

Thus does self-love magnify every man in his own eyes, and so differently will men determine when each is to judge in his own cause. Which of these competitors thinks most justly of his own station and character, or whether both are not mistaken in their opinion, I think it by no means necessary to decide. This, at least, is evident, that to preserve peace and harmony between two bodies of men obliged to live together with sentiments so opposite, there is required an uncommon degree of prudence, moderation, and knowledge of mankind, which is chiefly to be exerted on the part of the soldiers, because they are subject to more rigorous command, and are more easily governed by the authority of their superiours.

Let us suppose any dispute of this kind, sir, to happen where the soldiers were commanded only by private sentinels, disguised in the dress of officers, but retaining, what it cannot be expected that they should suddenly be able to lay aside, the prejudices which they had imbibed in the ranks, and all the ardour of trifling competition in which their station had once engaged them. What could be expected from their councils and direction? Can it be imagined that they would inquire impartially into the original cause of the dispute, that they would attend equally to the parties, endeavour, by mildness and candour, to soften the malevolence of each, and terminate the dispute by some addressful expedient, or decent accommodation? He, surely, must be very little acquainted with the vulgar notions of bravery and honour, that could form any hopes of such conduct.

The plain soldier, sir, has not accustomed himself to regulate his motions by reason, nor has learned any more of honour, than that it consists in adhering invariably to his pretensions, even though he should discover that they are false; and in resenting affronts with the utmost rigour, even when they were provoked by himself, he is taught, that it is his business to conquer in whatever cause, and that to desist from any of his attempts, or retract any of his assertions, is unworthy of a man of honour.

Warm with such notions as these, sir, would such officers, as have been recommended by the honourable gentleman, apply themselves to the termination of differences? Without any knowledge of the laws of society, without any settled ideas of the different rights of different persons, they would have nothing in view but the honour of their profession, nor endeavour to support it by any other method than that of violence. If a soldier was affronted by a farmer, they would probably lay his territories waste, and ravage his plantations like an enemy's country; if another disagreed with his landlord, they would advise him to make good his quarters, to invade the magazines of provision without restraint, to force the barricadoes of the cellar, and to forage in the stables without controul.

But gentlemen, sir, are proper judges of debates between the army and the rest of the community, because they are equally related to both parties, as men who possess or expect estates, or who are allied to those whose influence arises from their property. As men bred in affluence and freedom, and acquainted with the blessings of our constitution, and the necessity of civil government, they cannot willingly contribute to the increase of the military power, and as members of the army they cannot but be desirous to support their own rank, and to hinder their profession from sinking into contempt; it is, therefore, their care to repress insolence on one part, and to prevent oppression on the other, to stop dissensions in their beginning, and reconcile all the different pretensions of Britons and soldiers.

I am, indeed, surprised, sir, to hear the promotion of serjeants recommended by the honourable gentleman who has so often strained his lungs, and exhausted his invention, to explain how much our constitution is endangered by the army, how readily those men will concur in the abolition of property who have nothing to lose, and how easily they may be persuaded to destroy the liberties of their country, who are already cut off from the enjoyment of them, who, therefore, can only behold with envy and malevolence those advantages which they cannot hope to possess, and which produce in them no other effects than a quicker sense of their own misery.

Upon what principles, sir, any gentleman can form those notions, or with what view he can so long and so studiously disperse them, it is his province to explain; for the only reason that can be offered by any other person for his incessant declamations, the desire of securing his country from the oppression of a standing army, is now for ever overthrown by this new proposal; which, if it were to be received, would in a very few years produce an army proper to be employed in the execution of the most detestable designs, an army that could be of no other use than to gratify an ambitious prince, or a wicked ministry, as it would be commanded, not by men who had lost their liberty, but by men who never enjoyed it, by men who would abolish our constitution without knowing that they were engaged in any criminal undertaking, who have no other sense of the enjoyment of authority than that it is the power of acting without controul, who have no knowledge of any other laws than the commands of their superiours.

To men like these, sir, to men raised up from poverty and servility to rank and power, to ignorance invested with command, and to meanness elated with preferment, would any real patriot, any zealous assertor of liberty, any inflexible enemy to the corruptions of the ministry, consign the protection of his country, and intrust to these our happiness, properties, and our lives?

Whether the honourable gentleman has changed any of the sentiments which he has hitherto appeared to admit with regard to the army, whether this new determination is only an instance of that inconsistency which is scarcely to be avoided in the vindication of a bad cause, or whether he was betrayed to it only by his hatred of the administration, which would prompt him to recant his own advice, if it should happen to be approved, I will not pretend to determine, but I must lament, on this occasion, the entertainment which the house will lose, by the eternal cessation of any harangues on the army, since he cannot now declaim on either part without contradicting his former declarations.

Nor will the honourable gentleman find less difficulty in proving, that justice, rather than policy, requires the promotion of Serjeants to commissions. Military preferments are always at the disposal of the crown, nor can any right be pretended to them, but such as arises from the custom which has been generally followed in conferring them, which is not only variable at pleasure, but has never been, at any time, regularly observed. The order of rotation has been suffered sometimes to proceed, because of two persons, otherwise equal, he that has served longest may plead the most merit; but the plea of service has been always overruled by birth or powerful recommendation. And though, sir, it is natural for men disappointed to complain, yet as those officers, whose preferment has been delayed, were not thought, in reality, to have received any injury, their murmurs have been the less regarded.

It might be expected, sir, from a patriot, a lamenter of the degeneracy of mankind, and an inflexible opponent of corruption, that he should consider rather facts than persons, that he should regulate his decision by the unvariable principles of reason and justice, and that, therefore, he should not applaud at one time what he condemns at another.

But this gentleman seems to have established some new maxims of conduct, and, perhaps, upon new notions of morality; for he seems to imagine, that his friends may seize, as their right, what his adversaries cannot touch without robbery, though the claim of both be the same.

It is well known, sir, to the whole army, that a noble person, whose abilities are so loudly celebrated, whose virtues are so liberally praised, and whose removal from his military employments is so solemnly lamented as a publick calamity, obtained his first preferments by pretensions very different from military merit, and that at the age only of seventeen, a time of life in which, whatever might be his abilities, very little prudence or experience could be expected, he was advanced to the command of a regiment, and exalted above many officers whose known bravery and frequent hazards entitled them to favour.

I do not assert that he was undeservedly promoted, or condemn those who either solicited or granted his commission; I maintain only, that what was then reasonable and just, is not now either iniquitous or ridiculous, and different persons in the same circumstances have a right to the same treatment.

In the reign of queen Anne, a reign, sir, which every Briton recollects with so much satisfaction, and which will for ever afford examples of the wisest councils, and most successful wars, when new regiments were to be raised, it was far from being thought necessary to observe this gentleman's favourite method of rotation; posts were filled, not with the officers of other regiments, that room might be left for the promotion of serjeants, but with gentlemen who had never seen a battle, or learned any part of the military discipline.

But though, sir, the regulation of our army be thus violently attacked, the greatest crime of the ministry is, in this gentleman's opinion, that of levying new troops, when we have no employment for our standing forces, of laying unnecessary impositions upon the nation, and alarming with the fears of an invasion, only that the army might be increased.

On this head, sir, a declaration of the duke of MARLBOROUGH has been produced, with a great pomp of circumstances, and such a seeming accuracy of narration, that the attention of the house was engaged, and the account was received with all the solemnity of universal silence, and with the veneration due to so high an authority in a question of so much importance.

The subject is, indeed, so worthy of regard, that I think, sir, every man ought to contribute to its elucidation, and, therefore, I take the liberty of adding to the honourable gentleman's relation, what I hope will be heard with equal curiosity, the method by which that great commander proposed to put a stop to an invasion with so small a number.

He was very far, sir, from imagining that he should be able to repel them by open force, he was far from being so confident of his superiority in military skill, as to imagine that he should defeat them by stratagem, and, therefore, he designed, by burning the villages, and destroying the country, to deprive them of the means of subsistence, and harass them with famine; to hover at a distance, and cut off those parties which necessity should force out to forage, till a body of troops could be assembled sufficient to overthrow them in a battle, or to drive them back to their ships.

Such was the scheme, sir, as I have been informed, of this great man, nor, perhaps, can any other be struck out by human abilities, where greater numbers are to be opposed by smaller. But this scheme, though preferable, in the last extremities, to slavery, is such as cannot be mentioned without horrour, and of which the execution ought to be avoided by every expedient that can be practised without the danger of our liberties. We ought, certainly, not to reject a nauseous medicine, by which that health is preserved, which, if lost, can only be restored by the amputation of a limb.

As it was, therefore, necessary, sir, to secure our coasts from an invasion, it was necessary to raise new troops for the American expedition; nor did this method produce any delay, for the regiments were completed a long time before the ships of war and the transports were ready to convoy and receive them, nor could the utmost ardour and diligence despatch them sooner from our coasts.

The ships, sir, were, by the violence of a frost, scarcely exampled, retained, for a long time, in the harbours, without a possibility of being put to sea; when they were all assembled at the place appointed for their conjunction, they waited for a wind; all the delay that can be objected, was produced by the seasons, of which the regulation was in no man's power.

But the time, sir, which was unwillingly spent in the camp, was not, however, lost or misemployed, for the troops were, by the order of the general, every day exercised, and instructed in the art of war, so that what was lost in time, was more than recompensed by the advantage of better discipline.

Nor did these troops appear an herd so ignorant and contemptible, as they have been represented by malicious invectives and ludicrous descriptions; there were not, indeed, among them many grey-headed warriours, nor were their former campaigns and past exploits the subjects of their conversation; but there was not one amongst them who did not appear ready to suffer, in the cause of his country, all that the most hardened veteran could undergo, or whose alacrity and eagerness did not promise perseverance in the march, and intrepidity in the battle.

Their general, sir, who saw them pursue their exercises, declared how much he was satisfied with their proficiency, applauded their appearance, and expressed his confidence in their courage; nor do I doubt, but our enemies will find, that it is not necessary to send out our most formidable forces to humble them, and that the youth of Britain will compensate their want of experience by their courage.

If I, sir, have been drawn aside from the present question, it is by following, perhaps, with an exactness too scrupulous, the honourable gentleman, whose propositions I have now shown to be erroneous, and whose reproaches will, I believe, now appear rather the effects of disappointment than of zeal, and, therefore, I think it now necessary to return to the business before us, the consideration of the present establishment, from which, as it was approved by the duke of MARLBOROUGH, and has been defended with very strong arguments, by one of the most experienced officers of this time, I cannot think it safe or prudent to depart.

Mr. GRENVILLE spoke next, to the following effect:—Sir, as a noble person has been frequently hinted at in this debate, to whom my relation is well known, and whom, as I know him well, I have the strongest motives to reverence and honour, I cannot forbear to give, on this occasion, an attestation which he will be allowed to deserve by all those whom interest has not blinded, and corruption depraved.

It will be allowed, sir, that he is one of those who are indebted for their honours only to merit, one whom the malice of a court cannot debase, as its favour cannot exalt; he is one of those whose loss of employments can be a reproach only to those who take them from him, as he cannot forfeit them but by performing his duty, and can only give offence by steady integrity, and a resolution to speak as he thinks, and to act as his conscience dictates.

There are, sir, men, I know, to whom this panegyrick will seem romantick and chimerical, men, to whom integrity and conscience are idle sounds, men, who are content to catch the word of their leader, who have no sense of the obligation of any law but the supreme will of him that pays them, and who know not any virtue but diligence in attendance, and readiness in obedience.

It is surely, sir, no loss to the noble person to be debarred from any fellowship with men like these. Nothing can be more unpleasing to virtue than such a situation as lays it under a necessity of beholding wickedness that cannot be reformed; as the sight of a pesthouse must raise horrour, though we should suppose the spectator secure from the contagion.

Mr. ORD spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, as I cannot approve the scheme now proposed, for augmenting our forces, I shall endeavour to show why the arguments, by which it has hitherto been supported, have failed to convince me, and shall lay before the house some reasons against it, to which I shall expect an answer, before I shall think that I can agree to it, without squandering the money of which my constituents have intrusted me with the disposal.

The argument, sir, with which this motion was introduced, which is, indeed, the strongest that has yet been offered, was, that this estimate is less expensive than one that was laid before the house in a late reign, and that, therefore, it could not reasonably be charged with extravagance.

Let us now consider this argument with that care which is required by the importance of the question, let us inquire what consequences will follow from it, and to what previous suppositions it must owe its force.

The argument, sir, evidently supposes that the estimate in king William's reign was drawn up without any intention to deceive the house, or to raise money for purposes different from those for which it was really expended. But if we suppose that estimate to be fraudulently calculated, this may contain the same fallacies in a lower degree, and the only merit that can be claimed by the authors of it, will be, that they are not the most rapacious plunderers of their country, that, however they may be charged with profusion of publick money, they are yet more modest than some of their predecessors.

But it is known, sir, that in king William's reign, very few estimates were honestly computed; it is known that the rotation of parties, and fluctuation of measures, reduced the ministry to subsist upon artifices, to amuse the senate with exorbitant demands, only that they might obtain the necessary grants, and to pretend expenses which never were incurred, that the supplies which the publick affairs really required, might not be withheld; as fraudulent tradesmen fix immoderate prices, that the buyer may make offers proportionate to their demands.

The estimates, therefore, of that reign are of very little authority, though they might sometimes pass the house without censure; for it is to be considered, that by the frequency of new elections, the greatest part of the members were often unacquainted with the state of publick accounts, and that an army was so little known to this kingdom, that the true expense of it might easily be concealed.

Nor is this, sir, the only fallacy of this argument; for it supposes, likewise, that the nation is no less wealthy than in the time when that computation was offered, with which this is so triumphantly compared. For every man knows that publick as well as private expenses are to be proportioned to the revenue by which they are supplied, and that the charges which are easily supported at one time, may threaten ruin at another.

But unhappily, sir, it is evident, that, since the days of that sovereign, the nation has been exhausted by a long and wasteful war, and since, by a peace equally destructive, it is embarrassed with an enormous debt, and entangled in treaties, of which the support may call every day for new expenses; it has suffered since that time a thousand losses, but gained no advantage, and yet the expenses of that time are mentioned as an example to be compared with those which are proposed in this.

The difference of the condition of the British nation at those two periods of time, sir, is not less than that of the strength of the same man in the vigour of youth and the frigidity of old age, in the flush of health and the languor of disease, of the same man newly risen from rest and plenty, and debilitated with hunger and fatigue.

To make such a comparison, sir, betrays, at least, a very criminal insensibility, of the publick misery, if it may not be charged with greater malignity. I know not whether those who shall hear of this debate, may not impute such reflections rather to cruelty than negligence, and imagine that those who squander the treasure of the nation take pleasure in reproaching that poverty which their counsels produce, and indulge their own vanity by contemplating the calamities from which they are themselves secure, and to which they are indebted for opportunities of increasing their own fortunes, and gratifying their ambition. It is evident, that an estimate which requires less than that which has been mentioned, may yet exact more than the nation can now raise, without feeling too great inconveniencies to be compensated by the advantages which can be expected from our new forces. Nor is it sufficient that it is lower than those of former times; for, as it ought to be the care of the government to preserve the ease and happiness of the people, it should be reduced in proportion to the diminution of the national wealth.

The right honourable gentleman confesses, sir, that frugality is a virtue, and his argument supposes that to contract expenses is an argument of prudent measures; why then is he afraid of carrying virtue to a greater height, of making the burden still more light, and preferring the cheapest estimate that can be proposed, when it is asserted by those whose authority is most worthy of regard, that it will produce no weakness in our troops, nor give our enemies any superiority?

I do not pretend any other skill in military affairs, than may be gained by casual conversation with soldiers, and by a cursory observation of daily occurrences; but I speak with greater confidence on this occasion, because I do not think any other qualifications necessary for the determination of this question, than a habit of just reasoning, and freedom from the prejudices of interest.

Every man knows, sir, without a military education, that it is imprudent to purchase any thing at a greater price which may be procured at a less, and that when the same sum will buy two things, of which one is evidently preferable to the other, the best ought to be chosen.

If the application of either of these two positions will decide this controversy, there will be no need of recurring to experience, of citing the authority of foreign commanders, of comparing the actions of the German and British generals, or of inquiring how battles have been lost, or to what victories are to be ascribed.

It is evident, sir, that the scheme now proposed, is twice as costly as that which is recommended in opposition to it, and therefore, unless it will produce twice the advantage, it must be acknowledged to be imprudently chosen. The advantage in war, is to be rated by comparing the strength of different numbers in different circumstances, and inquiring what degree of superiority will be found.

If we suppose, sir, two bodies of men, equally armed and disciplined, opposed to each other without any advantage of situation, we must conceive that neither party could be conquered, that the balance of the day must remain equal, and that the contest would continue undecided.

It cannot be objected to this supposition, sir, that no such event is recorded in history, because in war many causes really act which cannot be estimated; one army may consist of soldiers more courageous, and more confident in the justice of their cause; unforeseen accidents may operate, orders may be mistaken, or leaders may be misinformed; but all these considerations are to be set aside in speculation, because they may equally be alleged on either part.

Two bodies of men, sir, equally numerous, being, therefore, supposed equal, it is to be inquired how either may be superiour to the other. It is proposed, on one part, to produce this effect by doubling the number of officers rather than increasing that of the soldiers; on the other, to double the soldiers under the same officers, the expense being the same of both methods.

When two armies, modelled according to these different schemes, enter the field, what event can be expected? Either five thousand men, with a double number of officers, must be equal to ten thousand, differently regulated, or the publick has paid more for assistance of the officers than its real value, and has chosen, of two methods equally expensive, that which is least efficacious.

This, sir, is the state of the question now before us; our present deficiency is not of men but money, and we may procure ten thousand men regulated like the foreign troops, at the same expense as five thousand in the form proposed; but I am afraid that no man will be found to assert, that the addition of officers will be equivalent to a double number of soldiers.

Thus it is evident, sir, evident to demonstration, that the most expensive method is, at the same time, the least advantageous, and that the proposal of new regiments is intended to augment the strength of the ministry rather than of the army.

If we suppose, sir, what is more than any foreigner will grant, that the additional officers raise a body of five thousand men to an equality with six thousand, is not the pay of four thousand men apparently thrown away? And do not the officers receive a reward which their service cannot deserve? Would it not be far more rational to raise seven thousand, by which our army would be stronger by a seventh part, and as the pay of three thousand would be saved, the publick would be richer by almost a third.

Surely, sir, numerical arguments cannot but deserve some consideration, even from those who have learned by long practice to explain away mere probability at pleasure, to select the circumstances of complicated questions, and only to show those which may be produced in favour of their own opinions.

In the present question, sir, there is very little room for fallacy; nor do I see what remains to the decision of it, but that those gentlemen who have been acquainted with military operations, inform us, what degree of superiority is conferred by any assignable number of officers; that we may compare their service with the price, and discover whether the same money will not purchase greater advantages.

The experience of the late war may evince, sir, that those troops which have the greatest number of officers are not always victorious; for our establishment never admitted the same, or nearly the same number with that of the French, our enemies; nevertheless, we still boast of our victories; nor is it certain that we might not have been equally successful, though the number of our officers had been yet less.

Foreigners, sir, are very far from discovering the defect of their own establishment, or imagining that they should become more formidable by imitating our methods. When I travelled, I took opportunities of conversing with the generals of those nations which are most famous for the valour of their troops, and was informed by them, that they thought a multitude of officers by no means useful, and that they were so far from desiring to see their own regulation changed, that they should make no scruple of recommending it to other nations, who, in their opinion, squandered their treasure upon useless commissions, and increased the calamities of war by unnecessary burdens.

I hope no man will think it sufficient to reply to these arguments with general assertions, or will deny the necessity of frugality, and extol the opulence of the nation, the extent of our commerce, and the happiness of our condition. Such indeed, sir, is the method of argumentation made use of by the hireling scribblers of the court, who, because they feel none of the publick calamities, represent all complaints as criminal murmurs, and charge those with sedition who petition only for relief. Wretches like these would celebrate our victories, though our country should be overrun by an invader, would praise the lenity of any government by which themselves should be spared, and would boast of the happiness of plenty, when half the people should be languishing with famine.

I do not suppose, sir, that the despicable sophistry of prostitutes like these has any effect here, nor should I have thought them worthy of the least notice, had it not been proper to inquire, whether those may not be justly suspected of some inclination to deceive, even in this assembly, by whom the most profligate of mankind are openly paid for the promulgation of falsehood, and the patronage of corruption.

It is indeed, sir, artful, in those who are daily impairing our honour and influence, to endeavour to conceal from the people their own weakness, that weakness which is so well known in foreign countries, that every nation is encouraged to insult us, and by which it may reasonably be imagined that new enemies will, in a short time, be raised.

The late changes in our military regulations have, indeed, taken away all the terrour of our arms; those troops are now no longer dreaded, by which the liberties of Europe were recovered, and the French reduced to abandon their schemes of universal empire, for the defence of their own country, because the officers by whom they were formerly conducted to glory and to victory, are now dismissed, and men advanced to their posts, who are neither feared nor known.

When the duke of ARGYLE was lately deprived of his command, the Spaniards could not conceal their satisfaction; they bestowed, however unwillingly, the highest panegyrick upon his bravery and conduct, by showing that he was the only Briton of whom they were afraid. Nor did their allies, the French, discover less exultation; for by them it was declared, that the nation was now disarmed, that either no war was intended, or that none could be successfully prosecuted, since, as they made no scruple to assert, though I know not whether I ought to repeat it, we have no other man capable of commanding armies, or conducting any great design.

I am informed that this illustrious warriour, whose abilities are sufficiently attested by these enemies, that have felt their prevalence, is of opinion, that the number of officers now required is not necessary, and has declared that he should with equal confidence undertake either invasion or defence, with forces modelled after the German custom; and since I have shown, that, unless the troops so regulated, are equivalent to a double number, added to the standing regiments, part of the expense of the officers is evidently squandered, I shall vote against the motion, unless it be proved, which I believe will not be attempted, that the force of a regiment is doubled by doubling the officers.

General WADE then spoke, to the purpose following:—Sir, the learned gentleman who spoke last, must be acknowledged to have discovered a very specious method of reasoning, and to have carried his inquiry as far as speculation without experience can hope to proceed, but has, in my opinion, admitted a false principle, by which all his argument has been perplexed.

He supposes, that the advantages must be always in proportion to the money expended in procuring them, and that, therefore, if five thousand men, raised at any given cost, will be equal to five thousand, they ought, if they are regulated according to an establishment of double the charge, to be able to encounter ten thousand.

But in this supposition, sir, he forgets that the possibility of loss is to be thrown into the balance against the advantage of the expense saved, and that though the strength of the troops be not increased in proportion to the increase of the cost, yet the additional security against a great loss may justly entitle the most expensive regulation to the preference.

Suppose five thousand men to be brought into the field against six thousand; if they can, by multiplying their officers at a double expense, be enabled to engage successfully a body superiour in number by only a sixth part, the nation may be justly said to gain all that would have been lost by suffering a defeat.

That we ought not to choose a worse method when we can discover a better, is indisputably true, but which method is worse or better, can be discovered only by experience. The last war has taught us, that our troops in their present establishment are superiour to the forces of France, but how much they might suffer by any alteration it is not possible to foresee.

Success is gained by courage, and courage is produced by an opinion of superiority; and it may easily be imagined, that our soldiers, who judge of their own strength only by experience, imagine their own establishment and discipline advanced to the highest perfection; nor would they expect any other consequences from an alteration of it, but weakness and defeats. It is, therefore, dangerous to change the model of our forces, because it is dangerous to depress the spirit of our soldiers.

Though it is confessed, sir, that the French, whose officers are still more numerous, have been conquered by our troops, it must be likewise alleged, that they had yielded us far easier victories had their officers been wanting; for to them are they indebted for their conquests wherever they have been successful, and for their resistance wherever they have been with difficulty defeated; their soldiers are a spiritless herd, and were they not invigorated by the example of their leaders, and restrained by the fear of instant punishment, would fly at the approach of any enemy, without waiting for the attack.

