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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA

AND IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY

W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

VOL. V.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED

ANSWERS TO SOME ATTACKS

IN

ROBINSON’S LIFE OF PICTON, AND IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW;

WITH

COUNTER-REMARKS

TO

MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S REMARKS

UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH VOLUME OF THE HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

LONDON:

THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.

MDCCCXXXVI.

LONDON:

MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

LIST OF APPENDIX.

LIST OF THE PLATES,

To be placed together at [Page 582]

NOTICE

1º. In the present volume will be found a plan of the Peninsula on a very small scale, yet sufficient to indicate the general range of operations. A large map would be enormously expensive without any correspondent advantages to the reader; and it would only be a repetition of errors, because there are no materials for an accurate plan. The small one now furnished, together with the sketches which I have drawn and published with each volume, and which are more accurate than might be supposed, will give a clear general notion of the operations. Those who desire to have more detailed information will find it in Lieutenant Godwyn’s fine atlas of the battles in the Peninsula—a work undertaken by that officer with the sole view of forming a record of the glorious actions of the British army.

2º. Most of the manuscript authorities consulted for former volumes have been also consulted for this volume, and in addition the official correspondence of Lord William Bentinck; some notes by Lord Hill; the journal and correspondence of sir Rufane Donkin; a journal of Colonel Oglander, twenty-sixth regiment; a memoir by sir George Gipps, royal engineers; and a variety of communications by other officers. Lastly, authenticated copies of the official journals and correspondence of most of the marshals and generals who commanded armies in Spain. These were at my request supplied by the French War-office with a prompt liberality indicative of that military frankness and just pride which ought and does characterize the officers of Napoleon’s army. The publication of this volume also enables me with convenience to produce additional authorities for former statements, while answering, as I now do, the attacks upon my work which have appeared in the “Life of Sir Thomas Picton,” and in the “Quarterly Review.”

“Many there are that trouble me and persecute me; yet do I not swerve from the testimonies,”—Psalm cxix.

Robinson’s Life of Picton.—This writer of an English general’s life, is so entirely unacquainted with English military customs, that he quotes a common order of theLife of Picton, page 31. day, accrediting a new staff officer to the army, as a remarkable testimony to that staff officer’s talents. And he is so unacquainted with French military customs, that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he places a French marshal, Marmont, who by the way was not then even inPage 325. Spain, at the head of a division of Ney’s corps. He dogmatises upon military movements freely, and is yet so incapable of forming a right judgment upon the materials within his reach, as to say, that sir John Moore should not have retreated, because as he was able to beat the French at Coruña, he could also have beaten them in the heart of Spain. Thus setting aside the facts that at Coruña Moore had fifteen thousand men to fight twenty thousand, and in the heart of Spain he had only twenty-three thousand to fight more than three hundred thousand!

And lest this display of incompetency should not be sufficient, he affirms, that the same sir John Moore had, comparatively, greater means at Sahagun to beat the enemy than Lord Wellington had in the lines of Torres Vedras. Now those lines, which Wellington had been fortifying for more than a year, offered three nearly impregnable positions, defended by a hundred thousand men. There was a fortress, that of St. Julian’s, and a fleet, close at hand as a final resource, and only sixty thousand French commanded by Massena were in front. But sir John Moore having only twenty-three thousand men at Sahagun, had no lines, no fortifications for defence, and no time to form them, he was nearly three hundred miles from his fleet, and Napoleon in person had turned one hundred thousand men against him, while two hundred thousand more remained in reserve!

Any lengthened argument in opposition to a writer so totally unqualified to treat of warlike affairs, would be a sinful waste of words; but Mr. Robinson has been at pains to question the accuracy of certain passages of my work, and with what justice the reader shall now learn. [1]

1º. Combat on the Coa.—The substance of Mr. Robinson’s complaint on this subject is, that I have imputed to general Picton, the odious crime of refusing, from personal animosity, to support general Craufurd;—that such a serious accusation should not be made without ample proof;—that I cannot say whether Picton’s instructions did not forbid him to aid Craufurd;—that the roads were so bad, the distance so great, and the time so short, Picton could not have aided him;—that my account of the action differs from general Craufurd’s;—that I was only a lieutenant of the forty-third, and consequently could know nothing of the matter;—that I have not praised Picton—that he was a Roman hero and so forth. Finally it is denied that Picton ever quarrelled with Craufurd at all; and that, so far from having an altercation with him on the day of the action he did not on that day even quit his own quarters at Pinhel. Something also there is about general Cole’s refusing to quit Guarda.

To all this I reply that I never did accuse general Picton of acting from personal animosity, and neither the letter nor the spirit of my statement will bear out such a meaning, which is a pure hallucination of this author. That the light division was not supported is notorious. The propriety of supporting it I have endeavoured to shew, the cause why it was not so supported I have not attempted to divine; yet it was neither the distance, nor the badness of the roads, nor the want of time; for the action, which took place in July, lasted from day-break until late in the evening, the roads, and there were several, were good at that season, and the distance not more than eight miles.

It is quite true, as Mr. Robinson observes, that I cannot affirm of my own knowledge whether the duke of Wellington forbade Picton to succour Craufurd, but I can certainly affirm that he ordered him to support him because it is so set down in his grace’s despatches, volume 5th, pages 535 and 547; and it is not probable that this order should have been rescinded and one of a contrary tendency substituted, to meet an event, namely the action on the Coa, which Craufurd had been forbidden to fight. Picton acted no doubt upon the dictates of his judgment, but all men are not bound to approve of that judgment; and as to the charge of faintly praising his military talents, a point was forced by me in his favour, when I compared him to general Craufurd of whose ability there was no question; more could not be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson’s assurance that he was a Roman hero.

The exact object of Mr. Robinson’s reasoning upon the subject of general Cole’s refusal to quit Guarda it is difficult to discover; but the passage to which it relates, is the simple enunciation of a fact, which is now repeated, namely, that general Cole being requested by general Craufurd to come down with his whole division to the Coa, refused, and that lord Wellington approved of that refusal, though he ordered Cole to support Craufurd under certain circumstances. Such however is Mr. Robinson’s desire to monopolize all correctness, that he will not permit me to know any thing about the action, though I was present, because, as he says, being only a lieutenant, I could not know any thing about it. He is yet abundantly satisfied with the accuracy of his own knowledge, although he was not present, and was neither a captain nor lieutenant. I happened to be a captain of seven years standing, but surely, though we should admit all subalterns to be blind, like young puppies, and that rank in the one case, as age in the other, is absolutely necessary to open their eyes, it might still be asked, why I should not have been able, after having obtained a rank which gave me the right of seeing, to gather information from others as well as Mr. Robinson? Let us to the proof.

In support of his views, he has produced, the rather vague testimony of an anonymous officer, on general Picton’s staff, which he deems conclusive as to the fact, that Picton never quarrelled with Craufurd, that he did not even quit Pinhel on the day of the action, and consequently could not have had any altercation with him on the Coa. But the following letters from officers on Craufurd’s staff, not anonymous, shew that Picton did all these things. In fine that Mr. Robinson has undertaken a task for which he is not qualified.

Testimony of lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy, who was on general Craufurd’s staff at the action of the Coa, July 24, 1810.

“Manchester, 7th November, 1835.

“I have received your letter in which you mention ‘Robinson’s Life of Picton;’ that work I have not seen. It surprises me that any one should doubt that Picton and Craufurd met on the day the French army invested Almeida in 1810. I was wounded previously, and did not therefore witness their interview; but I consider it certain that Picton and Craufurd did meet on the 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the left bank of the Coa during the progress of the action, and that a brisk altercation took place between them. They were primed and ready for such an altercation, as angry communications had passed between them previously regarding the disposal of some sick of the light division. I have heard Craufurd mention in joke his and Picton’s testiness with each other, and I considered that he alluded both to the quarrel as to the sick; and to that which occurred when they met during the action at Almeida.

“J. S. Kennedy.”

“Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.”

Testimony of colonel William Campbell, who was on general Craufurd’s staff at the action on the Coa, July 24, 1810.

“Esplanade, Dover, 13th Nov. 1835.

“Your letter from Freshford has not been many minutes in my hands; I hasten to reply. General Picton did come out of Pinhel on the day of the Coa combat as you term it. It was in the afternoon of that day when all the regiments were in retreat, and general Craufurd was with his staff and others on the heights above, that, I think, on notice being given of general Picton’s approach, general Craufurd turned and moved to meet him. Slight was the converse, short the interview, for upon Craufurd’s asking enquiringly, whether general Picton did not consider it advisable to move out something from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to cover the light division, in terms not bland, the general made it understood that ‘he should do no such thing.’ This as you may suppose put an end to the meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned! We went our several ways, general Picton, I think, proceeding onwards a hundred yards to take a peep at the bridge. This is my testimony.

“Yours truly,
“William Campbell.”

“Colonel Napier, &c. &c. &c.”

2º. Battle of Busaco.—Mr. Robinson upon the authority of one of general Picton’s letters, has endeavoured to show that my description of this battle is a mass of errors; but it shall be proved that his criticism is so, and that general Picton’s letter is very bad authority.

In my work it is said that the allies resisted vigorously, yet the French gained the summit of the ridge, and while the leading battalions established themselves on the crowning rocks, others wheeled to their right, intending to sweep the summit of the Sierra, but were driven down again in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

Picton’s letter says, that the head of the enemy’s column got possession of a rocky point on the crest of the position, and that they were followed by the remainder of a large column which was driven down in a desperate charge made by the left of the third division.

So far we are agreed. But Picton gives the merit of the charge to the light companies of the seventy-fourth and eighty-eighth regiments, and a wing of the forty-fifth aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, under major Birmingham, whereas, in the History the whole merit is given to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth regiments. Lord Wellington’s despatch gives the merit to the forty-fifth, and eighty-eighth, aided by the eighth Portuguese regiment, under colonel Douglas. The “Reminiscences of a Subaltern,” written by an officer of the eighty-eighth regiment, and published in the United Service Journal, in like manner, gives the merit to the eighty-eighth and forty-fifth British regiments, and the eighth Portuguese.

It will presently be seen why I took no notice of the share the eighth Portuguese are said to have had in this brilliant achievement. Meanwhile the reader will observe that Picton’s letter indicates the centre of his division as being forced by the French, and he affirms that he drove them down again with his left wing without aid from the fifth division. But my statement makes both the right and centre of his division to be forced, and gives the fifth division, and especially colonel Cameron and the ninth British regiment, a very large share in the glory, moreover I say that the eighth Portuguese was broken to pieces. Mr. Robinson argues that this must be wrong, for, says he, the eighth Portuguese were not broken, and if the right of the third division had been forced, the French would have encountered the fifth division. To this he adds, with a confidence singularly rash, his scanty knowledge of facts considered, that colonel Cameron and the ninth regiment would doubtless have made as good a charge as I have described, “only they were not there.”

In reply, it is now affirmed distinctly and positively, that the French did break the eighth Portuguese regiment, did gain the rocks on the summit of the position, and on the right of the third division; did ensconce themselves in those rocks, and were going to sweep the summit of the Sierra when the fifth division under general Leith attacked them; and the ninth regiment led by colonel Cameron did form under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy out of those rocks; and if they had not done so, the third division, then engaged with other troops, would have been in a very critical situation. Not only is all this re-affirmed, but it shall be proved by the most irrefragable testimony. It will then follow that the History is accurate, that general Picton’s letter is inaccurate, and the writer of his life incompetent to censure others.

Mr. Robinson may notwithstanding choose to abide by the authority of general Picton’s letter, which he “fortunately found amongst that general’s manuscripts,” but which others less fortunate had found in print many years before; and he is the more likely to do so, because he has asserted that if general Picton’s letters are false, they are wilfully so, an assertion which it is impossible to assent to. It would be hard indeed if a man’s veracity was to be called in question because his letters, written in the hurry of service gave inaccurate details of a battle. General Picton wrote what he believed to be the fact, but to give any historical weight to his letter on this occasion, in opposition to the testimony which shall now be adduced against its accuracy, would be weakness. And with the more reason it is rejected, because Mr. Robinson himself admits that another letter, written by general Picton on this occasion to the duke of Queensbury, was so inaccurate as to give general offence to the army; and because his letters on two other occasions are as incorrect as on this of Busaco.

Thus writing of the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, Picton says, “about this time, namely, when the third division carried the main breach, the light division which was rather late in their attack, also succeeded in getting possession of the breach they were ordered to attack.” Now it has been proved to demonstration, that the light division carried the small breach, and were actually attacking the flank of the French troops defending the great breach, when the third division carried that point. This indeed is so certain, that Mr. Uniack of the ninety-fifth, and others of the light division, were destroyed on the ramparts close to the great breach by that very explosion which was said to have killed general M’Kinnon; and some have gone so far as to assert that it is doubtful if the great breach would have been carried at all but for the flank attack of the light division.

Again, general Picton writing of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, says “the light division under general Craufurd was rather roughly handled by the enemy’s cavalry, and had that arm of the French army been as daring and active upon this occasion, as they were when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they would doubtless have cut off the light division to a man.”

Nevertheless as an eye-witness, and, being then a field-officer on the staff, by Mr. Robinson’s rule entitled to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry, though they often menaced to charge, never came within sure shot distance of the light division. The latter, with the exception of the ninety-fifth rifles, who were skirmishing in the wood of Pozo Velho, was formed by regiments in three squares, flanking and protecting each other, they retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man, without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or receiving fire; they moved in the most majestic manner secure in their discipline and strength, which was such as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged under Tamerlane or Genghis.

But it is time to give the proofs relative to Busaco, the reader being requested to compare them with the description of that battle in my History.

Extracts from major-general sir John Cameron’s letters
to colonel Napier.

“Government House, Devonport, Aug. 9th, 1834.

“—I am sorry to perceive in the recent publication of lord Beresford, his ‘Refutation of your justification of your third volume,’ some remarks on the battle of Busaco which disfigure, not intentionally I should hope, the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps on that occasion, of which I, as commanding officer of one of the regiments composing it, may perhaps be permitted to know something. I shall however content myself at present with giving you a detail of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s own words, extracted from a document in my possession, every syllable of which can be verified by many distinguished officers now living, some of them actors in, all of them eye-witnesses to the affair.

“‘The ground where the British brigade was now moving, was behind a chain of rocky eminences where it had appeared clearly, the enemy was successfully pushing to establish himself and precluded major-general Leith from seeing at that moment the progress the enemy was making, but by the information of staff officers stationed on purpose who communicated his direction and progress. Major-general Leith moved the British brigade so as to endeavour to meet and check the enemy when he had gained the ascendancy. At this time a heavy fire of musketry was kept upon the height, the smoke of which prevented a clear view of the state of things. When however the rock forming the high part of the Sierra became visible, the enemy appeared in full possession of it, and a French officer was in the act of cheering with his hat off, while a continual fire was kept up from thence and along the whole face of the Sierra, in a diagonal direction towards the bottom, by the enemy ascending rapidly from the successive columns formed for the attack, on a mass of soldiers from the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments, who having been severely pressed had given way and were rapidly retiring in complete confusion and disorder. Major-general Leith on that occasion spoke to Major Birmingham (who was on foot, having had his horse killed), who stated that the fugitives were of the ninth Portuguese as well as the eighth regiment, and that he had ineffectually tried to check their retreat. Major-general Leith addressed and succeeded in stopping them, and they cheered when he ordered them to be collected and formed in the rear. They were passing as they retired diagonally to the right of the ninth British regiment. The face of affairs in this quarter now bore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant having dispersed or driven every thing opposed to him was in possession of the rocky eminence of the Sierra at this part of major-general Picton’s position without a shot then being fired at him. Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had hitherto been moving rapidly by its left in column in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness, under the fire of the enemy, who had just appeared formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time perceived the British brigade under him. Major-general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth regiment should have moved on in rear of, and to the left of, the ninth British regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the Sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height; the royal Scots to have been posted (as they were) in reserve. But the enemy having driven every thing before him in that quarter afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double-quick time. The thirty-eighth regiment was therefore directed to form also and support when major-general Leith led the ninth regiment to attack the enemy on the rocky ridge, which they did without filing a shot. That part which looks behind the Sierra (as already stated) was inaccessible and afforded the enemy the advantage of outflanking the ninth on the left as they advanced, but the order, celerity, and coolness with which they attacked panic-struck the enemy, who immediately gave way on being charged with the bayonet, and the whole was driven down the face of the Sierra in confusion and with immense loss, from a destructive fire which the ninth regiment opened upon him as he fled with precipitation after the charge.’

“I shall merely add two observations on what has been asserted in the ‘Refutation.’

“First with regard to the confusion and retreat of a portion of the Portuguese troops, I certainly did not know at the moment what Portuguese corps the fugitives were of, but after the action I understood they were belonging to the eighth Portuguese; a very considerable number of them were crossing the front of the British column dispersed in sixes and sevens over the field just before I wheeled the ninth regiment into line for the attack. I pushed on a few yards to entreat them to keep out of our way, which they understood and called out ‘viva los Ingleses, valerosos Portugueses.’

“As regards any support which the Portuguese afforded the British brigade in the pursuit, I beg to say that during the charge, while leading the regiment in front of the centre, my horse was killed under me, which for a moment retarded my own personal advance, and on extricating myself from under him, I turned round and saw the thirty-eighth regiment close up with us and the royal Scots appearing over the ridge in support; but did not see any Portuguese join in the pursuit, indeed it would have been imprudent in them to attempt such a thing, for at the time a brisk cannonade was opened upon us from the opposite side of the ravine.

“This, my dear colonel, is, on my honour, an account of the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at Busaco. It will be satisfactory to you to know that the information you received has been correct. The anonymous officer of the ninth regiment I do not know. There were several very capable of furnishing you with good information on the transactions of that day, not only as regarded their own immediate corps, but those around them. Colonel Waller I should consider excellent authority; that gallant officer must have been an eye-witness to all that passed in the divisions of Picton and Leith. I remember on our approach to the scene of confusion he delivered me a message from general Picton, intended for general Leith, at the time reconnoitring, to hasten our advance.”

“Government House, Devonport, Aug. 21, 1834.

“——The fact really is that both the eighth and ninth Portuguese regiments gave way that morning, and I am positive that I am not far wrong in saying, that there were not of Portuguese troops within my view, at the moment I wheeled the ninth regiment into line, one hundred men prepared either for attack or defence. Sir James Douglas partly admits that his wing was broken when he says that ‘if we were at any time broken it was from the too ardent wish of a corps of boy recruits to close.’ Now it is perfectly clear that the wing of the regiment under Major Birmingham fled, from what that officer said to general Leith. Sir James Douglas states also that ‘no candid man will deny that he supported the royals and ninth regiment, though before that he says, that ‘by an oblique movement he joined in the charge.’ I might safely declare on oath that the Portuguese never shewed themselves beyond the ridge of the Sierra that morning.

“Very faithfully yours,
“John Cameron.”

As these letters from general Cameron refer to some of marshal Beresford’s errors, as well as Mr. Robinson’s, an extract from a letter of colonel Thorne’s upon the same subject will not be misplaced here.

Colonel Thorne to colonel Napier.

“Harborne Lodge, 28th Aug. 1834.

Extract.—“Viscount Beresford in the ‘Refutation of your Justification of your third volume,’ has doubted the accuracy of the strength of the third dragoon guards and fourth dragoons on the 20th March 1811, as extracted by you from the journal which I lent to you. As I felt confident I had not inserted any thing therein, which I did not obtain from official documents, that were in my possession at the time it was written, I have, since the perusal of the ‘Refutation,’ looked over some of my Peninsula papers, and I am happy to say I have succeeded in finding amongst them, the monthly returns of quarters of the division of cavalry commanded by brigadier-general Long, dated Los Santos, April 20th, 1811, which was then sent to me by the deputy assistant quarter-master general of that division, and which I beg to enclose for your perusal, in order that you may see the statement I have made of the strength of that force in my journal is to be relied upon, although his lordship insinuates to the contrary, and that it contains something more than ‘the depositary of the rumours of a camp.’”

Extract from memorandum of the battle of Busaco, by colonel Waller, assistant quarter-master-general to the second division.

“—The attack commenced on the right wing, consisting of Picton’s division, by the enemy opening a fire of artillery upon the right of the British which did but little injury, the range being too great to prove effective. At this moment were seen the heads of the several attacking columns, three, I think, in number, and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity, and gallantry.

“As they formed on the plateau they were cannonaded from our position, and the regiment of Portuguese, either the eighth or the 16th Infantry, which were formed in advance in front of the 74th regiment, threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy’s columns in a flank direction, but the regiment was quickly driven into the position.

“More undaunted courage never was displayed by French troops than on this occasion: it could not have been surpassed, for their columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition, although repeatedly charged by Lightburne’s brigade, or rather by the whole of Picton’s division, they advanced, and fairly drove the British right wing from the rocky part of the position.

“Being an eye-witness of this critical moment, and seeing that unless the ground was quickly recovered the right flank of the army would infallibly be turned, and the great road to Coimbra unmasked, seeing also that heavy columns of the enemy were descending into the valley to operate by the road, and to support the attack of the Sierra, and to cut off lord Wellington’s communication with Coimbra, I instantly galloped off to the rear to bring up general Hill’s corps to Picton’s support. Having proceeded about two miles along the upper edge and reverse side of the Sierra, I fell in with the head of general Leith’s column moving left in front, at the head of which was colonel Cameron’s brigade, led by the ninth regiment. I immediately rode up to colonel Cameron, and addressed him in an anxious tone as follows.

“‘Pray, sir, who commands this brigade?’ ‘I do,’ replied the colonel, ‘I am colonel Cameron.’

“‘Then for God’s sake, sir, move off instantly at double-quick with your brigade to Picton’s support; not one moment is to be lost, the enemy in great force are already in possession of the right of the position on the Sierra and have driven Picton’s troops out of it. Move on, and when the rear of your brigade has passed the Coimbra road wheel into line, and you will embrace the point of attack.’ Colonel Cameron did not hesitate or balance an INSTANT, but giving the word ‘double-quick’ to his brigade nobly led them to battle and to victory.

“The brave colonel attacked the enemy with such a gallant and irresistible impetuosity, that after some time fighting he recovered the ground which Picton had lost, inflicting heavy slaughter on the elite of the enemy’s troops. The ninth regiment behaved on this occasion with conspicuous gallantry, as indeed did ALL the REGIMENTS engaged. Great numbers of the enemy had descended low down in the rear of the position towards the Coimbra road, and were killed; the whole position was thickly strewed with their killed and wounded; amongst which were many of our own troops. The French were the finest men I ever saw. I spoke to several of the wounded men, light infantry and grenadiers, who were bewailing their unhappy fate on being defeated, assuring me they were the heroes of Austerlitz who had never before met with defeat!

“Robert Waller, Lieut.-colonel.”

Extract of a letter from colonel Taylor, ninth regiment, to
colonel Napier.

“Fernhill, near Evesham, 26th April, 1832.

“Dear Sir,

“I have just received a letter from colonel Shaw, in which he quotes a passage from one of yours to him, expressive of your wish, if necessary, to print a passage from a statement which I made respecting the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, and in reference to which, I have alluded to the discomfiture of the eighth Portuguese upon the same occasion. I do not exactly recollect the terms I made use of to colonel Shaw (nor indeed the shape which my communication wore) but, my object was to bring to light the distinguished conduct of the ninth without any wish to, unnecessarily, obscure laurels, which others wore, even at their expense!

“To account for the affair in question, I could not however well omit to state, that it was in consequence of the overthrow of the eighth Portuguese, that sir James Leith’s British brigade was called upon, and it is remarkable, that at the time, there was a considerable force of Portuguese (I think it was the old Lusitanian Legion which had just been modelled into two battalions) between Leith’s British and where the eighth were being engaged, Leith pushed on his brigade double-quick, column of sections left in front, past these Portuguese, nor did he halt until he came in contact with the enemy who had crowned the heights and were firing from behind the rocks, the ninth wheeled up into line, fired and charged, and all of the eighth Portuguese that was to be seen, at least by me, a company officer at the time, was some ten or a dozen men at the outside, with their commanding officer, but he and they were amongst the very foremost in the ranks of the ninth British. As an officer in the ranks of course I could not see much of what was going on generally, neither could I well have been mistaken as to what I did see, coming almost within my very contact! Colonel Waller, now, I believe on the Liverpool staff, was the officer who came to sir James Leith for assistance, I presume from Picton.

“Yours, &c.
“J. Taylor.”

Second communication from major-general sir John
Cameron to colonel Napier.

Stoke Devonport, Nov. 21st, 1835.

“My dear colonel,

“Some months ago I took the liberty of pointing out to you certain mis-statements contained in a publication of lord Beresford regarding the operations of the British brigade in major-general Leith’s corps at the battle of Busaco, and as those mis-statements are again brought before the public in Robinson’s Life of sir Thomas Picton I am induced to trouble you with some remarks upon what is therein advanced. A paragraph in major-general Picton’s letter to lord Wellington, dated 10th November, 1810, which I first discovered some years ago in the Appendix No. 12 of Jones’s War in Spain, &c. &c. would appear to be the document upon which Mr. Robinson grounds his contradiction of your statement of the conduct of the ninth regiment at Busaco, but that paragraph, which runs as follows, I am bound to say is not the truth. ‘Major-general Leith’s brigade in consequence marched on, and arrived in time to join the five companies of the forty-fifth regiment under the honourable lieutenant-colonel Meade and the eighth Portuguese regiment under lieutenant-colonel Douglas in repulsing the enemy.’ This assertion of major-general Picton is, I repeat, not true, for, in the first place I did not see the forty-fifth regiment on that day, nor was I at any period during the action near them or any other British regiment to my left. In the second, as regards the eighth Portuguese regiment, the ninth British did not most assuredly join that corps in its retrograde movement. That major-general Picton left his right flank exposed, there can be no question, and had not assistance, and British assistance too, come up to his aid as it did I am inclined to believe that sir Thomas would have cut a very different figure in the despatch to what he did!! Having already given you a detail of the defeat of the enemy’s column which was permitted to gain the ascendency in considerable force on the right of the third division, I beg leave to refer you to the gallant officers I mentioned in a former letter, who were not only eye-witnesses to the charge made by the ninth regiment but actually distinguished themselves in front of the regiment at the side of their brave accomplished general during that charge. I believe the whole of sir Rowland Hill’s division from a bend in the Sierra could see the ninth in their pursuit of the enemy, and though last not the least in importance, as a party concerned, I may mention the present major-general sir James T. Barns, who commanded the British brigade under major-general Leith, (I omitted this gallant officer’s name in my former letter) as the major-general took the entire command and from him alone I received all orders during the action.

“I have now done with Mr. Robinson and his work which was perhaps hardly worth my notice.

“I am, my dear Colonel,
“Very sincerely yours,
“J. Cameron.”

Having now sufficiently exposed the weakness of Mr. Robinson’s attack upon me, it would be well perhaps to say with sir J. Cameron “I have done with his work,” but I am tempted to notice two points more.

Treating of the storming of Badajos, Mr. Robinson says,

“Near the appointed time while the men were waiting with increased anxiety Picton with his staff came up. The troops fell in, all were in a moment silent until the general in his calm and impressive manner addressed a few words to each regiment. The signal was not yet given, but the enemy by means of lighted carcasses discovered the position of Picton’s soldiers; to delay longer would only have been to expose his men unnecessarily; he therefore gave the word to march.”——“Picton’s soldiers set up a loud shout and rushed forward up the steep to the ditch at the foot of the castle walls.—General Kempt who had thus far been with Picton at the head of the division was here badly wounded and carried to the rear. Picton was therefore left alone to conduct the assault.”

Now strange to say Picton was not present when the signal was given, and consequently could neither address his men in his “usual calm impressive manner,” nor give them the word to march. There was no ditch at the foot of the castle walls to rush up to, and, as the following letter proves, general Kempt alone led the division to the attack.

Extract of a letter from lieutenant-general sir James
Kempt, K. C. B., master-general of the Ordnance, &c. &c.

Pall Mall, 10th May, 1833.

“According to the first arrangement made by lord Wellington, my brigade only of the third division was destined to attack the castle by escalade. The two other brigades were to have attacked the bastion adjoining the castle, and to open a communication with it. On the day, however, before the assault took place, this arrangement was changed by lord Wellington, a French deserter from the castle (a serjeant of sappers) gave information that no communication could be established between the castle and the adjoining bastion, there being (he stated) only one communication between the castle and the town, and upon learning this, the whole of the third division were ordered by lord Wellington to attack the castle. But as my brigade only was originally destined for the service, and was to lead the attack, the arrangements for the escalade were in a great measure confided to me by general Picton.

“The division had to file across a very narrow bridge to the attack under a fire from the castle and the troops in the covered way. It was ordered to commence at ten o’clock, but by means of fire-balls the formation of our troops at the head of the trench was discovered by the French, who opened a heavy fire on them, and the attack was commenced from necessity nearly half an hour before the time ordered. I was severely wounded in the foot on the glacis after passing the Rivillas almost at the commencement of the attack in the trenches, and met Picton coming to the front on my being carried to the rear. If the attack had not commenced till the hour ordered, he, I have no doubt, would have been on the spot to direct in person the commencement of the operations. I have no personal knowledge of what took place afterwards, but I was informed that after surmounting the most formidable difficulties, the escalade was effected by means of two ladders only in the first instance in the middle of the night, and there can be no question that Picton was present in the assault. In giving an account of this operation, pray bear in mind that he commanded the division, and to him and the enthusiastic valour and determination of the troops ought its success alone to be attributed.

“Yours, &c.
“James Kempt.”

“Colonel Napier, &c.”

The other point to which I would allude is the battle of Salamanca. Mr. Robinson, with his baton of military criticism, belabours the unfortunate Marmont unmercifully, and with an unhappy minuteness of detail, first places general Foy’s troops on the left of the French army and then destroys them by the bayonets of the third division, although the poor man and his unlucky soldiers were all the time on the right of the French army, and were never engaged with the third division at all. This is however but a slight blemish for Mr. Robinson’s book, and his competence to criticise Marmont’s movements is no whit impaired thereby. I wish however to assure him that the expression put into the mouth of the late sir Edward Pakenham is “né vero né ben trovato.” Vulgar swaggering was no part of that amiable man’s character, which was composed of as much gentleness, as much generosity, as much frankness, and as much spirit as ever commingled in a noble mind. Alas! that he should have fallen so soon and so sadly!! His answer to lord Wellington, when the latter ordered him to attack, was not, “I will, my lord, by God!” With the bearing of a gallant gentleman who had resolved to win or perish, he replied, “Yes, if you will give me one grasp of that conquering right hand.” But these finer lines do not suit Mr. Robinson’s carving of a hero; his manner is more after the coarse menacing idols of the South-Sea Islands, than the delicate gracious forms of Greece.

Advice to authors is generally thrown away, yet Mr. Robinson would do well to rewrite his book with fewer inaccuracies, and fewer military disquisitions, avoiding to swell its bulk with such long extracts from my work, and remembering also that English commissaries are not “feræ naturæ” to be hanged, or otherwise destroyed at the pleasure of divisional generals. This will save him the trouble of attributing to sir Thomas Picton all the standard jokes and smart sayings, for the scaring of those gentry, which have been current ever since the American war, and which have probably come down to us from the Greeks. The reduction of bulk, which an attention to these matters will produce, may be compensated by giving us more information of Picton’s real services, towards which I contribute the following information. Picton in his youth served as a marine, troops being then used in that capacity, and it is believed he was in one of the great naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned this, and it would be well also, if he were to learn and set forth some of the general’s generous actions towards the widows of officers who fell under his command: they are to be discovered, and would do more honour to his memory than a thousand blustering anecdotes. With these changes and improvements, the life of sir Thomas Picton may perhaps, in future, escape the equivocal compliment of the newspaper puffers, namely, that it is “a military romance.”

Quarterly Review.—This is but a sorry attack to repel. “Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle,” but “rats and mice and such small deer have been Tom’s food for many a year.”

The reviewer does not like my work, and he invokes the vinous vagaries of Mr. Coleridge in aid of his own spleen. I do not like his work, or Mr. Coleridge either, and I console myself with a maxim of the late eccentric general Meadows, who being displeased to see his officers wear their cocked hats awry, issued an order beginning thus:—“All men have fancy, few have taste.” Let that pass. I am ready to acknowledge real errors, and to give my authorities for disputed facts.

1º. I admit that the road which leads over the Pyrennees to Pampeluna does not unite at that town with the royal causeway; yet the error was typographical, not topographical, because the course of the royal causeway was shewn, just before, to be through towns very distant from Pampeluna. The true reading should be “united with the first by a branch road commencing at Pampeluna.”

2º. The reviewer says, the mountains round Madrid do not touch the Tagus at both ends within the frontier of Spain, that river is not the chord of their arc; neither are the heights of Palmela and Almada near Lisbon one and the same. This is very true, although not very important. I should have written the heights of Palmela and Almada, instead of the heights of Palmela or Almada. But though the mountains round Madrid do not to the westward, actually touch the Tagus within the Spanish frontier, their shoots are scarcely three miles from that river near Talavera, and my description was general, being intended merely to shew that Madrid could not be approached from the eastward or northward, except over one of the mountain ranges, a fact not to be disputed.

3º. It is hinted by the reviewer that lord Melville’s degrading observation, namely, that “the worst men made the best soldiers,” was picked by me out of general Foy’s historical fragment. Now, that passage in my history was written many months before general Foy’s work was published; and my authority was a very clear recollection of lord Melville’s speech, as reported in the papers of the day. The time was just before his impeachment for malversation.

General Foy’s work seems a favourite authority with the reviewer, and he treats general Thiebault’s work with disdain; yet both were Frenchmen of eminence, and the ennobling patriotism of vituperation might have been impartially exercised, the weakness of discrimination avoided. However general Thiebault’s work, with some apparent inaccuracies as to numbers, is written with great ability and elegance, and is genuine, whereas general Foy’s history is not even general Foy’s writing; colonel D’Esmenard in his recent translation of the Prince of Peace’s memoirs has the following conclusive passage upon that head.

“The illustrious general Foy undertook a history of the war in Spain, his premature death prevented him from revising and purifying his first sketch, he did me the honour to speak of it several times, and even attached some value to my observations; the imperfect manuscripts of this brilliant orator have been re-handled and re-made by other hands. In this posthumous history, he has been gratuitously provided with inaccurate and malignant assertions.”

While upon this subject, it is right to do justice to Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. A sensual and corrupt man he was generally said to be, and I calledSee Memoirs of Manuel Godoy, translated by Colonel D’Esmenard. him so, without sufficient consideration of the extreme exaggerations which the Spaniards always display in their hatred. The prince has now defended himself; colonel D’Esmenard and other persons well acquainted with the dissolute manners of the Spanish capital, and having personal experience of Godoy’s character and disposition,See also London & Westminster Review No 1. have testified that his social demeanour was decent and reserved, and his disposition generous; wherefore I express my regret at having ignorantly and unintentionally calumniated him.

To return to the reviewer. He is continually observing that he does not know my authority for such and such a fact, and therefore he insinuates, that no such fact had place, thus making his ignorance the measure of my accuracy. This logic seems to be akin to that of the wild-beast showman, who declares that “the little negro boys tie the ostrich bird’s leg to a tree, which fully accounts for the milk in the cocoa-nuts.” I might reply generally as the late alderman Coombe did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly exclaiming, “I don’t know that, Mr. Alderman! I don’t know that!” “Ah, sir George! all that you don’t know would make a large book!” However it will be less witty, but more conclusive to furnish at least some of my authorities.

1º. In opposition to the supposititious general Foy’s account of Solano’s murder, and in support of my own history, I give the authority of sir Hew Dalrymple, from whom the information was obtained; a much better authority than Foy, because he was in close correspondence with the insurgents of Seville at the time, and had an active intelligent agent there.

2º. Against the supposititious Foy’s authority as to the numbers of the French army in June 1808, the authority of Napoleon’s imperial returns is pleaded. From these returns my estimate of the French forces in Spain during May 1808 was taken, and it is so stated in my [Appendix.] The inconsistency of the reviewer himself may also be noticed, for he marks my number as exclusive of Junot’s army, and yet includes that army in what he calls Foy’s estimate! But Junot’s army was more than 29,000 and not 24,000 as the supposititious Foy has it, and that number taken from 116,000 which, though wrong, is Foy’s estimate of the whole leaves less than 87,000. I said 80,000. The difference is not great, yet my authority is the best, and the reviewer feels that it is so, or he would also have adopted general Foy’s numbers of the French at the combat of Roliça. In Foy’s history they are set down as less than 2,500, in mine they are called 5,000. He may be right, but it would not suit the reviewer to adopt a truth from a French writer.

3º. On the negative proofs afforded 1º. by the absence of any quoted voucher in my work, 2º. by the absence of any acknowledgement of such a fact in general Anstruther’s manuscript journal, which journal may or may not be garbled, the reviewer asserts that the English ministers never contemplated the appointing of a military governor for Cadiz. Against this, let the duke of Wellington’s authority be pleaded, for in my note-book of conversations held with his grace upon the subject of my history, the following passage occurs:—

“The ministers were always wishing to occupy Cadiz, lord Wellington thinks this a folly, Cadiz was rather a burthen to him, but either general Spencer or general Anstruther was intended to command there, thinks it was Anstruther, he came out with his appointment.”

Now it is possible that as Acland’s arrival was also the subject of conversation, his name was mentioned instead of Anstruther’s; and it is also possible, as the note shows, that Spencer was the man, but the main fact relative to the government could not have been mistaken. To balance this, however, there undoubtedly is an error as to the situation of general Anstruther’s brigade at the battle of Vimiero. It appears by an extract from his journal, that it was disposed, not, as the reviewer says, on the right of Fane’s brigade, but at various places, part being on the right of Fane, part upon his left, part held in reserve. The forty-third were on the left of Fane, the fifty-second and ninety-seventh on his right, the ninth in reserve, the error is therefore very trivial, being simply the describing two regiments as of Fane’s brigade, when they were of Anstruther’s without altering their position. What does the public care whether it was a general called Fane, or a general called Anstruther, who was on the right hand if the important points of the action are correctly described? The fighting of the fifty-second and ninety-seventh has indeed been but slightly noticed, in my history, under the denomination of Fane’s right, whereas those regiments make a good figure, and justly so, in Anstruther’s journal, because it is the story of the brigade; but general history ought not to enter into the details of regimental fighting, save where the effects are decisive on the general result, as in the case of the fiftieth and forty-third on this occasion. The whole loss of the ninety-seventh and fifty-second together did not exceed sixty killed and wounded, whereas the fiftieth alone lost ninety, and the forty-third one hundred and eighteen.

While on the subject of Anstruther’s brigade, it is right also to admit another error, one of place; that is if it be true, as the reviewer says, that Anstruther landed at Paymayo bay, and not at Maceira bay. The distance between those places may be about five miles, and the fact had no influence whatever on the operations; nevertheless the error was not drawn from Mr. Southey’s history, though I readily acknowledge I could not go to a more copious source of error. With respect to the imputed mistake as to time, viz. the day of Anstruther’s landing, it is set down in my first edition as the 19th, wherefore the 18th in the third edition is simply a mistake of the press! Alas! poor reviewer!

But there are graver charges. I have maligned the worthy bishop of Oporto; and ill-used the patriotic Gallician junta! Reader, the bishop of Oporto and the patriarch of Lisbon are one and the same person! Examine then my history and especially its appendix and judge for yourself, whether the reviewer may not justly be addressed as the pope was by Richard I. when he sent him the bishop of Beauvais’ bloody suit of mail. “See now if this be thy son’s coat.” But the junta! Why it is true that I said they glossed over the battle of Rio Seco after the Spanish manner; that their policy was but a desire to obtain money, and to avoid personal inconvenience; that they gave sir Arthur Wellesley incorrect statements of the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards at Oporto, and a more inaccurate estimate of the French army under Junot. All this is true. It is true that I have said it, true that they did it. The reviewer says my statement is a “gratuitous misrepresentation.” I will prove that the reviewer’s remark is a gratuitous impertinence.

1º. The junta informed sir Arthur Wellesley, that Bessieres had twenty thousand men in the battle, whereas he had but fifteen thousand.

2º. That Cuesta lost only two guns, whereas he lost eighteen.

3º. That Bessieres lost seven thousand men and six guns, whereas he lost only three hundred and fifty men, and no guns.

4º. That the Spanish army had retired to Benevente as if it still preserved its consistence, whereas Blake and Cuesta had quarrelled and separated, all the magazines of the latter had been captured and the whole country was at the mercy of the French. This was glossing it over in the Spanish manner.

Again the junta pretended that they desired the deliverance of Portugal to enable them to unite with the southern provinces in a general effort; but Mr. Stuart’s letters prove that they would never unite at all with any other province, and that their aim was to separate from Spain altogether and join Portugal. Their wish to avoid personal inconvenience was notorious, it was the cause of their refusal to let sir David Baird’s troops disembark, it was apparent to all who had to deal with them, and it belongs to the national character. Then their eagerness to obtain money, and their unpatriotic use of it when obtained, has been so amply set forth in various parts of my history that I need not do more than refer to that, and to my quoted authorities, especially in the second chapters of the 3d and 14th Books. Moreover the reviewer’s quotations belie his comments, and like the slow-worm defined by Johnson “a blind worm, a large viper, venomous, not mortal,” he is at once dull and malignant.

The junta told sir Arthur Wellesley that ten thousand Portuguese troops were at Oporto, and that two thousand Spaniards, who had marched the 15th, would be there on the 25th of July; yet when sir Arthur arrived at Oporto, on the 25th, he found only fifteen hundred Portuguese and three hundred Spaniards; the two thousand men said to be in march had never moved and were not expected. Here then instead of twelve thousand men, there were only eighteen hundred! At Coimbra indeed eighty miles from Oporto, there were five thousand militia and regulars, one-third of which were unarmed, and according to colonel Browne’s letter, as given in the folio edition of the inquiry upon the Cintra convention, there were also twelve hundred armed peasants which the reviewer has magnified into twelve thousand. Thus without dwelling on the difference of place, the difference between the true numbers and the statements of the Gallician junta, was four thousand; nor will it mend the matter if we admit the armed peasants to be twelve thousand, for that would make a greater difference on the other side.

The junta estimated the French at fifteen thousand men, but the embarkation returns of the number shipped after the convention gave twenty-five thousand seven hundred and sixty, making a difference of more than ten thousand men, exclusive of those who had fallen or been captured in the battles of Vimiero and Roliça, and of those who had died in hospital! Have I not a right to treat these as inaccurate statements; and the reviewer’s remark as an impertinence?

The reviewer speaking of the battle of Baylen scoffs at the inconsistency of calling it an insignificant event and yet attributing to it immense results. But my expression was, an insignificant action in itself, which at once reconciles the seeming contradiction, and this the writer who has no honest healthy criticism, suppresses. My allusion to the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, as being the saviours of American independence, also excites his morbid spleen, and assuming what is not true, namely, that I selected that period as the time of the greatest improvement in American discipline, he says, their soldiers there were few, as if that bore at all upon the question.

But my expression is at Valley Forge not “of Valley Forge.” The allusion was used figuratively to shew that an armed peasantry cannot resist regular troops, and Washington’s correspondence is one continued enforcement of the principle, yet the expression may be also taken literally. It was with the battalions of Valley Forge that Washington drew Howe to the Delawarre, and twice crossing that river in winter, surprised the Germans at Trenton and beat the British at Prince Town. It was with those battalions he made his attacks at German’s-town; with those battalions he prevented Howe from sending assistance to Burgoyne’s army, which was in consequence captured. In fine, to use his own expression, “The British eagle’s wings were spread, and with those battalions he clipped them.” The American general,See Stedman’s History, 4to. p. 285. however, at one time occupied, close to Valley Forge, a camp in the Jerseys, bearing the odd name of Quibble-town, on which probably the reviewer’s eye was fixed.

But notwithstanding Quibble-town, enthusiasm will not avail in the long run against discipline. Is authority wanted? We have had Napoleon’s and Washington’s, and now we have Wellington’s, for in the fifth volume of his Despatches, p. 215, as compiled by colonel Gurwood, will be found the following passage upon the arming of the Spanish and Portuguese people.

“Reflection and above all experience have shown me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view, and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies by any notion that the people when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much, use to them. The subject is too large for discussion in a paper of this description, but I can show hundreds of instances to prove the truth of as many reasons why exertions of this description ought not to be relied on. At all events no officer can calculate upon an operation to be performed against the French by persons of this description, and I believe that no officer will enter upon an operation against the French without calculating his means most anxiously.”

It is said that some officers of rank have furnished the reviewer’s military criticisms, I can understand why, if the fact be true, but it is difficult to believe that any officer would even for the gratification of a contemptible jealousy, have lent himself to the assertion that sir Arthur Wellesley could not have made a forced or a secret march from Vimiero to Mafra, because he was encumbered with four hundred bullock-carts. Sir Arthur did certainly intend toSee his evidence, Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra. make that march, and he would as certainly not have attempted such a flank movement openly and deliberately while thus encumbered and moving at the rate of two miles an hour, within a short distance of a general having a more experienced army and an overwhelming cavalry. The sneer is therefore directed more against sir Arthur Wellesley than against me.

This supposed officer of rank says that because the enemy had a shorter road to move in retreat, his line of march could not even be menaced, still less intercepted by his opponent moving on the longer route! How then did Cæsar intercept Afranius and Petreius, Pompey’s lieutenants, on the Sicoris? How Pompey himself at Dyrrachium? How did Napoleon pass Beaulieu on the Po and gain Lodi? How did Massena dislodge Wellington from Busaco? How did Marmont turn him on the Guarena in 1812? How did Wellington himself turn the French on the Douro and on the Ebro in 1813? And above all how did he propose to turn Torres Vedras by the very march in question, seeing that from Torres Vedras to Mafra is only twelve miles and from Vimiero to Mafra is nineteen miles, the roads leading besides over a river and through narrow ways and defiles? But who ever commended such dangerous movements, if they were not masked or their success insured by some peculiar circumstances, or by some stratagem? And what is my speculation but a suggestion of this nature? “Under certain circumstances,” said sir Arthur Wellesley at the enquiry, “an army might have gained three hours’ start in such a march.” The argument of the supposititious officer of rank is therefore a foolish sophism; nor is that relative to sir John Moore’s moving upon Santarem, nor the assertion that my plan was at variance with all sir Arthur Wellesley’s objects, more respectable.

My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a reasoning upon the advantages of sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan, and the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir Arthur wished sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if sir Arthur’s recommendation had been followed, sir John Moore, who, instead of taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half a day, that is before one o’clock on the 22d, might have been at Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer’s scale of march, ten miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he could stop Junot’s retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo, a cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem, a strong country. What was sir A. Wellesley’s observation on that head? “If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy’s possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if sir John Moore’s corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great safety in those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in our power to beat the French.” Lo! then, my plan is not at variance with sir Arthur Wellesley’s object. But the whole of the reviewer’s sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not against me, but through me against the duke of Wellington whom the writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that “wet-blanket” counsel which stopped sir Arthur Wellesley’s pursuit of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Aye, it sounds grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was strongly recommended to him to ask “who will vouch for the voucher?”

Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr. Southey’s “magnificent chapters” and sir Charles Vaughan’s “brief and elegant work,” that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is correct. My authority is well known to sir Charles Vaughan, and is such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, I feel well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox, it is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come; for I remembered the Roman saying about the “Lying Greek fable,” and endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that even our enemies should admit the facts. And they have hitherto done so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit in misfortune, thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.

Since writing the above a second article has appeared in the same review, to which the only reply necessary, is the giving of more proofs, that the passages of my history, contradicted by the reviewer, are strictly accurate. And to begin, it is necessary to inform him, that a man may be perfectly disciplined and a superb soldier, and yet be a raw soldier as to real service; and further, that staff officers may have been a long time in the English service, and yet be quite inexperienced. Even a quarter-master-general of an army has been known to commit all kinds of errors, and discover negligence and ignorance of his duty, in his first campaigns, who yet by dint of long practice became a very good officer in his line, though perhaps not so great a general as he would pass himself off for; for it was no ill saying of a Scotchman, that “some men, if bought at the world’s price, might be profitably sold at their own.” Now requesting the reader to observe that in the following quotations the impugned passages of my history are first given, and are followed by the authority, though not all the authority which might be adduced in support of each fact, I shall proceed to expose the reviewer’s fallacies.

1º. History. “Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening.”

The reviewer contradicts this on the authority of Savary’s Memoirs, quoting twice the pages and volume, namely vol. iv. pages 12, 40, and 41. Now Savary is a writer so careless about dates, and small facts, as to have made errors of a month as to time in affairs which he conducted himself. Thus he says king Joseph abandoned Madrid on the 3d of July 1808, whereas it was on the 3d of August. He also says the landing of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal was made known to him, before the council of war relative to the evacuation of Madrid was held at that capital; but the council was held the 29th of July, and sir Arthur did not land until the 1st of August! Savary is therefore no authority on such points. But there is no such passage as the reviewer quotes, in Savary’s work. The reader will look for it in vain in pages 12, 40, and 41. It is neither in the fourth volume nor in any other volume. However at page 8 of the second volume, second part, he will find the following passage. “L’Empereur prit la route d’Espagne avec toute son armée. Il arriva à Bayonne avec la rapidité d’un trait, de même que de Bayonne à Vittoria. Il fit ce dernier trajet à cheval en deux courses, de la première il alla à Tolosa et de la seconde à Vittoria.” The words “deux courses” the reviewer with his usual candour translates, “the first day to Tolosa, the second day to Vittoria.” But notwithstanding this I repeat, that the emperor made his journey in one day. My authority is the assurance of a French officer of the general staff who was present, and if the value of the fact were worth the pains, I could show that it was very easy for Napoleon to do so, inasmuch as a private gentleman, the correspondent of one of the newspapers, has recently performed the same journey in fourteen hours. But my only object in noticing it at all is to show the flagrant falseness of the reviewer.

2º. History. “Sir John Moore had to organize an army of raw soldiers, and in a poor unsettled country just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and griping enemy, he had to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers’ baggage. Every branch of the administration civil and military was composed of men zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a service where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience being severely felt.”

Authorities. Extracts from sir John Moore’s Journal and Letters.

“I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the frontier, but I found the army without the least preparation, without any precise information with respect to roads, and no arrangement for feeding the troops upon their march.” “The army is without equipments of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or any other appendage to an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes.”—“The commissariat has at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and honour, and of considerable ability, but neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion.”—“Every thing is however going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English army, and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to move through a very impracticable country, I expect to be past the frontier early in November.”

Extract from a memoir by sir John Colborne, military secretary to sir John Moore.

“The heads of departments were all zeal, but they had but little experience, and their means for supplying the wants of the army about to enter on an active campaign were in many respects limited.”

3º. History. “One Sataro, the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot’s in the negociations engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract so embarrassed the operations,” &c. &c.

Authority. Extract from sir John Colborne’s Memoir quoted above.

“Sataro, a contractor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions on the march through Portugal. He failed in his contract, and daily complaints were transmitted to head-quarters of want of provisions on this account. The divisions of generals Fraser and Beresford were halted, and had it not been for the exertions of these generals and of the Portuguese magistrates the army would have been long delayed.”

4º. History. “General Anstruther had unadvisedly halted the leading columns in Almeida.”

Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.

“Br.-general Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the French, and who has been there ever since, and to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this route and Coimbra, has stopt them within the Portuguese frontier instead of making them proceed as I had directed to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca.”

5º. History. “Sir John Moore did not hear of the total defeat and dispersion of Belvedere’s Estremaduran army until a week after it happened, and then only through one official channel.” That channel was Mr. Stuart. Sir John had heard indeed that the Estremadurans had been forced from Burgos, but nothing of their utter defeat and ruin: the difference is cunningly overlooked by the reviewer.

Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Nov. 16th, 1808.

“I had last night the honour to receive your letter of the 13th, together with letters of the 14th from Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck.” “I did not know until I received Mr. Stuart’s letter that the defeat of the Estremaduran army had been so complete.”

Now that army was destroyed on the morning of the 10th, and here we see that the intelligence of it did not reach sir John Moore till the night of the 15th, which if not absolutely a whole week is near enough to justify the expression.

6º. History. “Thousands of arms were stored up in the great towns.”

Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s letter to Mr. Stuart.

1st December, 1808. “At Zamora there are three or four thousand stand of arms, in other places there may be more. If they remain collected in towns they will be taken by the enemy.”

7º. History. “Sir John Hope’s division was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas.”

Authority. Extract of a letter from sir John Moore to sir David Baird, 12th Dec. 1808.

“Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve and general Beresford’s brigade, the rest of the troops from thence are moving to the Duero, my quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos, Hope’s at Tordesillas.”

Now it is true that on the 14th sir John Moore, writing from Alaejos to sir David Baird, says that he had then resolved to change his direction, and instead of going to Valladolid should be at Toro on the 15th with all the troops; but as Hope was to have been at Tordesillas the same day that Moore was at Alaejos, namely on the 13th, he must have marched from thence to Toro; and where was the danger? The cavalry of his division under general C. Stewart had already surprized the French at Rueda, higher up the Duero, and it was well known no infantry were nearer than the Carion.

8º. History. “Sir John Moore was not put in communication with any person with whom he could communicate at all.”

Authority. Extracts from sir John Moore’s letters and Journal, 19th and 28th November.

“I am not in communication with any of the Spanish generals, and neither know their plans nor those of their government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what as a stranger I picked up.”—“I am in communication with no one Spanish army, nor am I acquainted with the intentions of the Spanish government or any of its generals. Castaños with whom I was put in correspondence is deprived of his command at the moment I might have expected to hear from him, and La Romana, with whom I suppose I am now to correspond, (for it has not been officially communicated to me,) is absent, God knows where.”

9º. History. “Sir John’s first intention was to move upon Valladolid, but at Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. Valderas was given as the point of union with Baird.”

Authority. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.

“I marched on the 13th from Salamanca; head-quarters, Alaejos; there I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, prince of Neufchatel, to marshal Soult, duke of Dalmatia, which determined me to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead of Valladolid. At Valderas I was joined by sir David Baird with two brigades.”

10º. History. “No assistance could be expected from Romana.”—“He did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla.”—“Contrary to his promise he pre-occupied Astorga, and when there proposed offensive plans of an absurd nature.”

Authorities. 1º. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Dec. 12th, 1808.

“I have heard nothing from the marquis de la Romana in answer to the letters I wrote to him on the 6th and 8th instants. I am thus disappointed of his co-operation or of knowing what plan he proposes.”

2º. Colonel Symes to sir David Baird, 14th Dec.

“In the morning I waited on the marquis and pressed him as far as I could with propriety on the subject of joining sir John Moore, to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances.”

3º. Extract from sir John Moore’s Journal.

“At two I received a letter from Romana, brought to me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had twenty-two thousand, (he only brought up six thousand,) and would be happy to co-operate with me.” “At Castro Nuevo sir D. Baird sent me a letter he had addressed to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter requesting to know if such was his intention, but without expressing either approbation or disapprobation. In truth I placed no dependance on him or his army.”

4º. Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Astorga, 31st December.

“I arrived here yesterday, when contrary to his promise and to my expectations I find the marquis de la Romana with a great part of his troops.”—“He said to me in direct terms that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army.” “He could not be persuaded to destroy the bridge at Mansillas, he posted some troops at it which were forced and taken prisoners by the French on their march from Mayorga.”

The reviewer must now be content to swallow his disgust at finding Napoleon’s genius admired, Soult’s authority accepted, and Romana’s military talents contemned in my History; these proofs of my accuracy are more than enough, and instead of adding to them, an apology is necessary for having taken so much notice of two articles only remarkable for malevolent imbecility and systematic violation of truth. But if the reader wishes to have a good standard of value, let him throw away this silly fellow’s carpings, and look at the duke of Wellington’s despatches as compiled by colonel Gurwood, 5th and 6th volumes. He will there find that my opinions are generally corroborated, never invalidated by the duke’s letters, and that while no fact of consequence is left out by me, new light has been thrown upon many events, the true bearings of which were unknown at the time to the English general. Thus at page 337 of the despatches, lord Wellington speaks in doubt about some obscure negociations of marshal Victor, which I have shewn, book vii. chap. iii. to be a secret intrigue for the treacherous surrender of Badajos. The proceedings in Joseph’s council of war, related by me, and I am the first writer who was ever informed of them, shew the real causes of the various attacks made by the French at the battle of Talavera. I have shewn also, and I am the first English writer who has shewn it, that the French had in Spain one hundred thousand more men than the English general knew of, that Soult brought down to the valley of the Tagus after the fight of Talavera, a force which was stronger by more than twenty thousand men than sir Arthur Wellesley estimated it to be; and without this knowledge the imminence of the danger, which the English army escaped by crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, cannot be understood.

See Wellington’s Despatches, vol. v. p. 488, et passim. Again, the means of correcting the error which Wellington fell into in 1810 relative to Soult, who he supposed to have been at the head of the second corps in Placentia when he was really at Seville, has been furnished by me, insomuch as I have shewn that it was Mermet who was at the head of that corps, and that Wellington was deceived by the name of the younger Soult who commanded Mermet’s cavalry.

Two facts only have been misstated in my history.

1º. Treating of the conspiracy in Soult’s camp at Oporto, I said that D’Argenton, to save his life, readily told all he knew of the British, but with respect to his accomplices, was immoveable.

2º. Treating of Cuesta’s conduct in the Talavera campaign I have enumerated amongst his reasons for not fighting that it was Sunday.

Now the duke of Wellington says D’Argenton did betray his accomplices, and yet my information was drawn from authority only second to the duke’s, viz. major-general sir James Douglas, who conducted the interviews with D’Argenton, and was the suggester and attendant of his journey to the British head-quarters. He was probably deceived by that conspirator, but the following extract from his narrative proves that the fact was not lightly stated in my History.

“D’Argenton was willing enough to save his life by revealing every thing he knew about the English, and among other things assured Soult it would be nineteen days before any serious attack could be made upon Oporto; and there can be little doubt that Soult, giving credit to this information, lost his formidable barrier of the Douro by surprise. As no threats on the part of the marshal could induce D’Argenton to reveal the name of his accomplices, he was twice brought out to be shot and remanded in the expectation that between hope and intimidation he might be led to a full confession. On the morning of the attack he was hurried out of prison by the gens-d’armes, and, no other conveyance for him being at hand, he was placed upon a horse of his own, and that one the very best he had. The gens-d’armes in their hurry did not perceive what he very soon found out himself, that he was the best mounted man of the party, and watching his opportunity he sprung his horse over a wall into the fields, and made his escape to the English, who were following close.”

For the second error so good a plea cannot be offered, and yet there was authority for that also. The story was circulated, and generally believed at the time, as being quite consonant with the temper of the Spanish general; and it has since been repeated in a narrative of the campaign of 1809, published by lord Munster. Nevertheless it appears from colonel Gurwood’s compilation, 5th vol. page 343, that it is not true.

Having thus disposed of the Quarterly Review I request the reader’s attention to the following corrections of errors, as to facts, which having lately reached me, are inserted here in preference to waiting for a new edition of the volumes to which they refer.

1º. The storming of Badajos.

“General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they all surrendered the next morning to lord Fitzroy Somerset.”

Correction by colonel Warre, assented to by lord Fitzroy Somerset.

“Lieut.-colonel Warre was the senior officer present at the surrender, having joined lord Fitzroy Somerset (who was in search of the governor and the missing part of the garrison) just as he was collecting a few men wherewith to summon in his capacity of aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, the tête-du-pont of San Christoval.”

2º. Assault of Tarifa. “The Spaniards and the forty-seventh British regiment guarded the breach.”

Correction by sir Hugh Gough.

“The only part of the forty-seventh engaged during the assault were two companies under captain Livelesly, stationed on the east bastion one hundred and fifty paces from the breach, and the Spaniards were no where to be seen, except behind a pallisade in the street, a considerable way from the breach. The eighty-seventh, and the eighty-seventh alone, defended the breach. The two companies of the forty-seventh, I before mentioned, and the two companies of the rifles, which latter were stationed on my left but all under my orders, did all that disciplined and brave troops could do in support, and the two six-pounders, under lieut.-colonel Mitchel of the artillery, most effectively did their duty while their fire could tell, the immediate front of the breach from the great dip of the ground not being under their range.”

This correction renders it proper that I should give my authority for saying the Spaniards were at the breach.

Extract from a letter of sir Charles Smith, the engineer who defended Tarifa, to colonel Napier.

“The next great measure of opposition was to assign to the Spaniards the defence of the breach. This would have been insupportable: the able advocacy of lord Proby proved that it would be a positive insult to the Spanish nation to deprive its troops of the honour, and all my solemn remonstrances could produce, was to split the difference, and take upon myself to determine which half of the breach should be entrusted to our ally.”

The discrepancy between sir Charles Smith’s and sir Hugh Gough’s statement is however easily reconciled, being more apparent than real. The Spaniards were ordered to defend half the breach, but in fact did not appear there.

To the above it is proper here to add a fact made known to me since my fourth volume was published, and very honourable to major Henry King, of the eighty-second regiment. Being commandant of the town of Tarifa, a command distinct from the island, he was called to a council of war on the 29th of December, and when most of those present were for abandoning the place he gave in the following note,

“I am decidedly of opinion that the defence of Tarifa will afford the British garrison an opportunity of gaining eternal honour, and it ought to be defended to the last extremity.

“I. H. S. King,
“Commandant of Tarifa.”

3º. Battle of Barosa. “The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, turned indeed without orders coming up just as the action ceased, and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an Englishman, commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much, but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin’s division have rendered the defeat ruinous.”—History, vol. iii. p. 448.

Extract of a letter from sir Samford Whittingham.

“I am free to confess that the statement of the historian of the Peninsular War, as regards my conduct on the day of the battle of Barosa, is just and correct; but I owe it to myself, to declare that my conduct was the result of obedience to the repeated orders of the general commanding in chief under whose command I acted. In the given strength of the Spanish cavalry under my command on that day, there is an error. The total number of the Spanish cavalry, at the commencement of the expedition, is correctly stated; but so many detachments had taken place by orders from head-quarters that I had only one squadron of Spanish cavalry under my command on that day.”

COUNTER-REMARKS

TO

MR. DUDLEY MONTAGU PERCEVAL’S

REMARKS

UPON SOME PASSAGES IN COLONEL NAPIER’S FOURTH
VOLUME OF HIS HISTORY OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.

“The evil, that men do, lives after them.”

COUNTER-REMARKS,

&c. &c.

In the fourth volume of my history of the Peninsular War I assailed the public character of the late Mr. Perceval, his son has published a defence of it, after having vainly endeavoured, in a private correspondence, to convince me that my attack was unfounded. The younger Mr. Perceval’s motive is to be respected, and had he confined himself to argument and authority, it was my intention to have relied on our correspondence, and left the subject matter in dispute to the judgment of the public. But Mr. Perceval used expressions which obliged me to seek a personal explanation, when I learned that he, unable to see any difference between invective directed against the public acts of a minister, and terms of insult addressed to a private person, thinks he is entitled to use such expressions; and while he emphatically “disavows all meaning or purpose of offence or insult,” does yet offer most grievous insult, denying at the same time my right of redress after the customary mode, and explicitly declining, he says from principle, an appeal to any other weapon than the pen.

It is not for me to impugn this principle in any case, still less in that of a son defending the memory of his father; but it gives me the right which I now assert, to disregard any verbal insult which Mr. Perceval, intentionally or unintentionally, has offered to me or may offer to me in future. When a gentleman relieves himself from personal responsibility by the adoption of this principle, his language can no longer convey insult to those who do not reject such responsibility; and it would be as unmanly to use insulting terms towards him in return as it would be to submit to them from a person not so shielded. Henceforth therefore I hold Mr. Perceval’s language to be innocuous, but for the support of my own accuracy, veracity, and justice, as an historian, I offer these my “Counter-Remarks.” They must of necessity lacerate Mr. Perceval’s feelings, but they are, I believe, scrupulously cleared of any personal incivility, and if any passage having that tendency has escaped me I thus apologize before-hand.

Mr. Perceval’s pamphlet is copious in declamatory expressions of his own feelings; and it is also duly besprinkled with animadversions on Napoleon’s vileness, the horrors of jacobinism, the wickedness of democrats, the propriety of coercing the Irish, and such sour dogmas of melancholy ultra-toryism. Of these I reck not. Assuredly I did not write with any expectation of pleasing men of Mr. Perceval’s political opinions and hence I shall let his general strictures pass, without affixing my mark to them, and the more readily as I can comprehend the necessity of ekeing out a scanty subject. But where he has adduced specific argument and authority for his own peculiar cause,—weak argument indeed, for it is his own, but strong authority, for it is the duke of Wellington’s,—I will not decline discussion. Let the most honoured come first.

The Duke of Wellington, replying to a letter from Mr. Perceval, in which the point at issue is most earnestly and movingly begged by the latter, writes as follows:—

London, June 6, 1835.

Dear Sir,

I received last night your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding my great respect for Colonel Napier and his work, I have never read a line of it; because I wished to avoid being led into a literary controversy, which I should probably find more troublesome than the operations which it is the design of the Colonel’s work to describe and record.

I have no knowledge therefore of what he has written of your father, Mr. Spencer Perceval. Of this I am certain, that I never, whether in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or of any minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs of the public during the war, excepting in praise of them;—that I have repeatedly declared in public my obligations to them for the cordial support and encouragement which I received from them; and I should have been ungrateful and unjust indeed, if I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the king.

It is true that the army was in want of money, that is to say, specie, during the war. Bank-notes could not be used abroad; and we were obliged to pay for every thing in the currency of the country which was the seat of the operations. It must not be forgotten, however, that at that period the Bank was restricted from making its payments in specie. That commodity became therefore exceedingly scarce in England; and very frequently was not to be procured at all. I believe, that from the commencement of the war in Spain up to the period of the lamented death of Mr. Perceval, the difficulty in procuring specie was much greater than it was found to be from the year 1812, to the end of the war; because at the former period all intercourse with the Continent was suspended: in the latter, as soon as the war in Russia commenced, the communication with the continent was in some degree restored; and it became less difficult to procure specie.

But it is obvious that, from some cause or other, there was a want of money in the army, as the pay of the troops was six months in arrear; a circumstance which had never been heard of in a British army in Europe: and large sums were due in different parts of the country for supplies, means of transport, &c. &c.

Upon other points referred to in your letter, I have really no recollection of having made complaints. I am convinced that there was no real ground for them; as I must repeat, that throughout the war, I received from the king’s servants every encouragement and support that they had in their power to give.

Believe me, dear Sir,
Ever yours most faithfully,
Wellington.

Dudley Montagu Perceval, Esq.

This letter imports, if I rightly understand it, that any complaints, by whomsoever preferred, against the ministers, and especially against Mr. Perceval, during the war in the Peninsula, had no real foundation. Nevertheless his Grace and others did make many, and very bitter complaints, as the following extracts will prove.

No. 1.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon.

“Viseu, February 10th, 1810.

“I apprized Government more than two months ago of our probable want of money, and of the necessity that we should be supplied, not only with a large sum but with a regular sum monthly, equal in amount to the increase of expense occasioned by the increased subsidy to the Portuguese, and by the increase of our own army. They have not attended to either of these demands, and I must write again. But I wish you would mention the subject in your letter to lord Wellesley.”

No. 2.

“February 23d, 1810.

“It is obvious that the sums will fall short of those which His Majesty’s Government have engaged to supply to the Portuguese government, but that is the fault of His Majesty’s Government in England, and they have been repeatedly informed that it was necessary that they should send out money. The funds for the expenses of the British army are insufficient in the same proportion, and all that I can do is to divide the deficiency in its due proportions between the two bodies which are to be supported by the funds at our disposal.”

No. 3.

“March 1st, 1810.

“In respect to the 15,000 men in addition to those which Government did propose to maintain in this country, I have only to say, that I don’t care how many men they send here, provided they will supply us with proportionate means to feed and pay them; but I suspect they will fall short rather than exceed the thirty thousand men.”

No. 4.

“March 5th, 1810.

Mr. Stuart, speaking of the Portuguese emigrating, says,

“If the determination of ministers at home or events here bring matters to that extremity.”

No. 5.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart, in reference to Cadiz.

“30th March, 1810.

“I don’t understand the arrangement which Government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as a part of the army, and from the arrangement which I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all the money procured by bills was applicable to the service in this country. The instructions to general Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that the Spaniards should feed our troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much a part of my army that I had written to my brother to desire his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz, when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal, at least the troops, which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be at an end.”

No. 6.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.

“1st April, 1810.

“I agree with you respecting the disposition of the people of Lisbon. In fact all they wish for is to be saved from the French, and they were riotous last winter because they imagined, with some reason, that we intended to abandon them.”——“The arrangement made by Government for the command at Cadiz will totally ruin us in the way of money.”

No. 7.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.

“April 20th, 1810.

“The state of opinions in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public or as the opposition pretend to be, and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no purpose. Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions, and I have called for an explanation of the former, which when it arrives will shew me more clearly what they intend. The instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility for bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it will be necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer in these times to receive private hints and opinions from ministers, which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even to the letter of the public instructions; at the same time that, if not attended to, the danger of the responsibility imposed by the public instructions is increased tenfold.”

No. 8.

Ditto to Ditto.

“May, 1810.

“It is impossible for Portugal to aid in feeding Cadiz. We have neither money, nor provisions in this country, and the measures which they are adopting to feed the people there will positively oblige us to evacuate this country for want of money to support the army, and to perform the king’s engagements, unless the Government in England should enable us to remain by sending out large and regular supplies of specie. I have written fully to Government upon this subject.”

No. 9.

General Graham to Mr. Stuart.

“Isla, 22d May, 1810.

In reference to his command at Cadiz, says, “lord Liverpool has decided the doubt by declaring this a part of lord Wellington’s army, and saying it is the wish of Government that though I am second in command to him I should be left here for the present.” “This is odd enough; I mean that it should not have been left to his judgement to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than people in England.”

No. 10.

Lord Wellington to Mr. Stuart.

“June 5, 1810.

“This letter will shew you the difficulties under which we labour for want of provisions and of money to buy them.” “I am really ashamed of writing to the government (Portuguese) upon this subject (of the militia), feeling as I do that we owe them so much money which we are unable to pay. According to my account the military chest is now indebted to the chest of the aids nearly £400,000. At the same time I have no money to pay the army, which is approaching the end of the second month in arrears, and which ought to be paid in advance. The bât and forage to the officers for March is still due, and we are in debt every where.” “The miserable and pitiful want of money prevents me from doing many things which might and ought to be done for the safety of the country.” “The corps ought to be assembled and placed in their stations. But want of provisions and money obliges me to leave them in winter-quarters till the last moment. Yet if any thing fails, I shall not be forgiven.”

No. 11.

Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellington.

“June 9, 1810.

“I have received two letters from Government, the one relative to licenses, the other containing a letter from Mr. Harrison of the Treasury, addressed to colonel Bunbury, in which, after referring to the different estimates both for the British and Portuguese, and stating the sums at their disposal, they not only conclude that we have more than is absolutely necessary, but state specie to be so scarce in England that we must not rely on further supplies from home, and must content ourselves with such sums as come from Gibraltar and Cadiz,” &c. &c.

“From hand to mouth we may perhaps make shift, taking care to pay the Portuguese in kind and not in money, until the supplies, which the Treasury say in three or four months will be ready, are forthcoming. Government desire me to report to them any explanation which either your lordship or myself may be able to communicate on the subject of Mr. Harrison’s letter. As it principally relates to army finance, I do not feel myself quite competent to risk an opinion in opposition to what that gentleman has laid down. I have, however, so often and so strongly written to them the embarrassment we all labour under, both respecting corn and money, that there must be some misconception, or some inaccuracy has taken place in calculations which are so far invalidated by the fact, without obliging us to go into the detail necessary to find out what part of the statement is erroneous.”