Japan
and
The California Problem

By
T. Iyenaga, Ph.D.
Professorial Lecturer in the Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago

and

Kenoske Sato, M.A.
Formerly Fellow in the University of Chicago

G. P. Putnam’s Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1921

Copyright, 1921
by
G. P. Putnam’s Sons

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Japan and the California Problem

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

When, during the middle years of the last century, thousands of stalwart pioneers moved westward to California in quest of gold, they had no idea whatsoever of the part of destiny they were playing. When, synchronously with that movement, Commodore Perry crossed the Pacific and forced open the doors of Japan with the prime object of securing safe anchorage, water, and provisions for the daring American schooners then busily engaged in trade with China, he never dreamed of the tremendous result which he was thereby bringing about. What those men were doing unconsciously was nothing short of preparing the way for contact and ultimate harmonious progress of two great branches of mankind and civilization which originally sprang from a common root, but which in the course of thousands of years of independent development have come to possess strikingly different characteristics.

Culture is aggressive and masculine; it craves conquest and vaunts victory. Once let loose in the open field of the Pacific, the East and West are now involved in a mighty tournament, the outcome of which is yet beyond mortal imagination. The most we can hope for is the speedy realization of Kipling’s vision:

But there is neither East nor West,
Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
Though they come from the ends of the earth.

The Oriental problems in California, originating as they did in the conflict of local, economic, and political interests, have in recent years come to assume more and more the character of cultural and racial questions. The forms and motives of the movement for the exclusion of the Orientals are vastly diverse, often counteracting and contradictory, but deep in the bottom of the whirl there lies the fundamental question of race and civilization. To say the least, the present unrest in California with reference to the Japanese problem is the intensified, miniature form of the general struggle in which East and West are now being involved. Says Governor Stephens of California in his letter to Secretary of State Colby:

California stands as an outpost on the western edge of Occidental civilization. Her people are the sons or the followers of the Argonauts who wended their way westward ... and here, without themselves recognizing it at the time, they took the farthest westward step that the white men can take. From our shores roll the waters of the Pacific. From our coast the mind’s eye takes its gaze and sees on the other shores of that great ocean the teeming millions of the Orient, with its institutions running their roots into the most venerable antiquity, its own inherited philosophy and standards of life, its own peculiar races and colors.

This being the case, the magnitude of the Japanese problem in California can hardly be exaggerated. Enveloped in a state under the guise of local conflict, the problem is, nevertheless, a gigantic one, involving vital questions of world destiny. Shall the races of Asia and Europe, brought together by the progress of science, be once more strictly separated? Cannot different races, while remaining biologically distinct, form together the strong factors of a unified nation? Should white races organize in defense of themselves against “the rising tide of color” and invoke race war of an unprecedented scale and consequence? Is it not possible to arrive at some principle by which the contact of white and yellow races may be rendered a source of human happiness instead of being a cause for all the evil consequences imaginable? These are some of the questions which are contained in the Asiatic problem in California.

Already a considerable quantity of literature has appeared which sounds an extremely pessimistic forecast of the future of Eurasiatic relationship. Some writers erroneously divide mankind into so many races by the color of the skin, as if each were a pure, homogeneous race, and they indulge in the risky speculation of “inevitable” race war between the white race, which hitherto held supremacy, and the yellow race, which is now attaining a position of serious rivalry. Others urge the imperative need of organizing the white nations into a supernational state in order to enable them to weather the threatened attacks from the yellow races. All these arguments are based on the presumption that the Asiatic races wherever they go—in Australia, Canada, or America—create conflict with the Aryan race. The fallacy of such arguments lies in envisaging the large problem of East and West from its partial expression. The anti-Asiatic movement in the new world is certainly a significant problem, but it is only an incidental and local phenomenon of the great process under way of cultural unification. That the California problem is not all that is involved in the relationship of Asia and America can readily be seen by the incessant increase, in spite of it, of close coöperation between them. In science, in art, in religion, in ideals, in industry, and commerce, and, last but not least, in sentiment, the peoples of these continents find themselves ever more closely bound together, learning to appreciate the inestimable value thereby created, and fast widening the scope of their group consciousness so as to embrace all mankind, thus concretely vindicating the futility of the idle speculation of race war based on the mere difference of skin pigmentation.

If the error of race-war theory arises from absorption in parts, overlooking their relations with the whole—from magnifying out of proportion the local racial conflict to the extent of eclipsing the value and significance of vastly more important relations—it behooves us to avoid such grievous mistakes and to view the situation in a broader perspective. Indeed, the key to the understanding and the solution of the difficulty of the Pacific Coast is in viewing it in the light of friendship and coöperation between America and Japan. Then, and only then, does it become clear how important it is to approach the problem with prudence and foresight, and to endeavor to solve it in a spirit of fairness and justice. It then becomes plain, in the face of the vastly important tasks involved in wisely conducting the relationship of Orient and Occident, how foolish and cowardly it is to assume a negative attitude of fear and withdrawal from the natural circumstance which time has brought about. Whether one likes it or not, the world is already made one, and any human attempt to divide it into air-tight compartments is hopeless. We are bound to have yet closer contacts among all races and nations. The way to a satisfactory solution of the California problem clearly lies in a closer and more intimate association—in a word, better mutual understanding between Orientals and Occidentals.

Let us then honestly seek to comprehend the heart of the difficulty and frankly discuss the question, untrammeled by any bias, prepossessions, or fear; with eyes steadily fixed on the larger aspects of the problem; eager to arrive at some constructive principles of solution satisfactory to all concerned.

CHAPTER II

JAPANESE TRAITS AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

The national traits of different peoples are, like our faces, similar in rough outline but infinitely different in the finer details. The people of Japan are in the larger characteristics not different from any other people; they are part of the aggregate of human beings and they possess all the instincts and desires which are common to humanity. But, as distinguished from other peoples, they display certain individual characteristics which are the product of a unique environment and history.

Emotional Nature.

Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of the Japanese is their excitable, emotional nature, which among the ignorant is often expressed in turbulent and irascible action, and which among the refined takes the form of a fine sentimentality and temperamental delicacy. This is rather the direct opposite of the American disposition, which is stable, blunt and big, hearty and generous. Such difference is greatly responsible for mutual misunderstandings, such as the Japanese charge that the American is discourteous and inconsiderate, and the American impression that the Japanese is dissimulating, not to say tricky.

The emotional temper of the Japanese has played a large rôle in their history and constitutes a conspicuous factor in their national life. If the history of the Anglo-Saxons is primarily a story of competition and struggle for the control of power and the pursuit of material interests, that of the Japanese is a drama of sentimental entanglement largely removed from material issues. Without due regard to the rôle played by emotion, the history of the Japanese people is wholly incomprehensible. What, for instance, incited Hideyoshi to invade Korea in 1592? What made the Japanese accept so readily the teachings of the Jesuit Fathers during the latter half of the sixteenth century? What more recently induced Japan to insist at the Paris Conference on recognition of racial equality by the League of Nations?

If the emotionalism of the race has been deeply influential in the historic drama, it has been no less persuasive in the political and social life of the present-day Japan. Compare the Constitutions of America and Japan. If the outstanding features of the American Constitution are the safeguarding of the interests and rights of the individual, the states, and the nation, those of the Japanese Constitution are the expressions of the people’s anxiety to recognize and perpetuate their beloved head, the Emperor, as the great, the divine ruler of their ideals. Although the onslaught of materialism has wrought some changes in recent years, there yet remains the ineradicable proof of Japanese emotionalism in the realm of marriage and love, where all earthly considerations are forgotten, if not tabooed, and in the realms of family and of society, where the relations between parents and children, and between friends and neighbors, are conducted with an assured sense of devotion, love, and good will. The same tendency is to be recognized in almost all Japanese institutions, educational, military, and political, while it is particularly true in the realm of æsthetics, including, art, literature, and music—a realm that is ruled by sentiment.

In the common daily life of the Japanese their emotionalism expresses itself in almost infinitely diverse ways. Their peculiarly strong sense of pride and dignity, individual, family, and national, a sense for which the Japanese will make any sacrifice, comes from their highly-strung nervous system. Their keen sense of pride gives rise to another marked Japanese peculiarity—an excessive susceptibility to the opinions and feelings of their fellow men. Social ostracism to the Japanese is a punishment which is often more unbearable than the death penalty. The peculiarly high rate of suicides in Japan is explained by statisticians as being largely due to some mistake or sin for which the offender would rather die than be chastised by society. The cold-blooded hara kiri was an institution by which the Samurai could sustain his honor or save his face when involved in disgrace. High-spirited temper, suppressed by ethical teachings, social conventions, and rigorous discipline, results in a singular contrast between external physical expressions and internal feelings. The placid faces, reserved manners, and reticence are but masks of the intense, burning spirit, whose spontaneous expression has been inhibited by centuries of stoic training. It is most unfortunate that this virtue in the Oriental sense has frequently been a cause of misunderstanding, making the Japanese appear dissimulating, and, therefore, untrustworthy.

But at heart the Japanese are neither as inscrutable or deceitful as some believe, nor are they as intriguing or profound as these terms would imply. They are kind and sympathetic, easily moved by the attitude of others, quite simple-minded and honest, lacking tenacity, audacity, iron will, or cold deliberation. In these respects, as in many others, the Japanese possess some of the weaker traits of the South European peoples. They have proved heretofore not a great people, but a little people “who are great in little things and little in great things.”

The simple explanation of Japanese sentimentalism may be found in one of the original race stocks which migrated from southern islands of tropical climate, where emotion rather than will guides the conduct of the people. The topographical and climatic conditions of Japan have also had their influence, and these, with the numerous volcanic eruptions, frequent earthquakes, and recurrent typhoons, have given the people the disposition of restlessness and excitement. Perhaps also the social system of the Middle Ages, which was unduly autocratic and despotic, irritated the lower classes, driving them to turbulent and “peppery” conduct.

Æsthetic Temperament.

The next characteristic of the Islander is one which is closely related to the preceding trait. It is artistic temperament. Some scholars of archæology attempted to trace this characteristic to the original settlers of the empire, but the resultant opinions are so diverse as to deny scientific validity. Some of them maintain that the Ainu, the earliest known settlers in Japan, a now dwindling race living in the northern island called Hokkaido, were originally a very artistic people, contributing much to the æsthetic temperament of the Japanese. There are other scholars who insist that the Yamato race, and not the Ainu, was the most artistic, while there are still others who uphold the view that it was the vast horde of migrators coming from Korea, Tartary, and China who brought with them the love of beauty. But these are speculations of prehistorical conditions which are largely hidden from us by the veil of mythology. What we can be sure of is that the influence on the people of the exceptionally beautiful natural surroundings reflected itself in their artistic genius. Encouragement of art and literature and of artistic productions generally through the patronage of aristocrats, who enjoyed from the earlier ages leisure and wealth, has also had much to do in making the Japanese artistic.

What influence has this æsthetic temperament exerted on the life of the Japanese? In the first place, it has rendered Japanese civilization markedly feminine. This is shown by the fact that the creative efforts of the people were mainly directed to personal and home decoration and to literary and artistic pursuits, instead of to masculine efforts to fight and conquer the forces of nature, from which alone the sciences are born. Particularly noticeable was the almost total absence of science in Japan, in striking contrast to the remarkable wealth of art at the time, some half a century ago, when the country began a critical introspection of itself in comparison with other nations.

In the second place, it had the effect of making the people inclined to underestimate the value of material things and to exaggerate the glory of the spiritual aspects of life. This is most clearly seen in the teachings of Bushido,[1] which laid strong emphasis on the baseness of the conduct that has for its motive pecuniary or material interests, and which taught the subordination of the body to the soul as the most essential virtue of the Samurai. The traditional custom of sacrificing the material side of a question for the satisfaction and upholding of the emotional side still survives in present Japan, and constitutes one of the marked characteristics of the Japanese. His strong inclination towards imagination, meditation, and religious belief is too well known a fact to require more than a mention here.

It seems true that people gifted æsthetically are more apt to turn hedonistic. While it remains doubtful whether the Japanese are more immoral than other peoples, as is so frequently charged, it is quite true that they take more delight in a leisurely comfort of living, going to picnics, attending theaters, calling upon friends, and holding various ceremonies and feasts. Generally speaking, although not given to excesses, they show no puritanic disposition about drink and are lavish spenders for luxuries. In the tea houses and other places of social amusement they spend money often beyond the reasonable proportion of their income. They are not a thrifty people.

Group Consciousness.

Next to the artistic disposition must be mentioned their strong group consciousness. It is true that all people have a certain degree of group consciousness which emerges out of the facts of common biological and cultural heritage and experience. But in the case of the Japanese this group spirit is markedly strong, expressing itself in loyalty and patriotism. Most strangely, the spirit of Yamato, or the Japanese group spirit, has had its source more than anywhere else in primitive myths. Two ancient books of mythology, Kojiki and Nihongi, record the story of the Japanese ancestors who were originally born of the gods of heaven and earth, and who settled in Japan and established there through their brave deeds the majesty of the Empire of Nippon. From these ancestors sprang the people of Japan. This myth is faithfully believed by the Japanese, and the people worship at the shrines where the spirits of their heroic ancestors are supposed still to reside and guard the country. So strong is this belief in myth even to-day that, in spite of the anthropological discovery that the original settlers of the island were of diverse races and possessed no advanced culture, the people still cling to the idea that the Japanese are a pure and glorious race, having sprung from one line of ancestors which was divine and which is now represented by its direct descendant, the Emperor.

In addition to mythology, what bound the Japanese so close together was the natural environment and the lack of cosmopolitan associations. Marooned as they were on little islands, the mutual association and intermarriage of people took place freely, and in the course of time established a substantially complete homogeneity of the population. The internal unity was further strengthened by the policy of national seclusion, which gave the common people the idea that Japan was the only universe and that the Japanese were the only people on earth. In modern times, the group spirit or patriotism has been skillfully encouraged and enkindled by utilizing the national experience of the wars with China and Russia, and by a system of education which aimed to impress on the minds of children the glory of their people and history, the absolute duty of being loyal to the Emperor, and the hostile tendency of foreign countries toward their own.