I cannot, therefore, sir, but be of opinion, that the necessity of a large number of officers, may be learned even from the behaviour of those troops which have been unsuccessful, since it is certain, that though they have been often overcome, they have generally resisted with great steadiness, and retired with great order.

If those, who are only speculative warriours, shall imagine that their arguments are not confuted, I can only repeat what I declared when I first attempted to deliver my sentiments in this debate, that I do not pretend to be very skilful in the arts of disputation. I, who claim no other title than that of an old soldier, cannot hope to prevail much by my oratory; it is enough for me that I am confident of confuting those arguments in the field, which I oppose in the senate.

Mr. FOX spoke next, in this manner:—Sir, I am far from thinking that this question has been hitherto fully explained by those who have either considered it only as a dispute about money, or a question merely speculative concerning the proportions between different degrees of expense, and probability of success. In a war of this kind, expense is the last and lowest consideration, and where experience may be consulted, the conjectures of speculation ought to have no weight.

The method, sir, by which our troops have hitherto been regulated, is well known to have produced success beyond our expectations, to have exalted us to the arbitration of the world, to have reduced the French to change their threats of forcing a monarch upon us, into petitions for peace, and to have established the liberties of almost every nation of the world that can call itself free.

Whether this method, sir, so successful, so easy, and so formidable, shall be changed, whether it shall be changed at a time when the whole continent is in commotion, and every nation calling soldiers to its standard; when the French, recovered from their defeats, seem to have forgotten the force of that hand that crushed them in the pride of victory; when they seem to be reviving their former designs, and rekindling their extinguished ambition; whether, at such a time, the regulations of our army shall be changed to save, upon the highest computation, only thirty thousand pounds, is the present question.

On such a question, sir, I cannot observe, without astonishment, any man deliberating for a single moment. To suspend our opinion in this case, would be to balance our lives, our liberties, our patrimonies, and our posterity, against thirty thousand pounds.

The effects of our present method, sir, are well known to ourselves, our confederates, our enemies, to every man that has heard the name of Blenheim and Ramillies; the consequences of the establishment, now contended for, our most experienced commanders own themselves unable to foresee, and I am far from believing that theoretical disquisitions can enable any man to make great discoveries in military affairs.

Our own inexperience of the method which is so warmly recommended, is not the strongest objection to it, though even this ought, in my opinion, to restrain us from trying it at this hazardous conjuncture. But since arguments, merely negative, may be thought over-balanced by the prospect of saving money, I shall lay before the house, what effects the want of officers has produced, with regard to those nations whose poverty has laid them under a necessity of parsimonious establishments.

When the Germans were defeated by the French, in the late war, I was at the Sardinian court, where the battle was, as it may easily be supposed, the reigning subject of conversation, and where they did not want opportunities of informing themselves minutely of all the circumstances which contributed to the event; it was there, sir, universally determined, that the Germans lost the day merely for want of officers.

It was observed also, sir, that some troops, which were once courted and feared by all the neighbouring potentates, had lost their reputation in later times, of which no reason could be alleged, but that they had lessened the number of their officers; such is the change in the model of the Walloons, and such is the consequence produced by it.

I am very far, sir, from thinking, that reason is not to be consulted in military operations, as in other affairs, and have no less satisfaction than the learned gentleman who spoke last but one, in clear and demonstrative deductions; but in this question, reason itself informs me, that regard ought only to be had to experience, and that authority unsupported by practice, ought to have no prevalence.

I shall, therefore, sir, make no inquiry into the abilities of the generals, by whom these contrary opinions are defended, nor draw any parallel between their actions or their knowledge. It is sufficient for me that the one is proposing a new scheme, and that the opinion of the other can plead the practice of king William, and the duke of MARLBOROUGH, and the success of the last war.

Yet, sir, if parsimony be a virtue at this time so eminently necessary, it may be urged in favour of this estimate, that it will be less expensive than those that have been formerly offered, and that as all changes ought to be gradual, this may be considered as the first step towards a general reduction of the publick charge.

Mr. HEATHCOTE spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, it is not without astonishment, that I heard the honourable gentleman who spoke lately, conclude his remarks with an attempt to renew our apprehensions of the pretender, a chimerical invader, an enemy in the clouds, without spirit, and without forces, without dominions, without money, and without allies; a miserable fugitive, that has not a friend in this kingdom, or none but such as are exasperated by those whom the men that mention him with so much terrour are attempting to vindicate.

The vanity, sir, of such fears, the folly of admitting them, if they are real, and of counterfeiting them, if they are false, has been sufficiently exposed in this debate, by my honourable friend; but as he thought it unnecessary to employ arguments in proof of what cannot be denied, and believed it sufficient to ridicule a panick which he supposed merely political, I, who judge, perhaps, more favourably of the sincerity of some, and more tenderly of the cowardice of others, shall endeavour to show, that the frequent revolutions which have happened in this nation, afford us no reason for fearing another, equally sudden and unforeseen in favour of the pretender.

The government, sir, is always stronger, as it is complicated with the private interest of more individuals; because, though there are few that have comprehension sufficient to discern the general advantage of the community, almost every man is capable of attending to his own; and though not many have virtue to stand up in opposition to the approach of general calamities, of which every one may hope to exempt himself from his particular share, yet the most sanguine are alarmed, and the most indolent awakened at any danger which threatens themselves, and will exert their utmost power to obviate or escape it.

For this reason, sir, I have long considered the publick funds established in this nation, as a barrier to the government, which cannot easily be broken: a foreign prince cannot now be placed upon the throne, but in opposition almost to every wealthy man, who, having trusted the government with his money, has reposited a pledge of his own fidelity.

But to this gentleman, sir, whom I am now answering, arguments can be of very little importance, because, by his own confession, he is retained as a mere machine, to speak at the direction of another, and to utter sentiments which he never conceived, and which his hesitation and abrupt conclusion shows him to admit with very little examination. He had not even allowed himself time to know the opinion which he was to assert, or to imprint upon his memory those arguments to which he was to add the sanction of his authority. He seems to have boldly promised to speak, and then to have inquired what he was to say. Yet has this gentleman often declaimed here with all the apparent ardour of integrity, and been heard with that regard which is only due to virtue and independence.

Some of his assertions are such, however, as require confutation, which is, perhaps, more necessary since he has produced an authority for them, which many of those who heard him may think of much greater weight than his own. He affirms, that we can suffer only by an invasion, and infers from this position, that we need only to guard our own coasts. I am of an opinion very different, and having not yet prevailed upon myself to receive notes from any other person, cannot forbear to speak what I think, and what the publick prosperity requires to be generally known. We may surely suffer by many other causes, by the ignorance, or treachery, or cowardice of the ministry, by the negligence of that person to whom this gentleman was probably indebted for his notes. We may suffer by the loss of our sugar colonies, which may be justly valued at ten millions.

These plantations, which afford us almost all the profitable trade that is now left us, have been exposed to the insults of the enemy, without any other guard than two ships, almost unfit for service. They have been left to the protection of chance, with no other security, at a time when the Spaniards had fitted out a squadron, to infest and ravage our American dominions.

The admiral, who was sent into America, was confined for almost a year in the ports, without forces, ships, or ammunition, which yet might have been sent in a few months, had not pretences of delay been studiously invented, had not the preparations been obstructed by clandestine expedients, and had not every man been tacitly assured, that he should recommend himself to his superiours, by raising difficulties, rather than by removing them.

Such was the conduct of those who now stand up in the face of their country, and, without diffidence or shame, boast of their zeal, their assiduity, and their despatch; who proclaim, with an air of triumphant innocence, that no art or diligence could have been more expeditious, and that the embarkation was only impeded by the seasons and the winds.

With assertions equally intrepid, and arguments equally contemptible, has the same person, who boasted his expedition, endeavoured to defend the establishment of new regiments, in opposition to the practice of foreign nations, and to the opinion of the greatest general among us; and, to show how little he fears confutation, has recommended his scheme on account of its frugality.

It is not to be wondered, sir, that such an orator should undertake to defend the model of the troops sent to America, that he should prefer boys to veterans, and assert the propriety of intrusting new levies to unexperienced commanders; for he has given us in this debate such proofs of controversial courage, that nothing can be now imagined too arduous for him to attempt.

His strength, sir, is, indeed, not equal to his spirit, and he is frequently unsuccessful in his most vigorous efforts, but it must be confessed that he is generally overborne only by the force of truth, by a power which few can resist so resolutely as himself, and which, therefore, though it makes no impression upon him, prevails upon others to leave him sometimes alone in the vindication of his positions.

The examples, sir, of those noble persons who were advanced early to commissions, will be produced by him without effect, because the cases are by no means parallel. They were not invested with command till they had spent some time in the service, and exhibited proofs of their courage and their capacity; and it cannot be doubted, but some men may discover at seventeen, more merit than others in the full strength of manhood.

But, sir, there is another consideration of more importance, which will annihilate the parallel, and destroy the argument founded upon it. At the time in which these persons were preferred, the nation had but newly seen an army, and had, therefore, very few old officers whose experience could be trusted, or whose services required to be rewarded: the ministers were obliged to select those, who, though they did not understand the military sciences, were likely to attain them in a short time, and the event has sufficiently proved, that in the choice no greater regard was paid to interest than to judgment.

It was prudent, likewise, sir, to choose young persons, supposing their abilities equal with those of others, because the nation was likely to possess them longer, and would not be reduced, by an interval of peace, to make war again with raw forces, under the direction of ignorant commanders.

But this provision, however reasonable, the wisdom of this ministry has found means to defeat, by detaining at home the disciplined troops, and depriving the most experienced generals of their commands, at a time when they are most necessary, at a time when the whole world is in arms, when the ambition of France is reviving its claims, and the Spaniards are preparing to invade our colonies.

But, sir, though our generals are discarded, we are sufficiently informed, that it is not because we are imagined to be in a state of safety; for the increase of our army betrays our fear, of which, whether it will be dispelled or increased by such measures, it is not difficult to determine.

An army thus numerous, sir, is, in the opinion of every honest Briton, of every man that reveres the constitution, or loves his liberty, an evil more to be dreaded, than any from which we can be defended by it. The most unpopular act of the most unpopular of our monarchs, was the establishment of a standing-army; nor do I know any thing to be feared from the exaltation of the dreadful pretender to the throne, but that he will govern the nation with an armed force.

If our troops continue to be increased, which we may reasonably suspect, since, if arguments like these be admitted, pretences for augmentations can never be wanting, the consequences are easily foreseen; they will grow too numerous to be quartered in the towns, and, with an affectation of easing them of such unwelcome guests, it will be proposed, that after having spent the summer in a camp, they shall retire in winter to barracks. Then will the burden of a standing army be imposed for ever on the nation; then may our liberties be openly invaded, and those who now oppress us by the power only of money, will then throw aside the mask, and deliver themselves from the constraint of hypocrisy; those who now sooth us with promises and protestations, will then intimidate us with threatenings, and, perhaps, revenge the opposition of their schemes by persecution and sequestrations.

Mr. GAGE spoke next, to the following effect:—Sir, if the weakness of arguments proved the insincerity of those who produce them, I should be inclined to suspect the advocates for the establishment of new regiments, of designs very different from the defence of their country; but as their intentions cannot be known, they cannot be censured, and I shall, therefore, confine myself to an examination of the reasons which they have offered, and the authorities which they have cited.

The German general, who has been mentioned on this occasion with so much regard, is not less known to me than to the honourable gentleman, nor have I been less diligent to improve the hours in which I enjoyed his friendship and conversation. Among other questions, which my familiarity with him entitled me to propose, I have asked him to what causes he imputed the ill success of the last war, and he frankly ascribed the miscarriages of it to the unhappy divisions by which the German councils were at that time embarrassed.

Faction produces nearly the same consequence in all countries, and had then influenced the imperial court, as of late the court of Great Britain, to dismiss the most able and experienced commanders, and to intrust the conduct of the war to men unequal to the undertaking; who, when they were defeated for want of skill, endeavoured to persuade their patrons and their countrymen, that they lost the victory for want of officers.

They might, perhaps, think of their countrymen, what our ministers seem to imagine of us, that to gain belief among them, it was sufficient to assert boldly, that they had not any memory of past transactions, and that, therefore, they could not observe, that the same troops were victorious under Eugene, which were defeated under the direction of his successours; nor could discover that the regulation was the same, where the effects were different.

Thus, in every place, it is the practice of men in power, to blind the people by false representations, and to impute the publick calamities rather to any other cause than their own misconduct. It is every where equally their practice to oppress and obscure those who owe their greatness to their virtue or abilities, because they can never be reduced to blind obedience, or taught to be creatures of the ministry, because men who can discover truth, will sometimes speak it, and because those are best qualified to deceive others, who can be persuaded that they are contending for the right.

But it is surely time for this nation to rouse from indolence, and to resolve to put an end to frauds that have been so long known. It is time to watch with more vigilance the distribution of the publick treasure, and to consider rather how to contract the national expenses, than upon what pretences new offices may be erected, and new dependencies created. It is time to consider how our debts may be lessened, and by what expedients our taxes may be diminished.

Our taxes, sir, are such, at present, as perhaps no nation was ever loaded with before, such as never were paid to raise forces against an invader, or imposed by the insolence of victory upon a conquered people. Every gentleman pays to the government more than two thirds of his estate, by various exactions.—This assertion is received, I see, with surprise, by some, whose ample patrimonies have exempted them from the necessity of nice computations, and with an affected appearance of contempt by others, who, instead of paying taxes, may be said to receive them, and whose interest it is to keep the nation ignorant of the causes of its misery, and to extenuate those calamities by which themselves are enriched.

But, sir, to endeavour to confute demonstration by a grin, or to laugh away the deductions of arithmetick, is, surely, such a degree of effrontery, as nothing but a post of profit can produce; nor is it for the sake of these men, that I shall endeavour to elucidate my assertion; for they cannot but be well informed of the state of our taxes, whose chief employment is to receive and to squander the money which arises from them.

It is frequent, sir, among gentlemen, to mistake the amount of the taxes which are laid upon the nation, by passing over, in their estimates, all those which are not paid immediately out of the visible rents of their lands, and imagining that they are in no degree interested in the imposts upon manufactures or other commodities. They do not consider that whenever they purchase any thing of which the price is enhanced by duties, those duties are levied upon them, and that there is no difference between paying ten shillings a year in land taxes, and paying five shillings in land taxes, and five shillings to manufacturers to be paid by them to the government.

It would be, in reality, equally rational for a man to please himself with his frugality, by directing half his expenses to be paid by his steward, and the event is such as might be expected from such a method of economy; for, as the steward might probably bring in false accounts, the tradesman commonly adds twopence to the price of his goods for every penny which is laid on them by the government; as it is easy to show, particularly in the prices of those two great necessaries of life, candles and leather.

Now, sir, let any gentleman add to the land tax the duties raised from the malt, candles, salt, soap, leather, distilled liquors, and other commodities used in his house; let him add the expenses of travelling so far as they are increased by the burden laid upon innkeepers, and the extortions of the tradesmen which the excises have occasioned, and he will easily agree with me that he pays more than two-thirds of his estate for the support of the government.

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that it is now necessary to stop in our career of expenses, and to inquire how much longer this weight of imposts can possibly be supported. It has already, sir, depressed our commerce, and overborne our manufactures, and if it be yet increased, if there be no hope of seeing it alleviated, every wise man will seek a milder government and enlist himself amongst slaves that have masters more wise or more compassionate.

We ought to consider, sir, whether some of our present expenses are not superfluous or detrimental, whether many of our offices are not merely pensions without employment, and whether multitudes do not receive salaries, who serve the government only by their interest and their votes. Such offices, if they are found, ought immediately to be abolished, and such salaries withdrawn, by which a fund might be now established for maintaining the war, and afterwards for the payment of our debts.

It is not now, sir, in my opinion, a question whether we shall choose the dearest or the cheapest method of increasing our forces, for it seems to me not possible to supply any new expenses. New troops will require more money to raise and to pay them, and more money can only be obtained by new taxes; but what now remains to be taxed, or what tax can be increased? The only resource left us is a lottery, and whether that will succeed is likewise a lottery; but though folly and credulity should once more operate according to our wishes, the nation is, in the meantime, impoverished, and at last lotteries must certainly fail, like other expedients. When the publick wealth is entirely exhausted, artifice and violence will be equally vain. And though the troops may possibly be raised, according to the estimate, I know not how we shall pay them, or from what fund, yet unmortgaged, the officers who will be entailed upon us, can hope to receive their half-pay.

For my part, sir, I think the question so easy to be decided, that I am astonished to see it the subject of a debate, and imagine that the controversy might be ended only by asking the gentleman, on whose opinion all his party appear to rely, without any knowledge or conviction of their own, whether, if he were to defend a nation from its enemies, and could procure only a small sum for the war, he would not model his forces by the cheapest method.

Mr. SLOPER then spoke thus:—Sir, I cannot, without the highest satisfaction, observe any advances made in useful knowledge, by my fellow-subjects, as the glory of such attainments must add to the reputation of the kingdom which gives rise to such elevated abilities.

This satisfaction I have received from the observations of the right honourable member, whose accurate computations cannot but promise great improvements of the doctrine of arithmetick; nor can I forbear to solicit him, for the sake of the publick, to take into his consideration the present methods of traffick used by our merchants, and to strike out some more commodious method of stating the accoinpts between those two contending parties, debtor and creditor. This he would, doubtless, execute with great reputation, who has proved, from the state of our taxes, that new forces require new funds, and that new funds cannot be established without a lottery.

I am, indeed, inclined to differ from him in the last of his positions, and believe the nation not yet so much exhausted but that it may easily bear the expense of the war, and shall, therefore, vote for that establishment of our troops which will be most likely to procure success, without the least apprehension of being censured either by the present age, or by posterity, as a machine of the ministry, or an oppressor of my country.

General WADE spoke again, thus:—Sir, since the right honourable member has been pleased to insinuate, that by answering a plain question I may put an end to the debate, I am willing to give a proof of my desire to promote unanimity in our councils, and despatch in our affairs, by complying with his proposal.

If I were obliged with a small sum to raise an army for the defence of a kingdom, I should, undoubtedly, proceed with the utmost frugality; but this noble person's ideas of frugality would, perhaps, be very different from mine; he would think those expenses superfluous, which to me would seem indispensably necessary, and though we should both intend the preservation of the country, we should provide for its security by different methods.

He would employ the money in such a manner as might procure the greatest numbers; I should make my first inquiry after the most skilful officers, and should imagine myself obliged, by my fidelity to the nation that intrusted me with its defence, to procure their assistance, though at a high price.

It is not easy for persons who have never seen a battle or a siege, whatever may be their natural abilities, or however cultivated by reading and contemplation, to conceive the advantage of discipline and regularity, which is such, that a small body of veteran troops will drive before them multitudes of men, perhaps equally bold and resolute with themselves, if they are unacquainted with the rules of war, and unprovided with leaders to direct their motions.

I should, therefore, in the case which he has mentioned, prefer discipline to numbers, and rather enter the field with a few troops, well governed and well instructed, than with a confused multitude, unacquainted with their duty, unable to conduct themselves, and without officers to conduct them.

Mr. VINER spoke next, to the following effect:—Sir, I am not very solicitous what may be the determination of the house upon this question, because I think it more necessary to resolve against an augmentation of the army, than to inquire, whether it shall be made by one method or another.

Every addition to our troops, I consider as some approach towards the establishment of arbitrary power, as it is an alienation of part of the British people, by which they are deprived of the benefits of the constitution, and subjected to rigorous laws, from which every other individual is exempt.

The principal of these laws, which all the rest are intended to enforce, requires from every soldier an unlimited and absolute obedience to the commands of his officers, who hold their commission, and expect advancement, by the same compliance with the orders of the ministry.

The danger of adding to the number of men, thus separated from their fellow-subjects, and directed by the arbitrary determinations of their officers, has been often explained with great strength and perspicuity; nor should I have taken this occasion of recalling it to the attention of the house, but that I think it a consideration, to which, in all debates on the army, the first regard ought to be paid.

Colonel MORDAUNT spoke to the purpose following:—Sir, the objection which the honourable gentleman has raised, will be most easily removed, by considering the words of the act by which the military authority is established, where it is by no means declared, that either officers or soldiers are obliged indiscriminately to obey all the orders which they shall receive, but that they shall, on pain of the punishments there enacted, obey all the lawful orders of their commanders.

The obedience, therefore, sir, required from a soldier, is an obedience according to law, like that of any other Briton, unless it can be imagined that the word lawful is, in that place, without a meaning. Nor does his condition differ from that of his fellow-subjects by an exemption from any law, but by a greater number of duties, and stricter obligations to the performance of them; and I am not able to conceive how our constitution can be endangered by augmenting an army, which, as it can only act in conformity to it, can act only in defence of it.

[The question at last was put, that the new-raised troops be incorporated into the standing corps, but it passed in the negative, 232 to 166.]

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HOUSE OF LORDS, DEC. 9, 1740.

DEBATE ON TAKING THE STATE OF THE ARMY INTO CONSIDERATION.

The duke of ARGYLE rose first, and spoke to the following effect:—My lords, as the present situation of our affairs may require an augmentation of our forces, and as the success of our arms, and the preservation of our liberties, may equally depend upon the manner in which the new forces shall be raised, there is, in my opinion, no question more worthy the attention of this august assembly, than what may be the most proper method of increasing our army.

On this question, my lords, I shall offer my own sentiments with greater confidence, as there are few men who have had more opportunities of being acquainted with it in its whole extent, as I have spent great part of my life in the field and in the camp. I commanded a regiment under king William, and have long been either the first, or almost the first man in the army.

I hope, my lords, it will be allowed, without difficulty, that I have, at least, been educated at the best school of war, and that nothing but natural incapacity can have hindered me from making some useful observations upon the discipline and government of armies, and the advantages and inconveniencies of the various plans upon which other nations regulate their forces.

I have always maintained, my lords, that it is necessary, in the present state of the neighbouring countries, to keep up a body of regular troops, that we may not be less able to defend ourselves, than our enemies to attack us.

It is well known, my lords, that states must secure themselves by different means, as they are threatened by dangers of different kinds: policy must be opposed by policy, and force by force; our fleets must be increased when our neighbours grow formidable by their naval power, and armies must be maintained at a time like this, in which every prince on the continent estimates his greatness by the number of his troops.

But an army, my lords, as it is to be admitted only for the security of the nation, is to be so regulated, that it may produce the end for which it is established; that it may be useful without danger, and protect the people without oppressing them.

To this purpose, my lords, it is indispensably necessary, that the military subordination be inviolably preserved, and that discipline be discreetly exercised without any partial indulgence, or malicious severities; that every man be promoted according to his desert, and that military merit alone give any pretensions to military preferment.

To make the army yet more useful, it ought to be under the sole command of one man, exalted to the important trust by his known skill, courage, justice, and fidelity, and uncontrouled in the administration of his province by any other authority, a man enabled by his experience to distinguish the deserving, and invested with power to reward them.

Thus, my lords, ought an army to be regulated, to which the defence of a nation is intrusted, nor can any other scheme be formed which will not expose the publick to dangers more formidable than revolutions or invasions. And yet, my lords, how widely those who have assumed the direction of affairs have deviated from this method is well known. It is known equally to the highest and meanest officers, that those who have most opportunities of observing military merit, have no power of rewarding it; and, therefore, every man endeavours to obtain other recommendations than those of his superiours in the army, and to distinguish himself by other services than attention to his duty, and obedience to his commanders.

Our generals, my lords, are only colonels with a higher title, without power, and without command; they can neither make themselves loved nor feared in their troops, nor have either reward or punishment in their power. What discipline, my lords, can be established by men, whom those who sometimes act the farce of obedience, know to be only phantoms of authority, and to be restrained by an arbitrary minister from the exercise of those commissions which they are invested with? And what is an army without discipline, subordination, and obedience? What, but a rabble of licentious vagrants, set free from the common restraints of decency, exempted from the necessity of labour, betrayed by idleness to debauchery, and let loose to prey upon the people? Such a herd can only awe the villages, and bluster in the streets, but can never be able to oppose an enemy, or defend the nation by which they are supported.

