FOOTNOTES:
[1] Beattie seems to think that the antediluvians had an alphabet, and that hieroglyphical was posterior to alphabetical writing. “The wisdom and simple manners of the first men,” says he, “would incline me to think, that they must have had an alphabet; for hieroglyphic characters imply quaintness and witticism.” In this reasoning I cannot concur. Alphabetic writing is indeed simple, when known; so also are most inventions. But, simple and easy as it appears to us, we have only to examine the art itself, to be fully convinced, that science, genius, and industry, must have been combined in inventing it. Nay, the learned author himself acknowledges, “that though of easy acquisition to us, it is in itself neither easy nor obvious.” He even admits, “that alphabetical writing must be so remote from the conceptions of those who never heard of it, that without divine aid it would seem to be unsearchable and impossible.” I observe also that in passing from picture-writing to hieroglyphical expression, and in transferring the signs of physical to intellectual and invisible objects, fanciful conceits would naturally take place. It is true also that the manners of the antediluvians were simple; but it is not from prudence nor simplicity of manners, but from human genius, gradually improved, that we are to expect inventions, which require the greatest efforts of the human mind.
[2] Cicero regards the invention of alphabetic writing as an evidence of the celestial character of the soul; and many have ascribed its origin to the inspiration of the Deity. To resort to supernatural causes, to account for the production of any rare or striking event, is repugnant to the principles of true philosophy. And how wonderful soever the art of alphabetical writing may appear, there can be no necessity for referring its introduction to divine inspiration, if the inventive powers of man be not demonstrably unequal to the task. Picture-writing is generally believed to have been the earliest mode of recording events, or communicating information by permanent signs. This was probably succeeded by hieroglyphical characters. How these pictures and hieroglyphical devices would, either through negligence or a desire to abbreviate, gradually vary their form, and lose their resemblance to the objects which they represented, may be easily conceived. Hence that association, which existed between the sign and the thing signified, being founded in resemblance, would in process of time be entirely dissolved. This having taken place, hieroglyphical characters would naturally be converted into a mere verbal denotation, representative of words and not of things. Hence, as Goguet, in his work, “De l’Origine des Loix,” &c., reasonably conjectures, would arise by a partial and easy analysis, a syllabic mode of denotation, which would naturally introduce a literal alphabet. This conjecture must seem highly probable, when it is considered, that both a verbal and syllabic mode of notation are still practised by some Eastern nations.
[3] I am aware, that in considering the letters y and w to be the same with i and u (oo), I maintain an opinion, the truth of which has been disputed. The reasons, however, which have been assigned for rejecting it do not appear to me satisfactory.
[4] The mouth is not the proper organ for producing sound; but merely the organ for modulating and articulating the specific sounds.
[5] The sound of th in thin, is usually marked with a stroke through the h, to distinguish it from its other sound; thus, tħick. This distinction is by some writers reversed.
[6] Hutton’s Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, vol. ii. p. 688.
[7] Plato and Aristotle, when they treat of prepositions, considered the noun and the verb as the only essential parts of speech; these, without the aid of any other word, being capable of forming a sentence. Hence they were called τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου, “the most animated parts of speech.” The latter of these philosophers, in his Poetics, admits four, adding to the noun and the verb the article and the conjunction. The elder Stoics made five, dividing the noun into proper and appellative.
Noun, Nomen de quo loquimur.
Verb, Verbum seu quod loquimur.—Quint. lib. i. 4.
Horace has been thought by some to countenance this doctrine when he says,
“Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere.”—Lib. i. Sat. 3.
[9] The plural number, and the genitive singular, seem to have been originally formed by adding er to the nominative singular, as you, you-er, your; they, they-er, their; we, we-er, our. This termination was afterwards changed into en, and then into es or s. Thus we have still in provincial usage, though now almost entirely obsolete, childer for the plural of child, and the double plural in child-er-en, children, with the double genitive in west-er-en, western.
[10] Brethren, in Scripture, is used for brothers.
[11] The obsolete plural occurs in the Bible. “These men were bound in their hosen and hats.”—Dan. iii. 21.
[12] Baker inclines also to this usage in preference to the other; but does not affirm it to be a plural noun.
[13] Much is sometimes joined with collective nouns; but these denote number in the aggregate; thus, much company.
[14] The gender of mors, virtus, sol, θάνατος, ἀρετή, ἥλιος, was unalterably fixed.
[15] It seems, however, to be more applicable to the English language than to any other with which I am acquainted.
[16] These observations will sufficiently explain the reason why we cannot concur with Dr. Johnson in thinking that there is “an impropriety in the termination,” when we say of a woman, “She is a philosopher.” The female termination in such examples is not wanted; it would be pleonastic and improper. The meaning is, “She is a person given to the study of nature.” If we had been speaking of a lady devoted to philosophy, and had occasion afterwards to mention her by an appellative, we should feel the want of the appropriate termination; and instead of saying “the philosopher,” we should wish, for the sake of discrimination, to be able to say, “the philosophress,” or to employ some equally distinctive term. In the example adduced by the learned lexicographer, the female termination is superfluous; and would intimate a distinction of philosophic character, instead of a distinction of sex, the latter being denoted by the female pronoun.
[17] We remark, in some instances, a similar phraseology in Greek and Latin. Θεὸς and θεὰ, deus and dea, are contradistinguished as in English, god and goddess; the former of each pair strictly denoting the male, and the latter the female. But the former, we find, has a generical meaning, expressing “a deity,” whether male or female; and is frequently used when the female is designed, if divinity in the abstract be the primary idea without regard to the sex, thus,
... “τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξ’ Ἀφροδίτη,
Ῥεῖα μάλ’ ὥστε θεός.”—Hom. Il. iii. 380.
Here the term θεός is applied to Venus, the character of divinity, and not the distinction of sex, being the chief object of the poet’s attention. Θεός is, therefore, to be considered as either masculine or feminine.
“Ἀλλά μ’ ἁ Διός γ’ ἀλκίμα θεός.”—Soph. Aj. 401.
“Μήτε τις οὖν θήλεια θεός.”—Hom. Il. Θ. 7.
“Descendo, ac ducente deo, flammam inter et hostes
Expedior.”—Virg. Æn. ii. 632.
Here, also, deo is applied to Venus, as likewise in the following passage, “deum esse indignam credidi.”—Plaut. Pœn. 2, l. 10.
[18] Πτῶσις γενική: general case. It has been supposed by some that the Latins, mistaking the import of the Greek term, called this the genitive case. See Ency. Brit., Art. Grammar.
[19] Amor Dei denotes either amor quo Deus amat, or quo Deus amatur. Reformatio Lutheri, either qua reformavit, or qua reformatus est. Injuria patris, desiderium amici, with many other examples which might be produced, have either an active or passive sense. ἡ ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, אהבת יהוה, l’amore de Dio, l’amour de Dieu, severally involve the same ambiguity with “the love of God.”
[20] Of the six declensions, to one or other of which the learned Dr. Hickes conceives the inflexion of almost all the Saxon nouns may be reduced, three form their genitive in es, as, word, wordes; smith, smithes. In the Mœsogothic, a kindred language, the genitive ends in s, some nouns having is, some ns, and others as, as, fan, fanins; faukagagja, faukagagjis.
[21] It must be obvious, that the terms general and universal belong not to real existences, but are merely denominations, the result of intellect, generalising a number of individuals under one head.
[22] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum.—Inst. lib. viii. cap. 4.
I am inclined to think that our language possesses a superiority in this respect over the Greek itself. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ may signify either “man in the species, or an individual, was sent from God.” The author of the article Grammar, in the Encyc. Brit., observes, “that the word ἄνθρωπος is here restricted to an individual by its concord with the verb and the participle.” If he mean by this that the term must be significant of only one individual, (and I can annex no other interpretation to his words,) because a singular verb and participle singular are joined with it, he errs egregiously. Numberless examples might be produced to evince the contrary. Job. v. 7. ἄνθρωπος γεννᾶται κόπῳ “man (mankind) is born unto trouble;” where the subject is joined to a verb singular. Psal. xlix. 12. ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε, “man being in honour abideth not.” Here also man for mankind is joined with a participle and verb singular. And here it may be pertinently asked, would not the term one for a in the first example somewhat alter the meaning, and convey an idea different from that intended by the evangelist?
[23] They are the Saxon words this or thes, “hic, hæc, hoc,” that or thæt, “ille, illa, illud,” which were frequently used by the Saxons for what we term the definite article, as, send us on thas swyn, “send us into the swine.” Mark v. 21, tha eodon tha unclænan gastas on tha swyn, “then the unclean spirits entered into the swine.”
The Saxon definites are se, seo, thæt, for the three genders severally; and tha in the plural, expressing the or those, as, thæt goed sæd, the good seed. Thæt is also joined to masculine and feminine nouns, as, thæt wif, the woman; thæt folc, the people. Thæ (pronounced they) still obtains in Scotland, as, “thæ men” for “these men.”
