INTRODUCTION.
Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man; the latter is common to all animals. By inarticulate language, we mean those instinctive sounds, or cries, by which the several tribes of inferior creatures are enabled to express their sensations and desires. By articulate language is understood a system of expression, composed of simple sounds, differently modified by the organs of speech, and variously combined.
Man, like every other animal, has a natural language intelligible to all of his own species. This language, however, is extremely defective, being confined entirely to the general expression of joy, grief, fear, and the other passions or emotions of the mind; it is, therefore, wholly inadequate to the purposes of rational intercourse, and the infinitely-diversified ideas of an intelligent being. Hence arises the necessity of an artificial or articulate language; a necessity coeval with the existence of man in his rudest state, increasing also with the enlargement of his ideas, and the improvement of his mind. Man, therefore, was formed capable of speech. Nature has furnished him with the necessary organs, and with ingenuity to render them subservient to his purposes. And though at first his vocabulary was doubtless scanty, as his wants were simple, and his exigencies few, his language and his intellect would naturally keep pace. As the latter improved, the former would be enlarged.
Oral language, we have reason to suppose, continued long to be the only medium by which knowledge could be imparted, or social intercourse maintained. But, in the progress of science, various methods were devised for attaining a more permanent and more extensive vehicle of thought. Of these, the earliest were, as some think, picture-writing and hieroglyphics. Visible objects and external events were delineated by pictures, while immaterial things were emblematically expressed by figures representative of such physical objects as bore some conceived analogy or resemblance to the thing to be expressed. These figures or devices were termed hieroglyphics[1]. It is obvious, however, that this medium of communication must not only have embarrassed by its obscurity, but must have also been extremely deficient in variety of expression.
At length oral language, by an effort of ingenuity which must ever command admiration, was resolved into its simple or elementary sounds, and these were characterized by appropriate symbols[2]. Words, the signs of thought, came thus to be represented by letters, or characters arbitrarily formed, to signify the different sounds of which the words were severally composed. The simplest elementary part of written language is, therefore, a letter: and the elements or letters into which the words of any language may be analyzed, form the necessary alphabet of that language.
In the English alphabet are twenty-six letters.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z.
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z.
Of these there are six vowels, or letters which by themselves make every one a perfect sound. The remaining twenty are called consonants, or letters which cannot be sounded without a vowel.
This alphabet is both redundant and defective. It is redundant; for of the vowels, the letters i and y are in sound the same: one of them therefore is unnecessary. Of the consonants, the articulator c having sometimes the sound of k, and sometimes of s, one of these must be unnecessary. Q, having in all cases the sound of k, may likewise be deemed superfluous. W appears to me in every respect the same with the vowel u (oo), and is therefore supernumerary[3]. The double consonant x might be denoted by the combination of its component letters, gs or ks.
It is to be observed also, that g, when it has the soft sound, is a double consonant, and performs the same office as the letter j; each having a sound compounded of the sounds of d and the French j. Thus, g in general has the same sound as j in join. J, however, is not, as some have supposed, resolvable into two letters, for we have no character to express the simple sound of the French j, of which, with the consonant d, the sound of the English j is compounded. To resolve it into dg, as some have done, is therefore an error; as the soft g, without the aid of the other consonant, is precisely identical, in respect to sound, with the consonant j. The letter h is no consonant; it is merely the note of aspiration.
Our alphabet is likewise defective. There are nine simple vowel sounds, for which we have only six characters, two of which, as it has been already observed, perform the same office. The simple vowel sounds are heard in these words,
Hall, hat, hate, met, mete, fin, hop, hope, but, full.
Some of these characters occasionally perform the office of diphthongs. Thus, in the word fine, the vowel i has the diphthongal sound of the letters â è, as these are pronounced in French; and the vowel u frequently represents the diphthong eu (e-oo), as fume (fe-oom).
There are, besides, four different consonants for which we have no proper letters; namely, the initial consonant in the word thin, the initial consonant in then, the sibilating sound of sh, and the final consonant (marked ng), as in the word sing.
Consonants are generally divided into mutes and semi-vowels. The mutes are those which entirely, and at once, obstruct the sound of the vowel, and prevent its continuation. These are called perfect mutes. Those which do not suddenly obstruct it are called imperfect mutes.
Semi-vowels are those consonants which do not entirely obstruct the voice: but whose sounds may be continued at pleasure, thus partaking of the nature of vowels.
The nature of these consonants I proceed briefly to explain.
A vowel sound may be continued at pleasure, or it may be terminated, either by discontinuing the vocal effort, in which case it is not articulated by any consonant, as in pronouncing the vowel o; or by changing the conformation of the mouth, or relative position of the organs of speech, so that the vowel sound is lost by articulation, as in pronouncing the syllable or. It is to be observed, also, that a vowel may be articulated, not only by being terminated by a consonant, as in the example now given, but likewise by introducing the sound with that position of the organs, by which it had, in the former case, been terminated, as in pronouncing the syllable ro.
In pronouncing the consonants, there are five distinguishable positions of the organs[4]. The first is the application of the lips to each other, so as to close the mouth. Thus are formed the consonants p, b, and m.
In the second position, the under lip is applied to the fore teeth of the upper jaw; and in this manner we pronounce the consonants f and v.
The third position is, when the tongue is applied to the fore teeth; and thus we pronounce th.
In the fourth position we apply the fore part of the tongue to the fore part of the palate, and by this application we pronounce the letters t, d, s, z, r, l, n.
The fifth position is, when the middle part of the tongue is applied to the palate, and thus we pronounce k, the hard sound of g (as in ga), sh, j, and ng.
In the first position we have three letters, of which the most simple, and indeed the only articulator, being absolutely mute, is p. In the formation of this letter, nothing is required but the sudden closing of the mouth, and stopping the vowel sound; or the sound may be articulated by the sudden opening of the lips, in order to emit the compressed sound of the vowel.
Now, if instead of simply expressing the vowel sound by opening the lips, in saying for example pa, we shall begin to form a guttural sound, the position being still preserved; then, on opening the lips, we shall pronounce the syllable ba. The guttural sound is produced by a compression of the larynx, or windpipe; and is that kind of murmur, as Bishop Wilkins expresses it, which is heard in the throat, before the breath is emitted with the vocal sound. B, therefore, though justly considered as a mute, is not a perfect mute.
The mouth being kept in the same position, and the breath being emitted through the nostrils, the letter m is produced.
In the first position, therefore, we have a perfect mute p, having no audible sound; a labial and liquid consonant m, capable of a continued sound; and between these two extremes we have the letter b, somewhat audible, though different from any vocal sound.
Here, then, are three things to be distinguished. 1st, The perfect mute, having no sound of any kind: 2dly, The perfect consonant, having not only a proper, but continued sound: and 3dly, Between these extremes we find the letter b, having a proper sound, but so limited, that, in respect to the perfect consonant, it may be termed a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may be properly termed imperfect.
In the second position, we have the letters f and v, neither of which are perfect mutes. The letter f is formed by having the aspiration not altogether interrupted, but emitted forcibly between the fore teeth and under lip. This is the simple articulation in this position. If to this we join the guttural sound, we shall have the letter v, a letter standing in nearly the same relation to f, as b and m, in the first position, stand to p. The only difference between f and v is, that, in the former, the compression of the teeth and under lip is not so strong as in the latter; and that the former is produced by the breath only, and the latter by the voice and breath combined.
The consonant f, therefore, though not a mute like p, in having the breath absolutely confined, may notwithstanding be considered as such, consistently with that principle, by which a mute is understood to be an aspiration without guttural sound.