They may, indeed, form a camp upon some of the neighbouring heaths, or pass in review with tolerable regularity; they may sometimes seize a smuggler, and sometimes assist a constable with vigour and success. But unhappy would be the people, who had no other force to oppose against an army habituated to discipline, of which every one founds his hopes of honour and reward upon the approbation of the commander.

That no man will labour to no purpose, or undergo the fatigue of military vigilance, without an adequate motive; that no man will endeavour to learn superfluous duties, and neglect the easiest road to honour and to wealth, merely for the sake of encountering difficulties, is easily to be imagined. And, therefore, my lords, it cannot be conceived, that any man in the army will very solicitously apply himself to the duties of his profession, of which, when he has learned them, the most accurate practice will avail him nothing, and on which he must lose that time, which might, have been employed in gaining an interest in a borough, or in forming an alliance with some orator in the senate.

For nothing, my lords, is now considered but senatorial interest, nor is any subordination desired but in the supreme council of the empire. For the establishment of this new regulation, the honours of every profession are prostituted, and every commission is become merely nominal. To gratify the leaders of the ministerial party, the most despicable triflers are exalted to an authority, and those whose want of understanding excludes them from any other employment, are selected for military commissions.

No sooner have they taken possession of their new command, and gratified with some act of oppression the wantonness of new authority, but they desert their charge with the formality of demanding a permission to be absent, which their commander dares not deny them. Thus, my lords, they leave the care of the troops, and the study of the rules of war, to those unhappy men who have no other claim to elevation than knowledge and bravery, and who, for want of relations in the senate, are condemned to linger out their lives at their quarters, amuse themselves with recounting their actions and sufferings in former wars, and with reading in the papers of every post, the cormissions which are bestowed on those who never saw a battle.

For this reason, my lords, preferments in the army, instead of being considered as proofs of merit, are looked on only as badges of dependence; nor can any thing be inferred from the promotion of an officer, but that he is in some degree or other allied to some member of the senate, or the leading voters of a borough.

After this manner, my lords, has the army been modelled, and on these principles has it subsisted for the last and the present reign; neither myself, nor any other general officer, have been consulted in the distribution of commands, or any part of military regulations. Our armies have known no other power than that of the secretary of war, who directs all their motions, and fills up every vacancy without opposition, and without appeal.

But never, my lords, was his power more conspicuous, than in raising the levies of last year; never was any authority more despotically exerted, or more tamely submitted to; never did any man more wantonly sport with his command, or more capriciously dispose of posts and preferments; never did any tyrant appear to set censure more openly at defiance, treat murmurs and remonstrances with greater contempt, or with more confidence and security distribute posts among his slaves, without any other reason of preference than his own uncontroulable pleasure.

And surely no man, my lords, could have made choice of such wretches for military commands, but to show that nothing but his own private inclinations should influence his conduct, and that he considered himself as supreme and unaccountable: for we have seen, my lords, the same animals to-day cringing behind a counter, and to-morrow swelling in a military dress; we have seen boys sent from school in despair of improvement, and intrusted with military command; fools that cannot learn their duty, and children that cannot perform it, have been indiscriminately promoted; the dross of the nation has been swept together to compose our new forces, and every man who was too stupid or infamous to learn or carry on a trade, has been placed, by this great disposer of honours, above the necessity of application, or the reach of censure.

Did not sometimes indignation, and sometimes pity, check the sallies of mirth, it would not be a disagreeable entertainment, my lords, to observe, in the park, the various appearances of these raw commanders, when they are exposing their new scarlet to view, and strutting with the first raptures of sudden elevation; to see the mechanick new-modelling his mien, and the stripling tottering beneath the weight of his cockade; or to hear the conversation of these new adventurers, and the instructive dialogues of schoolboys and shopkeepers.

I take this opportunity, my lords, of clearing myself from any suspicion of having contributed, by my advice, to this stupendous collection. I only once interposed with the recommendation of a young gentleman, who had learned his profession in two campaigns among the Muscovians, and whom yet neither his own desert, nor my patronage could advance to a commission. And, I believe, my lords, all the other general officers were equally unconsulted, and would, if their advice had been asked, equally have disapproved the measures that have been pursued.

But thus, my lords, were our new regiments completed, in which, of two hundred and fifty officers who have subsisted upon half-pay, only thirty-six have been promoted, though surely they might have pleaded a juster claim to employment, who had learned their profession in the service of their country, and had long languished in penury, than those who had neither knowledge nor capacity, who had neither acted nor suffered any thing, and who might have been destined to the hammer or the plough, without any disreputation to their families, or disappointment to themselves.

I have been told, indeed, my lords, that to some of these officers commissions were offered, which they refused, and for this refusal every reason is alleged but the true: some, indeed, excused themselves as disabled by age and infirmities from military service; nor can any objection be made to so just a plea. For how could those be refused in their age the comforts of ease and repose, who have served their country with their youth and vigour?

Others there are, my lords, who refused commissions upon motives very different, in which, nevertheless, some justice cannot be denied. They who had long studied and long practised their profession; they, who had tried their courage in the breach, and given proofs of their skill in the face of the enemy, refused to obey the command of novices, of tradesmen, and of schoolboys: they imagined, my lords, that they ought to govern those whom they should be obliged to instruct, and to lead those troops whom they must range in order. But they had forgot that they had outlived the time when a soldier was formed by study and experience, and had not heard, in their retreats, that a colonel or a captain was now formed in a day; and, therefore, when they saw and heard their new commanders, they retired back to their half-pay, with surprise and indignation.

But, my lords, the follies of last year cannot be easily rectified, and are only now to be exposed that they may not be repeated. If we are now to make new levies, and increase the number of our land-forces, it is, in my opinion, incumbent upon us to consider by what methods we may best augment our troops, and how we may be able to resist our foreign enemies, without exposing the nation to intestine miseries, and leaving our liberties at the mercy of the court.

There are, my lords, two methods of increasing our forces; the first is, that of raising new regiments; the other, of adding new men to those which already subsist.

By raising new regiments, my lords, we shall only gratify the minister with the distribution of new commissions, and the establishment of new dependents; we shall enlarge the influence of the court, and increase the charge of the nation, which is already loaded with too many taxes to support any unnecessary expense.

By the other method, of adding a hundred men to every company, we shall not only save the pay of the officers, which is no slight consideration, but what seems, if the reports raised by the ministry of our present danger be true, of far more importance, shall form the new forces with more expedition into regular troops; for, by distributing them among those who are already instructed in their duty, we shall give them an opportunity of hourly improvement; every man's comrade will be his master, and every one will be ambitious of forming himself by the example of those who have been in the army longer than themselves.

If it be objected, my lords, that the number of officers will not then bear a just proportion to that of the soldiers, it may be answered, that the foreign troops of the greatest reputation have no greater number of officers, as every one must know who is acquainted with the constitution of the most formidable armies of Europe. Those of the Prussian monarch, or of the various nations by which we were assisted in the late war, either as confederates or mercenaries, have but few officers. And I very well remember, my lords, that whenever they were joined by parties of our own nation, the inequality in the number of the officers produced contests and disputes.

The only troops of Europe, my lords, that swarm with officers, are those of France, but even these have fewer officers, in proportion to their private men, in time of war; for when they disband any part of their forces, they do not, like us, reduce their officers to half-pay, but add them to the regiments not reduced, that the families of their nobility may not be burdened with needy dependents, and that they may never want officers for new levies.

There are many reasons, my lords, that make this practice in France more reasonable than it would be in our kingdom. It is the chief view of their governours to continue absolute, and therefore their constant endeavour to keep great numbers in dependence; it ought to be our care to hinder the increase of the influence of the court, and to obstruct all measures that may extend the authority of the ministry, and therefore those measures are to be pursued by which independence and liberty will be most supported.

It is likewise to be remembered, my lords, that a French officer is supported with pay not much larger than that of a private soldier among us, and that, therefore, the argument which arises from the necessity of frugality is not of the same force in both nations.

There is yet another reason why the French are under the necessity of employing more officers than any other nation: the strength of their armies consists in their gentlemen, who cannot be expected to serve without some command: the common soldiers of the French army are a mean, spiritless, despicable herd, fit only to drudge as pioneers, to raise intrenchments, and to dig mines, but without courage to face an enemy, or to proceed with vigour in the face of danger.

Their gentlemen, my lords, are of a very different character; jealous of their honour, and conscious of their birth, eager of distinction, and ambitious of preferment. They have, commonly, their education in the army, and have no expectations of acquiring fortunes equal to their desires by any other profession, and are, therefore, intent upon the improvement of every opportunity which is offered them of increasing their knowledge and exalting their reputation.

To the spirit of these men, my lords, are the French armies indebted for all their victories, and to them is to be attributed the present perfection of the art of war. They have the vigilance and perseverance of Romans joined with the natural vivacity and expedition of their own nation.

We are, therefore, not to wonder, my lords, that there is in the French armies an establishment for more gentlemen than in other countries, where the disparity between the military virtues of the higher and lower classes of men is less conspicuous. In the troops of that nation nothing is expected but from the officers, but in ours the common soldier meets danger with equal intrepidity, and scorns to see himself excelled by his officer in courage or in zeal.

We are, therefore, my lords, under no necessity of burdening our country with the expense of new commissions, which, in the army, will be superfluous, and, in the state, dangerous, as they will fill our senate with new dependents, and our corporations with new adherents to the minister, whose steady perseverance in his favourite scheme of senatorial subordination, will be, perhaps, the only occasion of these new levies, or, at least, has hindered the right application of our standing troops. For what reason, my lords, can invention or imagination assign, why the troops, who had been for some time disciplined, were not rather sent to the assistance of Vernon than the new marines, except that some of them were commanded by men who had obtained seats in the other house, and who, by their settled adherence and avowed fidelity to the minister, had recommended themselves too powerfully to be rashly exposed in the service of their country to the bullets of the Spaniards.

So great, my lords, has been the minister's regard to senatorial abilities, and so strict his gratitude to his friends, that I know of but one member of the other house that has been hazarded in this expedition, and he a hopeless, abandoned patriot, insensible of the capacity or integrity of our ministry, and whom nothing has been able to reconcile to our late measures. He, therefore, who has never exerted himself in defence of the ministry, was, in his turn, thought unworthy of ministerial protection, and was given up to the chance of war without reluctance.

But I hope your lordships will concur with me in the opinion, that it is not always necessary to gratify the ministry, but that our country claims some part of our regard, and, therefore, that in establishing our army we should pursue that method which may be most accommodated to our constitution, and, instead of imitating the military policy of the French, follow the example of those nations by whose troops they have been conquered.

Had this scheme been hitherto followed, had our new levies, instead of being put under the command of boys, been distributed in just proportions among the standing regiments, where they might soon have been qualified for service by the inspection of experienced officers, we might now have seen an army capable of awing the court of Spain into submission, or, if our demands had been still refused, of revenging our injuries, and punishing those who have insulted and despised us.

From an army thus raised and disciplined, detachments, my lords, ought to have been sent on board of all our fleets, and particularly that which is now stationed in the Mediterranean, which would not then have coasted about from one port to another, without hurting or frighting the enemy, but might, by sudden descents, have spread terrour through a great part of the kingdom, harassed their troops by continual marches, and, by frequent incursions, have plundered all the maritime provinces, driven the inhabitants into the inland country, and laid the villages in ashes.

There is yet, my lords, no appearance of a peace, for our success has not enabled us to prescribe terms, and I hope we are not yet fallen so low as to receive them; it is, therefore, proper to form such resolutions as may influence the conduct of the war, and enable us to retrieve the errours of our past measures.

The minister, my lords, is not without panegyrists, who may, perhaps, endeavour to persuade us, that we ought to resign all our understandings to his superiour wisdom, and blindly trust our fortunes and our liberties to his unshaken integrity. They will, in proof of his abilities, produce the wonderful dexterity and penetration which the late negotiations have discovered, and will confirm the reputation of his integrity by the constant parsimony of all his schemes, and the unwillingness with which he at any time increases the expenses of the nation.

But, my lords, it is the great duty of your high station to watch over the administration, and to warn those, who are more immediately intrusted with the publick affairs, against measures which may endanger the safety or happiness of the nation; and, therefore, if I have proved to your lordships, that to raise new regiments is dangerous to our liberties, that a multitude of officers is of no use in war, and that an army may be more expeditiously disciplined by adding new men to every company, I hope your lordships will agree to this resolution, which I have drawn up with the utmost brevity, and of which the meaning cannot be mistaken:

"That the augmenting the army by raising regiments, as it is the most unnecessary and expensive method of augmentation, is also the most dangerous to the liberties of the nation."

The duke of NEWCASTLE next spoke, to this effect:—My lords, as my education and employments have afforded me no opportunity of acquiring any skill in military affairs, it will not be expected by your lordships, that I should be able to confute the arguments of the noble duke, whose acknowledged superiority in the art of war, and the abilities which he has displayed in the administration of every province which he has undertaken, give him a claim to the highest deference.

But, my lords, as I cannot assume the province of disputing on this question, so I cannot, without longer consideration, form any resolution concerning it; for arguments may be fallacious, which, yet, I cannot confute, and to approve without knowledge is no less weak than to censure.

There is not any present necessity, my lords, of forming a resolution on this subject; we are not now called upon particularly to consider it, and certainly it cannot be prudent, by so determinate a decision, pronounced without reflection or deliberation, to preclude a fuller examination of this important question.

Lord CARTERET rose, and spoke in this manner:—My lords, the noble duke who made the present motion has supported it by such strength of argument, and so fully explained the advantages of the method which it tends to recommend, that not only the present age, but posterity may, probably, be indebted to him, for juster notions of a military establishment, than have been yet attained even by those whose profession obliges them to such inquiries.

Nor, my lords, could we expect less from his long experience and extensive capacity; experience gained in the heat of war, and in the midst of danger; a capacity not only cultivated by solitary disquisitions in retirement and security, but exercised by difficulties, and quickened by opposition.

Such abilities, my lords, matured by such an education, have justly made the noble duke the oracle of war, and procured him the esteem and reverence of all the powers upon earth.

As I did not receive from my education any military knowledge, I am not able to add much to the arguments which your lordships have already heard; but, nevertheless, having been under the necessity of regulating the army when I had the honour to be employed in Ireland, and having made, in those countries where I transacted the business of the crown, some observations upon the different forms of military establishments, I hope I shall be allowed to offer what my experience or my remarks may suggest to me, in confirmation of the sentiments of the noble duke.

When I was in Ireland, my lords, the troops of that kingdom consisted of twenty-one regiments, of which ten were, as last year, brought into Britain, and the Irish forces were to be filled up by new levies, which were raised in the manner now proposed, by increasing every regiment from three hundred and forty to six hundred men; so that the eleven regiments remaining composed a body of nearly the same number with the twenty-one regiments, as formerly constituted.

Of the Swedish establishment, my lords, the reputation and success of their troops are an uncontrovertible vindication, attd I have often had an opportunity of comparing the number of officers with that of ours, and found their private men to be far more numerous in proportion to the officers.

In Hanover, my lords, I have seen his majesty's troops remarkable for the elegance of their appearance; and being once asked, by the commander, at what expense one of those gallant troopers and his horse was supported, was told, after confessing my ignorance, that he cost no more than fourteen pounds a year, who could not, in this country, be maintained for less than forty.

I believe, my lords, that the French forces are not more expensive than those of Hanover, and, therefore, we are by no means to imitate their establishment, for the price of provisions and habits of life do not admit of any diminution of the pay of either our officers or soldiers, and we can only lessen our expenses by reducing their numbers, to which I shall, for my part, most willingly contribute.

But as this, my lords, is not the proper time for disbanding our forces, of which the present state of our affairs may, perhaps, demand an augmentation, it is necessary to compare the state of our forces with that of foreign troops, and supply, by prudent methods, the disadvantages to which we are subject, by the peculiar condition of our country. For, if the French can support an army at a fourth part of our expense, what must be the consequence of a war, supposing the wealth of the two nations nearly equal? It will be to little purpose that we boast, however justly, of the superiority of our troops; for though it should be granted that the British cannot be resisted by an equal number, yet it can never be expected that they should conquer troops four times as numerous as themselves.

Thus, my lords, it appears, with all the evidence of arithmetical demonstration, that the method now proposed is highly expedient, nor can any objection, in my opinion, be made to the resolution offered to your lordships.

That this is not a proper time for this inquiry has been, indeed, urged, but surely no time can be more proper than when we may, by a resolution unanimously passed, regulate, in some degree, the conduct of the other house, and faint to them the opinion of this assembly on a question which is, perhaps, to-morrow to be brought before them.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY then spoke thus:—My lords, though I was once honoured with a command in the army, and consequently ought to have attained some military knowledge, yet I have so long resigned my commission, possessed it for so short a time, and have suffered my attention to be diverted from inquiries on that subject by employments of so different a kind, that I cannot presume to oppose any knowledge of my own to the reasons which have been offered; but I cannot think that the conclusions drawn by the noble duke, are so evidently true as to force conviction, and exclude all possibility of reply; nor can I conceive it consistent with the dignity of this assembly, to yield implicitly to any man's assertions, or to pass any resolution without an accurate inquiry.

Some objections, my lords, arise, upon reflection, from my narrow observation and transient reading, and these I shall lay before your lordships, with an open acknowledgment of my insufficiency to discuss the question, and a sincere desire of being instructed where I may be mistaken.

The subordination of the army, my lords, appears to me, in general, to be sufficiently maintained, nor is it ever infringed but by particular partiality, that can never be prevented, or a casual difference in the circumstances of the officers, which, though not relative to their military characters, will always produce some degree of influence.

I know not, my lords, how the general regulation of our forces, and the distribution of military honours, can be condemned, without extending some degree of censure to a person who ought not to be mentioned as concurring in any measures injurious to the publick. Our army, my lords, is maintained by the parliament, but commanded by the king, who has not either done or directed any thing of which his people may justly complain.

Here the duke of ARGYLE interrupted him:—My lords, it is necessary to clear myself from misrepresentations, and to preserve, at the same time, the order of this assembly, by reminding the noble lord, that his majesty is never to be introduced into our debates, because he is never to be charged with wrong; and by declaring to your lordships, that I impute no part of the errours committed in the regulation of the army to his majesty, but to those ministers whose duty it is to advise him, and whom the law condemns to answer for the consequences of their counsels.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY resumed:—My lords, if I misrepresented any assertion of the noble duke, it was by misapprehension, or failure of memory, and not by malice or design; and if in any other objections which I shall make, I shall fall into any errour of the same kind, I desire that it may be ascribed to the same cause.

The ignorance and inexperience of our present officers have been exposed with great gaiety of imagination, and with the true spirit of satirical rhetorick, nor can I presume to support them against so formidable censures. But, my lords, I cannot discover any method of protracting the lives of our old officers beyond the usual term, nor of supplying the loss of those whom death takes away from the army, but by substituting others, who, as they have seen no wars, can have little experience.

With regard to the number of officers in the foreign troops, I have been informed, that they were, by an express stipulation, to be constituted in the same manner with the British and Dutch forces.

Then the duke of ARGYLE again interrupted him:—My lords, as it was my province in the late war to superintend the payment of the foreign troops, I may be allowed to have some knowledge of the establishment, and hope I shall not be imagined to need any information on that subject.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY said:—My lords, I do not presume to dispute any assertion of the noble duke, for whose knowledge I have the highest veneration, but only to offer such hints for inquiry as may be pursued by other lords of greater abilities, and to show, that as some difficulties may be raised, the resolution ought not to be agreed to without farther deliberation; since it not only tends to prescribe the measures which shall be hereafter taken, and prohibit a method of raising forces, which, when diligently examined, may, perhaps, appear most eligible, but to censure the methods, which, when they were put in practice the last year, received the approbation of all the powers of the legislature.

Lord WESTMORELAND spoke next, as follows:—My lords, I have, for my own satisfaction, stated the difference of the expense between the two methods of raising forces, and find it so great, that the method proposed by the noble duke ought, undoubtedly, to be preferred, even though it were attended with some inconvenience, from which he has shown it to be free.

Frugality, my lords, is one of the chief virtues of an administration; a virtue without which no government can be long supported: the publick expense can never be too accurately computed, or the first tendency to profusion too rigorously opposed; for as in private life, so in political economy, the demands of necessity are easily supplied; but if once the calls of wantonness and caprice are complied with, no limits can be fixed, nor will any treasure be sufficient.

Whether the burdens under which the people are now toiling were all imposed by necessity, I will not inquire, but I think, my lords, we may readily determine, that whatever is not necessary is cruel and oppressive, and that, therefore, since the expense of raising new regiments appears, at least, not to be necessary, it ought to be opposed; and how can it be opposed more properly or effectually than by the noble duke's resolution?

Lord HERVEY spoke to this effect:—My lords, I do not claim any superiority of knowledge in any affairs that relate to the publick, but have less acquaintance with the military establishment than with any other part of the government, and can, therefore, neither oppose the resolution now offered to your lordships by such arguments as may deserve your attention, nor agree to it with that degree of conviction which the importance of it seems to require.

That the chief argument which has been produced against raising new regiments, is less formidable than it has been represented, will, I believe, appear to your lordships, when it is considered that the officers are always gentlemen of the first families in the empire, who, therefore, cannot be supposed voluntarily to give up their relations and posterity to the power of any ministry, or, for the sake of their commissions, to betray that constitution by which their own properties are secured.

Whether every other argument may not with equal justice be controverted, is not, without longer consideration, possible to be determined, and, therefore, it cannot be reasonably expected that we should agree to the resolution, which would be only to decide without examination, and to determine what we don't understand; for I am under no apprehension of being imagined to reflect unjustly on this assembly, in supposing that many of your lordships may be strangers to the question, which, when the last levies were made, was neither discussed nor proposed.

I therefore move, that the previous question may be put, which may, perhaps, gain time sufficient for a more exact inquiry upon this important subject.

Lord TALBOT replied to this purport:—My lords, if, in imitation of some noble lords, I profess my ignorance of the subject on which I am to speak, may it not yet be allowed me, after the example of others, to employ the little knowledge which I have in the defence of a resolution, which appears to have no other tendency than the advantage of the publick, and to show my zeal for the happiness of my country, though, perhaps, without the true knowledge of its interest?

The noble lord, who spoke last, is too great a master of eloquence not to be heard with all the attention which pleasure naturally produces, and a reasoner too formidable not to raise in his hearers all the anxiety which is produced by the fear of being deceived by partial representations, and artful deductions. I am always afraid, my lords, lest errour should appear too much like truth in the ornaments which his lordship's imagination may bestow, and lest sophistry should dazzle my understanding whilst I imagine myself only guided by the light of reason.

I shall, therefore, endeavour, my lords, to review his ornaments, and try whether they owe their influence to the force of truth, or to that of eloquence.

His lordship has observed, that the objections which are now made to the method of raising new regiments, were not produced last year upon a like occasion. I know not, indeed, what can be inferred from this assertion; for, surely, it will not maintain, that an errour, once admitted, is to become perpetual.

But, my lords, another reason may be assigned, for which the objections that occurred last year might not be produced. The ministry, after a long course of disgraceful negotiations, and artful delays, were, at length, compelled to a war, by the general clamours of the whole nation; but they acted as men unwilling to execute what they did not approve. They proceeded so slowly in their preparations, and were so languid in all their motions, that it was evident how willingly they would have improved every opportunity of retarding the vengeance which they were forced to threaten; and with what artifices they would have protracted any delay, which they could have imputed to those by whom they were opposed. It was, therefore, to the last degree, improper to embarrass their measures of themselves sufficiently perplexed, or to lay any obstacle in the way of those who would gladly be stopped.

