The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language Explained and Illustrated

by Alexander Crombie

PART III.

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CHAPTER I.
CANONS OF CRITICISM.

Having explained and illustrated the etymology and syntax of the English language, as fully as the limits, which I have prescribed to myself, will permit, I would now request the reader’s attention to some additional observations.

The grammar of every language is merely a compilation of those general principles, or rules, agreeably to which that language is spoken. When I say, a compilation of rules, I would not be understood to mean, that the rules are first established, and the language afterwards modelled in conformity to these. The very reverse is the fact: language is antecedent to grammar. Words are framed and combined to express sentiment, before the grammarian can enter on his province. His sole business is, not to dictate forms of speech, or to prescribe law to our modes of expression; but, by observing the modes previously established, by remarking their similarities and dissimilarities, his province is to deduce and explain the general principles, and the particular forms, agreeably to which the speakers of that language express themselves. The philosopher does not determine by what laws the physical and moral world should be governed; but, by the careful observation and accurate comparison of the various phenomena presented to his view, he deduces and ascertains the general principles, by which the system is regulated. The province of the grammarian seems precisely similar. He is a mere digester and compiler, explaining what are the modes of speech, not dictating what they should be. He can neither assign to any word a meaning different from that which custom has annexed to it; nor can he alter a phraseology, to which universal suffrage has given its sanction. Usage is, in this case, law; usage quem penes arbitrium est, et jus et norma loquendi. If it were now the practice to say, “I loves,” instead of “I love,” the former phraseology would rest on the same firm ground, on which the latter now stands; and “I love,” would be as much a violation of the rules of grammar, or, which is the same thing, of established usage, as “I loves” is at present. Regula est, quæ rem, quæ est, breviter enarrat; non ut ex regula jus sumatur, sed ex jure, quod est, regula fiat.—Paul. Leg. 1, de Reg. Jur.

Having said thus much to prevent misconception, and to define the proper province of the grammarian, I proceed to observe, that this usage, which gives law to language, in order to establish its authority, or to entitle its suffrage to our assent, must be, in the first place, reputable.

The vulgar in this, as in every other country, are, from their want of education, necessarily illiterate. Their native language is known to them no farther, than is requisite for the most common purposes of life. Their ideas are few, and consequently their stock of words poor and scanty. Nay, their poverty, in this respect, is not their only evil. Their narrow competence they abuse and pervert. Some words they misapply, others they corrupt; while many are employed by them, which have no sanction, but provincial or local authority. Hence the language of the vulgar, in one province, is sometimes hardly intelligible in another. Add to this, that debarred by their occupations from study, or generally averse to literary pursuits, they are necessarily strangers to the scientific improvements of a cultivated mind; and are therefore entirely unacquainted with that diction, which concerns the higher attainments of life. Ignorant of any general principles respecting language, to which they may appeal; unable to discriminate between right and wrong; prone therefore to adopt whatever usage casual circumstances may present; it is no wonder, if the language of the vulgar be a mixture of incongruity and error, neither perfectly consistent with itself, nor to themselves universally intelligible. Their usage, therefore, is not the standard, to which we must appeal for decisive authority; a usage so discordant and various, that we may justly apply to it the words of a celebrated critic,

Bellua multorum es capitum; nam quid sequar, aut quem?

The question then is, what is reputable usage? On this subject philologists have been divided. Dr. Campbell appears to me to decide judiciously, when he says, that the usage, to which we must appeal, is not that of the court, or of great men, nor even of authors of profound science, but of those, whose works are esteemed by the public, and who may, therefore, be denominated reputable authors. By referring to their practice, he appeals to a standard less equivocal, than if he had resorted to the authority of good writers; for, as he justly observes, there may be various opinions respecting the merits of authors, when there may be no disagreement concerning the rank which they hold in the estimation of the public; and, because it is the esteem of the public, and not their intrinsic merit, (though these go generally hand in hand,) that raises them to distinction, and stamps a value on their language. Besides, it is to be observed, that consummate knowledge is not always accompanied with a talent for communicating it: hence the sentiment may be confessedly valuable, while the language is regarded as of no authority.

This usage must be, in the second place, national. It must not be confined to this or that province; it must not be the usage of this or that district, the peculiarities of which are always ridiculous, and frequently unintelligible beyond its own limits; but it must be the general language of the country, intelligible everywhere, and in no place ridiculous. And, though the variety of dialects may collectively form a greater number of authorities than national usage can boast, taken singly they are much fewer. Those, to use Campbell’s apposite similitude, who deviate from the beaten road, may be incomparably more numerous than those who travel in it; yet, into whatever number of by-paths the former may be divided, there may not be found in any one of these tracks so many as travel in the king’s highway.

In the third place, this usage must be present. Here it may be asked, what is meant by present usage? Is it the usage of the present year, the present age, or the present century? How is it defined, or by what boundary is it limited? In short, how far may we revert in search of decisive authority? may we go back, for example, as far as Chaucer, or must we stop at the age of Addison?

In determining this matter, the same learned and judicious critic observes, that regard must be had to the species of composition and the nature of the subject. Poetry is properly allowed a greater latitude than prose; and therefore, a word, which in prose we should reject as a barbarism, may, with strict propriety, be admitted in verse. Here, also, there are limits which must not be passed; and, perhaps, any word, which cannot plead the authority of Milton, or of any contemporary or later poet, may be justly regarded as obsolete. In prose, no word, unless the subject be art or science, should be employed, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man. This is the judgment of the same critic. Against this answer, indeed, it is possible to raise a thousand cavils; and, perhaps, we shall be reminded of the poet’s strictures on the term ancient in his days[134]. One thing, however, is certain, that, though it be difficult to fix a precise limit, where the authority of precedent terminates, and legislative usage commences, or to define with precision the age of man, it must be acknowledged, that there are limits, in respect to usage, which we must not overleap, as there is a certain term, which the life of man cannot surpass.

As there is a period, beyond which precedent in language ceases to have authority; so, on the contrary, the usage of the present day is not implicitly to be adopted. Mankind are fond of novelty; and there is a fashion in language, as there is in dress. Whim, vanity, and affectation, delight in creating new words. Of these, the far greater part soon sink into contempt. They figure for a little, like ephemeral productions, in tales, novels, and fugitive papers; and are shortly consigned to degradation and oblivion. Now, to adopt every new-fangled upstart at its birth, would argue not taste, nor judgment, but childish fondness for singularity and novelty. On the contrary, if any of these should maintain its ground, and receive the sanction of a reputable usage, to reject it, in this case, would be to resist that authority, to which every critic and grammarian must bow with submission. The term mob, for example, was, at its introduction, zealously opposed by Dean Swift. His resistance, however, was ineffectual; and to reject it now would betray prudish affectation, and fruitless perversity. The word inimical, previously to the American war, could, I believe, plead, in its favour, only one authority. In some dictionaries, accordingly it was omitted; and in others stigmatized as a barbarism. It has now obtained a permanent establishment, and is justly admitted by every lexicographer.

“In words, as fashions, the same rule will hold;

Alike fantastic, if too new or old:

Be not the first, by whom the new are tried,

Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.”

Pope’s Essay on Criticism.

In short, in this, as in every other question on this subject, perspicuity should be our guide. If the subject be art or science, or if the composition be intended for literary men, then a greater latitude may be allowed, as the reader is supposed to be master of the language, in all its varieties. But if the subject be accommodated to common capacity, and the composition designed for ordinary readers, the rule now given, not to employ a word, which has been disused for a period greater than the age of man, will be deemed, I conceive, rational and necessary.

The usage, then, which gives law to language, and which is generally denominated “good usage,” must be reputable, national, and present. It happens, however, that “good usage” is not always uniform in her decisions, and that unquestionable authorities are found for different modes of expression. In such cases, the following canons, proposed by the same author, will be of considerable service, in enabling the reader to decide, to which phraseology the preference is due. These canons I shall give, nearly in the words of the author; and illustrate them, as I proceed, by a few apposite examples, partly his, and partly my own.

Canon I.—When the usage is divided, as to any particular words or phrases, and when one of the expressions is susceptible of a different meaning, while the other admits only one signification, the expression, which is strictly univocal, should be preferred.

For this reason, aught[135], for “anything,” is better than ought; scarcely, as an adverb, better than scarce; by consequence is preferable to of consequence, which signifies also “of importance;” and exceedingly, as an adverb, is preferable to exceeding.

For the same reason, to purpose, for “to intend,” is better than to propose, which signifies also “to lay before,” or “submit to consideration;” and proposal, for “a thing offered or proposed,” is better than “proposition,” which denotes also “a position,” or the “affirmation of any principle or maxim.” Thus we say, “he demonstrated Euclid’s proposition,” and “he rejected the proposal of his friend.”

Agreeably also to this canon, disposal, in common language, when a grant, or giving away is denoted, or when the management of anything is to be expressed, is preferable to disposition, which signifies also arrangement, and likewise temper of mind; and exposure, as the verbal noun from expose, is better than exposition, the verbal noun of expound. We should say, “the exposure of a fault,” and “the exposition of a text.” The analogous words composure, from compose, and composition, from compound, or compose, have been suffered to retain their distinct significations. “To speak contemptuously of a person,” is better than “to speak contemptibly;” the latter term meaning generally, “in a contemptible manner,” or, “in a manner worthy of contempt;” whereas the former is univocal, and denotes disrespectfully, or “in a manner significant of contempt.”

For the same reason, obvious, for “evident,” is better than apparent, which means also “seeming,” as opposed to “real.”

The term primitive, as equivalent to original, is preferable to primary. The latter is synonymous with principal, and is opposed to secondary; the former is equivalent to original, and is opposed to derivative or acquired. I shall illustrate this distinction by a few examples. The words falsehood and lie agree in expressing the same primary idea, namely, “contrariety to fact;” but they differ in their secondary ideas, the former implying simply, “inconsistency with physical truth,” the latter being a term of reproach, expressing “a wilful breach of veracity, or of moral truth.” To kill, and to murder, agree also in their primary ideas, both denoting “the deprivation of life;” but they differ in their secondary, the former implying no moral turpitude, the latter denoting an immoral act. From these examples it will appear, that primary denotes “what is principal or chief,” as opposed to “secondary,” or “subordinate.”

Primitive is equivalent to original; thus we say, the primitive meaning of the word villain, was “a nearer tenant to the lord of the manor;” custom has altered its signification, and it now denotes “a wicked fellow.” Thus the primary and the primitive meaning of words may be very different; these terms, therefore, ought to be duly discriminated.

Intension, for “the act of stretching or straining,” is for the same reason, preferable to intention, which signifies also “purpose,” or “design.” “I am mistaken,” is frequently used to denote “I misunderstand,” or “I am in error;” but as this expression may also signify, “I am misunderstood,” it is better to say, “I mistake.”

This canon I would earnestly recommend to the observance of every writer, who is solicitous to exclude all unnecessary ambiguity, but more emphatically to my junior readers, who are peculiarly prone to the violation of this rule, misled by false notions of elegance and dignity. There prevails at present a foolish and ridiculous, not to say absurd, disposition in some writers, to prefer in every instance, with no discrimination, long to short words. They seem to entertain an inveterate antipathy to monosyllabic terms; and disdaining whatever savours of Saxon origin, are incessantly searching after the sesquipedalia verba of Greek or Latin extraction, with no regard whatever to precision and perspicuity. Thus many words, which cannot be dismissed without detriment to the language, are falling into disuse, and their places supplied by equivocal and less appropriate terms.

Canon II.—In doubtful cases analogy should be regarded.

For this reason, contemporary is better than cotemporary, con being used before a consonant, and co before a vowel; as, concomitant, coeval.

For the same reason, “he needs,” “he dares,” “whether he will or not,” are better than “he need,” “he dare,” “whether he will or no.” The last of the three phraseologies, here recommended, Priestley thinks exceptionable. To me, as to Campbell, the ellipsis appears evident; thus, “whether he will, or will not:” hence “will not” seems the only analogical expression.

Canon III.—When expressions are in other respects equal, that should be preferred, which is most agreeable to the ear. This requires no illustration.

Canon IV.—When none of the preceding rules take place, regard should be had to simplicity. On this ground, “accept,” “approve,” “admit,” are preferable to “accept of,” “approve of,” “admit of.”

I have already observed, that no expression, or mode of speech, can be justified, which is not sanctioned by usage. The converse, however, does not follow, that every phraseology, sanctioned by usage, should be retained; and, in such cases, custom may properly be checked by criticism, whose province it is, not only to remonstrate against the introduction of any word or phraseology, which may be either unnecessary or contrary to analogy, but also to extrude whatever is reprehensible, though in general use. It is by this exercise of her prerogative, that languages are gradually refined and improved; and were this denied, language would soon become stationary, or more probably would hasten to decline. In exercising this authority, she cannot pretend to degrade instantly any phraseology, which she may deem objectionable; but she may, by repeated remonstrances, gradually effect its dismission. Her decisions in such cases may be properly regulated by the following canons, as delivered by the same author.

Canon I.—All words and phrases, particularly harsh, and not absolutely necessary, should be dismissed; as, “shamefacedness,” “unsuccessfulness,” “wrongheadedness.”

Canon II.—When the etymology plainly points to a different signification from what the word bears, propriety and simplicity require its dismission. For example, the word “beholden,” taken for “obliged,” or the verb “to unloose,” for “to loose,” or “untie,” should be rejected.

Canon III.—When words become obsolete, or are never used, but in particular phrases, they should be repudiated; as they give the style an air of vulgarity and cant, when their general disuse renders them obscure. Of these “lief,” “dint,” “whit,” “moot,” “pro and con,” furnish examples; as, “I had as lief go,” “by dint of argument,” “not a whit better,” “a moot point,” “it was argued pro and con.” These phraseologies are vulgar, and savour too much of cant to be admitted in good writing.

Canon IV.—All words and phrases, which, analyzed grammatically, include a solecism, should be dismissed; as, “I had rather go.” The expression should be, “I would,” or “I’d rather go:” and from the latter, the solecism “I had go,” seems by mistake to have arisen, I’d being erroneously conceived to be contracted for I had, instead of a contraction for I would. This is the opinion of Campbell, and to this opinion I expressed my assent, in the former edition of this Treatise. I acknowledge, however, that it now appears to me not strictly correct; and that Webster has not questioned its accuracy on insufficient grounds. In the phrases adduced by Campbell, such as “I’d go,” “I’d rather stay,” we can readily perceive the probability that I’d is a contraction for “I would.” But in such expressions as “I had like to have been caught,” which occur not only in colloquial language, but also in authors of considerable name, it is impossible to admit Campbell’s explanation. I must observe also, that the phraseology, which he censures, occurs in some of our earliest writers, and is so frequently found in Pope and Swift, that one is tempted to infer, notwithstanding its solecistic appearance, that it is genuine English. It is difficult, however, nay, perhaps impossible, to reconcile it to analogy. Were I to offer conjecture on the subject, I should be inclined to say, that in such phrases as “I had go,” I had is, by a grammatical figure very common in English, put for I would have, or I would possess, and that the simple name of the act or state, by an ellipsis perhaps of the verbal sign, is subjoined, as the object wished, no regard being had to the completion of the action; in the same manner as we say, I would have gone, when we wish the action perfected. But by whatever authority this phraseology may be recommended, and in whatever way it may be reconciled to the rules of syntax, it has so much the appearance of solecism, that I decidedly prefer with Campbell the unexceptional form of expression, I would. The phrase I had like appears to me utterly irreconcilable with any principle of analogy.

Canon V.—All expressions, which, according to the established rules of the language, either have no meaning, or involve a contradiction, or, according to the fair construction of the words, convey a meaning different from the intention of the speaker, should be dismissed. Thus, when a person says, “he sings a good song,” the words strictly imply that “the song is good,” whereas the speaker means to say, “he sings well.” In like manner, when it is said, “this is the best part he acts,” the sentence, according to the strict interpretation of the words, expresses an opinion, not of his manner of acting, but of the part or character which he acts. It should be, “he acts this part best,” or “this is the part which he acts best.” “He plays a good fiddle,” for “he plays well on the fiddle,” is, for the same reason, objectionable.