Agreeably to the distinction already made, v may be termed a perfect consonant, and f an imperfect one, having no proper sound, though audible. Thus we have four distinctions in our consonantal alphabet; namely, of perfect and imperfect consonants; perfect and imperfect mutes: thus,
p is a perfect mute, having no sound.
b an imperfect mute, having proper sound, but limited.
m a perfect consonant, having sound, and continued.
f an imperfect consonant, having no sound, but audible.
In the third position we have th as heard in the words then and thin, formed by placing the tip of the tongue between the teeth, and pressing it against the upper teeth. The only difference between these articulations is, that like f and v, the one is formed by the breath only, and the other by the breath and voice together[5].
Here also may be distinguished the perfect and the imperfect consonant; for the th in thin has no sound, but is audible, whereas the th in this, there, has a sound, and that continued[6].
In the fourth position there are several consonants formed.
1st, If the breath be stopped, by applying the fore part of the tongue forcibly to that part of the palate, which is contiguous to the fore teeth, we produce the perfect mute t, having neither aspiration nor guttural sound. By accompanying this operation of the tongue and palate with the guttural sound, we shall pronounce the letter d, which, like b, of the first position, may be considered as a mute, though not perfect. For in pronouncing ed, the tongue at first gently touches the gum, and is gradually pressed closer, till the sound is obstructed; whereas in pronouncing et, the tongue is at once pressed so close, that the sound is instantly intercepted.
2dly, If the tip of the tongue be turned up towards the upper gum, so as not to touch it, and thus the breath be cut by the sharp point of the tongue passing through the narrow chink left between that and the gum, we pronounce the sibilating sound of s. If we accompany this operation with a guttural sound, as in b, v, and th in then, we shall pronounce the letter z; the same difference subsisting between s and z as between f and v, p and b, tħ and th.
3dly, If we make the tip of the tongue vibrate rapidly between the upper and lower jaw, so as not to touch the latter, and the former but gently, we shall pronounce the letter r. The more closely and forcibly the tongue vibrates against the upper jaw, the stronger will the sound be rendered. It is formed about the same distance from the teeth as the letter d, or rather somewhat behind it.
4thly, If the end of the tongue be gently applied to the fore part of the palate, a little behind the seat of the letter d, and somewhat before the place of r, and the voice be suffered to glide gently over the sides of the tongue, we shall pronounce the letter l. Here the breadth of the tongue is contracted, and a space left for the breath to pass from the upper to the under part of the tongue, in forming this the most vocal of all the consonants.
5thly, If the aspirating passage, in the formation of the preceding consonant, be stopped, by extending the tongue to its natural breadth, so as to intercept the voice, and prevent its exit by the mouth, the breath emitted through the nose will give the letter n.
In the fifth position, namely, when we apply the middle or back part of the tongue to the palate, we have the consonants k, g, sh, j, and ng.
If the middle of the tongue be raised, so as to press closely against the roof of the mouth, and intercept the voice at once, we pronounce the letter k (ek). If the tongue be not so closely applied at first, and the sound be allowed to continue a little, we have the letter g (eg). Thus ek and eg bear the same analogy to each other, as et and ed of the fourth position. If the tongue be protruded towards the teeth, so as not to touch them, and be kept in a position somewhat flatter than in pronouncing the letter s, the voice and breath passing over it through a wider chink, we shall have the sound of esh.
If we apply the tongue to the palate as in pronouncing sh, but a little more forcibly, and accompanying it with the guttural sound, we shall have the sound of the French j. Thus j is in this position analogous to the letters b, v, th, in the first, second, and third positions, and is a simple consonant: j in English is a double consonant, compounded of d and the French j, as in join.
If we raise the middle of the tongue to the palate gently, so as to permit part of the voice to issue through the mouth, forcing the remainder back through the nose, keeping at the same time the tongue in the same position as in pronouncing eg, we shall have the articulating sound of ing, for which we have no simple character.
The only remaining letter h is the note of aspiration, formed in various positions, according to the vowel with which it is combined.
The characters of the several letters may be seen in the following table:
| Perfect Mutes. | Sounded, or Imperfect. | Imperfect Consonants. | Perfect. |
| P | B | ||
| M | |||
| F | V | ||
| tħ | th the | ||
| T | D | ||
| S | Z | ||
| R | |||
| L | |||
| N | |||
| K | G | ||
| Sh | J French | ||
| ng |
What effect the compression of the larynx has in articulation may be seen by comparing these pairs of consonants:
| With compression. | Without compression. |
| B | P |
| G | K |
| D | T |
| Z | S |
| Th | Tħ |
| V | F |
| J | Sh |
These, as Mr. Tooke observes, differ, each from its partner, by a certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of or near the larynx. This compression, he remarks, the Welsh never use. For instead of
I vow by God, that Jenkin is a wizard;
they say,
I fow by Cot, that Shenkin iss a wisart.
The consonants have been distributed into different classes, according to the organs chiefly employed in their formation.
| The Labial are | eb, ep, ef, ev. |
| Dental | ed, et, etħ, eth. |
| Palatal | eg, ek, el, er, ess, esh, ez, ej. |
| Nasal | em, en, ing. |
The association of two vowels, whether the sound of each be heard or not, is called a diphthong, and the concurrence of three is called a triphthong.
Of diphthongs there are twenty, viz. ai, au, ea, ee, ei, eo, eu, ie, oa, oo, ui, ay, ey, uy, oi, oy, ou, aw, ew, ow. Of the diphthongs seventeen have a sound purely monophthongal; hence they have been called improper diphthongs. It would be idle to dispute the propriety of a term almost universally adopted; but to call that a diphthong whose sound is monophthongal is an abuse of language, and creates confusion. The only proper diphthongs in our language are eu, oi, ou, in which each vowel is distinctly heard, forming together one syllable. The triphthongs are three, eau, ieu, iew. Of these, the first eau is sometimes pronounced eu, as in beauty; sometimes o, as in beau: the other two have the diphthongal sound of eu.
PART I.
ETYMOLOGY.
OF WORDS IN GENERAL, AND THE PARTS OF SPEECH.
A word, in oral language, is either a significant simple sound, or a significant combination of sounds. In written language, it may be defined to be a simple character, or combination of characters, expressive of significant sounds, simple or compound.
A word of one syllable is called a monosyllable; of two syllables, a dissyllable; a word of three syllables, a trisyllable; and a word of more than three syllables is called a polysyllable. The last term, however, is frequently applied to words exceeding two syllables.
Words are either derivative or primitive.
A primitive is that which is formed from no other word, being itself a root, whence others spring, as angel, spirit, school.
A derivative is that which is derived from some other word, as angelic, spiritual, scholar.
A compound is a word made up of two or more words, as archangel, spiritless, schoolman.
In examining the character of words as significant of ideas, we find them reducible into classes, or denominations, according to the offices which they severally perform. These classes are generally called parts of speech; and how many of these belong to language has long been a question among philosophers and grammarians. Some have reckoned two, some three, and others four; while the generality have affirmed, that there are not fewer than eight, nine, or ten[7]. This strange diversity of opinion has partly arisen from a propensity to judge of the character of words more from their form, which is a most fallacious criterion, than from their import or signification. One thing appears certain, how much soever the subject may have been obscured by scholastic refinements, that to assign names to objects of thought, and to express their properties and qualities, are the only indispensable requisites in language. If this be admitted, it follows, that the noun and the verb are the only parts of speech which are essentially necessary; the former being the name of the thing of which we speak, and the latter, verb, (or the word, by way of eminence,) expressing what we think of it[8]. All other sorts of words must be regarded as subsidiaries, convenient perhaps for the more easy communication of thought, but by no means indispensably requisite.
Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain. Language, therefore, must be composed of general signs, that it may be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals. Now, whatever mode be adopted to render general terms significant of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must be regarded as a substitute for the proper name. Thus man is a general term to denote the whole of a species; if I say, the man, this man, that man, it is obvious that the words the, this, and that, termed definitives, serve, with the general term, as a substitute for the proper name of the individual.
Hence it is evident, that those words which are termed definitives, how useful soever, cannot be regarded as indispensable.
The pronoun is clearly a substitute for the noun: it cannot therefore be deemed essential. The adjective expressing merely the property or quality in concreto, without affirmation, may be dispensed with; the connexion of a substance with a quality or property being expressible by the noun and the verb. Thus, “a good man” is equivalent to “a man of, with, or having, goodness.” Adverbs, which have been termed attributes of the second order, are nothing but abbreviations, as, here, for in this place, bravely, for brave like. These, therefore, cannot be considered as essentials in language. In the same manner it might be shown, that all parts of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substitutes or abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indispensably requisite. But, as there will be occasion to illustrate this theory, when the generally received parts of speech are severally examined, it is unnecessary to enlarge on the subject at present.
Though the essential parts of speech in every language are only two, the noun and the verb; yet, as there is in all languages a number of words not strictly reducible to either of these primary divisions, it has been usual with grammarians to arrange words into a variety of different classes. This distribution is partly arbitrary, there being no definite or universally-received principle, by which to determine what discriminative circumstances are sufficient to entitle any species of words to the distinction of a separate order. Hence grammarians are not agreed concerning the number of these subordinate classes. But, into whatever number of denominations they may be distributed, it should be always remembered, that the only necessary parts of speech are noun and verb; every other species of words being admitted solely for despatch or ornament. The parts of speech in English may be reckoned ten: Noun, Article, Pronoun, Adjective, Verb, Participle, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, Interjection.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NOUN.
SECTION I.
Noun (Nomen) is that part of speech which expresses the subject of discourse, or which is the name of the thing spoken of, as, table, house, river.
Of nouns there are two kinds, proper and appellative.
A proper noun, or name, is the name of an individual, as Alexander, London, Vesuvius.
An appellative, or common noun, expresses a genus, or class of things, and is common or applicable to every individual of that class.
Nouns or Substantives (for these terms are equivalent) have also been divided into natural, artificial, and abstract. Of the first class, man, horse, tree, are examples. The names of things of our own formation are termed artificial substantives, as, watch, house, ship. The names of qualities or properties, conceived as existing by themselves, or separated from the substances to which they belong, are called abstract nouns; while Adjectives, expressing these qualities as conjoined with their subjects, are called concretes. Hard, for example, is termed the concrete, hardness the abstract.
Nouns have also been considered as denoting genera, species, and individuals. Thus man is a generic term, an Englishman a special term, and George an individual. Appellative nouns being employed to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called Number, by which we signify, whether one or more individuals of any genus or species be intended.
In English there are two numbers, the singular and the plural. The singular, expressing only one of a class or genus, is the noun in its simple form, as, river; the plural, denoting more than one, is generally formed by adding the letter s to the singular, as, rivers[9]. To this rule, however, there are many exceptions.
Nouns ending in ch, sh, ss, or x, form their plural by adding the syllable es to the singular number, as, church, churches. Dr. Whately, (Archbishop of Dublin,) in violation of this universal rule, writes premiss in the singular number, and premises in the plural. (See his Logic, pp. 25, 26.) Premise, like promise, is the proper term, and makes premises in the plural. Premiss and premises are repugnant to all analogy.—Ch hard takes s for the plural termination, and not es, as patriarch, patriarchs; distich, distichs.
Nouns ending in f or fe, make their plural by changing f or fe into ves, as, calf, calves; knife, knives. Except hoof, roof, grief, dwarf, mischief, handkerchief, relief, muff, ruff, cuff, snuff, stuff, puff, cliff, skiff, with a few others, which in the formation of their plurals follow the general rule.
Nouns in o impure form their plural by adding es, as, hero, heroes; echo, echoes: those which end in o pure, by adding s, as, folio, folios.
Some nouns have their plural in en, thus following the Teutonic termination, as, ox, oxen; man, men.
Some are entirely anomalous, as, die, dice; penny, pence; goose, geese; sow, swine; and brother makes brethren[10], when denoting persons of the same society or profession. Die, a stamp for coining, makes dies in the plural.
Index makes in the plural indexes, when it expresses a table of contents, and indices, when it denotes the exponent of an algebraic quantity.
Some are used alike in both numbers, as, hose[11], deer, sheep, these being either singular or plural.
Nouns expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural have no singular, as, bowels, lungs, scissors, ashes, bellows.
Nouns ending in y impure form their plural by changing y into ies, as quality, qualities.
Nouns purely Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, &c., retain their original plurals.
| Sing. | Pl. | |
| Lat. | Arcanum | Arcana |
| Fr. | Beau | Beaux |
| Lat. | Erratum | Errata |
| Fr. | Monsieur | Messieurs, Messrs. |
| Heb. | Cherub | Cherubim |
| Heb. | Seraph | Seraphim |
| Lat. | Magus | Magi |
| Gr. | Phenomenon | Phenomena |
| Lat. | Stratum | Strata |
| Gr. | Automaton | Automata |
| Lat. | Vortex | Vortices |
| Lat. | Radius | Radii |
| Lat. | Genus | Genera |
| Gr. | Crisis | Crises |
| Gr. | Emphasis | Emphases |
| Gr. | Hypothesis | Hypotheses |
| Lat. | Genius | Genii, |
when denoting aërial spirits; but when signifying men of genius, or employed to express the plural of that combination of mental qualities which constitutes genius, it follows the general rule.
A proper name has a plural number when it becomes the name of more individuals than one, as, the two Scipios; the twelve Cæsars. It is to be observed, however, that it ceases then to be, strictly speaking, a proper name.
Some nouns have no plural. 1st. Those which denote things measured or weighed, unless when they express varieties, as, sugar, sugars; wheat, wheats; oil, oils; wine, wines. Here, not numbers of individuals, but different species or classes, are signified. In this sense the nouns are used plurally.
2d. Names of abstract, and also of moral qualities, as, hardness, softness, prudence, envy, benevolence, have no plural. It is to be observed, however, that several nouns of this class ending in y, when they do not express the quality or property in the abstract, but either its varieties or its manifestations, are used plurally. Thus we say, levities, affinities, gravities, &c. There may be different degrees and different exhibitions of the quality, but not a plurality.
Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using with Hume (vol. vii. p. 411) the plural insolences, the expression acts of insolence, would be preferable.
Some of those words which have no singular termination are names of sciences, as, mathematics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, pneumatics, &c.
Of these, the term ethics is, I believe, considered as either singular or plural.
Mathematics is generally construed as plural; sometimes, however, we find it as singular. “It is a great pity,” says Locke, (vol. iii. p. 427, 8vo. 1794,) “Aristotle had not understood mathematics, as well as Mr. Newton, and made use of it in natural philosophy.”
“But when mathematics,” says Mr. Harris, “instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place, no wonder if logic pass into contempt.”
Bacon improperly uses the word as singular and plural in the same sentence. “If a child,” says he, “be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin.” He likewise frequently gives to some names of sciences a singular termination; and Beattie, with a few others, have, in some instances, followed his example.
“Thus far we have argued for the sake of argument, and opposed metaphysic to metaphysic.”—Essay on Truth.
“See physic beg the Stagyrite’s defence,
See metaphysic call for aid on sense.”—Pope.
This usage, however, is not general.
Metaphysics is used both as a singular and plural noun.