That the army is filled with gentlemen, is so far, my lords, from proving that there is nothing to be feared from it, that it is the only foundation of all our solicitude. For none but gentlemen can injure our liberties, and while the posts of the army are bestowed as rewards of senatorial slavery, gentlemen will always be found who will be corrupted themselves, and can corrupt a borough; who will purchase a vote in the house, and sell it for military preferments. By the posts of the army the senate may be corrupted, and by the corruption of the senate the army be perpetuated.

Those, my lords, who are the warmest opponents of the army, apprehend not any danger from their swords, but from their votes. As they have been of late regulated without discipline or subordination, I should not feel such anxiety at seeing them led on by their new commanders against a body of honest ploughmen, united in the cause of virtue and of liberty; I should, with great alacrity, draw my sword against them, and should not doubt of seeing them in a short time heaped upon our fields.

But, my lords, they are employed to ruin us by a more slow and silent method; they are directed to influence their relations in the senate, and to suborn the voters in our small towns; they are dispersed over the nation to instil dependence, and being enslaved themselves, willingly undertake the propagation of slavery.

That the army is instrumental in extending the influence of the ministry to the senate, cannot be denied, when military preferments are held no longer than while he that possesses them gives a sanction, by his vote, to the measures of the court; when no degree of merit is sufficient to balance a single act of senatorial opposition, and when the nation is rather to be left to the defence of boys, than the minister be suspected of misconduct.

Could either bravery or knowledge, reputation, or past services, known fidelity to his majesty, or the most conspicuous capacity for high trust, have secured any man in the enjoyment of his post, the noble duke who made the motion, had carried his command to his grave, nor had the nation now been deprived either of his arms, or of his counsels.

But, as he has now offered his advice to his country, and supported his opinion with proofs from reason and experience, which even those who oppose them have confessed themselves unable to answer; as the justness of his reasoning, and the extent of his knowledge, have silenced those whose prejudices will not suffer them to own themselves convinced; let us not, my lords, reject what we cannot condemn, nor suffer our country to be defrauded of the advantage of this resolution, by that low senatorial craft, the previous question.

Then the CHANCELLOR spoke to the following purpose:—My lords, I am far from suspecting that an open profession of my inability to examine the question before us, in its full extent, will be imputed to an affectation of modesty, since any knowledge of military affairs could not be acquired in those stations in which I have been placed, or by those studies, in which the greatest part of my life is known to have been spent.

It will not be expected, my lords, that I should attempt a formal confutation of the noble duke's positions, or that I should be able to defend my own opinion against his knowledge and experience; nor would I, my lords, expose myself to the censure of having harangued upon war in the presence of Hannibal.

The noble duke has explained his sentiments to your lordships with the utmost accuracy of method, and the most instructive perspicuity of language; he has enforced them with a strength of reasoning rarely to be found, and with an extent of knowledge peculiar to himself. Yet, my lords, as his arguments, however powerful in themselves, do not strike me with the same force with which others may be affected, who are more capable of receiving them, I hope that your lordships will allow me to mention such objections as occur to me, that in voting on this question I may, at least, preserve my conscience from violation, and neither adopt the opinion of another, however great, without examination, nor obstinately reject the means of conviction.

Every lord who has spoken either in support of the noble duke's opinion, or in opposition to it, has confessed that he is very little acquainted with the subject of our debate; and it may not, therefore, be an improper or useless attempt, if I endeavour by objections, however injudicious, or by arguments, however inconclusive, to procure some illustration of a question so important, and, at the same time, so little understood.

The objections, my lords, which I shall produce, are such as I have heard in conversation with those whose long acquaintance with military employments give them a just claim to authority in all questions which relate to the art of war; among whom I find no uniformity of opinion with regard to the most proper method of augmenting our forces. And, my lords, when we observe those to differ in their sentiments, whose education, experience, and opportunities of knowledge have been nearly the same, and who have all obtained a very great degree of reputation in their profession, what can be inferred, but that the question is in its own nature obscure and difficult? That it involves a multitude of relations, and is diffused through a great variety of circumstances? And that, therefore, it is prudent for every man, who can judge only upon the authority of others, to suspend his opinion?

The chief argument, or that, at least, which impressed itself most strongly on my mind, against any innovation in our military constitution, was drawn from the success of our armies in their present form, with that proportion of soldiers and officers, which the present motion tends to abolish. Our forces, say the advocates for the present establishment, have afforded us a sufficient testimony of the propriety of their regulation, by their frequent victories over troops, whose discipline has been studied with the utmost vigilance, and which have been trained up to war with a degree of attention not disproportioned to the mighty design for which they were raised, the subjection of the world, and attainment of universal monarchy. These troops, who have been taught, almost from their infancy, that cowardice and flight are the greatest crimes, and persuaded, by national prejudices, and principles studiously instilled, that no foreign forces could withstand them, have fled before equal numbers of Britons, and been driven from one province to another, till, instead of grasping at general dominion, they were reduced to defend their wives and children.

How much of this success was to be ascribed to that part of the regulation which this motion proposes to be changed, it is not, my lords, within my province to determine; the great commander whom I have the honour to oppose, can best explain to your lordships the province of every officer in the field, and how far the number of inferiour officers may influence the success of a battle and the fate of a kingdom.

But to me, my lords, the establishment of our armies, comprising different views, and connecting various subordinate regulations, may be compared to a medicine composed of different ingredients, and found infallibly efficacious in a dangerous disease, in which, though some of the parts may seem to physicians of the profoundest learning, superfluous or improper, it would be no less than the folly of preferring experiments to life, to make any alteration.

The wantonness of innovation, my lords, is a dangerous disease of the mind; in a private station, it prompts men to be always discontented with what they find, and to lose the enjoyment of good in search of something better; it incites them to leave the safe and beaten tracks of life, in search of those which they imagine nearer, but, which are, at best, less secure, and which generally lead them to points far different from that to which they originally intended to direct their course.

It is dangerous, my lords, to admit any alteration which is not absolutely necessary, for one innovation makes way for another. The parts of a constitution, like a complicated machine, are fitted to each other, nor can one be changed without changing that which corresponds to it. This necessity is not always foreseen, but when discovered by experience is generally complied with; for every man is more inclined to hazard farther changes, than to confess himself mistaken by retracting his scheme. Thus, my lords, one change introduces another, till the original constitution is entirely destroyed.

By the ambition of innovation, my lords, have almost all those empires been destroyed, of which nothing now is left but the memory. Every human establishment has its advantages and its inconveniencies, and by weak attempts to remedy these defects, which, notwithstanding the utmost attention, will embarrass the machine of government, alterations have been introduced which have been quickly followed by a total dissolution.

There seem, my lords, to be few regulations on which it is more dangerous to make experiments than on that of the armies of a nation. We are sufficiently convinced how much of success is the consequence of courage, and that courage is only an opinion of our own superiority, arising from certain circumstances, either imaginary or real.

The courage which at present animates our forces, arises, my lords, from a very proper ground, their former victories over the enemies which they are now to combat, and will, therefore, doubtless, continue while they can consider themselves as enjoying the same advantage with those particular men by whom the victories were obtained. But, my lords, if any essential part of their establishment be changed, they will be considered, both by themselves and their enemies, as a different army; they will then charge with less alacrity, and be opposed with less dejection; they will consider themselves as fighting without that certainty of success which arises from experience, and their enemies will resolve to try, by an obstinate resistance, whether they are now equally formidable as in their former state.

Thus, my lords, I have attempted, however weakly, to represent the arguments which I have heard for the continuance of the establishment, of which your lordships will examine the validity, and shall now proceed to consider the noble duke's system of a military subordination in time of peace.

Whether a standing army in time of peace is made necessary to the change of conduct in foreign courts, it is now useless to inquire; but it will be easily granted by your lordships, that no motive but necessity, necessity absolute and inevitable, ought to influence us to support a standing body of regular forces, which have always been accounted dangerous, and generally found destructive to a free people.

The chief reason, my lords, of the danger arising from a standing army, may be ascribed to the circumstances by which men, subject to military laws, are distinguished from other members of the same community; they are, by the nature of martial government, exposed to punishment which other men never incur, and tried by forms of a different and more rigorous kind than those which are practised by the civil power. They are, if not exempted from the jurisdiction of a magistrate, yet subject to another authority which they see more frequently and more severely exerted, and which, therefore, they fear and reverence in a higher degree. They, by entering into the army, lay aside, for the most part, all prospect of advantage from commerce or civil employments, and, in a few years, neither fear nor hope any thing but from the favour or displeasure of their own officers.

For these, my lords, or for other reasons, the soldiers have always been inclined to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the community, and independent on it, a government regulated by their own laws, without regard to the general constitution of their country; they have, therefore, been ready to subvert the constitution, from which they received little advantage, and to oppress the civil magistrates, for whom they had lost their reverence.

And how soon, my lords, might such outrages be expected from an army formed after the model of the noble duke, released from the common obligations of society, disunited from the bulk of the nation, directed solely by their own officers, and ultimately commanded by a man who had the right of commanding no other? Would they not soon consider themselves as a separate community, whose interests were, no less than their laws, peculiar to themselves? Would they not consider him, from whom they received all their rewards, and all their punishments, as the proper object of their supreme regard, and endeavour to exalt him to the same dominion over others, which he enjoyed in regard to themselves, that they might share in his superiority?

A body of men, my lords, thus separated from the rest of the people, must consider themselves as either ennobled or degraded by such distinction, and would soon find themselves inclined to use the power of their arms, either in the exertion of their privileges, or the revenge of their disgrace. Then, my lords, would they set at defiance the laws of the nation, nor would one of these noble lords be able to disband, nor the other to resist them.

The army, my lords, is, in time of peace, then best regulated when it is kept under the strictest subordination to the civil power, that power which it is instituted to protect and to preserve.

Thus, my lords, have I examined the proposal and reasons of the noble duke, perhaps not much to the information of your lordships; but it cannot be expected that any capacity should be able, in an unexpected and sudden debate, to dispute on a subject, which the noble duke's education gave him particular opportunities of understanding far beyond almost every other man, and which he has had time to consider with respect to this present motion.

For this reason, my lords, I cannot but think the previous question highly expedient, but not for this reason alone; for as the state of the army, and the proper methods of augmenting it, are soon to be examined by the other house, to prejudice their determinations, may raise a contest about privileges, and oblige us either to persist, for our own honour, in opposition to measures necessary to the security of the publick, or, in compliance with the present exigence, accept their scheme, however opposite to our own resolution.

Lord CARTERET spoke in substance as follows:—My lords, the known abilities of that noble lord incline me always to hear him with uncommon expectation and attention, which seldom fail to be rewarded by such pleasure and information as few other men are able to afford. But his observations on the question before us, my lords, have only convinced me, that the greatest abilities may be sometimes betrayed into errour, and the most candid disposition be vitiated by accidental prejudices. For his own arguments neither appear just, nor his representation impartial, of those advanced in favour of the motion.

With regard to the number of officers necessary in time of war, his lordship asserted nothing from his own knowledge, nor do I believe that any other lord will imagine himself qualified to dispute with the noble duke upon questions purely military. His experience entitles him to the highest authority, in debates of this kind; and if every man has a claim to credit in his own profession, surely, he who has given evidence of his proficiency in the art of war in the eyes of the whole world, will not be denied, in this house, that superiority which would readily be allowed him in any other part of the universe.

And yet less, my lords, can it be suspected, that he intends to deceive us, than that he can be deceived himself; for not only his probity, his love of his country, and his fidelity to the crown, concur to secure him from any temptations to make an ill use of his credit, but his own interest obliges him to offer that scheme for the regulation of our forces, which, in his own opinion, will most certainly contribute to their success. For it is not to be doubted, my lords, that when we shall be engaged in war too far for negotiations and conventions, when we shall be surrounded by enemies, and terrified at the near approach of danger, he will be called upon to lead our armies to battle, and attack, once more, those enemies that have fled so often before him.

Then, my lords, if he has contributed to form a weak plan of our military constitution, must he atone for it with the loss of his reputation; that reputation, for which he has undergone so many fatigues, and been exposed to so many dangers.

But, my lords, it is ridiculous to suspect where nothing appears to provoke suspicion, and I am very far from imagining that the dangers of innovation, however artfully magnified, or the apprehensions of the soldiers, however rhetorically represented, will be thought of any weight.

The establishment of the army, my lords, is an innovation, and, as the noble lord has justly represented it, an innovation that threatens nothing less than the destruction of our liberties, and the dissolution of our government. Our vigilance ought, therefore, to be very anxiously employed in regulating this new part of our government, and adapting it, in such a manner, to the national constitution, that no detriment may arise from it, and that our civil rights may be protected, not oppressed, by the military power.

To this purpose, says the noble lord, the soldiers are to be restrained by a due subordination to the magistrate, a position undoubtedly true, but now superfluously urged: for it was never controverted by the noble person whose opinion he intended to oppose.

Should any man assert, my lords, that the army ought to be formed into a distinct and independent society, which should receive laws only from a council of war, and have no other governour than their officers, none should oppose such an assertion with more ardour or constancy than myself, but what was never advanced it is unnecessary to confute.

Yet, my lords, to obviate those dangers from the army which have been so strongly and justly represented, it is necessary, not only that a legal subordination to the civil authority be firmly established, but that a personal dependence on the ministry be taken away.

How readily men learn to reverence and obey those on whom their fortunes depend, has been already shown by the noble lord, and therefore it will follow, that a minister who distributes preferments at his pleasure, may acquire such an influence in the army, as may be employed to secure himself from justice by the destruction of liberty. And unless it can be proved, that no such minister can ever exist; that corruption, ambition, and perfidy, have place only in the military race; every argument that shows the danger of an army, dependent only on the general, will show the danger, likewise, of one dependent only on the minister.

The influence of the minister, my lords, is known to arise from the number of the officers, and to be proportioned to the value of the preferment, which it is in his power to bestow; it is, therefore, evident, by adding new officers to our army, we shall throw weight into the scale, which already is, at least, an equal balance to our constitution, and enable the ministry either to employ an army in defence of their measures, or to obtain such an influence in the senate, as shall make any other security superfluous.

Such, my lords, is the danger of a multitude of officers, a danger which surely deserves more attention than the imaginary prejudice of the soldiers in favour of the present establishment; a prejudice represented so powerful, both in our own forces, and those of our enemies, that the future success of our arms may probably depend upon it.

Surely, my lords, that cause may be allowed indefensible, which such a patron defends so weakly. What can be more chimerical than to imagine that men would lay down their arms, and forsake their standards, because there are twenty more in a company than have formerly been? That such a panick, from such a cause, was never found, I need not prove; and I scarce think it necessary to assert, that, without supposing a universal depravity of reason, it never can be found.

The establishment proposed by the noble duke, is the same with that of most foreign troops, and particularly with that of his majesty's forces in his foreign dominions, and, therefore, cannot but be approved by him, if it should be proposed by your lordships. For why should he imagine a greater number of officers necessary to the troops of Britain, than to those of any other nation.

The expediency of the motion, my lords, is, in my opinion, so obvious and incontestable, as to require no farther consideration, and, therefore, it is no argument against it, that we were not previously informed of the question.

Much less, my lords, can I discover the force of the assertion, that by such a resolution we shall excite the displeasure of the other house; we have, my lords, at least, an equal right with them to examine any position relating to the publick security, a right which we may exert with less danger of disgusting them, while they have yet formed no determination, and with less danger to the nation, than when their opinion, whatever it may be, cannot be controverted without retarding the important bill against mutiny.

We are never offended, my lords, at receiving the opinions of the other house, which we often adopt without any alteration, and often make use of for our own instruction, and now are become so contemptible as that no regard should be paid by them to our resolutions.

It is well known, my lords, that this assembly is an essential and constituent part of the legislature of this kingdom, and that we received from our ancestors a great extent of power, which it ought to be our care not to suffer to be contracted by degrees, till this assembly shall become merely formal, and sit only to ratify implicitly the determinations of the other house.

[Several other lords spoke in the debate, and the president having put the previous question, "Whether the question should be then put?" upon a division, it passed in the negative. Content, 42. Not content, 59.]

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HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1740.

RESPECTING OFFICERS ON HALF-PAY.

Mr. SANDYS this day moved for an humble address to his majesty, that, for the future ease of his majesty's subjects, all officers now subsisting upon half-pay, etc. might be employed in the army, and supported it to the following effect:

Sir, though I have often known motions opposed without any just objections, or at least without any proof of such inconveniencies likely to arise from them, as were equivalent to the advantages which they would have produced, yet I cannot but confess, that any opposition to this will be unexpected and surprising; for it is, in my opinion, supported by every law of justice and humanity. If we regard the publick in general, it cannot but produce some alleviation of the national expense; and if we consider the particular persons to whom it immediately relates, they have certainly a just claim to that regard which it is the tendency of this motion to procure them.

To burden with superfluous officers, and unnecessary expenses, a people already overwhelmed with taxes, and overrun with the dependents on the crown, is, surely, to the highest degree cruel and absurd. And to condemn those men to contempt and penury, who have served their country with bravery and fidelity, to prefer unexperienced striplings to those commissions, which would gladly be accepted by men who have already tried their courage in the battle, and borne the fatigues of marches, and the change of climates, is surely not only to oppress the deserving, and scatter promotion without just distinction; but, what is yet more enormous, it is to wanton with the publick safety, and expose us to our enemies.

Nor does it appear to me sufficient, that the veteran officers be restored to the commissions which they formerly enjoyed; they ought, upon an augmentation of our troops, to be recompensed by some advancement for their services and their sufferings; the ensign ought to become a lieutenant, and the lieutenant be exalted to a captain; stations which they will surely fill with more dignity and greater abilities, than boys newly discharged from school, and intrusted with unexpected authority.

If it be reasonable, sir, that expense should be spared in a time of general poverty, if it be politick to carry on war in the manner most likely to produce success, if it be just, that those who have served their country should be preferred to those who have no merit to boast, this motion cannot be rejected.

Sir William YONGE answered to this purpose:—Sir, to the motion now made, it will not, I believe, be objected, that it is unreasonable, or unjust, but that it is unnecessary, and that it is not drawn up with sufficient consideration.

It is unnecessary, because his majesty is advised by it to no other measures than those which he has already determined to pursue; for he has declared to me, sir, his intention of conferring the new commissions upon the officers who receive half-pay, before any other officers shall be promoted.

The motion appears to me not to be very attentively considered, or drawn up with great propriety of expression; for it supposes all the half-pay officers fit for the service, which cannot be imagined by any man, who considers that there has been peace for almost thirty years; a space of time, in which many vigorous constitutions must have declined, and many, who were once well qualified for command, must be disabled by the infirmities of age. Nor is the promotion of one of these gentlemen considered always by him as an act of favour; many of them have, in this long interval of peace, engaged in methods of life very little consistent with military employments, many of them have families which demand their care, and which they would not forsake for any advantages which a new commission could afford them, and therefore it would not be very consistent with humanity to force them into new dangers and fatigues which they are now unable to support.

With regard to these men, compassion and kindness seem to require that they should be suffered to spend their few remaining days without interruption, and that the dangers and toils of their youth should be requited in their age with ease and retirement.

There are others who have less claim to the regard of the publick, and who may be passed by in the distribution of new preferments without the imputation of neglecting merit. These are they who have voluntarily resigned their commissions for the sake of half-pay, and have preferred indolence and retreat to the service of their country.

So that it appears, that of those who subsist upon half-pay, some are unable to execute a commission, some do not desire, and some do not deserve it; and with regard to the remaining part, which can be no great number, I have already stated the intention of his majesty, and therefore cannot but conclude that the motion is needless.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke as follows:—Sir, I know not by what fatality it is, that all the motions made by one party are reasonable and necessary, and all that are unhappily offered by the other, are discovered either to be needless, or of pernicious tendency. Whenever a question can be clouded and perplexed, the opponents of the ministry are always mistaken, confuted, and, in consequence of the confutations, defeated by the majority of votes. When truth is too notorious to be denied, and too obvious to be contested, the administration claim the honour of the first discovery, and will never own that they were incited to their duty by the remonstrances of their opponents, though they never, before those remonstrances, had discovered the least intention of performing it.

But that the motion is allowed to be just and proper, is sufficient; the importance of it will be easily discovered. For my part I shall always consider that motion as important, which tends to contract the expenses of the publick, to rescue merit from neglect, and to hinder the increase of the dependents on the ministry.

Sir Robert WALPOLE answered:—Sir, there is no temper more opposite to that incessant attention to the welfare of the publick, which is the perpetual boast of those who have signalized themselves by opposing the measures of the administration, than a lust of contradiction, and a disposition to disturb this assembly with superfluous debates.

Whether this disposition is not discovered in the reply made to the declaration of his majesty's intentions, and the confession of the propriety of the motion, let the house determine. It must surely be confessed, that it is not necessary to advise what is already determined.

Nor is it less evident, that many of the officers whose interest is now so warmly solicited, must be incapacitated by their age for service, and unable to receive any benefit from the offer of new commissions. To deny this, is to question the flux of time, or to imagine that the constitution of a soldier is exempt from its injuries.

Mr. SANDYS explained himself to this effect:—Sir, I am far from intending by this motion to fill the army with decrepit officers, or to obstruct in any manner the service of the publick; nor have I any other intention, than to secure to those whose years permit, and whose inclinations incite them to enter once more into the army, that preferment to which they have a claim, not only from their past services, but from the state of penury and obscurity in which they have languished.

I desire to preserve those, whose valour has heretofore made our nation the terrour of the world, from the mortification of seeing themselves insulted by childhood, and commanded by ignorance; by ignorance exalted to authority by the countenance of some rhetorician of the senate, or some mayor of a borough.

Whoever has observed the late distribution of military honours, will easily discover that they have been attained by qualifications very different from bravery, or knowledge of the art of war; he will find that regiments and companies are the rewards of a seasonable vote, and that no man can preserve his post in the army, whether given him as the reward of acknowledged merit, or sold him for the full value, any longer than he employs all his influence in favour of the ministry.

Sir Robert WALPOLE then said:—Sir, it has been already admitted, that the motion can only be objected to as superfluous, and, therefore, all farther debate is mere waste of time, without any prospect of advantage; nor is any thing now necessary, but to review the motion, and correct such expressions as may be thought inaccurate or improper.

That all the half-pay officers are not able to enter into the service, has been already shown, and, therefore, I should imagine, that, instead of all the officers, we might very justly substitute officers properly qualified.

Sir John BARNARD replied:—Sir, though I cannot discover the necessity of any alteration, since it cannot be conceived that the senate can advise impossibilities, yet since so much accuracy is affected, it may be allowed that the word all shall be left out, as seeming to imply more than can be intended.

But the honourable gentleman is not, in my opinion, so happy in his amendment, as in his objection; for the words properly qualified convey to me no distinct idea. He that is qualified is, I suppose, properly qualified, for I never heard of improper qualifications; but if the word properly be omitted, I have no objection to the amendment.

This motion was agreed to.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS, JAN. 24, 1740-1.

[DEBATE ON AN ADDRESS FOR PAPERS RELATING TO ADMIRAL HADDOCK.]

Mr. WALLER this day offered the following motion in writing, That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there may be laid before this house copies of two particular letters written by his majesty's secretary of state to admiral Haddock, which had been addressed for before, and of the letters received from admiral Ogle mentioned therein; together with all letters written by admiral Haddock to either of his majesty's secretaries of state, concerning the said letters, and the execution of the orders contained therein.

This motion he supported by arguments to the following effect:—Sir, no man who considers the present situation of our foreign affairs, the expense and inefficacy of our military preparations, the appearance of negligence in our naval expeditions, and the general disappointment of the hopes which the nation had conceived of victories, vengeance, and reparations, can, in my opinion, doubt the expediency of the motion which I have taken the liberty to make.

When the expectations of the nation are deceived, it certainly becomes those who are deputed to watch over the prosperity of the publick, to inquire whence the disappointment proceeds, and either to inform their constituents that their uneasiness arises from their own errour, and that their hopes are destroyed because they had no rational foundation; or to detect the weak management of those by whom the publick measures have been ill-conducted, or the national treasure has been misapplied.