Of expressions involving a contradiction, the following will serve as an example. “There were four ladies in company, every one prettier than another.” This is impossible. If A was prettier than B, B must have been less pretty than A; but by the expression every one was prettier than another, therefore B was also prettier than A. Such absurdities as this ought surely to be banished from every language[136].

Of those, which have little or no meaning, Campbell has given us examples, “currying favour,” “having a month’s mind,” “shooting at rovers.” Such modes of expression, he justly calls trash, the disgrace of any language.

These canons I have extracted from “Campbell on Rhetoric,” a book which I would recommend to the reader’s attentive perusal.

I proceed to observe, that to write any language with grammatical purity, implies these three things:

1st. That the words be all of that language.

2ndly. That they be construed and arranged, according to the rules of syntax in that language.

3rdly. That they be employed in that sense, which usage has annexed to them.

Grammatical purity, therefore, may be violated in three ways:

1st. The words may not be English. This error is called barbarism.

2ndly. Their construction may be contrary to the English idiom. This error is termed solecism.

3rdly. They may be used in a sense different from their established acceptation. This error is named impropriety[137].

The barbarism is an offence against lexicography, by admitting new words, as, “volupty,” “connexity,” “majestatic;” or by using obsolete words, as, “uneath,” “erst;” or an offence against etymology, by improper inflection, as, “teached” for “taught,” “oxes” for “oxen.”

The solecism is an offence against the rules of syntax, as, “I reads,” “you was.”

The impropriety is an offence against lexicography, by mistaking the meaning of words or phrases.

A solecism is regarded by grammarians as a much greater offence than either of the others; because it betrays a greater ignorance of the principles of the language. Rhetorically considered, it is deemed a less trespass; for the rhetorician and grammarian estimate the magnitude of errors by different standards; the former inquiring only how far any error militates against the great purpose of his art—persuasion; the latter, how far it betrays an ignorance of the principles of grammar. Hence with the former, obscurity is the greatest trespass; with the latter, solecism, and that species of barbarism which violates the rules of etymology[138].

CHAPTER II.
CRITICAL REMARKS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Having, in the preceding chapter, explained the nature of that usage which gives law to language; and having proposed a few rules for the student’s direction in cases where usage is divided, and also where her authority may be justly questioned and checked by criticism; I intend, in the following pages, to present the young reader with a copious exemplification of the three general species of error against grammatical purity, arranging the examples in the order of the parts of speech.

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SECTION I.
THE NOUN.

BARBARISM.

“I rode in a one-horse chay.” It ought to be “a one-horse chaise.” There is no such word as chay.

“That this has been the true and proper acception of this word, I shall testify by one evidence.”—Hammond. Acception is obsolete; it ought to be acceptation.

“Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain wage.”—Wealth of Nations. Wage is obsolete; the plural only is used.

“Their alliance was sealed by the nuptial of Henry, with the daughter of the Italian prince.”—Gibbon. Nuptial has not, I believe, been used as a substantive since the days of Shakspeare, and may be deemed obsolete. The plural nuptials is the proper word.

“He showed that he had a full comprehension of the whole of the plan, and of the judicious adaption of the parts to the whole.”—Sheridan’s Life of Swift. Adaption is obsolescent, if not obsolete: adaptation is the proper term. Adaption is frequently employed by Swift, from whom Sheridan seems to have copied it.

... “Which even his brother modernists themselves, like ungrates, whisper so loud that it reaches up to the very garret I am now writing in.”—Swift. “Ungrate” is a barbarism. “Ingrate” is to be found in some of our English poets as an adjective, and synonymous with “ungrateful;” but “ungrate,” as a substantive, is truly barbarous. Almost equally objectionable is Steele’s use of stupid as a substantive plural. “Thou art no longer to drudge in raising the mirth of stupids.”—Spectator, No. 468. And also of ignorant, “the ignorants of the lowest order.”—Ibid.

Pope also says, in one of his letters, “We are curious impertinents in the case of futurity.” This employment of the adjective as a noun substantive, though never sanctioned by general use, is now properly avoided by our most reputable writers. It tends to confusion, where distinction is necessary.

“The Deity dwelleth between the cherubims.” The Hebrews form the plural of masculines by adding im; “cherubims,” therefore, is a double plural. “Seraphims,” for the same reason, is faulty. The singular of these words being “cherub” and “seraph,” the plural is either “cherubs” and “seraphs,” or “cherubim” and “seraphim.” Milton has uniformly avoided this mistake, which circumstance Addison, in his criticisms on that author, has overlooked; nay, he has, even with Milton’s correct usage before him, committed the error. “The zeal of the seraphim,” says he, “breaks forth in a becoming warmth of sentiments and expressions, as the character which is given of him,” &c. Here “seraphim,” a plural noun, is used as singular. It should be, “the zeal of the seraph.”

“Nothing can be more pleasant than to see virtuosoes about a cabinet of medals descanting upon the value, the rarity, and authenticalness of the several pieces.” Authenticalness, though used by Addison, is obsolescent, and may, perhaps, be deemed a barbarism. It may be properly dismissed, as a harsh and unnecessary term.

“He broke off with Lady Gifford, one of his oldest acquaintances in life.”—Sheridan’s Life of Swift. Acquaintances is now deemed a Scotticism, being almost peculiar to the northern parts of the island. Johnson, however, did not disclaim it. “A young student from the inns of court, who has often attacked the curate of his father’s parish, with such arguments as his acquaintances could furnish.”—Rambler. We find it also in Steele; thus, “she pays everybody their own, and yet makes daily new acquaintances.”—Tatler, No. 109.

“I am sure that the farmeress at Bevis would feel emotions of vanity ... if she knew you gave her the character of a reasonable woman.”—Lord Peterborough to Pope. This, I believe, is the only passage in which farmeress is to be found; but, though it may therefore be pronounced a barbarism, the author could not have expressed himself so clearly and so concisely, in any other way. We every now and then, as Johnson observes, feel the want of a feminine termination.

“The bellowses were broken.” The noun, as here inflected, is barbarous. “Bellows” is a plural word denoting a single instrument, though consisting of two parts. There is, therefore, no such word as “bellowses.”

SOLECISM[139].

“I have read Horace Art of Poetry.” This expression may be deemed solecistical, being a violation of that rule, by which one substantive governs another in the genitive. It should be, “Horace’s Art of Poetry.” “These are ladies ruffles,” “this is the kings picture,” are errors of the same kind, for “ladies’ ruffles,” “the king’s picture.”

“These three great genius’s flourished at the same time.” Here “genius’s,” the genitive singular, is improperly used for “geniuses,” the nominative plural.

“They have of late, ’tis true, reformed, in some measure, the gouty joints and darning work of whereunto’s, whereby’s, thereof’s, therewith’s, and the rest of this kind.”—Shaftesbury. Here also the genitive singular is improperly used for the objective case plural. It should be, whereuntos, wherebys, thereofs, therewiths.

“Both those people, acute and inquisitive to excess, corrupted the sciences.”—Adams’s History of England.

“Two rival peoples, the Jews and the Samaritans, have preserved separate exemplars of it.”—Geddes’ Preface to his Translation of the Bible. The former of these passages involves a palpable error, the word “people,” here equivalent to nation, and in the singular number, being joined with both or “the two,” a term of plurality. In the latter, this error is avoided, the noun being employed in the plural number. This usage, however, though sanctioned by the authority of our translators of the Bible in two passages, seems now to be obsolete. States, tribes, nations, appear to be preferable.

“I bought a scissars,” “I want a tongs,” “it is a tattered colours,” involve a palpable solecism, the term significant of unity being joined with a plural word. It should be “a pair of scissars,” “a pair of tongs,” “a pair of colours.”

“They tell us, that the fashion of jumbling fifty things together in a dish was at first introduced, in compliance to a depraved and debauched appetite.”—Swift.

We say, “comply with;” therefore, by Rule xvii. “in compliance with” is the analogical form of expression, and has the sanction of classical usage.

“The fortitude of a man, who brings his will to the obedience of his reason.”—Steele. Analogy requires “obedience to.” We say, obedient to command: the person obeying is expressed in the genitive, or with the preposition of; and the person or thing obeyed with the preposition to, as, “a servant’s obedience,” or “the obedience of a servant to the orders of his master.”

“Give attendance to reading, to exhortation, to doctrine.”—Bible. “Attendance” and “attention” are verbal nouns, derived from “attend.” When the verb signifies “to regard,” or “to fix the mind upon,” it is followed by to, as, “he attends to his studies,” and the verbal noun is “attention,” construed, agreeably to Rule xvii. in the same manner as the verb. Thus, “he gives attention to his studies.” But when “to attend” signifies “to wait on,” or “be present at,” it is followed by on, upon, or at, and is sometimes used without the preposition.

Thus, “if any minister refused to admit a lecturer recommended to him, he was required to attend upon the committee.”—Clarendon.

“He attended at the consecration with becoming gravity.”—Hume. In this sense the verbal noun is “attendance,” and construed like the verb, when it bears this signification. In the sentence, therefore, last quoted, syntax requires, either “attendance at” or “attention to.” The latter conveys the meaning of the original.

IMPROPRIETY.

“The observation of the Sabbath is a duty incumbent on every Christian.” It should be, “the observance.” Both substantives are derived from the verb “to observe.” When the verb means “to keep,” or “obey,” the verbal noun is “observance;” when “to remark,” or “to notice,” the noun is “observation.”

“They make such acquirements, as fit them for useful avocations.”—Staunton’s Embassy to China.

The word avocation is frequently, as in the example before us, confounded with vocation. By the latter is clearly signified “calling,” “trade,” “employment,” “business,” “occupation;” and by the former is meant whatever withdraws, distracts, or diverts us from that business. No two words can be more distinct; yet we often see them confounded.

“A supplication of twenty days was decreed to his honour.”—Henry’s History of Britain. The term supplication is in our language confined to what Johnson calls “petitionary worship,” and always implies request, entreaty, or petition. The Latin term supplicatio has a more extensive meaning, and likewise supplicium, each denoting not only prayer, strictly so called, but also thanksgiving. The latter of these should have been employed by the author.

“Our pleasures are purer, when consecrated by nations, and cherished by the greatest genii among men.”—Blackwell’s Mythology. Genii means spirits. (See [p. 18].) It ought to be geniuses.

I have already remarked (see [p. 31]), that, when the primary idea implied in the masculine and feminine terms is the chief object of attention, and when the sex does not enter as a matter of consideration, the masculine term should be employed, even when the female is signified. Thus, the Monthly Reviewer, in giving a critique on the poems of Mrs. Grant, says, in allusion to that lady, “such is the poet’s request.” This is strictly proper. He considers her merely as a writer of poetry. But, were we to say, “as a poet she ought not to choose for her theme the story of Abelard,” we should be chargeable with error. For this would imply, that the story of Abelard is not a fit subject for a poem,—a sentiment manifestly false. There is no incongruity between the subject and poetry, but between the subject and female delicacy. We ought, therefore, to say, “as a poetess, she ought not to choose for her theme the story of Abelard.”

“It was impossible not to suspect the veracity of this story.” “Veracity” is applicable to persons only, and properly denotes that moral quality or property, which consists in speaking truth, being in its import nearly synonymous with the fashionable, but grossly perverted term, honour: it is, therefore, improperly applied to things. It should be “the truth of this story.” The former denotes moral, and the latter physical truth. We therefore say “the truth” or “verity of the relation or thing told,” and “the veracity of the relater.”

Pope has entitled a small dissertation, prefixed to his translation of the Iliad, “A View of the Epic Poem,” misled, it is probable, by Bossu’s title of a similar work, “Traité du Poëme Epique.” Poem denotes the work or thing composed; “the art of making,” which is here intended, is termed poesy.

An error similar to this occurs in the following passage: “I apprehend that all the sophism which has been or can be employed, will not be sufficient to acquit this system at the tribunal of reason.”—Bolingbroke. “Sophism” is properly defined by Johnson, “a fallacious argument;” sophistry means “fallacious reasoning,” or “unsound argumentation.” The author should have said “all the sophistry,” or “all the sophisms.”

“The Greek is, doubtless, a language much superior in riches, harmony, and variety to the Latin.”—Campbell’s Rhet. As the properties or qualities of the languages are here particularly compared, I apprehend, that the abstract “richness” would be a more apposite term. “Riches” properly denotes “the things possessed,” or “what constitutes the opulence of the owner;” “richness” denotes the state, quality, or property of the individual, as possessed of these. The latter, therefore, appears to me the more appropriate term.

“He felt himself compelled to acknowledge the justice of my remark.” The justness would, agreeably to Canon 1st, be the preferable word, the former term being confined to persons, and the latter to things.

“The negligence of this leaves us exposed to an uncommon levity in our usual conversation.”—Spectator. It ought to be “the neglect.” “Negligence” implies a habit; “neglect” expresses an act.

“For I am of opinion that it is better a language should not be wholly perfect, than it should be perpetually changing; and we must give over at one time, or at length infallibly change for the worse; as the Romans did when they began to quit their simplicity of style for affected refinements, such as we meet with in Tacitus, and other authors, which ended, by degrees, in many barbarities.” Barbarity, in this sense, is obsolescent. The univocal term, barbarism, is much preferable.

Gibbon, speaking of the priest, says, “to obtain the acceptation of this guide to salvation, you must faithfully pay him tythes.” Acceptation in this sense is obsolete, or at least nearly out of use; it should be favour or acceptance.

“She ought to lessen the extravagant power of the duke and duchess, by taking the disposition of employments into her own hands.”—Swift. Disposal, for reasons already assigned[140], is much better.

“The conscience of approving one’s self a benefactor to mankind, is the noblest recompense for being so.” “Conscience” is the faculty by which we judge our own conduct. It is here improperly used for “consciousness,” or the perception of what passes within ourselves.

“If reasons were as plenty as blackberries, I would give no man a reason on compulsion.”—Shakspeare. Here plenty, a substantive, is improperly used for plentiful.

“It had a prodigious quantity of windows.”—Spence’s Excursions. It should be number. This error frequently occurs in common conversation. We hear of “a quantity of people,” of “a quantity of troops,” “a quantity of boys and girls,” just as if they were to be measured by the bushel, or weighed in the balance.—“To-morrow will suit me equally well.” If we enquire here for a nominative to the verb, we find none, morrow being under the government of the preposition. This error is so common, that we fear its correction is hopeless. The translators of the Bible seem carefully to have avoided this inaccuracy:—“To-morrow (i.e. ‘on the morrow’) the Lord shall do this;” “And the Lord did that thing on the morrow.” Analogy requires, that we should say, “The morrow will suit me equally well.”

“I have the Dublin copy of Gibbon’s History.” This is a Scotticism for Dublin edition; and so palpable, that I should not have mentioned it, were it not found in authors of no contemptible merit. “I have no right to be forced,” said a citizen to a magistrate, “to serve as constable.” This perversion of the word right, originally, we believe, a cockneyism, is gradually gaining ground, and is found in compositions, into which nothing but extreme inattention can account for its introduction. A right implies a just claim, or title to some privilege, freedom, property, or distinction, supposed by the claimant to be conducive to his benefit. We should smile, if we heard a foreigner, in vindication of his innocence, say, “I have no right to be imprisoned;” “I have no right to be hanged.” The perversion here is too palpable to escape our notice. But we hear a similar, though not so ridiculous, an abuse of the word, in common conversation without surprise. “I have no right,” says one, “to be taxed with this indiscretion;” “I have no right,” says another, “to be subjected to this penalty.” These phraseologies are absurd. They involve a contradiction; they presume a benefit, while they imply an injury. The correlative term on one side is right, and on the other obligation; a creditor has a right to a just debt, and the debtor is under an obligation to pay it. Instead of these indefensible phraseologies we should say, “I am not bound,” or “I am under no obligation to submit to this penalty;” “I ought not to be taxed with this indiscretion,” or “you have no right to subject me,” “you have no right to tax me.”