What the people gain by narrow patriotism in the maintenance of national integrity they lose in their failure to take a broad view of things. This stubbornly obstructs the Japanese in their efforts to view their country in its proper relation to other countries; it hinders them from being “Romans when in Rome”; it makes the idea of following the example of England, the policy of loose national expansion, wholly unthinkable—Japanese colonies must be exclusively Japanese. The chief cause of the failure of Japanese colonization and emigration must be attributed to the strong consciousness of the Yamato Minzoku (Yamato race). This has made the Japanese noticeably narrow-minded, quite awkward in their relations with different peoples, and more or less given to race prejudice. The reputation of the Japanese as poor mixers is well known. Their strong race prejudice has been exemplified by their attitude toward the Chinese, Koreans, and the outcast class of their fellow countrymen, called Eta, which has been nothing short of prejudicial discrimination.

In spite of the desperate efforts of the militarists and bureaucrats to conserve narrow patriotism and racial pride, it has been found increasingly difficult to do so, since the facts and thoughts of the West became accessible to the people. When the marvelous scientific achievements of the Occidental peoples, their advanced political and social systems, their profound philosophies of life and of the universe, together with their superior physique and formidable armament, were appreciated, it became all too apparent, even to the most conceited mind, that the culture and racial stock, in which the Japanese had taken so much pride, were sadly inferior, and that years of hard toil would be necessary before they could be the equals of the Occidentals. The pathetic cry of Japan for recognition of racial equality by the League of Nations is a reluctant admission of this fact.

The outcome of this disillusionment has been the appearance of three currents of thought with reference to the national policy. One is the ultra Occidentalism which sees nothing good in their own country and people, and hence is extremely merciless and outspoken in denunciation of things Japanese, but which admires even to the point of worship almost everything that is European and American. To this school belong many younger radicals who are more or less socialistically inclined and who would like to see Japan converted into a republic or a Bolshevik communism. Categorically opposed to this thought is another school, which its adherents call “Japanism.” This school sees nothing new or worth while in things Occidental, and advocates, after the reasoning of Rousseau, a return to natural Japan. Between these two extremes stand the majority of sane intellectuals, who clearly perceive both the limitations and the strength of Japan, and endeavor to benefit through learning and assimilating the valuable experience of advanced nations.

Adaptable Disposition.

Another notable feature of the Japanese is their meager endowment of originality and, conversely, their marked aptitude for adaptability. A glance at the outline of Japanese history shows how much the Japanese borrowed from other peoples in almost all phases of civilization and how little they themselves have created. Indeed, there is hardly anything which belongs to Japan that cannot be traced originally to the earnest creative effort of other peoples. The same may be said of modern peoples, who, with the exception of scientific inventions, have mainly derived their culture from the Greeks and Romans. Whatever difference the future may witness, the Japanese thus far have been borrowers and receivers of other races’ accomplishments. Perhaps this is the cause of the rapid development of the Japanese, who have succeeded in imitating and assimilating the strong points of nations in succession from the lower to the top of the hierarchy—from Korea, China, India, to Europe. When the process reaches the top of the ladder, let us hope that Nippon will start for the first time real creative work.

Spirit of Proletarian Chivalry.

The discussion of Japanese traits would be very incomplete if we omitted one outstanding idiosyncrasy that has not yet been mentioned. So peculiar is this trait to the Japanese that there is no adequate word to designate it in other languages. The Japanese express it by such words as kikotsu, otokodate, and gikyoshin. The nearest English equivalents for these terms would be heroism and chivalry. It is a mixed sentiment of rebellion against bully power, sympathy for the helpless, and willingness to sacrifice self for the sake of those who have done kind acts. This admirable sentiment must be strictly distinguished from the spirit of Bushido, because it has arisen among the plebeians in place of Bushido, which was the way of the Samurai or aristocrats, although it may have been, as some scholars claim, the source of inspiration for the growth of proletarian chivalry. Bushido has found an able propounder in Dr. Nitobé. Under the Tokugawa régime the Samurai was the flower and the rest were nothing. The Samurai often abused their privilege and oppressed the common people not a little, disregarding their rights and personality. Then a class of plebeians appeared who called themselves “men of men,” and who made it their profession to defy the bullying Samurai and to defend the oppressed people. It was the virtue of this class always to help the weak and crush the strong, and to be ready to lay down their lives at any moment. The story of Sakura Sogoro, who fell a martyr to the cause of oppressed peasants, has become a classic.

Thus originating in defiance of despotism, the spirit of proletarian chivalry permeated among the lower classes of people, and to this day it forms the bulwark of the rights and freedom of the common people. Refined and enriched by the embodiment in it of enlightened knowledge and ideals, the sentiment came to be on one side a keen appreciation of kindness and sympathy, and on the other a strong hatred of oppression and injustice. The present proletarian movement in Japan, a movement which is destined presently to become a mighty social force, owes its source and guidance to “the ways of the common people.”

If Dr. Nitobé is right in predicting that Bushido, “the way of the Samurai,” will eventually enjoy the glory of “blessing mankind with the perfume with which it will enrich life,” we may reasonably hope that proletarian chivalry will succeed in bringing about general freedom and democracy in Nippon, in defiance of military and imperialistic domination.

The understanding of this trait of the common people of Japan goes far to explain what has puzzled those Americans who wonder why the Japanese immigrants in this country are so unsubmissive and rebellious. In his letter to the Legislature of Nevada, the late Senator Newlands stated: “The presence of the Chinese, who are patient and submissive, would not create as many complications as the presence of Japanese, whose strong and virile qualities would constitute additional factors of difficulty.” Governor Stephens of California, too, observes in his letter to the Secretary of State: “The Japanese, be it said to their credit, are not a servile or docile stock.” Acquired by centuries of opposition to arbitrary power, the trait has become almost instinctive, and expresses itself even under democracy whenever they think they are unjustly treated.

In discussing the features of Japanese character thus far, we have taken care to state the known causes which gave rise to each trait. This has been done with a view to preparing ourselves to answer the question; To what extent are these characteristics of the Japanese inherent in the race and to what extent acquired? The answer which the foregoing discussion suggests is that they are both inherent and acquired, biological and social. While racial stock is responsible to an extent, other factors, such as natural environment and social conditions, have helped to develop the characteristics of the Japanese. Perhaps the best criterion by which we can determine the relative strength of heredity and environment in this case is to observe how and in what respects the Japanese, born and reared in other countries, undergo transformation in their mentality and characteristics. We shall touch on this point again later when we discuss the characteristics of the American-born Japanese children.

Philosophy of Life.

It is but natural that the philosophy of a nation developed from the life and experience of people should be deeply colored by their temperament. After having discussed the essential features of the Japanese disposition, it may be easy to anticipate the character of philosophy which rests on it. We shall now consider the outstanding features of Japanese thought, with a view to interpreting and evaluating the spiritual side of Japan’s civilization.

True to the characteristics of the Japanese, who lack initiative, the thought of the people also manifests a marked absence of originality. Until, in the early part of the sixth century, Buddhism and Confucianism came into the country, the Japanese seem to have had no system of religion or philosophy save fetichism and mythology. The advent of new doctrines of ethics and religion caused a rapid transformation of the life and ideas of the people, elevating them by one stroke from barbarian obscurity to civilized enlightenment. From this time on a childish admiration of mythological characters and stories began to be superseded by an earnest effort for the perfection of the individual character and the realization of social ideals; and crude superstitions were gradually replaced by the profound teachings of Gautama. Out of the religious zeal were developed admirable art and literature, and from the moral effort were born elaborate ethical codes, social order, and social etiquette. Thus, with raw materials imported, the Japanese worked diligently and carefully to turn out finished products well adapted to their tastes and needs. If the Japanese were people endowed with great originality, they would surely have given evidence of it during nearly three hundred years of national seclusion (1570-1868), when almost all conditions requisite for a creative impulse were present, including peace, prosperity, need, and encouragement. In fact, however, the people were interested and absorbed in stamping out the feeble hold of Christian influence, in assimilating the teachings of Wang Yang Ming, and in recasting the doctrines of Confucius and Buddha. When the flood gates of Japan were thrown open and the tides of Occidental learning swept in, the Japanese were almost overwhelmed, and found themselves too busy in coping with them to think of the original contribution.

Lack of ability to start new things is generally compensated by the capacity to borrow new things. In the point of borrowing new ideas and then working these to suit their own tastes, the Japanese are probably second to no nation on earth. Japan first borrowed Confucianism and Buddhism, and within a short time remodeled them in ways peculiar to her, rendering their identity with the original almost unrecognizable. Thus the stoic, pessimistic character of Buddhism was greatly modified, becoming more or less epicurean and optimistic in the hands of the Japanese. The casuistic, practical, individualistic ethics of Confucius were radically changed to general principles of ideal conduct, with the addition of æsthetic elements, and a strong emphasis laid on group loyalty rather than on filial piety. It is to this ability of the Japanese to assimilate new thought and new belief that the unexpected success of early Catholic propaganda was chiefly due. To this capacity of assimilation is also due the origin of Bushido, which is essentially an eclectic of Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist doctrines. The later-day Shintoism, the so-called cult of ancestor worship, is also a product of the skillful combination of native mythology, Taoism, and Confucianism, with an infusion of certain of the Buddhist doctrines. That the present Japanese civilization is largely a product of assimilation by native genius of American, French, German, and English ideas and institutions is an established fact. It may be that therein lies the hope, as many Japanese thinkers cherish, of making Japan a modern Alexandria, where centuries of human achievements in Asia and Europe may be harmoniously woven together for the realization of a more perfect fabric of civilization.

In literature it is asserted that the creative period is uncritical and the critical period is barren. It seems that the critical tendency is the antithesis of creative effort. This applies to the Japanese, who do not create but who are keenly critical. Instinctively bent on absorbing new ideas, they immediately react to any new schools of thought—turning from Eucken to Bergson, again to Russell, now to Einstein—but they soon begin to analyze their doctrines and to find fault and fallacy here and there, and, finally, are ready to depreciate them wholesale. In so doing, of course, they assimilate some of the good points involved in various systems. The chief obstacle which Christianity, as interpreted by healthy-minded missionaries, encounters in Nippon is the sceptical temper of the Japanese intellectuals.

A strong appeal to emotionalism and to the sense of beauty rather than to cold reason and unpleasant realities is another common characteristic of Japanese philosophy. The Japanese have always taken pride in expressing great truths in a short verse form called Uta, with choice words and exquisite phrases. Until the advent of European learning, poetry and philosophy were never clearly distinguished in Japan. Love of emotionalism naturally leads Japanese thought to humanism rather than to metaphysical speculation.

From this it may be thought that English positivism would find great vogue in Japan. In fact, the influence of Adam Smith, Bentham, Mill, Malthus, and others was a considerable factor in shaping modern Japanese thought. But at bottom the Japanese are not utilitarians. They are by temper idealists. The magical power by which German idealism as propounded by Kant, Hegel, and Fichte, and more recently by Lotze and Eucken, controls the Japanese mind is astounding. Nearly all the prominent philosophers of the Meiji era may be classed under some branch of German idealism. The fact that of American thinkers Emerson is more widely read than any other, and that Royce is more popular than James, is no accident. If pragmatism appeals to the Japanese mind, it is not in the logical form of Professor Dewey but rather in the æsthetic presentation of Santayana.

New Turn in Thought.

Recently, however, or more particularly since the war, the trend of Japanese thought has began to follow a somewhat different path. Industrial revolution, which has been rapidly advancing during the past twenty years, reached its culmination during the war, when various forces accidently combined in bringing about universal recognition of the need for radical social reorganization. Capitalism, which had in the course of time grown to be a gigantic power, proved unable to adapt itself to the changing conditions of the day, and it thus obstructed the onward march of liberalism and democracy. Labor, however, shook off the dust of long humiliation, and began with united front to demand recognition of its rights and of humanity. The struggle naturally forced the attention of the people to the actual condition of society, where the poor majority are sadly left in destitution, where sins and crime are sapping the very vitality of the people, where the rich are abusing their fortunes for deplorable ends. Then came the European downfall of autocracy and the triumph (at least for a short time) of democracy. Liberty, equality, and fraternity became once more the slogan of the time. All these forces united and started a reform movement, upsetting to a certain degree the age-long social system of Nippon.

The three years of confusion did a lasting good. The German systems of government, diplomacy, education, military affairs, and philosophy, to which the Japanese had hitherto adhered too blindly, were, one after another, filtrated and purified, thereby removing much of the scum that was in them. It is, of course, impossible for hardened militarists and bureaucrats to get rid of the beliefs in which they were born and brought up and which have become endeared; but the old generations are gradually dying off, carrying with them to the grave the skeleton of systems which are now dead. In open rebellion against these falling autocrats there arose a great number of brilliant young people, bred and trained in the new school of liberty and democracy, with courage and foresight to complete the second Restoration—that of the rights of humanity belonging to the common masses. Already the status of the working classes is greatly improved through a persistent, costly struggle against the misused power of capital; wages have been increased, hours shortened, and, in the near future, we may expect the triumph of industrial democracy, a triumph which will secure for labor the deserved right of industrial copartnership. Already the status of the women has been greatly improved by their emancipation from the traditional and social bondage under which they suffered so long. Political rights have been greatly enlarged, and universal manhood suffrage is now within view. The educational system, too, has just been revised, rendering its spirit a great deal more liberal than ever before. In this way, though the road is yet long and uncertain, true liberalism in Nippon at last stands firmly on its ground, ready to march towards its ordained goal.