With regard, sir, to the present war, I know not how the nation can be charged with having formed unreasonable expectations. If they considered the speech from the throne, the most authentick declaration of the intentions of the government, they found there the warmest resentments of the injuries which they had sustained, and the strongest assurances of a vigorous prosecution of all those measures which might produce speedy recompense, and inviolable security.

If they reflect, sir, on the preparations for war, on the multitude of ships, the demand of materials for naval equipments, and the high prices at which workmen were retained, they could not but imagine that either some mighty attempt was designed, or some formidable enemy dreaded, and as they know not whom they had to fear, they ascribed the vigour of our proceedings to a resolution of humbling our enemies by one fatal blow, and re-establishing our naval dominion by a single effort.

And justly, sir, might they indulge this pleasing imagination; with reason might they anticipate a triumph over an enemy whose strength bears no proportion to the force that was fitted out against them, and expect that in a few months they should see the ambassadors of Spain supplicating for peace.

To raise their expectations yet higher, their trade was suspended by an embargo, long continued, and in the strictest manner enforced, and the impresses were let loose upon the sailors; they saw nothing omitted, however grievous to the nation, that could contribute to make it formidable, and bore part of the miseries of war without impatience, in hopes of being rewarded by military glory, and repaid by the plunder of Spain.

But, sir, when so long a time has elapsed, and no account is brought of either a victory or a battle, when they hear nothing but that our fleets have visited several neutral ports, and those of the enemy sailed unmolested from coast to coast, and when they are every day told of the losses of our merchants, are insulted in our own channel by the Spanish privateers, and receive no relations of our success upon the shores of our enemies, can it be wondered that they suspect the reality of our designs, or inquire whence it proceeds that their money has been wasted, their trade interrupted, and the liberty of their fellow-subjects invaded to no purpose?

But how much more justly, sir, are they inflamed when they hear of the lucky stratagems, or daring enterprises of those enemies, which a just sense of their own superiority, had induced them to consider as vanquished before the battle, and of whom they had no apprehensions but that their cowardice would always secure them from vengeance? How justly may they murmur when they read, that our fleets leave every part of the enemy's coast where their presence is necessary, and have afforded the Spaniards an opportunity of changing one port for another, as it is most convenient, and at length of joining the French squadrons, and sailing to the defence of their American dominions?

May they not justly, sir, require of their representatives some reason for such inexplicable conduct? May they not reasonably demand an account of the arguments which procured their approbation of measures, which, so far as they can be examined by those who have no opportunity of perusing the necessary papers, appear either cowardly or treacherous?

And what answer, sir, can we return to such remonstrances, unless this motion be agreed to? How can we appease the discontents of our constituents, or discharge the trust reposed in us, without a very minute and attentive inquiry into questions thus obscure and thus important?

Are we to tell our constituents, that we absolutely rely upon the prudence and fidelity of the ministry and admirals, and recommend to them the same implicit dependence? Are we to confess that we have now for two sessions voted in the dark, and approved what we were not suffered to examine and understand?

Such answers, sir, to questions so reasonable, will not contribute to increase the veneration of the people either for ourselves, or our constitution; and yet this answer, and this only, they can receive from us, if the papers mentioned in the motion I have made are denied.

Mr. CLUTTERBUCK replied in the following manner:—Sir, this motion, though so warmly urged, and so artfully supported, I can consider only as a repetition of a former motion which was approved by the assembly, so far as it could properly be complied with, nor was any paper then concealed which it would not have been an injury to the nation to have divulged.

If the design of this motion be to promote the success of the present war, and the zeal with which it has been pressed, be incited only by the ardour of true patriotism, I doubt not but it will easily be withdrawn by those who are now most inclined to support it, when they shall reflect that it tends to the discovery of our schemes, and to the overthrow of our designs, that it will expose all our consultations to our enemies, and instruct them how to annoy us with most success, and how to shelter themselves from our intended attacks.

It is the first care, sir, of every administration, that their military designs should only be discovered by the execution of them, and that their enemies, by being obliged to guard all parts, should be weak in all. If, by laying our papers before this house, the Spaniards should come to be informed against what part of their dominions our expeditions are designed, will they not increase their strength, improve their fortifications, and double their vigilance? And if we are thus obliged to form new schemes, must we not impute the defeat of the former to our own imprudent zeal, or unseasonable curiosity?

Mr. SANDYS spoke to this effect:—Sir, that we should demand the schemes laid for the future conduct of the war with Spain was never proposed, nor, as it may reasonably be concluded, ever imagined; for what is mentioned in the motion but the papers relating to the transactions of the two last years.

That it should be necessary to remind gentlemen of the difference between the future and the past, would hardly be suspected by any man not accustomed to senatorial controversies and artifices of state; and yet in the argument which has been offered against the motion, nothing has been asserted but that the orders relating to past transactions are not to be laid before us, lest the enemy should thereby gain intelligence of what we now design against them.

The necessity of secrecy in war needs not be urged, because it will not be denied; but when designs have been laid, and miscarried, the reasons of that miscarriage may surely be inquired, without danger of betraying the councils of our country.

If the negligence of our councils, and the misconduct of our commanders, has been such, that no designs have been premeditated; if a war has been carried on by chance, and nothing has succeeded, because nothing has been attempted; if our commanders have not done ill, and have only done nothing; if they have avoided loss by avoiding danger; we may surely inquire to whom such proceedings are to be imputed, whether the defeat of our designs is to be charged upon the strength of our enemy, or the cowardice of our officers; or whether the inactivity and apparent neutrality of our forces is occasioned by the negligence of our admirals, or the irresolution of our own ministry.

There have been, sir, many incidents in these two last years, of which the examination can be of very little advantage to the Spaniards. I do not know what pernicious intelligence they can glean from an inquiry into the reasons for which Haddock's fleet was divided, and Ogle sent to the defence of Minorca, or for which he afterwards returned.

Nor can I conceive that any advantage, except that of merriment and diversion, can be thrown into the hands of our enemies, though we should seriously inquire into what no man has yet pretended to understand, the wonderful escape of the Spanish squadron. A transaction on which we had dwelt long enough with that admiration which ignorance produces, and on which it may not be improper at length to enable us to reason.

This is an affair, perhaps, much better understood by our enemies than by ourselves, and surely we cannot, therefore, be afraid of informing them of it; at least since the fleet has long since sailed out, and left their coast, we can hardly be restrained in our inquiries by the fear of discovering our future designs.

If, therefore, it be the incontestable right of the senate to examine the conduct of publick affairs, which I suppose will scarcely be denied, this motion cannot be rejected as unseasonable, nor can the papers be refused, without increasing those suspicions which are already too prevalent throughout the nation.

Nor, indeed, for our own sakes, ought we to delay this inquiry any longer, lest by having long acted without being accountable, the minister should form a prescription against our privilege, and, in time, tell us in plain terms that we are his slaves, and that we are not to presume to carry our examinations, however solemn and important they may continue to appear, farther than he shall be pleased to permit; and that, whatever may be the opinion of the people that deputes us, or, whatever ancient claims we may plead to authority, we are now to consider ourselves only as the oppressors of the nation, and the panegyrists of the court.

Mr. WALPOLE next rose, and spoke to this purpose:—Sir, it cannot be denied to be reasonable that all those papers should be laid before the senate, which can be communicated without injury to the publick. Of this number we may justly imagine the orders sent to the admirals, in which the time of their departure is fixed, and many others which may be of use to inform the house, but cannot enable the enemy to judge either of our force or our designs.

But it is evident, that there must be others included in this motion, which our regard for the success of the war, and the prosperity of our country, ought to determine us to conceal, and such as are never exposed by any administration; it is, therefore, proper to limit the address to papers of a certain kind, or a certain date, which may be considered by the house without benefit to our enemies, and for the examination of which a day or two will be more than sufficient.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke in substance as follows:—Sir, I know not what number of papers the wisdom of the administration will allow us, but, if we judge by the time proposed to be spent in examination, we shall not be distracted with a great diversity of subjects; intelligence will be very penuriously dealt out, and if we submit to their choice of the writings which shall be laid before us, our inquiry will probably end without any discoveries made either by our enemies or ourselves.

But I hope, sir, we shall not be so cheaply satisfied, nor exposed by the fear of one enemy, to the insolence of another. I hope we shall resolutely continue our demands of information, while a single line is concealed, from which any light can be expected.

There may, indeed, be circumstances in which our demands, however loud, will necessarily be vain. It is not impossible that we may suspect those transactions of deep art, and secret contrivance, which have been the consequences of mere indolence, and want of consideration. Our great ministers have been, perhaps, only doing nothing, while we have imagined that they were working out of sight.

Misled, sir, by this notion, we may call for the orders that have been despatched in these two last years, when, perhaps, our secretaries of state have been fattening on their salaries without employment, and have slept without care, and without curiosity, while we have been congratulating ourselves upon their vigilance for our preservation.

Or if orders have been given, it is to be considered, that the end of inspecting orders is to compare them with the conduct of the admirals to whom they were directed: from this comparison, I doubt not but many gentlemen expect uncommon discoveries; but to check all unreasonable hopes before they have taken possession of their hearts, for unreasonable hopes are the parent of disappointment, I think it proper to remind them, that to draw any conclusions from the orders, it is necessary to understand them.

This consideration alone is sufficient to redress the ardour of inquiry, for every man that has had opportunities of knowing the wonderful accomplishments of our ministry, the depth of their designs, the subtilty of their stratagems, and the closeness of their reasoning, will easily conceive it probable that they might send such orders as none but themselves could understand; and what then will be the consequence of our idle curiosity, but that we be led into a labyrinth of endless conjectures? For we have long ago found that no explanations are to be expected, and that our ministry are too wise to discover their secrets to their enemies.

Let us, therefore, examine the naked facts which have fallen within our observation, and endeavour to inform ourselves of the meaning of these secret orders by the execution of them.

Admiral Ogle was despatched from Haddock's fleet to protect Minorca, and, in his absence, the Spanish squadron sailed away. Perhaps he was ordered to watch Ferrol and Minorca at the same time, and not understanding how that was to be done, neglected one part of his charge, by an attention to the other: as a watchman who should be employed to guard at once the bank in London, and the treasury in Westminster.

Admiral NORRIS, sir, sailed lately forth, I suppose, in pursuance of orders, with a very formidable fleet, and after having lost sight for some days of the British coast, sailed back again with great precipitation. Whether his orders were only to sail forth, or whether, when he examined them farther, he could not understand them, I pretend not to determine; but it may reasonably be imagined that his orders were of the same kind with those of our other admirals, because they produced the same consequences.

I have been told, that formerly our commanders were ordered to burn, sink, and destroy; and that in those times it was not uncommon for a British admiral to do much mischief with a strong fleet; but it is evident that the style is since changed, for our admirals are now very inoffensive, and go out only to come back. I, therefore, think the motion highly necessary, and such as ought to be complied with.

Admiral NORRIS here rose up, and spoke thus:—Sir, I am not conscious that my conduct in any part of my life has exposed me to be justly treated with contempt and ridicule, and what I have not deserved I will not bear.

If any gentleman in this house can accuse me of having neglected my duty, or deserted it, let him not spare insults or invectives, let him now expose my cowardice or my carelessness, let him prove me unworthy of trust or of command.

But my own conscience acquits me, and I defy any man to produce and support his accusation; nor can you, sir, [Footnote: Addressing himself to Mr. PULTENEY.] who have thus contemptuously treated me, allege any thing against me that may justify your neglect of decency: that you have transgressed the rules of decency is the softest censure that your behaviour admits, and I think it may with equal propriety be asserted, that you have broken the laws of justice.

Mr. PULTENEY replied in this manner:—Sir, I shall submit to you and all who hear me, whether I have treated the honourable gentleman's name with any contemptuous freedom of speech. The usual method of mentioning an expedition is that of naming the commander, who is not thereby necessarily included in the censure of an unsuccessful attempt, and I am very far from calling his courage and capacity into question.

Not that I shall ever think it necessary to make an apology for expressing my sentiments with freedom as a member of this house, in which I shall always speak what I think, and in what manner it shall appear to me most proper, nor shall I fear to repeat without doors what I say here.

Sir Robert WALPOLE next rose up, and spoke to this purpose:—Sir, as I am not acquainted with any measures pursued by the administration, which it is their particular interest to conceal, I am desirous that all papers should be laid before the house which will not afford our enemies any opportunity of obviating our designs.

What necessity there is for this address I cannot, indeed, discover, because I know not any foundation for suspicion of either negligence or treachery, which have been both insinuated in this debate.

Nor are the ministry, however ludicrously their abilities have been treated, afraid of discovering their ignorance, by laying before the house the orders which they have given to our admirals; orders of which they are far from doubting that they will appear, upon a candid examination, rational and proper.

The chief objection to this motion arises from its unreasonableness, and the necessity which it will produce of assigning to a fruitless inquiry those hours that may be more usefully employed.

Mr. PITT replied in terms to the effect following:—Sir, it is my opinion, that our time cannot be more usefully employed during a war, than in examining how it has been conducted, and settling the degree of confidence that may be reposed in those to whose care are intrusted our reputations, our fortunes, and our lives.

There is not any inquiry, sir, of more importance than this; it is not a question about an uncertain privilege, or a law, which, if found inconvenient, may hereafter be repealed; we are now to examine whether it is probable that we shall preserve our commerce and our independence, or whether we are sinking into subjection to a foreign power.

But this inquiry, sir, will produce no great information, if those, whose conduct is examined, are allowed to select the evidence. For what accounts will they exhibit but such as have often already been laid before us, and such as they now offer without concern: accounts obscure and fallacious, imperfect and confused, from which nothing can be learned, and which can never entitle the minister to praise, though they may screen him from punishment.

Mr. PELHAM spoke as follows:—Sir, I am confident that no man engaged in the administration desires to be screened from the most rigorous inquiry, or would defer to exhibit the papers a moment for any other reason than his regard for the publick.

I am confident, that nothing could so much contribute to advance the particular and distinct interest of the ministry as the publication of all the writings that relate to the present war, by which it would incontestably appear that nothing has been omitted that could promote our success, that our commanders have been sent out with orders to act with the utmost vigour, and that our preparations have been not disproportioned to the importance of our design.

It will appear that no former ministry have given greater proofs of their zeal for the publick interest, or have more steadily pursued the most proper measures by which it might be advanced.

I am not, indeed, certain that those who now call so loudly for information would be prevailed on by any degree of evidence to suspend their censures. Them, who are now dissatisfied, I shall despair of influencing by reason or testimony; for they seem to inquire only to condemn; nor is this motion, perhaps, made so much for the sake of obtaining information, as of harassing the ministry with delays, and suspending affairs of greater importance.

This motion was agreed to, and upon another motion made by Mr. SANDYS, it was resolved,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons sent by admiral Cavendish, in pursuance of an order from the commissioners of the admiralty, which had retarded the sailing of admiral Ogle's squadron, so much beyond expectation."

Likewise,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons transmitted by admiral Ogle, that did prevent him from sailing, pursuant to his repeated orders for that purpose, and particularly to those sent him by the commissioners of the admiralty."

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HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 3, 1740-1.

[DEBATE REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF THE
FRENCH AND SPANISH SQUADRONS.]

Mr. SANDYS this day presented a motion in writing, for petitioning his majesty to inform them when the regency received intelligence that the French and Spanish squadrons sailed, which was seconded, as follows, by Mr. WALLER:—

Sir, the information now moved for, appears to me so necessary in their deliberations on the conduct of the war, that without it we can only conjecture in the dark, and entangle ourselves in an inextricable labyrinth.

It is well known, that in war all motions are, in a great degree, to be regulated by those of the enemy, and that, therefore, no vigilance is to be spared by which any knowledge can be gained of their designs, nor any methods omitted of communicating them to those who have the direction of the war.

A ministry may, in conducting military operations, disappoint the expectations of their country, either by neglecting to procure intelligence, or by failing to make use of those opportunities which seasonable information puts into their power, and they may, when their designs fail of success, justify themselves, by proving that they were deceived by intelligence which it was reasonable to believe, or that better intelligence was not attainable, or that they made use, however unsuccessfully, of all the forces that could then be employed, and of all the advantages that were then in their possession.

But how shall we judge of our administration, how shall we know what confidence we ought to repose in their prudence and fidelity, and what miscarriages are to be attributed to the chance of war or superiour force of our enemies, if we cannot be informed with what diligence they endeavour at information, and how early they have notice of the motions of the enemy?

The sailing, or rather escape of the Ferrol squadron, and departure of the French fleet, are the most important events of the present war; events that threaten very dangerous consequences, no less than descents upon our American colonies, the conquest of our dominions, the slavery of our fellow-subjects, and perhaps the destruction of the brave Vernon, who is secure in the imagined vigilance of the other commanders, and may, perhaps, in a few days see himself surrounded by formidable squadrons of different nations, and exposed to the attack of forces to which his little fleet bears no proportion.

Nothing appears more evident, than that we had opportunities of observing, at least, all the preparations of the French, and of watching the moment of their departure, and that our force on the coast of Spain was sufficient to have confined their fleets for ever in their harbours, or to have destroyed them at their first entrance into the open seas, of which we may justly inquire, why it was not attempted, but shall inquire to no purpose till we know when they departed, that we may consider the state of our own forces, and whether our enemies escaped by our negligence, cowardice, or weakness.

Mr. WINNINGTON then spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, that we cannot deliberate upon subjects which we do not understand, and that, therefore, no necessary or useful information ought to be denied to the house, I shall readily admit; but must observe, at the same time, that the reputation of the house would be very little consulted, in demanding information which cannot be given.

To address his majesty to inform us of the time at which the squadrons of our enemies sailed, is to inquire of him what it ought to be the highest care of those princes to conceal from him, and which he can only know by having spies in their privy councils.

And of what importance is it to inquire what intelligence was brought him, or when he received it, if it appears that his intelligence must be in its own nature uncertain and dubitable?

That they have left their ports is now certain, because they have been twice discovered in different parts of the world; but, as we can now only form conjectures on their designs and courses, so, before they sailed, it was impossible to know when they were fully equipped, or what time was fixed for their departure. It is to be remembered, that they form their measures, and make their preparations in their own dominions, and therefore, have more advantages of concealing their schemes than we of discovering them.

Mr. Advocate CAMPBELL then spoke thus:—Sir, this motion, which has been represented as unreasonable and absurd, is, in my opinion, not only proper, but important.

It is important, because it will enable us to judge, upon sufficient foundations, of the conduct of the ministry, who are censured by the voice of the nation, for having been either defective in vigilance or in activity, for having been either ignorant by their own fault of the designs of the enemy, or perfidiously passive in permitting the execution of them.

I am far from believing that such intelligence as our ministry is expected to procure, requires any uncommon subtilty, or any other agents than are always employed by every minister, to transmit to them informations from foreign courts. Such, I am afraid, are always hovering about our consultations, and I know not why our ministers should be less diligent or less successful than those of other princes.

If, therefore, such intelligence might have been obtained, it was criminal not to obtain it; and if the departure of the Spanish squadron was foreseen, it ought to be inquired, why it was not prevented; and if it was only known when it was too late to hinder it from sailing, why it was not pursued, or why succours were not immediately despatched to admiral Vernon.

All these questions can only be resolved, in consequence of the information which his majesty shall give us; and for which it is, therefore, in my opinion, necessary to petition.

Mr. Henry PELHAM spoke next, to this purpose:—Sir, how the regency could be informed of the intention of the Spaniards to leave their ports till it appeared by their departure, or by what means it can be expected that his majesty should be now acquainted with their particular course, or farther designs, I confess myself unable to conceive.

With regard, sir, to the intelligence transmitted from foreign courts by agents and spies, a little consideration will easily discover that it is not to be trusted. For what can be generally expected from them, but that they should catch flying reports, or by chance intercept uncertain whispers, that they should inquire timorously, and, therefore, for the greatest part, of those from whom no satisfactory accounts can be received, and that they should often endeavour to deserve their salaries by such information as is rather pleasing than true.

All the knowledge that can be obtained of an enemy's designs, must arise from a diligent comparison of one circumstance with another, and from a general view of his force, his interest, and his opportunities. And that such conjectures will be often erroneous, needs not be told.

Probability, therefore, is, in such inquiries, all that can be attained, and he that sits idle in the time of war, expecting certain intelligence, will see his enemies enjoying the advantages of his folly, and laying hold on a thousand opportunities which he has neglected to improve.

The war in which we are now engaged, has been carried on by the administration with the utmost diligence and vigour; nor have any measures been omitted that could probably produce success, and the success of the wisest measures is only probable.

Should the great admiral, who is now present in the house, have met the French and Spaniards in the open seas, by what art could he arrive at a certain knowledge of their designs? He might by his acquaintance with the situation and state of neighbouring countries, the observation of their course, the periods of particular winds, and other hints of observation, form probable conjectures, but could never reach to certainty or confidence.

It seems to me, therefore, highly improper, to petition his majesty for intelligence which he cannot be imagined to have received, and I cannot agree to any motion for that purpose.

Mr. SANDYS then made another motion, to address his majesty, that there may be laid before the house copies of all letters received from, or written to, admiral Vernon since his going to the West Indies. Which being seconded,

Mr. PELHAM spoke to this effect:—Sir, this motion, if the intention of it be limited by proper restrictions, is doubtless reasonable and just; for the right of this house to examine into the conduct of publick affairs, and, consequently, for calling for the papers necessary to enlighten their inquiries, is not to be disputed.

But, as the end of all such inquiries is the promotion of the publick welfare, so they are not to be made in a manner by which that end may be defeated. Papers are not to be demanded, which cannot be produced without discovering our own secrets, and acquainting our enemies either with that weakness which we ought carefully to conceal, or that force which will be most effectually employed if it is not known, and, therefore, no preparations are made to oppose it.

It cannot be imagined, but that many of the papers which have passed between the admiralty and the commander in America, contain plans for the prosecution of the war, observations on the conditions of our own colonies, and, perhaps, intelligence of the estate of the Spanish fortresses and towns. Many informations of the utmost consequence to our enemies may be collected from those papers, but nothing can be expected from them, that will enable us to prosecute a senatorial inquiry with more success, that will put it in our power to discover frauds, negligence, or treachery.

There are, sir, other papers which may, indeed, be laid before us, without any benefit to our enemies, and, perhaps, with some advantage to ourselves; the papers which contain the accompts of our preparations and stores, the lists of our forces, and the calculation of our expenses, are the proper subjects of senatorial inquiries; and if the motion be restrained to those, I believe it will not be opposed by any gentleman engaged in the administration of our affairs. I shall beg leave to propose these words may be added, "So far as the same relates to a supply of ships, marines, or land forces."

The motion, thus amended, was agreed to.

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HOUSE OF LORDS, FEB. 13, 1740-1.

DEBATE ON ADDRESSING HIS MAJESTY FOR
REMOVING SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The opposition which for a long time had been made in the commons, to the measures of the administration, was on this day pushed to a crisis, and produced a motion in both houses. In the house of lords it occasioned the following debate:

Lord CARTERET began in this manner:—My lords, as the motion which I am about to make is of the highest importance, and of the most extensive consequences; as it cannot but meet with all the opposition which the prejudices of some, and the interest of others, can raise against it; as it must have the whole force of ministerial influence to encounter, without any assistance but from justice and reason; I hope to be excused by your lordships for spending some time in endeavouring to show, that it wants no other support, that it is not founded upon doubtful suspicions, but upon uncontestable facts; that it is not dictated by private interest, but by the sincerest regard to publick happiness; not abetted by the personal malevolence of particular men, but enforced by the voice of the people; a voice which ought always to be attended to, and, generally, to be obeyed.

To endeavour, my lords, to remove from places of publick trust all those who appear to want either the virtues or abilities necessary for executing their offices, is the interest of every member of a community. And it is not only the interest but the duty of all those who are, either by the choice of the people, or by the right of birth, invested with the power of inspecting publick affairs, and intrusted with the general happiness of their country. That, therefore, every motive combines to make it the duty, and every argument concurs to prove it the privilege of your lordships, is too evident to be doubted.