Robertson, when speaking of the Mexican form of government (Book viith), says, “But the description of their policy and laws is so inaccurate and contradictory, that it is difficult to delineate the form of their constitution with any precision.” I should here prefer the appropriate and univocal term polity, which denotes merely the form of government; policy means rather wisdom or prudence, or the art of governing, which may exist where there is no settled polity.

“A letter relative to certain calumnies and misrepresentations which have appeared in the Edinburgh Review, with an exposition of the ignorance of the new critical junto.”—Here, agreeably to Canon I. (see [p. 229]), I should prefer exposure, as being a word strictly univocal. It would conduce to perspicuity were we to consider exposition as the verbal noun of expound, and confine it entirely to explanation, and exposure as the verbal noun of expose, signifying the act of setting out, or the state of being set out or exposed.

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SECTION II.
THE ADJECTIVE.

BARBARISM.

“Instead of an able man, you desire to have him an insignificant wrangler, opiniatre in discourse, and priding himself on contradicting others.”—Locke. Opiniatre is a barbarism; it should be opinionative.

“And studied lines, and fictious circles draw.”—Prior.

The word fictious is of Prior’s own coining; it is barbarous.

“The punishment that belongs to that great and criminous guilt is the forfeiture of his right and claim to all mercies.”—Hammond. Criminous is a barbarism.

“Which, even in the most overly view, will appear incompatible with any sort of music.”—Kames’s Elements. Overly is a Scotticism; in England it is now obsolete. The proper term is cursory or superficial.

“Who should believe, that a man should be a doctor for the cure of bursten children?”—Steele. The participle bursten is now obsolete.

“Callisthenes, the philosopher, that followed Alexander’s court, and hated the king, being asked, how one should become the famousest man in the world, answered, By taking away him that is.”—Bacon’s Apophth. The superlative is a barbarism; it should be, “most famous.”

SOLECISM.

“I do not like these kind of men.” Here the plural word these is joined to a noun singular; it should be, “this kind.” “Those sort,” “these kind of things,” are gross solecisms.

“Neither do I see it is any crime, farther than ill manners, to differ in opinion from the majority of either, or both houses; and that ill manners I have often been guilty of.”—Swift’s Examiner. Here is another egregious solecism. He should have said, “those ill manners,” or “that species of ill manners.”

“The landlord was quite unfurnished of every kind of provision.”—Sheridan’s Life of Swift. We say, “to furnish with,” not “to furnish of.” Furnished and unfurnished are construed in the same manner. It should be, “unfurnished with.”

“A child of four years old was thus cruelly deserted by its parents.” This form of expression frequently occurs, and is an egregious solecism. It should be, “a child four years old,” or “aged four years,” not “of four years.” Those who employ this incorrect phraseology, seem misled by confounding two very different modes of expression, namely, “a child of four years of age,” or “of the age of four years,” and “a child four years old.” The preposition of is requisite in the two first of these forms, but inadmissible in the third. They would not say, “I am of four years old,” but “I am four years old;” hence, consistently, they ought to say, “a child four years old.” “At ten years old, I was put to a grammar school.”—Steele. Grammatically this is, “I old at ten years.”

“This account is very different to what I told you.” “I found your affairs had been managed in a different manner than what I advised.” Both these phraseologies are faulty. It should be in each, “different from.” The verb “to differ” is construed with from before the second object of disparity; the adjective therefore should (by Rule xvii.) be construed in the same manner.

“These words have the same sense of those others.” Same should be followed with as, with, or the relatives who, which, that. It ought, therefore, to be, “as those,” or “with those,” or “have the sense of those others.”

“I shall ever depend on your constant friendship, kind memory, and good offices, though I were never to see or hear the effects of them, like the trust we have in benevolent spirits, who, though we never see or hear them, we think are constantly serving and praying for us.”—Pope’s Letters to Atterbury. Like can have no grammatical reference to any word in the sentence but I, and this reference is absurd. He should have said, “as, or just as, we trust in benevolent spirits.”

“This gentleman rallies the best of any man I know.”—Addison. The superlative must be followed by of, the preposition implying out of a plurality, expressed either by a collective noun, or a plural number. But here we have a selection denoted by of, and the selection to be made out of one. This is absurd. It should be, “better than any other”—the best of all men—“I know;” “this gentleman, of all my acquaintance, rallies the best;” or “of all my acquaintance, there is no one, who rallies so well as this gentleman.”

“Besides, those, whose teeth are too rotten to bite, are best, of all others, qualified to revenge that defect with their breath.”—Preface to A Tale of a Tub.

“Here,” says Sheridan, “the disjunction of the word best from the word qualified makes the sentence uncouth, which would run better thus, ‘are, of all others, best qualified.’” So far Mr. Sheridan is right; but he has left uncorrected a very common error. The antecedent subject of comparison is here absurdly referred at once to the same, and to a different aggregate, the word of referring it to others, to which it is opposed, and to which therefore it cannot, without a contradiction, be said to belong. The sentence, therefore, involves an absurdity: either the word others should be expunged, when the sentence would run thus, “Those, whose teeth are too rotten to bite, are, of all, best qualified to revenge that defect;” or, if the word others be retained, the clause should be, “are better qualified than all others.”[141]

The phraseology here censured is admissible in those cases only where a previous comparison has been made. If we say, “To engage a private tutor for a single pupil is, perhaps, of all others, the least eligible mode of giving literary instruction,” (Barrow on Education,) without making that previous discrimination, which the word others implies, we commit an error. But we may say with propriety, “I prefer the mode of education adopted in our public schools; and of all other modes, to engage a private tutor appears to me the least eligible.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“They could easier get them by heart, and retain them in memory.”—Adams’s History of England. Here the adjective is improperly used for the adverb; it ought to be “more easily.” Swift commits a similar error, when he says, “Ned explained his text so full and clear,” for “so fully and clearly.”

“Thus much, I think, is sufficient to serve, by way of address, to my patrons, the true modern critics, and may very well atone for my past silence as well as for that, which I am like to observe for the future.”—Swift. Like, or similar, is here improperly used for likely, a word in signification nearly synonymous with probable. We say, “he is likely to do it,” or “it is probable he will do it.”

“Charity vaunteth not itself, doth not behave itself unseemly.” Here the adjective unseemly is improperly used for the adverb, denoting “in an unseemly manner.” Unseemlily not being in use, the word indecently should be substituted.

“The Romans had no other subsistence but the scanty pillage of a few farms.” Other is redundant; it should be, “no subsistence but,” or “no other subsistence than.” In the Saxon language, and the earlier English writers, the word other is not uniformly followed by than, but sometimes with but, before, save, except[142], thus, Mark xii. 32, “thær an God is, and nis other butan him,” thus rendered in the Bishops’ Translation, “there is one God, and there is none but he,” and in the common version, “none other but he.” In the Book of Common Prayer we have, “Thou shalt have no other Gods but me;” and the same form of expression occurs in Addison, Swift, and other contemporary writers. Usage, however, seems of late to have decided almost universally in favour of than. This decision is not only consistent with analogy, if the word other is to be deemed a comparative, but may also, in some cases, be subservient to perspicuity. No other but, no other beside, no other except, are equivalent expressions, and do not perhaps convey precisely the same idea with none but, no other than. Thus, if we take an example similar to Baker’s, and suppose a person to say “A called on me this morning,” B asks, “No one else?” “No other,” answers A, “but my stationer.” Here the expression, as Baker remarks, seems strictly proper, the words no other having a reference to A. But if the stationer had been the only visitor, he should say, “none but,” or “no other than the stationer called on me this morning.” This is the opinion of Baker. The distinction, which he wishes to establish, is sufficiently evident; but that it is warranted by strict analysis, I do not mean to affirm.

“He has eaten no bread, nor drunk no water, these two days.” No is here improperly used for any, two negatives making an affirmative: it should be, “nor drunk any water.”

“The servant must have an undeniable character.” Undeniable is equivalent to incontrovertible, or “not admitting dispute.” An “undeniable character,” therefore, means, a character which cannot be denied or disputed, whether good or bad: it should be “unexceptionable.”

“But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an object inadequate to your strength.”—Watson’s History of Philip III. Inadequate means “falling short of due proportion,” and is here improperly used in a sense nearly the reverse. It should be “to which your strength is inadequate,” or “superior to your strength.”

“I received a letter to-day from our mutual friend.” I concur with Baker in considering this expression to be incorrect. A may be a friend to B, and also to C, and is therefore a friend common to both; but not their mutual friend: for this implies reciprocity between two individuals, or two parties. The individuals may be mutually friends; but one cannot be the mutual friend of the other. Locke more properly says, “I esteem the memory of our common friend.” This is, doubtless, the correct expression; but, as the term common may denote “ordinary,” or “not uncommon,” the word mutual, though not proper, may, perhaps, as Baker observes, be tolerated.

The superlatives lowest and lowermost, highest and uppermost, appear to me to be frequently confounded. Thus we say, “the lowest house in the street,” when we mean the lowest in respect to measurement, from the basement to the top, and also the lowest in regard to position, the inferiority being occasioned by declivity. Now it appears to me, that when we refer to dimension, we should say, lowest or highest; and when we refer to site or situation, we ought to say, lowermost or uppermost.

“It was due, perhaps, more to the ignorance of the scholars, than to the knowledge of the masters.”—Swift. It should be rather, “it was owing,” or “it is ascribable.” The author had previously been speaking of the first instructors of mankind, and questioning their claim to the title of sages. To say, then, that their right to this title, or that the appellation itself, “was due more to ignorance than to knowledge,” is manifestly improper. Swift, however, was not singular in using the adjective in this sense. Steele, and some other contemporary writers, employed it in the same acceptation. “The calamities of children are due to the negligence of the parents.”—Spectator, No. 431. It is now seldom or never employed as equivalent to “owing to,” or “occasioned by.”

“Risible,” “ludicrous,” and “ridiculous,” are frequently confounded. Risible denotes merely the capacity of laughing, and is applied to animals having the faculty of laughter, as, “man is a risible creature.” Ludicrous is applicable to things exciting laughter simply; ridiculous to things exciting laughter with contempt. The tricks of a monkey are ludicrous, the whimsies of superstition are ridiculous. “The measure of the mid stream for salmon among our forefathers is not less risible.”—Kames’s Sketches. He should have said “ridiculous.”

We have already expressed our doubt of the propriety of using the numeral adjective one, as referring to a plurality of individuals, denoted by a plural noun. (See [p. 48].) There is something which is not only strange to the ear, but also strikes us as ungrammatical, in saying[143], “The Greeks and the Trojans continued the contest; the one were favoured by Juno, the other by Venus.” At the same time, it must be acknowledged, that there seems to be an inconsistency in questioning this phraseology, and yet retaining some others, which appear to be analogous to it, and can plead in their defence reputable usage. We say, “The Romans and the Carthaginians contended with each other;” and “The English, the Dutch, and the Spaniards disputed, one with another, the sovereignty of the sea.” Here each and one clearly refer to a plurality, expressed by a noun plural. A similar example occurs in the following sentence: “As the greatest part of mankind are more affected by things, which strike the senses, than by excellences, that are discovered by reason and thought, they form very erroneous judgments, when they compare one with the other.”—Guardian. If we inquire, what one? we find the answer to be “things.” Here is a manifest incongruity, which might have been prevented, by saying, “one subject with the other,” or “when they compare them together.” As this construction of one, referring to a noun plural, seems irreconcilable with the notion of unity, and may be avoided, it becomes a question, whether this phraseology ought to be imitated. The subject, as far as I know, has not been considered by any of our grammarians.

“That this was the cause of the disaster, was apparent to all.” Apparent is sometimes used in this sense. The word, however, is equivocal, as it denotes seeming, opposed to real; and obvious, opposed to doubtful or obscure. “I consider the difference between him and the two authors above mentioned, as more apparent than real.”—Campbell. Here apparent is opposed to real; and to this sense it would be right to confine it, as thus all ambiguity would be effectually prevented. “But there soon appeared very apparent reasons for James’s partiality.”—Goldsmith. Obvious, or evident, would unquestionably be preferable.

“How seldom, then, does it happen, that the mind does not find itself in similar circumstances? Very rare indeed.”—Trusler’s Preface to Synon. The adjective rare is here improperly used for the adverb. As the question, indeed, is adverbially proposed, it is somewhat surprising that the author should answer adjectively: it ought to be, “very rarely.”

“No man had ever less friends, and more enemies.” Less refers to quantity, fewer to number; it should be, “fewer friends.”

“The mind may insensibly fall off from this relish of virtuous actions, and by degrees exchange that pleasure, which it takes in the performance of its duty, for delights of a much more inferior and unprofitable nature.”—Addison. Inferior implies comparison, but it is grammatically a positive. When one thing is, in any respect, lower than another, we say, “it is inferior to it;” and if a third thing were still lower, we should say, “it is still more inferior.” But the author is comparing only two subjects; he should therefore have said, “of a much inferior, and more unprofitable nature.” The expression “more preferable” is for the same reason faulty, unless when two degrees of excess are implied.

The adjectives agreeable, suitable, conformable, independent, consistent, relative, previous, antecedent, and many others, are often used, where their several derivative adverbs would be more properly employed; as, “he lives agreeable to nature,” “he wrote to me previous to his coming to town,” “tolerable good,” “he acted conformable to his promise.” It is worthy of remark, however, that the idiom of our language is not repugnant to some of these phraseologies; a circumstance which many of our grammarians have overlooked, if we may judge from the severity with which they have condemned them. If I say, “he acted according to nature,” the expression is deemed unobjectionable: but is not according a participle, or, perhaps, here more properly a participial? “He acted contrary to nature” is also considered as faultless; but is not contrary an adjective? Were we to reason on abstract principles, or to adopt what is deemed the preferable phraseology, we should say, “contrarily” and “accordingly to nature.” This, however, is not the case. “Contrary to nature,” “according to nature,” and many similar phraseologies, are admitted as good: why, then, is “conformable to nature,” an expression perfectly analogous, so severely condemned? Johnson has, indeed, uselessly enough, in my opinion, called according a preposition; fearful, however, of error, he adds, it is properly a participle, for it is followed by to. According is always a participle, as much as agreeing, and can be nothing else. Because secundum in Latin is termed a preposition, hence some have referred according to the same species of words. With equal propriety might in the power of be deemed a preposition, because penes in Latin is so denominated. Now, if “he acted contrary to nature” and “according to nature” be deemed unexceptionable expressions, with many others of the same kind, which might be adduced, it follows that, “he acted agreeable,” “conformable,” “suitable to nature,” may plead in their favour these analogous phraseologies. I offer these observations, in order to show that, misled by abstract reasonings, or by the servile imitation of another language, we sometimes hastily condemn, as altogether inadmissible, modes of expression, which are not repugnant to our vernacular idiom. I would not, however, be understood to mean, that the adverb is not, in these cases, much to be preferred, when it can be employed consistently with good usage. For, if we say, “he acts agreeable to the laws of reason,” the question is, who or what is agreeable? the answer, according to the strict construction of the sentence, is he; but it is not he, but his mode of acting, of which the accordance is predicated; agreeably is, therefore, the preferable term.

I observe also, that, wherever the adjective is employed to modify the meaning of another adjective, it becomes particularly exceptionable, and can scarcely, indeed, plead aught in its favour, as, “indifferent good,” “tolerable strong,” instead of “indifferently good,” and “tolerably strong.” The following phraseology is extremely inelegant, and is scarcely admissible on any principle of analogy: “Immediately consequent to the victory, Drogheda was invested.”—Belsham’s History. What was consequent? Grammatically “Drogheda.”