Such a great social innovation is but a concrete expression of changes that are taking place in the underlying currents of thought. It indicates the breaking up of classic systems of moral and political philosophy, which by dint of age-long prestige had never ceased to exercise a strong influence upon the minds of the people. It discloses the bankruptcy of that German idealism which so precisely fitted in with the à priori, passive, spiritual temper of the people but which proved hopeless in the face of vital problems of life and society. It means the exposure of the inadequacy of English utilitarianism, with its over-emphasis on individualism, to help the people effectually to solve many difficulties of society. The changes now taking place in Japanese thought imply the failure of those philosophies which belittle the value of the material, slight the position of mankind in the universe and fail to satisfy man’s inherent craving for ceaseless progress. The new direction of Japanese thought is decidedly towards pragmatic humanism at its best, with due emphasis on the importance of the practical and social phases of life, enriched with the spirit of a sentimental delicacy and an æsthetic proclivity singularly characteristic of the people.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN’S ASIATIC POLICY

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt once remarked to one of the authors of this book, with his accustomed emphasis and gesture: “The United States’ proper sphere is in this hemisphere; Japan’s proper sphere is in Asia.” With this text the great statesman was propounding an idea of deep political significance. What is suggested by the text is, of course, not that either of the two nations should resume its traditional policy of isolation or confine its activities within the specified zones, but rather it is to the effect that each should know its bounds and play the part which destiny and geography have assigned to it.

In further elucidating the same idea, in his book entitled Fear God and Take Your Own Part, Roosevelt says:

Japan’s whole sea front, and her entire home maritime interest, bear on the Pacific; and of the other great nations of the earth the United States has the greatest proportion of her sea front on, and the greatest proportion of her interest in, the Pacific. But there is not the slightest real or necessary conflict of interests between Japan and the United States in the Pacific. When compared with each other, the interest of Japan is overwhelmingly Asiatic, that of the United States overwhelmingly American. Relatively to each other, one is dominant in Asia, the other in North America. Neither has any desire, nor any excuse for desiring, to acquire territory on the other’s continent.

President Roosevelt had a unique opportunity of making himself thoroughly conversant with the situation in the Far East without even setting foot on the soil. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, negotiated on behalf of America by the able Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and the American recognition of the amalgamation of Korea into the Japanese Empire in 1910, are the outstanding acts of the Roosevelt administration wherein the foregoing idea has been translated into deeds. These acts have proceeded from a thorough appreciation of the history and development of modern Japan. Nor did Colonel Roosevelt cease on his return to private life to follow closely the march of events in Asia. He wrote many articles on Far Eastern affairs which showed his remarkable grasp of the situation. No wonder, then, that the Japanese people reciprocate this generous appreciation by paying the highest respect to, and entertaining a genuine admiration for, the late American statesman.

Korean Situation.

Recently Japan has been made the target of attack from many quarters with reference to her Asiatic policy. The Shantung settlement, the Korean administration, and Japan’s activities in East Siberia have been severely assailed by her critics. Patriotism imposes upon a citizen no obligation to condone any mistakes and wrongs which his country has committed. We deplore the gross diplomatic blunder which Japan made in 1915 in her dealings with China, which, although perfectly justifiable in the main proposals presented,[2] had the appearance of browbeating her to submission by brandishing the sword. We deplore the atrocities perpetrated in the attempt to crush the Korean uprisings. Whatever may have been the advisability of adopting drastic measures to nip the Korean revolt in the bud, a revolt which, if leniently dealt with, might have resulted in far greater sufferings of the people, it can never be proffered as a plea for the committing of inhuman deeds. Fortunately, a change of heart has come to the Mikado’s Government, which, by uprooting the militaristic régime, is now resolutely introducing liberal measures and reforms in Korea. The most significant of the measures is the system of local self-government which has just been inaugurated. It creates in the provinces, municipalities, and villages of Chosen (Korea) consultative or advisory Councils whose functions are to deliberate on the finances and other matters of public importance to the respective local bodies. The members are partly elective and partly appointive. Besides these deliberative Councils, there will be established in each municipality, county, and island a School Council to discuss matters relating to education. This is the sure road to complete self-government in Chosen. The same process of evolution, which brought local autonomy and a constitutional régime to Japan proper, which took thirty years to perfect, is now being applied to the newly joined integral part of the Mikado’s Empire. The step may be slow, but the goal is sure. Korea’s union with Japan was consummated after the bitter experience of two sanguinary wars and the mature deliberation of the best minds of the two peoples. Its revocation is out of the question, unless it is demanded in the future for most cogent reasons. The privilege of taking a hand in the government of the empire, however, should be extended as speedily as possible to its subjects in the peninsula.

Policy of Self-Preservation.

Many as are the pitfalls into which Japan has fallen in pursuance of her Asiatic policy, it may confidently be asserted that the road she has trodden has, on the whole, been straight. She can face with a clean conscience the verdict of history. When Far Eastern history, from the China-Japan War to the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, is carefully examined and rightly understood, it will be conceded that the course which Japan has adopted, so far as its general principles are concerned, is the one which any nation of self-respect and right motive would pursue. Fundamentally Japan’s Asiatic policy is the policy of self-preservation, the policy of defense, and never of aggression. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was and still remains the cornerstone of Japan’s Asiatic policy, was formed for purely defensive purposes, in order to maintain peace in Asia and safeguard mutual interests vested therein of the two Powers. Only the “inexorable march of events” has brought Japan into Korea, Manchuria, and East Siberia. None of the statesmen who took part in the Meiji Restoration could ever have dreamed that their country would in the course of time be driven through sheer force of circumstances to plant its flag on the Asiatic mainland. It was solely in self-defense that Japan took up arms against China and Russia. Once enmeshed in continental politics, however, it became imperative for her to take such measures as would ensure and consolidate the position and gains that were won through enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure. Herein, in short, is the genesis of Japan’s present status in Korea and Manchuria.

Even at the present time, the heavy arming of Japan is a case of necessity, so long as the Far East remains in such an unstable condition as exists there to-day, and is not free from the menace of the Bolsheviki, who, professing pacifism, are not slow to emulate the military machine of Imperial Russia. Nothing could be more welcome to the Japanese people than to see the curtailment of their naval and military equipments, for the maintenance of which they have to bear the burden of crushing taxes, and to behold the day when they can, without fear of interference by force of arms, win their spurs in the Far East by engaging in the peaceful enterprises of farming, trade, and industry.

Precisely as the position of Japan on the Asiatic mainland was the result of arbitrament by the sword, drawn in response to a challenge made by others, and is now upheld by the prestige of arms, her Asiatic policy, although conceived in self-defense, came to assume in the eyes of the outside world a semblance of military aggrandizement. As a consequence, Japan is looked upon as a militaristic nation, bent upon conquest. Suspicion and fear are thereby engendered. This is, to say the least, extremely unfortunate. No stone should be left unturned to smooth the sharp edges cut by this historical retrospect and to obliterate the unpleasant memories of the past. No effort would be too great for Japan to convince the world of her genuine faith that her future lies “not in territorial and military conquest, but on the water in the carrying trade and on land in her commercial and industrial expansion abroad.” Her erstwhile failure to dispel the suspicion of the world about her intentions and to take it into her confidence is the root of many ills with which she has been afflicted for the past few years.

Shantung Settlement.

The storm of criticism we have witnessed in America about the Shantung settlement is a good illustration. Whatever part party politics in the United States may have played in raising the furor, had Japan secured the complete confidence of the American people, all the eloquence expended for the denunciation of the Shantung clause in the Versailles Treaty would surely have fallen on deaf ears. That our judgment is not wrong is sustained by the fact that the Portsmouth Treaty evoked not a word of protest in America. We need not remind our readers that the Treaty concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt and the settlement made at Versailles are not only based upon the same principles but are exactly identical in many respects, with this most important exception—namely, that the former Treaty transferred to Japan the lease of the Kwantung territory, and she still holds it, while in the latter case she pledges herself to relinquish the leasehold of Kiaochow, thereby restoring the complete sovereignty of China over Shantung, which had been infringed upon by Germany. The Shantung settlement is, consequently, of a far greater advantage to China. What Japan secures in that province is only the same economic rights and privileges which are enjoyed by other Powers in other parts of China. There is, therefore, no justifiable ground for singling out Japan for attack with regard to the international arrangement now in vogue in China. Were the complete reconstruction of China, the re-writing of her history, to be attempted, international justice would demand that the parties interested should all share equal responsibilities and sacrifices. Discrimination against Japan alone is unjust, unfair. The would-be builders of the new heaven and the new earth can ill afford to lay the cornerstone of their edifice on such an unsafe and unlevel ground. Manifestly, the dawn of the millennium is still far away. We have to make the best of the world as it is. To ignore this fact is to make the confusion in the world worse confounded. As a result of this misapprehension of history, the Shantung question still remains in abeyance, because of China’s refusal to enter into negotiations with Japan for the restoration of Kiaochow, thus delaying perfect accord between the two Oriental neighbors whom destiny has called to be on the best of terms. The foregoing interpretation of the Shantung question could not in ordinary circumstances have failed to convince the practical American people of the appropriateness of the Versailles settlement, were they not tempted to indulge suspicions of Japan and, hence, ready to be easily misled by false stories, misrepresentations, and slanders concocted by her enemies.

Rather unfortunate, one is sometimes tempted to think, has been the heading of the clause in the Versailles Treaty, that has readjusted the German-China Treaty of 1898 and its sequel, and disposed of the rights and privileges Germany had secured thereby in the province of Shantung. Like “the three R’s” and other catchwords that have in American history often proved so powerful in misleading the people, so this curt phrase “Shantung clause,” which was seized on and skillfully utilized by Japan’s critics, has been a cause of mountains of misunderstanding that have crept into the heads of the American people, who, as a rule, take neither time nor pains to examine the subject carefully and thoroughly. As a result, they imagine that the whole province of Shantung was ceded to Japan by the Peace Treaty. Great, indeed, as is this mistake, it would be extremely difficult to correct it, as the mischief has already been done, except by the actual restoration of Kiaochow. Japan cannot, of course, be held responsible for the misinterpretations of other people, but at the same time it would be well for her to spare no effort to convince China of the wisdom of entering into negotiations for the recovery of the leased territory, and, consequently, of her complete sovereignty over the province of Shantung. Until this pledge is redeemed, Japan’s credit will suffer, and all her pronouncements on justice and humanity fall flat on the ears of the world.

Coöperation with China.

While Japan’s Asiatic policy was, of course, primarily formulated to further her own interests, it has also been inspired with the laudable ambition of rendering a good record of stewardship over the people who have come within the orbit of its influence. No one who knows the work undertaken in Korea and South Manchuria will grudge a word of praise for the record. It has bestowed untold benefits on the inhabitants. Theodore Roosevelt, in reviewing the enterprise of Japan in Korea, grew enthusiastic over it. The same story is repeated in South Manchuria, where the South Manchurian Railroad Company, acting as a civilizing agent, has wrought marvels. We should like to dwell here with patriotic pride on these reforms and undertakings in some detail, were they not out of place in this book.

Commendable as are these civilizing measures adopted by Japan, the fact remains that she has signally failed in one great essential, namely, in winning the good will and friendship of her neighbors. This is the weakest spot in the armor of her Asiatic policy. She is thereby jeopardizing her future. The sentiment of good will is as much a fact, though imponderable, as any other fact, and is a force of immense consequence. How vital this moral asset is to Japan can easily be gauged when we consider that in her neighboring lands are found the indispensable materials for her industrial expansion and the best market for her commerce. Japanese leaders are thoroughly aware of the importance of this moral asset, and have done all that they could to secure it.

The failure to win it is partly due to the pettiness of Japanese officialdom, so bitterly complained of by Lafcadio Hearn with his fine poetical irony—the pettiness which tries to bring everything within its prescribed order and does not allow free play to the idiosyncrasies and peculiar characteristics of other peoples. No less responsible are the shortsightedness of Japanese nationals, their too great eagerness to accomplish things within a short time, their haughtiness and overbearing manners, which are decidedly offensive to their neighbors. The fault, however, is not Japan’s alone. There are tremendous difficulties which confront her in the way of winning the friendship of her neighbors. The first to reckon with are their weak and unstable qualities, which have so sadly but too clearly been shown by their incapacity to organize a strong nation or to put their house in order. To deal with these neighbors is no easy task. It requires the highest statesmanship. The task is made difficult a hundredfold by the counteracting influences exerted on Japan’s neighbors, as they are in the vortex of international rivalry. And not all foreigners are the friends of Japan. There is a considerable number of those who entertain, for one reason or another, a dislike of the Island Empire, and ceaselessly labor to defeat its purpose. They paint, either wittingly or unwittingly, every act of Japan so maliciously that it instills fear and hatred of her among her neighbors. Undiscriminating and unfair attacks of Japan’s critics play into the hands of the jingoistic elements in the countries concerned and make the task of the liberals extremely difficult. Whatever the obstacles, however, they must be surmounted, for the future road to tread is clear. Japan’s salvation, together with that of her neighbors, lies in their genuine friendship and coöperation.

Understanding with America.

A brief review of Japan’s Asiatic policy was deemed advisable in connection with the discussion of the Japanese-California problem in order to see how Japan proposes to solve the question of human congestion at home and to meet her other urgent needs. The succeeding chapters will show what an unparalleled predicament Japan is facing. Circumscribed within a narrowly limited area, only 16 per cent. of which is fit for cultivation, and crowded with two thirds as many people as the entire population of the United States, with an annual increase at the rate of seven hundred thousand, Japan must perforce find a way whereby her people may live contentedly and develop robustly. Emigration and industrial expansion are manifestly the exits from the dilemma of slow strangulation. Emigration, however, is found a difficult exit, for the Japanese find themselves barred from the most favorably placed lands of the earth. Australia, Canada, and the United States, with their vast lands yet sparsely peopled, and their immense resources left unexploited, while welcoming every race and creed of Europe, shut their doors against the Japanese.

Japan has acquiesced without much ado in the restrictive immigration measures adopted by America and by British colonies from the higher consideration of international comity. She saw that there lies at the bottom of these measures the delicate question of race difference, which requires a long period for its proper adjustment. To ignore this fact and force the race issue, however just in principle, would be to court disaster. It might result in the loss of friendship of her best associates in international affairs and of the vital interests involved in that friendship. At the same time, the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” which Japan has entered into is evidence of her sincere solicitude to avoid embarrassment of her friends by the influx of an alien race. It is then but just that they reciprocate the courtesy by a sympathetic understanding of Japan’s difficulties.

