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JOURNAL

OF A

CAVALRY OFFICER;

INCLUDING

THE MEMORABLE SIKH CAMPAIGN OF
1845-1846.

BY

W.W.W. HUMBLEY, M.A.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;

FELLOW OF THE CAMBRIDGE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY;

CAPTAIN, 9^TH QUEEN'S ROYAL LANCERS.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.
1854.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WERTHEIMER AND CO.
FINSBURY CIRCUS.

TO

LORD STANLEY, M.P.

THIS VOLUME

IS

BY PERMISSION DEDICATED

AS A

SMALL TOKEN OF ADMIRATION AND REGARD,

BY HIS

FRIEND AND SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

CONTENTS.

JOURNAL

OF

A CAVALRY OFFICER IN INDIA.

[INTRODUCTION.]

The remark has often been made, that India is but little known to persons in England and on the continent of Europe. That there is ample ground for such a remark none can deny. For, whether we consider its vast territorial extent, covering an area of upwards of a million of square miles, with a population of more than 150 millions; its commercial wealth and enterprise, from the remotest ages of antiquity, and its immense natural resources; or, whether we regard India in a more intimate point of view, as forming an integral part of our own dominions, owing allegiance to one sovereign ruler, bound up with us by social relations and family ties, and consider what an El Dorado it has proved to the British empire for upwards of two centuries and a half; it is indeed a matter of no small surprise, that India should be so little, and so imperfectly, known by us.

We can scarcely comprehend how, until recently, the Emperor of China and his subjects should have looked upon the celestial empire as the most important in the world; but it is yet more astonishing that we, to whom the whole world lies open, should be contented to remain in ignorance of what it is so obviously our interest to understand.

Nearly six centuries have elapsed since that enterprising Venetian, Marco Polo, first visited India, and revealed to Europe the treasures of the Eastern Hemisphere; nay, they are familiar to us from the earliest records of the sacred writers; and, in later ages, Herodotus and other Greek authors dwelt upon the wonders of the East, its history, its resources, and its races. It is true that Marco Polo gained little credit for the marvels he related; but, we must bear in mind that he did not always speak from personal observation: he not only noted down what he saw, but eagerly collected all the information which he could obtain respecting those regions which he was unable to visit himself. His "Maraviglie del Mondo da lui descritte" were sneered at and discredited by many, in former times, as the visions of an enthusiast. People, indeed, believed in the existence of such cities as Agra and Delhi, because it was corroborated by the Chinese and Arabic maps which he brought home; while the fact of there being such an individual as the Great Mogul, was demonstrated by the painted representation of his Sublime Majesty on the royal court cards, which are supposed to have been then first introduced. More accurate investigations, however, have proved his veracity; and the researches of Klaproth, and other distinguished travellers, of modern times, have amply verified the truth of his statements.

The discredit at first thrown upon Marco Polo's narratives, may, in a great measure, be attributed to the Jesuit missionaries in India and China, who followed in his track, and who, while they availed themselves of the valuable information which he had supplied, scrupled not to add the most unblushing and incredible falsehoods. These Jesuits, though the most learned men of their time, composed a class of writers whose object it was to appear to surpass all other European travellers in information; and who sought to acquire an ascendancy in Asiatic countries, for the benefit of their master, the Pope, and the sovereigns of the European States.

The maps brought home by Marco Polo, and the information which he communicated, proved invaluable to the Pope's missionaries, and to the Venetian and Portuguese traders and navigators who succeeded him, and aided the gallant Vasco di Gama in discovering the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope. The Jesuits, however, did not make full use of the advantages which they possessed; for, while employed in constructing their excellent map of the Empire of China, which gained them free access to every part, they lost an opportunity for investigating and describing its natural productions, which might never have occurred again, but for the present movement in China. In the reign of Kang-hi they obtained permission to establish a college for the promotion of Christianity; but his successor regarded the institution with different feelings; and, being jealous of the influence which it was calculated to produce, ordered it to be broken up, and thus deprived us of the means of obtaining much valuable information.

Among the few Oriental works which modern scholars have been able to obtain, the only one that has as yet been translated into English, from the Sanscrit, is, a History of the Kings of Cashmere, down to the Mahomedan conquest, entitled, "Raja Tarengini," published in 1835.

It was not till about seventy years ago, during the war with Hyder Ali, and the subsequent hostilities between the sovereigns of Mysore, from 1792 to 1799, that the English became acquainted with the state of Southern India; when (to our shame be it spoken) the capture at Seringapatam of the Sultan's library, revealed the fact of an extensive political correspondence with Napoleon Bonaparte, the Directory, and the French governor of the Isle of France; also with the Shah of Persia, with Shah Zeman of Affghanistan, the Maharattas, and many other native princes of India.

With so many salient points of tangible danger to defend, it might have been expected that the Government of India would have employed—as Russia does, and as France has ever done—competent officers in their service to travel in Persia, Afghanistan, and, in fact, in all the countries from whence the danger of an invasion was to be apprehended: especially as it was well known that Zeman Shah of Affghanistan had, in 1796, '97, and '98, made attempts to invade India.

Foreigners have asked the question: "How is it that you English, who have so long possessed a considerable portion of India, know so little of that country, that, in our day, Baron Humboldt, a foreigner, should contemplate a visit to India, to explore the Himalaya mountains?" It is true, that nearly forty years ago, Lieutenant Webb and others had ascertained that the highest peak was about 27,000 feet above the level of the sea, and that it was the loftiest in the world; but doubts were expressed as to the amount of scientific knowledge possessed by a Bengal subaltern. Captain Fraser and other Englishmen have since visited those snowy regions; but it still remains to be seen what enterprising nation will equip an expedition to explore the character and resources of India.

That the English, as a commercial nation, have not as yet ascertained all the products of India, is a matter of yet greater astonishment to all foreign travellers. It is a fact, that the existence of that useful article, coal, has only been known within the last few years; and the same may be said in regard to other natural productions. The truth is, that, till the year 1814, the East India Company, who possessed the exclusive right of trade within the limits prescribed by their Charter of 1660, were the chief merchants of India; and their investments were almost wholly confined to the exportation of silk, and the usual cargoes of tea from China. It is to private enterprise that we are indebted for the commerce in indigo, sugar, and other articles of modern exportation; till the free trade with China, since the year 1834, opened up a more extended commerce.

Since that period, both India and China have become better known to us; and the wars in the latter country have naturally made us acquainted with the eastern portions of its vast dominions.

It cannot, however, be expected that persons pursuing commercial speculations should have leisure or inclination to write on Indian subjects, beyond the facts relating to their own traffic. Some men will not even take the pains to learn the language of the people, but trust to such natives as speak English. Though some of these gentlemen have certainly acquired a colloquial knowledge of the language, and made themselves acquainted with the localities in their immediate vicinity—yet, as they have never travelled much in India, their statements are of course imperfect and superficial. It is from the pen of the civil, military, and other servants of the East India Company, and from officers in Her Majesty's service, that we must look for accounts descriptive of different parts of India, and of the various tribes and races of its inhabitants.

The removal of the army from place to place, affords an observant officer not only an opportunity of investigating the geological formation, natural history, and productions of the country, but also gives him great facilities for studying the history, religion, and civilization of the people, from the various monuments and inscriptions, both ancient and modern, which lie on his route.

The rapid extension of our Eastern empire since our first occupation of Hindoostan may, in some measure, account for our imperfect acquaintance with the productions and natural resources of the several great Presidencies under our jurisdiction at the present day. Great Britain, in self-defence, rather than from choice, or from a policy of self-aggrandizement, such as she might reasonably be excused in adopting, has been forced to extend her sway, and to annex numerous native territories; for a long time, indeed, she only assumed a passive military tenure of dominions thus acquired, while her natural reluctance to obtrude or infringe upon the rights and prerogatives of others has not only influenced her general policy, but even led her subjects invariably to observe the same caution in indulging their natural bent for investigation and discovery. This, coupled with an apprehension for personal safety, and a want of confidence in native integrity and honour, has greatly impeded a free and frequent intercourse, and damped the ardour of enterprising and scientific enquiry.

The well-known faithlessness of the native character, and the internal disaffection existing among various tribes, have also tended to interrupt or preclude the possibility of travelling about among the people, for the purpose of investigating their manners and customs, and the general state of the country.

The wars with the Sikhs afforded many opportunities of becoming practically acquainted with the perfidy and duplicity of the natives. The treachery of Tej Singh at the battle of Ferozeshah, the artful and wily conduct of Goolab Singh, in his negotiations with the Maharannee and the British, and the subsequent perfidy of our professed friend and ally, Shere Singh, at the siege of Mooltan, where he caused the defection of the Sikh army from the British to Moolraj, and thereby prevented our taking the fortress, are indisputable proofs of this trait. It is a painful peculiarity in the Oriental character, which will ever stamp it in the eyes of a European with an indelible stigma. This inherent vice, and our cognizance of it, have hitherto checked, and will continue to check, the ardour of all enquiry and enterprise, even where pecuniary gain, and still more, scientific information, are the objects in view.

We may also refer to the history of Moolraj, his confederates, and their diabolical schemes; but, thanks to an over-ruling Providence, the arch-traitor and his base accomplices were defeated; their designs were marred, and fell upon themselves. Truly it is said, "Man proposes, but God disposes." Who could have foreseen or anticipated the results of the deliberations within the walls of Mooltan? Who could have foretold that Moolraj would be dethroned and immured in a British prison, and his rich and extensive territories revert to a British Queen? His treachery, however, led to the wanton murder of two of our officers, and to an immense sacrifice of the lives, both of natives and Europeans.

Our unwillingness to invade, or to annex to the British dominions, even partial portions of frontier countries, virtually in our possession before, has proved, as we have seen, a great barrier to enterprising researches; and our officers, generally speaking, had more work upon their hands, than allowed of much leisure or inclination for scientific expeditions into adjacent, and still less into more distant localities. We feel justified in offering this explanation, in order to do away with the reproaches to which the civil and military officers in India, have been subjected in regard to this question.

With respect to the Punjaub, our Government was perfectly justified in its annexation; and the act was quite consistent with wise policy, and compatible with our previous and general mode of dealing with Indian rulers. No other power except Great Britain would so long have abstained from punishing a local authority, which had so shamefully and recklessly disregarded and violated its own solemn pledges and engagements, upon the faith of which, and which only, the rule of the Sikhs rested and eventually depended. Great Britain ought to have annexed this country long before, even as early as 1845. She relied on the gratitude and fidelity of the Sikh rulers, and was betrayed and disappointed.

What is applicable in one case, as in that of the Punjaub, may apply equally to all or any of our Indian acquisitions, and account, in a great measure, for our still imperfect knowledge of the products and vast resources of India.

We will not conceal from ourselves, nor leave the public in ignorance of the fact, that while all classes at home are unanimous as to the benefit and vast importance of steam communication, the case is far otherwise in India. The imperative necessity for improvement in facilitating the means of communication in the interior of India, by means of roads, bridges, canals, railways and river navigation, has not obtained that fair share of attention and support which the past and future wants of India, her products, resources, and trade demand. These reforms are only in their infancy. India, strange to say, is still as backward as Turkey in these respects. It is extraordinary that in a country like India, and under such a rule as the British, no line of railway should have been laid down till the year 1851, when the attempt was made in the short line from Bombay.

Any contributions, however scanty, respecting India will be better appreciated now that a more judicious system has been adopted with regard to the qualification of candidates for Indian affairs. There are few families who have not friends and relations in some part of India, and these are now beginning to give their attention to subjects bearing upon its history, its people, products, institutions, and religion.

If we have been remiss in the past, and of this there is no question, we must endeavour, in the future, to regain our credit as a nation by progressive reform, and the promotion of civilization. India and her riches, her mountains of light and her hills of gold, must not blind us to our duties, nor cause us to forget the true though trite saying, that, "Property and its possession have their duties as well as their rights." We must not lose sight of the well-being of the country and her people, in the pursuit of personal aggrandizement, and thus expose ourselves to the world's obloquy, our children's detriment, and our disgrace as a nation whose glorious destiny it was to elevate India to a high and proud position, compared with that state in which we found her.

It must not be supposed, from the foregoing remarks, that the author of these pages intends to write a history of India; all he presumes to do is to give information respecting that part of the country in which his regiment was on active service, and which is perhaps the most imperfectly known, namely, the vast district in the north west of India, where the Sikh battles were fought. Moreover they are not written for the scrutinizing eye of the public, but only for the amusement of his friends, and of those who have a personal interest in the war.