“Metaphysics has been defined, by a writer deeply read in the ancient philosophy, ‘The science of the principles and causes of all things existing.’”—Encyc. Brit. Here the word is used as singular; as likewise in the following example:
“Metaphysics has been represented by painters and sculptors as a woman crowned and blindfolded, holding a sceptre in her hand, and having at her feet an hour-glass and a globe.”
“Metaphysics is that science, in which are understood the principles of other sciences.”—Hutton.
In the following examples it is construed as a plural noun.
“Metaphysics tend only to benight the understanding in a cloud of its own making.”—Knox.
“Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science.”—Hume.
The latter of these usages is the more common, and more agreeable to analogy. The same observation is applicable to the terms politics, optics, pneumatics, and other similar names of sciences.
“But in order to prove more fully that politics admit of general truths.”—Hume.
Here the term is used as plural.
Folk and folks are used indiscriminately; but the plural termination is here superfluous, the word folk implying plurality.
Means is used both as a singular and plural noun. Lowth recommends the latter usage only, and admits mean as the singular of means. But notwithstanding the authority of Hooker, Sidney, and Shakspeare, for the expressions this mean, that mean, &c., and the recommendation they receive from analogy, custom has so long decided in favour of means, repudiating the singular termination, that it may seem, perhaps, idle, as well as fastidious, to propose its dismission.
It is likewise observable, that the singular form of this noun is not to be found in our version of the Bible; a circumstance which clearly shows, that the translators preferred the plural termination.
That the noun means has been used as a substantive singular by some of our best writers, it would be easy to prove by numberless examples. Let a few suffice.
“By this means it became every man’s interest, as well as his duty, to prevent all crimes.”—Temple, vol. iii. p. 133.
“And by this means I should not doubt.”—Wilkins’s real Character.
“He by that means preserves his superiority.”—Addison.
“By this means alone the greatest obstacles will vanish.”—Pope.
“By this means there was nothing left to the parliament of Ireland.”—Blackstone, vol. i. p. 102.
“Faith is not only a means of obeying, but a principal act of obedience.”—Young.
“Every means was lawful for the public safety.”—Gibbon.
That this word is also used as plural, the most inattentive English reader must have frequently observed.
“He was careful to observe what means were employed by his adversaries to counteract his schemes.”
While we offer these examples to show that the term is used either as a singular or as a plural noun, we would at the same time remark, that though the expression “a mean” is at present generally confined to denote “a middle, or medium, between two extremes,” we are inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a more extended use of the noun singular. This usage was common in the days of Shakspeare.
“I’ll devise a mean to draw the Moor out of the way.”—Othello.
“Pamela’s noble heart would needs gratefully make known the valiant mean of her safety.”—Sidney.
“Their virtuous conversation was a mean to work the Heathen’s conversion unto Christ.”—Hooker.
Melmoth, Beattie, and several other writers, distinguished by their elegance and accuracy of diction, have adopted this usage. A means, indeed, is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported by analogy, is yet so repugnant to the general idiom of our language, and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause, that we should be pleased to see it dismissed from use. If we say, “This was one of the means which he employed to effect his purpose,” analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending a mean, or one mean, as preferable to a means. News, alms, riches, pains, have been used as either singular or plural; but we never say, “one of the news,” “one of the alms,” “one of the riches,” “one of the pains,” as we say “one of the means;” we may, therefore, be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general usage, in pronouncing “a means” a palpable anomaly.
News is likewise construed sometimes as a singular, and sometimes as a plural noun. The former usage, however, is far the more general.
“A general joy at this glad news appeared.”—Cowley.
“No news so bad as this at home.”—Shakspeare, Richard III.
“The amazing news of Charles at once was spread.”—Dryden.
“The king was employed in his usual exercise of besieging castles, when the news was brought of Henry’s arrival.”—Swift.
“The only news you can expect from me is news from heaven.”—Gay.
“This is all the news talked of.”—Pope.
Swift, Pope, Gay, with most other classic writers of that age, seem to have uniformly used it as singular.
A few examples occur of a plural usage.
“When Rhea heard these news.”—Raleigh, Hist. World.
“Are there any news of his intimate friend?”—Smollett.
“News were brought to the queen.”—Hume.
The same rule as that just now recommended in regard to the noun means might perhaps be useful here also, namely, to consider the word as singular when only one article of intelligence is communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported.
Pains is considered as either singular or plural, some of our best writers using it in either way. This word is evidently of French extraction, being the same with peine, pains or trouble, and was originally used in a singular form thus, “Which may it please your highness to take the payne for to write.”—Wolsey’s Letter to Henry VIII. It seems probable, that this word, after it assumed a plural form, was more frequently used as a singular than as a plural noun. Modern usage, however, seems to incline the other way. A celebrated grammarian indeed, has pronounced this noun to be in all cases plural; but this assertion might be proved erroneous by numberless examples[12].
“The pains they had taken was very great.”—Clarendon.
“Great pains has been taken.”—Pope.
“No pains is taken.”—Pope.
In addition to these authorities in favour of a singular usage, it may be observed, that the word much, a term of quantity, not of number, is frequently joined with it, as,
“I found much art and pains employed.”—Middleton.
“He will assemble materials with much pains.”—Bolingbroke on History.
The word much is never joined to a plural noun; much labours, much papers, would be insufferable[13].
Riches is generally now considered as a plural noun; though it was formerly used either as singular or plural. This substantive seems to have been nothing but the French word richesse; and therefore no more a plural than gentlenesse, distresse, and many others of the same kind. In this form we find it in Chaucer:
“But for ye spoken of swiche gentlenesse,
As is descended out of old richesse.
And he that ones to love doeth his homage,
Full often times dere bought is the richesse.”
Accordingly he gives it a plural termination, and uses it as a plural word.
“Thou hast dronke so much hony of swete temporal richesses, and delices, and honours of this world.”
It seems evident, then, that this word was originally construed as a substantive singular, and even admitted a plural form. The orthography varying, and the noun singular assuming a plural termination, it came in time to be considered by some as a noun plural.
In our translation of the Bible, it is construed sometimes as a singular, but generally as a plural noun.
“In one hour is so great riches come to nought.”—Bible.
“Riches take to themselves wings, and fly away.”—Ibid.
Modern usage, in like manner, inclines to the plural construction; there are a few authorities, however, on the other side, as,
“Was ever riches gotten by your golden mediocrities?”—Cowley.
“The envy and jealousy which great riches is always attended with.”—Moyle.
Alms was also originally a noun singular, being a contraction of the old Norman French almesse, the plural of which was almesses.
“This almesse shouldst thou do of thy proper things.”—Chaucer.
“These ben generally the almesses and workes of charity.”—Ibid.
Johnson says this word has no singular. It was, in truth, a first a noun singular, and afterwards, by contraction, receiving a plural form, it came to be considered by some as a noun plural. Johnson would have had equal, nay, perhaps, better authority for saying that this word has no plural. Our translators of the Bible seem to have considered it as singular. “To ask an alms,” “to give much alms,” and other similar phraseologies, occur in Scripture. Nay, Johnson himself has cited two authorities, in which the indefinite article is prefixed to it.
... “My arm’d knees,
Which bow’d but in my stirrup, bend like his
That hath received an alms.”—Shakspeare.
“The poor beggar hath a just demand of an alms from the rich man.”—Swift.
Lowth objected to the phraseology a means, for this reason, that means, being a plural noun, cannot admit the indefinite article, or name of unity. The objection would be conclusive, if the expressions this means, that means, did not oppose the learned author’s opinion, that means is a noun plural. To the substantive alms, as represented by Johnson to have no singular, the objection is applicable.
Thanks is considered to be a plural noun, though denoting only one expression of gratitude. It occurs in Scripture as a substantive singular. “What thank have ye?”