“No other person, besides my brother, visited me to-day.” Here the speaker means to say that no person, besides his brother, visited him to-day; but his expression implies two exceptions from none, the terms other and besides each implying one, and can, therefore, be correct on this supposition only, that some one besides his brother had visited him. It should be rather, “no person besides.”

“The old man had, some fifty years ago, been no mean performer on the vielle.”—Sterne. This phraseology appears to me very objectionable; and can be proper in no case, except when the date of the period is to be expressed as uncertain. The word some should be cancelled. We may say, “I was absent some days,” because the period is indefinite; but to say, “I was absent some five days,” either involves an incongruity, representing a period as at once definite and indefinite; or denotes “some five days or other,” a meaning which the expression is rarely intended to signify.

“Brutus and Aruns killed one another.” It should be, “each other:” “one another” is applied to more than two. “The one the other” would be correct, though inelegant.

“It argued the most extreme vanity.”—Hume. Extreme is derived from a Latin superlative, and denotes “the farthest,” or “greatest possible:” it cannot, therefore, be compared.

“Of all vices pride is the most universal.” Universal is here improperly used for general. The meaning of the latter admits intension and remission, and may, therefore, be compared. The former is an adjective, whose signification cannot be heightened or lessened; it therefore rejects all intensive and diminutive words, as, so, more, less, least, most. The expression should be, “Of all vices pride is the most general.”

“Tho’ learn’d, well-bred; and tho’ well-bred, sincere:

Modestly bold, and humanly severe.”—Pope.

Human and humane, as Dr. Campbell observes, are sometimes confounded. The former properly means “belonging to man;” the latter, “kind and compassionate:” humanly, therefore, is improperly, in the couplet now quoted, used for humanely.

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SECTION III.
THE PRONOUN.

BARBARISM.

Pronouns are so few in number, and so simple, that this species of error, in respect to them, can scarcely occur. To this class, however, may perhaps be reduced such as, his’n, her’n, our’n, your’n, their’n, for his own, her own, our own, &c., or for his one, her one, &c.

SOLECISM.

“Who calls?” “’T is me.” This is a violation of that rule, by which the verb to be has the same case after it that it has before it. It should be, “It is I.”

“You were the quarrel,” says Petulant in “The Way of the World.” Millamant answers, “Me!” For the reason just given it should be “I.”

“Spare thou them, O God, which confess their faults.” As the relative refers to persons, it should be who.

“Nor is mankind so much to blame, in his choice thus determining him.”—Swift. Mankind is a collective noun, and is uniformly considered as plural; his, therefore, is a gross solecism.

“By this institution, each legion, to whom a certain portion of auxiliaries was allotted, contained within itself every species of lighter troops, and of missile weapons.”—Gibbon. It ought to be, to which—the pronoun itself, which follows, referring to a noun of the neuter gender. To whom and itself cannot each agree with one common antecedent.

“The seeming importance given to every part of female dress, each of which is committed to the care of a different sylph.”—Essay on the Writings of Pope. This sentence is ungrammatical. Each implying “one of two,” or “every one singly of more than two,” requires the correlative to be considered as plural; yet the antecedent part, to which it refers, is singular. It should be “all parts of female dress.”

“To be sold, the stock of Mr. Smith, left off business.” This is an ungrammatical and very offensive vulgarism. The verb left off, as Baker observes, has no subject, to which it can grammatically belong. It should be, “who has left off,” or “leaving off business” “A. B. lieutenant, vice C. D. resigned.” Here is a similar error. Is C. D. resigned? or is it the office which has been resigned? An excessive love of brevity gives occasion to such solecisms.

“He was ignorant, the profane historian, of the testimony which he is compelled to give.”—Gibbon’s Decline of the Roman Empire.

“The youth and inexperience of the prince, he was only fifteen years of age, declined a perilous encounter.”—Ib.

In the former sentence the historian appears neither as the nominative, nor the regimen to any verb. If it be intended to agree with he by apposition, it should have immediately followed the pronoun. If it be designed emphatically, and ironically, to mark the character of the historian, it should have been thrown into the form of a parenthetic exclamation. In the latter sentence a phraseology occurs, which, notwithstanding its frequency in Gibbon, is extremely awkward and inelegant. The fault may be corrected either by throwing the age of the prince into a parenthesis, or, preferably, by the substitution of who for he.

“Fare thee well” is a phraseology which, though sanctioned by the authority of a celebrated poet, and also by other writers, involves a solecism. The verb is intransitive, and its imperative is fare thou. No one would say, “I fare me well,” “we fare us well.”

“That faction in England, who most powerfully opposed his arbitrary pretensions.”—Mrs. Macaulay. It ought rather to be, “that faction in England, which.” It is justly observed by Priestley, “that a term, which only implies the idea of persons, and expresses them by some circumstance or epithet, will hardly authorize the use of who.”

“He was certainly one of the most acute metaphysicians, one of the deepest philosophers, and one of the best critics, and most learned divines, which modern times have produced.”—Keith on the Life and Writings of Campbell.

“Moses was the mildest of all men, which were then on the face of the earth.”—Geddes.

“Lord Sidney was one of the wisest and most active governors, whom Ireland had enjoyed for several years.”—Hume.

In the two first of these passages, which is improperly applied to persons; in the last, the author has avoided this impropriety, and used whom. The pronoun that, however, is much preferable to who, or which, after a superlative.

“Such of the Morescoes might remain, who demeaned themselves as Christians.”—Watson’s Life of Philip III. Such is here improperly followed by who instead of as. The correlative terms are those who, and such as.

“It is hard to be conceived, that a set of men could ever be chosen by their contemporaries, to have divine honours paid to them, while numerous persons were alive, who knew their imperfections, and who themselves, or their immediate ancestors, might have as fair a pretence, and come in competition with them.”—Prideaux’s Connexion. The identity of subject, in the relative clauses of this sentence, requires the repetition of the same pronoun. It should be, “who themselves, or whose immediate ancestors.”

“If you were here, you would find three or four in the parlour, after dinner, whom you would say past their afternoons very agreeably.”—Swift. The pronoun whom should not be under the government of the verb would say, having no connection with it; but should be a nominative to the verb passed; thus, “who, you would say, passed their afternoons.”

“By these means, that religious princess became acquainted with Athenias, whom she found was the most accomplished woman of her age.” Whom, for the reason already assigned, should be who, being the nominative to the verb was. If it were intended to be a regimen to the verb found, the sentence should proceed thus, “whom she found to be.”

“Solomon was the wisest man, him only excepted, who was much greater and wiser than Solomon.” In English the absolute case is the nominative; it should, therefore, be, “he only excepted.”

“Who, instead of being useful members of society, they are pests to mankind.” Here the verb are has two nominatives, who and they, each representing the same subjects of discourse. One of them is redundant; and by the use of both, the expression becomes solecistical, there being no verb to which the relative who can be a nominative.

“My banks, they are furnish’d with bees,”

is faulty for the same reason, though here, perhaps, the poetic licence may be pleaded in excuse.

“It is against the laws of the realm, which, as they are preserved and maintained by your majesty’s authority, so we assure ourselves, you will not suffer them to be violated.” Which is neither a regimen nor a nominative to any verb; the sentence, therefore, is ungrammatical—Them is redundant.

“Whom do men say that I am?” The relative is here in the objective case, though there be no word in the sentence by which it can be governed. In such inverted sentences, it is a good rule for those who are not well acquainted with the language to arrange the words in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verbs, thus, “men say, that I am who,” a sentence precisely analogous to “men say, that I am he,” the verb requiring the same case after it, as before it. Hence it is obvious, that it should be, “Who do men say that I am?”

“Who do you speak to?” It ought to be whom, the relative being under the government of the preposition, thus, “To whom do you speak?”

“Who she knew to be dead.”—Henry’s Hist. of Britain. Here also the relative should be in the objective case, under the government of the verb, thus, “whom she knew,” or “she knew whom to be dead.”

“Than whom, Satan except, none higher sat.”—Milton.

“The king of dykes, than whom no sluice of mud,

With deeper sable blots the silver flood.”—Pope.

This phraseology I have already examined. In answer to Mr. Baker’s reason for condemning the phrase “than whom,” Story’s observations betray, as I conceive, extreme ignorance, and require correction. “The English,” says he, “is strictly good; for the relative whom is not in the same case with sluice, (which is the nominative to the verb blots,) but referring to its antecedent, the king of dykes, is very properly in the objective case, even though the personal pronoun he, if substituted in its place, would be in the nominative.”

If Mr. Story conceives that the relative must agree with its antecedent in case, he labours under an egregious mistake. Every page of English evinces the contrary. Yet, such must be his opinion, or his argument means nothing; for the only reason, which he offers for whom, is, that its antecedent is in the objective case. Besides, if than whom be admissible, nay proper, he will have difficulty in assigning a good reason, why it should not be also than him. But Mr. Story should have known, that, when two nouns are coupled by a conjunction, the latter term is not governed by the conjunction, but is either the nominative to the verb, or is governed by it, or by the preposition understood. The sentence proceeds thus, “no sluice of mud blots with deeper sable, than he or who blots.”

“It is no wonder if such a man did not shine at the court of Queen Elizabeth, who was but another name for prudence and economy.”—Hume. The word Elizabeth, as represented in the latter clause, is here a mere word, nuda vox, and not the sign of a person; for it is said to be another name for prudence and economy. Not the person, but the word, is said to be significant of this quality. The pronoun, therefore, should be which, not who. The sentence, however, even thus corrected, would be inelegant. Better thus, “Queen Elizabeth, whose name was but another word for prudence and economy.”

“Be not diverted from thy duty by any idle reflections the silly world may make upon you.” Consistency requires either “your duty,” or “upon thee.” Thy and your, a singular and a plural pronoun, each addressed to the same individual, are incongruous.

A similar error occurs in the following passage: “I pray you, tarry all night, lodge here, that thy heart may be merry.”—Bible.

“It is more good to fall among crows than flatterers, for these only devour the dead, those the living.” The pronoun this always refers to the nearer object, that to the more remote. This distinction is here reversed. It should be, “those (crows) devour the dead; these (flatterers) the living.” I observe also, in passing, that those adjectives, whose mode of comparison is irregular, are not compared by more and most. It ought to be, “it is better.”

“It is surprising, that this people, so happy in invention, have never penetrated beyond the elements of geometry.” It should be has, this people being in the singular number. We may say, “people have,” the noun being collective, but not “this people have.”

“I and you love reading.” This is a Latinism, and not accordant with our mode of arrangement. Wolsey was right, when he said, “Ego, et rex meus;” but in English we reverse the order. It should be, “you and I.” We say also, “he and I,” “they and I.” You always precedes.

“Each of the sexes should keep within its proper bounds, and content themselves with the advantages of their particular districts.”—Addison. Here the pronoun does not agree with the word to which it refers, the word each being singular; whereas themselves and their are plural. It should be, itself and its.

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Some of our principal public schools have each a grammar of their own.”—Barrow on Education. It ought to be, “each a grammar of its own.” The expression is elliptical, for “schools have each (has) a grammar of its own.” Thus we say, “Simeon and Levi took each man his sword,” not their swords.—Gen. xxxiv. 25.

“Let each esteem other better than themselves.”—Bible. For the reason just given, it ought to be himself.

“So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.”—Bible. Here is a manifest solecism, the pronoun their referring to “his brother,” a singular subject.

“I wonder that such a valiant hero as you should trifle away your time in making war upon women.”—Essay on the Writings of Pope. Here the pronoun disagrees in person with the noun to which it refers, hero being of the third person, and your of the second. The connexion is, “I wonder that such a valiant hero should trifle away his time.”

“The venison, which I received yesterday, and was a present from a friend,” &c. Which is here in the objective case, and cannot properly be understood as the nominative to the verb was: better, therefore, “and which was a present.” The following sentence is still more faulty: “It was happy for them, that the storm, in which they were, and was so very severe, lasted but a short time.” This is ungrammatical, the verb “was” having no nominative. It should be, “which was.”

“There is not a sovereign state in Europe, but keeps a body of regular troops in their pay.” This expression, to say the least of it, is inelegant and awkward. Better, “its pay.” “Is any nation sensible of the lowness of their own manners?”—Kames. Nation is here improperly construed as both singular and plural. It should be rather “its own.”

“The treaty he concluded can only be considered as a temporary submission, and of which he took no care to secure the continuance of it.”—Dryden. The redundancy of the words of it, renders the sentence somewhat ungrammatical. It should run thus, “The treaty he concluded can only be considered as a temporary submission, of which he took no care to secure the continuance.”

An improper reference occurs in the following sentence: “Unless one be very cautious, he will be liable to be deceived.” One here answers to the indefinite word on in French, and cannot be represented by any pronoun. It must, therefore, be repeated, thus, “Unless one be very cautious, one will be liable to be deceived.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“Give me them books.” Here the substantive pronoun is used adjectively, instead of the demonstrative those or these. The substantive pronouns, which are, strictly speaking, the only pronouns, cannot be construed as adjectives agreeing with substantives. We cannot say, “it book,” “they books,” “them books:” but “this” or “that book,” “these” or “those books.” The former phraseology may be deemed solecistical.

“Great numbers were killed on either side.”—Watson’s Philip III. “The Nile flows down the country above five hundred miles from the tropic of Cancer, and marks on either side the extent of fertility by the measure of its inundation.”—Gibbon.

It has been already observed, that the Saxon word ægther signifies each, as Gen. vii. 2. “Clean animals thou shalt take by sevens of each kind,” ægthres gecyndes. The English word either is sometimes used in the same sense. But as this is the only word in our language, by which we can express “one of two,” “which of the two you please,” and as it is generally employed in that sense, perspicuity requires that it be strictly confined to this signification. For, if either be used equivocally, it must, in many cases, be utterly impossible for human ingenuity to ascertain, whether only “one of two,” or “both,” be intended. In such expressions, for example, as “take either side,” “the general ordered his troops to march on either bank,” how is the reader or hearer to divine, whether both sides, both banks, or only one, be signified? By employing each to express “both,” taken individually, and either to denote “one of the two,” all ambiguity is removed.

“The Bishop of Clogher intends to call on you this morning, as well as your humble servant, in my return from Chapel Izzard.”—Addison to Swift. After the writer has spoken of himself in the third person, there is an impropriety in employing the pronoun of the first. Much better “in his return.”

“The ends of a divine and human legislator are vastly different.”—Warburton. From this sentence it would seem, that there is only one subject of discourse, the ends belonging to one individual, a divine and human legislator. The author intended to express two different subjects, namely, “the objects of a divine,” and “the objects of a human legislator.” The demonstrative those is omitted. It should be, “the ends of a divine, and those of a human legislator, are vastly different.” This error consists in defect, or an improper ellipsis of the pronoun: in the following sentence the error is redundancy. “They both met on a trial of skill.” Both means “they two,” as ambo in Latin is equivalent to “ οἱ δύο” It should therefore be, “both met on a trial of skill.”

“These two men (A and B) are both equal in strength.” This, says Baker, is nonsense; for these words signify only, that A is equal in strength, and B equal in strength, without implying to whom; so that the word equal has nothing to which it refers. “A and B,” says he, “are equal in strength,” is sense; this means, that they are equal to each other. “A and B are both equal in strength to C,” is likewise sense. It signifies, that A is equal to C, and that B likewise is equal to C. Thus Mr. Baker. Now, it appears to me, that, when he admits the expression, “are both equal,” as significant of the equality of each, he admits a phraseology which does not strictly convey that idea. For if we say, “A and B are both equal,” it seems to me to imply, that the two individuals are possessed of two attributes or qualities, one of which is here expressed; and in this sense only, as I conceive, is this phraseology correct. Thus we may say, with strict propriety, “A and B are both equal in strength, and superior in judgment to their contemporaries.” Or it may denote, that “they two together, namely, A and B, are equal to C singly.” In the former case, both is necessarily followed by and, which is in Latin rendered by et. Thus, “A and B are the two things, (both) equal in strength, and (add) superior in judgment to their contemporaries.” In the latter case, it is equivalent to ambo, expressing two collectively, as, “they two together are equal to C, but not separately.” I am aware, that the word both in English, like ambo in Latin, is an ambiguous term, denoting either “the two collectively,” or “the two separately,” and that many examples of the latter usage may be adduced. But that surely cannot be deemed a correct or appropriate term, which, in its strict signification, conveys an idea different from that intended by the speaker; or which leaves the sentiment in obscurity, and the reader in doubt. The word each, substituted for both, renders the expression clear and precise, thus, “A and B are each equal to C, in strength.”[144]

An error the reverse of this occurs in the following sentence: “This proves, that the date of each letter must have been nearly coincident.” Coincident with what? Not surely with itself; nor can the date of each letter be coincident with each other. It should be, “that the dates of both letters must have been nearly coincident with each other.”