The author left England in the year 1836, and served with H.M.'s 4th (Queen's own) Light Dragoons for seven years. He studied both the Oordoo and Maharatta languages, passed his examination, and became Interpreter to the regiment, and was therefore able to converse with the natives. Returning to England in 1842, he joined the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers, and was engaged in the Sikh campaign in 1845-46, which prostrated the power of that people, and exhibits a series of the most triumphant successes ever recorded in the military history of India.

The author has endeavoured to delineate scenes presented in a time of war, which could not be familiar to the general traveller, because the presence of two hostile armies exhibits the people in their native character, calling forth their hopes and fears as to the issue of the combat. In times of peace, the minds of the inhabitants repose upon the prospects of a good harvest and a fruitful season. The grand features of an Indian life are comprehended in the expressive phrase: "āb aur hawa humaree bustee kee achchha huen; mi khoob khata aur khoob sota hon:" i.e.; "The climate (air and water) of our village is good; I eat well and sleep well." If the Indian has plenty of good water and food, his family share it with him, and he is content; he is no politician, but when war rages between hostile parties close to his own door, he can be no longer indifferent, and all his energies are aroused in estimating the issue. In losing his old masters, the English, he would fall under the iron rule of the Sikhs; or should the Sikhs suddenly attack his village and carry off his grain, he would have reason to apprehend that this act might be construed into "aiding the enemy," while a refusal to give up his corn to the Sikhs would involve the burning of his village.

In this way I shall, therefore, endeavour to represent the character of these people as I myself observed them in peace and in war, that the reader may judge whether there exists among the natives of her north-western provinces any peculiarity of character, or whether we have any reason to conclude that the actions of human nature there are much the same as in similar countries in the East; for we must not judge them by those of the West.

It is to be hoped that better days are in store for the East; and, in that comprehensive term, I would include China, and countries nearer home, Asiatic Turkey, Persia, etc. I am sanguine that the bright dawning of a happy future is awaiting these interesting countries. If the British people have conquered India, it is their imperative obligation to promote the welfare of their possessions; and we are glad to notice a laudable spirit in recent legislative measures to promote many desirable improvements. India, under an improved system, and with greater facilities of intercourse, will more than recompense any effort, or application of capital, on our part. Its internal resources are beyond our conception, and its people will unquestionably advance and improve in proportion to its elevation as an empire. Schools, industry, and commerce, if based on a solid foundation, will be the quick harbingers of peace, good-will, and prosperity to the people and their rulers, both native and European.

May this happy era be expedited in the good Providence of God!

Eynesbury, St. Neots,
Huntingdonshire,
May, 1, 1854.

[CHAPTER I.]

Voyage to India—Advantages of Sailing with Troops on Board—Regulations at Sea—March from Cawnpore to Meerut—Return from Nougawa Ghât to Meerut—March to Ferozepore—Cantonments at Kurnaul—Colonel Campbell's Force—Number of Cattle required on a March—Sunday—Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A.—Distribution of Prize-Money—Advanced Guard—Governor-General—Major Broadfoot and Captain Nicolson—Suspicions of the Sikhs—Sir David Ochterlony—The Sikh Army—The Battle of Moodkee—Tej Singh.

The circumstances of a voyage to or from India are so well known, from their frequent occurrence, that I will not even allude to them. Our voyage, however, offered some variety to the usual monotony of a mere passenger ship, from our having troops on board. This naturally gave rise to numerous incidents which afford topics of interest, especially to military men. We, of course, had regular parades both for the sake of discipline, and to ascertain that the men were sober and clean. The men had, too, specific duties assigned to them—keeping watch, etc.

The object of placing the troops in watches, in time of peace, is, that they may assist in pulling and easing the ropes. They are confined to duties on deck only. If there should be an old sailor among them he may, of course, occasionally reef and unfurl sail. It is obvious that the addition of some fifty or sixty men to the crew of a merchant vessel of 600 or 700 tons burthen, is a great advantage in bad weather, as it enables almost the whole of the ship's crew to be employed aloft. In case of necessity a soldier or two will also assist the man at the wheel, or those at the pumps, by order of the quarter-master, or of the officer on duty, or of the captain himself.

Another advantage from having soldiers on board is in the case where the crew might be inclined to mutiny; when they would be restrained by the military. The troops being told off in watches, those on the morning watch assist in cleaning, or, what is called swabbing, the quarter-deck; but the rules for merchant ships are very imperfect in this respect.

Having troops on board necessarily adds much to the safety of the vessel.

It will probably be in the recollection of many of my readers, that two ships taken up in Australia as transports, were wrecked on the Great Andamans, islands on the east side of the Bay of Bengal, in the year 1844. These vessels would have been totally lost, but for the assistance rendered by the officers and men of the 80th Foot, the regiment which so nobly distinguished itself, the following year, at the battle of Ferozeshah, where many of those brave fellows who helped to save these vessels, yielded up their lives for their country.

To ensure regularity and a perfect understanding between the commanding officers of troops and captains of ships, a copy of rules for the guidance of the commanders of merchant-ships, should be given to the officer commanding the troops; and a copy of the regulations for troops of Her Majesty's forces, and the East India Company's service, given to the commander of the ship. The captain of a free-trader is not allowed to flog his men; but he may stop a sailor's grog and his pay for any crime of which he has been guilty. He may also put a culprit in irons, and lose the man's services.

Without stopping to describe my first impressions of India, or the countries which I traversed, after landing upon its far-famed shores, I will proceed at once to Cawnpore, where I found that my regiment was quartered, and where I first joined it.

On the 17th of October, 1845, my regiment, the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers, set out on its march from Cawnpore to Meerut, a distance of 266 miles. The Artillery received orders, at the same time, to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to the north-west. We reached Meerut on the 12th of November, and encamped near the lines of the 16th Lancers, to await further orders. We stayed only a few days in this place, which is situated in the province of Delhi. It is a very large town, of some antiquity, lying about forty miles to the north-east of the city of Delhi, and is one of our principal civil and military stations.

On the 23rd, our corps received orders to march the next day to Umballa, a large military station, a distance of 126 miles. We accordingly set out on the morning of the 25th, and marched to Sirdhana, eleven miles. On the 26th we encamped on the right bank of the river Hindon, at Nougawa Ghât, nineteen miles from Meerut. On the 27th, just as the corps was about to proceed onwards—for the trumpet to boot and saddle had already been sounded—we received a sudden order, by an express camel, to return and encamp on our old ground at Meerut. On the 28th, the regiment halted; the following day it re-crossed the river, and encamped at Sirdhana; and on the 30th returned to Meerut.

Here we were quartered till the 10th of December, when the Queen's Royal Lancers received an unexpected and peremptory order, at half-past eight P.M., to march immediately to Umballa. We accordingly again set out for Sirdhana, which we reached the next morning; and whilst at Shamlee, four marches from Meerut, and twenty-eight miles from Kurnaul, we received, between three and four o'clock P.M., an express direct from the Commander-in-Chief, with the following important intelligence:—

"That the 9th Lancers were to proceed at once to Ferozepore, agreeably to an enclosed route; and that the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry, which were to leave Meerut the same day as the Lancers, were to proceed thither also: the whole to be under the command of Colonel Campbell, of the latter corps."

SKETCH OF THE
PRINCIPAL ROADS
approaching the SUTLEJ.

On reaching Kurnaul, we halted on the 18th, in order to make preparations for forming a depôt at Umballa; to which place all the superfluous heavy baggage, and the young horses, were immediately sent, under the charge of Cornet R.W. King, with instructions to rejoin head-quarters as soon as he had reported himself to the officer commanding at Umballa.

At this time, it was not yet known at Kurnaul that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej—an event which took place as early as the 13th of this month.

I may here remark, that the extensive cantonments of Kurnaul had been abandoned about three years before, by order of Lord Ellenborough, then Governor-General. The officers' bungalows were now nearly all roofless, and the neat little church going to decay. In 1852 it was entirely dismantled, and the materials conveyed to Umballa, to assist in building a station-church there. The immense parade-ground, large enough to allow for the exercise of 12,000 men, is about the best in India.

The route of the 9th here changed; for instead of proceeding to Umballa, we marched as follows:—

On the 19th of December to Suggah, 10 miles.
" 20th " Khol, 14½ "
" 21st " Pehoah 14 "

These three villages were in the protected Sikh states: the two former are small and insignificant; the latter is larger, and of more importance.

The whole tract of country, on either side of our line of march, was one continued jungle, and as level as a bowling-green.

The force under the personal command of Colonel Campbell, exclusive of officers, amounted at this time to 2,833 men, with twelve iron twelve-pounders, each drawn by an elephant. Brass guns of this description are usually drawn by ten, or even twelve, bullocks; brass eighteen-pounders by fourteen bullocks; and brass twenty-four-pounders by eighteen bullocks. An iron twenty-four-pounder is drawn by twenty-six bullocks; an iron eighteen-pounder by twenty-two bullocks; and an iron twelve-pounder by eighteen bullocks. Singly, therefore, that noble animal, the elephant, will draw a gun for which ten or even more bullocks are allowed.

These and the following remarks regarding cattle, are given for the purpose of showing the number used in dragging guns and carrying loads. By the regulations of the service in Bengal, it is directed that no elephant shall be taken into the service under twelve years of age, nor under seven feet in height. A committee is appointed to examine and report whether the animals are fit for service; but it not unfrequently happens that infantry or cavalry officers, or both, are put upon these committees, who know nothing at all of the matter. Sometimes, however, the animals are so palpably inefficient and diseased, that, as one of the committee-officers exclaimed, "This camel speaks for itself." No elephant is employed unless the committee can report that he is capable of carrying at least 20 maunds of 80 sicca weight, or 1,600 pounds = 14 cwt. 32 lbs.

Camels admitted into the service by a committee, must never be under five, nor more than nine, years old; and capable of carrying a load of at least 6 maunds, or 480 lbs. Bullocks are admitted into the service not under five, nor above eight, years of age. Draught-bullocks must be fifty inches in height; those for carriage, not under forty-eight inches. The former must be capable of carrying 210 lbs. avoirdupoise weight, besides the gear. The comparative value of these animals will be seen by the following scale:—

An elephant carries 1,600 lbs.
A camel " 480 "
A bullock " 210 "

In wet weather a camel, which, in dry weather, carries six maunds of tents, etc., will carry only four maunds, one-third being allowed for the difficulty which the camel finds of keeping on his legs in wet ground.

A six-pounder gun is drawn by six horses, and when bullocks are used, by six of these animals. This shows the relative value as to draught. Now a single elephant pulled along by himself one of the iron twelve-pounder guns, or, as they were more properly styled, "nine-pounders reamed up to twelves," which may be thus explained. Knowing that the Sikhs used guns of large calibre, the Government had ordered that these guns should be sent to the Delhi magazine, to be re-cast and reamed up for the occasion; and they did good service. They were a fraction lighter by this process than the nine-pounders were before.

On the 21st of December our troops halted at Pehoah. It is a large town, containing a succession of brick-built houses, the high walls of which, without any apertures, face the back streets, being evidently intended as a defence against marauders.

It will be seen, by reference to the map, that the original route by which the troops were ordered to march to Umballa, would have caused us to make a considerable détour, indeed, one of about thirty or thirty-five miles, for Umballa is nearly direct north of Kurnaul, while Ferozepore is north-west.

The Sunday at Pehoah was not kept as is customary on the Lord's-day in cantonments. We had no chaplain with us; and hence divine service was not performed. It would appear proper that, in the absence of the chaplain, some officer should take his place. This is the case in several European regiments, where the commanding or some superior officer reads the service to the troops. As on board of ship, when there is no chaplain, the purser reads the service, so I think, in the army, the paymaster should discharge this duty. A graduate of either University, if there be one in the corps, would be, from his education and training, the most desirable person to read a selection of prayers from the church service. A chaplain accompanied the Bengal and Bombay columns, which went to Afghanistan in 1838-39.

We have a noble instance of voluntary dedication to the duties of chaplain to an army on active service, in the case of the Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A., during the second Sikh campaign. The arduous and invaluable services which this excellent clergyman rendered during that campaign called forth the grateful thanks of the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, the Bishop of Calcutta, and the Court of Directors. He has left an indelible impression, on all engaged in that war, of the importance of his benevolent, as well as spiritual ministrations.