Barred in the east and south, it is natural for Japan to strive to find room and employment for the surplus of her population in her neighboring lands—the sparsely peopled Manchuria, Mongolia, and East Siberia. Climate, cheap and efficient native labor, and the unfavorable economic conditions, however, preclude the immigration in large numbers of Japanese laborers into these regions. Only by building up large plants and inaugurating big agricultural enterprises, in coöperation with the natives, could Japan hope to transplant in these lands some portion of her skilled laborers and traders. During the stay of a decade and a half in South Manchuria, limited as it was until the conclusion of the China-Japan Treaties of 1915 to the Kwantung territory and the railway zones, Japan can count therein as colonists only a little over 150,000 of her sons and daughters.[3]

The only alternative which remains and which is the most feasible proposition to absorb the energies of her crowded population is found in her commercial and industrial expansion. Here again, however, she is terribly handicapped, as we shall see in the next chapter, by the conspicuous absence and scarcity of raw materials indispensable for industrial development. Fortunately, in the territories of her neighbors—China and East Siberia—there are vast stores of these materials untouched and unused, the unfolding of which will not only meet her wants, but will equally benefit her neighbors. The supreme importance of winning their good will thereby becomes accentuated a thousandfold, for without their willing coöperation nothing can be accomplished. In the participation of the benefits accruing from the development of her neighbors’ natural resources Japan need not ask for special privileges. The faithful and effective execution of the “open door” policy is all she requires. Here she stands on common ground with Occidental Powers. She entertains no fear of the outcome of the “open door” policy, for she is in a position to secure every advantage accruing from its operation.

Japan’s Proper Sphere of Activity.

As Colonel Roosevelt pointed out, “Japan’s proper sphere is in Asia,” and it is but proper that her activities therein develop in intensity and vigor. She is entitled to use every peaceful and legitimate means that is open to her for the extension of her influence in the Far East, for it is there that she can assure herself of her right to live. America and Great Britain, while reserving to themselves the right of opening or closing their own doors to the Japanese, will not be playing a fair and even game if they grudge to recognize this fact. In the strict adherence on the part of Japan to the spirit which gave birth to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” and in the just appreciation on the part of America of Japan’s difficulties at home and abroad, lies one of the fundamentals of an equitable solution of the Japanese-California problem.

CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE EMIGRATION

Causes of Emigration and Immigration.

Diverse as are the causes that induce emigration and invite immigration, the most fundamental of all, with the exception of a few extraordinary cases, such as that of the Pilgrim Fathers, is economic pressure. There is a close relationship—a mutual give and take—between the immigrants and those who receive them. Generally speaking, human activities have their main-spring in man’s desire to improve his conditions of living. The motive which induces the people of one country to go out and settle in another country is the same as the motive which induces another people to invite immigrants from other countries. True, in the former case, the direct reason for the move is generally the overcrowding and poor natural environment at home. In the latter case, it is the lack of man-power and the presence of great unexploited natural resources. But in both cases the real motive is the pursuit of interest, which may be reciprocally promoted by the transaction. It is well to keep this point clearly in mind at the outset, because much of the confusion in discussing the Japanese problem in California arises from forgetting the real cause which brought Japanese immigrants to America and which induced America to invite them.

During the early colonial period the American colonies invited refugees from political and religious oppression to come and settle in the new world of freedom and democracy. The remnant of this early spirit still remains embodied in the present immigration laws of the United States. Nevertheless, it is almost a dead letter, with great historic interest but with no practical significance. The real motive for welcoming immigrants has been the acquisition of man-power for the exploitation of vast natural resources and for the development of industry. This is a fact which may be observed in almost all “new worlds,” including the South American republics, Canada, and Australia, where the dearth of human energy is the capital reason of slow economic development. With settlers, however, the economic motive is not the only one, though it is predominant. Here the motives are diverse and complicated. With the Japanese there are particular causes which have been driving them to seek opportunities in new worlds.

Japan’s Land Area.

The first and foremost cause is Japan’s limited and unresourceful land. The land area of Japan Proper is 147,655 square miles, which is about 8,000 square miles less than that of California. The terrain of Japan is mountainous and volcanic, being traversed by two chains of mountains. One runs down from Saghalien towards the center of Honshu and the other from China via Formosa headed towards the north, both meeting at the middle of Honshu, thereby producing rugged upheavals popularly known as “the Japanese Alps.” Being thus rocky and mountainous, the area contains a very small portion of plain land. Hokkaido, the extreme northern island, has seven plains. Honshu, the main island, has between the mountains five small plains, and Kyushu, the large southern island, has one. The total area of plains forms about one fourth of the entire area of Japan. The consequence of this geological formation is that about 16 per cent. of the total area is fit for cultivation, while over 70 per cent. of it is made up of mountains and forests.

Agriculture.

The Japanese having always been primarily farmers, agriculture still remains the principal occupation of the people. More than half the population is earning a livelihood wholly or partially by agricultural pursuits. The large number of farmers and the small amount of agricultural land allotted to them has given rise to the most intensive cultivation, which probably has no parallel in the world. Nearly five and a half million families, or thirty million people, cultivate fifteen million acres, which means less than three acres per family, and half an acre per individual farmer. It is little wonder that the law of diminishing return has long been operating, rendering the agricultural pursuit less and less remunerative, driving farm hands to industry and other work. The average daily wage of the farm laborer was 56 sen in 1917, while that of the industrial laborer was 1 yen.[4]

In recent years the Government undertook a thorough examination of the tillable land in the country and reported as a result that there is yet a possibility of reclaiming about five million acres. By way of experiment, the Government began, with the approval of the 41st Session of the Diet (1918-19), to undertake the work of partial reclamation of seven hundred thousand acres on a nine-year program, with an outlay of some four million yen. It is yet uncertain how the enterprise will turn out; but it is fairly doubtful, in view of the fact that already the land is utilized almost to the limit of cultivation, including narrow back yards and rugged hillsides, as well as sandy beach, whether the program can materially increase the present amount of farm acreage.

Parallel with the effort to extend the tillable land, everything has been done to increase the productivity of the soil under cultivation. Thanks to the application of scientific methods in agriculture and the use of fertilizer, the average yield of all crops per acre has increased since 1894 by about 35 per cent. But experts assert that owing to the excessive employment of land the soil now indicates signs of exhaustion, and that accordingly any further increase of productivity cannot be hoped for. On the contrary, the tendency will be toward a gradual decrease of productivity in the future. This is a grave forecast for Japan, and makes that country dependent more and more upon the food supply from abroad. The average yield of staple crops in Japan during the past few years comprises: barley, nine million koku (a koku is approximately five bushels); rye, seven million koku; wheat, five million koku; millet, four million koku, and rice, the most important crop, fifty-two million koku. The crops are far from being sufficient to feed a population of fifty-five millions, and Japan buys annually millions of koku of staple food from abroad. Taking rice, for instance, the average annual consumption is fifty-eight million koku, which exceeds by six million koku the average annual yield of Japan, so that the deficiency is made up by imports from Korea, China, and India.

Naturally, the Japanese, being very good farmers and fond of agriculture, and yet having so small a prospect of success at home, look with eager eyes for an opportunity to cultivate land abroad. In the north there are the vast plains of Manchuria; towards the south the fertile soil of Australia; in the east, California and Hawaii appear to offer golden opportunities for industrious farmers. Manchuria, however, turned out to be too cold, and competition there with cheap Chinese labor proved unprofitable. Australia, from the beginning, never welcomed the yellow races. Only Hawaii and California seemed in all respects satisfactory for Japanese emigration. Hence, large numbers of Japanese farmers migrated to these places during the years between 1891 and 1907.

Population.

Another big factor of Japanese emigration is the overcrowded status of the home population. Strangely, during the three centuries of national isolation, Japan’s population remained fairly static, varying only slightly around twenty-six millions. A reasonable explanation of this peculiar phenomenon may be found in the rigid social structure of feudalism, which allowed no swelling of population beyond a certain number. Malthusian factors, such as pestilence and famine, as well as artificial means of control, operated in effectively thwarting the increasing forces of population.

When, however, feudalism was at last destroyed and in its place were established new forms of political and social systems which were much more liberal and advanced, the population suddenly began to swell at a tremendous rate. The advent of Occidental enlightenment which went far to improve the economic conditions of the country, and hence the conditions of living among the people, greatly encouraged the rapid multiplication of the number of people. Within the last fifty years the population of Japan has nearly doubled, increasing from thirty millions to fifty-five millions. At the present time the population is increasing at the rate of 650,000 to 700,000 per annum within Japan proper alone. The census taken on October 1, 1920, shows the total population of the Mikado’s Empire as totalling 77,005,510, of which that of Japan proper is 55,961,140.

The significance of Japan’s population cannot be appreciated unless it is considered in connection with her land. The total area of Japan proper we have seen to be 147,655 square miles and the population close to 56,000,000. That is to say, the number of inhabitants per square mile is 380. This is rather a high figure when compared with that of other countries. Germany with her dense population counted, in 1915, 319 per square mile; France had 191, America 31 (1910), India and China, famous for density, had populations enumerated respectively at 158 and 100. Great Britain has rather a dense population (370 per square mile), but she has vast colonies, the population of which is extremely thin. This comparison of the number of people per square mile does not tell the true story until the quality and resources of each square mile are also compared. It has already been made clear that only 16 per cent., or fifteen million acres, of the land of Japan proper is tillable. This gives only one quarter of an acre of agricultural land per capita of population. In Great Britain agricultural land occupies 77 per cent. of the total area; in Italy, 76 per cent.; in France, 70 per cent. and in Germany 65 per cent.

Industry.

Handicapped as she is in agriculture, and holding on the other hand a vast and ever-increasing population, the best, in fact the only, policy for Japan to follow has been to utilize her vast man-power for the development of industry. Firmly convinced that the future of Japan depends solely on her ability to stand in the world as an industrial nation, the far-sighted statesmen of Japan long ago formulated plans for a steady industrial expansion. These plans were furthered by Government subsidy and have been faithfully carried out step by step by the authorities. The creation of a vast merchant marine; the building of railroads throughout the country, closely knitting all parts of the empire together; the enactment of a carefully drafted protective tariff; the national and municipal monopolization of public utilities and important industries; the establishment of a stable financial system with facilities for financing healthy enterprises; the establishment of technical schools throughout the empire for the training of experts and skilled workmen, and thousands of other remarkable undertakings were accomplished within a very short time by the direct and indirect efforts of the State.

The people, too, were not behind in their devotion to the cause of making Japan an industrial power. They toiled most willingly under all kinds of disadvantages and hardships; they shouldered extortionate taxes with smiling faces; they worked in unison, disregarding for the time being petty private interests; they calmly and bravely met all privations and adversities. There is little wonder indeed that Japan established herself within only a few decades as an industrial nation of the first rank.

In order to get a general idea of Japan’s industrial strides, a few figures will perhaps suffice. Take, for instance, the number of factories. There was not one factory, properly so-called, in the country at the time of the Restoration in 1868; as late as 1885 there were but 496 industrial companies, joint stock or partnership, with a total capital of seven million yen. In the year 1900, however, there were 7000 typically modern factories, and this number rapidly multiplied, subsequently reaching over 25,000, with billions of paid-up capital. The number of factory operatives, too, correspondingly multiplied during that period. Less than 500,000 twenty years ago, they now total 1,500,000. The increase in the output of production and multiplication of various kinds of industries has been particularly phenomenal. In the textile industry the production has increased more than 300 per cent. during the past twenty years, cotton yarn having increased from 30,000,000 kan (one kan is approximately equal to 8.27 pounds avoirdupois) in 1900 to 100,000,000 kan; and in the silk textiles from 2,500,000 kan to 7,500,000 kan. In cloth fabrics, similarly the value turned out in silk weaving increased from $42,000,000 to $100,000,000; in cotton weaving from $30,000,000 to $200,000,000 between the years mentioned. The corresponding increase of output has been realized in almost all established industries, and the same ratio obtains in the many new industries which have sprung up in recent years. Generally speaking, the industry of Japan, which was established on a firm footing by the year 1900, has trebled during the last twenty years.

The World War, too, by absorbing for military purposes all the energies of the belligerent Powers in Europe and America, was greatly instrumental in stimulating the industrial growth of Japan, who, after accomplishing her allotted task at the initial stage of the great conflict, was thereafter called upon by her Allies to do her utmost in supplying their urgent needs in ships and industrial products.

The development of industry naturally accompanies a similar expansion in commerce. The total amount of foreign trade, which started with the meager sum of $13,000,000 in 1868, jumped to about $250,000,000 in 1900, and in 1920 reached $2,124,000,000. That is, within the past twenty years only, Japan’s foreign trade increased roughly ten times, and during the past fifty years 163 times.

Yet, with all this remarkable development, the future of Japanese manufactures does not allow unqualified optimism. In several important respects the foundation of Japan’s industrialism is seriously hampered. In the first place, the supply of raw material is pitifully meager. With the exception of silk, Japan has in store hardly any raw material worthy of mention. She produces no wool or cotton and has only a limited store of iron. With the exception of coal, in which alone she is fairly independent—at least for the present—Japan depends for these indispensable factors of modern industry mostly on foreign supply. Scarcity of iron, in particular, is a notable weakness of Japan as an industrial nation.

The many mistakes Japan made in her labor policy, which were the inevitable outcome of the extreme difficulty she confronted in adjusting the sudden transition from the Feudal régime to the modern industrial stage, must also be counted as a cause in retarding the progress of her industry. Due to exceedingly low wages, long working hours, and lack of adequate protection of labor from exploitation, the man-power of Japan has been greatly lavished and wasted. The paternal social systems inherited from the feudal days long refused to allow the voice of the working classes to be heard and to give them freedom to improve their status. Strikes and labor unions, whatever their motive and character, have always been frowned upon in Japan. It is by no means too much to say that the present development of Japan’s industry has been achieved largely by the costly sacrifice of health and the rights of millions of laboring men and women. Considering how costly was the present achievement of industry, there remains some doubt as to how far Japan can carry on its progress in the future.

It may seem that the development of industry must have brought a marked improvement in the standard of living of the masses. Such, however, is not the case. It has indeed immensely swelled the pockets of plutocrats, but has not much benefited the rank and file. While the income of the lower classes has not increased to any large extent, the cost of living has gone up by leaps and bounds, aggravating the severity of their struggle.