“It’s great cruelty to torture a poor dumb animal.” Better, ’Tis, in order to distinguish the contraction from the genitive singular of the pronoun it.

“Neither Lady Haversham, nor Miss Mildmay, will ever believe but what I have been entirely to blame.” The pronoun what, equivalent to that which, is here improperly used for that. This mode of expression still obtains among the lower orders of the people, and is not confined to them in the northern parts of the island. It should be, “that I have been.” The converse of this error occurs in the following passages:

“That all our doings may be ordered by thy governance, to do always that is righteous in thy sight.”—Book of Common Prayer.

“For, if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted, according to that a man hath.”—Bible.

The pronouns it and that were formerly used as including the relative. “This submission is it implieth them all.” “This is it men mean by distributive justice.”—Hobbes. “To consider advisedly of that is moved.”—Bacon. This usage is now obsolete. The clauses should therefore proceed thus, “to do always what,” or “that, which is righteous.” “According to what,” or “that, which a man hath.”

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SECTION IV.
THE VERB.

BARBARISM.

“Thus did the French ambassadors, with great show of their king’s affection, and many sugared words, seek to addulce all matters between the two kings.”—Bacon. The verb “to addulce” is obsolete.

“Do villany, do; since you profess to

Like workmen, I’ll example you with thievery.”

Shakspeare.

The verb “to example,” as equivalent to the phrase “to set an example,” is obsolete; and when used for “to exemplify,” may be deemed obsolescent. “The proof whereof,” says Spencer in his State of Ireland, “I saw sufficiently exampled;” better “exemplified.”

“I called at noon at Mrs. Masham’s, who desired me not to let the prophecy be published, for fear of angering the queen.”—Swift. The verb “to anger” is almost obsolete. In Scotland, and in the northern part of England, it is still colloquially used; but in written language, of respectable authority, it now rarely occurs. I have met with it once or twice in Swift or Pope; since their time it appears to have been gradually falling into disuse.

“Shall we once more go to fight against our brethren, or shall we surcease?”—Geddes’s Transl. The verb to “surcease” is obsolete.

“And they and he, upon this incorporation and institution, and onyng of themself into a realme, ordaynyd,” &c.—Fortescue. Here we have the participle of the verb “to one,” now obsolete, for “to unite.”

“For it is no power to may alien, and put away; but it is a power to may have, and kepe to himself. So it is no power to may syne, and to do ill, or to may be syke, or wex old, or that a man may hurt himself; for all thees powers comyne of impotencye.”—Ib. It has been already observed, that the verb may is derived from the Saxon mægan, posse.—See [p. 97]. From the passage before us it appears, that in the time of Fortescue (anno 1440) the infinitive “to may,” for “to be able,” was in use. It has now been long obsolete. In the following passage, it forms what is called a compound tense with the word shall, the sign of the infinitive being suppressed. “Wherthorough the parlements schall may do more good in a moneth.”—Ib. That is, “shall be able to do.”

“Wherefor al, that he dothe owith to be referryed to his kingdom.”—Ib. The verb to owe, as expressive of duty, is now obsolete. It has been supplanted by ought, formerly its preterite tense, and now used as a present. We should now say, “ought to be referred.”

“Both these articles were unquestionably true, and could easily have been proven.”—Henry’s History of Britain. “Admitting the charges against the delinquents to be fully proven.”—Belsham’s History. Proven is now obsolete, having given place to the regular participle. It is still, however, used in Scotland, and is therefore deemed a Scotticism.

“Methoughts I returned to the great hall, where I had been the morning before.” Methoughts is barbarous, and also violates analogy, the third person being thought, and not thoughts.

SOLECISM.

“You was busy, when I called.” Here a pronoun plural is joined with a verb in the singular number. It should be, “you were.”

“The keeping good company, even the best, is but a less shameful art of losing time. What we here call science and study are little better.” What is equivalent to that which. It should be is, and not are; thus, “that, which we call ... is little better.”

“Three times three is nine,” and “three times three are nine,” are modes of expression in common use; and it has become a question, which is the more correct. The Romans admitted both phraseologies. “Quinquies et vicies duceni quadrageni singuli fiunt sex millia et viginti quinque.”—Colum. Here the distributive numerals are the nominatives to the verb. “Ubi est septies millies sestertium.”—Cic. Here the adverbial numerals make the nominative, and the verb is singular. Plurality being evidently implied, the plural verb seems more consonant with our natural conception of numbers, as well as with the idiom of our language.

“This is one of those highwaymen, that was condemned last sessions.” According to the grammatical construction of this sentence, “one of those highwaymen” is the predicate; for the syntactical arrangement is, “This (highwayman), that was condemned last sessions, is one of those highwaymen.” But this is not the meaning which this sentence is in general intended to convey: for it is usually employed to denote, that several highwaymen were condemned, and that this is one of them. The sentence, therefore, thus understood, is ungrammatical; for the antecedent is, in this case, not one, but highwaymen. The relative, therefore, being plural, should be joined with a plural verb, thus, “This is one of those highwaymen, that were condemned last sessions.”

“I had went to Lisbon, before you knew that I had arrived in England.” This is an egregious solecism, the auxiliary verb had, which requires the perfect participle, being here joined with the preterite tense. It should be, “I had gone.”

“He would not fall the trees this season.” The verb “to fall” is intransitive, and cannot therefore be followed by an objective case, denoting a thing acted upon. It should be, “he would not fell.”

“Let him know, that I shall be over in spring, and that by all means he sells the horses.”—Swift. Here we have in the latter clause a thing expressed as done or doing, for a thing commanded. It should be, “that he should sell;” or elliptically, “that he sell.”

“It is very probable that neither of these are the meaning of the text.” Neither, means, “not the one, nor the other,” denoting the exclusion of each of two things. It should, therefore, be, “neither is the meaning of the text.”

“He was a man, whose vices were very great, and had the art to conceal them from the eyes of the public.” According to the grammatical construction of this sentence, vices understood is the nominative to the verb had; thus, “whose vices were very great, and whose vices had the art to conceal them.” It should be, “and who had the art to conceal them.”

“At the foot of this hill was soon built such a number of houses, that amounted to a considerable city.” Here the verb amounted has no nominative. To render the sentence grammatical, it should be, “that they amounted,” or “as amounted to a considerable city.”

“It requires more logic than you possess, to make a man to believe that prodigality is not a vice.” After the verb “to make,” the sign of the infinitive should be omitted. See [Rule xv. note 3].

“He dare not,” “he need not,” may be justly pronounced solecisms, for “he dares,” “he needs.”

“How do your pulse beat?” Pulse is a noun singular, and is here ungrammatically joined with a verb plural. It should be, “how does your pulse beat?”

“The river had overflown its banks.” Overflown is the participle of the verb to fly, compounded with over. It should be “overflowed,” the participle of “overflow.”

“They that sin rebuke before all.” The pronoun, which should be the regimen of the verb rebuke, is here put in the nominative case. It should, therefore, be them. The natural order is, “rebuke them, that sin.”

“There are principles innate in man, which ever have, and ever will incline him to this offence.” If the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence will be found to be ungrammatical; thus “which ever have incline, and ever will incline.” It should be, “which ever have inclined, and ever will incline.”

“Nor is it easy to conceive that in substituting the manners of Persia to those of Rome, he was actuated by vanity.”—Gibbon. “Substitute to,” is a Latinism. It should be, “substitute for.”

“I had rather live in forty Irelands, than under the frequent disquiets of hearing, that you are out of order.”—Swift’s Letters. “You had better return home without delay.” In both these examples would is far preferable, thus, “I would rather live,” “you would better return,” or “you would do better to return.”

“That he had much rather be no king at all, than have heretics for his subjects.”—Watson’s Philip III. Here is involved the same error. It should be, “he would.”

“The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls, one viscount, and twenty-nine barons, all the nobles of the Lancastrian party having been either killed in battles, or on scaffolds, or had fled into foreign parts.”—Henry’s History. This sentence is ungrammatical. The word nobles joined to the participle having must be regarded as put absolutely, and therefore to the verb had there is strictly no nominative. But, even were a nominative introduced, the structure of the sentence would be still highly objectionable, the two last clauses, “having been killed,” and “they had fled,” being utterly discordant one with the other. The primary idea to be expressed is the fewness of the nobility; this forms the subject of the principal clause. There are two reasons to be assigned for this fewness, their destruction and their flight; these form the subjects of the two subordinate clauses. Between these two, therefore, there should be the strictest congruity; and in this respect the sentence is faulty. It ought to proceed either thus, “The nobility of England consisted only of one duke, four earls, one viscount, and twenty-nine barons; for all the nobles of the Lancastrian party had either been killed in battles, or on scaffolds, or had fled into foreign parts;” or thus, “all the nobles having been killed, or having fled.” The latter is the preferable form.

“He neglected to profit of this occurrence.” This phraseology occurs frequently in Hume. “To profit of,” is a Gallicism; it ought to be, “to profit by this occurrence.”

“The people of England may congratulate to themselves, that the nature of our government and the clemency of our king, secure us.”—Dryden. “Congratulate to,” is a Latinism. The person congratulated should be in the objective case governed by the verb; the subject is preceded by the preposition on, as, “I congratulate you on your arrival.”

“You will arrive to London before the coach.”

“A priest newly arrived to the north-west parts of Ireland.”—Swift’s Sacr. Test.

In these examples the verb “to arrive,” is followed by to, instead of at, an error which should be carefully avoided. Good writers never construe it with the preposition significant of motion or progression concluded, but with those prepositions which denote propinquity or inclusion, namely, at or in. Hence also to join this verb with adverbs, expressive of motion to, or towards a place, is improper. We should say, “he arrived here, there, where,” not—“hither, thither, whither.”

“Elizabeth was not unconcerned; she remonstrated to James.”—Andrew’s Continuation of Henry’s History. This is incorrect. We remonstrate with and not to a person, and against a thing.

“I am the Lord that maketh all things, that stretcheth forth the heavens alone, that spreadeth the earth abroad by myself.” According to the structure of the second and third clauses of this sentence, the Lord is the antecedent to that, which is, therefore, properly joined with the third person of the verbs following, “maketh,” “spreadeth;” but the pronoun of the first person, myself, in the last clause, does not accord with this structure; for as we cannot say, “he spreadeth the earth by myself,” there being only one agent implied, and where he and myself are supposed to allude to one person, so we cannot say, “that (Lord) spreadeth the earth by myself,” but “by himself,” an identity of person being indispensably requisite. The sentence, therefore, should conclude thus, “that spreadeth abroad the earth by himself.” If myself be retained, the pronoun I must be considered as the antecedent, and the sentence will then run thus: “I am the Lord, that make all things, that stretch forth the heavens alone, that spread abroad the earth by myself.”

“Thou great First Cause, least understood,

Who all my sense confin’d

To know but this, that thou art good,

And that myself am blind.”—Pope.

The antecedent to the pronoun who is the pronoun of the second person singular. The relative, therefore, being of the same person, should be joined to the second person singular of the verb, namely, “confinedst.”

“The executive directory, to prove that they will not reject any means of reconciliation, declares,” &c.—Belsham’s Hist. The nominative is here joined to a verb singular, and at the same time represented by a pronoun plural. The error may be corrected either by the substitution of it for they, or declare instead of declares.

“These friendly admonitions of Swift, though they might sometimes produce good effects, in particular cases, when properly timed, yet could they do but little towards eradicating faults.”—Sheridan. The nominative admonitions is connected with no verb, the pronoun they being the nominative to the verb could. The sentence, therefore, is ungrammatical; nor can the figure hyperbaton be here pleaded in excuse, as the simplicity and shortness of the sentence render it unnecessary. They in the third clause should be suppressed.

“This dedication may serve for almost any book, that has, is, or shall be published.”—Bolingbroke. Has being merely a part of a compound tense, conveys no precise meaning without the rest of the tense. When joined, then, to the participle, here belonging to the three auxiliaries, the sentence proceeds thus, “This dedication may serve for almost any book, that has published.” It ought to be “has been, is, or shall be published.” The following sentence is chargeable with an error of the same kind.

“This part of knowledge has been always growing, and will do so, till the subject be exhausted.” Do what? The auxiliary cannot refer to been, for the substantive verb, or verb of existence, does not imply action, nor can we say, “do growing.” It ought to be, “has been growing, and will still be so.”

“All that can be now urged, is the reason of the thing, and this I shall do.”—Warburton. Here is a similar incongruity. He should have said, “and this shall be done.”

Some of the preceding errors, with those which follow under this head, may be denominated rather inaccuracies, than solecisms.

“’T was twenty years and more, that I have known him,” says Pope to Gay, speaking of Congreve’s death. It ought to be, “It is twenty years and more,” the period concluding with the present time, or the time then present. He might have said, “It is now twenty years,” where the adverb now, being obviously admissible, points to present time, and necessarily excludes the preterite tense. Pope says, “’T was twenty years.” When? not surely in some part of the past time, but at the time of writing.

“It were well for the insurgents, and fortunate for the king, if the blood, that was now shed, had been thought a sufficient expiation for the offence.”—Goldsmith. “It were,” which is equivalent to “it would be,” is evidently incongruous with the following tense, “had been thought.” It ought to be, as he was speaking of past time, “it would have been,” or, “it had been, well for the insurgents.”

“Was man like his Creator in wisdom and goodness, I should be for allowing this great model.”—Addison. This form of expression cannot be pronounced entirely repugnant to analogy, the preterite of the auxiliary “to have” being used in a similar sense. But the verb “to be” having a mood appropriate to the expression of conditionality, the author should have said, “Were man like his Creator.”

“If you please to employ your thoughts on that subject, you would easily conceive the miserable condition many of us are in.”—Steele. Here there is obviously an incongruity of tense. It should be either, “if you please to employ, you will conceive,” or “if it pleased you to employ, you would conceive.”

“James used to compare him to a cat, who always fell upon her legs.”—Adam’s Hist. of England. Here the latter clause, which is intended to predicate an attribute of the species, expresses simply a particular fact; in other words, what is intended to be signified as equally true of all, is here limited to one of the kind. It should be, “always falls upon her legs.”

“This is the last time I shall ever go to London.” This mode of expression, though very common, is certainly improper after the person is gone, and can be proper only before he sets out. The French speak correctly when they say, “la dernière fois que je vais,” i.e. the last time of my going. We ought to say, “this is the last time I shall be in London.”

“He accordingly draws out his forces, and offers battle to Hiero, who immediately accepted it.” Consistency requires, that the last verb be in the same tense with the preceding verbs. The actions are described as present; the language is graphical, and that which has been properly enough denominated the “historical tense” should not be employed. It ought to be, “who immediately accepts it.”