By the warrant for prize-money for the navy, dated 1846, naval chaplains share in the prize money. There appears to be no positive regulation for army chaplains; but the analogy between the two services will point out the propriety of its existing in the latter case; and the warrant being by royal authority, no doubt ought to exist on the subject. It is pleasing to hear that the Rev. George Robert Gleig, M.A., Chaplain-General to the Forces, formerly a subaltern during the Peninsular war, and author of several entertaining and instructive military works, has not only received his medal, with two bars, but has worn it at Court over his canonicals, and does wear it at all times in the pulpit.

By the navy warrant, passengers on board a man-of-war, if they desire to join in an action, receive a share of the prize money. The navy prize rules are fairer than those of the army. The army rules were made—I am speaking of India—by the Prize Committees, assembled at Seringapatam, Agra, etc., in 1799 and 1803; and, being composed of senior officers, they took good care of their own grade, while the juniors got a very disproportionate share.

I return from this digression to the bellicose signs of the times. Colonel Campbell's detachment marched, on the 22nd December, to Goelah, sixteen miles distant. Here, in consequence of rumours that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej, and having heard, in the afternoon, a distant noise resembling the sound of cannon (which subsequently turned out to be the explosion of mines), Colonel Campbell ordered all the troops under his immediate command to join and march together.

On the following morning the advanced guard consisted of a troop of the Royal Lancers—the light companies of the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry—some sappers and miners—and four 12-pounders. The main body consisted of the 9th Lancers—43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry—and six 12-pounders. The rear-guard consisted of a troop of the 9th—one company from each of the Infantry regiments—and two 12-pounders: Captain Spottiswoode, 9th Lancers, an able and most intelligent officer, acting as major of brigade. Here was a respectable force of nearly 3,000 men and twelve guns, or four to each thousand men, being above Napoleon's proportion, which was only three to 1,000.

It will be seen that we began the campaign with an artillery very inferior to that of the Sikhs. In fact, if calibres are reckoned, we, probably, were in the minority as one to three. I shall, in the sequel, prove these facts. But to proceed:

It will appear strange to the European reader when he hears that the whole tract of country between the Sutlej and the Jumna, including the protected Sikh states, which were under our control, as well as our protection, had been in the possession of the East India Company since the year 1809, or for thirty-six years before this period; and that, nevertheless, troops marching to join the army, in a direct line, sixty miles off, were not even aware that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej; and that, moreover, two battles had been fought, that of Moodkee, on the 18th, and that of Ferozeshah on the 21st and 22nd of December, the latter being one of the most deadly contested actions ever fought in India. I have before stated that the 9th Lancers had been ordered from Meerut, and did march on the 25th of November; that this line corps, being unfortunately ordered back, did not leave Meerut the second time until the 11th of December. Here was a loss of sixteen days: hence it is clear, that, as the regiment heard firing, or sounds arising from the explosion of powder mines on the 21st of December, it would have been present in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, had not its march been countermanded.

Now the order to return to Meerut was received on the 27th of November. To what circumstance was this to be attributed? The Sikhs did not cross the Sutlej until the 13th of December, or sixteen days after the 27th of November; and, allowing the order for the return to be dated the 25th of November, there certainly was not any crossing of the Sikhs at that time. It is positively stated, by a staff officer, that Lord Hardinge did not send the order. Although a Governor-General can send such an order direct, yet all military men here know that the Commander-in-chief is the channel for transmitting such orders. At the same time it is an established rule in the Indian army that a Commander-in-chief cannot order any troops on service without the sanction of the Governor-General, or of the government. Even in the common biennial or triennial relief the order is prefaced with the words: "With the sanction of government." The Governor-General being, in the present instance, on the field, was, de facto, the government. As Louis XIV. said: L'état? C'est moi.

Great uncertainty if not mystery prevailed in our army as to the probability of the Sikhs crossing the Sutlej. The Blue Book comes to our aid in deciding upon such a probability. It was argued that in 1843 the Sikhs did threaten to cross, but thought better of it and forebore; and therefore they might do the same now. But all the politicals knew well enough that the Punts and Punchees were no longer under the control of the Durbar as they were in 1843, but were more likely than not, to act in open defiance of it.

There were two officers, however, of great political talent, whose official position enabled them to know more of the feelings of the Sikhs, and of the probability of such a step than most others; one was Major G. Broadfoot of the 34th Madras Native Infantry, who had held the office of British Agent for Sikh affairs since November 1844, and who had acted as engineer in the celebrated defence of Jellalabad, the heroes of which obtained the well merited Roman distinction of a mural crown; the other was Captain P. Nicolson, 28th Bengal Native Infantry who had been appointed his assistant. Captain Nicolson was in Affghanistan in 1838-39, and was deputed to conduct the traitor Dost Mahomed Khan to Calcutta, and afterwards to Saharunpore. This officer had had seven years' experience of the politics of the Affghans and the Sikhs. At this juncture he was with Major General Sir John H. Littler at Ferozepore. He was in the daily receipt of intelligence from Lahore, and knew that the Sikhs would cross, for he wrote to Calcutta on the 9th of October, 1845, that "he believed the Sikhs would cross." What! because Major Broadfoot knew that the Sikhs had made an empty threat to cross in 1843, was it therefore improbable, that, being encamped for a long time, on the right bank of the Sutlej, menacing the Durbar at Lahore, from whence they marched in defiance of their government and of their chief, whom they compelled to join them, they would execute their threat under these circumstances?

Major Broadfoot was the Governor-General's agent, and as such was the officer to whom he looked for intelligence, Captain Nicolson was his subordinate; the Major doubted the Captain's intelligence, because he had received no other information to induce him to believe that the rebellious and infatuated Khalsa (or royal) troops would dare to cross. If they threatened to cross in 1843 without carrying that threat into execution, why might they not do the same in 1845? But this was not good logic; the inference was against him; because in 1843 they were obedient to the Durbar, and in 1845 they acted in defiance of it.

It would be useless at this distant period to enter into the discussion which arose in India, and was afterwards taken up with much warmth in England, as to the correctness of the views entertained by these officers on the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs. The relative views of those two officers were then and are still sustained by their respective friends; but as far as we can individually offer an opinion, and as it seemed to many at the time, there is great difficulty in arriving at a decision as to the rights of the question at issue. It is true that Major Broadfoot, as the superior officer, might be presumed to be in a position for obtaining access to sources of information from which his subordinate was debarred. In a military point of view, this position must always carry its due weight in the scale of probable authentic intelligence, and should have a preponderating influence in ultimate proceedings, especially in such a country as India, and among such a people as we were then dealing with.

On the other hand, it is by no means uncommon for a subordinate in an important position, to have access directly, and indirectly, to authentic intelligence from which his superior may be shut out, and such a subordinate, knowing his duties and his means of intelligence, can constantly elicit facts in a variety of ways, especially from a hostile source, from which his superior is excluded.

Now, in reference to the position of Captain Nicolson at this juncture, and for a long period antecedent, we are decidedly of opinion that his information and impressions were correct: at the same time we do not consider that the admission of this circumstance can warrant any one to seek, or in justice desire, to disparage the opinions of Major Broadfoot. He, no doubt, had strong grounds for arriving at the conclusion that he did, as the information upon which he acted coincided with his own predilections, and for persisting in these views, even in the face of equally strong opinions on the part of Captain Nicolson.

Officers will, and must, differ on points like the one at issue; but we do not hesitate to say, that Major Broadfoot's views have subjected him to no small share of obloquy and censure. It is, however, important to bear in mind, that in no country, and among no class of people in the world, is there so much cause for a difference of opinion as among military men in India, especially on such a question as that under consideration. The character of the Sikhs, their former empty and vacillating tactics, made the crossing of the Sutlej a matter of uncertainty, even up to a few days of their actual transit; and, to the very last moment, some of their own people were doubtful on the point. This has always been a piece of oriental policy.

It cannot be denied, that the Sikhs had considerable cause for provocation. The sequestration of the two Sikh villages near Loodianna, by the British government, early in November, was the culminating point, and left no doubt of our aggressive intentions on the minds of the Sikhs. Their suspicions had long been awakened by our proceedings—by the rumours of boats preparing at Bombay, to form pontoons across the Sutlej—of our equipping troops in Scinde, for a march on Mooltan—and reinforcing our frontier stations with men and ammunition. They persuaded themselves that the policy of our government was territorial aggrandizement, and that war was inevitable. This feeling was shared by the mass of the Sikh population. The Durbar sitting at Lahore, however, knew well enough that the British government would not take the initiative; but it had completely lost the confidence and allegiance of the army by its internal dissensions, and the supine weakness and luxurious indolence of the chiefs of the Punjaub. The Sikh soldiery used to assemble in groups round the tomb of Runjeet Singh, vowing to defend with their lives all that belonged to the commonwealth of Govind—that they would never suffer the kingdom of Lahore to be occupied by the British strangers, but stand ready to march, or give the invaders battle on their own ground.

Thus, led on from one step to another, the Sikhs declared war on the 17th of November, and by an overt act broke the solemn treaty of alliance with our government; they crossed the Sutlej on the 13th of December, and on the 14th took up a position in the immediate vicinity of Ferozepore.

This treaty of alliance between the British government and the Maharajah had been concluded in April, 1809; being occasioned by the aggressions of Runjeet Singh upon the territories of the chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej provinces, who claimed the British protection.[1]

In Sir David Ochterlony's proclamation,[2] which was issued at the same time, it was especially stated, "That the force of cavalry and infantry which may have crossed to this side of the river Sutlej, must be recalled to the other side, to the country of the Maharajah. This communication is made solely with the view of publishing the sentiments of the British, and of ascertaining those of the Maharajah. The British are confident that the Maharajah will consider the contents of this precept as redounding to his real advantage, and as affording a conspicuous proof of their friendship; that with their capacity for war, they are also intent on peace."

There can be no question, that so long as Runjeet Singh held the government, this and subsequent treaties would have remained inviolate. He knew the power and influence of the English well enough to desire their friendship, rather than their enmity. But this was not the case with his successors, whose policy was guided by views of self-aggrandizement, rather than by the weal of their people, by which they lost their hold over them.

Up to this time, the British had adopted only precautionary measures for the protection of their frontier states. The Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, had joined the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, at Umballa, early in December; and as soon as the rumour gained ground, that the Sikh forces were marching towards the Sutlej, the troops in the upper provinces received marching orders, and all were speedily on the move. The corps stationed at Umballa, Loodianna, and Ferozepore, amounted to about 30,000 men, with 70 field-guns; and as Ferozepore, which was then occupied by Sir John Littler, was the most exposed, the troops from Umballa were sent to his support, and only a small garrison was left at Loodianna, in order that as large a body of available men as possible, should be placed at the disposal of Sir H. Gough to give battle to the Sikhs, should they carry out their threat of crossing the Sutlej.

This, as we have seen, they actually did on the 13th; but so great was the influence which Captain Nicolson exercised over some of their chiefs, that he prevailed upon Lall Singh to divide his forces; and it was only a division of the Sikhs which fought at Moodkee on the 18th of December.

The Sikh army numbered from 35,000 to 40,000 men, with 50 pieces of heavy artillery, besides a reserve force stationed near Loodianna, to act according to circumstances. The army of invasion consequently more than doubled that of the British. Notwithstanding the jealousy, mistrust, and treachery which prevailed in the Sikh army, in one thing they were agreed, that they would rid the commonwealth of Govind, of their hated British allies; and that in order to accomplish this, it behoved every individual to act as if the result depended upon himself alone. The Sikhs were commanded by Tej Singh, an officer of considerable talent. They took up an entrenched position at Ferozeshah, an inconsiderable village about 10 miles from Ferozepore and the same distance from Moodkee.

General Sir John Littler was, as we have stated, lying at Ferozepore with a garrison of about 10,000 men. As the Sikhs appeared to threaten the town, the gallant general immediately led out his men, and offered them battle; this they declined, mainly it would appear, from the double dealing and artful conduct of Lall Singh and Tej Singh, who, uncertain as to the result of the present movement, were anxious to remain friends with both parties.

The head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief were at Umballa about 150 miles from Moodkee. His Excellency[3] broke up his camp on the 11th, and by forced marches arrived at the village of Moodkee on the 18th. The Governor-General was a little in advance of his Excellency, and rode over to Loodianna to inspect the troops. Finding that post secure from an attack, he dispatched about 5,000 of the garrison to guard the important grain depôt of Bussean.