How often this privilege has been exerted by this house, and how often it has rescued our country from oppression, insolence, and rapine; how often our constitution has been reanimated, and impending ruin been averted by it, a superficial acquaintance with history may inform us. And we are now called upon by the universal cry of the nation, and urged by the perplexed and uncertain state of our foreign affairs, and declension of our wealth, and attacks upon our liberties at home, to recollect these precedents of magnanimity and justice, and to make another effort for the relief of our country.

This house, my lords, has proceeded against ministers, whose conduct they disapproved, by methods of greater or less severity, according to the necessity of affairs, or the supposed malignity of the crimes alleged against them; and, therefore, have sometimes thought it necessary to deter posterity from imitating them by rigorous censures, and exemplary punishments, and sometimes have thought it sufficient to set the nation free from its distresses, without inflicting any penalties on those by whose misconduct they imagined them produced.

What were the more violent and vindictive methods of proceeding, it is not necessary, with regard to this motion, to examine; since I shall only propose, that we should, in imitation of our predecessors, in cases of this nature, humbly address his majesty to remove the minister from his presence and councils.

Nothing, my lords, can be more moderate or tender than such an address, by which no punishment is inflicted, nor any forfeiture exacted. The minister, if he be innocent, if his misconduct be only the consequence of his ignorance or incapacity, may lay down in peace an office for which nature has not designed him, enjoy the vast profits of long employment in tranquillity, and escape the resentment of an unhappy people; who, when irritated to the highest degree, by a continuation of the same miscarriages, may, perhaps, in the heat of a more malevolent prosecution, not sufficiently distinguish between inability and guilt.

Those, therefore, among your lordships, that think him honest but mistaken, must willingly agree to a motion like this, as the best expedient to appease the people without the ruin of the minister. For surely no man who has read the history, or is acquainted with the temper of this nation, can expect that the people will always bear to see honours, favours, and preferments, distributed by the direction of one universally suspected of corruption, and arbitrary measures; or will look only with silent envy upon the affluence of those whom they believe to be made great by fraud and plunder, swelled to insolence by the prosperity of guilt, and advanced to wealth and luxury by publick miseries.

Such of your lordships who join with the people in ascribing our present unhappy state not to the errours, but to the crimes of the minister, and who, therefore, think a bare removal not sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice, must, doubtless, give their consent to the motion, for the sake of obtaining proper evidence of his wickedness, which cannot be expected while he stands exalted in prosperity, and distributes the riches of the nation, and the gifts of his sovereign at his own choice; while he is in possession of every motive that can influence the mind, enforce secrecy, and confirm fidelity; while he can bribe the avaricious, and intimidate the fearful; while he can increase the gratification of luxury, and enlarge the prospects of ambition. For, my lords, if it be considered from whom this evidence must be drawn, it will soon appear that no very important discoveries can be made, but by those whom he has intrusted with his secrets, men whose disregard of virtue recommended them to his favour, and who, as they are moved only by interest, will continue faithful while they can hope for recompense; but may, perhaps, be willing to buy their own security by sacrificing their master, when they shall see no farther prospect of advantage from serving him, or any other method of escaping punishment.

But, my lords, all must allow this motion to be reasonable, whatever they think of the minister's conduct, who are of opinion that a free people have a right of complaining when they feel oppression, and of addressing the crown to remove a minister that has incurred their universal detestation. That such is the condition of the present minister, I believe, will scarcely be denied, or may be discovered by those who find themselves inclined to doubt it, by asking any man whom they shall accidentally meet, what are his sentiments on the situation of national affairs, and of the hands by which they are administered. What answer he will receive is well known to most of your lordships. Let him not be satisfied with a single suffrage, let him repeat the question to ten thousand persons, different in their ages, their conditions, and religious opinions, in every thing that produces contrariety of dispositions and affections, he will yet find them unanimous in complaining of publick misconduct, and in censuring one gentleman as the author of it.

Let us not imagine, my lords, that these accusations and murmurs are confined to the lowest class of the people, to men whose constant attention to more immediate distresses, hinder them from making excursions beyond their own employments. For though, perhaps, it might be made evident from the accounts of past times, that no general dissatisfaction, even among men of this rank, was ever groundless; though it might be urged that those who see little can only clamour, because they feel themselves oppressed; and though it might not unseasonably be hinted that they are at least formidable for their numbers, and have, sometimes, executed that justice which they had not interest to procure, and trampled upon that insolence that has dared to defy them; yet I shall not insist upon such motives, because it is notorious that discontent is epidemical in all ranks, and that condition and observation are far from appeasing it.

Whether the discontent, thus general, is groundless, whether it is raised only by the false insinuations of the disappointed, and the wicked arts of the envious, whether it is, in exception to all the maxims of government, the first dislike of an administration that ever overspread a nation without just reasons, deserves to be inquired into.

In this inquiry, my lords, it will be necessary to consider not only the state of domestick affairs, increase or diminution of our debts, the security or violation of our liberties, the freedom or dependence of our senates, and the prosperity or declension of our trade, but to examine the state of this nation, with regard to foreign powers; to inquire, whether we are equally feared and equally trusted now as in former administrations; whether our alliances have contributed to secure us from our inveterate and habitual enemies, or to expose us to them; whether the balance of Europe be still in our hands; and whether, during this long interval of peace, our power has increased in the same proportion with that of our neighbours. France, my lords, is the constant and hereditary enemy of Britons, so much divided from her in religion, government, and interest, that they cannot both be prosperous together; as the influence of one rises, that of the other must, by consequence, decline. Alliances may form a temporal show of friendship, but it cannot continue; for their situation produces a natural rivalship, which every accidental circumstance has contributed to increase. Long wars, for many reigns after the conquest, established a radical and insuperable hatred between us, nor did those wars cease till the reformation produced new occasions of jealousy and aversion. France was, by these reasons, obliged for many ages to employ all her influence and policy in strengthening herself against us, by treaties and alliances; and in our times, has given us a new reason for jealousy by extending her commerce, and improving her manufactures.

It has been, therefore, my lords, the settled principle of every wise administration, of every Briton, whose opinions were not regulated by some other motives than those of reason, to attend, with the highest degree of vigilance, to all the designs of the French, and oppose, with incessant diligence, every attempt to increase their force, or extend their influence, and to check their conquests, obstruct their alliances, and forestal their trade.

For this great end it has been our constant endeavour to support the Austrian family, whose large dominions and numerous forces make a counterbalance on the continent to the power of France. For this end we entered into a long war, of which we still languish under the consequences, squandered the lives of our countrymen, and mortgaged the possessions of our posterity. For failing in the prosecution of this purpose, for leaving France too formidable, and neglecting the interests of the emperour, was the treaty of Utrecht censured, and the authors of it prosecuted by the present minister; but how much he has improved the errours of his predecessors to his own advantage, how diligent he has been to rectify the miscarriages of their conduct, and supply the defect, I shall endeavour to explain.

It is well known, my lords, that during the regency of the duke of Orleans, we had nothing to apprehend from French machinations; his interest, a tie which that nation is seldom found to break, held him steady to his engagements with us; nor is it less known how much he distrusted Spain, and how little, by consequence, he favoured her. We had, at that time, no necessity of anxiously attending to every whisper of the French court, which was sufficiently engaged in regulating their domestick affairs, and repairing the ruins of a destructive war; but, my lords, we ought to observe, that it had been happy for us had our minister laboured with equal address at the same employment.

After the death of this duke, the affairs of France were restored to their former situation, her old schemes were revived, her ancient alliances cultivated, and her general interest pursued. Spain was again considered as the power which had the same views with her, and which could never rival, but might always assist her.

This alliance, my lords, was intended to have been unalterably confirmed by a marriage, but as no human policy can form measures certain of success, an irreconcilable hatred was nearly produced by the measure intended to confirm a settled and indissoluble friendship. The infanta was sent back after her arrival in France, an affront which no nation would soon have forgot, but which the general character and habitual sentiments of the Spaniards inclined them to resent beyond any other people. To any one acquainted with their character in this respect, it will readily appear, that no other insult or injury could so sensibly affect them, or excite so eager a desire of revenge, This, my lords, the sagacity of our minister should have discovered, this opportunity should have been improved with the utmost care, by which Spain and France might possibly have been disunited for ages, and Britain have gained such advantages as would have made her the sole arbitress of Europe.

The Spaniards were not deficient on their side, nor did they neglect to court our friendship, but gave us the highest proof of their confidence by offering us the sole mediation of their differences with the emperour of Germany: but at this time it was, that the gentleman whose conduct I am examining, obtained the chief influence in our councils, and by his peculiar penetration discovered, that nothing was to be done which might give the least offence to the French. We, therefore, refused to mediate, unless French ministers might be associated with ours, which the Spaniards had too much spirit to consent to.

Thus, my lords, was neglected the first opportunity of forming against the French an alliance by which they might have been awed in all their designs, and by which the peace of Europe might have been long preserved.

The Spaniards, finding that we would not undertake to reconcile their differences with the emperour of Germany, and continuing their abhorrence of French mediators, concluded, without the intervention of any other power, a treaty both of peace and alliance with his imperial majesty.

This, my lords, was the famous treaty of Vienna, the source of so many projects and expedients, of so much terrour and solicitude, of such immense expenses, and perplexed negotiations. This treaty, a paper innocent and well-meaning, which related only to the contracting parties, kept, for some time, this nation in alarms, in apprehensions of conspiracies, and expectations of invasions.

To this treaty, had we singly regarded our own affairs, without applying to France for instructions, we ought to have acceded, by which we should have divided the interest of the house of Bourbon, broken the combination of these pontifical powers, and, by improving one lucky incident, obtained what our arms and our politicks had never, hitherto, been able to accomplish.

But the French, sensible of their danger, and well acquainted with our minister, contrived an expedient which, indeed, would not often have succeeded, but which was so well adapted to the intellects of this gentleman, that it extricated them from all their difficulties.

They told us, my lords, and, what is yet more wonderful, they prevailed upon us to believe, that in this dreadful treaty of Vienna, it was stipulated between the German emperour and Spain, that they should employ their joint forces against Britain, that they should exalt the pretender to the throne, take immediate possession of Gibraltar, and, without mercy, debar us for ever from our trade both in Spain and in the Western Indies. This his late majesty was advised to assert in his speech from the throne, which I desire may be read.

Of which the following clauses were read:

"My lords and gentlemen,

"The distressed condition of some of our religious brethren abroad, and the negotiations and engagements entered into by some foreign powers, which seem to have laid the foundation of new troubles and disturbances in Europe, and to threaten my subjects with the loss of several of the most advantageous branches of their trade, obliged me, without any loss of time, to concert with other powers such measures as might give a check to the ambitious views of those who are endeavouring to render themselves formidable, and put a stop to the farther progress of such dangerous designs. For these ends I have entered into a defensive alliance with the French king, and the king of Prussia, to which several other powers, and particularly the Dutch, have been invited to accede, and I have not the least reason to doubt of their concurrence. This treaty shall, in a short time, be laid before you.

"By these means, and by your support and assistance, I trust in God, I shall be able not only to secure to my own subjects the enjoyment of many valuable rights and privileges, long since acquired for them by the most solemn treaties, but effectually to preserve the peace and balance of Europe, the only view and end of all my endeavours.

"It is not to be doubted, but the enemies to my government will conceive hopes, that some favourable opportunity for renewing their attempts may offer, from the prospect of new troubles and commotions: they are already very busy by their instruments and emissaries in those courts whose measures seem most to favour their purposes, in soliciting and promoting the cause of the pretender; but I persuade myself, notwithstanding the countenance and encouragement they may have received, or flatter themselves with, the provision you shall make for the safety and defence of the empire, will effectually secure me from any attempts from abroad, and render all such projects vain and abortive.

"When the world shall see that you will not suffer the British crown and nation to be menaced and insulted, those who most envy the present happiness and tranquillity of this empire, and are endeavouring to make us subservient to their ambition, will consider their own interest and circumstances before they make any attempt upon so brave a people, strengthened and supported by prudent and powerful alliances, and though desirous to preserve the peace, able and ready to defend themselves against the efforts of all aggressors. Such resolutions and such measures, timely taken, I am satisfied, are the most effectual means of preventing a war, and continuing to us the blessings of peace and prosperity."

Who would not have been terrified, my lords, at a treaty like this? Our religion was to be destroyed, our government subverted, and our trade reduced to nothing. What could a ministry, thus intimidated, do, but resign themselves implicitly to the direction of a kind neighbour, that promised to shelter them from the storm?

There have been ministers, my lords, in former times, who, upon hearing such a representation, would have considered, that Britain was an island, that the pretender could not be forced upon us without an army, and that an army could not be transported without ships, that the emperour of Germany had neither navies nor ports, that Gibraltar might be easily supplied with every thing requisite for its defence, and that any attempt made by Spain to injure our trade, might easily be punished by intercepting their Plate fleets.

They would then have considered whether attempts so improbable, and stipulations so absurd and ridiculous, ought to be credited upon the information of an ambassadour's secretary, who, as he proposed to reveal his master's secrets for a bribe, might as probably take another reward for imposing upon those whom he pretended to inform. Those, therefore, who advised his majesty to assert to the senate what they knew from no better authority, those whose daring insolence could make their sovereign instrumental in alarming the people with false terrours, and oppressing them with unnecessary burdens, well deserve to feel a senatorial censure.

But our ministers, my lords, were too much frighted to make such reflections: they imagined that destruction was hanging over us, and, in a dread of arbitrary government, oppression, and persecution, concluded at Hanover a treaty with the French.

Thus the French gained our confidence, and raised in us a distrust of both the powers with whom it was our interest to be united: but the alliance of the emperour of Germany with Spain made them still uneasy; and, therefore, they determined, once more, to make our credulity instrumental in procuring a reconciliation between them and the Spaniards.

To effect this, they kindly gave us intelligence, that when the Spaniards should receive their treasures from the Western Indies, they designed to employ it in favour of the pretender, and that, therefore, it was necessary to intercept it. This advice was thankfully listened to, a fleet was fitted out, and thousands were sacrificed without any advantage; for the French not only forbore to assist us in the expedition, but forbade us to seize the treasure when we had found it.

The Spaniards, apprehending themselves attacked, omitted no opportunity of showing their resentment; they seized our ships, and laid siege to Gibraltar, while our new allies looked quietly on, and expected the event of their own scheme, which was far from being defeated by our policy; for the Spaniards, finding the return of their American revenues insuperably obstructed, and knowing that the emperour of Germany, that emperour who was to invade Britain, had not any power even to assist them, were obliged to have recourse to the nation which they then hated, and to forgive the past affront, that they might obtain their good offices in this exigence.

But, my lords, it was not sufficient for the designs of the French, that they had recovered their ancient allies the Spaniards, unless they could disunite them from the emperour of Germany: this it was, likewise, our interest to prevent, and yet this, likewise, we enabled them to effect; for they prevailed upon us to promise, in our stipulations with the Spaniards, what they had not the least claim to demand, that Spain, instead of neutral troops, should be introduced into Italy, to secure certain successions there to a son of the queen of Spain.

With what reluctance the emperour of Germany would consent to see troops placed in the provinces bordering upon his dominions, which would certainly, on the first occasion, be employed to invade them, it was easy to foresee, and with what degree of good-will he would regard those by whom they were introduced; yet, my lords, such was the influence of France, and so ardent our desire of diverting Spain from setting the pretender upon the throne of Britain, that we complied at all events, without any prospect or promise of advantage.

Thus were the Spaniards, by being persuaded to make this demand, and we, by granting it, brought equally to ill terms with the emperour of Germany; and France was, by procuring such agreeable conditions to the Spaniards, again considered as their most useful ally.

That nation, my lords, is in a very unhappy state, which is reduced to admit such terms as mediators are pleased to prescribe. We durst not refuse the introduction of Spanish troops, nor durst we introduce them without the emperour of Germany's consent, which, however, he granted at an easy rate, for he demanded only that we should become guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction. This we gladly agreed to, and thought ourselves so happy in purchasing, so cheaply, an opportunity of ingratiating ourselves with Spain, that we desired no other recompense.

This treaty with the emperour of Germany, was, however, by no means improper, nor could we, after the errours which had been committed, do any thing more effectual to preserve the balance of Europe, and reestablish our credit.

But, my lords, this only treaty, which it was for our interest to make, seems to have been made without any intention of observing it; for about this time all the northern powers were alarmed by the approaching election of Poland, and every nation that had any thing either to hope or fear from the event of it, endeavoured to influence it.

How this election was determined, my lords, and by what means, it is unnecessary to relate; but it may not be improper to remark, that whatever cause we may have to congratulate ourselves upon the choice, it does not appear that we had any part in promoting it. Nay, as it is not common for ministers to keep the best part of their conduct secret, there is reason for suspecting that they were not altogether without foundation reported to have favoured France.

The emperour of Germany, sensible of his own interest, promoted the election with vigour and resolution, proportioned to the greatness of the danger that might have arisen from neglecting it. By this conduct he drew upon himself the resentment of the French, who had now a pretence for taking measures which might effectually reunite them to Spain, and, as the event showed, alienate us from the emperour, and, therefore, in vindication of the claim of Stanislaus, declared war upon Germany, in conjunction with Spain.

Now, my lords, the emperour learned to set the true value upon his alliance with Britain, and all Europe had an opportunity of remarking our spirit, our power, and our vigilance. The troops which we prevailed upon his imperial majesty to admit into Italy, were now drawn out of the garrisons against him, his dominions were attacked on each side, by formidable enemies, and his British allies looked with tranquillity and unconcern upon the difficulties into which they had betrayed him. The liberties of Europe were endangered by a new combination of the houses of Bourbon; and Britain, the great protectress of the rights of mankind, the great arbitress of the balance of power, either neglected or feared to interpose.

Of the event of the war, my lords, I need only observe, that it added new strength to France, and contributed to such an union between her and Spain, as the most artful politician cannot hope to dissolve.

Thus, my lords, whether by negligence, ignorance, cowardice, or treachery, it is not easy to determine, we were made the instruments of the French policy. Thus was that power enabled by our assistance to retrieve all that she had lost by the ill success of her arms, and by her indecent and contemptuous treatment of Spain. Thus was the German emperour dispirited and weakened; thus were we deprived at once of our allies and our reputation.

Our loss of reputation, the greatest loss that bad measures can bring upon a nation, is made evident beyond controversy, by the insolence with which the Spaniards have treated us while we were flattering, enriching, and supporting them. While we were fitting out squadrons to convey their princes to Italy, and increasing their dominions at our own expense, they seem to have considered our good offices, not as the benefits of friends, but the drudgery of slaves, and, therefore, could scarcely refrain from insults while they employed us, at least when they no longer wanted our immediate assistance. They renewed their contempt and cruelty, their robberies and oppressions; they prescribed laws to our navigation, and laid claim to our colonies.

To these ravages and injuries what did we oppose? What but humble intreaties, pacifick negotiations, and idle remonstrances? Instead of asserting our just claims, and incontestable possessions, instead of preventing war by threatening it, and securing ourselves from a second injury by punishing the first, we amused ourselves with inquiries, demands, representations, and disputes, till we became the jest of that nation which it was in our power to distress, by intercepting their treasure, and to reduce to terms almost without bloodshed.

Thus, my lords, did we proceed, new questions ever arose, and the controversy became more intricate; commissaries were despatched to Spain, who returned without obtaining either restitution or security, and in the mean time no opportunity was neglected of plundering our merchants, and insulting our flag: accounts of new confiscations and of new cruelties daily arrived, the nation was enraged, and the senate itself alarmed, and our ministers, at length awakened from their tranquillity, sent orders to the envoy at the Spanish court to expedite an accommodation; these directions were immediately obeyed, and produced the celebrated convention.

What was given up, or what was endangered by this detestable treaty, your lordships have often had occasion to observe, and the consequences of it were so obvious, that the nation was astonished. Every man saw that we were either treacherously betrayed by our own ministry, or that the ministers were almost the only men in the kingdom utterly unacquainted with our claims, our injuries, and our danger.

A war could now no longer be avoided, it was not in the power of the ministry any longer to refuse to send out our fleets, and make an appearance of hostile measures; but they had still some expedients remaining to shelter the Spaniards from our resentment, and to make their country yet more contemptible: they could contrive such orders for their admirals as should prevent them from destroying their enemies with too little mercy; and if any one was suspected of intentions less pacifick, there were methods of equipping his fleet in such a manner as would effectually frustrate his schemes of revenge, reprisals, and destruction.

These, my lords, are not the murmurs of the disappointed, nor the insinuations of the factious; it is well known to our countrymen and to our enemies, how ill admiral Vernon was furnished with naval and military stores, and how little his importunate demands of a supply were regarded. What opportunities were lost, and what advantages neglected, may be conjectured from the success of his inconsiderable force. A very little reflection on the situation and state of those countries will easily satisfy your lordships, how far a small body of land-forces might have penetrated, what treasures they might have gained, and what consternation they might have spread over the whole Spanish America.

That our squadrons in the Mediterranean have been, at least, useless, that they have sailed from point to point, and from one coast to another, only to display the bulk of our ships, and to show the opulence of our nation, can require no proof: I wish, my lords, there was less reason for suspecting that they acted in concert with our enemies, that they retired from before their ports only to give them an opportunity of escaping, and that they, in reality, connived at some attempts which they were, in appearance, sent to prevent.

There are some miscarriages in war, my lords, which every reasonable man imputes to chance, or to causes of which the influence could not be foreseen; there are others that may justly be termed the consequences of misconduct, but of misconduct involuntary and pardonable, of a disregard, perhaps, of some circumstances of an affair produced by too close an attention to others. But there are miscarriages, too, for which candour itself can find no excuses, and of which no other causes can be assigned than cowardice or treachery. From the suspicion of one, the past actions of the admiral who commands our fleet in those seas will secure him, but I know not whether there are now any that will attempt to clear the minister's character from the imputation of the other.

All the insolence of the Spaniards, a nation by no means formidable, is the consequence of the reunion of the houses of Bourbon; a reunion which could not easily have been accomplished, but by the instrumental offices of our ministry, whom, therefore, the nation has a right to charge with the diminution of its honour, and the decay of its trade.

Nor has our trade, my lords, been only contracted and obstructed by the piracies of Spain, but has been suffered to languish and decline at home, either by criminal negligence, or by their complaisance for France, which has given rise to our other calamities. The state of our woollen manufactures is well known, and those whose indolence or love of pleasure keeps them strangers to the other misfortunes of their country, must yet have been acquainted with this, by the daily accounts of riots and insurrections, raised by those who, having been employed in that manufacture, can provide for their families by no other business, and are made desperate by the want of bread.

We are told, my lords, by all parties, and told with truth, that our manufactures decline, because the French have engrossed most of the foreign markets; and it is not denied even by those whose interest it might be to' deny it, that the cloth which they ruin us by vending, is made of our own wool, which they are suffered to procure either by the folly of an unskilful, or the connivance of a treacherous administration.

If our own manufactures, my lords, had been carefully promoted, if the whole influence of our government had been made to cooperate with the industry of our traders, there had always been such a demand for our wool, that they could not have afforded to purchase it at a price equivalent to the danger of exporting it: and if any means were now steadily practised to prevent the exportation, our trade must consequently revive, because cloth is one of the necessaries of life which other nations must have from Britain, when France can no longer supply them.

But, my lords, notwithstanding the decay of trade, our expenses have never been contracted; we have squandered millions in idle preparations, and ostentatious folly; we have equipped fleets which never left the harbour, and raised armies which were never to behold any other enemy than the honest traders and husbandmen that support them. We have, indeed, heard many reasons alleged for oppressing the empire with standing troops, which can have little effect upon those who have no interest to promote by admitting them: sometimes we are in danger of invasions, though it is not easy to imagine for what purpose any prince should invade a nation, which he may plunder at pleasure, without the least apprehension of resentment, and which will resign any of its rights whenever they shall be demanded: sometimes, as we have already heard, the pretender is to be set upon the throne by a sudden descent of armies from the clouds; and sometimes the licentiousness and disobedience of the common people requires the restraint of a standing army.