“I have lost this game, though I thought I should have won it.” It ought to be, “though I thought I should win it.” This is an error of the same kind, as, “I expected to have seen you,” “I intended to have written.” The preterite time is expressed by the tenses “expected,” “intended;” and, how far back soever that expectation or intention may be referred, the seeing or writing must be considered as contemporary, or as soon to follow; but cannot, without absurdity, be considered as anterior. It should be, “I expected to see,” “I intended to write.” Priestley, in defending the other phraseology, appears to me to have greatly erred, the expression implying a manifest impossibility. The action, represented as the object of an expectation or intention, and therefore, in respect to these, necessarily future, cannot surely, without gross absurdity, be exhibited as past, or antecedent to these. In the following passage the error seems altogether indefensible. “The most uncultivated Asiatics discover that sensibility, which, from their situation on the globe, we should expect them to have felt.”—Robertson’s History of America. The author expresses himself, as if he referred to a past sensation, while the introductory verb shows that he alludes to a general fact. The incongruity is obvious. He should have said, “expect them to feel.”

“Fierce as he moved, his silver shafts resound.”—Pope.

Much better, “Fierce as he moves.” Congruity of tense is thus preserved; and there is, besides, a peculiar beauty in employing the present,—a beauty, of which the preterite is wholly incapable. The former imparts vivacity to the expression; it presents the action, with graphical effect, to the mind of the reader; and thus, by rendering him a spectator of the scene, impresses the imagination, and rouses the feelings with greater energy. Compared to the latter, it is like the pencil of the artist to the pen of the historian.

“Jesus answering said unto him, What wilt thou, that I should do unto thee?” The blind man said unto him: “Lord, that I might receive my sight.” It ought to be, “that I may receive my sight,” I will being understood; thus, “I will, that I may receive my sight,” where the present wish, and the attainment of it, are properly represented as contemporary.

“These things have I spoken unto you, that your joy might be full.” Better, “that your joy may be full.”

“If an atheist would peruse the volume of nature, he would confess, that there was a God.” Universal, or abstract truths, require the present tense; it should be, “that there is a God.”

“ ... impresses us with a feeling, as if refinement was nothing, as if faculties were nothing, as if virtue was nothing, as if all that was sweetest, and all that was highest in human nature was an idle show.”—Godwin’s Life of Chaucer. This sentence errs at once against elegance and accuracy. The former offence may be partly corrected, by substituting the conditional for the indicative tense, in the hypothetical clauses. But the author’s principal error consists in converting a general proposition into a particular fact, by representing that as past which is always present and immutable. The sentence should proceed thus: “Impresses us with a feeling, as if refinement were nothing, as if faculties were nothing, as if virtue were nothing, as if all that is sweetest, and all that is highest in human nature, were an idle show.”

A similar error occurs in this passage: “He proceeded to demonstrate, that death was not an evil;” and also in this, “I have frequently been assured by great ministers, that politics were nothing, but common sense.”

“Tom has wit enough to make him a pleasant companion, was it polished by good manners.” As the latter clause is intended to be purely hypothetical, the verb should not be in the indicative mood. “Were it polished,” is the proper expression.

“He understood the language of Balnibarbi, although it were different from that of this island.”—Swift’s Voyage to Laputa. From the phraseology here employed, the reader might naturally infer, that the language of the island, and that of Balnibarbi, were identical; for a concessive term, as I have already said, when joined to what is called the conjunctive form of the verb, implies pure hypothesis, as contrary to fact; or, in other words, implies a negation of the attribute expressed. The author’s intention was to signify, that the languages were not the same. He should, therefore, have said, “although it was different.”

“The circumstances were as follows.” Several grammarians and critics have approved this phraseology; I am inclined, however, to concur with those, who prefer “as follow.” To justify the former mode of expression, the verb must be considered as impersonal. This, I own, appears to me a very questionable solution of the difficulty; for I am convinced, that we have no impersonal verbs in English, but such as are uniformly preceded by it. We frequently, indeed, meet with sentences, where verbs occur without a nominative, and in the singular number. These are, by some, considered as impersonal verbs, to which the nominative it is understood. I apprehend, however, that, on strict inquiry, some one or other of the preceding words, which are now considered as conjunctions, adverbs, or particles, was originally the nominative; and that it is only since the primitive and real character of these words has been obliterated and lost, that we have found it necessary to inquire for another nominative. Thus, if the word as be equivalent to it, that, or which[145], then it is obvious, that, when we say, “the circumstances were as follows,” there is no real ellipsis of the nominative involved, nor, therefore, any ground for asserting the impersonality of the verb, in order to explain the syntax, or construction of the phrase; for the word as, equivalent to it, that, or which, is the true nominative. It is evident, then, that this solution of the difficulty must be rejected as false; and that the argument in favour of “as follows,” resting on the supposed impersonality of the verb, and the suppression of the pronoun, is entirely unfounded.

If as then be the nominative to the verb, and be synonymous with it, that, or which, it is of importance to determine, whether as be a singular, or a plural word; or whether it be either the one, or the other. That it is construed as singular, there can be no doubt. We say, “his insensibility is such, as excites our detestation.” That it is also joined to a verb plural is equally certain, thus, “his manners are such, as are universally pleasing.” In the former example, such as is equivalent to that which, and in the latter to those which. If as, then, be either singular or plural, and synonymous with it, that, or which, I conceive that, when it refers to a plural antecedent, it must, like which, be considered as plural, and joined to a plural verb. Now, it is surely more consonant with analogy to say, “the circumstances were, which follow,” than it follows, or that follows. Besides, when the demonstrative such precedes, and is joined to a plural noun, it is universally admitted, that as must then be followed by a plural verb. If so, the construction of the word as cannot, I apprehend, be in the least degree affected by the ellipsis of the correlative term. Let us now hear those who adopt the contrary opinion.

Baker prefers the verb singular, and remarks “that there are instances in our language of verbs in the third person without a nominative case, as, ‘he censures her, so far as regards.’” In answer to this it may be observed, that, if the word as is to be considered in no other light, than as a conjunctive particle, it is certainly true, that the verb regards has no nominative. But I am persuaded, no person who has examined the theory of Mr. Tooke can entertain a doubt respecting the original and real character of this word. Nay, if we investigate the true and primitive import of the correspondent Latin terms ut and uti, we shall find, that these, which are termed adverbs, are, in fact, the pronouns ὅτι, ὁτ’, and that quod (anciently written quodde) is nothing else than καὶ ὅττι, which, like our word that, is sometimes called a conjunction, and sometimes a pronoun. Why the original character and real import of the word as have been completely merged in the name of adverb, while the word that has been assigned the double character of pronoun and conjunction, it would be easy to show, if the discussion were essential to the question before us. But in answer to Baker’s remark, it is sufficient to observe, that as means properly it, that, or which.

Campbell adopts the opinion of Baker. “When a verb,” says he, “is used impersonally, it ought undoubtedly to be in the singular number, whether the neuter pronoun be expressed or understood.” But a question naturally arises, whence has the author learned that the verb is impersonal? There appears to me to be no more impersonality in the verb, when we say, “it is as follows,” than when we say, “it is such, as follows,” or, “they are such, as follow.” If as be admitted as the nominative in two of these examples, I can perceive no reason for rejecting it in the third. But here lies, as will presently appear, the author’s great error. Unacquainted with the true meaning of the word as, he conceived it as incapable of becoming a nominative to a verb, as ut or uti is deemed in Latin; and he therefore immediately recurs to ellipsis.

“For this reason” (that is, because the verb is impersonal), he proceeds to observe, “analogy as well as usage favour this mode of expression, The conditions of the agreement were as follows, and not as follow.”

How analogy favours this mode of expression, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. The general rule surely is, that to every verb there shall be a nominative, and that this nominative shall be expressed, unless its presence in some preceding clause shall render the repetition of it unnecessary. But how is it consonant with analogy, that no nominative shall appear; or that the supposed nominative shall not be found in any part of the sentence? This surely is repugnant to analogy.

“A few late writers,” he observes, “have inconsiderately adopted this last form (as follow) through a mistake of the construction.” But, if the verb be not impersonal, the error is his, not theirs. I must observe, likewise, that from the manner in which the author expresses himself, one would naturally infer, that a few writers, either contemporary, or immediately preceding his own time, had inconsiderately introduced a solecism into our language. When he offered this observation, he surely was not aware that Steele and Addison, nearly seventy years before the publication of “The Philosophy of Rhetoric,” used the plural form. “The most eminent of the kennel,” says Steele, “are blood-hounds, which lead the van, and are as follow.”—Tatler, No. 62. “The words were as follow.”—Ibid. No. 104. “The words are as follow.”—Addison, Spectator, No. 513.

“For the same reason,” continues he, still presuming the verb to be impersonal, “we ought to say, I shall consider his censures so far only, as concerns my friend’s conduct, not concern. It is manifest,” he observes, “that the word conditions in the first case, and censures in the second, cannot serve as nominatives.” This observation demonstrates that the author’s argument is founded in his ignorance of the real character of the word as. The most extraordinary part of his reasoning follows. “But,” says he, “if we give either sentence another turn, and instead of as, say such as, the verb is no longer impersonal. The pronoun such is the nominative, whose number is determined by its antecedent. Thus we must say, they were such as follow; such of his censures only as concern my friend.” This is truly an extraordinary assertion. The antecedent correlative term such can have no connexion whatever with the subsequent verb, but must agree with the principal subject of discourse. Not only does analogy require this, but the usage of every language with which I am acquainted. If we say, Perseverantia fuit tanta, quantus erat furor. Is est, quem dicimus. Talis est, qualem esse creditis. Illæ erant conditiones, quæ sequuntur,—the antecedent correlative terms tanta, is, talis, illæ,—have no connexion whatever with the verbs in the subsequent clause, erat, dicimus, creditis, sequuntur. The truth of this observation must be sufficiently obvious to every classical scholar.

But to illustrate the extreme inaccuracy of the learned author’s opinion, let us change the correlative terms, and say, “I will consider those censures only, which concern my friend.” In this sentence it will not be questioned that those and censures are in the objective case, under the government of the verb. And can it be doubted, if we say, “I will consider such censures,” that censures with its concordant adjective are in the same case? It is impossible, I conceive, to make this plainer; but we shall suppose, for the sake of illustration, if this should yet be deemed necessary, the example in question to be thus rendered in Latin, eas tantum reprehensiones perpendam, quæ ad amicum meum attinent. Now, what should we think of his classical attainments who should contend that eas or reprehensiones is the nominative to the verb? If we revert, then, to the original terms, and say, “I will consider such of his censures as concern my friend,” by what rule of grammar, by what principle of analysis, can we suppose such to be the nominative to the verb? For let me ask, what is he to consider? Is it not such censures? And are we, contrary to every principle of English grammar, to represent the object or subject after an active verb, as in the nominative case? The absurdity is too monstrous for a moment’s consideration. The very argument, therefore, by which the author defends his doctrine is founded in error, and involves an absurdity. Murray, as usual, adopts the opinion of Campbell.

If it should be inquired how as, an adverb or a conjunctive particle, can be the nominative to a verb, it may be answered, that to whatever order of words we reduce this term, it was evidently at first what we denominate a pronoun; and that it still so far retains its primitive character as to supply the place of a nominative. It is of little moment by what designation it be called, if its character and real import are well understood, any more than it can be of consequence whether we call that a conjunction or a pronoun, provided we know, that it is truly and essentially the same word in the same meaning wherever it occurs. I would observe, also, though my limits will not permit me to illustrate the principle, that those, who disapprove the verb singular in the examples in question, may notwithstanding admit it in such expressions as so far as, so long as, and all similar phraseologies.

“To illustrate, and often to correct him, I have meditated Tacitus, examined Suetonius, and consulted the following moderns.”—Gibbon. To meditate, when a regimen is assigned to it, as here, means to plot, to contrive, as, “he meditated designs against the state.” When it signifies to ponder, or to reflect seriously, it should be followed by the preposition on, as, “he meditates on the law of God day and night.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“They form a procession to proceed the palanquin of the ambassador.”—Anderson’s Embassy to China. Here the verb to proceed, or go forward, is improperly used for to precede, or to go before.

“He waved the subject of his greatness.”—Dryden. “To wave” is properly “to move loosely,” and should be distinguished from “to waive,” i.e. “to leave” or “to turn from.”—See Skinner’s Etym.

“It lays on the table; it laid on the table.” This error is very common, and should be carefully avoided. The verb to lay is an active verb; to lie is a neuter verb. When the subject of discourse is active, the former is to be used; when the subject is neither active nor passive, the latter ought to be employed. Thus, “he lays down the book,” “he laid down the book,” where the nominative expresses an agent, or a person acting. “The book lies there,” “the book lay there,” where the nominative expresses something, neither active, nor passive. When we hear such expressions as these, “he lays in bed,” “he laid in bed,” a question naturally occurs, what does he lay? what did he lay? This question demonstrates the impropriety of the expressions. The error has originated, partly in an affected delicacy, rejecting the verb “to lie,” as being synonymous with the verb “to tell a falsehood wilfully,” and partly from the identity of the one verb in the present with the other in the preterite sense; thus, “lay,” “laid,” “laid;” “lie,” “lay,” “lain.”

“The child was overlain.” The participle, for the reason now given, should be overlaid.

“It has been my brother you saw in the theatre, and not my cousin.” This use of the preterite definite is, I believe, confined to Scotland, where, in colloquial language, it is very common. The Scots employ it in those cases, in which an Englishman uses either the preterite indefinite, or the verb signifying necessity. Thus, in the preceding instance, an Englishman would say, “it must have been my brother, you saw in the theatre.”

“Without having attended to this, we will be at a loss in understanding several passages in the classics.”—Blair’s Lectures. “In the Latin language, there are no two words we would more readily take to be synonymous, than amare and diligere.”—Ib. This error occurs frequently in Blair. In the former example it should be shall, and in the latter should. (See [p. 98].)

An error, the reverse of this, occurs in the following passage. “There is not a girl in town, but let her have her will, in going to a mask, and she shall dress like a shepherdess.”—Spectator, No. 9. It should be, she will. The author intended to signify mere futurity; instead of which he has expressed a command.

“He rose the price of bread last week.” Here rose, the preterite of the neuter verb to rise, and, therefore, unsusceptible of a regimen, is ungrammatically joined with an objective case, instead of raised, the preterite of the active verb to raise. This error, therefore, involves a solecism, as well as an impropriety.

“Does the price of bread raise this week?” This error is the converse of the former, the active verb being here used instead of the neuter. The question, What does it raise? shows the impropriety of the expression. It ought to be, “Does the price of bread rise this week?” These verbs, like the verb to lay and to lie, are very often confounded in vulgar use.

“It would be injurious to the character of Prince Maurice, to suppose, that he would demean himself so far, as to be concerned in those anonymous pamphlets.”—Watson’s Philip III. Here the verb to demean, which signifies “to behave,” is used as equivalent to the verb to debase, or “to degrade.” This impropriety is now, I believe, almost entirely confined to Scotland; it has, therefore, been ranked in the number of Scotticisms. “I demean myself” is equivalent to “I behave myself;” and in this sense the author last quoted has, in another passage, very properly used it. “Such of the Morescoes might remain, who, for any considerable time, demeaned themselves as Christians.”—Ibid.

“Considerable arrears being now resting to the soldiers.”—Ibid. “Resting,” which is equivalent to “being quiet,” or “remaining,” is, in the sense in which it is here employed, a rank Scotticism: it should be, “due,” or “owing.”

“The reason will be accounted for hereafter.”—Warburton. Accounted for is here improperly used for assigned. “To account for a reason,” is “to account for an account.”

“But no evidence is admitted in the house of lords, this being a distinct jurisdiction, which differs it considerably from these instances.”—Blackstone. The verb to differ is a neuter verb, and cannot admit a regimen. The author has improperly used it in an active sense, for “to make to differ.” It should be, “by which it differs,” or “which makes it differ considerably from these instances.”[146]

“In order to have this project reduced to practice, there seems to want nothing more, than to put those in mind,” &c.—Swift. Here, “to want,” that is, “to need,” “to require,” is improperly used for “to be wanting,” “to be required,” “to be wanted.” It should be, “there seems to be nothing wanting.” The verb to want was frequently employed by Pope and Swift in the sense in which we here find it. Johnson, likewise, in one or two passages, has adopted the same usage, thus, “there had never wanted writers to talk occasionally of Arcadia and Strephon.”—Life of Phillips. But in this sense it may now be deemed obsolescent, if not entirely obsolete.