It has been observed, that many of those words which have no singular denote things consisting of two parts, and therefore have a plural termination. Hence the word pair is used with many of them, as, “a pair of bellows, a pair of scissors, a pair of colours, a pair of drawers.”
SECTION II.
Of Genders.
We not only observe a plurality of substances, or of things of the same sort, whence arises the distinction of number; but we distinguish also another character of some substances, which we call sex. Every substance is either male or female, or neither the one nor the other. In English, all male animals are considered as masculine; all female animals as feminine; and all things inanimate, or destitute of sex, are termed neuter, as belonging neither to the male nor the female sex. In this distribution we follow the order of nature; and our language is, in this respect, both simple and animated.
The difference of sex is, in some cases, expressed by different words, as,
| Masc. | Fem. |
| Boy | Girl |
| Buck | Doe |
| Bull | Cow |
| Bullock | Heifer |
| Boar | Sow |
| Drake | Duck |
| Friar | Nun |
| Gaffer | Gammer |
| Gander | Goose |
| Gelding } | Mare |
| Horse } | |
| Milter | Spawner |
| Nephew | Niece |
| Ram | Ewe |
| Sloven | Slut |
| Stag | Hind |
| Widower | Widow |
| Wizard | Witch |
Sometimes the female is distinguished by the termination ess or ix.
There are a few whose feminine ends in ix, viz.
| Masc. | Fem. |
| Administrator | Administratrix |
| Executor | Executrix |
| Testator | Testatrix |
| Director | Directrix |
Where there is but one word to express both sexes, we add another word to distinguish the sex; as, he-goat, she-goat; man-servant, maid-servant; cock-sparrow, hen-sparrow.
It has been already observed, that all things destitute of sex are in English considered as of the neuter gender; and, when we speak with logical accuracy, we follow this rule. Sometimes, however, by a figure in rhetoric, called personification, we assign sex to things inanimate. Thus, instead of “virtue is its own reward,” we sometimes say, “virtue is her own reward;” instead of “it (the sun) rises,” we say, “he rises;” instead of “it (death) advances with hasty steps,” we say, “he advances.”
This figurative mode of expression, by which we give life and sex to things inanimate, and embody abstract qualities, forms a singular and striking beauty in our language, rendering it in this respect superior to the languages of Greece and Rome, neither of which admitted this animated phraseology[14].
When we say,
“The sun his orient beams had shed,”
the expression possesses infinitely more vivacity than
“The sun its orient beams had shed.”
In assigning sex to things inanimate, it has been supposed that we have been guided by certain characters or qualities in the inanimate objects, as bearing some resemblance to the distinctive or characteristic qualities of male and female animals. Thus, it has been said, that those inanimate substances, or abstract qualities, which are characterized by the attributes of giving or imparting, or which convey an idea of great strength, firmness, or energy, are masculine; and that those, on the contrary, which are distinguished by the properties of receiving, containing, and producing, or which convey an idea of weakness or timidity, having more of a passive than active nature, are feminine. Hence it has been observed, that the sun, death, time, the names also of great rivers and mountains, are considered as masculine; and that the moon, a ship, the sea, virtue, in all its species, are considered as feminine. Of these and such speculations it may be truly said, as the learned author of them remarks himself, that they are at best but ingenious conjectures. They certainly will not bear to be rigorously examined; for there are not any two languages which harmonize in this respect, assigning the same sex to the same inanimate objects, nor any one language in which this theory is supported by fact[15]. Hence it is evident, that neither reason nor nature has any share in the regulation of this matter; and that, in assigning sex to inanimate things, the determination is purely fanciful. In Greek, death is masculine: in Latin, feminine. In those languages the sun is masculine; in the Gothic, German, Anglo-Saxon, and some other northern languages, it is feminine; in Russian it is neuter. In several of the languages of Asia, the sun is feminine. According to our northern mythology, the sun was the wife of Tuisco. The Romans considered the winds as masculine; the Hebrews, says Caramuel, represented them as nymphs. In the Hebrew language, however, they were of the masculine gender, as were also the sun and death. In short, we know not any two languages which accord in this respect, or any one language in which sex is assigned to things inanimate according to any consistent or determinate rule.
In speaking of animals whose sex is not known to us, or not regarded, we assign to them gender either masculine or feminine, according, as it would appear, to the characteristic properties of the animal himself. In speaking, for example, of the horse, a creature distinguished by usefulness and a certain generosity of nature, unless we be acquainted with the sex and wish to discriminate, we always speak of this quadruped as of the male sex; thus,
“While winter’s shivering snow affects the horse
With frost, and makes him an uneasy course.”—Creech.
In speaking of a hare, an animal noted for timidity, we assign to it, if we give it sex, the feminine gender; thus, “the hare is so timorous a creature, that she continually listens after every noise, and will run a long way on the least suspicion of danger: so that she always eats in terror.”
The elephant is generally considered as of the masculine gender, an animal distinguished not only by great strength and superiority of size, but also by sagacity, docility, and fortitude.
“The elephant has joints, but not for courtesy;
His legs are for necessity, not flexure.”—Shakspeare.
To a cat we almost always assign the female sex; to a dog, on the contrary, or one of the canine species, we attribute the masculine gender.
“A cat, as she beholds the light, draws the ball of her eye small and long.”—Peacham on Drawing.
“The dog is a domestic animal remarkably various in his species.”
It would be easy to illustrate, by more examples, this ascription of either male or female sex to animals, when we speak of them in the species, or are not acquainted with the sex of the individual; but these now adduced will, I presume, be sufficient.
By what principle this phraseology is dictated, or whether it be merely casual or arbitrary in its origin, it would be of no utility at present to inquire. It may be necessary, however, to remark that, when speaking of animals, particularly those of inferior size, we frequently consider them as devoid of sex. “It is a bold and daring creature,” says a certain writer, speaking of a cat, “and also cruel to its enemy; and never gives over, till it has destroyed it, if possible. It is also watchful, dexterous, swift, and pliable.”
Before I dismiss this subject, I would request the reader’s attention to an idiom which seems to have escaped the notice of our grammarians. It frequently happens, as I have already observed, that our language furnishes two distinct terms for the male and the female, as shepherd, shepherdess. It is to be observed, however, that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male and female, and is always employed, when the office, occupation, profession, &c., and not the sex of the individual is chiefly to be expressed; and that the feminine term is used in those cases only, when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be illustrated by the following examples. If I say, “The poets of this age are distinguished more by correctness of taste, than sublimity of conception,” I clearly include in the term poet, both male and female writers of poetry. If I say, “She is the best poetess in this country,” I assign her the superiority over those only of her own sex. If I say, “She is the best poet in this country,” I pronounce her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female. “Spinning,” says Lord Kames in his Sketches, “is a female occupation, and must have had a female inventor.” If he had said “a female inventress,” the expression would have been pleonastic. If he had said “must have had an inventress,” he would not have sufficiently contrasted the male and the female; he would have merely predicated the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the term inventor as applicable to each of the sexes, limiting it to the female by the appropriate term[16]. When distinction of sex is necessary for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather than the general idea implied by the term, is the primary object, the feminine noun must be employed to express the female; thus, “I hear that some authoresses are engaged in this work.”—Political Register. Here the feminine term is indispensable[17]. This subject will be resumed in “the Critical Remarks and Illustrations.”
SECTION III.
Of Cases.
The third accident of a noun is case, (casus, or fall,) so called because ancient grammarians, it is said, represented the cases as declining or falling from the nominative, which was represented by a perpendicular, and thence called Casus rectus, or upright case, while the others were named Casus obliqui, or oblique cases. The cases, in the languages of Greece and Rome, were formed by varying the termination; and were intended to express a few of the most obvious and common relations.