On the 18th of December, the Commander-in-Chief, with the Umballa division of the army arrived at Moodkee, and was immediately joined by the Loodianna division. On reaching Moodkee there was no longer any doubt as to the whereabouts of the Sikh forces. Orders were immediately issued by the deputy adjutant-general to a brigadier, that he should be ready for duty next day; in other words, that he should command the advance guard. This was about twelve o'clock in the day, when the officers were in the mess tent at tiffin. Two young officers of the 16th Native Grenadiers overheard the order: "You are brigadier for to-morrow; the army will march early in the morning to attack the Sikhs, who are known to be ten miles off." They were still discussing the glorious prospect of an encounter with the Sikhs, when orders arrived in camp for "all hands to turn out," Major Broadfoot having received intelligence that the Sikhs were near. The order had been sent by Lord Hardinge,—every inch a soldier, but who at that time had not yet been appointed second in command to the Commander-in-Chief.

The cavalry and horse artillery darted off to the right front; the infantry followed; it was a short affair. Lord Gough did not at first credit the report: "The Sikhs are coming!" Like a true Irish soldier, he would have a view of them before he could make up his mind—but he was soon convinced of the reality of the rumour. Major Broadfoot, galloping up to their position, was fired on; both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were, it is said, at one time nearly captured. The Governor-General, on the other hand, promptly put the troops in motion: being himself an old Peninsular officer, he was an excellent judge of the matter. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief could not have done otherwise, but there was not time to send to him: the urgency of the occasion satisfies the mind of all military men; by a delay the Sikhs might have attacked the British.

Napoleon and other great generals "always anticipated the attack." They who attack have the advantage of deciding on the form of attack; those who await it, have no certainty where it may be made.

The battle of Moodkee was, as we have said, a short affair. The Sikhs headed by Lall Singh, opened with a heavy cannonade, but were answered by a brisk fire from the English; the enemy's rear was then attacked by a brilliant cavalry movement which routed him; and night put a stop to the carnage. The Sikhs were defeated with a loss of 17 guns. That of the British was very great; they had 215 killed, and 657 wounded. Among the killed were Sir Robert Sale and Sir John M^cCaskill. It is doubtful whether the addition of the 9th Lancers would have been of service at the battle of Moodkee, because there was no extended field for cavalry movements: at Ferozeshah, however, they would have been of eminent use, for on the the second day (December 22nd,) Tej Singh advanced with a large force of horse artillery; and I have heard it deeply regretted by officers present in this action, that we were not at hand to complete the rout of the brave Sikhs.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Appendix I.

[2] See Appendix, II.

[3] The Commander-in-Chief is always so styled; the Governor-General never.

[CHAPTER II.]

Colonel Campbell's Advance—Provisions required—Camp Followers—Samana—The Doabs—Gooroo Govind—The Akalees, their quoits—Sikhs attack Ahmed Shah—Maha Singh—Maharattas—General Thomas—Runjeet Singh—Holcar—Sir Charles Metcalfe—Ochterlony's Proclamation—The Akalees routed—Generals Allard and Ventura—Treaty with Runjeet—Runjeet's Army—Runjeet's Death—Shere Singh Murdered—Dhuleep Singh—Ajean Khan—Battle of Moodkee.

In the meanwhile the force under Colonel Campbell was rapidly advancing to the scene of action. It was as we have stated, nearly 3,000 strong, and attended by about 10,000 or 11,000 camp followers, so that we were in all 13,000 or 14,000 assembled in camp, besides numerous elephants, camels, bullocks, horses, ponies, &c. I will here remark for what purposes camp followers are allowed. Every officer, according to his rank, will have from ten to twenty or twenty-five servants; the Bengal officers and others have more than those of Madras and Bombay; but the latter servants cost as much as the Bengalese. If a polki (or palanquin) be kept, then six bearers well be required; for every horse two servants, namely a groom and a grass-cutter;[4] for every elephant, two; for camels, one to every three is the usual number; for every two bullocks, one servant is allowed. Besides these there is a host of tent pitchers, store Lascars, etc.

Let us next consider the quantity of provisions required for our force; calculating the 9th Lancers at 800 horses (including officers' chargers,) the consumption of gram, a kind of vetch, daily would be, 800 × 5 = 4,000 seers, or 8,000 lbs. = 71 cwt. 48 lbs. The reader may hence form some idea of the quantity of corn required for 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry horses, or including horse artillery, waggon and private horses, say 5,000, and there would be a consumption of about 440 or 450 cwt. of gram daily. Then each elephant consumes 30 lbs. of atta (flour) cakes;[5] each camel public and private is allowed 6 lbs. of gram, and a bullock 5 or 6 lbs. daily. The elephant likewise gets forage, such as the leaves of trees; and if he can meet with the branch of a tree he is all the happier, for with it he gracefully fans away the flies from himself or his driver: the poor animal suffers greatly from the mosquito bite. The Mahāwat, or elephant-keeper puts the rice in a whisp of rice straw, making a kind of bowl for the food, which is boiled. The camels, too, get bhoosa, or split straw, when it can be procured, otherwise the leaves of trees: they prefer those of the Imlee, Peepul, Babool, and Burh (fig-tree). The bullocks eat bhoosa or karbi, the stalk of Joar or Bajra (the Holcus Sorgum and Spicatus). If we calculate the quantity of grain consumed in an army of 10,000, 30,000, or 40,000 men, the result will be enormous, and we can only marvel where such supplies are obtained.

The Duke of Wellington[6] when in India, often marched with 30,000, or 40,000 bullock-loads of grain, or 600,000, or 800,000 lbs. or 53,571, or 71,428 cwt. His grace's plan was never to open these grain bags so long as he could get supplies from the villages.

Let the reader imagine an Indian army of 20,000 men with its 60,000, 70,000, or even 80,000 camp followers, all of whom must be fed daily. Again, the number of hackeries, or carts, with an army of 20,000 or 25,000 men, varies from 700, to 12,000 or more, (for much depends upon whether there is a siege train), drawn by two, three, or four bullocks each, carrying shot, shells, and stores, and moving at the rate of two miles an hour, the whole line of march from the old to the new ground. Allowing 10 doolies, or light palanquins, for every European troop or company, for the conveyance of the sick or wounded men, there would be 80 required for the 9th Lancers, and as each dooly needs 6 bearers we had 480 bearers in our corps alone. In a European infantry regiment of 10 companies there will be 10 × 10 = 100; 100 × 6 = 600 bearers. A native corps is allowed only one for a troop or company, but some extra ones accompany the field hospital. Now such an army would have at least 5,000 dooly bearers, besides those which are required for luxurious officers, who have been seen, though, I am happy to say, rarely, to ride in palanquins.

The English waggon train establishment is said not to be good. A veterinary surgeon has published a work on the use of a light cart, with cross seats on springs; but before it can be generally adopted, the roads must be improved. In the Affghan war they used Kajawahs, that is a frame-work on each side of the camel, for two men.

On the 23rd of December, our force marched to Samana, a large old town, now completely in ruins, in the province of Delhi. It is in the Rajah of Pattiala's country, and is about seventeen miles distant from Pattiala, and seventy miles from Kurnaul. It was a very fatiguing march; the road during the last few miles being bad, rough and sandy; this greatly impeded the elephants who dragged the guns, and our progress was very slow; so slow indeed that at six o'clock in the afternoon the men had not dined. In cantonments one o'clock is the usual hour, but in marching to meet an enemy the dinner hour is uncertain. Yesterday and to-day we were obliged to breakfast upon what chance threw in our way.

On service with Lord Lake, it is said that frequently neither officers nor men got any breakfast at all, but broke their fast at sunset; similar privations no doubt often occurred in the Peninsula; but this is very undesirable when it can be obviated, for especially in hot countries, European soldiers require more nourishment than in colder climates.

Samana contains a large brick-built fort; it appears at one time to have been very strong, but is now falling to decay. There are many of these forts, and their origin is long anterior to 1809, when the British obtained possession of the protected Sikh states. They were built by Runjeet Singh, when he was lord and master of the country on the left bank of the Sutlej, governing, in fact, the whole district between the Jumna and the Sutlej. At that time he fortified all the towns and villages, to defend not only the inhabitants against the attacks of their neighbours, but also to prevent the cattle sheltered under the walls, from being carried off by marauders.

Before proceeding further on our route, we will take a brief survey of the territory of the Sikhs, and of the history of the singular race whom we were marching to encounter.

The Punjaub, or country of five waters, from punj, "five," and āb, "water," forms the northern portion of the plain of the Indus. It covers an area of 6,000 geographical miles, and extends from the lower ranges of the Himalaya mountains to the confluence of the Chenāb with the Indus. The four streams or arms of the Indus which rise in the Himalayas, namely, the Jelum, the Chenāb, the Rāvee and the Sutlej, intersect the country, and, with the Indus, divide it into four Doabs or Provinces.

The first Doab ("country between two rivers"), lying between the Indus and the Jelum, is 147 miles in breadth; this Doab is intersected with defiles and mountain chains, and covered with thickets. It is the worst cultivated, the most barren and thinly peopled of all the Doabs.

The second Doab is formed by the rivers Jelum and Chenāb. At its narrowest breadth it is forty-six miles across; this country is flat, except the low range of hills terminating the beds of rock salt that run through the Jelum. It is capable of very improved cultivation.

The third Doab lies between the Chenāb and the Rāvee. This Doab might with the greatest ease be converted into a most fertile country, were the land irrigated by the mountain streams, which could be conveyed in artificial canals. It is seventy-six miles in breadth at its widest part.

The fourth Doab is considerably the smallest, being only forty-four miles in breadth. It, however, comprises some of the most important cities, namely, Lahore, Umritsur and Kussoor. It lies between the Rāvee and the Sutlej.

Besides this fine country, the rule of the Sikhs at this time extended over the rich Province of Mooltan, on the right bank of the Indus. The territory under the sway of the Maharajah might be estimated at 8,000 geographical square miles, with a population of about 5,000,000 inhabitants, and an annual revenue of between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000 sterling.

The Sikhs, or "Disciples," were originally a religious sect, which arose among the inhabitants of the Punjaub as late as the close of the fifteenth century. Their leader was Nānak, who succeeded in drawing thousands of enthusiasts after him. He was a disciple of Kahir, and consequently a Hindoo deist; he upheld the principle of universal toleration, calling upon his followers to worship the one invisible God, and to lead a virtuous life. He died at the age of seventy, in 1539. His doctrines and writings tended greatly to elevate the mind, and reform the morals of his disciples. The Sikhs believe that the soul of Nānak has transmigrated into the body of each succeeding Gooroo, or teacher.

The spirit of religious toleration adopted by the Sikhs, was odious in the eyes of the bigoted Mahomedans, and Arjoon, their chief, who was celebrated not only for his piety, but for his wisdom and skill as a legislator, was falsely accused, and put to death, by the Mogul, in 1606. Arjoon converted the obscure hamlet of Umritsur into a city of great importance, by making it the seat of his disciples, and the place of the Sikhs' pilgrimage. His cruel death transformed the quiet and peaceable Sikhs into a warlike nation; their spirit was roused, and, led on by Hur Govind, the son of their murdered priest, they determined to avenge themselves upon his assassins. The Mogul, however, was too mighty for them; and they were forced to retreat into the mountain districts beyond Lahore.

After a series of sanguinary engagements, in which the Mahomedans were successful, a powerful opponent to the infidel faith and arms, was raised up, in the person of Gooroo Govind, grandson of Hur Govind, in 1675. He effected a radical change in the character, laws, and institutions of the Sikhs, by the abolition of caste, and the introduction of religious, social and military reforms. Amidst the surrounding spiritual darkness, Govind had comparatively enlightened views of the Deity; he abhorred idol worship, and declared that there was but one Lord, and that the invisible God, the Creator of heaven and earth, could not be represented by any painted or graven image; and that as He could be seen only by the eye of faith, He must be worshipped in sincerity and truth. Fearful that he himself might hereafter become an object of religious adoration, Govind denounced all who should regard him as a divinity, alleging that it was his highest ambition that his spirit should return to God after his death.

In the full persuasion, that the only hope of successfully opposing the Mahomedan power was by throwing open the ranks of the army to men of every grade and profession, he adopted the wise and politic measure of abolishing the system of caste. This step was at first highly offensive, especially to the Brahmins, and many quitted the community; but the majority of the Sikhs rejoiced at the breaking down of this barrier to all social and religious intercourse. His expectations, however, were more than realized; vast multitudes joined his ranks, he caused each of his followers to wear a peculiar dress, to adopt the name of Singh, or soldier, and to suffer their beard and hair to grow; he completely reorganized the army, divided his followers into troops and bands, and placed them under the command of able and confidential men.