That the people are, to the last degree, exasperated and inflamed, I am far from intending to deny, but surely they have yet been guilty of no outrage so enormous as to justify so severe a punishment; they have generally confined themselves to harmless complaints, or, at least, to executions in effigy. The people, my lords, are enraged because they are impoverished, and, to prevent the consequences of their anger, their poverty is increased by new burdens, and aggravated by the sight of an useless, despicable herd, supported by their industry, for no other purpose than to insult them.

By these useless armaments and military farces, our taxes, my lords, have been continued without diminishing our debts, and the nation seems condemned to languish for ever under its present miseries, which, by furnishing employment to a boundless number of commissioners, officers, and slaves, to the court, under a thousand denominations, by diffusing dependence over the whole country, and enlarging the influence of the crown, are too evidently of use to the minister for us to entertain any hopes of his intention to relieve us.

Let it not be boasted that nine millions are paid, when a new debt of seven millions appears to be contracted; nothing is more easy than to clear debts by borrowing, or to borrow when a nation is mortgaged for the payment.

But the weight of the present taxes, my lords, though heavier than was perhaps ever supported by any nation for so long a time, taxes greater than ever were paid, to purchase neither conquests nor honours, neither to prevent invasions from abroad, nor to quell rebellions at home, is not the most flagrant charge of this wonderful administration, which, not contented with most exorbitant exactions, contrives to make them yet more oppressive by tyrannical methods of collection. With what reason the author of the excise scheme dreads the resentment of the nation is sufficiently obvious; but surely, in a virtuous and benevolent mind, the first sentiments that would have arisen on that occasion, would not have been motions of anger, but of gratitude. A whole nation was condemned to slavery, their remonstrances were neglected, their petitions ridiculed, and their detestation of tyranny treated as disaffection to the established government; and yet the author of this horrid scheme riots in affluence, and triumphs in authority, and without fear, as without shame, lifts up his head with confidence and security.

How much, my lords, is the forbearance of that people to be admired, whom such attacks as these have not provoked to transgress the bounds of their obedience, who have continued patiently to hope for legal methods of redress, at a time when they saw themselves threatened with legal slavery, when they saw the legislative power established only for their protection, influenced by all possible methods of corruption to betray them to the mercy of the ministry?

For, that corruption has found its way into one of the houses of the legislature, is universally believed, and, without scruple, maintained by every man in the nation, who is not evidently restrained from speaking as he thinks; and that any man can even be of a different opinion, that any man can even affirm that he thinks otherwise, would be, in any other age, the subject of astonishment. That an immense revenue is divided among the members of the other house, by known salaries and publick employments, is apparent; that large sums are privately scattered on pressing exigencies, that some late transactions of the ministry were not confirmed but at a high price, the present condition of the civil list, a civil list vastly superiour to all the known expenses of the crown, makes highly probable. That the commons themselves suspect the determinations of their assembly to be influenced by some other motives than justice and truth, is evident from the bill this day sent hither for our concurrence; and, surely, no aggravation can be added to the crimes of that man who has patronised our enemies, and given up our navigation, sunk his country into contempt abroad, and into poverty at home, plundered the people, and corrupted the legislature.

But, my lords, the minister has not only contributed, by his wickedness or his ignorance, to the present calamities, but has applied all his art and all his interest to remove from posts of honour and trust, to banish from the court, and to exclude from the legislature all those whose counsels might contribute to restore the publick affairs, without any regard to the popularity of their characters, the usefulness of their talents, or the importance of their past services to the crown. Had any of these considerations prevailed, we had not seen the greatest general in Britain dispossessed of all his preferments, dispossessed at a time when we are at war with one nation, and in expectation of being attacked by another far more powerful, which will, doubtless, be encouraged, by his removal, to more daring contempt, and more vigorous measures.

What were the motives of this procedure it is easy to discover. As his open defence of the present royal family in the late rebellion, exempts him from the imputation of being disaffected to the crown, the only crime with which he can be charged is disaffection to the minister.

Perhaps, my lords, the minister may have determined to have no need of generals in his transactions with foreign powers; but in proportion as he relies less upon the sword, he must depend more upon the arts of peaceable negotiation, and, surely, there has been another person dismissed from his employments, whose counsels it had been no reproach to have asked, and to have followed.

The nature of my motion, my lords, makes it not necessary to produce evidence of these facts, it is sufficient that any minister is universally suspected; for when did an innocent man, supported by power, and furnished with every advantage that could contribute to exalt or preserve his character, incur the general hatred of the people? But if it could ever happen by a combination of unlucky accidents, what could be more for the happiness of himself, his master, and the nation, than that he should retire and enjoy the consciousness of his own virtue.

His own interest, in such a retirement, I have already considered, and that both of the prince and the people is no less apparent: while a hated minister is employed, the king will always be distrusted by the nation, and, surely, nothing can so much obstruct the publick happiness, as a want of confidence in those who are intrusted with its preservation.

That common fame is, in this case, sufficient, will not be questioned, when it is considered that common fame is never without a foundation in facts, that it may spread disquiet and suspicion over all the kingdom, and that the satisfaction of millions is very cheaply purchased by the degradation of one man, who was exalted only for their benefit.

The objection, that there is no sole minister, will create no greater difficulty; if there be many concerned in these transactions, respondeat superior: but it is too apparent that there is, in reality, one whose influence is greater than that of any other private man, and who is arrived at a height not consistent with the nature of the British government; it is uncontested that there is one man to whom the people impute their miseries, and by whose removal they will be appeased.

The affairs of Europe, my lords, will probably be so much embarrassed, and the struggles between the different designs of its princes be so violent, that they will demand all our attention, and employ all our address, and it will be to the highest degree dangerous to be distracted at the same time with apprehensions of domestick troubles; yet, such is the present unhappy state of this nation, and such is the general discontent of the people, that tranquillity, adherence to the government, and submission to the laws, cannot reasonably be hoped, unless the motion I shall now take leave to make your lordships, be complied with: and I move, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, most humbly to advise and beseech his majesty, that he will be most graciously pleased to remove the right honourable sir Robert WALPOLE, knight of the most noble order of the blue riband, first commissioner of his majesty's treasury, and chancellor of the exchequer, and one of his majesty's most honourable privy council, from his majesty's presence and councils for ever."

He was seconded by lord ABINGDON in the following manner:—My lords, the copiousness and perspicuity with which the noble lord has laid down the reasons of his motion, make it neither easy nor necessary to enlarge upon them. I shall, therefore, only offer to your lordships a few thoughts upon the authority of common fame, as the evidence upon which the motion is in part founded.

That all the miscarriages of our late measures are by common fame imputed to one man, I suppose, will not be denied; nor can it, in my opinion, be reasonably required, that in the present circumstances of things any other proof should be brought against him.

Common fame, my lords, is admitted in courts of law as a kind of auxiliary or supplemental evidence, and is allowed to corroborate the cause which it appears to favour. The general regard which every wise man has for his character, is a proof that in the estimation of all mankind, the testimony of common fame is of too great importance to be disregarded.

If we consider the nature of popular opinions on publick affairs, it will be difficult to imagine by what means a persuasion not founded on truth should universally take possession of a people; it will be yet more difficult to believe that it should preserve its empire, and that in opposition to every art that can be made use of to undeceive them, they should pertinaciously adhere to an errour not imbibed in their education, nor connected with their interest. And how has any man been originally prejudiced against the present minister? Or what passion or interest can any man gratify, by imagining or declaring his country on the verge of ruin? The multitude, my lords, censure and praise without dissimulation, nor were ever accused of disguising their sentiments; their voice is, at least, the voice of honesty, and has been termed the voice of heaven, by that party of which those affect to be thought whom it now condemns.

Let it not be urged, that the people are easily deceived, that they think and speak merely by caprice, and applaud or condemn without any calm inquiry or settled determination; these censures are applicable only to sudden tumults, and gusts of zeal excited by fallacious appearances, or by the alarms of a false report industriously disseminated, but have no relation to opinions gradually propagated, and slowly received.

If the credulity of the people exposes them to so easy an admission of every report, why have the writers for the minister found so little credit? Why have all the loud declamations, and the laboured arguments, the artful insinuations, and positive assertions, which have been for many years circulated round the nation, at the expense of the government, produced no effect upon the people, nor convinced any man, who was not apparently bribed, to resign his private opinion to that of his patrons? Whence comes it, my lords, that falsehood is more successful than truth, and that the nation is inclined to complain rather than to triumph? It is well known that the people have been charged in all former ages, with being too much dazzled by the glitter of fortune, and the splendour of success, and bestowing their applauses not according to the degrees of merit, but prosperity. The minister, my lords, has defeated his opponents in almost all their attempts; his friends have sounded victory every session, and yet the people declare against him; his adversaries have retired into the country with all the vexation of disappointment, and have been rewarded for their unsuccessful efforts with general acclamations. What is it, my lords, but the power of truth, that can preserve the vanquished from ridicule, and influence the nation to believe them the only patrons of their commerce and liberty, in opposition to all the writers and voters for the ministry?

If we consult history, my lords, how seldom do we find an innocent minister overwhelmed with infamy? Innocent men have sometimes been destroyed by the hasty fury, but scarcely ever by the settled hatred of the populace. Even that fury has generally been kindled by real grievances, though imputed to those who had no share in producing them; but when the tempest of their first rage has subsided, they have seldom refused to hear truth, and to distinguish the patriot from the oppressor.

But though it should be acknowledged, my lords, that the people have been blinded by false representations, and that some causes yet undiscovered, some influence which never has been known to operate in any state before, hinder them from beholding their own felicity; yet, as publick happiness is the end of government, and no man can be happy that thinks himself miserable, it is, in my opinion, necessary to the honour of his majesty, and to the tranquillity of the nation, that your lordships should agree to the present motion.

The duke of NEWCASTLE answered to this effect:—My lords, it is not without wonder that I hear a motion so uncommon and important, a motion which may be reasonably supposed to have been long premeditated, and of which such affecting expectations have been raised, so weakly supported by evidence. I cannot think that any other attestation is needful for the vindication of the right honourable gentleman, whose conduct is this day to be examined, than the declaration of the noble lord, that there appears no positive evidence against him.

The pretence that no evidence can be expected while he continues in his present station, is too openly fallacious to impose upon your lordships; for why should his influence be greater, and his power less resistible than that of other ministers, who are well known to have found accusers in the height of their authority, and to have been dragged to punishment almost from behind the throne?

It is sufficiently known, that during the continuance of this administration, many have been dismissed from their employments, who appear not altogether unaffected with the loss, and from whose resentment a discovery of wicked measures might be reasonably expected, as their acquaintance with the secrets of the government must have given opportunities of detecting them. If, therefore, no particular crimes are charged upon him, if his enemies confine themselves to obscure surmises, and general declamations, we may reasonably conclude, that his behaviour has been at least blameless. For what can be a higher encomium than the silence of those who have made it the business of years to discover something that might be alleged against him on the day of trial.

I suppose that no man can question the penetration of those noble lords who have opened this debate, and I, my lords, shall be very far from insinuating that cowardice suppresses any of their sentiments. As the highest reproach that can be thrown upon any man, is to suggest that he speaks what he does not think; the next degree of meanness would be to think what he dares not speak, when the publick voice of his country calls upon him.

When, therefore, popular reports are alleged as the foundation of the address, it is probable that it is not founded, in reality, upon known crimes or attested facts, and if the sudden blasts of fame may be esteemed equivalent to attested accusations, what degree of virtue can confer security?

That the clamour is so loud and so general as it is represented, I can discover no necessity of admitting; but, however the populace may have been exasperated against him, we are surely not to be influenced by their complaints, without inquiring into the cause of them, and informing ourselves whether they proceed from real hardships, unnecessary severities, and calamities too heavy to be borne, or from caprice, and inconstancy, idle rumours, and artful representations.

I very readily allow, my lords, that nothing has been left unattempted that might fill the people with suspicion and discontent. That inevitable calamities have been imputed to misconduct, or to treachery, and even the inconstancy of the winds and severity of the weather charged upon the right honourable gentleman, the daily libels that are in every man's hand, are a standing evidence; and though I should grant that the people never complain without cause, and that their burdens are always heavy before they endeavour to shake them off, yet it will by no means follow, that they do not sometimes mistake the cause of their miseries, and impute their burdens to the cruelty of those whose utmost application is employed to lighten them.

Common fame is, therefore, my lords, no sufficient ground for such a censure as this, a censure that condemns a man long versed in high employments, long honoured with the confidence of his sovereign, and distinguished by the friendship of the most illustrious persons in the nation, to infamy and contempt, unheard, and even unaccused; for he against whom nothing is produced but general charges, supported by the evidence of common fame, may be justly esteemed to be free from accusation.

That other evidence will appear against him when he shall be reduced, in consequence of our agreeing to this motion, to the level with his fellow-subjects, that all informations are now precluded by the terrours of resentment, or the expectations of favour, has been insinuated by the noble lord, who made the motion: whether his insinuation be founded only upon conjecture, whether it be one of those visions which are raised by hope in a warm imagination, or upon any private informations communicated to his lordship, I pretend not to determine; but if we may judge from the known conduct of the opposition, if we consider their frequent triumphs before the battle, and their chimerical schemes of discoveries, or prosecutions and punishments, their constant assurance of success upon the approach of a new contest, and their daily predictions of the ruin of the administration, we cannot but suspect that men so long accustomed to impose upon themselves, and flatter one another with fallacious hopes, may now, likewise, be dreaming of intelligence which they never will receive, and amusing themselves with suspicions which they have no reasonable expectation of seeing confirmed.

And to confess the truth, my lords, if I may be allowed, in imitation of these patrons of their country, to indulge my own imagination, and presume to look forward to the future conduct of those who have exerted such unwearied industry in their attempts upon the administration, and so long pursued the right honourable gentleman with inquiries, examinations, rhetorick, and ridicule, I cannot but find myself inclined to question whether, after their motion shall have been received in this house, and their petition granted by his majesty, they will very solicitously inquire after evidence, or be equally diligent in the discovery of truth, as in the persecution of the minister.

I am afraid, my lords, that they will be too deeply engaged in the care of making a dividend of the plunder in just proportions, to find leisure for pursuit of the enemy, and that the sight of vacant posts, large salaries, and extensive power, will revive some passions, which the love of their country has not yet wholly extinguished, and leave in their attention no room for deep reflections, and intricate inquiries. There have formerly, my lords, been patriots, who, upon a sudden advancement to a place of profit, have been immediately lulled into tranquillity, learned to repose an implicit confidence in the ministers, forgotten to harangue, threaten, inquire, and protest, and spent the remaining part of their lives in the harmless amusement of counting their salaries, perquisites, and gratuities.

How great, my lords, would be the disappointment of the people, that unhappy people which has been long neglected and oppressed, which so justly detests the minister, and calls so loudly for vengeance, when they shall see their defenders remit the vigour of the pursuit, when once the minister flies before them, and instead of driving him into exile, contend about his places!

Unhappy then surely, my lords, would the nation be: the administration, we are told, is already universally abhorred, and its hope is only in the opposition; but should the zeal of the patriots once grow cold, should they discover to the publick, that they have been labouring not for general liberty, but for private advantage; that they were enemies to power only because it was not in their hands; and disapproved the measures of the government only because they were not consulted; how inevitably must the people then sink into despair; how certain must they then imagine their destruction?

It seems, therefore, my lords, equally prudent and just to reject this motion, till better proof shall be brought to support it; lest, by complying with it, we should heighten rather than appease the discontent of the people; lest we should too soon deprive them of their only consolation, and expose the patriots to censure, without vindicating the ministry.

In my opinion, my lords, all who have approved the conduct of the present ministry, must necessarily join in rejecting the motion, as cruel and unequitable, and incline to support a just, and continue a wise administration; and all those whom the restless clamours of the opposite party have persuaded to regard them as arbitrary, corrupt, and perfidious, must, if they are true friends to their country, and steady exacters of justice, resolve to defer their compliance, in order to bring to light the evidences necessary for a legal conviction, and severer punishment.

That these evidences will never be found, and that, therefore, no legal punishment will ever be inflicted, we may reasonably collect from the injustice of the laboured charge which your lordships have now heard; a charge drawn up with all the assistance of senatorial and political knowledge, and displayed with all the power of eloquence, a collection of every occurrence for many years, of which any circumstance could be shown in an unfavourable light, and a recapitulation of all the measures which have miscarried by unforeseen events, or which the populace have been persuaded to dislike.

In the administration of governments, my lords, many measures reasonable and just, planned out in pursuance of a very exact knowledge of the state of things then present, and very probable conjectures concerning future events, have yet failed to produce the success which was expected; they have been sometimes defeated by the inconstancy or dishonesty of those who are equally engaged in them, and sometimes frustrated by accidents, of which only providence has the disposal. It will even be allowed, my lords, that the ministry have been sometimes mistaken in their conjectures, and, perhaps, deceived by their intelligence, but I will presume to say, it never will be discovered that they willingly betrayed, or heedlessly neglected their trust, that they ever oppressed their country with unnecessary burdens, or exposed it to be insulted by foreign powers. Nor will it, perhaps, be found that they ever appeared grossly ignorant of the publick interest, or failed to discover any obvious truth, or foresee any probable contingencies.

But, my lords, I am willing to confess that they cannot judge of events to come with such unerring and demonstrative knowledge as their opponents can obtain of them after they have happened; and they are inclined to pay all necessary deference to the great sagacity of those wonderful prognosticators, who can so exactly foresee the past. They only hope, my lords, that you will consider how much harder their task is than that of their enemies; they are obliged to determine very often upon doubtful intelligence, and an obscure view of the designs and inclinations of the neighbouring powers; and as their informers may be either treacherous or mistaken, and the interests of other states are subject to alterations, they may be sometimes deceived and disappointed. But their opponents, my lords, are exempt, by their employment, from the laborious task of searching into futurity, and collecting their resolutions, from a long comparison of dark hints and minute circumstances. Their business is not to lead or show the way, but to follow at a distance, and ridicule the perplexity, and aggravate the mistakes of their guides. They are only to wait for consequences, which, if they are prosperous, they misrepresent as not intended, or pass over in silence, and are glad to hide them from the notice of mankind. But if any miscarriages arise, their penetration immediately awakes, they see, at the first glance, the fatal source of all our miseries, they are astonished at such a concatenation of blunders, and alarmed with the most distracting apprehensions of the danger of their country.

Accusation of political measures is an easy province; easy, my lords, in the same proportion as the administration of affairs is difficult; for where there are difficulties there will be some mistakes; and where there are mistakes, there will be occasions of triumph, to the factious and the disappointed. But the justice of your lordships will certainly distinguish between errours and crimes, and between errours of weakness and inability, and such as are only discoverable by consequences.

I may add, my lords, that your wisdom will easily find the difference between the degree of capacity requisite for recollecting the past, and foreknowing the future; and expect that those whose ambition incites them to endeavour after a share in the government of their country, should give better proofs of their qualifications for that high trust, than mere specimens of their memory, their rhetorick, or their malice.

Even the noble lord, who must be confessed to have shown a very extensive acquaintance with foreign affairs, and to have very accurately considered the interests and dispositions of the princes of Europe, has yet failed in the order of time, and by one errour very much invalidated his charge of misconduct in foreign affairs.

The treaty of Vienna, my lords, was not produced by the rejection of the infanta, unless a treaty that was made before it could be the consequence of it; so that there was no such opportunity thrown into our hands as the noble lord has been pleased to represent. Spain had discovered herself our enemy, and our enemy in the highest degree, before the French provoked her by that insult; and, therefore, how much soever she might be enraged against France, there was no prospect that she would favour us, nor could we have courted her alliance without the lowest degree of meanness and dishonour.

See then, my lords, this atrocious accusation founded upon false dates, upon a preposterous arrangement of occurrences; behold it vanish into smoke at the approach of truth, and let this instance convince us how easy it is to form chimerical blunders, and impute gross follies to the wisest administration; how easy it is to charge others with mistakes and how difficult to avoid them.

But we are told, my lords, that the dangers of the confederacy at Vienna were merely imaginary, that no contract was made to the disadvantage of our dominions, or of our commerce, and that if the weakness of the Spaniards and Germans had contrived such a scheme, it would soon have been discovered by them to be an airy dream, a plan impossible to be reduced to execution.

We have been amused, my lords, on this occasion with great profusion of mirth and ridicule, and have received the consolation of hearing that Britain is an island, and that an island is not to be invaded without ships. We have been informed of the nature of the king's territories, and of the natural strength of the fortress of Gibraltar; but the noble lord forgot that though Britain has no dominions on the continent, yet our sovereign has there a very extensive country, which, though we are not to make war for the sake of strengthening or enlarging it, we are, surely, to defend when we have drawn an invasion upon it.

The weakness of the Spaniards, my lords, has been also much enlarged upon, but the strength of the jacobites at home has been passed over in silence, though it is apparent how easily the pretender might have landed here, and with what warmth his cause would have been espoused, not only by those whose religion avowed and professed makes them the enemies of the present royal family, but by many whom prospects of interest, the love of novelty, and rage of disappointment, might have inclined to a change.

That no such stipulations were made by that treaty, that no injury was intended to our commerce, nor any invasion proposed in favour of the pretender, are very bold assertions, and though they could be supported by all the evidence that negatives admit of, yet will not easily be believed by your lordships, in opposition to the solemn assurances of his late majesty. It is evident, from this instance, how much prejudice prevails over argument; they are ready to condemn the right honourable gentleman to whom they give the title of sole minister, upon the suffrage of common fame, yet will not acquit him upon the testimony of the king himself.

But, my lords, the arguments alleged to prove the improbability of such a confederacy, are so weak in themselves, that they require no such illustrious evidence to overbalance them. For upon what are they founded, but upon the impossibility of executing such designs?

It is well known, my lords, how differently different parties consider the same cause, the same designs, and the same state of affairs. Every man is partial in favour of his own equity, strength, and sagacity. Who can show that the same false opinion of their own power, and of our intestine divisions, which now prompts the Spaniards to contend with us, might not then incite them to invade us, or at least to countenance the attempts of one, whom they are industriously taught to believe the greatest part of the nation is ready to receive?

That they might have injured our trade is too evident from our present experience, and that they would have supported the Ostend company, which they espoused in an open manner, is undeniable. Nor is it in the least unlikely, that, elated with the certain power of doing much mischief, and with the imaginary prospects of far greater effects, they might engage in a confederacy, and farther attempts against us.

I am far from imagining, my lords, that it was in the power of the Germans and Spaniards united to force the pretender upon us, though we had stood alone against them; but the impossibility of succeeding in their design was not then so apparent to them as it is at present to us; they had many reasons to wish, and therefore would not be long without some to believe it practicable; and it was not the danger but the insult that determined his late majesty to enter into an alliance with France.

War, my lords, is always to be avoided, if the possessions and reputation of a people can be preserved without it; it was, therefore, more eligible to oblige them to lay aside their scheme while it was yet only in idea, than to defeat it in its execution. And an alliance with France effectually restrained the emperour, as our fleets in America reduced the Spaniards to desire peace.

Why we did not seize the cargo of the galleons, has been often asked, and as often such answers have been returned as ought to satisfy any rational examiner. We did not seize them, my lords, because a larger part belonged to other nations than to the Spaniards, and because the interests of our trade made it convenient not to exasperate the Spaniards, so far as to render a reconciliation very difficult.

In the terms of this reconciliation, my lords, it is charged upon the ministry, that they were guilty of contributing to the power of the house of Bourbon, by stipulating that Spain, instead of neutral troops, should be introduced into Italy. That those troops were less agreeable to the emperour cannot be denied, but it has already been shown how little reason we had to consult his satisfaction; and with regard to the advantages gained by the French and Spaniards in the late war, a very small part of them can be ascribed to six thousand troops.