In English there are only three cases, nominative, genitive, and objective, or accusative case. In substantives the nominative case and the objective, have, like neuter nouns in Greek and Latin, the same form, being distinguishable from each other by nothing but their place; thus,
| Nom. | Obj. |
| Achilles slew Hector, | |
| Hector slew Achilles, | |
where the meaning is reversed by the interchange of the nouns, the nominative or agent being known by its being placed before the verb; and the subject of the action by its following it. Pronouns have three cases, that is, two inflexions from the nominative, as, I, mine, me; thou, thine, thee.
The genitive in English, by some called the possessive case, is formed by adding to the nominative the letter s, with an apostrophe before it, as king, king’s. It expresses a variety of relations, and was hence called by the Greeks the general case[18]. The relation which it most commonly denotes is that of property or possession, as, the king’s crown; and is, in general, the same with that which is denoted by the word of, as, the crown of the king, the rage of the tyrant, the death of the prince, equivalent to the king’s crown, the tyrant’s rage, the prince’s death.
The nature of the relation which the genitive expresses must, in some instances, be collected from the scope of the context; for, in English, as in most other languages, this case frequently involves an ambiguity. When I say, “neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God,” it may mean, either from the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for “God’s love” may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, “love to God.”
An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing either the relation of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its subject. “A little after the reformation of Luther,” says Swift. This may import either the change produced by Luther, or a change produced in him. The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though not that which was intended by the author. He should have said, “the reformation by Luther.” It is clear, therefore, that the relation expressed by the genitive is not uniformly the same, that the phrase may be interpreted either in an active or passive sense[19], and that the real import must be collected not from the expression, but the context.
Mr. Harris has said, that the genitive is formed to express all relations commencing from itself, and offers the analysis of this case in all modern languages as a proof. That it expresses more than this, both in English and Latin, and that it denotes relations, not only commencing from itself, but likewise directed to itself, the examples already quoted are sufficient to prove. Nay, were it necessary, it would be easy to demonstrate, that this ambiguity in the use of the genitive is not confined to these two languages, but is found in Greek, Hebrew, Italian, and, I believe, in all the modern languages of Europe.
Concerning the origin of the English genitive, grammarians and critics are not agreed. That the cases, or nominal inflexions, in all languages were originally formed by annexing to the noun in its simple form a word significant of the relation intended, is a doctrine which, I conceive, is not only approved by reason, but also attested by fact. That any people, indeed, in framing their language, should affix to their nouns insignificant terminations, for the purpose of expressing any relation, is a theory extremely improbable. Numerous as the inflexions are in the Greek and Latin languages, I am persuaded that, were we sufficiently acquainted with their original structure, we should find that all these terminations were at first words significant, subjoined to the radix, and afterwards abbreviated. This opinion is corroborated by the structure of the Hebrew, and some other oriental languages, whose affixes and prefixes, in the formation of their cases and conjugation of their verbs, we can still ascertain.
Now the English genitive being formed by annexing to the nominative the letter s, with an apostrophe, several critics, among whom is Mr. Addison, deliver it as their opinion, that this termination is a contraction for the possessive pronoun his. This opinion appears to be countenanced by the examples which occur in the Bible, and Book of Common Prayer, in which, instead of the English genitive, we find the nominative with the possessive pronoun masculine of the third person; thus, “for Christ his sake,” “Asa his heart was perfect.” Dr. Lowth considers these expressions as errors either of the printers or the authors. That they are not typographical mistakes I am fully persuaded. They occur in the books now mentioned, and also in the works of Bacon, Donne, and many other writers, much too frequently to admit this supposition. If errors, therefore, they are errors not of the printers, but of the authors themselves.
To evince the incorrectness of this phraseology, and to show that Addison’s opinion is erroneous, Dr. Lowth observes that, though we can resolve “the king’s crown” into “the king his crown,” we cannot resolve “the queen’s crown” into “the queen her crown,” or “the children’s bread” into “the children their bread.” This fact, he observes, ought to have demonstrated to Mr. Addison the incorrectness of his opinion. Lowth, therefore, refers the English to the Saxon genitive for its real origin, and observes, that its derivation from that genitive decides the question[20]. Hickes, in his Thesaurus, had previously delivered the same opinion. Speaking of the Anglo-Saxon genitive in es, he observes, “Inde in nostratium sermone nominum substantivorum, genitivus singularis, et nominativus pluralis, exeunt in es, vel s.” From the introduction of the Saxons into this island, to the Norman conquest, the Saxon genitive was in universal use. From the latter period to the time of Henry II. (1170), though the English language underwent some alterations, we still find the Saxon genitive. Thus, in a poem, entitled “The Life of St. Margaret,” in the Normanno-Saxon dialect, we find the following among other examples, “chrisꞇes angles,” and the pronoun hyꞅ (his) spelled is; thus, “Theodosius was is name.”—See Hickes, Thes. vol. i. p. 226.
Webster has asserted that, in the age of Edward the Confessor (1050), he does not find the Saxon genitive; and as a proof that the pronoun his was used instead of the Saxon termination, he quotes a passage from a charter of Edward the Confessor, where the words, “bissop his land” occur, which he conceives to be equivalent to “bishop’s land.” Now, had he read but a small part of that charter, he would have found the Saxon genitive; and what he imagines to be equivalent to the English genitive is neither that case, nor synonymous with it. The passage runs thus: “And ich ke þe eu þat Alfred havet iseld Gise bissop his land at Llyton;” the meaning of which is, “Know that Alfred hath sold to Bishop Gise his land at Lutton.” In the time of Richard II. (1385) we find Trevisa and Chaucer using the Saxon genitive. Thus, in Trevisa’s translation of the Athanasian creed, we find among other examples, “Godes sight.”
In Gavin Douglas, who lived in the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find is instead of es, thus, faderis hands.
In the time of Henry the Eighth we find, in the works of Sir T. More, both the Saxon and the English genitive; and in a letter, written in 1559, by Maitland of Lethington, the English genitive frequently occurs. Had this genitive, then, been an abbreviation for the noun and the pronoun his, the use of the words separately would have preceded their abbreviated form in composition. This, however, was not the case.
To form the genitive plural, we annex the apostrophe without the letter s, as eagles’ wings, that is, the wings of eagles. The genitive singular of nouns terminating in s, is formed in the same manner, as, righteousness’ sake, or the sake of righteousness.
I finish this article with observing, that there are in English a few diminutive nouns, so called from their expressing a small one of the kind. Some of these end in kin, from a Dutch and Teutonic word signifying a child, as manikin, a little man, lambkin, pipkin, thomkin. Proper names ending in kin belonged originally to this class of diminutives, as, Wilkin, Willielmulus; Halkin, Hawkin, Henriculus; Tomkin, Thomulus; Simkin, Peterkin, &c.
Some diminutives end in ock, as, hill, hillock; bull, bullock; some in el, as pike, pickrel; cock, cockrel; sack, satchel; some in ing, as goose, gosling. These seem to be the only legitimate ones, as properly belonging to our language. The rest are derived from Latin, French, Italian, and have various terminations.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE ARTICLE.
Language is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of genera or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common and more general name than that which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name man to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of animal[21]. Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,
“The proper study of mankind is man,” i.e. not one man, not many men, but all men.