A special corps was formed of the "Akalees," the Immortals, or Soldiers of God, they wore a blue dress and steel bracelets, and were provided with a quoit, which they carried either round their pointed turbans or at their side; this quoit is a flat iron ring, from eight to fourteen inches in diameter, the outer edge is extremely sharp; they twirl this weapon round their finger or on a stick, and fling it to a distance with such dexterity and precision, that the head of the destined victim is often severed from his body.

In proportion as the Mahomedan power declined, that of the Sikhs rose into importance. They were bound together by the strong ties of a fervid common faith; and this gave them unity of purpose, and consequent strength in operation.

After various struggles for independence, in which they displayed heroism amounting even to martyrdom, they boldly attacked Ahmed Shah, the king of Affghanistan on his first invasion of India, in 1747. They were, however, dispersed by Mere Munroo, and expelled from Umritsur by Timoor, the son of Ahmed Shah, who was appointed governor of the Punjaub. Strong in the faith of Govind, and in his all-prevailing name they rallied their forces, drove out the Affghans, and re-occupied Lahore in 1756.

About this time they called in the aid of the Maharattas, gained several victories, and fortified their towns. In 1762, they were again attacked by Ahmed Shah, who completely routed them, but with their native energy and warlike prowess, they once more gathered their scattered forces, and in 1763 slew the Affghan governor, and defeated his army in the plains of Sirhind, when they took undisputed possession of the country from the Sutlej to the Jumna, and partitioned it among their chiefs.

They successfully defeated a seventh attack made by Ahmed Shah; and after ejecting the governor of Lahore, they took possession of the territory from the Jelum to the Sutlej. Like the former acquisition, it was divided among their chiefs.

During the brief period of peace which now intervened, the Sikhs settled the boundaries of their respective districts, and more firmly established their federal government, which, properly speaking, may be styled a theocratic feudal confederation, inasmuch as they considered God as the Head and Leader of their confraternity. They held stated councils, or conclaves, which they called "gooroo-moottas," in which they settled their civil and religious affairs. The nation was divided into twelve confederacies or "misls," from an Arabic word signifying "equal," each "misl" being under the control of a sirdar or chief.

Their respite from war was not, however, of long duration; for in 1767, Ahmed Shah made an eighth and last attempt to reconquer the Punjaub. Being, however, deserted by 12,000 of his own troops, he was compelled to retire, and had scarcely re-crossed the Indus when he was besieged at Rhotas, by the grandfather of Runjeet Singh; and the Sikhs took possession of this stronghold in 1768.

Timoor, the son of the veteran Shah, had various conflicts with the Sikhs; and in 1779 reconquered the city of Mooltan, which they had taken seven years before. He died in 1793, leaving the Sikhs undisputed masters of the Upper Punjaub.

Maha Singh, though originally an obscure sirdar, soon rose by his military skill to be the most influential chief in the Punjaub. With the view of cementing his power, he espoused his only son, Runjeet Singh, to the daughter of Sudda Kour. Maha Singh died at the early age of twenty-seven, leaving Runjeet Singh to succeed him in the government. He was a boy of only eleven years of age, having been born in 1792, at Gujeranwalla, forty-seven miles from Lahore.

From a very early age, Runjeet Singh began to display that wisdom and valour, combined with prompt decision and firmness of character, which distinguished him through life. He carved out with his sword his own colossal position in the Punjaub; and, at the age of twenty, expelled the Sikh chiefs, Ischet Singh, Muhuc Singh and Sahib Singh, who opposed him. On the second invasion and retreat of Shah Zeman, king of Cabool, Runjeet Singh acquired the object of his ambition—the wealthy kingdom of Lahore, with the royal investiture and title of Maharajah.

About this time the star of the Maharattas again rose in the Northern Provinces, under their able leader, Madhajee Sindhia, who, in 1785, formed an alliance with the Sikhs, and threatened the kingdom of Oude, then under the protection of the British. Runjeet, however, soon became jealous of his allies; and finding that they were likely to prove troublesome, he had recourse to the strongest measures to check their growing influence.

One of the generals of the Maharatta forces was an English adventurer, named George Thomas. He came to India in 1781, in a British man-of-war; he was originally a common sailor, but rose to be quarter-master, and on his arrival in India entered the service of the native chiefs. He was sent to oppose the combined forces of the Sikhs. Leaving a competent force for the defence of Jeypore, which was then threatened with an attack from another quarter, he marched to Kurnaul, where the Sikhs lay encamped. Here four successive engagements took place, in which the Maharattas lost 500 men, and the Sikhs about 1,000. Both parties at last inclining to peace, a treaty was concluded, by which the Sikhs agreed to evacuate the Province. In 1800, General Thomas again entered the Sikh country, with a body of 5,000 men and sixty pieces of artillery. He was now opposed by the youthful Maharajah, Runjeet Singh; but the issue was adverse to the Sikhs. Nor was it surprising that General Thomas with a well disciplined army of 5,000 men, and sixty guns[7] should defeat a young chief of twenty-two years of age.

The British government was not ignorant of the warlike character and growing power of the Sikhs. As far back as the year 1784, Warren Hastings placed a British agent at the court of Delhi, in order to watch the Sikhs, and deter them from making any attempt upon the kingdom of Oude.

The Sikhs, however, finding the Maharattas too powerful for them, applied to the British Resident, to enter with them into a defensive alliance against their common foe, at the same time placing at the disposal of the British a body of 30,000 men, whom they had stationed at Delhi to watch the Maharattas.

In the year 1805, the ambitious spirit of Holcar, the enterprising Mahomedan leader of the Maharatta forces, determined him to invade Upper India, and to invest Delhi. He met with a powerful resistance from Lord Lake, who drove him beyond the Sutlej, where he expected to find support from the Sikhs. Runjeet Singh had penetrated the Doab, between the Chenāb and the Indus. He had a meeting with Holcar at Umritsur, but finding it more to his interest to make friends with the English, the wily Maharajah put Holcar off, under the pretext that he must first reduce the Pathans of Kussoor. Friendly relations were then established with the British;[8] Runjeet Singh visited Lord Lake's camp in disguise, and a treaty was concluded, by which the English agreed not to encroach upon the Sikhs' territories so long as the chiefs of the Punjaub continued to maintain friendly relations.

Runjeet Singh, speaking of this circumstance some time afterwards to Sir John Malcolm, remarks, that he "was very glad to get rid of two such troublesome guests," namely, Holcar and the British. It was a curious coincidence that both Runjeet Singh and Holcar had each but one eye, but those eyes were piercing, nor were they disliked by the fair sex, if report speak true.

The news of the intended invasion of India by Napoleon, in 1808, spread a panic through the country, and the British government took instant measures to ascertain how far they could rely on the support of the various native princes. The most powerful and important of these was Runjeet Singh; and Sir Charles Metcalfe was accordingly despatched to the court of Lahore as British Envoy. The Maharajah was at that time engaged in the subjugation of some of the petty independent Sikh princes. His continued aggressions upon the Cis-Sutlej states, several of which he had made tributary, induced the princes of Sirhind to place themselves under British protection, and the envoy was charged with a remonstrance to Runjeet Singh upon this subject.

He received the envoy at Kussoor, which he had just conquered, and seemed more intent upon the enlargement and defence of his own borders, than alive to the dangers of a French invasion. So far from entering into the views of the British government on the necessity of a defensive alliance between them and the Sikhs and Affghans, in order to oppose the ambitious designs of Napoleon, Runjeet Singh replied, that, as the head of the whole Sikh population, and as master of Lahore, he had an indisputable right to the enlargement of his own territories, and scorned the attempts of the British to confine him to the right bank of the Sutlej. He abruptly broke off the negotiation, and made a third invasion into the Cis-Sutlej territory; the British envoy remonstrated against these open acts of hostility, and remained on the banks of the Sutlej until the Maharajah returned victorious from the conquest of Fureedkot and Umballa.

The British government hereupon again remonstrated, and declared to him, through Sir Charles Metcalfe, that they would not tolerate any superior authority in these parts, as the whole country, from the Jumna to the Sutlej, was under their protection. To give efficacy to this remonstrance, they despatched a corps under Colonel Ochterlony, and a reserve corps under Colonel St. Leger. The former advanced to the Sutlej, and in the beginning of February, 1809, he issued a proclamation declaring the Cis-Sutlej states to be under British protection.[9] The proclamation ordered that the fortresses on the left bank of the Sutlej should be razed, and the lands restored to their ancient possessors: that all the troops which had crossed the Sutlej should be recalled by the Maharajah to his side, and that in future they should never advance into the countries of the chiefs situated on the left bank of the river, who had placed themselves under the protection of the British government. That the British government would maintain perpetual friendship with the government of Lahore, and have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Rajah to the north of the Sutlej; but that in the event of any violation of these stipulations, the treaty should be null and void.

An apparently trivial circumstance, coupled with the apprehension lest the remaining independent states might break their allegiance with him for that of the British, favoured the demands of the envoy, and convinced the Maharajah that the British soldiers far surpassed his own. Sir Charles was at this time in the Sikh camp at Umritsur, and was attended by an escort of only two companies of native troops and sixteen horsemen. The festival of the Muharram was being celebrated by his Mahomedan attendants. The Akalees looked upon this as an insult, collected a body of the Sikhs, and attacked the envoy's camp with a round of musketry. The small escort immediately seized their arms; and, though their assailants were ten times more numerous than themselves, they completely routed them with considerable loss. Runjeet Singh was attracted by the uproar, and arrived just as the little band of brave Sepoys had gained the victory. Their valour had a great effect upon him; he apologized to the envoy for the insult offered by his people, expressed his high admiration of the discipline and courage of the British troops, and declared himself ready to sign the wished for treaty, which he accordingly did on the 5th of April, 1809.

Two years after, in 1811, when the Goorkhas threatened to invade his dominions, and asked the British to aid them in their attempt, Runjeet Singh obtained permission from the Governor-General, not only to cross the Sutlej and fight the enemy in their mountain recesses, but received the assurance, that, if the Goorkhas should descend into the plains of Sirhind, he should receive the assistance of British troops, in maintaining inviolate the passage of the Sutlej.

This assurance allayed his apprehensions and jealousy, of the influence and power of the British. He continued incessantly engaged in extending his dominions and increasing his army. Sword in hand, he conquered Mooltan and Cashmere; while his warfare with his formidable foes, the Affghans, was unabated, till he finally succeeded in obtaining possession of Peshawur, through the treachery of the brother of Dost Mahomed, whom Runjeet had bribed with the large promise of an annual pension of two lakhs. The continued intestine disputes of the minor states, induced the British government to issue the proclamation of 1811.[10]

It was in 1822, that Runjeet first received into his service two foreign officers, MM. Allard and Ventura; the former being a Frenchman, the latter an Italian. After the fall of Napoleon, these officers had in vain sought an honourable employment in Persia, and, therefore, turned to the warlike chief of Lahore. He gave them a most cordial and brilliant reception, and commissioned them to organize his army on the French system; which they did with great success. Each of these officers had a salary of 50,000 rupees, or £5,000. sterling annually. Four years afterwards, they were followed by Generals Court and Avitabile. It was to these officers that the Sikh chief owed the highly efficient state of his army, which consisted of a well disciplined body of 50,000 men, besides 100,000 Irregulars. Lahore and Umritsur were made the depôts of arms; and here cannon foundries, powder magazines and arsenals were established.

At times Runjeet, and still more his chiefs, felt jealous, lest too much authority should be given to these European officers; for which reason he rather wished them to instruct than to command,[11] fearing they might prove dangerous to the state.

In the summer of 1831, his late Majesty King William IV. despatched Sir Alexander Burnes to Lahore, to take charge of a splendid present of horses from His Britannic Majesty to the Maharajah. Runjeet Singh was then at the height of his power; respected by his friends, and dreaded by his foes. The veteran hero was flattered by receiving this distinguished honour from the monarch of a nation which he highly venerated, and whose superiority in every respect he acknowledged. He gave Sir Alexander Burnes a brilliant reception; and the esteem which he thus manifested for the English, led to several interviews between himself and the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, at Rooper, in October, 1831.