With as little reason, my lords, is the charge advanced of neglecting to preserve the balance of Europe, by declining to assist the emperour against the French; for the intention of the war seems to have been rather revenge than conquest, and the emperour rather exchanged than lost his dominions.

That we declined engaging too far in the affairs of the continent, proceeded, my lords, from a regard to the trade of the nation, which is not only suspended and interrupted during the time of war, but often thrown into another channel, out of which it is the business of many years to recover it.

Nor have the ministry, my lords, deviated from their regard to trade, in their transactions with Spain, which have been the subject of so much clamour, and such pathetick declamations; they always knew what the nation now feels, that the merchants would suffer much more from a war than from piracies and depredations, which, however, they were far from submitting to, and for which they constantly made demands of satisfaction. To these demands they received such answers, as, if they had been sincere, would have left the nation no room to complain; but when it was discovered that nothing but verbal satisfaction was to be expected, the security of our trade, and the honour of our country, demanded that war should be declared.

The conduct of the war, my lords, has been frequently the subject of censure; we are told of the inactivity of one fleet, and the imperfect equipment of another, the escape of our enemies, and the interception of our trading ships. War, my lords, is confessed to be uncertain, and ill success is not always the consequence of bad measures: naval wars are by the nature of the element on which they are to be conducted, more uncertain than any other; so that, though it cannot but be suspected that the common people will murmur at any disappointment, call every misfortune a crime, and think themselves betrayed by the ministry, if Spain is not reduced in a single summer, it might be reasonably hoped, that men enlightened by a long familiarity with the accounts of past, and instructed by personal experience in national transactions, will produce stronger arguments than want of success, when they charge the ministry with misconduct in war.

But, my lords, they have not any misfortunes to complain of; nor is the accusation, that we have been defeated ourselves, but that we have not enough molested our enemies. Of this, my lords, it is not easy to judge, at a distance from the scene of action, and without a more accurate knowledge of a thousand minute circumstances, which may promote or retard a naval expedition. It is undoubtedly true, my lords, that many of our merchant ships have been taken by the enemy; but it is not certain that they do not murmur equally that they have been obstructed in their commerce, and have been so little able to interrupt ours, since they have so many advantages from the situation of their coasts. When we reckon those that are lost, let us not forget to number those that have escaped. If admiral Vernon's fleet was ill provided with arms and ammunition, even then, let all censure be suspended till it can be proved that it was ill furnished by the fault of the ministry.

Nothing is more common, my lords, in all naval wars, than sudden changes of fortune; for on many occasions an accidental gust of wind, or unexpected darkness of the weather, may destroy or preserve a fleet from destruction, or may make the most formidable armaments absolutely useless; and in the present disposition of some people towards the ministry, I should not wonder to hear an alteration of wind charged upon them.

For what objections may they not expect, my lords, when all the disadvantages which the nation suffers from the enemies of his majesty, are imputed to them; when daily endeavours are used to make them suspected of favouring arbitrary power, for maintaining an army which nothing has made necessary but the struggles of those men whose principles have no other tendency than to enslave their country. Let not our domestick animosities be kept alive and fomented by a constant opposition to every design of the administration, nor our foreign enemies incited by the observation of our divisions, to treat us with insolence, interrupt our trade, prescribe bounds to our dominions, and threaten us with invasions—and the army may safely be disbanded.

For the ministry, my lords, are not conscious of having consulted any thing but the happiness of the nation, and have, therefore, no apprehensions of publick resentment, nor want the protection of an armed force. They desire only the support of the laws, and to them they willingly appeal from common fame and unequitable charges.

I mention the ministry, my lords, because I am unacquainted with any man who either claims or possesses the power or title of sole minister. I own, in my province, no superiour but his majesty, and am willing and ready to answer any charge which relates to that part of the publick business which I have had the honour to transact or direct.

A great part of what I have now offered was, therefore, no otherwise necessary on the present occasion, than because silence might have appeared like a consciousness of misconduct, and have afforded a new subject of airy triumph to the enemies of the administration; for very few of the transactions which have been so severely censured, fell under the particular inspection of the right honourable gentleman against whom the motion is levelled; he was not otherwise concerned in counselling or in ratifying, than as one of his majesty's privy council; and, therefore, though they should be defective, I do not see how it is reasonable or just, that he should be singled out from the rest for disgrace or punishment.

The motion, therefore, my lords, appears to me neither founded on facts, nor law, nor reason, nor any better grounds than popular caprice, and private malevolence.

If it is contrary to law to punish without proof; if it is not agreeable to reason that one should be censured for the offences of another; if it is necessary that some crime should be proved before any man can suffer as a criminal, then, my lords, I am convinced that your lordships will be unanimous in rejecting the motion.

The duke of ARGYLE spoke next, as follows:—My lords, if we will obstinately shut our eyes against the light of conviction; if we will resolutely admit every degree of evidence that contributes to support the cause which we are inclined to favour, and to reject the plainest proofs when they are produced against it, to reason and debate is to little purpose: as no innocence can be safe that has incurred the displeasure of partial judges, so no criminal that has the happiness of being favoured by them, can ever be in danger.

That any lord has already determined how to vote on the present occasion, far be it from me to assert: may it never, my lords, be suspected that private interest, blind adherence to a party, personal kindness or malevolence, or any other motive than a sincere and unmingled regard for the prosperity of our country, influences the decisions of this assembly; for it is well known, my lords, that authority is founded on opinion; when once we lose the esteem of the publick, our votes, while we shall be allowed to give them, will be only empty sounds, to which no other regard will be paid than a standing army shall enforce.

The veneration of the people, my lords, will not easily be lost: this house has a kind of hereditary claim to their confidence and respect; the great actions of our ancestors are remembered, and contribute to the reputation of their successours; nor do our countrymen willingly suspect that they can be betrayed by the descendants of those, by whose bravery and counsels they have been rescued from destruction.

But esteem must languish, and confidence decline, unless they are renewed and reanimated by new acts of beneficence; and the higher expectations the nation may have formed of our penetration to discover its real advantages, and of our steadiness to pursue them, the more violent will be its resentment, if it shall appear, on this important question, that we are either ignorant or timorous, that we are unconcerned at the miseries of the people, or content ourselves with pitying what our ancestors never failed to redress.

Let us, therefore, my lords, for our own interest, attend impartially to the voice of the people; let us hear their complaints with tenderness, and if, at last, we reject them, let it be evident that they were impartially heard, and that we only differed from them because we were not convinced.

Even then, my lords, we shall suffer, for some time, under the suspicion of crimes, from which I hope we shall always be free; the people will imagine that we were influenced by those whose interest it appears to continue their miseries, and, my lords, all the consolation that will be left us, must arise from the consciousness of having done our duty.

But, my lords, this is to suppose what I believe no history can furnish an example of; it is to conceive that we may inquire diligently after the true state of national affairs, and yet not discover it, or not be able to prove it by such evidence as may satisfy the people.

The people, my lords, however they are misrepresented by those who, from a long practice of treating them with disregard, have learned to think and speak of them with contempt, are far from being easily deceived, and yet farther from being easily deceived into an opinion of their own unhappiness: we have some instances of general satisfaction, and an unshaken affection to the government, in times when the publick good has not been very diligently consulted, but scarcely any of perpetual murmurs and universal discontent, where there have been plain evidences of oppression, negligence, or treachery.

Let us not, therefore, my lords, think of the people as of a herd to be led or driven at pleasure, as wretches whose opinions are founded upon the authority of seditious scribblers, or upon any other than that of reason and experience; let us not suffer them to be at once oppressed and ridiculed, nor encourage, by our example, the wretched advocates for those whom they consider as their enemies, nor represent them as imputing to the misconduct of the ministry the late contrariety of the winds, and severity of the winter.

The people, my lords, if they are mistaken in their charge, are mistaken with such evidence on their side, as never misled any nation before; not only their reason but their senses must have betrayed them; and those marks of certainty that have hitherto established truth, must have combined in the support of falsehood.

They are persuaded, my lords, too firmly persuaded, to yield up their opinions to rhetorick, or to votes, or any proof but demonstration, that there is a first, or, to speak in the language of the nation, a sole minister, one that has the possession of his sovereign's confidence, and the power of excluding others from his presence, one that exalts and degrades at his pleasure, and distributes, for his own purposes, the revenues of his master, and the treasure of the nation.

Of this, my lords, can it be maintained that they have no proof? Can this be termed a chimerical suspicion, which nothing can be produced to support? How can power appear but by the exercise of it? What can prove any degree of influence or authority, but universal submission and acknowledgment? And surely, my lords, a very transient survey of the court and its dependents, must afford sufficient conviction, that this man is considered by all that are engaged in the administration, as the only disposer of honours, favours, and employments.

Attend to any man, my lords, who has lately been preferred, rewarded, or caressed, you will hear no expressions of gratitude but to that man; no other benefactor is ever heard of, the royal bounty itself is forgotten and unmentioned, nor is any return of loyalty, fidelity, or adherence professed, but to the minister; the minister! a term which, however lately introduced, is now in use in every place in the kingdom, except this house.

Preferments, my lords, whether civil, ecclesiastical, or military, are either wholly in his hands, or those who make it the business of their lives to discover the high road to promotion, are universally deceived, and are daily offering their adorations to an empty phantom that has nothing to bestow; for, no sooner is any man infected with avarice or ambition, no sooner is extravagance reduced to beg new supplies from the publick, or wickedness obliged to seek for shelter, than this man is applied to, and honour, conscience, and fortune offered at his feet.

Did either those whose studies and station give them a claim to advancement in the church, or those whose bravery and long service entitle them to more honourable posts in the army; did either those who profess to understand the laws of their own country, or they who declare themselves versed in the interests and transactions of foreign powers, apply to any other man for promotion or employment, he might then, indeed, be called the chief, but not properly the sole minister.

But it is well known, my lords; many of us know it too well, that whatever be the profession or the abilities of any person, there is no hope of encouragement or reward by any other method than that of application to this man, that he shall certainly be disappointed who shall attempt to rise by any other interest, and whoever shall dare to depend on his honesty, bravery, diligence, or capacity, or to boast any other merit than that of implicit adherence to his measures, shall inevitably lie neglected and obscure.

For this reason, my lords, every one whose calmness of temper can enable him to support the sight, without starts of indignation and sallies of contempt, may daily see at the levee of this great man, what I am ashamed to mention, a mixture of men of all ranks and all professions, of men whose birth and titles ought to exalt them above the meanness of cringing to a mere child of fortune, men whose studies ought to have taught them, that true honour is only to be gained by steady virtue, and that all other arts, all the low applications of flattery and servility will terminate in contempt, disappointment, and remorse.

This scene, my lords, is daily to be viewed, it is ostentatiously displayed to the sight of mankind, the minister amuses himself in publick with the splendour, and number, and dignity of his slaves; and his slaves with no more shame pay their prostrations to their master in the face of day, and boast of their resolutions to gratify and support him. And yet, my lords, it is inquired why the people assert that there is a sole minister?

Those who deny, my lords, that there is a sole minister to whom the miscarriages of the government may justly be imputed, may easily persuade themselves to believe that there have been no miscarriages, that all the measures were necessary, and well formed, that there is neither poverty nor oppression felt in the nation, that our compliance with France was no weakness, and that our dread of the treaty of Vienna was not chimerical.

The treaty of Vienna, my lords, which has been the parent of so many terrours, consultations, embassies, and alliances is, I find, not yet to be acknowledged, what it certainly was, a mere phantom, an empty illusion, sent by the arts of the French to terrify our ministry. His late majesty's testimony is cited to prove that stipulations were really entered into by the two powers allied by that treaty, to destroy our trade, subvert our constitution, and set a new king upon the throne, without consent of the nation.

Such improbabilities, my lords, ought, indeed, to be proved by a high testimony, by a testimony which no man shall dare to question or contradict; for as any man is at liberty to consult his reason, it will always remonstrate to him, that it is no less absurd to impute the folly of designing impossibilities to any powers not remarkable for weak counsels, than unjust to suspect princes of intending injuries, to which they have not been incited by any provocation.

But, my lords, nowithstanding the solemnity with which his late majesty has been introduced, his testimony can prove nothing more than that he believed the treaty to be such as he represents, that he had been deceived into false apprehensions and unnecessary cautions by his own ministers, as they had been imposed upon by the agents of France.

This is all, my lords, that can be collected from the royal speech, and to infer more from it is to suppose that the king was himself a party in the designs formed against him; for if he was not himself engaged in this treaty, he could only be informed, by another, of the stipulations, and could only report what he had been told upon the credit of the informer, a man, necessarily of very little credit. Thus, my lords, all the evidence of his late majesty vanishes into nothing more than the whisper of a spy.

But as great stress ought, doubtless, to be laid upon intelligence which the nation is believed to purchase at a very high price, let it be inquired, what proofs those have who dare to suspect the sagacity of our ministers, to put in the balance against their intelligence, and it will be discovered, my lords, that they have a testimony no less than that of the German emperour himself, who could not be mistaken with regard to the meaning of the treaty concluded at his own court, and to whom it will not be very decent to deny such a degree of veracity as may set him at least on the level with a traitor and a hireling.

If the treaty of Vienna was an imposture, most of our misfortunes are evidently produced by the weakness of the minister; but even supposing it real, as it was only a formidable mockery, an idle threat, that could never be executed, it was not necessary, that in order to obviate it, we should give ourselves implicitly into the hands of France.

It was not necessary, my lords, that we should suffer them first to elude the treaty of Utrecht, by making a port at Mardyke, and then directly and openly to violate it by repairing Dunkirk. That this latter is a port contrary to treaty, the bills of entry at the custom-house daily show; and as the customs are particularly under the inspection of the commissioners of the treasury, this man cannot plead ignorance of this infraction, were no information given him by other means. If it should now be asked, my lords, what, in my opinion, ought to be done, I cannot advise that we should attempt to demolish it by force, or draw upon ourselves the whole power of France by a declaration of war, but what it may be difficult now to remedy, it was once easy to obviate.

Had we shown the same contempt of the French power with our ancestors, and the same steadiness in our councils, the same firmness in our alliances, and the same spirit in our treaties, that court would never have ventured to break a known solemn stipulation, to have exasperated a brave and determined adversary by flagrant injustice, and to have exposed themselves to the hazard of a war, in which it would have been the interest of every prince of Europe who regarded justice or posterity to wish their defeat.

Now they see us engaged in a war, my lords, they may be animated to a more daring contempt of the faith of treaties, and insult us with yet greater confidence of success, as they cannot but remark the cowardice or the ignorance with which we have hitherto carried on this war. They cannot but observe that either our minister means in reality to make war rather upon the Britons than the Spaniards, or that he is totally unacquainted with military affairs, and too vain to ask the opinion of others who have greater knowledge than himself.

Nothing, my lords, is more apparent than that the minister was forced, by the continual clamours of the nation, to declare war, contrary to his own inclination, and that he always affected to charge it upon others, and to exempt himself from the imputation of it. It is, therefore, probable that he has not acted on this occasion so wisely as even his own experience and penetration might, if they were honestly employed, enable him to act, and that he has suffered our counsels to be embarrassed; that he sees with great tranquillity those suffering by the war, at whose request it was begun, and imagines it a proof of the excellence of his own scheme, that those who forced him to break it, may in time repent of their importunities.

For that in the management of the war, my lords, no regard has been had either to the advantages which the course of our trade inevitably gives to our enemies, or to the weakness to which the extent of their dominions necessarily subjects them, that neither the interest of the merchant has been consulted, nor the ease of the nation in general regarded, that the treasure of the publick has been squandered, and that our military preparations have intimidated no nation but our own, is evident beyond contradiction.

It is well known, my lords, to every man but the minister, that we have nothing to fear from either the fleets or armies of the Spaniards, that they cannot invade us except in America, and that they can only molest us by intercepting our traders. This they can only effect by means of their privateers, whose vessels, being light and active, may be easily fitted out, nimbly seize their prey, and speedily retire.

The experience of the last French war, my lords, might have taught us how much we have to fear from the activity of men incited by prospects of private gain, and equipped with that care and vigilance, which, however omitted in national affairs, the interest of particular men never fails to dictate. It is well known, my lords, how much we lost amidst our victories and triumphs, and how small security the merchants received from our magnificent navies, and celebrated commanders. It was, therefore, surely the part of wise men, not to miscarry twice by the same omission, when they had an opportunity to supply it.

I need not inform your lordships of what every reader of newspapers can tell, and which common sense must easily discover, that privateers are only to be suppressed by ships of the same kind with their own, which may scour the seas with rapidity, pursue them into shallow water, where great ships cannot attack them, seize them as they leave the harbours, or destroy them upon their own coasts.

That this is, in its own nature, at once obvious to be contrived, and easy to be done, must appear upon the bare mention of it, and yet that it has been either treacherously neglected, or ignorantly omitted, the accounts of every day have long informed us. Not a week passes in which our ships are not seized, and our sailors carried into a state of slavery. Nor does this happen only on the wide ocean, which is too spacious to be garrisoned, or upon our enemies' coasts, where they may have, sometimes, insuperable advantages, but on our own shores, within sight of our harbours, and in those seas of which we vainly style our nation the sovereign.

Who is there, my lords, whose indignation is not raised at such ignominy? Who is there by whom such negligence will not be resented? It cannot be alleged that we had not time to make better preparations; we had expected war long before we declared it, and if the minister was the only man by whom it was not expected, it will make another head of accusation.

Nor was his disregard of our dominions less flagrant than that of our trade: it was publickly declared by don Geraldino, that his master would never give up his claim to part of our American colonies, which yet were neither fortified on the frontiers, nor supplied with arms, nor enabled to oppose an enemy, nor protected against him.

One man there is, my lords, whose natural generosity, contempt of danger, and regard for the publick, prompted him to obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own territories; a man, whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war by a regular education, who yet miscarried in his design, only for want of supplies necessary to a possibility of success.

Nor is there, my lords, much probability that the forces sent lately to Vernon will be more successful; for this is not a war to be carried on by boys: the state of the enemy's dominions is such, partly by situation, and partly by the neglect of that man whose conduct we are examining, that to attack them with any prospect of advantage, will require the judgment of an experienced commander; of one who had learned his trade, not in Hyde-park, but in the field of battle; of one that has been accustomed to sudden exigencies and unsuspected difficulties, and has learned cautiously to form, and readily to vary his schemes.

An officer, my lords, an officer qualified to invade kingdoms is not formed by blustering in his quarters, by drinking on birth-nights, or dancing at assemblies; nor even by the more important services of regulating elections, and suppressing those insurrections which are produced by the decay of our manufactures. Many gallant colonels have led out their forces against women and children, with the exactest order, and scattered terrour over numerous bodies of colliers and weavers, who would find difficulties not very easily surmountable, were they to force a pass, or storm a fortress.

But, my lords, those whom we have destined for the conquest of America, have not even flushed their arms with such services, nor have learned, what is most necessary to be learned, the habit of obedience; they are only such as the late frost hindered from the exercise of their trades, and forced to seek for bread in the service; they have scarcely had time to learn the common motions of the exercise, or distinguish the words of command.

Nor are their officers, my lords, extremely well qualified to supply those defects, and establish discipline and order in a body of new-raised forces; for they are absolutely strangers to service, and taken from school to receive a commission, or if transplanted from other regiments, have had time only to learn the art of dress. We have sent soldiers undisciplined, and officers unable to instruct them, and sit in expectation of conquests to be made by one boy acting under the direction of another.

To their commander-in-chief, my lords, I object nothing but his inexperience, which is by no means to be imputed to his negligence, but his want of opportunities; though of the rest, surely it may be said, that they are such a swarm as were never before sent out on military designs; and, in my opinion, to the other equipments, the government should have added provisions for women to nurse them.

Had my knowledge of war, my lords, been thought sufficient to have qualified me for the chief command in this expedition, or had my advice been asked with regard to the conduct of it, I should willingly have assisted my country with my person or my counsels; but, my lords, this man, who engrosses all authority, seems, likewise, to believe that he is in possession of all knowledge, and that he is equally capable, as he is equally willing, to usurp the supreme and uncontroulable direction both of civil and military affairs.

Why new forces were raised, my lords, it is very easy to judge; new forces required new commissions, and new commissions produced new dependencies, which might be of use to the minister at the approaching election; but why the new-raised troops were sent on this expedition rather than those which had been longer disciplined, it is very difficult to assign a reason, unless it was considered that some who had commands in them had likewise seats in the senate; and the minister was too grateful to expose his friends to danger, and too prudent to hazard the loss of a single vote. Besides the commander-in-chief, there is but one senator in the expedition, and, my lords, he is one of too great integrity to be corrupted, and, though sensible of the weakness of the troops, too brave to quit his post. How much our country may suffer by such absurd conduct, I need not explain to your lordships; it may easily be conceived how much one defeat may dispirit the nation, and to what attempts one victory may excite our enemies; those enemies whom, under a steady and wise administration, we should terrify into submission, even without an army.

I cannot forbear to remark on this occasion, how much the ignorance of this man has exposed a very important part of our foreign dominions to the attempts of the Spaniards. Gibraltar, my lords, is well known to be so situated, as to be naturally in very little danger of an attack from the land, and to command the country to a great distance; but these natural advantages are now taken away, or greatly lessened, by new fortifications, erected within much less than gunshot of the place, erected in the sight of the garrison, and while one of our admirals was cruizing upon the coast.

The pretence, my lords, upon which they were erected, was, that though Gibraltar was granted to Britain, yet there was no district appendent to it, nor did the British authority extend beyond the walls of the town: this poor excuse did the chicanery of the Spaniards invent, and with this, my lords, was our minister contented, either not knowing or not appearing to know what, I hope, the children whom we have despatched to America have been taught, and what no man, versed in national affairs, can be ignorant of without a crime, that when a fortress is yielded to another nation, the treaty always virtually includes, even without mentioning it, an extent of land as far as the guns of the fortification can reach.

Whether this man, my lords, was so ignorant as to be deceived thus grossly, or so abandoned as willingly to deceive his country, he is equally unqualified to support the office of first minister, and almost equally deserves to be prosecuted by the indignation and justice of this assembly, in the severest manner; for how great must be his wickedness who undertakes a charge above his abilities, when his country may be probably ruined by his errours?

Your lordships cannot but observe, that I make use rather of the term minister than that of the administration, which others are so desirous to substitute in its place, either to elude all inquiry into the management of our affairs, or to cover their own shameful dependence.

Administration, my lords, appears to me a term without a meaning, a wild indeterminate word, of which none can tell whom it implies, or how widely it may extend: a charge against the administration may be imagined a general censure of every officer in the whole subordination of government, a general accusation of instruments and agents, of masters and slaves: my charge, my lords, is against the minister, against that man, who is believed by every one in the nation, and known by great numbers, to have the chief, and, whenever he pleases to require it, the sole direction of the publick measures; he, to whom all the other ministers owe their elevation, and by whose smile they hold their power, their salaries, and their dignity.

That this appellation is not without sufficient reason bestowed upon that man, I have already proved to your lordships; and as it has already been made appear that common fame is a sufficient ground of accusation, it will easily be shown that this man has a just claim to the title of minister; for if any man be told of an accusation of the minister; he will not ask the name of the person accused.

But there is in the motion one title conferred upon him, to which he has no pretensions; for there is no law for styling him the first commissioner of the treasury. The commissioners, my lords, who discharge, in a collective capacity, the office of lord high treasurer, are constituted by the same patent, invested with equal power and equal dignity, and I know not why this man should be exalted to any superiority over his associates.

If we take, my lords, a review of our affairs, and examine the state of the nation in all its relations and all its circumstances, we cannot, surely, conceive that we are in a state of prosperity, unless discontent at home, and scorn abroad, the neglect of our allies, and insolence of our enemies, the decay of trade, and multitude of our imposts, are to be considered as proofs of a prosperous and nourishing nation.

Will it be alleged, my lords, has this man one friend adventurous enough to assert, in open day, that the people are not starving by thousands, and murmuring by millions, that universal misery does not overspread the nation, and that this horrid series of calamities is not universally, among all conditions, imputed to the conduct of this man?