When both farming and manufacturing failed successfully to cope with the ever-increasing population, the only alternative for the Japanese was emigration. Among the students, the talk of another alternative, namely birth-control, is becoming a fad.

Social Factors.

Besides the economic reasons so far discussed there are social reasons which induce Japanese youths to go abroad. Socially an old country like Japan contains a vast accumulated crust of custom and tradition which refuses to adapt itself to the changing conditions and ideals of the age, and which, therefore, is objectionable to the younger generation who know something of the value of freedom and democracy. Again, the national conscription for military service is becoming increasingly distasteful to the youths of individualistic inclination. It is but natural, in the face of such powerful and numerous fetters which obstruct the free development of lives and personalities, that the young people of Nippon should seek opportunities abroad.

All these factors above described would not have constituted the effective motive forces for Japanese emigration had it not been for the assumed external advantages. Attractive narratives in which some of the new countries, more especially America, were represented as places where economic opportunities are really boundless and where an ideal state of freedom and democracy prevails, took an exaggerated form in the imagination. The glaring contrast which the visualized America presents with the actual Japan stimulates the desire of young men to turn to America and try their fortunes.

CHAPTER V

ATTEMPTS AT EMIGRATION: RESULTS

The history of Japanese emigration began only a few decades ago. Immediately after the conclusion of treaties with the Western Powers many Japanese youths were sent abroad to acquire advanced Occidental knowledge. A number of adventurous persons and travelers also knocked at the doors of western countries, but they were not immigrants. Real immigration movement did not start until the facts of other countries became more or less known; until the colossal task of economic and social “revolutions” was well started; until the influence of European imperialism began to take root in the empire. Then came a brief period of “emigration fever” towards the end of the eighties, lasting some twenty years. What follows is a brief history of the various attempts made by Japanese to emigrate into different countries, and the results of the experiment.

Australia.

Because of the geographical proximity and alluring temptations that the vast uncultivated lands and rich natural resources presented, Australia was the place which early attracted the Japanese. A few hundreds of them began to migrate to several colonies, chiefly to Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria. But they soon found the conditions exceedingly uncomfortable, owing to the hostile feeling already prevalent there against the Asiatics. The Australian fear of an influx of Asiatic races was early aroused by Chinese immigrants, who, as early as 1848, attained a sufficient number to cause agitation and race riots in several colonies. These colonies subsequently enacted rigorous anti-Asiatic immigration laws restricting the number of immigrants admitted per annum to a few hundred. Since then, filled with the fear, real or imaginary, of a menace of Asiatic inundation from across the equator, where one-half of the planet’s population live congested on one-tenth of the total area of the earth, the great task of Australia during the last sixty years has been to keep the country clear of Asiatics.

The immigration policy of the Commonwealth of Australia presents perhaps the most clear-cut and radical example of racial discrimination. While, on the one side, she spares neither effort nor money to attract and welcome white settlers, on the other side she leaves no stone unturned to exclude all Asiatic immigrants. With an immensely large area—about 50,000 square miles more extensive than that of the United States—yet almost untouched, and a population less than that of the City of New York, Australia really needs farmers, artisans, and all other classes of people. It is the function of the Commonwealth Department of Home and Territories to advertise in Europe, through lectures, films, exhibitions, and posters, for the purpose of inviting laborers and settlers to Australia. Each State of the Commonwealth has extended assistance in money and privilege to hundreds of thousands of European immigrants. The cause for lamentation by the government is that with all this effort and sacrifice she has not been successful in getting any considerable number of people as settlers.

Unsuccessful in attracting white settlers, she has been most successful in repelling the yellow race. She has an immigration law which requires immigrants to pass a dictation test—a test in writing of not less than fifty words of a European language—which is dictated to them by an officer. Examination in a European language for the Asiatics! And what is more, the Europeans are exempt from it. The law provides, furthermore, that Asiatic immigrants may be required to pass a test at any time within two years after they have entered the Commonwealth. Even for the reception of those Asiatics who have been lawfully admitted, some of the States, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Tasmania in particular, do not allow them the right of owning or leasing land, under the pretext that they are not eligible to citizenship. The Commonwealth of Australia does not extend the right of naturalization to Asiatics. No wonder, then, that there is only a handful of Orientals in that vast country—35,000 Chinese and some 5000 Japanese.

Canada.

Until recent years, no record was kept of the number of Japanese immigrants arriving in Canada and consequently the development of the movement cannot be accurately traced. The Canadian census of 1901 shows that 4674 persons born in Japan were in the Dominion at that time; 4415 were in the Province of British Columbia, the rest being scattered in the Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. After that year the number of Japanese immigrants coming to Canada gradually increased, and when the United States placed restrictions on the influx of Japanese from Hawaii, and the latter began to seek entrance into Canada, the number grew considerably and soon caused serious concern to the people of Western Canada. It was estimated that in 1907 the Japanese domiciled in Canada had reached eight thousand. Determined opposition soon arose among the western provinces, and protests were sent by the Canadian Government to Hawaii and Tokyo requesting them to control the sudden immigration tide. An agreement was reached in 1908 between Japan and Canada by which the number of passports to be granted in any one year to Japanese emigrating to Canada was limited to four hundred. In this way the question was satisfactorily settled.

Canada’s treatment of the Asiatic races lawfully admitted has been marked by leniency. She has extended to the Orientals the privilege of naturalization and of securing homesteads. Even in British Columbia, the center of anti-Oriental agitation, the Japanese and Chinese are permitted to conduct business and cultivate land on an equal basis with British subjects in Canada. They may own land, both urban and rural, and in provinces other than British Columbia they are entitled to voting privileges when naturalized; only in that province the Orientals are not allowed to cast ballots, though free to become citizens. It is reported that there are 13,823 Japanese residing in Canada to-day, engaged in fishing and logging and sawmill industries, as well as in agriculture.

South America.

For some years past a number (about six thousand) of Japanese immigrants has been sent every year to Brazil in compliance with the request of the Republic. They have been mostly engaged on coffee plantations in Sao Paulo. The colonization is still in an experimental stage, and it is a little premature to forecast its future at this time. Altogether about twenty thousand Japanese immigrants have gone to the South American Republic.

The United States.

Perhaps attracted by the wonderful stories of the discovery of gold in the Sacramento Valley, or possibly cast ashore in boats on the Pacific Coast of America, there seem to have lived in the early sixties in California about a hundred Japanese. Early California papers record the story of quaint-looking Japanese settlers, who were received with great favor. Although accurate records are lacking, it would seem that the number of Japanese did not begin to increase until the late eighties, when a few hundred began to come in every year. The census of 1890 reported the number of Japanese residents as 2039. From that time on the number of immigrants steadily increased, reaching the highest mark in 1907, when about ten thousand of them entered continental America in one year.[5]

The direct incentive for Japanese emigration was furnished by a few large emigration companies,[6] which were formed with a view to supplying contract labor to Hawaii and America, where the demand for labor was insatiable. In the former case, the rapid growth of the sugar plantations demanded a large supply of cheap labor. In the latter case, the need for cheap labor was urgent, due to the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Law in 1882, which soon began to effect a decrease in the number of Chinese laborers, resulting in a dearth of labor on the farms and in railroad work. It was in response to the urgent demand of capitalists and landowners in Hawaii and America for Japanese labor that the emigration companies sprang into existence with the object of facilitating the complex process of immigration.

The Japanese coolies so brought in were welcomed and prosperous—at least for a while. Their industry and frugality won them the confidence of their employers. In agriculture, in railroad-building, in mining and fishing, they proved useful hands. They saved money and remitted to their native country a considerable portion of it. Some of them returned home with a fortune and a degree of refinement which a superior environment could bestow upon a laborer. These incidents stimulated the desire of ambitious Japanese to leave for and work in California and Hawaii, and the number of applicants for emigration greatly multiplied.

In the meantime, between 1895 and 1900, changes had taken place in the attitude of the people of California toward the Japanese. For various reasons the friendly feeling of the Californians was gradually replaced by a more or less hostile sentiment. It so happened that just about this time California was the stage for a struggle between organized labor and capital. It was with a great deal of effort and sacrifice that the organized labor of California succeeded in excluding the Chinese coolies. But their hard-won victory was shattered to pieces by the advent of Japanese laborers, whom capital, taking advantage of their ignorance of American customs and language, wisely utilized as a powerful weapon to defeat the unions. To the union men it made no difference whether the strike-breakers were Chinese or Japanese; whether strike-breaking was voluntarily or unwittingly performed; they were enemies just the same. The cry for exclusion was a natural consequence.

Then there also seems to be some truth in the report[7] made in 1908 by W. L. Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of the Government of Canada, which states that it is suspected that much of the anti-Japanese agitation in California was deliberately fermented by the interests of the Planters’ Association of Honolulu, who, alarmed by the tendency of Japanese laborers engaged on the sugar plantations to seek work on the Pacific Coast of America, where wages were much better, started a campaign to check the exodus by causing ill feeling toward the Japanese along the Pacific Coast. The report states in part:

It is believed ... that the members of the Asiatic Exclusion League in San Francisco were not without contributions from the Association’s incidental expense fund, to assist them in an agitation which by excluding Japanese from the mainland would confine that class of labor to the islands, to the greater economic advantage of the members of the Association.[8]

For these two chief reasons, and perhaps for many other minor ones, there arose the persistent social movement for Japanese exclusion in California, which first took definite shape in 1900, when a mass-meeting held at San Francisco for the express purpose of more rigidly excluding the Chinese, adopted a resolution urging Congress to take measures for the total exclusion of Japanese other than members of the Diplomatic Staff. Following this came the first of the anti-Japanese messages delivered by the Governor of California, and of the resolutions voted on by the State Legislature calling upon Congress to extend the Chinese Exclusion Law to other Asiatics. The climax of the movement was reached when, immediately after the earthquake, the Board of Education of San Francisco passed the “separate school order,” and Japan protested. A series of diplomatic negotiations followed, which finally resulted in the repeal of the school discriminatory order and the conclusion of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” whereby Japan pledged herself to restrict the number of immigrants to the United States.

Leaving to a later chapter the detailed discussion of the result which the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” has brought about in the status of Japanese immigration, it will suffice to mention here that the agreement has faithfully and loyally been carried out by Japan, and that since then the Japanese problem has in fact ceased to be an immigration issue.

Results.

Twenty years of emigration attempts, chief of which we reviewed in this chapter, have resulted in failure in every case, and Japan’s effort to plant her race in other lands has proved futile. There are many causes for this failure, for which Japan is partially, but not wholly, responsible. But this is a matter which we shall more fully discuss in the next chapter. Excluded and maltreated wherever they went, the Japanese returned home with shattered hopes and wounded feelings, and the mooted question of population once more confronted them with intensified severity. Giving up as entirely hopeless the attempt at settling in places where the white races held supremacy, they now appear to have made up their minds to migrate towards the north, where climatic and economic disadvantages, together with political revolution in Eastern Europe, have freed the land temporarily from the strong white grip, offering the line of least resistance for Japanese.

CHAPTER VI

CAUSES OF ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

Modern Civilization.

The major cause of the agitation against Japanese in California must be attributed to modern civilization, which, with scientific devices, has conquered time and space and thereby destroyed the high walls of international boundaries. Indeed, had it not been for the steamboat, railroad, telegraph, and other civilized instruments, which bind the nations of the world into a composite whole, and modern industrialism, which civilization brought about and which in turn assisted in unifying the world, Japan for one would have remained a peaceful hermit nation, undisliked or unsuspected by any other. She, of course, has no reason to regret the adoption of European culture, which brought her untold values and happiness; but the fact remains that the present anti-Japanese agitation in California, as well as elsewhere in the world, would never have occurred had she not followed the lead of Occidental nations.

Clearly, such a conflict is one of the by-products of the complex international relations brought about by modern science, which, simply because of the lack of experience and regulation due to their short history, remain deplorably defective. This suggests the point already brought out in our introduction, that the principle of the solution of the California problem lies not in an attempt at separating Japan and the United States, which time and destiny brought together, but in a yet closer, more regulated relationship, and in the promotion of a better mutual understanding.

Various Attitudes Towards Japanese.

With reference to the attitude toward the Japanese, it is possible to discern four classes of critics in California. There are the veteran exclusionists, whose only hope in this world seems to be the realization of the slogan, “All Japs must go!” There is the majority of people which is too preoccupied with its own affairs to investigate the facts and is ready to accept anything said or asserted by the exclusionists. Then there are those, intellectually more critical, who hold independent opinions as to why the Japanese must be excluded. There are also others who stoutly oppose, rationally or irrationally, any attempt at excluding the Japanese.

The reasons offered for justifying the exclusion of the Japanese widely vary according to the class of people, and they are often mutually contradictory and conflicting. To those agitators whose motive is purely self-interest, agitation is a profession, and hence it transcends the consideration of justice or international courtesy. They have no scruples about lying or resorting to any means which they think would serve their purpose. The masses, generally speaking, accept what is given to them by the agitators, unthinkingly echo their voices, and so play directly into their hands. Only fair, rational exclusionists study the facts of the case, consider the significance involved therein, and present arguments supporting their conviction. It is in this class of people, and not in professional agitators or whimsical populace, or irrational friends of the Japanese, that the hope of the solution of the problem may be found.

From the fact that so much agitation is going on in California, some may think—especially those in Japan—that all Californians are unkind or hostile to the Japanese. This, however, is far from being the case. It is precisely in California that the most earnest, devoted friends of the island people are found—found in great numbers.[9] These sympathizers are wholly unable to share the opinions of the exclusionists, and are simply at a loss to comprehend the reason why so much fuss should be made because of a handful of Japanese who compare favorably with European immigrants.

Psychological Nature of the Cause.