The result of these interviews was a treaty of commerce and navigation, to which a supplementary treaty was afterwards added, between Runjeet Singh and the British, by which it was agreed, that the merchants and traders should pay a certain fixed duty, in lieu of the former arbitrary exactions.[12]

The meeting at Rooper, in October, 1831, between the Governor-General and Runjeet Singh, caused a great display of British and Sikh troops. An officer who was present on this occasion, told me that the movements of the Sikh battalions were very slow, and to the beat of drum: the cavalry, mostly wearing bright cuirasses, looked glittering and showy; whilst many of the gun carriages seemed as if a long march over a rough road would break them down. The word of command was always given in French.

In March, 1837, the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Fane, G.C.B., visited Lahore, on the occasion of the marriage of Runjeet's grandson, Nou Nehal Singh. The entertainment was on a magnificent scale, and cost between ten and eleven lakhs of rupees, or between £100,000 and £110,000 sterling. Here there was again a grand military display, and feats of arms. On this occasion, Runjeet Singh established an order of Knighthood, called "the Star of the Punjaub." He bestowed the Order upon Colonels Torrens, Churchill, Lumley, and Dunlop; the Adjutants-General, and Quartermasters-General, of the Queen's and Company's armies respectively. The investiture, with the Order, took place afterwards at Simla, at the head-quarters of Sir Henry Fane. All these individuals, donor and receivers, are now dead. It was the setting star of Runjeet Singh, for he died about two years after, in June, 1839.

The appearance and discipline of Runjeet's army, was the admiration of all military beholders. In December, 1838, before the Bengal column marched from Ferozepore to Cabool, viâ Scinde and Candahar, there was a review of the British troops under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane. Several Sikh soldiers who were present, were heard to make very insolent remarks, and twisted their moustachoes, a gross affront to any one, especially to an officer. They asserted that their troops could manœuvre much better, etc. A day or two afterwards the Sikhs gave a review, and actually copied all the British evolutions, with the greatest accuracy and precision. The infantry movements were also more rapid than at Rooper, in 1831.

Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, in the same month, visited Runjeet Singh, at Lahore, when another display of English and Sikh troops took place. It was on the occasion of the review of our troops, that his Lordship, who was a bad rider, had a serious fall from his horse. His death would have been a great blow.

Lord Auckland, at that time, asked permission of the Maharajah to allow the British troops a free passage through his territory, on their march to Cabool, and to join his forces with those of the British, in this expedition into Affghanistan. This Runjeet Singh acceded to rather as a matter of necessity than of choice. Though only 59 years of age, his mind and body had become so enfeebled by his irregular course of life, that during his interview with Lord Auckland, his speech was already affected. He sank rapidly, from dropsy, and was finally carried off by paralysis.

When the death of their great chief was approaching, the army was drawn up in a line, and the dying monarch was carried in a litter through the ranks. As the procession moved slowly along, his favourite minister, Dhean Singh, appeared, to receive orders from his expiring sovereign, and informed the army, that Runjeet Singh declared, that his son, Khurruk Singh, should succeed him, and that Dhean Singh should be the chief minister of the kingdom. The soldiers received this intimation in perfect silence. According to the custom of the Sikhs, the body of the Maharajah was burnt the next day, before the gates of his palace, in the presence of all the great persons of the kingdom, and of the assembled troops. Four of his wives, two of whom were only sixteen years of age, and endowed with great personal beauty, together with seven of his concubines, committed themselves to the flames with his body. Dhean Singh also made a semblance of profound grief, and appeared to be in the act of throwing himself upon the funeral pile, but was forcibly withheld by the family of the Maharajah.

The death of Runjeet Singh occasioned considerable difficulty in the management of the auxiliary Sikhs under Colonel Wade, the British agent at Lahore who was now with the British army, and had the command of the column that was to force the Khyber pass. This glorious achievement he accomplished from the 22nd to the 27th of June, when he made himself master of Ali Musjid. He was nobly sustained in this campaign by the troops of Runjeet Singh; and on the 6th of August, the army of the Indus entered Cabool and forced Dost Mahomed to fly to Bokhara.

Runjeet Singh was succeeded by his son Khurruk Singh, then thirty-seven years of age. He was a weak and luxurious prince, and was totally incompetent to the affairs of government. Soon after his accession he was seized with a severe illness, of which he died, in November, 1840. His son, Nou Nehal Singh, and the chief minister, Dhean were supposed to have been not altogether innocent of his death.

Nou Nehal Singh, who was nineteen years of age, inherited his grandfather's ambitious spirit, and could scarcely conceal his joy, even at his father's funeral pyre, on finding himself sovereign of Lahore. He hated the English, and dreaded the effect of their policy in procuring a clear passage for their troops through the Punjaub, and thus, by a chain of consecutive alliances, effecting a union between the southern provinces of India and the West of Europe. He was determined to give proof of this on the first favourable opportunity that might present itself; but the royal sceptre which had so long fired his youthful breast soon passed to another, for the same day that elevated him to the throne, saw him a corpse! On leaving the pile he thought to wash away his sins in the Rāvee, and as he was riding through the outer gateway of the palace, a large portion of the archway fell upon him, killed the friend who was riding at his side, and so severely wounded the young prince in the head, that he expired in three hours. For several days his death was kept a secret; by some, in order to give his mother time to come up, and by others, to secure the succession to Shere Singh, the reputed, and afterwards adopted, son of Runjeet Singh. After a fierce contest between the queen mother and Shere Singh, the latter ascended the throne.

Shere Singh, though he had compelled the troops to recognise him as king, was incapable of commanding them. They soon became insubordinate and committed the most violent excesses; and their lawless conduct gave rise to apprehensions of a general insurrection.

This so intimidated the merchants and wealthy inhabitants on both sides of the Sutlej, that they appealed to the English for protection. The Maharajah was fully sensible of the critical state of his position, and though he deprecated the interference of the British power, he considered it best to yield to the necessities of the case and listen to the advice of the British. For though educated at the most magnificent and warlike court in India, amid events which were calculated to call forth a chivalrous spirit, Shere Singh never manifested either valour or firmness of character, but was carried along by the tide of events, and swayed by the dominant minds of the age. He felt his own incapacity as a ruler, and for a long time was completely under the control of Dhean Singh.

During the disastrous campaign of Cabool in 1842, Shere Singh rendered great services to the English in the relief of the distressed garrison of Jellalabad, and provided more than the stipulated corps of 5,000 men on payment of the sum of two lakhs of rupees.

The Governor-General, in consequence of the state of Affghanistan, determined to place an army of reserve at Ferozepore, and took this occasion for proposing an interview with Shere Singh. The Maharajah, however, apprehensive of the result of such an interview, declined the proposed honour. Lord Ellenborough took offence at this, and Shere Singh despatched Dhean Singh and his own son, Perthaub Singh, to make an apology in person, which was accepted; and his Lordship returned the visit of the young prince.

The military Sikh escort which accompanied, them crossed the Sutlej, which was much swollen at the time by the late heavy rains, with a rapidity and skill that excited the admiration of the British officers. The prince was permitted to review the British forces, soon after which the Governor-General broke up the encampment, and Shere Singh was relieved from his dreaded foe.

Shere Singh was addicted to drunkenness and vice, and succumbed to the influence of unworthy favourites. He had become suspicious of Dhean Singh, and, at their instigation, was induced to sign a royal warrant for his execution. This order was shewn to Dhean Singh by the very men who had procured it. Incensed at the treachery and ingratitude of the man whom he had raised to the royal power, Dhean Singh, as prime minister, immediately signed an order for the assassination of Shere Singh himself, and placed it in the hands of Ajeet Singh, the favourite who had supplanted him, and who had before threatened to kill Shere Singh.

Both Shere Singh and his hopeful son, Perthaub Singh were treacherously murdered on the next day, September the 15th, 1843, by Ajeet and Lena Singh; and the wily minister, Dhean Singh, who had joined with them in the conspiracy, met with the same fate, at their hands, before the close of that very day.

Heera Singh, the son of Dhean Singh, called upon the army to avenge his father's murder. Ajeet and Lena Singh were surrounded the same night, and both met with their well-merited fate before the morning's dawn.

Dhuleep Singh, the reputed son of Runjeet Singh, who was only a few months old at the time of his father's death, and, consequently, now only four years of age, was proclaimed Maharajah. His mother, Chunda, appointed her brother, Jowahir Singh, prime minister; but he was disliked by the army, and cruelly murdered by them. The military were now masters of the state, and sought to make Goolab Singh, the oldest of Runjeet's favourites, vizier. Goolab being fully aware that his great wealth was the bait, kept them in a state of uncertainty as to his resolve; but, in the meantime, instigated them to march upon the British territories, with the intent of invasion.

Deceived by the promised support of Goolab, and buoyed up by exalted notions of their own military prowess and discipline, as well as animated by the desire of pillage, the Sikhs made sure of success. Though they had never seen the British troops in battle, the Khalsa soldiers considered themselves fully equal to contend against them. There is no doubt, and it is necessary to make the remark in order to account for the presumptuous conduct of the Sikhs, that our sad reverses at Cabool in 1841, and our retreat in 1842, had greatly affected the prestige of the British military character. Just as the failure of Lord Lake before Bhurtpore, in 1805, even after his victories in 1803 and 1804, had left the impression on the minds of the native princes, that we could not take forts.

Now the Sikhs under Runjeet Singh had defeated the Affghans under Ajean Khan, the elder brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, at Noushera (half way between Attock and Peshawur), in 1823. They imagined themselves superior, as soldiers, to the Affghans, and knew that the latter had defeated the British. They did not, however, bear in mind that our troops were destroyed in the retreat by the frost and snow. Lady Sale says, the first snow fell on the 26th of November. They, therefore, argued thus:—They had beaten the Affghans, and the Affghans had beaten the British; therefore the British were not invincible, and might be overcome by Sikh troops.

The disturbed state of the Lahore government during the latter part of the reign of Runjeet Singh, up to the present moment, had compelled the British government to introduce various precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier, on a scale which was opposed to the terms of the treaty of 1809. It is true that the British government had recognised their boy-king, Dhuleep Singh, who had been proclaimed by the army, but being of a naturally suspicious character, the Sikhs considered themselves in danger of invasion, and resolved to anticipate the British, and wage war, by crossing the Sutlej. They appointed Lall Singh, prime minister, or vizier, and Tej Singh, an officer of considerable talent and experience, commander-in-chief of the Sikh forces.

The British government demanded an explanation of this movement, but none being given, the Governor-General issued a proclamation,[13] declaring all the possessions and territories of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej to be confiscated and annexed to the British dominions; calling upon the inhabitants and their rulers to second the British government, he assured all who were peaceably disposed, of the protection of that government.

Thus the war was begun. The Sikhs, as we have seen, crossed the Sutlej with their heavy artillery on the 13th, on the 14th, marched to Ferozeshah, and, on the 18th, met the British forces, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough.

The battle of Moodkee, on the 18th of December, was their first battle with the English. This engagement they themselves allowed to be a defeat; but in that of Ferozeshah, three or four days later, they claimed the victory. Indeed many British officers have told me that it was a very desperate affair, and that it was fortunate the Sikhs were ignorant of their own power and resources. If this fact be held in recollection, when the reader comes to the battle of Sobraon, seven weeks later, he will see the necessity for a grand effort on their part; for another defeat or retreat would have been ruin to the Sikh cause.

Colonel Campbell's force was, as we have stated, nearly 3,000 strong, but the loss of the English in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, amounted to 3,291 men killed and wounded, and 804 horses; so that the arrival of this force would not replace the numbers lost. It was, therefore, necessary to draw troops from other quarters also, and concentrate them at the place of action.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] In the Dragoons, one groom is allowed by Government for every two horses, the other being paid by the soldiers themselves.

[5] In Bengal Proper, rice. These cakes are made just like those eaten by the men, but thicker and of coarser flour. No bad food on a pinch.

[6] Vide Despatches.

[7] See Appendix III.

[8] See Appendix IV.

[9] See Appendix V.

[10] See Appendix VI.

[11] In 1845, Allard was dead; Ventura, Court and Avitabile were in Europe; Cortland, son of Lieut.-Colonel Cortland, late of H.M. 31st Foot, who had entered the service of the Sikh leader, came over to the British. Colonel Hurbon, a Spanish officer, erected the works at Sobraon; still he was not a regular officer in the pay of the Sikh government, but was employed for the occasion by the troops.

[12] See Appendix VII.

[13] See Appendix VIII.

[CHAPTER III.]

Nidampore—Christmas-day—Munsorepore—Kotla Mullair—Phurawallee—Bussean—Surrender of Wudnee—Cession of Ferozepore—Bhaga Poorana—False Alarms—Roree Bukkur—Sir John Littler—Sir H.M. Wheeler—Ferozeshah—Aliwal—Sikh Forces—British Forces—Sikh Entrenchment—Returns of Killed and Wounded—Sir H. Hardinge—Battle of Ferozeshah—Sudden Attack by Tej Singh—His Blunder—Appearance of a field of Battle—Fate of the Wounded.

To resume our route. On December the 24th, Colonel Campbell's force marched to Nidampore, a small village; a distance of nine miles. Here we halted, with the prospect of spending a quiet Christmas Day. On this day, however, we received intelligence, in camp, of the battle of Ferozeshah, which had taken place on the 22nd of December; and that the Sikhs, driven from the field, had retired across the Sutlej. This day, therefore, instead of breathing peace and love, was employed in preparations for war with our determined foes: unlike the Romans at the siege of Jerusalem, when no operations were undertaken against the Jews on their Sabbaths and Holy days. In Europe, however, and indeed all over the world in the present age, all days are alike in regard to war. The heathen Sikhs, who keep sacred no day in the week, might attack us on any day, and at any hour; so that it was necessary in self-defence that we should be prepared for the enemy. Accordingly the services of the armourer-sergeant and his men were put in requisition to sharpen swords and lances, and all was ready for starting the next morning.

On the 26th, our troops began their march to the village of Munsorepore, a distance of ten miles, through a country abounding in jungle, which rendered it necessary to observe great caution on the march; and flanking parties were sent out to prevent a surprise. Our route lay through two villages, which appeared to be thinly peopled: the walls of the houses were in a state of decay, and altogether they presented a desolate and deserted appearance. This, however, was not extraordinary; for as the Sikhs had been located on the south side of the Sutlej for fourteen days, it was to be expected that the people would abandon their homes and fly to the desert.

On the 27th of December, our troops marched to Kotla Mullair, a distance of sixteen miles. This town is very long and densely built; the main street being peculiarly narrow.

On the 28th we marched to Phurawallee, the country of the Nabah Rajah, twelve miles over a flat country, and by an unmade road, but by no means bad. This was Sunday; and still no public service. Last night, a private of the Lancers shot himself dead; such an event is happily of rare occurrence, and it produced a deep impression upon both men and officers.

There was a report abroad in the bazaar to-day, that another battle had taken place; but there was no foundation for the rumour. The Sikhs, it will be seen, did not meditate fighting again so soon.

On the 29th, we proceeded to Bussean, a long twelve miles' march through a flat and open country. The detachment had under its charge 4,300,000 rounds of ball (musketry) cartridges. This would give for 20,000 infantry, 215 rounds per man; and, as it is said that one shot in 100 kills, there were rounds sufficient to destroy 43,000 of the enemy. Independently of this, we had round-shot, shrapnell, canister and grape.

Our next march was to Wudnee or Budnee, fifteen miles and a half, by a very sandy route, which was consequently quite unfit for hackeries.

On the road, the commanding officer received an Express from the Governor-General, ordering us to take the fort of Wudnee, should we find it occupied by Sikh troops. Captain Rose, of the Lancers, was accordingly sent in advance of our force, to surround the Avails with his troop. To his great regret, the garrison offered no resistance, and about 5,000 rupees, and a few half-starved horses were given up to us. Two companies of the 59th Regt. of Native Infantry were left in charge of the fort.

Only a few days before, the whole of this district had been under the sway of the Maharajah of Lahore; but by the proclamation of the Governor-General it was now incorporated with the British dominions.

About ten years previous to these events, the demise of the female chief of Ferozepore without issue, gave us possession of that place; the rule in such cases being, that the estates of those chiefs who die without heirs become escheats. Thus this city fell to the East India Company. Runjeet Singh had previously objected to cede to us any of the ferries; but we had now for some time past been permitted to make use of them, both here and along the course of the river. On the cession of Ferozepore, however, his jealousy was aroused anew, and studiously fostered by his officers, at our occupation of a territory so near his own capital; and his chiefs constantly urged upon him the necessity of excluding us. Thus, with the possession of Ferozepore, we had gained the ferry at that place, and subsequently also secured one opposite to Loodianna.

This was an important point, for by it we obtained the right to cross whenever we chose. The Sikhs, however, as we have seen, were not prevented from crossing over to us. It was a very anomalous position for the British rule to be placed in, for, while we were protectors of the estates of four Sikh Rajahs, the estates of other chiefs were under the government of the Lahore Durbar. It is obvious that the circumstance of the Sikhs having a right to visit the estates of those chiefs who owed allegiance to the Durbar, and none to the British government, must have been a source of considerable inconvenience and annoyance, to say the least of it. Hence there is no doubt, that they sent over guns and ammunition to the left or south bank of the Sutlej, long before they crossed themselves, and when they did venture over, we confiscated the said estates.

To return to our narrative. On the 31st of December, the detachment under Colonel Campbell marched twelve miles to Bhaga Poorana, a small native village in the possession of the Alloo-walla Rajah, who held lands on both sides of the Sutlej. Here the Colonel received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Loodianna, instead of to Ferozepore, the object of which change we could not in the least understand. In the evening, while we were at mess, we were suddenly disturbed by the report that some thousands of Sikhs were approaching our camp, and indeed had actually entered it. Our dessert was left untouched upon the table; the whole regiment was soon mounted, and drawn up at the head of their lines. After waiting about half an hour, and seeing no enemy, all retired to bed. In less than half an hour after, we had a second false alarm, from the firing of some sentries, belonging to the picquets of the Native Infantry corps. Such mistakes, with all their concomitant annoyances, are by no means unfrequent. An alarm has been occasioned by a few bullocks crossing a nullah near a camp during a dark night. In such a case, a Sepoy sentry receiving no answer to his challenge, "Who come dare?" (who goes there?), fires his piece, and the whole camp taking this as a signal of danger, is instantly in motion.

A false alarm of this kind occurred at Roree Bukkur, in Scinde, when the Bengal column under Major-general Sir Willoughby Cotton, was en route to Candahar, in February, 1839. The musket of one of the sentries went off by accident; the others immediately fired, whereupon the whole of the troops turned out.

Looking at the map, it would seem as if the recent "Express" to move on Loodianna had in view to command the road from Delhi, though just then no convoy was, it is believed, on the road from that city. Again, troops had been marched from Loodianna, and Runjoor Singh had not then crossed. The sudden appearance of the Sikhs in the neighbourhood of our frontier, threatened the two advanced posts at Ferozepore and Loodianna, both on the south bank of the Sutlej, and distant from each other about seventy miles. Major-General, now Sir John Littler, commanded at the former place; and, when summoned on the 23rd of December, 1845, to join the Commander-in-Chief, had about 10,000 troops. He left a small force at that post, and joined head-quarters at about 1 o'clock, P.M. At Loodianna, Colonel, now Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler, K.C.B., commanded. At Subathoo, fourteen miles up the hills, the Honourable Company's 1st European regiment was stationed. Loodianna is about equi-distant from Subathoo and Moodkee.

The battle of Ferozeshah, on the 21st and 22nd of December, 1845, has been the subject of discussion both as to the time and form of making; the attack. In regard to time, it is the opinion of the French marshal, Marmont, in his "L'Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p. 151, that "it is best to begin a battle early in the morning if certain of success; but if uncertain, in the middle of the day." Some assert that it was not necessary to commence the attack on the 21st, and that it would have been far better to have deferred it till early the next morning. Then again it is maintained, that had the attack been deferred till the morning of the 22nd, Tej Singh would have joined the main body of the Sikhs. However, early next morning the attack was renewed, and the rest of the entrenchments soon taken. It also appears that Tej Singh did actually come up before Ferozeshah at nine o'clock in the morning—at an hour when the British had possession of the place—and Major-General Littler was ordered to hold it at all risks.

I have before said that the cavalry were taken off in the direction of Ferozepore, with the exception of the 3rd Dragoons. Here, again, I may remark on the absence of the 9th Lancers, which was a general subject of regret among the officers present in the battle; a regret which I have heard repeatedly expressed both at the time and since. It is not possible to calculate the value of the services which this strong corps might have rendered in the hour of need; instead of which they were marching backwards and forwards between Ferozepore and Loodianna. Yet it is very probable that Tej Singh may have been aware that the 9th and 16th Lancers, and other corps, were on their march to join the main army, and hence have hastened his retreat.

Another objection to delay was the great scarcity of water; there being, it is said, no water at Ferozeshah, except in the village held by the enemy, and but little in the villages near it. Others, again, assert, that had the troops fallen back a little they would have found a supply of water, and that the Sikhs, moreover, would then most probably have come out of their entrenchments, and attacked the English on even ground.

At the battle of Aliwal, which took place subsequently, namely, on the 28th of January, 1846, the Sikhs did leave the little entrenchment which they had thrown up, and took up a position, their right resting on a village of the same name; their left on a circular entrenchment; and their centre on some heights. Again, it is whispered that the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were desirous of making an immediate attack, in order to prevent the Sikhs from marching upon Ferozepore or Loodianna. Of Loodianna, however, there was no danger, because they would naturally attack that place by crossing at Philoor; there was far more reason to have expected an attack upon Ferozepore, for three good reasons.

1st. Because the Sikhs had fallen back to Ferozeshah, only a few miles from Ferozepore.

2ndly. Because, as has been before stated, Runjeet Singh's Chiefs were very averse to the English having possession of Ferozepore, from which there is a direct road to Lahore, their capital; and

3rdly. Because, by their retrograde movements from Moodkee, the Sikhs joined the other infantry.

The object in not attacking till the next morning, would have been to gain information respecting the nature and strength of the enemy's entrenched position at Ferozeshah. The late Captain P. Nicolson, the assistant political agent, is said strongly to have recommended an attack on the rear of the enemy's entrenchment. Major Broadfoot, when he reached the spot, where Major-General Littler joined about noon, exclaimed, "We will now drive them out of that entrenchment."

It is said that there was a great deal of jungle about Ferozeshah, but that the ground immediately around was open. By a brief delay, it might have been ascertained that the rear was undefended by guns. It is not to be supposed that the Sikhs would have thought of an advance beyond their then position, until they had gained a victory.

Again, it is broadly asserted that the Sikhs would never have left their entrenchments, and might have strengthened them, had any delay taken place.

The Sikh force is said to have been as follows:

The Infantry were 7,200 men.

The above force, with 3,000 detached Infantry, and the greater part of the Irregular Horse, marched to Ferozeshah, for the purpose of holding Moodkee; reaching this place in the evening, they fought the battle of the 18th of December, with a force of 17,000 or 18,000 men.

The British force at Moodkee was about 13,000 men, and 48 guns, 36 of which were horse artillery: the action was sudden, and there was no regularity; the corps moved off in echelon, but owing to the dust, confusion, and lateness of the day, some infantry corps fired into each other. I have heard that a native infantry corps fired by mistake into H.M. 50th foot. Many of the officers, and all those of the staff who were killed, were shot by Sikh soldiers from the branches of trees, where they had stationed themselves. The Horse Artillery and Cavalry opened the encounter; but the dust which these troops raised, caused the Infantry, which came up last, to grope as it were in the dark, and to make serious mistakes.

The Sikhs having been defeated at Moodkee, called upon the troops before Ferozepore, and the Nuggur Ghât to join them, which made their force as under:

This, including the 16,850 Irregular Cavalry, gives 32,550 men, of whom the Regular troops were 15,700 men; and, deducting the seventeen guns taken at Moodkee, the enemy ought to have had 126 guns at Ferozeshah, besides the 250 Zumbooruks. These were not very great odds against the British as to numbers.

The number of British killed and wounded was 2,419; namely, 2,269 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 150 officers, which gives one officer to every fifteen men; and as the usual proportion is one to twenty, or twenty-five, this was the greatest proportional loss in the four battles.

At Ferozeshah, including the Sikh force detached to Moodkee, there were 13,200 infantry; deducting, say 1,200 killed and wounded at Moodkee, there remained, say 12,000 men; to these add an additional reinforcement of 6,000 men and we have 18,000 infantry, which appears to have been the amount of the Sikh forces in the entrenchments at Ferozeshah on the 21st of December 1845; also 126 guns, of which twenty-eight were heavy guns, which likewise agrees with the returns; the enemy's cavalry could scarcely have exceeded 8,000 or 10,000 men. The entrenchment was about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, but as there was a village within those limits, the space for the troops was of course greatly diminished by it.