The reader will here permit me to observe, that there is an idiom in our language, respecting the use of active for passive verbs, which seems worthy of attention, and which I do not recollect to have seen remarked by any of our grammarians. In the languages of antiquity, the distinction between active and passive was strictly observed; but in English the active is frequently employed for the passive voice. Of this remarkable idiom numberless examples might be produced; but the few following will suffice. Thus we say, “the sentence reads ill,” “the wine drinks harsh,” “the grass cuts easily,” “the apples eat hard,” “the drum beats to arms,” “the metal works well.” In these examples, the subject clearly is acted upon; the verb, therefore, must be considered as having a passive signification. It is almost unnecessary to observe, that this phraseology should be avoided, whenever it is likely to create ambiguity.

“Lead me forth in thy truth, and learn me.”—Book of Common Prayer, Psal. xxv. The verb to learn formerly denoted, either “to teach,” or “to acquire knowledge.” In the former sense it is now obsolete. It should therefore be, “lead me forth in thy truth, and teach me.”

“Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings by thy most gracious favour.”—Book of Common Prayer. “He had prevented the hour, because we might have the whole day before us.”—Bacon. The verb to prevent, as signifying “to go before,” or “come before,” is now obsolete.

“There was no longer any doubt, that the king was determined to wreck his resentment on all concerned.”—Watson’s Philip II.

“They not only wrecked their vengeance on the living, but on the ashes of the dead heretics.”—Henry’s Britain.

Here the verb to wreck, or “to destroy, by dashing on rocks,” is improperly used for “to wreak,” or “to discharge.” In the last example the adverbs not only are improperly placed. It should be, “they wreaked their vengeance not only,” &c.

“We outrun our present income, not doubting to disburse ourselves out of the profits of some future plan.”—Addison. “To disburse,” or “to expend money,” is here improperly used for “to reimburse,” or “to repay.”

“And wrought a great miracle conform to that of the apostles.”—Bacon.

“The last is the most simple, and the most perfect, as being conform to the nature of knowledge.”—Hutton’s Investigation, vol. i. p. 643. Conform, here used for conformable, is, in this sense, deemed a Scotticism.

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SECTION V.
THE ADVERB.

BARBARISM.

“Friendship, a rare thing in princes, more rare between princes, that so holily was observed to the last, of those two excellent men.”—Sidney on Government. Holily is obsolete.

“Enquire, what be the stones, that do easiliest melt.”—Bacon. The adverb easily is not compared,—see [p. 70]. Easiliest is, therefore, a barbarism.

“Their wonder, that any man so near Jerusalem should be a stranger to what had passed there, their acknowledgment to one they met accidently, that they believed in this prophet,” &c.—Guardian. Steele has here used accidently, for accidentally. The former is a barbarism, and its derivation is repugnant to analogy.

“Uneath may she endure the flinty street,

To tread them with her tender feeling feet.”—Shakspeare.

Uneath is now obsolete, and may therefore be deemed a barbarism.

“In northern clime, a val’rous knight

Did whilom kill his bear in fight,

And wound a fiddler.”—Hudibras.

Whilom is now entirely disused. The adverbs whilere, erst, and perhaps also anon, may be ranked in the class of barbarisms.

“And this attention gives ease to the person, because the clothes appear unstudily graceful.”—Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories. The word unstudily is barbarous, and its mode of derivation contrary to analogy.

SOLECISM.

“Use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and thine often infirmities.” Often, an adverb, is here improperly used as an adjective, in accordance with the substantive “infirmities.” It ought to be “thy frequent infirmities.”

“We may cast in such seeds and principles, as we judge most likely to take soonest and deepest root.” Here, as in the preceding example, the adverb “soonest” is used as an adjective; for the connexion is, “soonest root,” and “deepest root.” Now, we cannot say “soon root,” the former term being incapable of qualifying the latter; nor can we, therefore, say, “soonest root.” It ought to be, “the earliest and the deepest root.”

“After these wars, of which they hope for a soon and prosperous issue.” Soon issue is another example of the same error.

“His lordship inveighed, with severity, against the conduct of the then ministry.” Here then, the adverb equivalent to at that time, is solecistically employed as an adjective, agreeing with ministry. This error seems to gain ground; it should therefore be vigilantly opposed, and carefully avoided. “The ministry of that time,” would be correct.

“He tells them, that the time should come, that the temple should be graced with the presence of the Messias.” Here that is incorrectly used for when, i.e. “at which time the temple should be graced.”

IMPROPRIETY.

“By letters, dated the third of May, we learn that the West India fleet arrived safely.” Here safely is improperly used for safe. The adverb is equivalent to “in a safe manner;” and when it is said, “that the fleet arrived safely,” it signifies that the manner of the arrival, rather than the fleet itself, was safe or free from accident. If I say, “he carried the parcel as safely as possible,” it implies merely his great attention to the manner of carrying it; but this does not infallibly exclude accident; for I may add, “but he unluckily fell,” or, “he was unfortunately thrown down, and the glass was broken.” But if I say, “he carried it as safe as possible,” or, “he carried it safe,” it implies that it came safe, or escaped all accidents. We should, therefore, say “that the West India fleet arrived safe.” In disapproving the expression, “he arrived safely,” I concur with Baker; but the judicious reader will perceive, that my reason for reprehending it, does not entirely coincide with his. The author’s words are these: “If a man says, that he arrived safely, or in a safe manner, he seems to suppose, that there is danger of some mischance in arriving. But what danger is there to be apprehended in the circumstance of arriving? The danger is only during the journey, or voyage; in the arrival there is none at all. The proper way of speaking is, therefore, ‘I arrived safe,’ that is, ‘having escaped all the dangers of the passage.’”

“The poor woman carried them to the person to whom they were directed; and when Lady Cathcart recovered her liberty, she received her diamonds safely.” It should be, “she received her diamonds safe.”

Errors like the one on which I have now animadverted, frequently arise from a desire to avoid the opposite mistake; I mean the improper use of the adjective for the adverb.—See [Syntax, Rule V. Note] 16. Hence many, when they employ such phraseologies as I have here exemplified, conceive that they express themselves with the strictest accuracy, thus verifying the poet’s observation,

“In vitium ducit culpæ fuga, si caret arte.”

In order to avoid this error, it should be remembered, that many English verbs, while they affirm some action, passion, or state of the subject, frequently serve as a copula, connecting the subject with another predicate. This is one of those idioms, in the grammar of our language, which demand the particular attention of the classical scholar. For, though an acquaintance with the learned languages will not seduce him into an improper use of an adjective for the adverb, it may, as in the example now before us, betray him into the converse error. And I am inclined to think, that from a propensity almost irresistible in the classical scholar to assimilate our language with the Latin tongue, our lexicographers have designated many of our words as adverbs, which are strictly adjectives. When it is said, for example, “it goes hard,” Johnson considers hard as an adverb. Yet when we say, “it goes contrary,” he considers contrary as an adjective. There appears to me to be more of caprice than of reason, more of prejudice than of truth, in this classification. Both words, I am persuaded, belong to one and the same species. Nay, I might venture to assert, that no person, who had studied the principles of the English language, and of that only, would pronounce the one to be an adverb, and the other an adjective. It is to be observed, likewise, that we have the regular adverb hardly to express the manner. When we say, “he reasoned concerning the rule,” “we argued respecting the fact,” “he lives according to nature,” is there not something extremely arbitrary and unphilosophical, in calling concerning a preposition, according a preposition, followed by to, but properly a participle, and respecting a participle? Are not all the three participles? Yet Johnson has classed them, as I have now mentioned. But the farther illustration of this subject would lead us into a field much too large for the limits of the present treatise. We must therefore revert to our primary observation, in which we cautioned the reader against the improper use of the adjective for the adverb. It should be remembered that, when it is intended to predicate something of the subject, beside the attribute of the verb, the adjective should be employed; but, when it is intended to express merely some modification of the attribute of the verb, we should then use the adverb. The difference may be illustrated by the following examples. When Gustavus says to his troops, “your limbs tread vigorous and your breasts beat high,” he predicates with the act of treading their physical strength; but had he said, “your limbs tread vigorously,” it would merely modify their treading, and express an act, not a constitutional habit. The same distinction may be made between saying with Arnoldus in the same play, “the tear rolls graceful down his visage,” and “the tear rolls gracefully.” The former predicates grace of the tear itself, the latter merely of its rolling. When we say, “he looks sly,” we mean he has the look or the appearance of being a sly man; when it is said, “he looks slyly,” we signify that he assumes a sly look. When we say, “it tastes good,” we affirm that the subject is of a good quality, whether the taste be pleasant or unpleasant; if we say, “it tastes well,” we affirm the taste of it to be pleasant.

“The manner of it is thus.” The adverb thus means “in this manner.” The expression, therefore, amounts to “the manner of it is in this manner.” It should be, “the manner of it is this,” or, “this is the manner of it.” “This much is certain.” Better, “thus much,” or “so much.”

“It is a long time since I have been devoted to your interest.” Since properly means “from the time when,” and not “during which time.” The expression might be construed into a meaning the reverse of that which is intended, implying, that the attachment had ceased for a long time. It should be, “it is a long time since I became devoted,” or, “it is a long time, that I have been devoted to your interest.”

“It is equally the same.” Equally is here redundant; it ought to be, “it is the same.”

“Whenever I call on him, he always inquires for you.” Whenever means “at what time soever,” “always when,” or “as often as;” always, therefore, is redundant.

“They will not listen to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely.” Never is here improperly used for ever. It ought to be, “charm he ever so wisely;” that is, “however wisely,” or “how wisely soever, he may charm.”

“And even in those characteristical portraits, on which he has lavished all the decorations of his style, he is seldom or ever misled.”—Stewart’s Life of Robertson. This error is the converse of the former. It ought to be, “seldom or never;” that is, “seldom, or at no time.” “Seldom or ever” is equivalent to “seldom or always,” or to “seldom or at any time;” expressions evidently improper.

“Whether thou be my son or not.”—Bible. “Whether you will keep his commandments, or no.” Both these phraseologies are in use; but I am inclined to agree with those grammarians, who prefer the former, as more consistent with the ellipsis—“Whether thou be, or be not.” “Whether you will keep his commandments, or will not keep.”

“Some years after being released from prison, by reason of his consummate knowledge of civil law, and military affairs, he was soon exalted to the supreme power.” The first clause of this sentence is ambiguous; for the sentence may imply, either that he gained the supremacy, some years after he was released from prison, that period being left indeterminate; or that some years after a time previously mentioned, he was released from prison, and attained the chief power. The latter being the author’s meaning, it ought to be, “some years afterwards being released from prison.” Another ambiguity is here involved by improper arrangement; for, as the sentence stands, it is somewhat doubtful, whether his consummate knowledge was the cause of his releasement, or the cause of his elevation. This error, however, belongs more to the rhetorician, than the grammarian. The French term this ambiguity, “construction louche,” or a squinting construction.

The following error consists in wrong collocation: “The Celtiberi in Spain borrowed that name from the Celtæ and Iberi, from whom they were jointly descended.” Jointly, with whom? It should be, “from whom (the Celtæ and Iberi) jointly they were descended.”

“And the Quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of Deists in the universe, the literati, or the disciples of Confucius in China.”—Hume’s Essays. The adverb nearly, which is synonymous with almost, is here improperly used for near[147]. It should be, approach near.

“This is the Leviathan, from whence the terrible wits of our age are said to borrow their weapons.”—Swift. From is here redundant; whence, denoting “from which place.”

“An ancient author prophecies from hence.”—Dryden. Here a similar impropriety is involved. It should be, hence.

“E’er we can offer our complaints,

Behold him present with his aid.”

E’er, a contraction for ever, which is synonymous with always, and also at any time, is here improperly used for ere or before.

In the two following passages, there appears to me to be a similar error: “Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken.”—Bible. “I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was.”—Ibid.

“And, as there is now never a woman in England, I hope, I may talk of women without offence.”—Steele.

“He spake never a word.”—Bible.

This usage of the word “never,” is now, I believe, entirely confined to the vulgar.

“As for conflagrations and great droughts, they do not merely dispeople and destroy.”—Bacon. Merely is here used, as it is uniformly by Bacon, and very frequently by Shakspeare, for entirely. In this sense, it is obsolete; and it now signifies purely, simply, only, nothing more than. From inattention to this, the passage, now quoted, has been corrupted in several editions. They have it, “do not merely dispeople, but destroy,” conveying a sentiment very different from what the author intended.

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SECTION VI.
THE PREPOSITION.

SOLECISM.

“Who do you speak to?” Here the preposition is joined with the nominative, instead of the objective case. It should be, “whom do you speak to?” or “to whom do you speak?” To who is a solecism.

“He talked to you and I, of this matter, some days ago.” It should be, “to you and me;” that is, “to you and to me.”

“Now Margaret’s curse is fallen upon our heads,

When she exclaim’d on Hastings you and I.”

Shakspeare.

It ought to be, “on Hastings you and me,” the pronouns being under the government of the preposition understood.

“Neither do I think, that anything could be more entertaining, than the story of it exactly told, with such observations, and in such a spirit, style, and manner, as you alone are capable of performing it.” This sentence is extremely faulty. “To perform a story” is not English; and the relative clause is ungrammatical, the preposition being omitted. It should be, “performing it in,” which would be grammatically correct, but inelegant, as well as improper. It would be better expressed thus, “in that spirit, style, and manner, in which you alone are capable of narrating it.”

“Notwithstanding of the numerous panegyrics on the ancient English liberty.”—Hume’s Essays. The error here in the use of the preposition after notwithstanding, is, I believe, peculiar to Scotland. Notwithstanding is a compound word of the same import as not preventing. The grammatical construction therefore is, “the numerous panegyrics notwithstanding,” that is, “not hindering,” the noun and the participle being in the absolute case. Of renders the expression solecistical.

IMPROPRIETY.

“If policy can prevail upon force.”—Addison. Here upon is improperly used for over. To prevail on, is “to persuade;” to prevail over, is “to overcome.”

“I have set down the names of several gentlemen, who have been robbed in Dublin streets, for these three years past.”—Swift. It should be, “within these three years past.” Swift’s expression implies, as Baker observes, that these gentlemen had been robbed during the whole three years.

“Ye blind guides, who strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.” In this sentence, the preposition at is very improperly used for out. It should be, “strain out a gnat;” that is, exclude it from the liquor by straining.

“Oliver Proudfute, a freeman and burgess, was slain upon the streets of the city.”—Scott. This form of expression is almost universal in Scotland. An Englishman says, “in the streets.”

“I have several times inquired of you without any satisfaction.”—Pope. We say, “inquire of,” when we ask a question; and “inquire for,” or “after,” when we desire to know the circumstances, in which any object is placed. He should have employed the latter expression.

“The greatest masters of critical learning differ among one another.”—Spectator. If the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence proceeds thus: “The greatest masters of critical learning differ, one differs among another.” Here the preposition among, which implies a number, or a plurality, is joined to a term significant of unity. It ought to be, “from one another;” that is “one from another,” or “differ among themselves.”

“I intended to wait of you this morning.” The preposition of is here improperly used for on. We say, to wait on, not to wait of.

“He knows nothing on it.” This is a vile vulgarism for “he knows nothing of it.”

“He is now much altered to the better.” To is here improperly used instead of for. “Altered to the better,” may, I believe, be deemed a Scotticism. It ought to be, “he is altered for the better.”