The fact that right in the midst of the hotbed of the Japanese exclusion movement there are goodly numbers of unqualified friends of the Japanese suggests that the motives of exclusion as well as inclusion are primarily personal; that is, psychological. We are all human and are prone to pass judgment from personal incidents or experience. A single disagreeable experience with a Japanese may drive a level-headed politician to a frenzy of Japanese exclusion, just as the memory of one Japanese friend may make another individual a consistent advocate of a friendly attitude toward all Japanese. Inevitably limited in the scope of experience, we can only generalize from a few particulars. This is why there are such contradictory attitudes to be found among Californians toward the same problem. In generalizing from particular experience we are more apt to arrive at a conclusion which suits our desires and emotions. We reach our conclusions in ways which we think promote our interests and please our feeling. Gain or loss, like or dislike, are two pivots determining our judgment. Those who think they gain from the presence of Japanese and those who like the Japanese, from whatever reason, naturally tend to welcome them; those who feel the contrary, incline to advocate their exclusion. At bottom, therefore, the effort of discrimination arises from a direct or indirect personal experience with Japanese which resulted in some sort of an unfavorable impression.

Chinese Agitation Inherited.

With this preliminary we shall see what are the more obvious factors which give rise to anti-Japanese sentiment on the Pacific Coast. It is perhaps beyond doubt, as most authorities insist, that the Japanese inherited the ill-feeling that early prevailed against the Chinese, and this for no other reason than that the Japanese are similar to the Chinese in many respects and were placed under the same conditions which caused hostility to the Chinese. We have already discussed how the Japanese coolies were used by capital as weapons to pit against the ascendency of organized labor. Under the general term “Asiatics” the Japanese shared at first, and later inherited, the painful experience of the Chinese.

Local Politics.

That the Japanese issue was frequently made the football of minor political games in California is an undeniable truth. Wholly apart from the consideration of right and wrong, we cite a case of political activity which illustrates such a situation. Writing in the January (1921) issue of the North American Review, Mr. R. W. Ryder observes:

All during the late war—while the Japanese fleet was protecting our commerce and other interests by patrolling the Pacific—the most cordial relationship existed between the two peoples. But the Armistice had hardly been signed before agitation against the Japanese again manifested itself; however, not until it had been resuscitated and energized by one of California’s United States Senators who was soon to be a candidate for reëlection. This Senator, Mr. Phelan, appeared in California early in 1919, and at once made a visit to the Immigration Station at San Francisco and Los Angeles; whereupon he issued a statement characterizing the Japanese situation as a menace. Next, he addressed the State Legislature on the Japanese question. Prior to his address, although the Legislature had been in session for almost two months, it had done nothing regarding the Japanese. But a few days afterward several anti-Japanese measures were introduced....

The particular susceptibility of the Japanese issue to political agitation in California may be attributed to the safety and advantage with which it may be manipulated. The Japanese in California having practically no vote are safe toys for play. The possibility of magnifying the “menace” of the Asiatic “influx” is immensely tempting in this case, rendering it a most effective smoke screen for the tactics of private interests.

The San Francisco Chronicle stated, in its editorial on October 22, 1920, under the heading, “It Would Probably Have Been Settled without Trouble but for Politicians,” as follows:

Had no attempt been made to drag California’s Japanese question into politics we would probably have settled the question satisfactorily and with no fuss....

We think it probable that if the question had not been appropriated by politicians seeking to make capital for themselves it would have been possible to have obtained the coöperation, at least the acquiescence, of the intellectual Japanese leaders in the State, in measures designed to prevent the presence of their countrymen from being or becoming an economic menace to California....

That the question has been brought into politics, where it was not an issue and could not be, that it has been made a cause of irritation between Japan and the United States, and has given Japan a lever to use against us in all matters affecting the Orient, is due to the senior Senator from California, who sought to use the problem to advance his own personal interests.

“Yellow Peril.”

The imaginary fear of an Asiatic influx, cleverly fermented by agitators, is certainly a strong cause of Japanophobia. Somehow we have a historical fear of foreign invasion. This fear is inculcated and whetted among the Californians by a hideous picture of a Japanese Empire, that, like medieval Mongolia, would send a storming army of invasion. One might gather from the reports of the Hearst papers in California that the Pacific Coast of North America was invaded by a Japanese army on an average of once a month. Whether misled by jingo journalism or aroused by the exaggeration of agitators—whatever the cause—it is simply amazing how large a portion of the California people honestly fear the utterly impossible eventuality of a Japanese invasion.

Quite recently another form of menace was suggested, which, because of its more plausible nature, has been widely circulated. It is the fear based upon conjecture that the Japanese will soon control the entire agricultural industry of California and that they will ere long overwhelm the white population in that State. This apprehension was by far the most effective force in deciding in the affirmative the initiative bill voted on by the California electorate on November 2, 1920.

Propaganda.

Propaganda is autocratic power in a democratic state; it is a subtle attempt at controlling social sentiment by influencing the people’s mind through its unconscious entrance. Freud teaches us that each of us is in a sense a complex of boundless wishes. We wish vastly more than our environment offers us; hence, most of our wishes have to be suppressed, thwarted. Now, propaganda appeals to this weakest part of man; it promises us an opportunity to satisfy our arrested wishes. “You are badly off, my friends,” a propagandist would say to honest laborers, “because the Japs are here to bid your wages down. We are trying to get rid of them for you, and for this we want your help.” A similar appeal can be made with immediate good results to almost all classes of people who have some unsatisfied wish—and all men do have such wishes.

Racial Difference.

It is clearly untenable, however, to argue that the Japanese agitation in California is wholly due to imaginary fear and aversion created in the minds of people by politicians and propagandists. The Japanese themselves are responsible for conditions which often justify some of the accusations, and which prompt exaggeration and misrepresentation. In the first place, the Japanese are a wholly different race, with different customs, manners, sentiment, language, traditions, and—not of least importance—of different physical appearance. Were these differences merely in kind, they would not be very repugnant, but when such differences involve qualitative difference they are particularly repulsive. It is, of course, impossible to pass judgment upon the relative superiority in all respects of things Occidental and Oriental; but western civilization naturally seems incomparably superior to American eyes. Mere difference of race alone gives no unpleasant feeling. When it is also a difference of quality, at least in appearance—and in this all must agree—it arouses our æsthetic repulsion.

Even if a man be of different race and as ugly as a Veddah from Ceylon, if he remains a solitary example, or one of a very limited number of his kind, he would not only not arouse our antipathy but would even stimulate our curiosity, and many of us would spend money to see his quaint customs and manners. But when his followers increase in number and establish themselves in our midst, and carry on the struggle for existence until they are in the way of fairly matching ourselves, we begin to be alarmed and unconsciously learn to hate them. This is an exaggerated illustration, but it is precisely the process which has been taking place in California relative to the Japanese. The fact that the Japanese are looked upon rather favorably in the East is because there they are comparatively few in number and are not competitors of the Americans in the struggle for existence.

Japanese Nationality.

To a certain extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in California as well as elsewhere is accentuated by the national principles of the Japanese Empire. It has a system of government which for various good reasons is unique. It embraces many points that are considered, from the standpoint of the Anglo-Saxon, undemocratic. The smooth operation of democracy has been hindered by some inherent defect in the national system, by lack of experience in representative government, and by the influence exerted through an unconstitutional power represented by the elder statesmen. To make the situation worse, by means of unscrupulous journalism, the American mind is duly impressed with the assumed bellicose and Prussian character of the Japanese Empire, the hatred of which becomes anti-Japanese sentiment in general.

The Japanese Government, again, adheres to a policy of extreme paternalism with regard to her colonists abroad. It seems true that in case of an aggressive and military government it is from necessity the devotee of a pure race and a solidified population, as Mr. Walter Lippman stated.[10] At any rate, Japan does not wish her subjects to be naturalized nor does she encourage them to lose their racial or national consciousness. This is clearly seen in her policy of dual nationality (which we shall have occasion to discuss later), which aims to retain the descendants of the Japanese who are born in America, and hence are citizens thereof, as subjects also of the Mikado. It is likewise observable in the spirit of Japanese education, which is fundamentally nationalistic, as it was referred to in the second chapter. Such a policy of nationalism inevitably incites the suspicion of countries to which Japanese immigrants go, and discourages the people from making an attempt at assimilating the Japanese. This, together with their nationalistic training and education, renders the assimilation of the Japanese exceedingly difficult.

Modern Nationalism.

What accentuates the difficulty in the situation is that the countries which receive such Japanese immigrants also uphold a policy of nationalism, which runs full tilt against the “influx” of immigrants who do not readily become amalgamated or assimilated. The inflow of such a population, they claim, threatens and endangers the unity of the nation, and therefore it must be stopped or resisted. This is the capital reason which is being ascribed for the discriminatory effort against the Japanese in California by the leaders of the movement.

Congestion in California.

The Japanese, moreover, manifest a strong tendency to congregate in a locality where they realize a social condition which is a poor hybrid of Japanese and American ways. The tendency to group together is not a phenomenon peculiar to Japanese immigrants alone. Such a tendency is manifested by almost all immigrants in America in different degrees. In the case of the Japanese, however, several additional factors operate to necessitate their huddling together—they are ethnologically different; English is an entirely different language from theirs; their customs are wholly different from those of Americans; their segregation offers advantages and facilities to some Americans who deal with them. The external hostile pressure naturally compresses them into small groups. Whatever the cause, it is true that this habit of collective living among themselves retards the process of assimilation, and, moreover, makes the Japanese problem loom large in the eyes of the white population living in adjoining places.

Fear and Envy Incited by Japanese Progress.

In addition to this, a point to be noted is the increase in number of Japanese and their rapid economic development within the State of California. The question of immigration becomes inextricably mixed up in the minds of the populace with the problem of the treatment of those who are already admitted. They act and react as causes and effects of the agitation. The apprehension of a Japanese “influx” expresses itself in a hostile attitude toward the Japanese already domiciled there. Conversely, the conflict arising from the presence of Japanese in California naturally prompts opposition against Japanese immigration. Now, it so happened that recently, and especially since the war, the number of Japanese coming to the United States through the California port has decidedly increased. This is due to the increased arrival of travelers, business men, officials, and students, as a consequence of the closer relationship between America and Japan, as we shall see in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it incites the fear of the Californians and induces them to adopt more stringent measures against the Japanese living in that State.

On the other hand, the economic status of the Japanese in California has been steadily developing. They are entering in some directions into serious competition with the white race. Thus, in agriculture, their steady expansion through industry and thrift has caused alarm among small white farmers. Added to this is the high birth rate among the Japanese, which, because of their racial and cultural distinction, forms a problem touching the fundamental questions of the American commonwealth.

Summary.

By the foregoing analysis of the situation, we see that although the problem of the Japanese in California has been made the subject of political and private exploitation, and thereby rendered unnecessarily complicated and acute, it is, nevertheless, a grave problem which contains germs that are bound to develop many evils unless it is properly solved.

In the following chapters we shall study the status of the Japanese in California in respect to population and birth rate, their agricultural condition, their living and culture, and their economic attainments, with a view to elucidating just wherein lie the precise causes of the difficulties.

CHAPTER VII

FACTS ABOUT THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA—POPULATION AND BIRTH RATE

A knowledge of the facts regarding the Japanese population in California is important, because it has been a point of sharp dispute between those who insist on exclusion and those who oppose it, the former arguing that the Japanese are increasing at an amazing rate through immigration, smuggling, and birth, threatening to overwhelm the white population in the State, the latter contending that they are not multiplying in a way menacing to the State of California. The fact that such a dispute prevails in the matter of the number of Japanese suggests that it is, at least, one of the crucial points on which the whole problem rests. This is true in the sense that, if the Japanese in California were decreasing in number as the American Indians are, it would be totally useless to waste energy in an attempt to quicken the final extinction. If, on the other hand, they were to multiply in a progressively higher rate so as to overwhelm the white population, it would certainly be serious both for California and for the United States.

Number of Japanese in California.

This being the case, it is but natural that the enemies of the Japanese should exaggerate the number of Japanese living in California. The leaders of the movement for excluding Japanese estimate their number as no less than one hundred thousand. The report of the State Board of Control of California, prepared for the specific purpose of emphasizing the gravity of the Japanese problem in California, enumerated the population of Japanese in that State at the end of December, 1919, as 87,279. This number turned out to be 13,355 higher than the number reported by the Foreign Office of Japan,[11] which was based on the Consular registrations (including American-born offspring of the Japanese) and the count made by the Japanese Association of America. Most fortunately, the preliminary publication of a part of the United States Census for 1920 removed the uncertainty arising from the discrepancy by stating the exact number of the Japanese in California to be 70,196. The possible cause of the over-estimation by the Board of Control is to be found in its method of computation. Instead of counting the actual number of residents, it simply added the number of net gain from immigration and the excess in birth over death statistics to the returns of the census of 1910, overlooking the fact that in the meantime a great number of Japanese were leaving California for Japan as well as other States of the Union.

The present number of Japanese is a minor matter compared with its dynamic tendency. The rate of increase of the Japanese population in California in the past may be easily obtained by comparing the returns of the United States Census.

The following table indicates the number and rate of decennial increase:

Number of Japanese in California According to the United States Census.

We see from the above table that after half a century of Japanese immigration to the United States, California’s net gain amounts to a little over 70,000, the number having increased at an average rate of 14,025 per decade, or 1603 per annum. We also observe that the percentage of decennial increase gradually decreased from 1234 per cent. to 69.7 per cent.

It is useful to compare this development of the Japanese population with that of California in general, because it gives an idea of the relative importance of the Japanese increase. This is shown in the following table, in which the decennial rates of increase between them are compared:

Comparison of Population Increase of California and of Japanese in California.

Thus we see that while the percentage of decennial increase of Japanese has been fast decreasing since the census of 1890, descending from 1234 per cent. to 785 per cent. in the next census, and to 307.3 per cent. in 1910, and 69.7 per cent. in 1920, that of California is headed, on the whole, towards an increase. We also notice that the percentage of the Japanese population to the total population of California also shows a tendency to slow growth, increasing only three tenths of one per cent. during the last decade. As a general conclusion, therefore, we may say that the rate of increase of Japanese in California is slowly declining while that of the total population of California is steadily increasing.

In the next place, how does the status of the Japanese population in California compare with that in the continental United States? In the following table, we compare the rate of increase in California and the United States, and enumerate the percentage of the number of Japanese in California to the total number of Japanese in the United States:

Japanese Population in the United States and California.