ארץ הארץ.
אשרי האיש.
[26] Horne Tooke appears to me to have erred in deriving odd from ow’d. His words are these: “Odd is the participle ow’d. Thus, when we are counting by couples or pairs, we say, ‘one pair,’ ‘two pairs,’ &c., and ‘one ow’d,’ ‘two ow’d,’ to make up another pair. It has the same meaning when we say, ‘an odd man,’ ‘an odd action,’ it still relates to pairing; and we mean ‘without a fellow,’ ‘unmatched.’” Now, I must own, this appears to me a very odd explanation; for, in my apprehension, it leads to a conclusion the very reverse of that which the author intends. The term odd is applied to the one which stands by itself, and not to that which is absent, or ow’d, to complete the pair. If I say, “there are three pairs, and an odd one,” the word odd refers to the single one, over and above the three pairs, and not to the one which is wanting; yet Mr. Tooke refers it to the latter. His explanation seems at once unnatural and absurd. Had he substituted, according to his own etymology, add for and, saying, “three pairs, add an ow’d one,” he must, I think, have perceived its inaccuracy. It is the odd and present one, of which the singularity is predicated, and not the absent or ow’d one.
[27] “Quivis seu quilibet affirmat; quisquam, quispiam, ullus, aut negat aut interrogat,” are the words of an ancient grammarian. It is observable also, that in Latin, ullus, any, is a diminutive from unus, one; as any in English is from ane, the name of unity, as formerly used.
[28] In Anglo-Saxon ic, in German ich, in Greek ἐγὼ, in Latin ego. Mr. Webb delivered it as his opinion, that the pronoun of the first person was derived from the Hebrew ech or ach, one, used by apocope for achad or ahad, he added, “oned,” or “united.” It is doubtless true, that ech occurs in one or two passages for one: see Ezek. xviii. 10, and Ps. xlix. 8; in which latter passage it is rendered in our translation, brother, and by R. Jonah, one; but we apprehend that this fact will by no means justify his conclusion. And as he considered that the pronoun of the first person radically denoted one, he imagined that the pronoun of the second person came from the numeral duo, du, tu, thu. Now, it must be granted that there is an obvious resemblance between ic and ech, and also between duo, tu, and thu; but were we to draw any conclusion from this similarity, it would be the reverse of that which the author has deduced. It seems quite preposterous to suppose, that the necessity for expressing a number would present itself, before that of discriminating between the person speaking and the person addressed. The rude savage could not converse with his fellow without some sign of this distinction; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be first adopted, we may reasonably presume, on several grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions.
The pronoun ic is in Saxon declined thus:
| Sing. Nom. Ic | Gen. Min | Dat. Me | Acc. Me |
| Plur. Nom. We | Gen. Ure | Dat. Us | Acc. Us. |
[29] The pronoun of the second person is thus declined:
| Sing. Nom. Thu | Gen. Thin | Dat. The | Acc. The |
| Plur. Nom. Ge (hard) | Gen. Eower | Dat. and | Acc. Eow. |
[30] The Anglo-Saxon he is declined thus:
| Sing. Nom. He | Gen. His | Dat. and Acc. Him. |
| Sing. Nom. Heo | Gen. Hire | Dat. Hire. | Acc. Hi. |
[32] This pronoun is from the Anglo-Saxon hyt or hit, “i” or “that.”
[33] In Anglo-Saxon hi, in Teutonic die.
[34] In Anglo-Saxon, hwa, hua; Gen. hwæs; Dat. hwam; Acc. hwæne, hwone. Also hwilc, whence, says Hickes, proceeded which, the letter l being elided.
[35] Mr. Tooke contends, that this part of speech is properly termed adjective noun, and “that it is altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive.” Names and designations necessarily influence our conceptions of the things which they represent. It is therefore desirable, that in every art or science, not only should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which it expresses. Now, I concur with Mr. Tooke in thinking, that the adjective is by no means a necessary part of speech. I agree with him also in opinion, that, in a certain sense, all words are nouns or names. But, as this latter doctrine seems directly repugnant to the concurrent theories of critics and grammarians, it is necessary to explain in what sense the opinion of Mr. Tooke requires to be understood; and in presenting the reader with this explanation, I shall briefly state the objections which will naturally offer themselves against the justness of this theory. “Gold, and brass, and silk, is each of them,” says Mr. Tooke, “the name of a thing, and denotes a substance. If, then, I say, a gold-ring, a brass-tube, a silk-string; here are the substantives adjectivè posita, yet names of things, and denoting substances.” It may be contended, however, that these are not substantives, but adjectives, and are the same as golden, brazen, silken. He proceeds: “If again I say, a golden ring, a brazen tube, a silken string; do gold, and brass, and silk, cease to be the names of things, and cease to denote substances, because instead of coupling them with ring, tube, and string, by a hyphen thus (-), I couple them to the same words, by adding the termination en?” It may be answered, they do not cease to imply the substances, but they are no longer names of those substances. Hard implies hardness, but it is not the name of that quality. Atheniensis implies Athenæ, but it is not the name of the city, any more than belonging to Athens can be called its name. He observes: “If it were true, that adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing.” This conclusion may be disputed. An adjective may imply a substance, quality, or property, though it is not the name of it. Cereus, “waxen,” implies cera, “wax;” but it is the latter only which is strictly the name of the substance. Pertaining to wax, made of wax, are not surely names of the thing itself. Every attributive, whether verb or adjective, must imply an attribute; but it is not therefore the name of that attribute. Juvenescit, “he waxes young,” expresses an attribute; but we should not call juvenescit the name of the attribute.
It may be asked, what is the difference between caput hominis, “a man’s head,” and caput humanum, “a human head?” If hominis, “man’s,” be deemed a noun, why should not humanum, “human,” be deemed a noun also? It may be answered, that hominis does, in fact, perform the office of an adjective, expressing not only the individual, but conjunction also; and that Mr. Wallis assigns to the English genitive the name of adjective. Besides, does not Mr. Tooke himself maintain, “that case, gender, and number, are no parts of the noun”? and does it not hence follow, that the real nouns are not hominis, but homo,—not man’s, but man? for such certainly is their form when divested of those circumstances which, according to Mr. Tooke, make no part of them. If the doctrine, therefore, of the learned author be correct, and if the real noun exclude gender, case, and number, as any part of it, neither hominis nor humanum, man’s nor human, can with consistency be called nouns.
But let Mr. Tooke’s argument be applied to the verb, the τὸ ῥῆμα, which he justly considers as an essential part of speech. “If verbs were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by verbs, for we cannot attribute nothing.” Are we then to call sapit, vivit, legit, names? If so, we have nothing but names; and to this conclusion Mr. Tooke fairly brings the discussion; for he says, that all words are names.
Having thus submitted to the reader the doctrine of this sagacious critic, with the objections which naturally present themselves, I proceed to observe, that the controversy appears to me to be, in a great degree, a mere verbal dispute. It is agreed on both sides, that the adjective expresses a substance, quality, or property; but, while it is affirmed by some critics, it is denied by others, that it is the name of the thing signified. The metaphysician considers words merely as signs of thought, while the grammarian regards chiefly their changes by inflexion: and hence arises that perplexity in which the classification of words has been, and still continues to be, involved. Now, it is evident that every word must be the sign of some sensation, idea, or perception. It must express some substance or some attribute: and in this sense all words may be regarded as names. Sometimes we have the name of the thing simply, as person. Sometimes we have an accessary idea combined with the simple sign, as “possession,” “conjunction,” “action,” and so forth, as personal, personally, personify. This accessary circumstance, we have reason to believe, was originally denoted by a distinct word, significant of the idea intended; and that this word was, in the progress of language, abbreviated and incorporated with the primary term, in the form of what we now term an affix or prefix. Thus frigus, frigidus, friget, all denote the same primary idea, involving the name of that quality, or of that sensation, which we term cold. Frigus is the name of the thing simply; frigidus expresses the quality in concreto, or conjunction. Considering, therefore, all words as names, it may be regarded as a complex name, expressing two distinct ideas,—that of the quality, and that of conjunction. Friget (the subject being understood) may be regarded as a name still more complex; involving, first, the name of the quality; secondly, the name of conjunction; thirdly, the sign of affirmation, as either expressed by an appropriate name, or constructively implied, equivalent to the three words, est cum frigore. According, then, to this metaphysical view of the subject, we have first nomen simplex, the simple name; secondly, nomen adjectivum or nomen duplex, the name of the thing, with that of conjunction; thirdly, nomen affirmativum, the name of the thing affirmed to be conjoined.
The simple question now is, whether all words, not even the verb excepted, should be called nouns; or whether we shall assign them such appellations as may indicate the leading circumstances by which they are distinguished. The latter appears to me to be the only mode which the grammarian, as the teacher of an art, can successfully adopt. Considering the subject in this light, I am inclined to say with Mr. Harris, that the adjective, as implying some substance or attribute, not per se, but in conjunction, or as pertaining, is more nearly allied to the verb than to the noun; and that though the verb and the adjective may, in common with the noun, denote the thing, they cannot strictly be called its name. To say that foolish and folly are each names of the same quality, would, I apprehend, lead to nothing but perplexity and error.