Ambiguity is sometimes produced by putting the preposition in an improper place. “A clergyman is, by the militia act, exempted from both serving and contributing.” This, though intended to express a different meaning, strictly implies, that he is not obliged both to serve and to contribute, but does not exclude his liability to do the one, or the other. If we say, “he is exempted both from serving and contributing,” we express an exemption from both.

“Such of my readers, as have a taste of fine writing.”—Addison’s Spect. “To have a taste of a thing,” is “to feel how it affects the sensitive or perceptive faculty;” “to have a taste for a thing,” is “to relish its agreeable qualities;” “to have a taste in a thing,” which is the expression used by Addison in the same paper, is “to have a discriminative judgment in examining the object.” The first expression is incorrect, as not conveying his meaning.

Swift, speaking of Marlborough’s dismission from the queen’s ministry, as a bad requital of his public services, says, “If a stranger should hear these furious outcries of ingratitude against our general, he would be apt to inquire,” &c. One would naturally conclude from the author’s expression, that Marlborough, and not the nation, was charged with ingratitude. He should have said, “ingratitude towards our general.”

“I received the sword in a present from my brother.” This is a very common colloquial Scotticism, and occurs occasionally in written language. The sword was not received in, but as a present.

In the use of prepositions, a distinction is properly made between their literal and figurative meaning. “Wit,” says Shakspeare, “depends on dilatory time.” Here the verb is employed figuratively, and the idea involved in the primitive meaning is dismissed.

“From gilded roofs depending lamps display.”—Dryden.

Here the verb is used in its literal acceptation, denoting “to hang,” and is followed, therefore, by from.

To the same purpose it has been remarked by Campbell, that the verb “to found,” used literally, is followed by on preferably to in, as, “the house was founded on a rock;” but, when employed metaphorically, is better followed by in, as, “dominion is founded in grace.”

“There is no need for your assistance.” It should be, “of your assistance.” We say, “occasion for,” and “need of.” Need for may likewise be pronounced a Scotticism, as, I believe, this phraseology is seldom or never used by English writers.

“For, what chiefly deters the sons of science and philosophy from reading the Bible, and profiting of that lecture, but the stumbling-block of absolute inspiration?”—Geddes. “To profit of” is a Gallicism; it should be, “profiting by.”

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SECTION VII.
THE CONJUNCTION.

SOLECISM.

“A system of theology, involving such absurdities, can be maintained, I think, by no rational man, much less by so learned a man as him.” Conjunctions having no government, the word as ought not to be joined with an objective case. It should be, “so learned a man as he,” the verb is being understood.

“Tell the cardinal, that I understand poetry better than him.”—Smollett. According to the grammatical construction of the latter clause, it means, “I understand poetry better than I understand him.” This, however, is not the sentiment which the writer intended to convey. The clause should proceed thus, “I understand poetry better than he;” that is, “than he understands it.” Those who contend for the use of than as a preposition, and justify the phraseology which is here censured, must at least admit, that to construe than as a preposition, creates ambiguity. Thus, when it is said, “you think him handsomer than me,” it would be impossible to determine whether the meaning is, “you think him handsomer than I think him,” or “you think him handsomer than you think me.”

“There is nothing more pleases mankind, as to have others to admire and praise their performances, though they are never so trivial.” Here there are two errors. The comparative more is followed by as, instead of than; and the adverb never is improperly used for ever. “How trivial so ever.” It should be, “There is nothing that pleases mankind more, than,” &c.

Conjunctions having no government, the scholar, desirous to avoid error, should carefully observe, whether the predicate be applicable to the two subjects, connected by the conjunction, or, to speak more generally, whether the two nouns be dependent on the same verb or preposition, expressed or understood. “The lover got a woman of greater fortune than her he had missed.”—Addison, Guardian. This sentence, if not acknowledged to be ungrammatical, is at least inelegant. The pronoun should have been introduced. If than be considered as having the power of a preposition, the charge of solecism is precluded; but if than be a conjunction, he should have said, “than she, whom he had missed.” For, as Lowth observes, there is no ellipsis of the verb got, so that the pronoun her cannot be under its government. The meaning is not, “The lover got a woman of greater fortune, than he got her, whom he missed,” for this would be a contradiction, but, “of greater fortune, than she was.” In like manner, in the following passage:

“Nor hope to be myself less miserable,

By what I seek, but others to make

Such as I.”—Milton.

Bentley says, that it should be me. We concur with Dr. Lowth in rejecting this correction, and approving the expression of Milton. There is no ellipsis of the verb make; others and I are not under the government of the same word. The meaning is not, “to make others such, as to make me,” but, “such as I am” the substantive verb being understood.

In the following passage, on the contrary, the ellipsis seems evident: “I found none so fit as him to be set in opposition to the father of the renowned city of Rome.” It has been contended, that the author should have said, “as he,” and not “as him:” but it appears to me, that the verb found is understood in the secondary clause, and that the expression is correct, the sense being, “I found none so fit, as I found him.”

In the following passage the two subjects belong to the same verb:

“The sun, upon the calmest sea,

Appears not half so bright as thee.”—Prior.

It ought to be, “as thou;” that is, “as thou appearest.”

“So as,” and “as, as,” though frequently, have not always the same import. “These things,” said Thales to Solon, who was lamenting the supposed death of his son, “which strike down so firm a man as you, have deterred me from marriage.” The expression clearly refers to Solon; but, if he had said “as firm a man as you,” it might have referred to a different person from Solon, but a man of equal fortitude.

“For ever in this humble cell,

Let thee and I, my fair one, dwell.”

The second line of the couplet is ungrammatical, the conjunction connecting an objective with a nominative case, or, to speak more correctly, the pronoun of the first person, which should be a regimen to the verb understood, being here in the nominative case. Thus, “let thee,” and, “let I, my fair one, dwell,” instead of “let thee, and let me.”

“Let us make a covenant, I and thou.”—Bible. The error here, though similar, does not come under precisely the same predicament with the former. The pronoun us is very properly in the objective case, after the verb let; I and thou should therefore be in the same case, according to Rule vii. of Syntax. The expression is in fact elliptical, and when completed proceeds thus, “Let us make a covenant: let me and thee make.”

“Though he were a son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered.” The first clause is intended to express a fact, not a hypothesis; the verb, therefore, should be in the indicative mood. Conjunctions have no government, either of cases or moods.

IMPROPRIETY.

“If in case he come, all will be well.” If and in case are synonymous, the one meaning “suppose,” and the other, “on the supposition.” One of them, therefore, is redundant.

“The reason of my desiring to see you was, because I wanted to talk with you.” Because means “by reason;” the expression, therefore, is chargeable with redundancy. It should be, “that I wanted to talk with you.”

“No sooner was the cry of the infant heard, but the old gentleman rushed into the room.”—Martinus Scrib. The comparative is here improperly followed by but, instead of than.

“Scarce had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, than it was attacked.” Than is employed after comparatives only, and the word other. It ought to be “scarce,” or, for reasons formerly given, “scarcely had the Spirit of Laws made its appearance, when it was attacked,” or “no sooner—than.”

“The resolution was not the less fixed, that the secret was as yet communicated to very few, either in the French or English court.” This passage from Hume I have not been able to find. Priestley observes, that it involves a Gallicism, the word that being used instead of as. If the meaning intended be, that some circumstances, previously mentioned, had not shaken the resolution, because the secret was as yet known to few, then Priestley’s observation was correct, and the word as should be substituted for that, to express the cause of the firmness. But, if the author intended to say, that the very partial discovery of the secret had not shaken the resolution, the clause is then perfectly correct. According to the former phraseology, the circumstance subjoined operated as a cause, preventing the resolution from being shaken: according to the latter, it had no effect, or produced no change of the previous determination. In other words, “the less fixed that,” implies that the subject of the following clause did not affect that of the preceding; “the less fixed as” denotes, that the latter circumstance contributed to the production of the former. As it is obvious, that, in such examples, the definite article may refer either to the antecedent or the subsequent clause, the distinction, here specified, should, for the sake of perspicuity, be carefully observed[148].

“His donation was the more acceptable, that it was given without solicitation.” That the word that is frequently used for because cannot be questioned; thus, “I am glad that you have returned safe,” that is, “because you have returned safe.”

“’T is not that I love you less

Than when before your feet I lay.”—Waller.

Here that is equivalent to because. English writers, however, after a comparative, employ as or because, to denote that the circumstance subjoined was the cause of the preceding one. The use of that in such examples is accounted a Scotticism; it should, therefore, be, “his donation was the more acceptable, as” or “because it was given without solicitation.”

“His arguments on this occasion had, it may be presumed, the greater weight, that he had never himself entered within the walls of a playhouse.”—Stewart’s Life of Robertson.

“A mortification, the more severe, that the joint authority of the archduke and the infanta governed the Austrian Netherlands.”—Thomson’s Continuation of Watson’s History.

These sentences are chargeable with the same error; and, it is not a little remarkable, though the impropriety has been pointed out again and again, that there is scarcely a Scotch writer, not even among those of the highest name, who is not chargeable with the frequent commission of this error.

“On the east and west sides, it (America) is washed by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.”—Robertson. This mode of expression is incorrect; and, though to the geographer intelligible, it strictly conveys a conception not intended by the author. The copulative joins the two sides, which ought to be separated; and combines the two seas, instead of the two facts, implying, that both sides are washed by the same two oceans. It should be rather, “On the east side it is washed by the Atlantic, and on the west (is washed) by the Pacific ocean.”

“Will it be believed, that the four Gospels are as old, or even older than tradition?”—Bolingbroke. Here there is a faulty omission of the particle corresponding to as; for the positive and comparative cannot be followed by the same conjunction. It ought to be, “as old as, or even older than tradition;” or, perhaps, better, “as old as tradition, or even older.”

“The books were to have been sold as this day.” This is a most offensive vulgarism. The conjunction as can have no regimen; nor can it be properly used as equivalent to on. It ought to be, “sold this day,” or “on this day.”

“It is supposed, that he must have arrived at Paris as yesterday.” This sentence is chargeable with the same error. Construed strictly, it is, “he must have arrived at Paris as, or in like manner as, he arrived yesterday.”

“The duke had not behaved with that loyalty, as he ought to have done.” Propriety of correspondence here requires with that to be followed by with which, instead of as. The sentence, even thus corrected, would be still inelegant and clumsy. “The duke had not behaved with becoming loyalty,” would be much better.

“In the order as they lie in his preface.” This involves a similar impropriety. It should be, “in order as,” or “in the order, in which they lie in his preface.”

“No; this is not always the case neither.”—Beattie.

“Men come not to the knowledge of ideas which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; nor then neither.”—Locke.

In old English two negatives denied; hence, perhaps, this phraseology originated. Johnson remarks, that the use of neither, after a negative, and at the end of a sentence, though not grammatical, renders the expression more emphatic. Analogy, however, is decidedly in favour of the affirmative term; I, therefore, prefer the word “either.” Were Johnson’s argument admitted, such expressions as these, “I forbade you not to go;” “I won’t suffer no such thing;” “He would not have none of my assistance,” might, I apprehend, be justified on the same principle. Those who employ them, doubtless, believe them to be more emphatic, than if they included a single negative.

“This I am the rather disposed to do, that it will serve to illustrate the principles above laid down.”—Campbell on Rhetoric. This sentence involves an error, on which I have already animadverted. “The rather” should be followed by as, not that.

“This is another use, that in my opinion contributes rather to make a man learned than wise: and is neither capable of pleasing the understanding, or imagination.” Lowth justly observes, that or is here improperly used for nor, the correlative words being neither, nor. In addition to this observation, I remark, that the word neither is erroneously placed. To render this collocation of the conjunction correct, there should be another attributive opposed to the word “capable,” as, “neither capable of pleasing the understanding, nor calculated to gratify the imagination.” But, as the author intended to exclude two subjects, these should have been contrasted by the exclusive conjunctions, thus, “is capable of pleasing neither the understanding, nor the imagination.”

A similar error occurs in the following sentence: “Adversity both taught you to think and reason.”—Steele. The conjunction, which is, in truth, the adjective both, is improperly placed. It should be, “taught you both,” i.e. the two things, “to think and reason.”

It has been already observed, that the conjunction or is used disjunctively, and subdisjunctively, sometimes denoting a diversity of things, and sometimes merely a difference of names. Hence often arises ambiguity, where the utmost precision of expression is necessary[149]. When Ruddiman delivers it as a rule, that “verbal adjectives, or such as signify an affection of the mind, require the genitive,” I have known the scholar at a loss to understand, whether there be two distinct classes of adjectives, here intended, or one class under two designations. The ambiguity might here be avoided, by using and or with instead of or. It may also be prevented in many cases, by more forcibly marking the distinction by the use of either. Thus, if we say, “whosoever shall cause, or occasion a disturbance,” it may be doubtful, whether the latter of the two verbs be not designed as explanatory of the former, they, though their meanings be distinct, being often used as synonymous terms. If we say, “shall either cause or occasion,” all doubt is removed. Sometimes ambiguity may be precluded either by the insertion, or the omission, of the article. Thus, if we say, “a peer, or lord of parliament,”[150] meaning to designate only one individual, or one order, the expression is correct. But if it be intended to signify two individuals, every peer not being a lord of parliament, and every lord of parliament not being a peer, we should say, “a peer, or a lord of parliament,” or “either a peer, or lord of parliament.”

Having now endeavoured to explain and illustrate the etymology and syntax of the English language, I cannot dismiss the subject without earnestly recommending to the classical student to cultivate a critical acquaintance with his native tongue. It is an egregious, but common error, to imagine, that a perfect knowledge of Greek and Latin precludes the necessity of studying the principles of English grammar. The structure of the ancient, and that of modern languages, are very dissimilar. Nay, the peculiar idioms of any language, how like soever in its general principles to any other, must be learned by study, and an attentive perusal of the best writers in that language. Nor can any imputation be more reproachful to the proficient in classical literature, than, with a critical knowledge of Greek and Latin, which are now dead languages, to be superficially acquainted with his native tongue, in which he must think, and speak, and write.

The superiority of Greek and Latin over the English language in respect of harmony, graceful dignity, conciseness, and fluency, will be readily admitted. Our language is, comparatively, harsh and abrupt. It possesses strength, indeed; but unaccompanied with softness, with elegance, or with majesty. It must be granted also, that the Greek is, perhaps, a more copious, and is certainly a more ductile[151] and tractable language. But though, in these respects, the English be inferior to the languages of Greece and Rome, yet in preciseness of expression, diversity of sound, facility of communication, and variety of phrase, it may claim the pre-eminence. It would be easy to evince the truth of this assertion, did the limits, which I have prescribed to myself permit. The fact is, that analogous languages almost necessarily possess a superiority in these respects over those, which are transpositive.

It is to be remembered, also, that our language is susceptible of high improvement; and though its abrupt and rugged nature cannot be entirely changed, much may be done to smooth its asperities and soften its harshness.

As a further inducement to the study of the English language, I would assure the young reader, that a due attention to accuracy of diction is highly conducive to correctness of thought. For, as it is generally true, that he, whose conceptions are clear, and who is master of his subject, delivers his sentiments with ease and perspicuity[152]; so it is equally certain, that, as language is not only the vehicle of thought, but also an instrument of invention, if we desire to attain a habit of conceiving clearly and thinking correctly, we must learn to speak and write with accuracy and precision.

It must, at the same time, be remembered, that to give our chief attention to mere phraseology, or to be more solicitous about the accuracy of the diction than the value of the sentiment, is a sure indication of a nerveless and vacant mind. As we estimate a man, not by his garb, but by his intellectual and moral worth, so it is the sentiment itself, not the dress in which it is exhibited, that determines its character, and our opinion of its author.

“True expression, like th’ unchanging sun,

Clears and improves whate’er it shines upon;

It gilds all objects, but it alters none.”—Pope.

In short, the precept of Quintilian should be studiously observed: “curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse solicitudinem.”—Inst. Orat. lib. viii.

THE END.

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G. Woodfall and Son, Printers, Angel Court, Skinner Street, London.