Not only, however, has this rule its limitations, though these seem governed by no fixed principle, but we frequently find the articles admitted when the whole genus or species is evidently implied. Thus we may say,
“Metal is specifically heavier than water;” i.e. not this or that metal, but all metals. But we cannot say, “Vegetable is specifically lighter than water;” or, “Mineral is specifically heavier than water.” Again; we say, “Man is born unto trouble;” but we cannot say, “Tiger is ferocious,” or, “Fox is cunning;” but, “The tiger, or a tiger, is ferocious;” “The fox, or a fox, is cunning;” the expressions being applicable to the whole species. It would appear, indeed, that when proper names assume the office of appellatives, the reverse of the rule takes place. Thus we say, “A Douglas braves the pointed steel;” the meaning being “every Douglas.” Suppress the indefinite article, and the general proposition becomes individual.
But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as ae man, ane ox. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a, and ane be shortened into an. These words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms, a, an, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence a and an cannot be joined with a plural noun.
Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where a or an occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, “Will one man be able to carry this burden so far?” I evidently oppose one to more: and the answer might be, “No; but two men will.” Let us substitute the term a, and say, “Will a man be able to carry this burden?” Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, “No; but a horse will.” I have here substituted a, for one; the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying, “A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse,” I should say, “One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse,” the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea, “one kingdom for one horse.” In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donnez-moi un livre means either “give me one book,” i.e. not two or more books; or “give me a book,” that is, “a book, not something else; a book, not a pen,” for example.
I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered, as Quintilian observes[22], that language should be, not such as the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that one may in every case be substituted for a, without in the least degree injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the sense. Be it observed also, that, though a, an, ae, ane, one, may have been all etymologically the same, it does not follow, nor is it practically true, as has been now shown, that they are all precisely equivalent words. In Scotland, the distinction between a and ae is well known. “Give me a book,” means any book, in contradistinction to any other object, as “a chair,” “a pen,” “a knife;” “give me ae book,” is in contradistinction to one or more. Such also is the difference between a and one.
It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word a, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred to a different class of words from the numeral one, and called an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must acknowledge the distinctive name of article assigned to this word appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle of classification, (and I see no other distinction between a and one,) the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number.
Besides the words a and an, termed indefinite articles, as not defining which of the species is signified, we have also another word, the, named the definite article, because it is said to point out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from the word this or that, much in the same manner as a and an from ae and ane. To what class of words this and that should be referred has been a subject of controversy[23]. That they are not pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives; and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinary numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. This means “the nearer,” “the latter,” or “the second;” that, “the more remote,” “the former,” or “the first.” Their office, in general, seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object whose character was either previously known, or is then described; hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives they accord with nouns, frequently denoting the accident of place, they may be grammatically referred to the class of adjectives. Their import will appear from a few examples.
“That kind Being who is a father to the fatherless, will recompense thee for this.”
Here a species is referred to, distinguished by benevolence. Of this species one individual is emphatically particularized: “That kind being.” Who? his distinctive character follows, “is a father to the fatherless.” The concluding word this, points to something previously described.
“—— ’T was idly done
To tell him of another world; for wits
Knew better; and the only good on earth
Was pleasure; not to follow that was sin.”
Here the word that refers with emphasis to a thing previously specified, namely, pleasure.
“It is no uncommon thing to find a man who laughs at everything sacred, yet is a slave to superstitious fears. I would not be that man, were a crown to tempt me.” Here one indefinitely of a species is mentioned, a man. The subject is afterwards limited by description to one of a certain character, “who laughs at things sacred, and is a slave to superstitious fears.” The word that selects and demonstrates the person thus described. The word the has nearly the same import; but is less emphatical. It seems to bear the same analogy to that, which a does to one. Hence in many cases they may be used indifferently.
“Happy the man whose cautious feet shun the broad way that sinners go.”
Here, “happy that man” would express the same idea. The Latins accordingly employed the demonstrative word ille; beatus ille, “happy the man.”
What, then, is the difference between the and that? To ascertain this, let us inquire, in what cases the is employed, and whether that can be substituted in its stead.
The word the is employed,
1st, When we express an object of eminence or notoriety, or the only one of a kind in which we are interested, as, “the king,” when we mean “the king of England.” “He was concerned in bringing about the revolution,” when we mean the revolution in this country. “Virgil copied the Grecian bard,” or “Homer.” “I am going to the city,” when I mean “London.” In none of these cases can we substitute that for the, without laying a particular emphasis on the subject, and implying that its character is there described in contradistinction to some other of the same species. Thus, “he was concerned in that revolution, which was accomplished by the English barons.” “He copied that Grecian bard, who disputes the claim of antiquity with Homer.”
2dly, We employ it in expressing objects of repeated perception, or subjects of previous conversation. I borrow an example from Harris. If I see, for the first time, a man with a long beard, I say, “there goes a man with a long beard.” If I see him again, I say, “there goes the man with the long beard.” Were the word that substituted for the, the same observation would be applicable as in the preceding examples.
3dly, Mr. Harris has said, that the article a is used to express objects of primary perception, and the employed to denote those only of secondary perception. This opinion is controverted by the author of the article Grammar in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Ed. 3d. who gives the following example to disprove its truth. “I am in company, and finding the room warm, I say to the servant, Request the gentleman in the window seat (to whom I am an entire stranger) to draw down the sash.” The example is apposite, and is sufficient to overturn the hypothesis of Mr. Harris. There can be no question but the is frequently employed to denote objects of primary perception; and merely particularizes, by some discriminating circumstance, an individual whose character, person, or distinctive qualities, were previously unknown. In the example now quoted, that may be substituted for the, if we say, “who is in the window seat.”
4thly, The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative from the determinative sense. In the former case it is rarely employed: in the latter it should never be omitted, unless when something still more definite supplies its place. “Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days, and full of trouble.” Here the relative clause is explicative, and not restrictive; all men being “born of a woman;” the definite article therefore is not employed. “The man” would imply that all men are not thus born; and would confine the predicating clause to those who are. In the latter sense, that may, without any alteration in the phraseology, be substituted for the article; for the man, and that man, are in this instance equivalent.
5thly, The definite article is often used to denote the measure of excess. “The more you study, the more learned you will become;” that is, “by how much the more you study, by so much the more learned you will become.” “The wiser, the better;” “that (by that) wiser, that (by that) better.” There also that and the may be considered as equivalent; and the Latins accordingly said “eo melior.”
From the preceding examples and observations it must appear, that the definite article, and the word that, though not strictly synonymous, are words nearly of the same import.
Their difference seems to be,
1st, That the article the, like a, must have a substantive conjoined with it; whereas that, like one, may have it understood. Speaking of books, I may select one and say, “give me that,” but not “give me the;” “give me one,” but not “give me a.” Here the analogy holds between a and one, the and that.
2dly, As the difference between a and one seems to be, that one denotes unity in contradistinction to more, with greater emphasis than a, so the distinction in general between the and that is, that the latter marks the object more emphatically than the former, being indirectly opposed to this. I cannot say, “there goes that man with that long beard,” without implying a contrast with “this man with this long beard,” the word that being always emphatical and discriminative.
The opinion here offered, respecting these words, receives some corroboration from the following circumstances.
In Latin ille frequently supplies the place of our definite article. “Thou art the man.” Tu es ille (iste) homo.
The le in French is clearly a derivative from ille, of which the former syllable il expresses he, and the latter denotes that unemphatically, serving as the definite article. From the same source also proceed the Italian articles il, lo, la.
In Hebrew, in like manner, our definite article is expressed by the prefix of the pronoun ille; thus, aretz, terra, “earth;”[24] ha’aretz, illa seu hæc terra, “the earth,” the letter he abbreviated from hou, ille, expressing the;—ashri, haish[25], beatus ille vir, “happy the man,” or “that man,” the he in like manner signifying the or that.
It appears to me, then, that as ae, ane, when not opposed to more, and therefore unemphatical, by celerity of pronunciation were changed into a, an; so that, when not opposed to this, or when it was unemphatical, was shortened to the. Hence, the words termed articles seem to be the name of unity, and the demonstrative word that abbreviated.