The table indicates that the percentage of Japanese in California to the total number of Japanese in the United States is rather high, justifying the complaint of the Governor of California that during ten years, between 1910 and 1920, “the Japanese population in California increased 25,592, but in all of the other States of the United States it decreased 10,873. Perhaps, in this last-named fact may be found the reason that makes Oriental immigration a live subject of continued consideration in California.”[12]

The truth of this statement, which in other words means that the cause of anti-Japanese agitation in California is due to congestion in that one State, becomes almost indisputable. It is doubly apparent when we consider the reason why the Chinese no longer constitute the objects of exclusion in California while the Japanese do. The Chinese have shown, ever since the launching of the agitation against them in the early ’80’s, a wise tendency to disperse into other States, thus avoiding conflict with the Californians. The Japanese, on the other hand, appear to cling tenaciously to California, and the more they are maltreated and slandered the more steadfastly they remain in that State. This is apparently due largely to the recognition of the desirability of California, even with its handicaps, over other States, but it is also due to their helplessness to extricate themselves from the situation in fear of a great financial loss involved in the change.

The Report of the State Board of Control of California uses the fact of the decreasing number of Chinese and the increasing number of Japanese in California as evidence of the success of the Chinese Exclusion Act in accomplishing its purpose, and of the failure of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” in restricting Japanese immigration.[13] But, in so doing, it fails to take into consideration the very fact which it points out elsewhere, which we have just quoted; namely, that the number of Japanese has decreased in all of the other States combined while it has increased in California. It also fails to take into account the fact that the number of Chinese, contrary to the Japanese tendency, has shown a marked tendency to grow in eastern and middle western States and to decrease in California. Thus, for example, the number of Chinese in New England, the Middle Atlantic, and Eastern and North Central States increased from 401, 1227, and 390 respectively in 1880 to 3499, 8189, and 3415, respectively, in 1910, while it decreased in the Pacific division from 87,828 to 46,320 in the corresponding period.[14]

The foregoing examination establishes the fact that much of the anti-Japanese agitation in California is due to the congestion of Japanese in that one State, as pointed out by the authorities of California, and as confirmed by the extinction of anti-Chinese sentiment in California, consequent upon the exodus of large numbers of Chinese from that State.

We have seen that the Japanese population in California increased from 86 in 1880 to 70,196 in 1920 at the annual rate of 1403. We shall now see how each of the three factors—lawful entrance of Japanese into the United States, smuggling, and birth—has contributed to this increase.

Immigration.

Without question, the coming of the Japanese who are legally permitted to enter the United States has been the largest factor contributing to their increase in California. Of the total Japanese entering the continental United States since its beginning up to the end of 1920, estimated at 180,000,[15] California claims to have received about two thirds,[16] or approximately 125,000. Since California’s present Japanese population is 70,196, of which about 25,000[17] are American-born children, it means that out of the total number of Japanese immigrants (125,000) who entered California, only 45,196 survive now in that State, the rest having either migrated to other States, or died out, or returned home.

One reason why the Japanese immigration is viewed with so much apprehension is because the facts of the situation are not rightly understood. The number of Japanese coming to the United States has decidedly increased in recent years, especially since the war, the annual number reaching the ten thousand mark. This would certainly be alarming were it not for the correspondingly large number of Japanese who returned every year. The following table shows the percentage of those who returned out of the total arrivals:

The growing number of Japanese coming into America and the increasing high rate of their return, as shown in the above table, clearly indicate the fact that the character of the Japanese now entering the United States has decidedly changed. The explanation of the high rate of Japanese entrance is to be sought in the growing business, diplomatic, intellectual, and other relations between America and Japan which the recent war brought about. In the field of business, the number of branch offices of Japanese firms employing Japanese clerks and managers rapidly increased in the large cities of the United States. Students who formerly went to Europe for study now flock to America and enter the large universities of this country. Many of the newly rich whom the unique opportunity of the World War has created, have taken it into their heads to see the post-war changes in America and Europe. But these Japanese visitors are not immigrants; they are not coolies; they do not come to America to work and settle. They will give America no trouble, for they stay in this country only a brief period of time. They are America’s guests, as it were, and they should not be treated as immigrants. The rough handling of these visitors, as sometimes happens in the Western States, gives them a bad impression of the American people at large.

That most of the Japanese now coming to this country are temporary visitors is shown by the following table which distinguishes non-laborers from laborers:

“Gentlemen’s Agreement.”

It is useful to remember the above fact when discussing the workings of the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement.” It is often alleged that Japan has not been observing the agreement in good faith. Thus Governor Stephens states:

There can be no doubt that it was the intent of our Government by this agreement (the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”) to prevent the further immigration of Japanese laborers. Unfortunately, however, the hoped-for results have not been attained. Without imputing to the Japanese Government any direct knowledge on the subject, the statistics clearly show a decided increase in Japanese population since the execution of the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement.” Skillful evasions have been resorted to in various manners.

Such an accusation appears plausible when it is examined solely in the light of the high number of annual Japanese arrivals. The accusation, however, falls to the ground when we consider two other facts already pointed out; namely, the correspondingly high and ascending rate of departures, and the increasingly high percentage of non-immigrants against immigrants.

It is provided in the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that “the Japanese Government shall issue passports to the continental United States only to such of its subjects as are non-laborers, or are laborers who in coming to the continent seek to resume a formerly-acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or children residing here, or to assume active control of an already possessed interest in a farming enterprise in this country.” Accordingly, the classes of laborers entitled to receive passports have come to be designated “former residents,” “parents, wives, or children of residents,” and “settled agriculturists.” Of these, the last item, the “settled agriculturists,” has practically no significance, because under that class only four entered America since the conclusion of the agreement. According to the agreement, then, only two classes of immigrants, former residents and the families of residents, are admitted.

This agreement leaves the question of the admittance of non-laborers entirely untouched, permitting the Japanese Government to decide as to who may be classed laborers and who non-laborers. The lack of concrete understanding between Japan and the United States in this respect is a grave defect in the agreement. True, the executive orders issued in connection with the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” provide a definition of term “laborer,” and state:

For practical administrative purposes, the term “laborer, skilled and unskilled,” within the meaning of the executive order of February 24, 1913, shall be taken to refer primarily to persons whose work is essentially physical, or, at least, manual, as farm laborers, street laborers, factory hands, contractors’ men, stablemen, freight handlers, stevedores, miners, and the like, and to persons whose work is less physical, but still manual, and who may be highly skilled as carpenters, stone masons, tile setters, painters, blacksmiths, mechanics, tailors, printers, and the like; but shall not be taken to refer to persons whose work is neither distinctively manual nor mechanical but rather professional, artistic, mercantile, or clerical—as pharmacists, draftsmen, photographers, designers, salesmen, bookkeepers, stenographers, copyists, and the like.[19]

The weakness of the provision, however, is in the difficulty it gives rise to in practical application and in the liability of wrong construction to be placed by the American public in the administration of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement.” The difficulty lies not at all in the lack of mutual understanding between the American and the Japanese Governments in respect to this question. The modus operandi arrived at between these two Governments has worked satisfactorily. But because of the lack of a specified definition of “non-immigrants” and “immigrants,” the distinction to be made between them, and, consequently, the granting of passports, as already stated, is left in a large measure to the discretion of the authorities of the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government.

The foregoing defect and the confusion on the part of the American people suggest that the adoption of a specific definition of “immigrants” and “non-immigrants”—in other words, laborers and non-laborers—on the basis of whether a person is coming to America for work and settlement or for a temporary visit, seems quite essential.

The Japanese method of distinguishing non-immigrants from immigrants, however, has not been altogether irrational or arbitrary. The established custom is that the Government issues two kinds of passports, one with a lavender color design on the front page with the word “non-immigrant” stamped on it, and the other with a green color design with the word “immigrant” printed on the front page. The former is given to those who desire to go to America for business, educational, or traveling purposes, expecting to return home after a brief stay, and who have strong financial assurance. The latter passports, namely, the immigrant’s, are given to those who are entitled to enter America, according to the already specified provisions of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” viz. “former residents,” “parents, wives, or children of residents,” and “settled agriculturists.” The passports, however, are not granted even to these classes unless they file a petition to the Government with a certificate from a Japanese Consulate in America certifying the breadwinner in America to be an honest man, with a clean record, who is capable of comfortably supporting a family. In this way, although without a definite standard of regulation, the Japanese Government faithfully adheres to the provisions of the agreement, even to the point of being charged with an extreme rigidity. The following table given in the Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration shows in detail how the agreement has been operating:

Japanese Laborers Admitted to Continental United States 1910 to 1919.

According to Annual Report of Commissioner-General of Immigration.

The table indicates that out of the total immigration of 18,217 from 1909 to 1920, 11,813 of this number were people who temporarily visited Japan; 4990 belonged to the families of residents; 4 were “settled agriculturists,” and 585 were persons not entitled, for reasons unexplained, to passports. It also shows that 825 were persons without proper passports. The latter category included immigrants bound for Canada, Mexico, and South America who were sidetracked on the way, those who lost their passports, as well as deserting seamen and smugglers. For these cases of illicit endeavors to enter America, the Japanese Government can hardly be held responsible. It would be absurd to put forth the negligible number of 585 cases, that are recorded during the period of ten years as persons who are not entitled to passports, as an evasion of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” on the part of the Tokyo Government. It is one thing to point out the defects of the agreement, but it is an entirely different matter to charge bad faith in its execution.

By way of summary, then, it may be stated that ever since the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was put into effect in 1907, the number of immigrants has gradually decreased, those admitted having been mostly former residents, although the total number of Japanese coming to the United States has increased, due to the growing number of tourists and business men. The agreement, as far as its execution is concerned, has been carried out with the utmost scruple, but it is defective in that it does not clearly distinguish immigrants from non-immigrants, and this leads to confounding visitors with immigrants, and hence to the unfounded claim that it is being ignored, evaded. Judging from the sentiment prevailing in California, and in other Western States, against the Japanese, it is desirable that the agreement be so amended as to forbid the advent of all Japanese, except well-defined non-immigrants and former residents temporarily visiting Japan. This will prevent the further increase through immigration of Japanese settlers in California or elsewhere in the United States. This step is deemed advisable, not that a handful of immigrants as such is serious, but that the main question at issue—the treatment of Japanese already in America—becomes thereby liberated from further complication. It will go far to reduce the fear of Californians, and thereby alleviate the difficulty of the main issue.

Smuggling.

There is no room for doubt that smuggling is responsible for a part of the Japanese population in California. From the nature of the case, it is, however, impossible to estimate the number of Japanese who have entered the United States through this illegal method. During the visit to California last summer, of the House sub-Committee on Immigration and Naturalization for the investigation of Japanese conditions, a rumor was circulated and published in the principal papers of the country to the effect that the Committee had discovered amazing facts as to the systematic smuggling of Japanese into this country through Guaymas. Later, it was made clear that the rumor owed its source to the machinations of certain anti-Japanese agitators who willfully concocted the canard. While it is possible that from the Mexican and Canadian borders a few scores of Japanese may be smuggled in every year, it is absurd to imagine that any wholesale smuggling is being practiced through the connivance of Japanese officials and under the noses of competent officers who patrol the borders and coasts.

It may also be remembered that Japan and Canada have an agreement restricting the number of Japanese entering Canada. This renders the northern borders of the United States comparatively free from the danger of smuggling. Except through desertion of seamen, which numbered 315 cases during the past ten years, it is almost impossible to enter secretly by way of the Pacific Coast. The only danger zone is the Mexican border. But here again there are good reasons for believing that smuggling from Mexico cannot be practiced on a large scale. In the first place, the number of Japanese in Mexico amounts only to 1169,[20] and no passports have been granted by the Japanese Government since 1908 to laborers who wish to go to Mexico.[21] In the second place, the American Government would take care to see that its border-patrol is efficient enough to arrest smugglers. The Mikado’s Government, too, has been sincere in cooperating with the American authorities to prevent the evasion of the law.

Birth Rate.

The cardinal question relating to the Japanese population in California is the question of birth rate. Immigration can be restricted, smuggling may be completely prevented, but the fact of the high birth rate is something which cannot be very easily combated without infringing upon traditionally sacred principles and personal freedom. It is quite true that the high birth rate among the Japanese in California would not have been a serious matter if the nationalism of America were as broad as that of Ancient Rome, or if the Japanese were a race which will readily and speedily lose its identity in the great American melting pot. But the fact remains that the United States of America is not merely a mixture of different races and colors; she is a solid, unified, composite country, although she draws race material from all over the world. Nor are the Japanese a race likely to amalgamate completely with Americans in a few generations. Thus the question of Japanese birth rate in America becomes a vital matter, touching the fundamental questions of national and racial unity in the United States.

With the importance of the question clearly kept in mind, we shall see what are the facts as to births among the Japanese in California. The following table, prepared from the reports of the California State Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, shows the number of annual births of Japanese from 1906 to 1919, and its percentage of the total number of births in California:

Number of Births.

The table indicates in the first place that the birth rate of California as a whole is steadily growing, and in the second place that the birth rate of the Japanese was very low until 1906 or 1907, but since then it has been rapidly growing. The relative percentage of Japanese births in the total births of California, however, indicates the tendency to diminish, having reached the highest mark in 1917, when it was 7.87 per cent., but decreasing slightly in the last few years.

The exceedingly high birth rate of the Japanese in California becomes clearer when considered in terms of the rate of birth per thousand of population. In the year 1919, the number of births in California was 1.79 per thousand population. In Japan, where the birth rate is high, it was 2.53 during the past decade. The birth rate of Japanese in California is more than three times as high as that for the total of California, and more than double that in Japan.

There are several reasons for this abnormally high birth rate among the Japanese in California. In the first place, a large portion of these Japanese are in the prime of life, and moreover they are selected groups of vigorous and healthy individuals. Commenting on the age distribution of Japanese in this country, the report of the Bureau of Census states[22]:

The most noteworthy fact about the age distribution of the Japanese is their remarkable concentration on the age groups 25 to 44, nearly two-thirds of the Japanese being in this period of life. Only 4.5 per cent. of the Japanese are over 45 years of age, as compared with 44.7 per cent. of the Chinese. The explanation is, doubtless, to be found in the fact that the Japanese represent more recent immigration than the Chinese.