It is true, if we are to confine the term noun to the simple name of the subject, we shall exclude the genitive singular from all right to this appellation; for it denotes, not the subject simply, but the subject in conjunction—the inflexion being equivalent to “belonging to.” This indeed is an inconsistency which can in no way be removed, unless by adopting the opinion of Wallis, who assigns no cases to English nouns, and considers man’s, king’s, &c., to be adjectives. And were we to adopt Mr. Tooke’s definition of our adjective, and say, “It is the name of a thing which is directed to be joined to another name of a thing,” it will follow, that king’s, man’s, are adjectives. In short, if the question be confined to the English language, we must, in order to remove all inconsistency, either deny the appellation of noun to the adjective, and, with Wallis, call the genitive case an adjective; or we must first call man’s, king’s, &c., adjectives; secondly, we must term happy, extravagant, mercenary, &c., nouns, though they are not names; and thirdly, we must assign the appellation of noun to the verb itself.
From this view of the subject the reader will perceive that the whole controversy depends on the meaning which we annex to the term noun. If by this term we denote simply the thing itself, without any accessary circumstance, then nothing can be called a noun but the name in its simple form. If to the term noun we assign a more extensive signification, as implying not only the thing itself simply and absolutely, but also any accessary idea, as conjunction, action, passion, and so forth, then it follows, that all words may be termed names.
[36] The Saxons formed their comparative by er or ere, ar or ære, er, or, ur, yr, and their superlative by ast, aste, est, ist, ost, ust, yst. Now ar means before; hence the English words ere and erst. Thus, in Saxon, riht wisere means “righteous before,” “just before,” or “more than.” The suffix is equivalent to the Latin præ, and the Hebrew preposition min, signifying also before; the only difference being this, that what is a suffix to the Saxon adjective is in Hebrew a prefix to the consequent subject of comparison, and that in Latin the preposition following the positive stands alone.
Mr. Bosworth, in his “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” a work displaying sound philological principles, has remarked, that the Gothic superlative in itsa bears an obvious resemblance to some of the Greek superlatives, as, ἄριστος, κάλλιστος, βράδιστος.
[37] Up and in are now used as adverbs and prepositions.
[38] This phraseology is Hebraistic—“more than all his children” is the literal translation of the original, מְּכל־בניו præ omnibus filiis, seu, magis omnibus filiis suis.
[39] See a valuable little volume on English Grammar, by Mr. Grant. The “Institutes of Latin Grammar,” by the same author, we would recommend to the attention of every classical student.
[40] I, hi, hie, “to go,” he considers to be from Ἰ-έναι, the Greek verb; and hence to be derived the Latin verb I-re, “to go,” “to hie.”
[41] Intransitive verbs sometimes are used transitively, as, when we say, “to walk the horse,” “to dance the child.” They also admit a noun of their own signification, as, “to run a race.”
[42] Conformably to general opinion I here consider the English language as having a passive voice. How far this opinion is well founded shall be the subject of future inquiry.
[43] Mr. Bosworth seems to think, that the word tense is derived from the Latin tensus, “used to denote that extension or inflexion of the word, by which difference in time is implied, or difference in action is signified.” I am rather inclined to consider it as derived from the French tems or temps, and that from tempus.
[44] “Some,” says Dr. Beattie, “will not allow anything to be a tense, but what, in one inflected word, expresses an affirmation with time; for, that those parts of the verb are not properly called tenses, which assume that appearance, by means of auxiliary words. At this rate, in English, we should have two tenses only, the present and the past in the active verb, and in the passive no tenses at all. But this is a needless nicety; and, if adopted, would introduce confusion into the grammatical art. If amaveram be a tense, why should not amatus fueram? If I heard be a tense, I did hear, I have heard, and I shall hear, must be equally entitled to that appellation.”
How simplicity can introduce confusion I am unable to comprehend, unless we are to affirm that the introduction of Greek and Latin names, to express nonentities in our language, is necessary to illustrate the grammar, and simplify the study of the language to the English scholar. But the author’s theory seems at variance with itself. He admits, that “we have no cases in English, except the addition of s in the genitive;” whence we may infer, that he considers inflexion as essential to a case. Now, if those only be cases, which are formed by inflexion, those only should, grammatically, be deemed tenses, which are formed in the same manner. When he asks, therefore, if amaveram be a tense, why should not amatus fueram be a tense also? the answer on his own principles is sufficiently obvious, namely, because the one is formed by inflexion, the other by combination. And, I would ask, if king’s be a genitive case, why, according to this theory, is not of a king entitled to the same appellation? I apprehend the answer he must give, consistently with his opinion respecting cases, will sufficiently explain why amaveram, and I heard, are tenses, while amatus fueram, and I had heard, are not.
Nay, further, if it be needless nicety to admit those only as tenses, which are formed by inflexion, is it not equally a needless nicety to admit those cases only, which are formed by varying the termination? And if confusion be introduced by denying I had heard to be a tense, why does not the learned author simplify the doctrine of English nouns, by giving them six cases, a king, of a king, to or for a king, a king, O king, with, from, in, or by a king? This surely would be to perplex, not to simplify. In short, the inconsistency of those grammarians, who deny that to be a case, which is not formed by inflexion, yet would load us with moods and tenses, not formed by change of termination, is so palpable, as to require neither illustration nor argument to expose it. If these authors would admit, that we have as many cases in English, as there exists relations expressed by prepositions, then, indeed, though they might overwhelm us with the number, we should at least acknowledge the consistency of their theory. But to adopt the principle of inflexion in one case, and reject it in another, precisely parallel, involves an inconsistency which must excite amazement. Nil fuit sic unquam impar sibi. Why do not these gentlemen favour us with a dual number, with a middle voice, and with an optative mood? Nay, as they are so fond of tenses, as to lament that we rob them of all but two, why do they not enrich us with a first and second aorist, and a paulo post future? and, if this should not suffice, they will find in Hebrew a rich supply of verbal forms. We should then have kal and niphal, pihhel and pyhhal, hiphhil and hophhal, hithpahhel and hothpahhel, and numerous other species and designations. What a wonderful acquisition this would be to our stock of moods, tenses, and voices!
One of these grammarians, indeed, reverencing the old maxim est modus in rebus, observes, that “it is necessary to set bounds to this business, so as not to occasion obscurity and perplexity, when we mean to be simple and perspicuous.” This is so far good; because, though it vindicates the impropriety, it modestly would confine it within decent bounds. But surely it cannot be necessary to remind this writer, that when the boundary between right and wrong, propriety and impropriety, is once passed, it is extremely difficult to prescribe limits to the transgression; and that arbitrary distinctions, resting on no other foundation than prejudice or fashion, must ever be vague, questionable, and capricious. These are truths of which, I am persuaded, the author to whom I allude needs not to be reminded. But it may be necessary to impress on his attention another truth equally incontestable, that no authority, how respectable soever, can sanction inconsistency; and that great names, though they may be honoured by ignorance and credulity with the most obsequious homage, will never pass with the intelligent reader, either for demonstration or for argument. This author, in defence of his theory of cases and tenses, observes, “that the proper form of a tense, in the Greek and Latin languages, is certainly that which it has in the grammars of these languages.” On what evidence is this assumption founded? Here is exhibited a petitio principii, too palpable to escape the detection of the most inattentive reader. He proceeds: “But in the Greek and Latin grammars we uniformly find that some of the tenses are formed by variations of the principal verb, and others by the addition of helping verbs.” It is answered that the admission of these forms in Greek and Latin grammars is a question of mere expediency, and nowise affects the doctrine for which we contend, any more than the admission of six cases in all the Latin declensions affects the doctrine of cases; though in no one declension have all the cases dissimilar terminations. This position it would be easy to demonstrate: it would be easy likewise to show why, notwithstanding this occasional identity of termination, six cases are admitted in all the declensions; but the subject is foreign to our present purpose. It is important, however, to observe, what has escaped the notice of the author, that the principle, on which the admission just mentioned may be expedient in a Latin grammar, has no existence whatever in the English language.
“It is, therefore,” he continues, “indisputable, that the principal, or the participle, and an auxiliary, constitute a regular tense in the Greek and Latin languages.” This, as I have remarked, is a palpable petitio principii. It is to say, that because amatus fueram is a tense, therefore “I had been loved” is a tense also. The author forgets that the premises must be true, to render the conclusion legitimate. He forgets, that a circular argument is a mere sophism, because it assumes as true what it is intended to prove. Whether amatus fueram be or be not a tense, is the very point in question; and so far am I from admitting the affirmative as unquestionable, that I contend, it has no more claim to the designation of tense, than ἔσομαι τετυφώς—no more claim than amandum est mihi, amari oportet, or amandus sum, have to be called moods. Here I must request the reader to bear in mind the necessary distinction between the grammar of a language and its capacity of expression.
In answer to the objection of inconsistency, in admitting tenses where there is no inflexion, yet rejecting cases where there is no change of termination, the author says, “that such a mode of declension cannot apply to our language.” But why can it not apply? Why not give as English cases, to a king, of a king, from a king, with a king, by a king, at a king, about a king, &c. &c.? The mode is certainly applicable, whatever may be the consequences of that application. A case surely is as easily formed by a noun and preposition, as a tense by a participle and auxiliary. But the author observes, “the English language would then have a much greater number of cases than the Greek and Latin languages.” And why not? Is the number of cases in English, or any other language, to be limited by the number in Greek or Latin? or does the author mean to say, that there is any peculiar propriety in the number five or six? The author, to be consistent with himself, ought to acknowledge as many cases as there are prepositions to be found in the English language. This, it may be said, would encumber our grammar, and embarrass the learner. This is, indeed, an argument against the expediency of the application, but not against the practicability of the principle in question. Besides, it may be asked, why does the author confine his love of simplification to cases? Why not extend it to tenses also? Why maintain, that inflexion only makes a case, and that a tense is formed without inflexion? Why dismiss one encumbrance, and admit another?
The author observes, that “from grammarians, who form their ideas and make their decisions respecting this part of grammar, on the principles and construction of languages, which in these points do not suit the peculiar nature of our own, but differ considerably from it, we may naturally expect grammatical schemes that are neither perspicuous nor consistent, and which will tend more to perplex than inform the learner.” Had I been reprehending the author’s own practice, I should have employed nearly the same language. How these observations, certainly judicious and correct, can be reconciled with the doctrine of the writer himself, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. His ideas of consistency and simplicity are to me incomprehensible. He rejects prepositional cases for the sake of simplicity, and he admits various moods and tenses, equally foreign to the genius of our language, in order to avoid perplexity. Surely this is not a “consistent scheme.” Nay, he tells us, “that on the principle of imitating other languages in names and forms (I beseech the reader to mark the words), without a correspondence in nature and idiom, we might adopt a number of declensions, as well as a variety of cases, for English substantives: but,” he adds, “this variety does not at all correspond with the idiom of our language.” After this observation, argument surely becomes unnecessary.
I have here, the reader will perceive, assailed the author’s doctrine merely on the ground of inconsistency. It is liable, however, to objections of a more serious nature; and were I not apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience of the reader, I should now proceed to state these objections. There is one observation, however, which I feel it necessary to make. The author remarks, that to take the tenses as they are commonly received, and endeavour to ascertain their nature and their differences, “is a much more useful exercise, as well as a more proper, for a work of this kind, than to raise, as might be easily raised, new theories on the subject.” If the author by this intends to insinuate that our doctrine is new, he errs egregiously. For Wallis, one of the oldest, and certainly one of the best of our English grammarians, duly attentive to the simplicity of that language whose grammar he was exhibiting, assigned only two tenses to the English verb. He says, Nos duo tantum habemus tempora Præsens et Præteritum; and on this simple principle his explanation of the verb proceeds. In the preface to his grammar, he censures his few predecessors for violating the simplicity of the English language, by the introduction of names and rules foreign to the English idiom. Cur hujusmodi casuum, generum, modorum, temporumque fictam et ineptam plane congeriem introducamus citra omnem necessitatem, aut in ipsa lingua fundamentum, nulla ratio suadet. And so little was he aware that the introduction of technical names for things which have no existence, facilitates the acquisition of any art or science, that he affirms it in regard to the subject before us to be the cause of great confusion and perplexity. Quæ (inutilia præcepta) a lingua nostra sunt prorsus aliena, adeoque confusionem potius et obscuritatem pariunt, quam explicationi inserviunt.
[45] Mr. Gilchrist, in his “Philosophic Etymology,” represents the terminations ath, eth, ad, ed, et, en, an, as conjunctives, equivalent to the sign +, denoting add, or join (see [p. 162]). In another part of the same work, he considers did to be do doubled, as dedi from the Latin do, which he believes to be the very same word with our do. Repetition, he observes, is a mode of expressing complete action. Hence we have do, do-ed, dede, did, in English. This explanation is ingenious, and furnishes a probable account of the origin of the word did, which he remarks was formerly spelled dede.
| I be | Thou beest | He, she, or it be |
| We be | Ye or you be | They be, |
| from the Saxon | ||
| Ic beo | Thu beest | He beeth, |
are obsolete, unless followed by a concessive term. Thus, instead of saying, “Many there be that go in thereat,” we should now say, “Many there are.” For “to whom all hearts be open,” we should now write, “to whom all hearts are open.” We find them, however, used with the conjunctions if and though; thus, “If this be my notion of a great part of that high science, divinity, you will be so civil as to imagine, I lay no mighty stress upon the rest.”—Pope. That this was his notion the author had previously declared; the introductory clause, therefore, is clearly affirmative, and is the same as if he had said, “As this is my notion.” “Although she be abundantly grateful to all her protectors, yet I observe your name most often in her mouth.”—Swift. “The paper, although it be written with spirit, yet would have scarce cleared a shilling.”—Swift. In the two last sentences the meaning is affirmative; nothing conditional or contingent being implied.
In the following examples, it expresses doubt or contingency. “If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down:” i.e. “shouldst be.” “If I be in difficulty, I will ask your aid;” i.e. “If I should be.”
[47] Though the authority of Milton, Dryden, Pope, and Swift, can be pleaded in favour of wert, as the second person singular of this tense, I am inclined to agree with Lowth, that in conformity to analogy, as well as the practice of the best ancient writers, it would be better to confine wert to the imperfect conditional.
[48] If the expression of time with an attribute “be sufficient to make a verb, the participle must be a verb too, because it signifies time also. But the essence of a verb consisting in predication, which is peculiar to it, and incommunicable to all other parts of speech, and these infinitives never predicating, they cannot be verbs. Again, the essence of a noun consisting in its so subsisting in the understanding, as that it may be the subject of predication, and these infinitives being all capable of so subsisting, they must of necessity be nouns.”—R. Johnson’s Gram. Comment.
[49] The variety of form which this verb assumes, clearly shows that it has proceeded from different sources.
Am is from the Anglo-Saxon eom, and is from the Anglo-Saxon ys or is; and these have been supposed to have come from the Greek εἰμὶ, εἶς.
The derivation of are is doubtful. It may, perhaps, have proceeded directly from er or erum of the Icelandic verb, denoting “to be.” By Mr. Gilchrist it is considered as “the same with the infinitive termination are, ere, ire.” Mr. Webb conjectured, that it might have some relation to the Greek ἔαρ, spring. Both these explanations appear to us somewhat fanciful.
Art is from the Anglo-Saxon eart. “Thou eart,” thou art.
Was is evidently the Anglo-Saxon wæs; and wast, wert, probably from the Franco-Theatisc, warst; and were from the Anglo-Saxon wære, wæron.
Be is from the Anglo-Saxon Ic beo, I am, which, with the Gaelic verb bi, to be, Mr. Webb considered to be derived from βίος, life, as the Latin fui, from φύω, to grow. This conjecture he supports by several pertinent quotations. See Mr. Bosworth’s “Elements of Anglo-Saxon Grammar,” p. 164.
[50] The words did, hast, hath, has, had, shall, wilt, are evidently, as Wallis observes, contracted for doed, haveth, haves, haved, shall’st, will’st.
[51] This verb is derived from the Saxon magan, posse, the present of which is Ic mæg, and the preterite Ic miht. Hence also Ic mot.
“For as the fisshe, if it be drie,
Mote in defaute of water die.”—Gower.
[52] This verb is derived from cunnan, scire, posse, sapere. Hence is derived the verb “to ken,” or “to know;” or more probably, indeed, they were one and the same word: hence also the word cunning. “To ken” is still used in Scotland; and in the expression of Shakspeare, “I ken them from afar,” is erroneously considered by some critics to mean, “I see them.”
[53] This verb is, unquestionably, a derivative from the Saxon ꞅceal, I owe or I ought, and was originally of the same import. I shall denoted “it is my duty,” and was precisely synonymous with debeo in Latin. Chaucer says, “The faith I shall to God;” that is, “the faith I owe to God.” “Thou shalt not kill,” or “thou oughtest not to kill.” In this sense shall is a present tense, and denoted present duty or obligation. But, as all duties and all commands, though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must be future in regard to their execution; so by a natural transition, observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty, came to be a note of future time. I have considered it, however, as a present tense; 1st, because it originally denoted present time; 2dly, because it still retains the form of a present, preserving thus the same analogy to should that can does to could, may to might, will to would; and 3dly, because it is no singular thing to have a verb in the present tense, expressive of future time, commencing from the present moment; for such precisely is the Greek verb μέλλω, futurus sum. Nay, the verb will denotes present inclination, yet in some of its persons, like shall, expresses futurition. I have considered, therefore, the verb shall as a present tense, of which should is the preterperfect.
Johnson’s explanation of the meaning of this verb is so perspicuous, that, as foreigners are apt to mistake its use, I shall here transcribe his words. I shall love: “it will be so that I must love,” “I am resolved to love.” Shall I love? “will it be permitted me to love?” “will it be that I must love?” Thou shalt love: “I command thee to love;” “it is permitted thee to love;” “it will be, that thou must love.” Shalt thou love? “will it be, that thou must love?” “will it be permitted thee to love?” He shall love: “it will be, that he must love;” “it is commanded that he love.” Shall he love? “is it permitted him to love?” The plural persons follow the signification of the singular.
I transcribe also the same author’s explanation of the verb I will. I will come: “I am willing to come,” “I am determined to come.” Thou wilt come: “it must be, that thou must come,” importing necessity; or “it shall be, that thou shalt come,” importing choice. Wilt thou come? “hast thou determined to come?” importing choice. He will come: “he is resolved to come;” or “it must be, that he must come,” importing choice or necessity.
Brightland’s short rule may be of some service in assisting foreigners to distinguish the use of these two verbs. It is this:
“In the first person simply shall foretels:
In will a threat, or else a promise, dwells;
Shall in the second and the third does threat;
Will simply then foretels the future feat.”
In addition to these directions for the use of shall and will, it is to be observed, that, when the second and third persons are represented as the subjects of their own expressions, or their own thoughts, shall foretels, as in the first person, thus, “he says he shall be a loser by this bargain:” “do you suppose you shall go?” “He hoped he should recover,” and “he hoped he would recover,” are expressions of different import. In the former, the two pronouns necessarily refer to the same person; in the latter, they do not.
[54] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb willan, velle, the preterite of which is Ic wold.
[55] The preterite would is frequently employed, like the Latin preterimperfect tense, to denote what is usual or customary. Thus,
Quintilio si quid recitares, corrige, sodes,
Hoc, aiebat, et hoc; melius te posse negares,
Bis terque expertum frustra; delere jubebat,
Et malè tornatos incudi reddere versus:
Si defendere delictum quàm vertere, malles,
Nullum ultra verbum, aut operam insumebat inanem.
Horace.
where the verbs aiebat, jubebat, insumebat, may be translated, “he would say,” “he would desire,” “he would spend.” Thus also in English,
Pleas’d with my admiration, and the fire
His speech struck from me, the old man would shake
His years away, and act his young encounters:
Then having show’d his wounds, he’d sit him down.
[56] In Latin the imperfect potential is frequently employed in the same manner to denote present time; thus, irem si vellem, expresses present liberty and inclination. And the same analogy obtains in Latin; for we say, either, tu, si hic sis, aliter sentias, or tu, si hic esses, aliter sentires. In such examples, it is intended to signify either the coexistence of two circumstances, or the one as the immediate consequence of the other. An identity of tense, therefore, best expresses contemporary events.
[57] If it should be said, that the participle may properly be considered as a verb, since it implies an attribute with time, I would ask, whether affirmation, the most important of all circumstances, and without which no communication could take place, should be overlooked in our classification of words agreeably to their import, or the offices which they perform. If the verb and participle be referred to one class, the principal part of speech which has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or the word, is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of thought. Surely, if any circumstance can entitle any sort of words to a distinct reference, it is that of affirmation.
If it should be objected that the participle, like the verb, governs a case, I would ask, because lectio, tactio, and many other substantives, are found sometimes joined with an accusative case, were they ever on this account considered as verbs? Besides, if the government of a case be urged as an argument, what becomes of those participles which govern no case? Nay, if the government of a case be deemed the criterion of a verb, what name shall we assign to those verbs which have no regimen at all? If any species of words is to be distinguished from another, the characteristic difference must surely belong, not to part only, but to the whole.
[58] The termination ing is from the Anglo-Saxon ande, ænde, ende, ind, onde, unde, ynde, and corresponds to the termination of the Latin gerunds in andum and endum, expressing continuation, Amandum, Lufiande, Loving.
[59] Here I would be understood to reason on their own principles; for the truth is, that each of these tenses admits a definitive.
[60] See the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. iii.
[61] Dr. Beattie observes, “that the fundamental error of those philosophers who deny the existence of present time is, that they suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we see or touch must of necessity have magnitude,) so neither is the present, or any other instant, wholly unextended.” His argument amounts to this, that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author’s position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure, and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.
[62] When we say, God is good, I would ask Dr. Browne whether the verb be definite or indefinite, whether it denote perfection or imperfection, or have no reference to either. It appears to me that neither of the terms is in his sense applicable; for that the verb denotes simple affirmation with time; or, if applicable, that the tense is, contrary to his opinion, indefinite, the idea of completion or imperfection being entirely excluded.
[63] These phraseologies, as the author last quoted justly observes, are harsh to the ear, and appear exceedingly awkward; but a little attention will suffice to show that they correctly exhibit the ideas implied by the tense which we have at present under consideration.
[64] See Encyc. Brit., Art. Grammar.
[65] I consider that no language, grammatically examined, has more cases, tenses, or moods, than are formed by inflexion. But if any person be inclined to call these forms of expression by the name of imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent, and call “Dost thou love?” an interrogative mood, adopting also the precative, the requisitive, the optative, the hortative, &c., together with the various cases in nouns, and tenses in verbs, which are formed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs: I should only apprehend, that language would fail him to assign them names.
If it should be asked, “Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb, as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the verbs in the following sentences, Depart instantly, improve your time, forgive us our sins? Will it be said that the verbs in these phrases are assertions?” I should answer that all moods, metaphysically considered, are, in my apprehension, equally indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but express the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation, his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form, therefore, the expression may assume, it must be resolvable into assertion; and must be considered as expressing, in the person of the speaker, what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one surely will deny, that “thou oughtest not to kill,” “thou shalt not kill,” “thou art forbidden to kill,” are affirmations. And are not these expressions so nearly equivalent to “do not kill,” that in Greek and Latin they are rendered indifferently either by οὐ φονεύσεις, or, μὴ φόνευε; non occides, or ne occidito? If then we say, “kill thou,” will it be contended that, though the prohibition implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to “thou shalt kill,” “thou art ordered to kill.” Hence ave and jubeo te avere, are deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to think that where there is no variety of termination, there cannot be established a diversity of mood.
[66] This verb is derived from the Saxon verb Ic most, ego debeo.
[67] It belongs not to my province to inquire, how amarem came to signify I might or could love, or whether it be strictly in the potential or the subjunctive mood. I here take it for granted that amarem does, without an ellipsis, signify, I might, could, would, or should love, implying licet, possum, volo, debeo.—See Johnson’s Comment.
[68] Why this verb forms an exception, it would be easy to explain.
[69] See Webster’s Dissertations, p. 263.
[70] A similar phraseology in the use of the pluperfect indicative for the same tense subjunctive, obtains in Latin, as
“Impulerat ferro Argolicas fœdare latebras.”—Virgil.
[71] The Latins used si in both cases: and though their poets did not attend to this distinction, their prose writers generally observed it, by joining si for quoniam with the indicative mood.
[72] Where R is added, the verb follows also the general rule.
[73] Some have excluded bore as the preterite of this verb. We have sufficient authority, however, for admitting it; thus,
“By marrying her who bore me.”—Dryden.
[74] Beholden is obsolescent in this sense.
[75] “So kept the diamond, and the rogue was bit.”—Pope.
“There was lately a young gentleman bit to the bone.”—Tatler.
[76] Brake seems now obsolescent.
[77] Though Johnson has not admitted the regular form of the participle in this verb, I think there is sufficient authority for concurring with Lowth in receiving builded as the participle as well as built, though it be not in such general use.
[78] Chode, which occurs twice in the Bible, is now obsolete.
[79] Lowth has given clomb as the preterite of climb. I can find, however, no authority later than Spenser, and am inclined to think it is now obsolete.
[80] The irregular preterite clad is obsolescent.
[81] I know no example in which the preterite, which analogically would be forwent, is to be found. It may be here remarked that this verb, in violation of analogy, is generally spelled forego, as if it meant “to go before.” This is equally improper as it would be to write forebid, foresake, foreswear, for forbid, forsake, forswear.
[82] Fraught is more properly an adjective than participle.
[83] This verb, Lowth says, when employed as an active verb, “may perhaps, most properly be used in the regular form.” Here the learned author appears to me, if he be not chargeable with error, to have expressed his meaning incorrectly; for it cannot be disputed that the irregular form of this verb is frequently, and with unquestionable propriety, used in an active sense. Thus we say, “the servant hung the scales in the cellar;” and passively, “the scales were hung by the servant.” I should, therefore, rather say that, when this verb denotes suspension, for the purpose of destroying life, the regular form is far preferable. Thus, “the man was hanged,” not “hung.”
[84] The irregular preterite and participle of this verb are employed in sea language; but the latter rarely.
[85] Lowth has given holpen as the participle; it is now obsolescent, if not obsolete. It belonged to the verb to holp, which has been long out of use.
[86] Several grammarians have rejected hid as a participle. It rests, however, on unquestionable authority; but hidden is preferable.
[87] Holden, which was some years ago obsolescent, is now returning into more general use.
[88] Laden, like fraught, may be deemed an adjective.
[89] Priestley, I apprehend, has erred in giving lain as the participle of this verb.
[90] Lien, though not so generally used as lain, is not destitute of unexceptionable authority. I have, therefore, with Johnson and Lowth, given it as the participle. Murray has omitted it.
[91] Some grammarians have rejected lit. It can plead, however, colloquial usage in its favour, and even other authority. “I lit my pipe with the paper.”—Addison.
[92] With Priestley and Lowth, I have given this verb a regular participle; for which, I believe, there is sufficient authority, without adducing the example of Shakspeare. Most other grammarians have rejected it.
[93] Quitted is far more generally used as the preterite than quit.
[94] Priestley has rejected rid, and Murray ridden, as the participle, while Johnson makes rid the preterite of ride. As rid is the present and preterite of another verb, it would, perhaps, be better to dismiss it entirely from the verb to ride, and conjugate, with Priestley, ride, rode, ridden.
[95] Our translators of the Bible have used roast as the perfect participle. In this sense it is almost obsolete. Roast beef retains its ground.
[96] Story, in his Grammar, has most unwarrantably asserted, that the participle of this verb should be shaked. This word is certainly obsolete, and, I apprehend, was never in general use. I have been able to find only one example of shaked as the participle, “A sly and constant knave, not to be shaked.”—Shakspeare. And two as the preterite, “They shaked their heads.”—Psal. cxi. 55. “I shaked my head.”—Steele, Spectator, No. iv.
[97] Of these preterites, the latter is now more generally used. Our translators of the Bible used the former.
[98] A. Murray has rejected sung as the preterite, and L. Murray has rejected sang. Each preterite, however, rests on good authority.
The same observation may be made respecting sank and sunk.
[99] Sitten, though formerly in use, is now obsolescent. Laudable attempts, however, have been made to restore it. “To have sitten on the heads of the apostles.”—Middleton.
“Soon after the termination of this business, the parliament, which had now sitten three years,” &c.—Belsham’s Hist.
“And he would gladly, for the sake of dispatch, have called together the same parliament, which had sitten under his father.”—Hume, vol. vi. p. 199.
Respecting the preterites which have a or u, as slang, or slung, sank, or sunk, it would be better were the former only to be used, as the preterite and participle would thus be discriminated.
[100] Pope has used the regular form of the preterite:
“In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease,
Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase.”
Essay on Crit.
Horsley, with one or two other writers, have employed the regular participle.
[101] Washen seems obsolescent, if not obsolete. The compound unwashen occurs in our translation of the Bible.
[102] Pope, and our translators of the Bible, have used winded as the preterite. The other form, however, is in far more general use.
[103] Wrote, as the participle, is generally disused, and likewise writ. The latter was used as a preterite by Pope, Swift, and other writers of the same period.
[104] Wit is now confined to the phrase to wit, or namely. It is an abbreviation from the Anglo-Saxon verb þiꞇan, to know.
[105] This verb, as an auxiliary, is inflexible; thus we say, “he will go,” and “he wills to go.”
[106] This verb, which signifies “to think,” or “to imagine,” is now obsolete.
[107] This verb is now used as significant of present duty. It was originally the preterite, and the perfect participle of the verb to owe; and is corruptedly used in Scotland still to express a past debt. “Apprehending the occasion, I will add a continuance to that happy motion, and besides give you some tribute of the love and duty I long have ought you.”—Spelman.
“This blood, which men by treason sought,
That followed, sir, which to myself I ought.”—Dryden.
It is now used in the present tense only; and, when past duty or obligation is to be signified, we note, as I formerly mentioned, the past time by the preterite sense of the subsequent verb; thus, “I ought to read,” “I ought to have read.” The classical scholar knows that the reverse takes place in Latin. Debeo legere, debui legere. Cicero, however, though very rarely indeed, uses the preterite of the infinitive after the preterite tense of this verb.
Murray has told us, that must and ought have both a present and past signification, and, in proof of this, he adduces the following examples:—“I must own, that I am to blame.” “He must have been mistaken.” “Speaking things which they ought not.” “These ought ye to have done.” This is truly a strange, and, I verily believe, a singular opinion. Its inaccuracy is so manifest, that every reader of discernment must intuitively perceive it. The opinion itself, indeed, is not more surprising, than the ground on which it is maintained by the author. It surely requires but a moderate portion of sagacity to perceive, that the past time, in the second and fourth examples, is not denoted by must and ought, but by the expressions “have been” and “have done.” In Latin, as I have just observed, necessity and duty are expressed as either present, past, or future, the verbs denoting these having the three correspondent tenses; and the object of the necessity or duty is expressed as contemporary, or relatively present. In English, on the contrary, the two verbs must and ought having only the present tense, we are obliged to note the past time by employing the preterite tense of the subsequent verb. Thus, Me ire oportet, “I ought to go,” “I must go.” Me ire oportuit, “I ought to have gone,” “I must have gone.” As well may it be affirmed, that the past time is denoted by ire and not oportuit, as that it is signified by must and not by “have gone.”
In the time of Wallis, the term must, as a preterite tense, was almost obsolete. “Aliquando,” he remarks, “sed rarius in præterito dicitur.” And when it was employed as a preterite, it was followed by the present tense. This verb in German has, I understand, a preterite tense.
[108] Firstly, is used by some writers.
[109] Denominativa terminantur in lic vel lice, ut þeꞃlic virilis, ælic legitimus, ꞃælic marinus, þiꝼlic muliebris, &c. Hanc terminationem hodie mutavimus in like vel ly, ut in godlike vel godly. Hickesii Thes.
The correctness of this explanation has been controverted by Mr. Gilchrist, who contends that, though it may answer in some cases, it will fail “in nine times out of ten.” In the expressions “weekly wages,” “daily labour,” “yearly income,” he observes, that the meaning cannot be, “wages like a week,” “labour like a day,” “income like a year.” He rejects, therefore, this explanation, and considers the termination lic to be the same with lig in the Latin verb ligo, “to tie,” or “join,” and to have the same effect as other conjunctive particles, as “a friendly part,” “a friend’s part,” “yearly produce,” “year’s produce.” Though a copious induction of examples justifies us in refusing our assent to Mr. Gilchrist’s exaggerated statement, that the derivation proposed by Hickes will fail in nine cases out of ten; we candidly acknowledge, that in many instances it is inadmissible; and that Mr. Gilchrist’s suggestion is ingenious, though it will be found, we apprehend, opposed by the same objection as he urges against Hickes’s explanation. Nor does it appear to us, that Mr. Gilchrist’s argument subverts the doctrine generally received. The termination may have been originally what Hickes supposed, and the principle of analogy may, in time, have introduced similar compositions, when this meaning of the termination ceased to be regarded. Thus the term candidly, which we have just now used, was probably introduced, in conformity to analogy, with no reference whatever to the meaning of the termination. It may be here also observed, that the import of this term seems inexplicable on the hypothesis that ly is a mere term of conjunction.
[110] These three adverbs, denoting motion or rest in a place, are frequently employed by us, in imitation of the French, to denote motion to a place in the same sense with the three following adverbs. It would be better, however, were the distinction observed. The French use ici for here and hither, là for there and thither, où for where and whither.
“For blithesome Sir John Barleycorn
Had sae allur’d them i’ the morn,
That, what wi’ drams, and mony a horn,
And reaming bicker,
The ferly is, withouten scorn,
They wauk’d sae sicker.”
Mayne’s Siller Gun.
This animated little poem will be read with no common pleasure by every admirer of the Scottish muse. In felicity of description the author is not inferior to Burns, while in delicacy of humour he may claim the superiority.
This preposition is supposed by Mr. Gilchrist to be derived from forth, or rather to be a different form of that word. See his “Philosophic Etymology,” a work exhibiting considerable ingenuity and philological knowledge, combined with many fanciful and unphilosophical opinions.
[112] It is possible that the Greek ἀπό, and the Latin ab derived from it, had their origin in אב pater principium, “author,” or “principle of existence.”
[113] The verb, “to twin,” is still used in Scotland for “to part,” or “separate.”
[114] That the Saxon word ægther signified each, is sufficiently evident from a variety of examples; and the adjective either has continued to be used in that sense by reputable writers. Lowth, who, I apprehend, did not advert to its primitive signification, condemns the use of it as equivalent to each; and notwithstanding its original import, I agree with him in thinking, that it is much better to confine its meaning to “one of two.” The reason will be assigned hereafter.
[115] Bot ser that Virgil standis but compare.—Gawin Douglass.
[116] An occurs frequently for if in the earliest English writers. Bacon frequently uses it in this sense. “Fortune is to be honoured and respected, an it be but for her daughters, Confidence and Reputation.” “And certainly it is the nature of extreme self-lovers, as they will set their house on fire, an it were, but to roast their eggs.”—Bacon’s Essays, Civ. and Mor. In the folio edition, printed in 1740, it is improperly spelled and. An for if is still retained in our address to royalty, An ’t please your majesty: and in Scotland is in general use.
[117] The correctness of most of these, and several other of Tooke’s etymologies, has been disputed, in a learned and ingenious article in the Quarterly Review (No. 108). In many of the critic’s animadversions it is impossible not to concur; but we do not agree with him, when he rejects the derivation of if from the Anglo-Saxon verb gifan, “to give;” nor do we consider that Jamieson’s argument, to which he refers, is such as to justify the critic’s conclusion. The distinction between bot and but he confidently pronounces to be “a mere chimera,” and maintains that but is in every instance be utan, “be out,” without corresponding to the Latin words sed, vero, autem, sine. It must be acknowledged that Tooke’s derivation is erroneous, there being no such Anglo-Saxon verb as “botan,” of which bot could be the imperative. But we agree with Dr. Jamieson in thinking, whatever may be the etymology, that but and bot are originally distinct words. Indeed, it appears to us, that the reasoning of the critic is neither correct, nor quite consistent with itself. We do not consider but for bot to be discriminative; nor can we allow, that, if but be equivalent to sed, se, sine, implying separation, it can also be equivalent to autem, “moreover,” to which bot corresponds, implying adjection, or subjunction. Nor can we admit, that the synonymous words mais (French), maar (Dutch), ma (Italian), imply preference, as the critic affirms, but something to be added, corresponding with what has been previously said.
[118] The critic to whom we have alluded in the preceding note contends, that except cannot be an imperative, “because it has no subject; and that a verb could not be employed, in any language that distinguishes the different persons, without a gross violation of idiom.” He considers the word to be an abbreviated participle. The correctness of this opinion I am disposed to question. In our Anglo-Saxon translation, the term except is rendered by buton, which is no participle; moreover, to place the participle perfect before the noun, the clause being absolute, is irreconcilable with the idiom of our language. “‘All were involved in this affair, except one;’ that is,” says Webster, who seems divided between the imperative and the participle, “‘one excepted.’” Now “one excepted,” and “excepting one,” are perfectly consonant with analogy; but “excepted one” is sanctioned by no authority. I am inclined to think that our translators, without regarding the Latin or the Icelandic idiom, to which the reviewer refers, used the word except as an imperative, without a subject. He denies, however, that it can be so employed. He surely will not deny, that usage warrants us in saying, “His arguments, take them as here exhibited, amount to nothing.” The use of the imperative, infinitive, and participles, in an absolute sense, or without a subject, is a common idiom in our language, and recommends itself, as shall be afterwards shown, by some peculiar advantages.
[119] This phraseology has been censured by Buchanan and the author of the British Grammar; but, as I apprehend, without the shadow of authority. To ask a question with a principal verb, as burns he, the latter affirms to be a barbarism. To disprove the assertion, I shall only, in addition to the one quoted from Macbeth, produce these examples. “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?”—Bible. “Died he not in bed?”—Shakspeare. “Or flies the javelin swifter to its mark?”—Ib. “And live there men who slight immortal fame?”—Pope.
[120] Our translators, as the judicious critic last quoted observes, have totally enervated the strength of the original, which runs thus, ἔπεσε, ἔπεσε, Βαβυλὼν ἡ πόλις ἡ μεγάλη, and which they have rendered, “Babylon is fallen, is fallen, that great city.”
[121] The ellipsis of the copulative, in such examples, was termed by the ancients asyndeton; and this deviation from the established rules of syntax they referred to a grammatical figure termed syllepsis indirecta, or “indirect comprehension of several singulars under one plural,” opposed to the syllepsis directa, or that expressed by a copulative.
[122] It is sometimes used for every, and applied to more than two.
[123] In the vulgar translation of the Bible, this mode of expression frequently occurs, thus, “I am thy exceeding great reward.” “I will make thee exceeding fruitful.”
Wallis’s admission of this phraseology proves it to have been good English when he wrote, or that, in his opinion at least, it was unobjectionable. His translation of vir summe sapiens, is “a man exceeding wise.” This, and similar modes of expression, appear to have been in his time very common, thus,
“ Although he was exceeding wealthy.”—Peers.
“He was moreover extraordinary courteous.”—Ibid.
“The Athenians were extreme apprehensive of his growing power.”—Tully.
And in our version of the Bible we find a few such expressions as the following: “The house I am to build, shall be wonderful great.”
Addison likewise often uses the phrase “exceeding great;” and Swift, less pardonably, writes “extreme unwilling,” “extreme good.”
[124] We say, indeed, “Messrs. Thomson;” but we seldom or never say, “the two Messrs. Thomson,” but “the two Mr. Thomsons.”
[125] Horne Tooke observes, that Lowth has rejected much good English: and it is to be apprehended, that the classical scholar is too prone to condemn in his own language whatever accords not with the Latin idiom.
[126] See Johnson’s Comm. p. 351, and Seyer on the Latin Verb, p. 174. To the arguments there offered, many others might be added.
[127] The propriety of this collocation of the negative will be more evident, if we attend to the two very different meanings of the word but. According to the former construction of the sentence, but is the imperative of beutan, “to be out,” and is synonymous with unless or except; thus, “but with the approbation,” or except with the approbation. According to the latter construction, it is properly bot, the imperative of botan, “to add.” Thus, “he was honoured not with (i.e. exclude or except) this reward, but (add) with the approbation of the people.”
[128] It is to be observed that a different collocation is sometimes admissible without any risk of ambiguity, especially when the clause is negative. Thus we may say, “His thoughts were entertained with not only,” i.e. “with not one thing,” viz. “the joys” with which he was surrounded; or, “not only with the joys; but (bot or add) a noble gratitude and divine pleasure.”
Usage in common conversation, and in familiar language, inclines to this arrangement, and many of our best writers frequently adopt it.
[129] The omission of the auxiliary in such examples tends much to produce ambiguity: for, as the adverb, when placed between the noun and the attributive, may qualify either the former or the latter, perspicuity requires the insertion of the auxiliary.
[130] Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere, curandum.
[131] In this and similar examples, the word only has been generally considered as an adjective, equivalent to solus. Thus, if we say, ille solum erat dives, it means, “he was only rich,” or “he was nothing but rich.” If we say, ille solus erat dives, it means, “he only,” or “he alone was rich.” In the latter example, the word only has been termed an adjective. It is from the equivalence of the words only and alone, in such examples as the latter, that several writers have employed them, as if, in all cases, synonymous. They are by no means, however, of the same import. Thus, if we say, “virtue alone is true nobility,” it means “virtue singly, or by itself, is true nobility;” if we say, “virtue only is true nobility,” it implies that nothing but virtue is true nobility. The expressions, therefore, are not equivalent. Both sentiments are conveyed in the following passage:
... “Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.”—Juvenal, Sat. viii.
The same observations are applicable to the collocation of the numeral term first, as equivalent either to primus or primum; and also to the position of many other words, which are used adjectively and adverbially. The classical scholar needs not to be informed, that Annibal primus, and Annibal primum—Alpes transiit, are not expressions mutually convertible.
[132] Addison, Pope, Swift, Steele, and Johnson, very generally place the adverb before the attributive, to which it refers, and very often also, before the substantive. “What he said, was only to commend my prudence.”—Addison. “He did not pretend to extirpate French music, but only to cultivate and civilise it.”—Addison. “I was only scribbling.”—Johnson. “Not only the thought, but the language is majestic.”—Addison. “Known only to those, who enjoy.”—Johnson. “Lay the blame only on themselves.”—Johnson. “Witty only by the help of speech.”—Steele.
Our translators of the Bible have almost uniformly observed the same collocation in respect to the predicate; but have, with few or no deviations, preferred a different arrangement in regard to the subject, placing the adverb after, and not before it. It is in conformity to their practice, that we have recommended the rule here given. From the following examples, to which many more might be added, it will appear that when the adverb referred to a sentence, they made it the introductory word; when it affected an attributive, they placed the adverb before it; and when it referred to a substantive, or the name of a subject, they put the adverb after it. “Only take heed to thyself.” “Only he shall not go in unto the vail.” “Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi.” ... “The thoughts of his heart are only evil.” “Thou shalt be only oppressed.” “They might only touch the hem of his garment.” ... “None followed David, but Judah only.” “He only of Jeroboam shall come to the grave.” “Against thee only have I sinned.” “Take nothing for your journey, but a staff only.” “David did that only which was right.” “They only shall be delivered.” “This only have I found.” “If in this life only we have hope.”
[133] In colloquial language, but chiefly among the vulgar, prepositions are prefixed to verbs indicative.
“Est vetus, atque probus, centum qui perficit annos.
Quid? qui deperiit minor uno mense, vel anno;
Inter quos referendus erit? veteresne poetas,
An quos et præsens et postera respuet ætas?
Iste quidem veteres inter ponetur honestè,
Qui vel mense brevi, vel toto est junior anno.
Utor permisso, caudæque pilos ut equinæ
Paulatim vello; et demo unum, demo etiam unum;
Dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi,
Qui redit ad fastos.”
Horace, Ep. I. Lib. 2.
[135] The Saxon word is awiht, contracted auht, aliquid.
[136] We have remarked the same violation of common sense, as occurring in Cicero, oftener than once. “Alium alio nequiorem.”—Ep. Fam. “Aliam alia jucundiorem.”—Att.
[137] Deprehendat, quæ barbara, quæ impropria, quæ contra legem loquendi composita.—Quintil. lib. i. cap. 5.
[138] In conformity to the example of most of our grammarians, I have employed the term etymology in the title of this work, and wherever else it occurs, as denoting that part of grammar, which teaches the inflection of words. In its primitive acceptation, it means an exposition of their derivation, and is still employed in that sense, as well as in the signification in which it is here used. Some writers have preferred the term analogy to express the doctrine of inflection. If the principle of analogy or similitude were confined to inflection, the designation might be proper; but, as this principle extends to the concord, the government, and the collocation, generally termed the syntax of words, it cannot be considered an appropriate name for that part of grammar, which teaches merely inflection or verbal termination. Analogy is the leading principle, on which every grammatical rule is founded; and those, who have employed the term for etymology, it would be easy to show, have not been observant of strict consistency.
[139] The reader is requested to observe, that under “solecism,” I have included several phraseologies, which, though not consistent with syntactical propriety, may be justly called by the softer name of “inaccuracies.”
[141] We perceive intuitively the error of Milton, when he calls Adam “the comeliest of men since born,” Eve also “the fairest of her daughters,” and we laugh, perhaps, when the Cork almanack-maker gravely tells us, “that the principal republics in Europe, are Venice, Holland, and America;” yet the error here reprehended is precisely of the same species, though it passes frequently unnoticed. See [p. 74].
[142] It has been already offered as the opinion of the writer, (see [p. 47],) that the English word other is the Saxon oðeꞃ, and that this word with the Arabic ahd, the Hebrew had or ahad, the Saxon oððe, the Teutonic odo, the Swedish udda, and probably the Latin aut, have all sprung from the same source, or that one of these is the parent of the rest, denoting unus or singulus, “one,” or “one by itself.” Of the origin of the Saxon other, Lye has hazarded no opinion. It appears to me to be a comparative from oððe. To those who have carefully examined, and have approved the theory of Mr. Tooke, it will furnish no valid objection against this opinion, that the word oððe is uniformly found in Saxon, signifying aut. Such can have little or no difficulty in perceiving, not only from the similarity of the elements, but from the affinity in point of sense, that had, ahd, aut, oððe, oðeꞃ, other, or, are all members of one and the same family.
[143] In French the article and the adjectives admitting a plural termination, the expression “les uns et les autres” joined to a plural verb is in perfect consistence with analogy. So also, in Latin, are utrique and alteri, referring to a plurality. But unus was never in this sense used as a plural.
[144] “Utrumque fecisse, dicimus, si et hic et ille fecerit divisim; ambos fecisse dicimus, si duo conjunctim aliquid fecerint.”—Stephan. This distinction, however, as the learned critic acknowledges, is not uniformly observed.
[145] “The truth is, that as is also an article; and however and whenever used in English, means the same as it, or that, or which. In the German, where it still evidently retains its original signification and use, (as so also does,) it is written es.”—Tooke’s Diversions.
[146] The error here involved suggests a few observations, which it may be useful to offer, concerning the distinctive character of active and neuter verbs. A neuter verb has been defined to be that, which denotes neither doing nor suffering. An active verb, as its name imports, denotes, that the subject is doing something. Johnson, however, in his Dictionary, gives every active verb the designation of neuter, unless followed by an objective case, that is, unless the object or subject of the action be expressed. In the following instances, for example, he considers the verbs as neuter. “’T is sure, that Henry reads;” “so I drank; and she made the camels drink also;” “if you plant where savages are;” “the priests teach for hire;” “nor feel him where he struck;” “they that sow in tears, shall reap in joy.” These are a few out of numberless examples, which might be produced. Indeed, Johnson’s idea seems to be, as has been just now observed, that the verb must be regarded as neuter, unless followed by an objective case. This is certainly a great inaccuracy, and tends to introduce perplexity and confusion. The verb surely does not the less denote action, because it expresses it absolutely, or because the subject acted upon is not particularly specified. In the examples now quoted, can it be questioned, when we say he struck, that he was active; or when we say, they that sow shall reap, will it be affirmed that they are not active? This would be to confound distinctions not merely acknowledged in theory, and adopted in definition, but also founded in the very nature of things. This matter, I conceive, may be shortly explained, and very easily understood. It is admitted by every grammarian, that an active verb denotes, that the subject is acting, and that a neuter verb signifies that the subject is neither doing nor suffering. Now, of active verbs there are two kinds, transitive and intransitive. The latter is that which denotes immanent action, or that which does not pass from the agent to anything else, as, I walk, I run. Transitive verbs are such as denote that the action passes from the agent to something acted upon, as, “Hector wounded him,” “Cain slew his brother.” But the subject to which the energy passes, may not always be expressed; the verb, however, is not the less active. Whether we say, “the drummer beats his drum,” or “the drummer beats every day,” it surely will not be contended, that there is less of action implied in the one case than in the other. The reader, then, is requested to observe, that it is not necessary to the active transitive verb, that the subject acted upon should be expressed. The active verb may predicate of its subject merely the action generally and absolutely, as, “he reads in the morning, and writes in the evening;” or with the action may be expressed the subject or object, as, “he reads Homer in the morning, and writes letters in the evening;” or the object or subject may be implied, and not expressed, as, “the drummer beats at night,” namely, his drum. But in all these cases the verb is equally active.
[147] In justice to this respectable sect, it is incumbent on me to observe, that the Quakers are not Deists, nor does their religious creed approach to Deism.
[148] A similar ambiguity sometimes occurs in Latin by the indiscriminate use of quod. This may be prevented by employing quoniam when the succeeding member of the sentence expresses the cause of the preceding subject. Thus, “Nec consilium eo minus erat firmum, quoniam secretum cum perpaucis adhuc erat communicatum,” where the eo refers to a preceding circumstance. “Nec consilium eo minus erat firmum, quod” where the eo refers to the subsequent clause. The former phraseology affirms, the latter denies, the influence of the circumstance subjoined.
[149] In our penal statutes, which should be precisely worded, because they are literally interpreted, much ambiguity frequently arises from the loose and incorrect manner in which this conjunction is used.
[150] The issue of a question, respecting a contested election at Rochester in 1820, depended on the construction of this designation, “a peer, or lord of parliament.”
[151] The superior ductility of the Greek, above every other language, must appear from its singular aptitude to form new words by composition or derivation, so as immediately to communicate any new idea. Hence the names of most of our modern discoveries and inventions are of Greek extraction. Thus we have the terms “microscope,” “telegraph,” “panorama,” “odometer,” and many others.
“Cui lecta potenter erit res,
Nec facundia deseret hunc, nec lucidus ordo.
Verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.”
Hor. de Art. Poet.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
The braces in the table on [page 142] have been removed; they were confusing and unnecessary.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
[Pg 44]: ‘primary preception’ replaced by ‘primary perception’.
[Pg 46]: ‘hartez, illa’ replaced by ‘ha’aretz, illa’.
Pg 46 [Footnote [24]: ‘ארצ’ replaced by ‘ארץ’.
Pg 46 [Footnote [24]: ‘הארצ’ replaced by ‘הארץ’.
Pg 87 [Footnote [45]: ‘eo-ed, dede’ replaced by ‘do-ed, dede’.
[Pg 102]: missing subheading ‘OF THE PARTICIPLE.’ added.
[Pg 115]: ‘I written’ replaced by ‘I have written’.
[Pg 150]: ‘siginifies against’ replaced by ‘signifies against’.
[Pg 155]: ‘I did confess”...’ replaced by ‘I did confess...”’.
Pg 173 [Footnote [123]: ‘Athough he was’ replaced by ‘Although he was’.
[Pg 191]: ‘the arrrangement is’ replaced by ‘the arrangement is’.
[Pg 209]: ‘The bridegrooms its’ replaced by ‘The bridegroom sits’.
[Pg 246]: ‘I know.” Addison.’ replaced by ‘I know.”—Addison.’.
[Pg 249]: ‘being accasioned’ replaced by ‘being occasioned’.
[Pg 262]: ‘οἱ duo’ replaced by ‘οἱ δύο’.
[Pg 297]: ‘before you feet’ replaced by ‘before your feet’.