Besides the words a, an, the, there are others which may be considered as reducible to the same class with these; such as this, that, any, other, same, all, one, none. This and that I have already considered. That they are not pronouns is evident, for they are never used as the representatives of a noun, and always require to be associated with a substantive. If ever they appear without this accompaniment, it will invariably be found that the expression is elliptical, some substantive or other being necessarily understood. If I say, “This was a noble action.” This what? “This action.” “This is true virtue.” This what? “This practice,” “this habit,” “this temper.” To what class of words I conceive them to belong has been already mentioned.
One is a word significant of unity, and cannot, without manifest impropriety, be called a pronominal adjective; unless, by an abuse of all language, we be disposed to name two, three, four, pronominal adjectives.
Some is reducible to the same class, denoting an indefinite, but, comparatively to many, a small number.
Many, few, several, are words of the same order, significant of number indefinitely.
None, or not one, implies the negation of all number, exclusive even of unity itself.
Other, which is improperly considered by some as a pronoun, is the Saxon oðer coming from oððe. The Arabic ahd, the Hebrew had, or ahad, the Saxon oððe, the Teutonic odo, and the Swedish udda, with our English word odd, seem all to have sprung from the same origin, the etymon expressing “one separately,” or “one by itself,” answering nearly to the Latin singulus. The English word odd plainly indicates its affinity to these words. We say, “He is an odd character,” or “singular character.” “He had some odd ones,” that is, “some separate from the rest,” not paired, or connected with them, “single.”[26]
“As he in soueraine dignity is odde,
So will he in loue no parting fellowes have.”
Sir T. More’s Works.
The same idea of singularity and separation is expressed by other; which is now generally used as a comparative, and followed by than.
Other is sometimes used substantively, and has then a plural number, as, “Let others serve whom they will; as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.” The word one has a plural number when an assemblage of units is expressed, not in the aggregate, but individually; and then it is used as a substantive, as, “I saw a great many fine ones.” It is also used indefinitely, in the same sense with the French on, as, “One would imagine these to be expressions of a man blessed with ease.”—Atterbury. And, in using it in this sense, it may be observed, in passing, that an error is often committed by employing the personal pronouns as referring to one; thus, “One is apt to exaggerate his own injuries,” instead of “one’s own injuries.” It is sometimes, though rarely, used as referring to a plural noun. “The Romans and the Carthaginians now took the field; the one ambitious of conquest, and the others in self-defence.” This mode of expression is objectionable. We should rather say, “the former,” and “the latter.”
Any, an, a, one, seem all to be nearly equivalent words, and derived from one origin, I mean from ane, the name of unity. Hence a, or an, and any, are frequently synonymous. “A considerate man would have acted differently;” that is, “any considerate man.” Hence also, like one, it is opposed to none, as, “Have you a book (any book) which you can lend me?” “None; my books are in the country; nor, if they were here, have I any (or one) which would suit you.” From expressing one indefinitely, like a or an, it came, by an easy and natural transition, to denote “whatever it be,” “what you please.” “Give me one (ane), any, no matter which.” In this sense it corresponds to the Latin quivis or quilibet[27] in affirmative sentences; whereas, in interrogative or negative sentences, it corresponds to quisquam, quispiam, or ullus. The preceding observations it may be useful to recapitulate.
Nouns are names of genera, and not of individuals; our perceptions are, on the contrary, all individual, not general. Hence, to denote one or more individuals of a species, numerals, or words significant of number, were invented. Some express a precise number, as one, two, three; others number indefinitely, as some, few, many, several. Our perceptions being all individual, and one being the basis of all number, the term significant of unity must frequently recur in expressing our sentiments. To denote this idea our forefathers employed ae, ane. In the progress of language, where unity was not to be expressed, as opposed to two or more, the terms, thus becoming unemphatical, would naturally be abbreviated into a, an. These latter, therefore, are the offspring of the names of unity, and belong to the class of words named cardinal numerals. To what part of speech these are reducible (if they can be reduced to any) it is difficult to determine. In some languages they have the form of adjectives; but, if their meaning be considered, it is clear that they have no claim to this appellation, as they express no accident, quality, or property whatever. In fact, they appear to be a species of words totally different in character from any of the parts of speech generally received; all of them, except the first of the series, being abbreviations for the name of unity repeated.
It being necessary not only to express an individual indefinitely of any species, but also to specify and select some particular one, which at first would probably be done by pointing to the object, if in sight, the words this and that, hence called demonstratives, were employed; the one to express the nearer, the other the more distant object. From one of these proceeded the word the, having the same relation to its original as a or an has to the name of unity. Hence the words synonymous with this and that, in those languages which have no definite article, are frequently employed to supply its place.
The use of these terms being to express any individual whatever of a class, and likewise some certain or particular object; we have also the words few, some, many, several, to denote a number indefinitely, and the cardinal numerals two, three, four, &c., a precise number of individuals.
CHAPTER III.
OF PRONOUNS.
Whether we speak of things present, or of things absent, of ourselves, or of others, and to whomsoever we address our discourse, the repetition of the names of those persons or things would not only be tiresome, but also sometimes productive of ambiguity. Besides, the name of the person addressed may be unknown to the speaker, and the name of the speaker may be unknown to the person addressed. Hence appears the utility of pronouns, words, as the etymology of the term denotes, supplying the place of nouns. They have therefore been denominated by some grammarians, nouns of the second order.
When the person who addresses speaks of himself, the pronoun I, called the pronoun of the first person, is employed instead of the name of the speaker, as, “The Lord said to Moses, I (the Lord) am the God of Abraham.”
When the person addressed is the subject of discourse, the pronoun thou, called the pronoun of the second person, is used instead of his name, as, “Nathan said unto David, Thou (David) art the man.”
When neither the person who speaks, nor the person addressed, but some other person or thing, is the subject of discourse, we employ the pronouns of the third person, namely, he, she, it; as, “When Jesus saw the multitude, he (Jesus) had compassion on them.”
I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that even the repetition of the name would, in all cases, answer the same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the pronoun. For, as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name, belonging to more persons than one, would not so clearly specify or individuate the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would often be necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to discriminate the person intended from others of that name; or the speaker would be obliged to point to the individual if he happened to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology would have nothing of that simplicity and energy which accompany the pronoun. If, in the first example, instead of saying, “I am the God,” we should say, “The Lord is the God;” or in the second, instead of “Thou art the man,” “David is the man,” the energy of the expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person, speaking of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation, it is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom, perspicuity, and vivacity of a letter.
Pronouns may be divided into substantive and adjective, personal and impersonal, relative and interrogative. The personal substantive pronouns are I, thou, he, she. The impersonal substantive pronoun is it.
The personal substantive pronouns have three cases, and are thus declined:
| First Person, Masc. and Fem. | ||
| Sing. | Plur. | |
| Nom. | I[28] | We |
| Gen. | Mine | Ours |
| Obj. | Me | Us. |
| Second Person, Masc. and Fem. | ||
| Sing. | Plur. | |
| Nom. | Thou[29] | Ye or you |
| Gen. | Thine | Yours |
| Obj. | Thee | You. |
| Third Person. | ||
| Masc. | ||
| Nom. | He[30] | They |
| Gen. | His | Theirs |
| Obj. | Him | Them. |
| Fem. | ||
| Sing. | Plur. | |
| Nom. | She[31] | They |
| Gen. | Hers | Theirs |
| Obj. | Her | Them. |
| Third Person. | ||
| Neuter. | ||
| Impersonal. | ||
| Nom. | It[32] | They[33] |
| