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THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES.

LONDON:

C RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.

THE

ENGLISH WORKS

OF

THOMAS HOBBES

OF MALMESBURY;

NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED

BY

SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

JOHN BOHN,

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

MDCCCXLI.

PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS

CONCERNING

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

BY

THOMAS HOBBES

OF MALMESBURY.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM EARL OF DEVONSHIRE,

MY MOST HONOURED LORD.

May it please your Lordship,

It was the speech of the Roman people, to whom the name of king had been rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquins as by the genius and decretals of that city; it was the speech, I say, of the public, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the censor were no more than such): that all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts. But what a beast of prey was the Roman people; whilst with its conquering eagles it erected its proud trophies so far and wide over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians, and the Achæans, with many other despoiled nations, into a specious bondage, with the pretence of preferring them to be denizens of Rome! So that if Cato’s saying were a wise one, it was every whit as wise, that of Pontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the companies of his army in that famous encounter which he had with Sylla, cried out: that Rome herself as well as Sylla, was to be razed; for that there would always be wolves and depredators of their liberty, unless the forest that lodged them were grubbed up by the roots. To speak impartially, both sayings are very true: that man to man is a kind of God; and that man to man is an arrant wolf. The first is true, if we compare citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare cities. In the one, there is some analogy of similitude with the Deity; to wit, justice and charity, the twin sisters of peace. But in the other, good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war, deceit and violence: that is, in plain terms, a mere brutal rapacity. Which although men object to one another as a reproach, by an inbred custom which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of other men, wherein, as in a mirror, all things on the left side appear to be on the right, and all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left; yet the natural right of preservation, which we all receive from the uncontrolable dictates of necessity, will not admit it to be a vice, though it confess it to be an unhappiness. Now that with Cato himself, a person of so great a renown for wisdom, animosity should so prevail instead of judgment, and partiality instead of reason, that the very same thing which he thought just in his popular state, he should censure as unjust in a monarchical; other men perhaps may have leisure to admire. But I have been long since of this opinion; that there was never yet any more than vulgar prudence, that had the luck of being acceptable to the giddy people; but either it hath not been understood, or else having been so hath been levelled and cried down. The more eminent actions and apothegms, both of the Greeks and Romans, have been indebted for their eulogies not so much to the reason, as to the greatness of them; and very many times to that prosperous usurpation, (with which our histories do so mutually upbraid each other), which as a conquering torrent carries all before it, as well public agents as public actions, in the stream of time. Wisdom, properly so called, is nothing else but this: the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever. Which being derived from the registers and records of things; and that as it were through the conduit of certain definite appellations; cannot possibly be the work of a sudden acuteness, but of a well-balanced reason; which by the compendium of a word, we call philosophy. For by this it is that a way is opened to us, in which we travel from the contemplation of particular things to the inference or result of universal actions. Now look, how many sorts of things there are, which properly fall within the cognizance of human reason; into so many branches does the tree of philosophy divide itself. And from the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant, there hath been given to those branches a diversity of names too. For treating of figures, it is called geometry; of motion, physic; of natural right, morals; put altogether, and they make up philosophy. Just as the British, the Atlantic, and the Indian seas, being diversely christened from the diversity of their shores, do notwithstanding all together make up the ocean. And truly the geometricians have very admirably performed their part. For whatsoever assistance doth accrue to the life of man, whether from the observation of the heavens or from the description of the earth, from the notation of times, or from the remotest experiments of navigation; finally, whatsoever things they are in which this present age doth differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to geometry. If the moral philosophers had as happily discharged their duty, I know not what could have been added by human industry to the completion of that happiness, which is consistent with human life. For were the nature of human actions as distinctly known as the nature of quantity in geometrical figures, the strength of avarice and ambition, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar as touching the nature of right and wrong, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants, there would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on the contrary, that neither the sword nor the pen should be allowed any cessation; that the knowledge of the law of nature should lose its growth, not advancing a whit beyond its ancient stature; that there should still be such siding with the several factions of philosophers, that the very same action should be decried by some, and as much elevated by others; that the very same man should at several times embrace his several opinions, and esteem his own actions far otherwise in himself than he does in others: these, I say, are so many signs, so many manifest arguments, that what hath hitherto been written by moral philosophers, hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the truth; but yet hath took with the world, not so much by giving any light to the understanding as entertainment to the affections, whilst by the successful rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the public ways, which lie open to all passengers to traverse up and down: or the same lot with highways and open streets, some for divertisement, and some for business; so that what with the impertinences of some and the altercations of others, those ways have never a seed time, and therefore yield never a harvest. The only reason of which unluckiness should seem to be this; that amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy there is not one that hath used an idoneous principle of tractation. For we may not, as in a circle, begin the handling of a science from what point we please. There is a certain clue of reason, whose beginning is in the dark; but by the benefit of whose conduct, we are led as it were by the hand into the clearest light. So that the principle of tractation is to be taken from that darkness; and then the light to be carried thither for irradiating the doubts. As often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake that clue, or wilfully cut it asunder; he describes the footsteps, not of his progress in science, but of his wanderings from it. And from this it was, that when I applied my thoughts to the investigation of natural justice, I was presently advertised from the very word justice, (which signifies a steady will of giving every one his own), that my first enquiry was to be, from whence it proceeded that any man should call anything rather his own, than another man’s. And when I found that this proceeded not from nature, but consent; (for what nature at first laid forth in common, men did afterwards distribute into several impropriations); I was conducted from thence to another inquiry; namely, to what end and upon what impulsives, when all was equally every man’s in common, men did rather think it fitting that every man should have his inclosure. And I found the reason was, that from a community of goods there must needs arise contention, whose enjoyment should be greatest. And from that contention all kind of calamities must unavoidably ensue, which by the instinct of nature every man is taught to shun. Having therefore thus arrived at two maxims of human nature; the one arising from the concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest; the other proceeding from the rational, which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution, as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature: which principles being laid down, I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion, in this little work of mine, first, the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts, and thence the rudiments both of moral and of civil prudence. That appendage which is added concerning the regiment of God, hath been done with this intent; that the dictates of God Almighty in the law of nature, might not seem repugnant to the written law, revealed to us in his word. I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse, not to meddle with the civil laws of any particular nation whatsoever: that is to say, I have avoided coming ashore, which those times have so infested both with shelves and tempests. At what expense of time and industry I have been in this scrutiny after truth, I am not ignorant; but to what purpose, I know not. For being partial judges of ourselves, we lay a partial estimate upon our own productions. I therefore offer up this book to your Lordship’s, not favour, but censure first; as having found by many experiments, that it is not the credit of the author, nor the newness of the work, nor yet the ornament of the style, but only the weight of reason, which recommends any opinion to your Lordship’s favour and approbation. If it fortune to please, that is to say, if it be sound, if it be useful, if it be not vulgar; I humbly offer it to your Lordship, as both my glory and my protection. But if in anything I have erred, your Lordship will yet accept it as a testimony of my gratitude; that the means of study, which I enjoyed by your Lordship’s goodness, I have employed to the procurement of your Lordship’s favour. The God of heaven crown your Lordship with length of days, in this earthly station; and in the heavenly Jerusalem with a crown of glory.

Your Honour’s most humble,

and most devoted Servant,

Thomas Hobbes.

THE AUTHOR’S
PREFACE TO THE READER.

Reader, I promise thee here such things, which ordinarily promised do seem to challenge the greatest attention, (whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated, or the right method of handling it, or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it, or lastly the moderation of the author,) and I lay them here before thine eyes. In this book thou shalt find briefly described the duties of men: first, as men; then as subjects; lastly, as Christians. Under which duties are contained, not only the elements of the laws of nature and of nations, together with the true original and power of justice; but also the very essence of Christian religion itself, so far forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it.

Which kind of doctrine, excepting what relates to Christian religion, the most ancient sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity, either curiously adorned with verse, or clouded with allegories, as a most beautiful and hallowed mystery of royal authority; lest by the disputations of private men it might be defiled. Other philosophers in the mean time, to the advantage of mankind, did contemplate the faces and motions of things; others, without disadvantage, their natures and causes. But in after times, Socrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civil science; although hitherto not thoroughly understood, yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the commonweal: and that he set so great a value on this, that utterly abandoning and despising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly embraced this, as judging it only worthy the labour of his mind. After him comes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well Greek as Latin. And now at length all men of all nations, not only philosophers but even the vulgar, have and do still deal with this as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit, and to be attained without any great care or study. And, which makes mainly for its dignity, those who suppose themselves to have it, or are in such employment as they ought to have it, do so wonderfully please themselves in its idea, as they easily brook the followers of other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous, learned, skilful, and what you will, except prudent: for this name, in regard of civil knowledge, they presume to be due to themselves only. Whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthiness of the persons who entertain them, or by the number of those who have written of them, or by the judgment of the wisest; certainly this must carry it, which so nearly relates to princes, and others engaged in the government of mankind; in whose adulterate species also the most part of men do delight themselves, and in which the most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant. The benefit of it, when rightly delivered, that is, when derived from true principles by evident connection, we shall then best discern, when we shall but well have considered the mischiefs that have befallen mankind from its counterfeit and babbling form. For in matters wherein we speculate for the exercise of our wits, if any error escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any loss, but of time only. But in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens that not only from errors, but even from ignorance itself, there arise offences, contentions, nay, even slaughter itself. Look now, how great a prejudice these are; such and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality truly declared. How many kings, and those good men too, hath this one error, that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death, been the slaughter of! How many throats hath this false position cut, that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed! And what bloodshed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for the multitude! Lastly, how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of, which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of kings be just or unjust, belongs to private men; and that before they yield obedience, they not only may, but ought to dispute them! Besides, in the moral philosophy now commonly received, there are many things no less dangerous than those, which it matters not now to recite. I suppose those ancients foresaw this, who rather chose to have the science of justice wrapped up in fables, than openly exposed to disputations. For before such questions began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already exercised the supreme power. They kept their empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good. Likewise subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgments of private men, but by the laws of the realm; nor were they kept in peace by disputations, but by power and authority. Yea, they reverenced the supreme power, whether residing in one man or in a council, as a certain visible divinity. Therefore they little used, as in our days, to join themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits, to the utter ruin of their state. For they could not entertain so strange a fancy, as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved. In truth, the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly. Wherefore it was peace and a golden age, which ended not before that, Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawful to take up arms against kings. This, I say, the ancients not only themselves saw, but in one of their fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us. For they say, that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he fell in love, and began to court Juno herself. Offering to embrace her, he clasped a cloud; from whence the Centaurs proceeded, by nature half men, half horses, a fierce, a fighting, and unquiet generation. Which changing the names only, is as much as if they should have said, that private men being called to councils of state, desired to prostitute justice, the only sister and wife of the supreme, to their own judgments and apprehensions; but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it, they have begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers, partly right and comely, partly brutal and wild; the causes of all contentions and bloodsheds. Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise, if any man now shall dispel those clouds, and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil, besides the constituted laws in each realm and government; and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust, good or ill, is to be demanded of none but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his laws: surely he will not only show us the highway to peace, but will also teach us how to avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition; than which I know not what can be thought more profitable.

Concerning my method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what I have to deliver, except I took my beginning from the very matter of civil government, and thence proceeded to its generation and form, and the first beginning of justice. For everything is best understood by its constitutive causes. For as in a watch, or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot well be known, except it be taken insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take them insunder, but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved; that is, that we rightly understand what the quality of human nature is, in what matters it is, in what not, fit to make up a civil government, and how men must be agreed amongst themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. Having therefore followed this kind of method, in the first place I set down for a principle, by experience known to all men and denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other; and as by natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, toward the preservation of himself. You will object perhaps, that there are some who deny this. Truly so it happens, that very many do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against myself, because I affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing? In truth I do not; but they do, whose actions disavow what their discourses approve of. We see all countries, though they be at peace with their neighbours, yet guarding their frontiers with armed men, their towns with walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To what purpose is all this, if there be no fear of the neighbouring power? We see even in well-governed states, where there are laws and punishments appointed for offenders, yet particular men travel not without their sword by their sides for their defences; neither sleep they without shutting not only their doors against their fellow subjects, but also their trunks and coffers for fear of domestics. Can men give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of other, and all of all? Now, since they do thus, and even countries as well as men, they publicly profess their mutual fear and diffidence. But in disputing they deny it; that is as much as to say, that out of a desire they have to contradict others, they gainsay themselves. Some object that this principle being admitted, it would needs follow, not only that all men were wicked, (which perhaps though it seem hard, yet we must yield to, since it is so clearly declared by holy writ), but also wicked by nature, which cannot be granted without impiety. But this, that men are evil by nature, follows not from this principle. For though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned. Much less does it follow, that those who are wicked, are so by nature. For though from nature, that is, from their first birth, as they are merely sensible creatures, they have this disposition, that immediately as much as in them lies they desire and do whatsoever is best pleasing to them, and that either through fear they fly from, or through hardness repel those dangers which approach them; yet are they not for this reason to be accounted wicked. For the affections of the mind, which arise only from the lower parts of the soul, are not wicked themselves; but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes, as when they are either offensive or against duty. Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish and cry, aye, and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from nature. Yet are they free from guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first, because they cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty. These when they come to riper years, having acquired power whereby they may do hurt, if they shall continue to do the same things, then truly they both begin to be, and are properly accounted wicked. Insomuch as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a child grown strong and sturdy, or a man of a childish disposition; and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience. Unless therefore we will say that men are naturally evil, because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature, we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire, fear, anger, and other passions from nature, and yet not impute the evil effects of those unto nature. The foundation therefore which I have laid, standing firm, I demonstrate, in the first place, that the state of men without civil society, which state we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else but a mere war of all against all; and in that war all men have equal right unto all things. Next, that all men as soon as they arrive to understanding of this hateful condition, do desire, even nature itself compelling them, to be freed from this misery. But that this cannot be done, except by compact, they all quit that right they have to all things. Furthermore, I declare and confirm what the nature of compact is; how and by what means the right of one might be transferred unto another to make their compacts valid; also what rights, and to whom they must necessarily be granted, for the establishing of peace; I mean, what those dictates of reason are, which may properly be termed the laws of nature. And all these are contained in that part of this book which I entitle Liberty.

These grounds thus laid, I show further what civil government, and the supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by what means it becomes so; and what rights particular men, who intend to constitute this civil government, must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power, whether it be one man or an assembly of men, that, except they do so, it will evidently appear to be no civil government, but the rights which all men have to all things, that is, the rights of war will still remain. Next I distinguish the divers kinds of it, to wit, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; and paternal dominion, and that of masters over their servants. I declare how they are constituted, and I compare their several conveniences and inconveniences, each with other. Furthermore, I unfold what those things are which destroy it, and what his or their duty is, who rule in chief. Last of all, I explicate the natures of law and of sin; and I distinguish law from counsel, from compact, from that which I call right. All which I comprehend under the title of Dominion.

In the last part of it, which is entitled Religion, lest that right, which by strong reason, in the preceding discourse, I had confirmed the sovereign powers to have over their subjects, might seem to be repugnant to the sacred Scriptures; I show, in the first place, how it repugns not the divine right, for as much as God overrules all rulers by nature, that is, by the dictates of natural reason. In the second, forasmuch as God himself had a peculiar dominion over the Jews, by virtue of that ancient covenant of circumcision. In the third, because God doth now rule over us Christians, by virtue of our covenant of baptism. And therefore the authority of rulers in chief, or of civil government, is not at all, we see, contrary to religion.

In the last place, I declare what duties are necessarily required from us, to enter into the kingdom of heaven. And of those I plainly demonstrate, and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ according to the interpretation made by all, that the obedience, which I have affirmed to be due from particular Christian subjects unto their Christian princes, cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto Christian religion.

You have seen my method: receive now the reason which moved me to write this. I was studying philosophy for my mind sake, and I had gathered together its first elements in all kinds; and having digested them into three sections by degrees, I thought to have written them, so as in the first I would have treated of body and its general properties; in the second of man and his special faculties and affections; in the third, of civil government and the duties of subjects. Wherefore the first section would have contained the first philosophy, and certain elements of physic; in it we would have considered the reasons of time, place, cause, power, relation, proportion, quantity, figure, and motion. In the second, we would have been conversant about imagination, memory, intellect, ratiocination, appetite, will, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like. What this last section handles, I have now already showed you. Whilst I contrive, order, pensively and slowly compose these matters; (for I only do reason, I dispute not); it so happened in the interim, that my country, some few years before the civil wars did rage, was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion and the obedience due from subjects, the true forerunners of an approaching war; and was the cause which, all those other matters deferred, ripened and plucked from me this third part. Therefore it happens, that what was last in order, is yet come forth first in time. And the rather, because I saw that, grounded on its own principles sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand in need of the former sections. Yet I have not made it out of a desire of praise: although if I had, I might have defended myself with this fair excuse, that very few do things laudably, who are not affected with commendation: but for your sakes, readers, who I persuaded myself, when you should rightly apprehend and thoroughly understand this doctrine I here present you with, would rather choose to brook with patience some inconveniences under government, (because human affairs cannot possibly be without some), than self-opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the public; that, weighing the justice of those things you are about, not by the persuasion and advice of private men, but by the laws of the realm, you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streams of your blood to wade to their own power; that you will esteem it better to enjoy yourselves in the present state, though perhaps not the best, than by waging war endeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age, yourselves in the meanwhile either killed or consumed with age. Furthermore, for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civil magistrate, and will be exempt from all public burthens, and yet will live under his jurisdiction, and look for protection from the violence and injuries of others, that you would not look on them as fellow-subjects, but esteem them for enemies and spies; and that ye rashly admit not for God’s word all which, either openly or privately, they shall pretend to be so. I say more plainly, if any preacher, confessor, or casuist, shall but say that this doctrine is agreeable with God’s word, namely, that the chief ruler, nay, any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chief’s command, or that subjects may resist, conspire, or covenant against the supreme power; that ye by no means believe them, but instantly declare their names. He who approves of these reasons, will also like my intentions in writing this book.

Last of all, I have propounded to myself this rule through this whole discourse. First, not to define aught which concerns the justice of single actions, but leave them to be determined by the laws. Next, not to dispute the laws of any government in special, that is, not to point which are the laws of any country, but to declare what the laws of all countries are. Thirdly, not to seem of opinion, that there is a less proportion of obedience due to an aristocracy or democracy than a monarchy. For though I have endeavoured, by arguments in my tenth chapter, to gain a belief in men, that monarchy is the most commodious government; which one thing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated, but only probably stated; yet every where I expressly say, that in all kind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal power. Fourthly, not in anywise to dispute the positions of divines, except those which strip subjects of their obedience, and shake the foundations of civil government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus written I would not presently expose to the public. Wherefore I got some few copies privately dispersed among some of my friends; that discrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous, hard, or obscure, I might correct, soften and explain them.

These things I found most bitterly excepted against. That I had made the civil powers too large; but this by ecclesiastical persons. That I had utterly taken away liberty of conscience; but this by sectaries. That I had set princes above the civil laws; but this by lawyers. Wherefore I was not much moved by these men’s reprehensions, as who in doing this, did but do their own business; except it were to tie those knots somewhat faster.

But for their sakes who have a little been staggered at the principles themselves, to wit, the nature of men, the authority or right of nature, the nature of compacts and contracts, and the original of civil government; because in finding fault they have not so much followed their passions, as their common-sense, I have therefore in some places added some annotations, whereby I presumed I might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts. Lastly, I have endeavoured to offend none, beside those whose principles these contradict, and whose tender minds are lightly offended by every difference of opinions.

Wherefore, if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpness, and less of certainty than they ought to have, since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the establishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some liberty; it is his only request to ye, Readers, ye will deign to receive them with an equal mind.

THE INDEX.

PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS

OF

A TRUE CITIZEN.

LIBERTY.

CHAPTER I.
OF THE STATE OF MEN WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY.

[1.] The Introduction. [2.] That the beginning of civil society is from mutual fear. [3.] That men by nature are all equal. [4.] Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth. [5.] The discord arising from comparison of wits. [6.] From the appetite many have to the same thing. [7.] The definition of right. [8.] A right to the end, gives a right to the means necessary to that end. [9.] By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation. [10.] By nature all men have equal right to all things. [11.] This right which all men have to all things, is unprofitable. [12.] The state of men without civil society, is a mere state of war: the definitions of peace and war. [13.] War is an adversary to man’s preservation. [14.] It is lawful for any man, by natural right, to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power, to give caution of his future obedience. [15.] Nature dictates the seeking after peace.

Introduction.

The faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason, passion. Taking the beginning of this following doctrine from these, we will declare, in the first place, what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bear towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty they are born apt for society, and to preserve themselves against mutual violence; then proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this business, and what are the conditions of society, or of human peace; that is to say, (changing the words only), what are the fundamental laws of nature.

That the beginning of mutual society is from fear.

2. The greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning commonwealths, either suppose, or require us or beg of us to believe, that man is a creature born fit[^[1]] for society. The Greeks call him πολιτικον[πολιτικον]; and on this foundation they so build up the doctrine of civil society, as if for the preservation of peace, and the government of mankind, there were nothing else necessary than that men should agree to make certain covenants and conditions together, which themselves should then call laws. Which axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly false; and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature. For they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together, and delight in each other’s company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man should love another, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man; or why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake, but that we may receive some honour or profit from it; these we desire primarily, that secondarily. How, by what advice, men do meet, will be best known by observing those things which they do when they are met. For if they meet for traffic, it is plain every man regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence factions sometimes may arise, but good will never; if for pleasure and recreation of mind, every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stir up laughter, whence he may, according to the nature of that which is ridiculous, by comparison of another man’s defects and infirmities, pass the more current in his own opinion. And although this be sometimes innocent and without offence, yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society, as their own vain glory. But for the most part, in these kinds of meeting we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined, judged, condemned. Nay, it is very rare but some present receive a fling as soon as they part; so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always at parting to go out last. And these are indeed the true delights of society, unto which we are carried by nature, that is, by those passions which are incident to all creatures, until either by sad experience or good precepts it so fall out, which in many it never happens, that the appetite of present matters be dulled with the memory of things past: without which the discourse of most quick and nimble men on this subject, is but cold and hungry.

But if it so happen, that being met they pass their time in relating some stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concerns himself; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell you miracles, if they have them; if not, they will feign them. Lastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than others: if they meet to talk of philosophy, look, how many men, so many would be esteemed masters, or else they not only love not their fellows, but even persecute them with hatred. So clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider human affairs, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory, whence the parties met endeavour to carry with them either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same εὐδοκιμεῖν[εὐδοκιμεῖν], some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have been conversant. The same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves of will, good, honour, profitable. For when we voluntarily contract society, in all manner of society we look after the object of the will, that is, that which every one of those who gather together, propounds to himself for good. Now whatsoever seems good, is pleasant, and relates either to the senses, or the mind. But all the mind’s pleasure is either glory, (or to have a good opinion of one’s self), or refers to glory in the end; the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality, which may be all comprehended under the word conveniences. All society therefore is either for gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence. Neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in myself; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others. But though the benefits of this life may be much furthered by mutual help; since yet those may be better attained to by dominion than by the society of others, I hope no body will doubt, but that men would much more greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain dominion, than to gain society. We must therefore resolve, that the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear[^[2]] they had of each other.

That men by nature are all equal.

3. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security. For if we look on men full-grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest: there is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others. They are equals, who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law.

Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth.

4. All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned. For one man, according to that natural equality which is among us, permits as much to others as he assumes to himself; which is an argument of a temperate man, and one that rightly values his power. Another, supposing himself above others, will have a license to do what he lists, and challenges respect and honour, as due to him before others; which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This man’s will to hurt ariseth from vain glory, and the false esteem he hath of his own strength; the other’s from the necessity of defending himself, his liberty, and his goods, against this man’s violence.

The discord arising from comparison of wits.

5. Furthermore, since the combat of wits is the fiercest, the greatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this contention. For in this case it is not only odious to contend against, but also not to consent. For not to approve of what a man saith, is no less than tacitly to accuse him of an error in that thing which he speaketh: as in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from. Which may appear hence, that there are no wars so sharply waged as between sects of the same religion, and factions of the same commonweal, where the contestation is either concerning doctrines or politic prudence. And since all the pleasure and jollity of the mind consists in this, even to get some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutual scorn and contempt, either by laughter, or by words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than which there is no greater vexation of mind, and than from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to do hurt.

From the appetite many have to the same thing.

6. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword.

The definition of right.

7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other withal, to have a care of one’s self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward. It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right. Neither by the word right is anything else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make use of his natural faculties according to right reason. Therefore the first foundation of natural right is this, that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.

A right to the end gives also a right to the means.

8. But because it is in vain for a man to have a right to the end, if the right to the necessary means be denied him, it follows, that since every man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also be allowed a right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself.

By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation.

9. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he is performing, be necessary to the preservation of his life and members or not, he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge. For if it be contrary to right reason that I should judge of mine own peril, say, that another man is judge. Why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are equal by nature, will I judge also of things which do belong to him. Therefore it agrees with right reason, that is, it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce to my preservation or not.

By right of nature, all men have equal right to all things.

10. Nature hath given to every one a right to all; that is, it was lawful for every man, in the bare state of nature,[^[3]] or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be judge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth or not, insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteem so), and by the [7th article] it appears that by the right of nature those things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of nature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying, nature hath given all to all. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right.

The right of all to all is unprofitable.

11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things. For the effects of this right are the same, almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his.

The state of men without society is a state of war.

12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an intention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number, and no great provision; it cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. |The definition of war and peace.|For what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or deeds? The time remaining is termed PEACE.

War is an adversary to man’s preservation.

13. But it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of mankind, or of each single man, a perpetual war is. But it is perpetual in its own nature; because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory. For in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should close up his life with many years and old age. They of America are examples hereof, even in this present age: other nations have been in former ages; which now indeed are become civil and flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and to get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.

That by the right of nature, it is lawful for any man to compel him whom he hath in his power, to give him caution for his future obedience.

14. Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; by constraint, when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve him, either through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him: by consent, when men enter into society to help each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by right compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a child), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural state of men, that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.

Nature dictates the seeking after peace.

15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation, continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war, by reason of that equality of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal. Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be showed in the next chapter.

[1]. Born fit.] Since we now see actually a constituted society among men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of congress and mutual correspondence, it may seem a wonderful kind of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a stumbling block before the reader, as to deny man to be born fit for society. Therefore I must more plainly say, that it is true indeed, that to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well. Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, to the making whereof faith and compacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools, and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what society is, cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society. Many also, perhaps most men, either through defect of mind or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature. Wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it follows not, that he therefore were born fit to enter into it. For it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equal conditions, without which there can be no society, do yet desire it.

[2]. The mutual fear.] It is objected: it is so improbable that men should grow into civil societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each others looks. They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted. I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future evil; neither do I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful. They who go to sleep, shut their doors; they who travel, carry their swords with them, because they fear thieves. Kingdoms guard their coasts and frontiers with forts and castles; cities are compact with walls; and all for fear of neighbouring kingdoms and towns. Even the strongest armies, and most accomplished for fight, yet sometimes parley for peace, as fearing each others power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise; but for the most part, by arms and defensive weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth they know each other’s spirits. But then if they fight, civil society ariseth from the victory; if they agree, from their agreement.

[3]. In the bare state of nature. This is thus to be understood: what any man does in the bare state of nature, is injurious to no man; not that in such a state he cannot offend God, or break the laws of nature; for injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such as in the state of nature there are none. Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived, is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindful reader in the articles immediately foregoing; but because in certain cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises, I will contract this argument, and make it most evident to a single view. Every man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the [seventh article]. The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end, by the [eighth article]. But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such, by the [ninth article]. He therefore hath a right to make use of, and to do all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation; wherefore by the judgment of him that doth it, the thing done is either right or wrong, and therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare state of nature, &c. But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature, as in the third chapter of this book is more at large declared. It hath been objected by some: if a son kill his father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, that a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father’s or his mother’s, or him that nourished him; as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter.

CHAPTER II
OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS.

[1.] That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason. [2.] That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend ourselves. [3.] That the first special law of nature, is not to retain our right to all things. [4.] What it is to quit our right: what to transfer it. [5.] That in the transferring of our right, the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. [6.] No words but those of the present tense, transfer any right. [7.] Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify the will, are valid in the translation of right. [8.] In matters of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any words of the future. [9.] The definition of contract and compact. [10.] In compacts, our right passeth from us through words of the future. [11.] Compacts of mutual faith, in the state of nature are of no effect and vain; but not so in civil government. [12.] That no man can make compacts with beasts, nor yet with God without revelation. [13.] Nor yet make a vow to God. [14.] That compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavour. [15.] By what means we are freed from our compacts. [16.] That promises extorted through fear of death, in the state of nature are valid. [17.] A later compact contradicting the former, is invalid. [18.] A compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. [19.] A compact to accuse one’s self, is invalid. [20.] The definition of swearing. [21.] That swearing is to be conceived in that form which he useth that takes the oath. [22.] An oath superadds nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. [23.] An oath ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from God himself.

That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason.

1. All authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very often make use of this term in their writings. The method therefore wherein we begin from definitions and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary disputes. For the rest, if any man say that somewhat is done against the law of nature, one proves it hence; because it was done against the general agreement of all the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind; which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent, and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But since all do grant, that is done by right, which is not done against reason, we ought to judge those actions only wrong, which are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some certain truth collected by right reasoning from true principles. But that which is done wrong, we say it is done against some law. Therefore true reason is a certain law; which, since it is no less a part of human nature, than any other faculty or affection of the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason,[^[4]] conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies.

That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace where it may be had, and, where not, to defend ourselves.

2. But the first and fundamental law of nature is, that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war. For we showed in the last article of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates of right reason are natural laws, that hath been newly proved above. But this is the first, because the rest are derived from this, and they direct the ways either to peace or self-defence.

The first special law of nature is, that our rights to all things ought not to be retained.

3. But one of the natural laws derived from this fundamental one is this: that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained; but that some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished. For if every one should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade, and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them. For every man by natural necessity endeavours to defend his body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his body. Therefore war would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of peace, that is, against the law of nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his right to all things.

What it is to quit our right: what to convey it.

4. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again, which before by right he might have done. But he conveys it to another, who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance whereof he might before with right have resisted him. But that the conveyance of right consists merely in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was conveyed, he to whom he conveyed it, had even then also a right to all; whence he could not give any new right; but the resisting right he had before he gave it, by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his rights, is utterly abolished. Whosoever therefore acquires some right in the natural state of men, he only procures himself security and freedom from just molestation in the enjoyment of his primitive right. As for example, if any man shall sell or give away a farm, he utterly deprives himself only from all right to this farm; but he does not so others also.

The will of the receiver must necessarily be declared, before the right be conveyed.

5. But in the conveyance of right, the will is requisite not only of him that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the right remains. For if I would have given what was mine to one who refused to accept of it, I have not therefore either simply renounced my right, or conveyed it to any man. For the cause which moved me to part with it to this man, was in him only, not in others too.

Words convey not, except they relate to the time present.

6. But if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit or convey our right, but only words; those words must either relate to the present or time past; for if they be of the future only, they convey nothing. For example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will give to-morrow, declares openly that yet he hath not given it. So that all this day his right remains, and abides to-morrow too, unless in the interim he actually bestows it: for what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; I do give or have given you this to be received to-morrow: by these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his right to receive it to-morrow is conveyed to him by me to-day.

Words of the future suffice to convey, if other testimonies of our will be not wanting.

7. Nevertheless, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present. If therefore, as by reason of those other signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right depends not on words, but, as hath been instanced in the fourth article, on the declaration of the will.

In matters of free gift, words of the future convey no right.

8. If any man convey some part of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a conveyance in this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in free donation, those words only oblige us, which signify the present or the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the foregoing article. It must needs therefore be, that the obligation arise from some other tokens of the will. But, because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that wills it; there can no other token be assigned of the will to give it, except some benefit either already received, or to be acquired. But it is supposed that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift. It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn without agreement be expected. But no sign can be given, that he, who used future words toward him who was in no sort engaged to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so understood as to oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to reason, that those who are easily inclined to do well to others, should be obliged by every promise, testifying their present good affection. And for this cause, a promiser in this kind must be understood to have time to deliberate, and power to change that affection, as well as he to whom he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that deliberates, is so far forth free, nor can be said to have already given. But if he promise often, and yet give seldom, he ought to be condemned of levity, and be called not a donor, but doson.

The definition of contract and covenant.

9. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying their rights, is called a contract. But in every contract, either both parties instantly perform what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other; or the one performs, the other is trusted; or neither perform. Where both parties perform presently, there the contract is ended as soon as it is performed. But where there is credit given, either to one or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called a covenant.

In covenants, we pass away our rights by words signifying the future.

10. But the covenant made by the party trusted with him who hath already performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no less transfer the right of future time, than if it had been made by words signifying the present or time past. For the other’s performance is a most manifest sign that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this sign the party trusted knew himself to be thus understood; which because he hindered not, was an evident token of his will to perform. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit received, which are also covenants, are tokens of the will; that is, as in the foregoing section hath been declared, of the last act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolished, and by consequence are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.

Covenants, in the state of nature, are in vain and of none effect: not so in civil government.

11. But the covenants which are made in contract of mutual trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there arise[^[5]] a just suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For he that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probable or not, he that doubts it must be judge of, as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter in the ninth article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature. But in a civil state, when there is a power which can compel both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first perform; because, that since the other may be compelled, the cause which made him fear the other’s non-performance, ceaseth.

That no man can make compacts with beasts; neither with God, without revelation.

12. But from this reason, that in all free gifts and compacts there is an acceptance of the conveyance of right required: it follows that no man can compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance. And therefore we cannot compact with beasts, neither can we give or take from them any manner of right, by reason of their want of speech and understanding. Neither can any man covenant with God, or be obliged to him by vow; except so far forth as it appears to him by Holy Scriptures, that he hath substituted certain men who have authority to accept of such-like vows and covenants, as being in God’s stead.

Nor yet vow to God.

13. Those therefore do vow in vain, who are in the state of nature, where they are not tied by any civil law, except, by most certain revelation, the will of God to accept their vow or pact, be made known to them. For if what they vow be contrary to the law of nature, they are not tied by their vow; for no man is tied to perform an unlawful act. But if what is vowed, be commanded by some law of nature, it is not their vow, but the law itself which ties them. But if he were free, before his vow, either to do it or not do it, his liberty remains; because that the openly declared will of the obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow; which, in the case propounded, is supposed not to be. Now I call him the obliger, to whom any one is tied; and the obliged, him who is tied.

Compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours.

14. Covenants are made of such things only as fall under our deliberation. For it can be no covenant without the will of the contractor. But the will is the last act of him who deliberates; wherefore they only concern things possible and to come. No man, therefore, by his compact obligeth himself to an impossibility. But yet, though we often covenant to do such things as then seemed possible when we promised them, which yet afterward appear to be impossible, are we not therefore freed from all obligation. The reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future, in certainty receives a present benefit, on condition that he return another for it. For his will, who performs the present benefit, hath simply before it for its object a certain good, equally valuable with the thing promised; but the thing itself not simply, but with condition if it could be done. But if it should so happen, that even this should prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants, therefore, oblige us not to perform just the thing itself covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this only is, the things themselves are not in our power.

In what manner we are freed from compacts.

15. We are freed from covenants two ways, either by performing, or by being forgiven. By performing, for beyond that we obliged not ourselves. By being forgiven, because he whom we obliged ourselves to, by forgiving is conceived to return us that right which we passed over to him. For forgiving implies giving, that is, by the fourth article of this chapter, a conveyance of right to him to whom the gift is made.

Promises forced from us through fear of death, are valid in the state of nature.

16. It is a usual question, whether compacts extorted from us through fear, do oblige or not. For example, if, to redeem my life from the power of a robber, I promise to pay him 100l. next day, and that I will do no act whereby to apprehend and bring him to justice: whether I am tied to keep promise or not. But though such a promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear. For then it would follow, that those promises which reduced men to a civil life, and by which laws were made, might likewise be of none effect; (for it proceeds from fear of mutual slaughter, that one man submits himself to the dominion of another); and he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally true, that promises do oblige, when there is some benefit received, and when the promise, and the thing promised, be lawful. But it is lawful, for the redemption of my life, both to promise and to give what I will of mine own to any man, even to a thief. We are obliged, therefore, by promises proceeding from fear, except the civil law forbid them; by virtue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawful.

A latter compact contradicting the former, is invalid.

17. Whosoever shall contract with one to do or omit somewhat, and shall after covenant the contrary with another, he maketh not the former, but the latter contract unlawful. For he hath no longer right to do or to omit aught, who by former contracts hath conveyed it to another. Wherefore he can convey no right by latter contracts, and what is promised is promised without right. He is therefore tied only to his first contract, to break which is unlawful.

A promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is invalid.

18. No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his body. For there is in every man a certain high degree of fear, through which he apprehends that evil which is done to him to be the greatest; and therefore by natural necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is supposed he can do no otherwise. When a man is arrived to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by flight or fight. Since therefore no man is tied to impossibilities, they who are threatened either with death, (which is the greatest evil to nature), or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obliged to endure them. Furthermore, he that is tied by contract is trusted; for faith only is the bond of contracts; but they who are brought to punishment, either capital or more gentle, are fettered or strongly guarded; which is a most certain sign that they seemed not sufficiently bound from non-resistance by their contracts. It is one thing, if I promise thus: if I do it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist. All men, if need be, contract the first way, and there is need sometimes. This second way, none; neither is it ever needful. For in the mere state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state itself affords you a right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will afterwards kill him. But in a civil state, where the right of life and death and of all corporal punishment is with the supreme, that same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the supreme himself contract with any man patiently to yield to his punishment; but only this, that no man offer to defend others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two realms, there should a contract be made on condition of killing if it were not performed, we must presuppose another contract of not killing before the appointed day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of war returns, that is a hostile state, in which all things are lawful, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of two evils to make choice of that which seems the greater. For certain death is a greater evil than fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to choose the least. By such a compact, therefore, we should be tied to impossibilities; which is contrary to the very nature of compacts.

The compact of self-accusation is invalid.

19. Likewise no man is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter life. Wherefore neither is a father obliged to bear witness against his son, nor a husband against his wife, nor a son against his father, nor any man against any one by whose means he hath his subsistence; for in vain is that testimony which is presumed to be corrupted from nature. But although no man be tied to accuse himself by any compact, yet in a public trial he may by torture be forced to make answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; so that whether the party tortured his answer be true or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right.

The definition of an oath.

20. Swearing is a speech joined to a promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of God’s mercy, unless he perform his word. Which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in them the very essence of an oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans, do thou Jupiter so destroy the deceiver, as I slay this same beast. Neither is this any let, but that an oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory as promissory; for he that confirms his affirmation with an oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashion for subjects to swear by their kings, that custom took its original hence, that those kings took upon them divine honour. For oaths were therefore introduced, that by religion and consideration of the divine power, men might have a greater dread of breaking their faiths, than that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their actions may lie hid.

The swearing must be conceived in that fashion which he uses who takes it.

21. Whence it follows that an oath must be conceived in that form, which he useth who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to swear by a God whom he believes not, and therefore neither fears him. For though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name, than what is contained in the precepts of his own proper, that is (as he who swears imagines) the true religion.

Swearing adds nothing to the obligation which is by compact.

22. By the definition of an oath, we may understand that a bare contract obligeth no less, than that to which we are sworn. For it is the contract which binds us; the oath relates to the divine punishment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in itself unlawful; but it could not be unlawful, if the contract were not obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God, obligeth himself not to any punishment; because it is ever lawful to deprecate the punishment, howsoever provoked, and to enjoy God’s pardon if it be granted. The only effect therefore of an oath is this; to cause men, who are naturally inclined to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment to make the more conscience of their words and actions.

An oath is not to be pressed, but where the breach of contract can either be kept private, or not be punished but from God alone.

23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party compacted withal wants not power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto self-defence, and shews a mind desirous not so much to benefit itself, as to prejudice another. For an oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of God’s anger, that is to say, of him that is omnipotent, against those who therefore violate their faith, because they think that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is omniscient, against those who therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.

[4]. Right reason.] By right reason in the natural state of men, I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his, which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbours. I call it peculiar, because although in a civil government the reason of the supreme, that is, the civil law, is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this civil government, in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with his own, every man’s own reason is to be accounted, not only the rule of his own actions, which are done at his own peril, but also for the measure of another man’s reason, in such things as do concern him. I call it true, that is, concluding from true principles rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the laws of nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men, who see not those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others in order to their own conservation. But the principles of right reasoning about such like duties, are those which are explained in the [second], [third], [fourth], [fifth], [sixth], and [seventh] articles of the first chapter.

[5]. Arise.] For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to perform from the other part, it cannot be judged to be a just fear; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made.

CHAPTER III.
OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.

[1.] The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. [2.] That trust is to be held with all men without exception. [3.] What injury is. [4.] Injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract. [5.] The distinction of justice into that of men, and that of actions. [6.] The distinction of commutative and distributive justice examined. [7.] No injury can be done to him that is willing. [8.] The third law of nature, concerning ingratitude. [9.] The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful. [10.] The fifth law, of mercy. [11.] The sixth law, that punishments regard the future only. [12.] The seventh law, against reproach. [13.] The eighth law, against pride. [14.] The ninth law, of humility. [15.] The tenth, of equity, or against acceptance of persons. [16.] The eleventh, of things to be had in common. [17.] The twelfth, of things to be divided by lot. [18.] The thirteenth, of birthright and first possession. [19.] The fourteenth, of the safeguard of them who are mediators for peace. [20.] The fifteenth, of constituting an umpire. [21.] The sixteenth, that no man is judge in his own cause. [22.] The seventeenth, that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged. [23.] The eighteenth, of witnesses. [24.] The nineteenth, that there can no contract be made with the umpire. [25.] The twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as hinder the use of reason. [26.] The rule by which we may presently know, whether what we are doing be against the law of nature or not. [27.] The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience. [28.] The laws of nature are sometimes broke by doing things agreeable to those laws. [29.] The laws of nature are unchangeable. [30.] Whosoever endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is a just man. [31.] The natural and moral law are one. [32.] How it comes to pass, that what hath been said of the laws of nature, is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the virtues. [33.] The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in Holy Writ.

The second law of nature, to perform contracts.

1. Another of the laws of nature is, to perform contracts, or to keep trust. For it hath been showed in the foregoing chapter, that the law of nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain peace, to convey certain rights from each to other; and that this, as often as it shall happen to be done, is called a contract. But this is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we shall perform ourselves what we contract with others shall be done or omitted; and in vain would contacts be made, unless we stood to them. Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace; it will prove, by the second article of the second chapter, to be a precept of the natural law.

That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.

2. Neither is there in this matter any exception of the persons with whom we contract; as if they keep no faith with others, or hold that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice. For he that contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vain; and it is against reason for a knowing man to do a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so he affirms the contract to be made in vain. He therefore who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain, and not in vain; which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace.

Injury defined.

3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action or omission), is called an injury. But that action or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing, and both are the same with breach of contract and trust. And it seems the word injury came to be given to any action or omission, because they were without right; he that acted or omitted, having before conveyed his right to some other. And there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury, and that which in the Schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the Schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.

4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no man[^[6]] but him with whom we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of bargain. And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined. For if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man; the servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any man offend another with whom he hath made no contract, he damages him to whom the evil is done; but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs. For if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, he that did it should answer thus: what art thou to me; why should I rather do according to your than mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath no manner of pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible.

The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.

5. These words, just and unjust, as also justice and injustice, are equivocal; for they signify one thing when they are attributed to persons, another when to actions. When they are attributed to actions, just signifies as much as what is done with right, and unjust, as what is done with injury. He who hath done some just thing, is not therefore said to be a just person, but guiltless; and he that hath done some unjust thing, we do not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. So as the justice or injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing, that of an action or omission another; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just. But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the law commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust, who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness by reason of the iniquity of his mind.

The distinction of commutative and distributive justice, examined.

6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished into two kinds, commutative and distributive; the former whereof, they say, consists in arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion; and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending, location and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to contractors; where, if there be an equal return made, hence, they say, springs a commutative justice: but this is busied about the dignity and merits of men; so as if there be rendered to every man κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to him that deserves less, and that proportionably; hence, they say, ariseth distributive justice. I acknowledge here some certain distinction of equality: to wit, that one is an equality simply so called; as when two things of equal value are compared together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver: the other is an equality secundum quod; as when a thousand pounds is to be divided to a hundred men, six hundred pounds are given to sixty men, and four hundred to forty, where there is no equality between six hundred and four hundred; but when it happens that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equal part, whence it is called an equal distribution. But such like equality is the same thing with geometrical proportion. But what is all this to justice? For neither if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, do I injure the buyer, who sought and desired them of me; neither if I divide more of what is mine to him who deserves less, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be denied but that justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this only; that since we are all equal by nature, one should not arrogate more right to himself than he grants to another, unless he have fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of justice, although now almost generally received by all; lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath been defined above.

No injury can be done to him that is willing.

7. It is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria, the willing man receives no injury; yet the truth of it may be derived from our principles. For grant that a man be willing that that should be done which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then, that is done by his will, which by contract was not lawful to be done. But he being willing that should be done which was not lawful by contract, the contract itself (by the fifteenth article of the foregoing chapter) becomes void. The right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it is done by right; wherefore it is no injury.

The third law of nature, of ingratitude.

8. The third precept of the natural law is, that you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who, out of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to endeavour that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this, he should act without reason, that would confer a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this means all beneficence and trust, together with all kind of benevolence, would be taken from among men, neither would there be aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of war would necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature. But because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust or contract, (for we suppose no contracts to have passed among them), therefore is it not usually termed an injury; but because good turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other, it is called ingratitude.

The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.

9. The fourth precept of nature is, that every man render himself useful unto others: which that we may rightly understand, we must remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the building, by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure. For as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones than it fills up itself, neither because of the hardness of its matter can it well be pressed together, or easily cut, and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and being incorrigible by reason of the stubbornness of his affections, is commonly said to be useless and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by right only, but even by natural necessity, is supposed with all his main might to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a war; because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending; he therefore acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence it follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept of nature, that every man accommodate himself to others. But he who breaks this law may be called useless and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulness, as having regard to this very law.

The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.

10. The fifth precept of the law of nature is, that we must forgive him who repents and asks pardon for what is past, having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it, after he hath warred against us, and now is become penitent. But peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains a hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future, that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution, peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary to the natural law.

The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.

11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evil past, but the future good: that is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been showed in the foregoing article. Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be only considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which points at no end; for it contemplates only what is past, but the end is a thing to come; but that which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vain glory, and is therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason, introduces a war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of nature. It is therefore a precept of the law of nature, that in revenge we look not backwards, but forward. Now the breach of this law is commonly called cruelty.

The seventh law of nature, against slander.

12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander; it follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed by the law of nature, that no man, either by deeds or words, countenance or laughter, do declare himself to hate or scorn another. The breach of which law is called reproach. But although nothing be more frequent than the scoffs and jeers of the powerful against the weak, and namely, of judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the judges; yet these kind of men do act against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

The eighth law, against pride.

13. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil state. For it hath been showed before (Chap. I. [Art. 3]) that all men by nature are equal; and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve; as if lord and servant were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance. Which foundation is not only against reason, (as but now hath been showed), but also against experience. For neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger do contest, have these always or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged; or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, it is necessary for the obtaining of peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore it is in the eighth place a precept of the law of nature, that every man be accounted by nature equal to another; the contrary to which law is pride.

The ninth law, of humility.

14. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he should part with some of his rights, so it is no less necessary to the same conservation that he retain some others, to wit, the right of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of air, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many common rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the natural law, to wit, that what rights soever any man challenges to himself, he also grant the same as due to all the rest; otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equal right and power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equal things to equals, is the same with giving things proportional to proportionals. The observation of this law is called meekness, the violation πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the Latins are styled immodici et immodesti.

The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of persons.

15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature, that every man in dividing right to others, shew himself equal to either party. By the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right by nature to ourselves, than we grant to others. We may take less if we will; for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this law to favour one more or less than another. For he that by favouring one before another observes not this natural equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is against the laws of nature. The observance of this precept is called equity; the breach, respect of persons. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.

The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.

16. From the foregoing law is collected this eleventh, those things which cannot be divided, must be used in common if they can, and if the quantity of the matter permit, every man as much as he lists; but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the number of the users. For otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have showed in the foregoing article to be commanded by the law of nature.

The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.

17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in common, it is provided by the law of nature, which may be the twelfth precept, that the use of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one only by lot; and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot, who shall have the first use of it. For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found but that of lot.

The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.

18. But all lot is twofold, arbitrary or natural.

Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders, and it consists in mere chance, as they say, or fortune. Natural is primogeniture, in Greek κληρονομια, as it were, given by lot; or first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided nor had in common, must be granted to the first possessor; as also those things which belonged to the father are due to the son, unless the father himself have formerly conveyed away that right to some other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature.

The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are mediators for peace.

19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature is, that safety must be assured to the mediators for peace. For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of reason is peace; all the rest are means to obtain it, and without which peace cannot be had. But neither can peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety. It is therefore a dictate of reason, that is, a law of nature, that we must give all security to the mediators for peace.

The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.

20. Furthermore because, although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other laws of nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done were against the law or not, which we call the question of right; whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore necessary to the preservation of peace, because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutual compacts to stand to his judgment in deciding the controversy. And he to whom they thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law, that both parties disputing concerning the matter of right, submit themselves unto the opinion and judgment of some third.

The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own cause.

21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the controversy, we gather that the arbiter must not be one of the parties. For every man is presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally, and what is just only for peace sake and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the law of nature, so exactly as a third man would do. It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature, that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own cause.

The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be judged.

22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth place, that no man must be judge, who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part: for the like reason sways here, as in the foregoing law.

The eighteenth law, of witnesses.

23. But when there is some controversy of the fact itself, to wit, whether that be done or not which is said to be done, the natural law wills that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is, because they affirm contradictories, that he believe neither. He must therefore give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judgment of the fact, as often as by other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The eighteenth law of nature therefore enjoins arbiters and judges of fact, that where firm and certain signs of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both parts.

The nineteenth law, that no contract is to be made with the judge.

24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter may be furthermore understood, that no contract or promise must pass between him and the parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be obliged to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equal. The judge is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equal, by the law of nature recounted in the [15th article]: to the obligation of which law nothing can be added by way of compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judgment he should contend for the equity of it, except such compact be of no force, the controversy would remain after judgment given: which is contrary to the constitution of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment which he should pronounce. The law of nature therefore commands the judge to be disengaged, which is its nineteenth precept.

The twentieth law, against gluttony and such things as hinder the use of reason.

25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature are nought else but the dictates of reason; so as, unless a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of nature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or willingly doth aught whereby the rational faculty may be destroyed or weakened, he knowingly and willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no difference between a man who performs not his duty, and him who does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to do it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do that which disturbs the mind from its natural state; that which most manifestly happens to drunkards, and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the twentieth place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.

The rule by which a man may presently know, whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature or not.

26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of nature derived by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us to look to the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will say that the deduction of these laws is so hard, that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will they prove obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not, nay indeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is true, that hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetousness, vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, do hinder a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge of these laws whilst those passions prevail in him: but there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind. At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know, though he be never so rude and unlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts whether what he is now doing to another may be done by the law of nature or not, he conceive himself to be in that other’s stead. Here instantly those perturbations which persuaded him to the fact, being now cast into the other scale, dissuade him as much. And this rule is not only easy, but is anciently celebrated in these words, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris: do not that to others, you would not have done to yourself.

The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience.

27. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of present profit, are very unapt to observe these laws, although acknowledged by them; if perhaps some, more humble than the rest, should exercise that equity and usefulness which reason dictates, the others not practising the same, surely they would not follow reason in so doing: nor would they hereby procure themselves peace, but a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the law become a mere prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be imagined, that by nature, that is, by reason, men are obliged to the exercise of all these laws[^[7]] in that state of men wherein they are not practised by others. We are obliged yet, in the interim, to a readiness of mind to observe them, whensoever their observation shall seem to conduce to the end for which they were ordained. We must therefore conclude, that the law of nature doth always and everywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of conscience; but not always in the external court, but then only when it may be done with safety.

The laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act agreeable to those laws.

28. But the laws which oblige conscience, may be broken by an act not only contrary to them, but also agreeable with them; if so be that he who does it, be of another opinion. For though the act itself be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is against them.

The laws of nature are immutable and eternal.

29. The laws of nature are immutable and eternal: what they forbid, can never be lawful; what they command, can never be unlawful. For pride, ingratitude, breach of contracts (or injury), inhumanity, contumely, will never be lawful, nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the court of conscience, where only they oblige and are laws. Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the civil law, that what is done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it another. Yet reason is still the same, and changeth not her end, which is peace and defence, nor the means to attain them, to wit, those virtues of the mind which we have declared above, and which cannot be abrogated by any custom or law whatsoever.

He who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is just.

30. It is evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the laws of nature are to be observed, because they require the endeavour only, (but that must be true and constant); which whoso shall perform, we may rightly call him just. For he who tends to this with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squared according to the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he hath a mind to fulfil all those laws; which is all we are obliged to by rational nature. Now he that hath done all he is obliged to, is a just man.

The natural law is the same with the moral.

31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is the same with the moral. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know, therefore, that good and evil are names given to things to signify the inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse constitutions, customs, opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man commends, that is to say, calls good, the other undervalues, as being evil. Nay, very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary it is there should be discord and strife. They are, therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason of the diversity of the present appetite, they mete good and evil by diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to be evil, and by consequence that peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree concerning a future good; which indeed is a work of reason; for things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy, (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues. The law therefore, in the means to peace, commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral.

Whence it comes to pass, that what hath been said concerning the law, is not the same with what hath been delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues.

32. But because men cannot put off this same irrational appetite, whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict consequence, many unforseen evils do adhere) before the future; it happens, that though all men do agree in the commendation of the foresaid virtues, yet they disagree still concerning their nature, to wit, in what each of them doth consist. For as oft as another’s good action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions which please them, are ever intituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass that the same action is praised by these, and called virtue, and dispraised by those, and termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by philosophers for this matter. For since they could not observe the goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord, they built a moral philosophy wholly estranged from the moral law, and unconstant to itself. For they would have the nature of virtues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity between two extremes, and the vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false. For to dare is commended, and, under the name of fortitude is taken for a virtue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great or little, or between both, makes not liberality, but the cause of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more of what is mine own than I owe him. The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of moral philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves against those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts of rational nature, from whence spring other virtues; for temperance, also, is a precept of reason, because intemperance tends to sickness and death. And so fortitude too, that is, that same faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, and which are more hardly declined than overcome; because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists.

The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in Holy Scripture.

33. But those which we call the laws of nature, (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of things to be done and omitted; but a law, to speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted), are not in propriety of speech laws, as they proceed from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures, as we shall see in the chapter following, they are most properly called by the name of laws. For the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right.

[6]. Injury can be done to no man, &c.] The word injustice relates to some law: injury, to some person, as well as some law. For what is unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done, and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private person, but the magistrate only; sometimes also neither against the magistrate, nor any private man, but only against God. For through contract and conveyance of right, we say, that an injury is done against this or that man. Hence it is, which we see in all kind of government, that what private men contract between themselves by word or writing, is released again at the will of the obliger. But those mischiefs which are done against the laws of the land, as theft, homicide, and the like, are punished, not as he wills to whom the hurt is done, but according to the will of the magistrate; that is, the constituted laws.

[7]. The exercise of all these laws. Nay, among these laws some things there are, the omission whereof, provided it be done for peace or self-preservation, seems rather to be the fulfilling, than breach of the natural law. For he that doth all things against those that do all things, and plunders plunderers, doth equity. But on the contrary, to do that which in peace is a handsome action, and becoming an honest man, is dejectedness and poorness of spirit, and a betraying of one’s self, in the time of war. But there are certain natural laws, whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of war itself. For I cannot understand what drunkenness or cruelty, that is, revenge which respects not the future good, can advance toward peace, or the preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what is just and unjust, is not to be esteemed by the actions but by the counsel and conscience of the actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of ourselves, is done with right, otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the natural law, and an injury against God.

CHAPTER IV.
THAT THE LAW OF NATURE IS A DIVINE LAW.

[1.] The natural and moral law is divine. [2.] Which is confirmed in Scripture, in general. [3.] Specially, in regard of the fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace. [4.] Also in regard of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in common. [5.] Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to be kept. [6.] Also of the third law, of thankfulness. [7.] Also of the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful. [8.] Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy. [9.] Also of the sixth law, that punishment only looks at the future. [10.] Also of the seventh law, concerning slander. [11.] Also of the eighth law, against pride. [12.] Also of the ninth law, of equity. [13.] Also of the tenth law, against respect of persons. [14.] Also of the eleventh law, of having those things in common which cannot be divided. [15.] Also of the twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot. [16.] Also of appointing a judge. [17.] Also of the seventeenth law, that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence. [18.] Also of the eighteenth law, concerning witnesses. [19.] Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness. [20.] Also in respect of that which hath been said, that the law of nature is eternal. [21.] Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience. [22.] Also that the laws of nature are easily observed. [23.] Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know, whether what he is about to act, be against the law of nature, or not. [24.] The law of Christ is the law of nature.

The natural and moral law is divine.

1. The same law which is natural and moral, is also wont to be called divine, nor undeservedly; as well because reason, which is the law of nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine Majesty for the laws of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and his holy prophets and apostles. What therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to confirm the same in this chapter by holy writ.

Which is confirmed in Scripture, in general.

2. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that the divine law is seated in right reason. Psalm xxxvii. 30, 31: The mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdom, and his tongue will be talking of judgment: the law of God is in his heart. Jeremiah xxx. 33: I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. Psalm xix. 7: The law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soul. Verse 8: The commandment of the Lord is pure, and giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron. xxx. 11: This commandment, which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off, &c. Verse. 14: But the word is very nigh unto thee in my mouth, and in thine heart, that thou mayest do it. Psalm cxix. 34: Give me understanding, and I shall keep thy law. Verse 105: Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. Prov. ix. 10: The knowledge of the holy is understanding. Christ the law-giver, himself is called (John i. 1): the word. The same Christ is called (verse 9): the true light, that lighteth every man that cometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have showed before, are the laws of nature.

Specially in regard of the fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace.

3. But that that which we set down for the fundamental law of nature, namely, that peace was to be sought for, is also the sum of the Divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. iii. 17: Righteousness, which is the sum of the law, is called the way of peace. Psalm lxxxv. 10: Righteousness and peace have kissed each other. Matth. v. 9: Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God. And after St. Paul, in his sixth chapter to the Hebrews, and the last verse, had called Christ (the legislator of that law we treat of), an High-priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec: he adds in the following chapter, the first verse: This Melchisedec was king of Salem, priest of the most high God, &c. (Verse 2): First being by interpretation king of righteousness, and after that also king of Salem, which is, king of peace. Whence it is clear, that Christ, the King, in his kingdom placeth righteousness and peace together. Psalm xxxiv. 14: Eschew evil and do good; seek peace and pursue it. Isaiah ix. 6, 7: Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Isaiah lii. 7: How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith unto Sion, thy God reigneth! Luke ii. 14: In the nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised God, saying, Glory be to God on high, and in earth peace, good-will towards men. And Isaiah liii. 5: the Gospel is called the chastisement of our peace. Isaiah lix. 8: Righteousness is called the way of peace. The way of peace they know not, and there is no judgment in their goings. Micah v. 4, 5, speaking of the Messias, he saith thus: He shall stand and feed in the strength of the Lord, in the majesty of the name of the Lord his God, and they shall abide, for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth; and this man shall be your peace, &c. Prov. iii. 1, 2: My son, forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my commandments; for length of days, and long life, and peace, shall they add to thee.

Also in regard of the first law of nature, in abolishing all things to be had in common.

4. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things, or concerning the introduction of meum and tuum; we perceive in the first place, how great an adversary this same community is to peace, by those words of Abraham to Lot (Gen. xiii. 8, 9): Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me, and between thy herdmen and my herdmen; for we be brethren. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee from me. And all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespass upon our neighbours: as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, &c. do confirm the law of distinction between mine and thine; for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to be kept.

5. The same precepts establish the second law of nature, of keeping trust. For what doth, Thou shalt not invade another’s right, import, but this? Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine: but it is expressly set down? Psalm xv. 1: to him that asked, Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle? it is answered (verse 4): He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not. And Prov. vi. 12: My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, thou art snared with the words of thy mouth.

Also of the third law, of thankfulness.

6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved by these places. Deut. xxv. 4: Thou shalt not muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out the corn: which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interprets to be spoken of men, not oxen only. Prov. xvii. 13; Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house. And Deut. xx. 10, 11: When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Prov. iii. 29: Devise not evil against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

Also of the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful.