The truth of this statement was borne out by the recent investigation conducted by the Japanese Association of San Francisco, which obtained the following result in thirty-six northern counties of California:

Age Distribution of Japanese in Middle and Northern California, 1920.

Thus, out of the total number of 43,622 investigated, 25,572 or nearly 59 per cent. are between the ages of seventeen to forty, only 5 per cent. of females being those who passed the age of fertility.

Another reason for the high birth rate of the Japanese in California is the high percentage of married people. The rate of married people among the Japanese in California suddenly rose since some ten years ago when a great number (between 400 and 900 per annum) of wives began to come in under the popular name, picture brides. The ratio maintained between male and female among the Japanese in California was one to six ten years ago, but at present, it is one to two.[23] Since it is estimated that there are 16,195 Japanese wives in California,[24] it is obvious that there are double that number, or 32,390 married Japanese, in California, which means that 46 per cent. of the total population are married. This is apparently a high rate, since it is 17 per cent. in Japan, 36 per cent. in Great Britain, 37 per cent. in Italy. Although exact data is lacking, judging from the fact that only less than a half of California’s white population are of ages above twenty-one,[25] it may not be too far-fetched to estimate the percentage of married people at 25 per cent. of the total population.

From the foregoing considerations we can deduce this, that the Japanese are mostly at the prime of life, and that the percentage of married people is exceedingly high. Now, in comparing the birth rates of two groups such as those of the Japanese and of the Californians in general, a mere comparison of rates without taking into consideration the difference in age distribution and marital conditions is not only useless, but it is absolutely misleading. California has only 20 per cent. of people between the ages of eighteen to forty-four,[26] while the Japanese group has 59 per cent.; California has about 25 per cent. or less of married population, including those who have passed the fertile period; while the Japanese community has 46 per cent. of married population, all of whom are in the zenith of productivity. No wonder, then, that the Japanese in California have three times as high a birth rate as that of California as a whole.

There is another factor which accounts for the high birth rate of the Japanese. It is the sudden rise of the standard of living. It is an established principle of immigration that when immigrants settle in a new country and attain a much higher standard of living than they were accustomed to at home they tend to multiply very rapidly through high birth rate. Among the European immigrants in this country, a birth rate of fifty per thousand is not rare.[27] In the careful researches made in Rhode Island concerning the fertility of the immigrant population,[28] it was found that their birth rate was invariably high, 72 per cent. of the married women each having upwards of three children, with an average of 4.5 children for each one of them. This fact holds equally good for the Japanese immigrants, most of whom came from the poor quarters of the agricultural communities, where not only economic handicaps but customs and social fetters operate to check their multiplication. When, therefore, they come to California, where food is abundant, work easy, climate salubrious, and personal freedom is incomparably greater, they naturally tend to multiply.

What we May Expect in the Future.

We have seen, then, that the high birth rate among the Japanese settlers in California is due primarily to the facts that the largest portion of them are in the prime of life; that the percentage of married people is remarkably high, the larger part of them, especially the women, being at the zenith of productivity, and that their standard of living suddenly improves when they settle in California. The question naturally arises as to what will be the future development of Japanese nativity. Remembering that a prediction, however scientific, cannot at best be more than a possibility, we shall venture to forecast the future of the Japanese birth rate in California.

In doing so, the proper way would be to examine any possible future change in the causes which constitute the present high birth rate. How, then, about the age distribution of the Japanese? It has been shown that 59 per cent. of them are between the ages of seventeen and forty, and that 15 per cent. of them are above forty. In other words, 74 per cent. of the Japanese are mature, while only 26 per cent. are minors. Now, we are all mortals, and grow old as time passes; even the Japanese do not have magical power to retain perennial juvenility, as some agitators seem to think. They grow old, the Japanese in California, as years come and go, passing gradually into the age when childbearing is no longer possible. Therefore, if fresh immigration is checked, which we have already indicated is desirable, it is manifest that a large portion of the present Japanese in California will die out without being reinforced by youths save those who are born in America, and hence are citizens thereof. That this tendency has already set in may be seen from the increase of the death rate among the Japanese in California, as the following table indicates:

Death Rate of Japanese in California.

The rate of death per one thousand population increased twice during the past ten years.

When the age distribution becomes normal by the passing away of the middle-aged group which constitutes the majority at present, rendering the population evenly distributed among the children, middle-aged, and the old, the present high percentage of married people also will disappear, descending to the normal rate ruling in the ordinary communities, which is but half as high as that now prevailing among the Japanese living in California. When the number of young people relatively lessens, and that of married people also decreases, what other result can we expect but the marked fall in numbers born?

Improved standards of living as a cause of the high birth rate will also cease to operate as new immigrants will no longer enter; and the American-born generations will gradually take their parents’ place. The younger generations of Japanese are as a rule higher in culture and ideals than their parents. Accordingly, it is unthinkable, other things being equal, that they should go on multiplying themselves as their parents did. It is an established principle proved conclusively by the thoroughgoing Congressional researches in Rhode Island,[29] that the birth rate among foreign-born immigrants is exceedingly high, and that it steadily decreases in successive generations, reaching the normal American rate within a few generations. We are, then, on a safe ground in inferring that a similar tendency will also manifest itself among the Japanese in the United States.

Our discussions concerning future birth rate then, seem to point decidedly to the conclusion that since the present high percentage of the middle-age group and the married group is bound to diminish as time passes, and since the fertility of the future generations is not likely to be as high as that of their parents, it will decrease markedly by the time the present generation passes away. It is, therefore, only a question of time. The present is a transitional period, a turning-point, in the history of the Japanese in America. It is surely unwise, then, to become unduly excited over the passing phenomenon, and thereby defeat the working of a natural process which promises to bring about a satisfactory solution in the not distant future.

CHAPTER VIII

FACTS ABOUT THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA—FARMERS AND ALIEN LAND LAWS

Agriculture is by far the most important occupation of the Japanese in California. Out of the total Japanese population of 70,196 in California, 38,000 belong to the farming classes including those who are sustained by breadwinners. Besides, there are thousands of laborers who seek farm work during the summer. Perhaps owing to the facts that most of the Japanese immigrants are drawn from the agricultural communities in Japan, that the climate and soil of California are especially suited to the kinds of farming in which the Japanese are skilled—such as garden-trucking and berry-farming—the Japanese in California have been markedly successful in agricultural pursuits.

History of Japanese Agriculture in California.

The history of Japanese farming in California dates back to the time when the Chinese Exclusion Law was enacted in 1882. A number of Japanese laborers were employed in the Vaca Valley and another group in the vineyards of Fresno as early as 1887-1888. Since that time the number of Japanese farm laborers has steadily increased. They have distributed themselves widely in the lower Sacramento, San Joaquin River, Marysville, and Suisun districts. Later many Japanese settled in Southern California. During that early period the Japanese farm laborers were warmly welcomed by the California farmers because of the dearth of farm hands and because of their skill and industry in farming.

But the Japanese were not satisfied at remaining mere farm hands. They saved their wages and attempted to start independent farming. In many cases independent farming was not as profitable as wage labor, since the former involved risk and responsibility. Yet because of the incalculable pleasure which independence brings, because of the ease with which leases could be obtained, and because of the social prestige attached to the “independent farmers,” the Japanese developed a distinct tendency to lease or buy land and to take up farming by themselves rather than be employed as wage earners.

This tendency, however, did not manifest itself distinctly until some time later, when they had saved sufficient sums of money to launch such undertakings. Thus the census of 1900 records only 29 farms, covering 4698 acres, which were operated by Japanese. The number steadily increased during the following ten years. According to the census of 1910 they operated 1816 farms, covering 99,254 acres of land. At present it is reported that they own some 600 farms covering 74,769 acres and operate some 6000 farms embracing 383,287 acres under lease or crop contract, bringing the total farm acreage under Japanese control to 458,056 acres.

The brilliant success of the Japanese farmers in California may be better appreciated when the amount and value of the crops turned out by them every year are considered. Governor Stephens, in his letter to Secretary of State Colby, quotes in part the report prepared by the State Board of Control, and states:

... At the present time, between 80 and 90 per cent. of most of our vegetable and berry products are those of the Japanese farms. Approximately, 80 per cent. of the tomato crop of the State is produced by Japanese; from 80 to 100 per cent. of the spinach crop; a greater part of our potato and asparagus crops, and so on.

In another part of the letter he remarks:

... In productive values—that is to say, in the market value of crops produced by them—our figures show that as against $6,235,856 worth of produce marketed in 1909, the increase has been to $67,145,730, approximately ten-fold.

Causes of Progress.

There are many causes for this rapid development. In the first place, the Japanese as a rule are ambitious. They do not rest satisfied, like the Chinese and the Mexicans, with being employed as farm laborers. They save money or form partnerships with well-to-do friends, and start independent farms. This is made easy by a form of tenancy which prevails in California. That is, the landowner advances the required sum of money to a tenant, offers him tools and shelter, and in return receives rent from the sale of the crops. This is a modified form of crop contract, but it is decidedly more secure for the owner, because he assumes less risk. It is more profitable to the tenant because he gets a due reward for his effort. On account of the ease with which this kind of lease is obtained, ambitious Japanese farm laborers soon become tenants, and when successful—and usually they are—they buy a piece of land with the intention of making a permanent settlement.

That Japanese farmers are usually favorably regarded by landowners is an important factor in their success. Although there have been cases in which the Japanese provoked the hatred of landowners by not observing promises or failing to carry out contracts, on the whole, the Japanese are preferred to other races, because they are more peaceful, take better care of the land, and pay higher rent.[30]

The reason why Japanese take better care of the land and can pay higher rent than ordinary farmers may be found in their previous agricultural training in Japan. There the farming is conducted on the basis of intensive cultivation. Moreover, in order to prevent exhaustion of land the farmers are accustomed to taking minute care that the soil’s fertility be retained. This habit of intensive cultivation and the minute care of the soil, which are really inseparable, are maintained by the Japanese farmers when they undertake agriculture in California. Furthermore, it so happens that the climate and soil of California are especially suited for intensive cultivation. Such products as vegetables and berries, which grow so abundantly in California, are precisely the kinds of crops which demand careful and intensive cultivation. The notable success of Japanese farmers in this form of production, therefore, is not an accident. By the introduction of methods of intensive cultivation they have been able to take good care of the land and to pay high rent to the landowners.

That the Japanese are good farmers is attested by the fact that they actually produce more per acre than the other farmers. The Japanese-American Year Book of 1918 has the following comment to make regarding the efficiency of Japanese farmers in California:

In the year 1917 there were 12,000,000 acres of irrigated farm lands in California. From this, California produced crops valued at $500,000,000; that is to say, the value of the product turned out per acre was about $42. Japanese cultivated 390,000 acres and produced $55,000,000 worth of farm products, or $141 per acre. The value of the Japanese farms turned out per acre was, therefore, three and a half times as much as that obtained by California farms in general.

Perhaps the patience and industry with which the Japanese have developed some of the “raw” land of California into productive farm land accounts for their prosperity in such localities as Florin, New Castle, the Sacramento district, and the Imperial Valley.

Japanese Farm Labor.

We may now inquire to what extent the Japanese farmers constitute a menace to the California farmers and to the State of California. In considering this question, it is useful to distinguish between the Japanese farm laborers and the regular farmers.

There are in California at present about fifteen thousand Japanese who are employed in various kinds of agriculture. The number varies according to season. In the summer months it increases considerably, while in the winter it greatly decreases. When the seasonal work is over in a locality, the men seek other jobs in other localities. There is work for them throughout the year, since the climatic conditions of California are such that some crop is raised in some part of the State in almost all months. The agency which adjusts the demand and supply of farm labor is known as a “Japanese Employment Office.” There are over three hundred, at least, of such agencies facilitating the supply of labor.

The chief advantage which the employment of Japanese farm laborers offers to employers is, in the first place, their highly transitory character. Most of the Japanese laborers, being men of middle age with no settled homes, go to any place where wages are high. The convenience which the farmers receive from this rapid supply of necessary labor is immense, since the crops handled by the Japanese are perishables demanding immediate harvesting. The transitory facility of Japanese labor is one thing which California farmers cannot easily dispense with and is a thing which the white laborers with families cannot very well substitute.

Another convenience derived from the employment of Japanese farm labor is the “boss system.” It is a form of contract labor in which a farmer employs workers on his farm as a united body through its representative or boss. This frees the farmer from the care of overseeing the work, of arranging the wages with the workers, and of taking other troubles. Although this system has given rise to many regrettable complications through the occasional failure of the Japanese to observe their contracts, which leads to the general belief that the Japanese are unreliable and dishonest; nevertheless, this “boss system” remains as the one distinct feature of Japanese farm labor which is welcomed by the California farmers.

There is one more characteristic of the Japanese farm laborers which is unique and extremely important. They are by habit and constitution adapted to the garden farming which prevails in California. Fruit and berry picking, trimming and hoeing, transplanting and nursery work, which require manual dexterity, quick action, and stooping over or squatting, are singularly suited to the Japanese. No other race, save possibly the Chinese, can compete with the Japanese in this sort of field labor. With their training in intensive cultivation, with physical adaptation to the important agricultural industries of California, and with the rapid transitory capacity and advantageous system of contract labor, the Japanese farm laborers constitute an important asset to the agriculture of California.

There are, however, serious charges made against this class of Japanese. Perhaps the most pertinent criticism of them is that they do not observe contracts or promises. This question was very ably discussed by Professor Millis in his valuable book, The Japanese Problem in the United States, as follows:

Much has been heard to the effect that the Japanese are not honest in contractual relations.... So far as it relates to the business relations of the farmers, there has been not a little complaint. Much of it, however, appears to have been due to their inability to understand all the details of a contract they could not read. In recent years more care has been taken to understand all of the conditions of the contract entered into, and the charges of breach of contract have become much fewer. Another source of misunderstanding has been that some of the Japanese, who think more in personal terms and less in terms of contract than the Americans, have sought to secure a change in their leases when they proved to be bad bargains, and have occasionally left their holdings in order to avoid loss. A third fact is that formerly some undesirable Japanese secured leases. These, however, have gradually fallen out of the class of tenants, so that most of those who remain are efficient and desirable farmers.[31]