CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG—THE SECOND DAY.
The ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has already been partially described. In two places it sunk away into intervening valleys. One between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill; the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top, as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top.
At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I saw him, soon after daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and want of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At dawn he commenced forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the movement. It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below. Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left, and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time. It is an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle- ground Hancock had selected.
Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion, would have been much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and, fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line.
There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them lost the battle of Gettysburg.
I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail. Gettysburg seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession and were defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive in time to sustain the attack. He realized the old fable. The peasant could not break the bundle of fagots, but he could break one at a time until all were gone.
Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took him three times as long as it did us to communicate with different parts of his line, and concentrate troops. His couriers who carried orders and the reinforcements he sent moved on the circumference and ours on the chord of the arc.
The two armies were about a mile apart. The Confederates—Longstreet and Hill—occupied Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery Ridge, upon which our forces were posted. Ewell's corps, on the rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the right.
Lee could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position on the heights, and should have done so. When he determined to attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all his force was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union army, the Fifth and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades of the Third Corps were also absent.
The latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was controlled by the enemy, Sickles felt anxious for the safety of his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort them in. This was not done, however. The trains were warned off the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested.
There has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet, Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox, and others as to whether Lee did or did not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and as to whether Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it. When a battle is lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on the part of each general to lay the blame on somebody else's shoulders. Longstreet waited until noon for Law's brigade to come up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching to avoid being seen by our troops. There was undoubtedly too much delay. The fact is, Longstreet saw we had a strong position and was not well pleased at the duty assigned him, for he thought it more than probable his attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to take up a position where Meade would be forced to attack him, and was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded. The rebel commander, however, finding the Army of the Potomac in front of him, having unbounded confidence in his troops, and elated by the success of the first day's fight, believed he could gain a great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to attempt it. He was sick of these endless delays and constant sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his opponent, and enable the South to crown herself queen of the North American continent.
By 9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was actively engaged with that of the enemy, who were making a reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road. No serious affair, however, occurred for some hours. Meade, as stated, was forming his lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied. The Fifth Corps, which came up about 1 P.M., was posted, as a reserve, south of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the attack which has already been referred to. About 3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four miles, and its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of Round Top, to reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an attack on the left. Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance against him, but boldly directed that each flank of the Union army should be assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations against our centre were to be kept up, to prevent either wing from being reinforced. It was another attempt to converge columns with an interval of several miles between them upon a central force, and, like almost all such enterprises, failed from want of proper co-operation in the different fractions of his line.
[Map] GETTYSBURG.—Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second Day.* [* The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield and Hanover roads. The second day's battle south of the same roads.]
REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE. Union Troops, [filled rectangle] MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD commanding the First and Eleventh Corps. FIRST CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding. FIRST DIVISION—MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding. a. First Brigade. Colonel Henry A. Morrow, 24th Michigan. b. Second Brigade. Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler. SECOND DIVISION—MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON. c. First Brigade. Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul. d. Second Brigade. Brigadier-General Henry Baxter. THIRD DIVISION—BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY. e. First Brigade. Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st Pennsylvania. f. Second Brigade. Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania. ELEVENTH CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding. FIRST DIVISION—BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. C. BARLOW commanding. g. First Brigade. Colonel Von Gilsa. h. Second Brigade. Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames. SECOND DIVISION—BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG. k. First Brigade. Colonel Von Arnsberg. l. Second Brigade. Colonel Kryzanowski. m. Coster's Brigade, of Steinwehr's Division.
Confederate Troops, [open rectangle]
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL commanding Third Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY HETH commanding Division.
1. Archer's Brigade. 3. Brockenborough's Brigade.
2. Davis' Brigade. 4. Pettigrew's Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. PENDER commanding Division.
6. McGowan's Brigade. 8. Thomas' Brigade.
7. Scales' Brigade. 9. Lane's Brigade.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENJ. EWELL commanding Second Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES commanding Division.
10. Daniel's Brigade. 12. Iverson's Brigade.
11. Ramseur's Brigade. 13. O'Neill's Brigade.
14. Doles' Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division.
15. Gordon's Brigade. 17. Hoke's Brigade.
16. Hays' Brigade. 18. Smith's Brigade.
Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and although Ewell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by General Meade, by which the force in that part of the field was withdrawn just as Ewell advanced against it. But we are anticipating our narrative.
Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps, complains that he was not allowed to go past Round Top and flank us on the south, as he might have done, but was required by his orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles' line along the Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to me, as he started late in the afternoon, if he had made the detour which would have been necessary in order to attack us on the south, he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might have interposed to cut him off from the main body.
Before describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary to fight a defensive battle. The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe. The Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right; next came one division of the First Corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First Corps at the base; next the Second Corps; then the Third, and the Fifth Corps on the extreme left, the Sixth Corps being posted in rear of Round Top as a general reserve to the army. Sickles, however, denies that any position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following reasons: First, because the ground was low, and second, on account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their artillery; third, because the ground between the valley he was expected to occupy, and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded excellent cover for an enemy operating in his immediate front. He had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating a suitable position for his corps. At his request, General Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose. They rode out to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted along that road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard, which was about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard with the other part of the line, and bent around, so as to cover the front of Little Round Top at the base. The disadvantages of this position are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which constitute the right angle. The diagram shows that the force A will have both its lines a1 and a2 enfiladed by batteries at b1 b2, and must yield. The ground, however, may be such that the enemy cannot plant his guns at b1 or b2; but under any circumstances it is a weak formation and the enemy easily penetrate the angle. When that is the case, and it was so in the present instance—each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and the position is no longer tenable.