It will be for the military reader to form his own judgment, as my experience does not warrant me in giving an opinion of the motives and actions of my superiors. I have trusted a great deal throughout my accounts, to officers who were actually present in this remarkable campaign. It is curious to note the opinions of others. One thing however seems tolerably clear, that the only mode by which a really true account of any battle can be given, is to obtain a statement from some competent officer of each corps, troop, or company of artillery, etc., actually present in the field.

The practice, in this respect in the Indian army is this: each brigadier reports to the major-general commanding his division, upon the efficiency and prominent services of each regiment in his brigade, noting also the disposition of each corps; the major-general in a similar manner makes a report to the Adjutant-General for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, of the state of each of his brigades, and the particular services rendered. It is from these divisional reports that the Commander-in-Chief draws up his despatches.

It is obvious, that after a great battle, particularly if there be a pursuit of the enemy, no correct return of the killed and wounded can be given for two, three, or four days; for those who are killed lie on the field, and those who are wounded will get into a village, if near, and remain concealed there.

The Sikhs having thus, as we have stated, drawn their various forces from Moodkee, Ferozepore, and Nuggur Ghât, concentrated them at Ferozeshah, and formed their entrenchments, which in several places they threw up breast high.

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, who was second in command, shared all the fatigues and dangers of the army with the Commander-in-Chief. Orders had been despatched to Sir John Littler to join head-quarters immediately. He accordingly left only a small garrison at Ferozepore, and, with a body of about 5,000 men and twenty-one guns, effected the junction, about noon on the 21st of December. Measures for a general attack were at once planned; but a considerable delay occurred, and much time was lost, as we have stated, in consequence of the conflicting views of competent officers, as to whether it was desirable to make an immediate attack, or to defer it till the following morning. The former was ultimately resolved upon.

The British marched in even ranks, and commenced the action with a brisk fire of artillery at a distance of about a mile from the enemy. The Sikhs made a gallant defence. The British artillery advanced steadily till they were within a few hundred yards of the entrenchment; but the Sikhs kept up an incessant fire from their heavy guns; in consequence of which our infantry were ordered to advance, and, in the face of a murderous fire, to take the batteries. Night put a stop to the carnage, but not to the awful state of confusion which prevailed in the British camp, which arose partly from the severe losses and the scattering of the different regiments, with the uncertainty as to whether any advantage had been gained, and partly from the incessant firing kept up during the whole night by the Sikhs upon the wretched soldiers who were lying wounded upon the field of battle, or who were cowering around their scanty fires, worn out with cold, fatigue and excruciating thirst.

Sir Henry Hardinge, finding that a large Sikh gun occasioned much annoyance to our troops, brought up the 80th Foot, who soon took it. He then passed among the different European corps, which greatly cheered and reanimated them under their intense sufferings. It was a night of terrific suspense and anxiety to the two British Chiefs, both of whom nobly resolved to fight and conquer, or perish in the attempt. The British lion was roused, and his vast strength was all centred in one final attempt. The die was cast. The Governor-General gave the word, and Britons struck home the death-blow.

The village of Ferozeshah appears to have been held during the night of the 21st of December, partly by the British and partly by the Sikhs. One of our divisions under the gallant Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, kept up a fire during the greater part of the night. The other divisions bivouacked at some distance, no one knows where. Had a concerted movement been necessary, it would have been quite out of the question; for, by some mistake or oversight, no place of rendezvous had been fixed on. I am told that the men belonging to two or three of the European corps got clubbed together, and were so found the next morning; nay, even the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief himself could not be found. A certain Major-General was anxious to communicate with him, and an engineer officer, who had just been with Sir Hugh Gough, offered to shew him the road; but, to his surprise, he could not find it: either His Excellency had moved his position, or the night was too dark to enable the officer to trace his way back.

The morning light revealed the fact that the Sikhs were still masters of a large portion of their entrenchments; the British retaining only that part where they had bivouacked during the night.

The Commander-in-Chief now drew up his forces; the Infantry forming into a line supported on either side by the horse artillery. His Excellency took the command of the left wing, the Governor-General of the right. The engagement opened with a brisk cannonade from the centre. The Sikhs renewed the deadly fire from their heavy guns, screened by their masked batteries, scattering death and destruction among the British troops. Both the left and right wings of infantry advancing under their able commanders, charged the Sikhs at the point of the bayonet, and took possession of the village of Ferozeshah.

At this juncture, when victory seemed to be decided for the British, Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief of the Sikh army, suddenly appeared on the field with his army of reserve, consisting of 30,000 men, and a large park of light guns. He charged into the midst of the British troops, and attempted to recover the entrenchment, but without success. He then opened a fire upon us from his guns, but, unhappily, all our shot were expended. It was one of those unexpected cases which demand the greatest promptitude and judgment; and our artillery are said to have fired blank ammunition.[15]

The British cavalry had been ordered by a certain staff officer, in the Adjutant-General's department, to move off to Ferozepore. This, I suppose, must have been before Tej Singh came up. It is also reported that Tej Singh conceived that this move was made in connection with some deeply concerted plan, with the intention of getting into his rear. Whatever may have been his opinion, he contented himself with firing a few shots from his light guns—none other had he—by which a few of the British were killed and wounded. Had the cavalry not been ordered off, the whole of which, I understand, moved away, with the exception of that noble regiment the 3rd Light Dragoons, who had previously, in this same action, performed prodigies of valour in charging batteries and entrenchments,—acts unparalleled in cavalry tactics,—Tej Singh might have been attacked to advantage. Thus much is certain; that the officer above alluded to was allowed to retire from the service. The whole affair of the morning of the 22nd cannot be either unravelled or explained; and I have discussed the matter with many officers who were present on that occasion, but have never met with one who could solve its mysteries. It savours more of romance than of reality. "Truth is strange—stranger than fiction." Goolab Singh, now Maharajah of Cashmere, speaking to a European officer, of Tej Singh's advance, as above described, observed that: "Tej Singh committed a great blunder; he should never have gone near you, but should have marched at once upon Delhi!"

Many, however, are of opinion, that the sudden attack of Tej Singh, with his 30,000 troops, was a mere feint. It was well known that he was in correspondence with Captain Nicolson; and it is even affirmed, that he had privately furnished an officer with a plan of the intended operations of the Sikh army. It was his object to ingratiate himself with both parties. His position as leader of the army demanded that he should make the attack; while at the same time he foresaw that the British would ultimately triumph in the Punjaub, and that it would be for his interest to make friends of them. Therefore, after firing a few shots, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sikhs fled from the field of battle, at the very moment when the failure of the enemy's ammunition, and the departure of their cavalry to Ferozepore, gave him an advantage which might have turned the tide of victory in his favour. After the desertion of their general, the Sikhs made several ineffectual attempts, to recover the entrenchment, but before night-fall, were compelled to retreat across the Sutlej.

The view of a field of battle awakens the noblest sympathies of our nature. Even the stern Napoleon has had his cold heart touched by such a scene. The first survey is overwhelming; and the heart of even the stoutest soldier shrinks within him, and sickens at the sight. On a nearer inspection, we find the dead and the dying, friend and foe, lying side by side; their furious contest suddenly cut short by the cold hand of death—while the cries and moans of the wounded till our ears with sounds of lamentation and woe, and our hearts with pity and commiseration.

We lament the fate of the slain, and grieve that his career is ended; yet it is the death of the brave soldier who has gloriously discharged his duty to his country, and whose fame remains imperishable, that calls forth our deepest grief, admiration and gratitude. "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." Well did Lord Hutchinson, in reporting the death of the brave and lamented Abercrombie, express the feelings of a soldier, when he said: "His name shall be embalmed in the memory of a grateful country."

Thoughts of a future state are powerfully impressed upon the mind, as the eye wanders over the battle-field of the slain. As we gaze upon those who have distinguished themselves, not only as the liege soldiers of their king, but as the faithful soldiers of the King of kings, our heart insensibly finds relief. While the spark of life yet flickers in the mortal tenement, we watch by the side of our wounded comrade, and, like king David, we fast and weep, and say: "Who can tell whether God will be gracious to me that he may live;" but when the dread fiat has gone forth, and the spirit no longer dwells within its house of clay, like David we restrain our grief, and looking beyond the grave, exclaim in faith: "Wherefore should I weep? Can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me."

Before quitting the field of slaughter, I would make a few remarks respecting the wounded. The fate of the private soldier is often very hard: by the loss of limbs he is rendered useless for life as a soldier, his means of subsistence are curtailed, and what is yet dearer to him, his military career is blighted for ever. The officer may do duty again if he lose an arm, or what is almost the same thing, if he be wounded and unable to have the ball extracted. This was the case with my father, who, having been hit in both shoulders at the battle of Waterloo, did duty in his most gallant regiment the old 95th, now the Rifle Brigade, for nearly three years after, although, as the ball remained in the shoulder, the left arm was rendered useless.[16] Some officers even continue in the service after they have lost a leg, and receive a good pension. This is the case with Field-Marshal the Marquis of Anglesey.

The disabled rank and file are what is styled "invalided," that is to say, they are sent to England and elsewhere, where they obtain a pension, fixed and determined by a board of officers.

The late Queen's Inspector-General of Hospitals in Bengal, states a fact which ought to be generally known, "The number of those who are wounded and die in consequence, cannot be ascertained fully under the lapse of a year, because there are cases in which a gun-shot through the lungs has superinduced affections of the brain, fevers, etc." It is likewise worthy of remark that gun-shot wounds are more dangerous than sabre cuts.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] The Jummoo Chief is called Dogra.

[15] When Sir Archibald Campbell, who commanded the expedition against Ava, in 1824-26, headed a Portuguese brigade of infantry in the Peninsular war, he was informed upon one occasion, that only a few rounds of shot were left. He immediately ordered a charge in line, his object being to conceal his want of ammunition.

[16] See Appendix IX.

[CHAPTER IV.]

Return to Bussean—Sir John Grey's Detachment—Battle of Assaye—Sindiah's Troops—Generals Allard and Ventura—General Lloyd's Observations on the Art of War—Tactics of the Sikhs—Runjeet Singh's Discipline—Sikh Artillery—Goojerat—Moodkee—Sir Joseph Thackwell—Bootawalla—Pontoons—Their Value to an Army—Great Rise in the Price of Food.

On the 2nd of January, 1846, Colonel Campbell's force marched to Bussean, a retrograde movement; but in times of war, such counter movements are occasionally unavoidable, and their utility can be known only to the superintending eye of the Commander-in-chief.

In the course of the day, soon after we had finished our long and fatiguing march, we were surprised to find that we were to return in the direction of Ferozepore, in company with Major General Sir John Grey's detachment, which, at this time, was a march or two in our rear. This detachment consisted of three troops of horse artillery, H.M. 16th Lancers, 3rd Light Cavalry, H.M. 10th Foot, three regiments of Native Infantry, a company of Sappers and Miners, and the 4th Irregular Horse. This formed a force of about 7,500 men. There were besides, twelve twelve-pounders and eighteen horse artillery guns; in all thirty guns, or four to every thousand men, a force as large as that with which the Duke of Wellington fought the battle of Assaye, on the 23rd of September, 1803; for, excluding the 3,000 Mysore, etc., cavalry, he had only 4,500 men. The enemy was defeated with the loss of 120 guns taken, destroyed, or lost; the captured guns amounted to above 100.

It may be asked, why, when the Duke of Wellington, with a mere handful of soldiers, attacked some 35,000 men and gained such an action, we could not utterly eradicate even the very name of Sikh? The reasons are threefold. The battles of Moodkee and Aliwal were field actions; those of Ferozeshah and Sobraon were storming entrenchments. The strength of the entrenchments at Ferozeshah was not equal to those at Sobraon. The number of killed and wounded at Ferozeshah amounted to 2,419, and at Sobraon 2,383. At the former battle, the enemy had more than one hundred, at the latter sixty-seven guns, and two hundred camel-swivels; besides, at Sobraon, the Sikhs had two strong batteries in the rear of the right and left flanks of the entrenchment; for there were entrenchments and works within one another. We made three good attacks. The attack in front by Major-General Gilbert's division was not originally designed. There was a bank or mound of earth between this division and the entrenchment. The brigade, of which the 29th Foot composed a part, got jammed up, and formed into a wedge, something like the Roman form. It was at first intended that this division should wait as a reserve, and act if required, There was a failure in the right attack on the enemy's left.