7. To the fourth law of accommodating ourselves, these precepts are conformable: Exod. xxiii. 4, 5: If thou meet thine enemy’s ox, or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee, lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him. Also (verse 9): Thou shalt not oppress a stranger. Prov. iii. 30: Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no harm. Prov. xv. 18: A wrathful man stirreth up strife; but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife. Prov. xviii. 24: There is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother. The same is confirmed, Luke x, by the parable of the Samaritan, who had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by thieves; and by Christ’s precept (Matth. v. 39): But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.

Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy.

8. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are some: Matth. vi. 14, 15: If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Matth. xviii. 21, 22: Lord how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? Till seven times? Jesus saith unto him; I say not till seven times, but till seventy times seven times; that is, toties quoties.

Also of the sixth law, that punishment only looks at the future.

9. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are pertinent which command us to shew mercy, such as Matth. v. 7: Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. xix. 18: Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But there are, who not only think this law is not proved by Scripture, but plainly disproved from hence; that there is an eternal punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where there is no place either for amendment or example. Some resolve this objection by answering, that God, whom no law restrains, refers all to his glory, but that man must not do so; as if God sought his glory, that is to say, pleased himself in the death of a sinner. It is more rightly answered, that the institution of eternal punishment was before sin, and had regard to this only, that men might dread to commit sin for the time to come.

Also of the seventh law, concerning slander.

10. The words of Christ prove this seventh: (Matth. v. 22): But I say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say unto his brother Racha, shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire. Prov. x. 18: He that uttereth a slander, is a fool. Prov. xiv. 21: He that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth. Prov. xv. 1: Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. xxii. 10[Prov. xxii. 10]: Cast out the scorner, and contention shall go out, and reproach shall cease.

Also of the eighth, against pride.

11. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of humility, is established by these places: Matth. v. iii: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Prov. vi. 16-19: These six things doth the Lord hate, yea, seven are an abomination unto him. A proud look, &c. Prov. xvi. 5: Every one that is proud, is an abomination unto the Lord; though hand join in hand, he shall not be unpunished. Prov. xi. 2: When pride cometh, then cometh shame; but with the lowly is wisdom. Thus Isaiah xl. 3: (where the coming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation towards his kingdom): The voice of him that cried in the wilderness, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low: which doubtless is spoken to men, and not to mountains.

Also of the ninth, of equity.

12. But that same equity, which we proved in the ninth place to be a law of nature, which commands every man to allow the same rights to others they would be allowed themselves, and which contains in it all the other laws besides, is the same which Moses sets down (Levit. xix. 18): Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. And our Saviour calls it the sum of the moral law: Matth. xxii. 36-40: Master, which is the great commandment in the law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. But to love our neighbour as ourselves, is nothing else but to grant him all we desire to have granted to ourselves.

Also the tenth, against respect of persons.

13. By the tenth law respect of persons is forbid; as also by these places following: Matth. v. 45: That ye may be children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the evil, and on the good, &c. Coloss. iii. 11: There is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian, bond or free, but Christ is all, and in all. Acts x. 34: Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons. 2 Chron. xix. 7: There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts. Ecclesiasticus xxxv. 12: The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of persons. Rom. ii. 11: For there is no respect of persons with God.

Also of the eleventh law, of having those things in common which cannot be divided.

14. The eleventh law, which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any express place in Scripture for it or not; but the practice appears every where, in the common use of wells, ways, rivers, sacred things, &c.; for else men could not live.

Also of the twelfth, of things to be divided by lot.

15. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a law of nature, that where things could neither be divided nor possessed in common, they should be disposed by lot. Which is confirmed, as by the example of Moses who, by God’s command (Numb. xxvi. 55), divided the several parts of the land of promise unto the tribes by lot: so (Acts i. 24) by the example of the Apostles, who received Matthias before Justus into their number, by casting lots, and saying, Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts of all men, show whether of these two thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. xvi. 33: The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. And, which is the thirteenth law, the succession was due unto Esau, as being the first born of Isaac; if himself had not sold it (Gen. xxv. 33), or that the father had not otherwise appointed.

Also of appointing a judge.

16. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians (1 Epist. vi), reprehends the Corinthians of that city for going to law one with another before infidel judges, who were their enemies: calling it a fault, that they would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is against that law, whereby we are commanded to be helpful to each other. But if it happen the controversy be concerning things necessary, what is to be done? Therefore the Apostle (verse 5) speaks thus: I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? He therefore, by those words, confirms that law of nature which we called the fifteenth, to wit, where controversies cannot be avoided; there by the consent of parties to appoint some arbiter, and him some third man; so as (which is the sixteenth law) neither of the parties may be judge in his own cause.

Also of the seventeenth law, that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence.

17. But that the judge or arbiter must receive no reward for his sentence, which is the seventeenth law appears, Exod. xxiii. 8: Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous. Ecclesiasticus xx. 29: Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Whence it follows, that he must not be more obliged to one part than the other; which is the nineteenth law; and is also confirmed, Deut. i. 17: Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as the great; and in all those places which are brought against respect of persons.

Also of the eighteenth, concerning witnesses.

18. That in the judgment of fact witnesses must be had, which is the eighteenth law, the Scripture not only confirms, but requires more than one. Deut. xvii. 6: At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeated Deut. xix. 15.

Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness.

19. Drunkenness, which we have therefore in the last place numbered among the breaches of the natural law, because it hinders the use of right reason, is also forbid in Sacred Scripture for the same reason. Prov. xx. 1: Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise. And Prov. xxxi. 4, 5: It is not for kings to drink wine, lest they drink and forget the law, and pervert the judgment of any of the afflicted. But that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroys judgment and reason, it follows in the next verse: Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let him drink and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenness (Luke xxi. 34): Take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness.

Also in respect of that which hath been said, that the law of nature is eternal.

20. That we said in the foregoing chapter, the law of nature is eternal, is also proved out of Matth. v. 18: Verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law; and Psalm cxix. 160: Every one of thy righteous judgments endureth for ever.

Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience.

21. We also said, that the laws of nature had regard chiefly unto conscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfil them. And although a man should order all his actions so much as belongs to external obedience just as the law commands, but not for the law’s sake, but by reason of some punishment annexed unto it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust. Both these are proved by the Holy Scriptures. The first (Isaiah lv. 7): Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon. Ezek. xviii. 31: Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you have transgressed, and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will you die, O House of Israel? By which, and the like places, we may sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds whose heart is right. The second, out of Isaiah xxix. 13, 14: The Lord said, forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their hearts far from me, therefore I will proceed, &c. Matth. v. 20: Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven. And in the following verses, our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God are broken, not by deeds only, but also by the will. For the Scribes and Pharisees did in outward act observe the law most exactly, but for glory’s sake only; else they would as readily have broken it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declared, that God accepts the will for the deed, and that as well in good as in evil actions.

Also that the laws of nature are easily observed.

22. That the law of nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares (Matth. xi. 28, 29, 30): Come unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, &c.; for my yoke is easy, and my burden light.

Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know, whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature, or not.

23. Lastly, the rule by which I said any man might know, whether what he was doing were contrary to the law or not, to wit, what thou wouldst not be done to, do not that to another; is almost in the self-same words delivered by our Saviour (Matth. vii. 12): Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them.

The law of Christ is the law of nature.

24. As the law of nature is all of it divine, so the law of Christ by conversion (which is wholly explained in the v. vi. and vii. chapters of St. Matthew’s Gospel), is all of it also (except that one commandment, of not marrying her who is put away for adultery; which Christ brought for explication of the divine positive law, against the Jews, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaical law) the doctrine of nature. I say, the whole law of Christ is explained in the fore-named chapters, not the whole doctrine of Christ; for faith is a part of Christian doctrine, which is not comprehended under the title of a law. For laws are made and given in reference to such actions as follow our will; not in order to our opinions and belief, which being out of our power, follow not the will.

DOMINION.

CHAPTER V.
OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT.

[1.] That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. [2.] That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. [3.] That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the concord of many persons. [4.] That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. [5.] The reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. [6.] That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. [7.] What union is. [8.] In union, the right of all men is conveyed to one. [9.] What civil society is. [10.] What a civil person is. [11.] What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject [12.] Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.

That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation of peace.

1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently, that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence by such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right to all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the fulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace peace when it may be had.

That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are silent.

2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of war, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by chap. iii. [art. 27]. And we mean such a war, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of nature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they called ληστρικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the law of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of nature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.

That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the agreement of many.

3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural law security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemy’s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.

That the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace.

4. Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action, through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the consent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.

Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men.

5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not man only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say, ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government, and therefore those animals not to be termed political; because their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is very true, that in those creatures living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the like creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good, which among them differs not from their private. But man scarce esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude of men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways; which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition: and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial. It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice.

That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men.

6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which I call a council.

What union is.

7. This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a right of defending himself against violence: and this is called union. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council consists.

In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.

8. But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to act); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men unto unity and concord.

What civil society is.

9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them together, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all), is to be accounted a city. A city therefore, (that we may define it), is one person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.