[Diagram]
_________________________
| b2
|
|b1 _________________
| | a1
| |
| | A
| |a2
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If one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot be enfiladed, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes permissible.
Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General Meade, who, however, censured the movement afterward. As soon as Sickles took position, General Buford's division of cavalry was sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the rebel left.
Sykes' corps—the Fifth—came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves at their right and front.
There had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders, called at Meade's headquarters, and it was universally agreed to remain and hold the position. As the Third Corps, in answer to the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his command and General Meade went with him. The latter objected to Sickles' line, but thought it was then too late to change it.
The severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to a furious attack against Ward's brigade on the left. This attack soon extended to the Peach Orchard. The fight became very hot against Birney's division from the left to the centre, but the troops on the right of the centre—Humphreys' division—were not at first actively engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Birney with one of his brigades, and subsequently with a regiment.
The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to describe the movements of the contestants. Some idea of it can probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram:
It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A, and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB. The angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward and took the position DE.
The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked the force there with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor. Indeed, Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries, HI. The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field.
The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking in of the angle at A will be described further on. The general result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important to be wholly omitted.
About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left, by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded ridge beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent. This central point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's and Humphreys' divisions. Birney's two brigades, commanded by Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three- quarters of an hour.
It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road, and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from Sykes' corps.
Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank. Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant charge upon the rebel advance.
The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.
General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top, to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment he rode down the slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had done and to represent the immense importance of holding this commanding point.
The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right; but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top which seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the 140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre, had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief. Colonel Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent. The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's regiment—the 20th Maine—was folded back by him, around the rear of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in their turn. This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the hill. The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number of prisoners. Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition. Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill in his official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise."
We will now return to the Peach Orchard. In answer to a shot from Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries opposite. Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became necessary to sacrifice one of them—that of Bigelow—to enable the others to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham still held the Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A battery was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally wounded in doing so.* Sickles lost a leg about this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved upon General Birney.
[* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had known him as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of Congress he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.]
The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to give the others time to form a new line. He fought with fixed prolonge until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men. Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience. McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this artillery was served. He says one shell killed and wounded thirty men, out of a company of thirty-seven.
The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and an enfilading fire from the right.
While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of Sickles' line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force —a front of two regiments—and his contest with Semmes' brigade in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very destructive. At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and occupied the wheat-field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone fence which bounded it.
Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came forward in its place. Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes' brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded.
Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles, went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line, from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time, and withdrew by piece.
[* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements.]
The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State, and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors of one of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division—that of Fisher—had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on the left of Little Round Top and fortified it.
As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther advance.
The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which rocky cavern they took shelter.
It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham—which took place soon after—upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to the road. Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock, who had been placed in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line" wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His activity and foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat. Humphreys was followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright—about the best fighting material in the rebel army. Perry was driven back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported on the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results. Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. Webb gave him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward with two regiments. He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned it upon them. Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox did the same. On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, for he pierced our centre, and held it for a short time, and had the movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack of support.
Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have captured temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.
As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped off. The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at him.* I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's name.
[* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian, a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright. Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.]
In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line. As he passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged he passed over to the right. On his return late in the day he saw Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade established on the crest barring his way back. He rode rapidly over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff. Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have pierced our centre." Meade expressed surprise at the information and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?" Tidball replied, "I do not know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are available." Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated. There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the action. When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more guns. I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to be located in that part of the field.
It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which after all was of no particular benefit to them. They were still outside our main line. They pierced the latter it is true, but the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the divisions which should have supported them remained inactive. I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command exerted a benumbing influence on the second day.
It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling into the hands of the enemy.
Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg," published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey, of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such a movement was contemplated.
Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.
In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.
Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek about half and hour before sunset. It suffered so severely from our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our communications.
Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's position saw this movement of Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine, perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before taking any further action. Yet they were now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack on the rear of our army, in conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded.
During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as the battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery about his movements which needs to be cleared up.
To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's infantry moved forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left, under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens' batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by Stevens' battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the approaching line energetically. The rebel left and centre fell back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries. In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts' guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement, exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible fire of double canister into their ranks. The 33d Massachusetts also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted, "Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose our guns." Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him.
The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right. As it could only be reached by a long circuit it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer. He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been repulsed.
The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses, and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the élite of his army, who had not been engaged, against our centre. He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown. This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field about 4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked at Two Taverns for the night.
Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet him. At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry.
At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously voted to stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily, "Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to fight a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced during the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought it better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing all.*
[* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency. It is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat, where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not always so easy to decide. On the night of the 2d the state of affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days, the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated; the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh. It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions, and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion. In such a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as an organization, and there is a vast difference between a destroyed army and a defeated army. By retiring while it was yet in his power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue; and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies, were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very energetically. Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was necessary for renewed effort.
There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his
communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at
Gettysburg.
It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between us and Washington. Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining now to fight it out.]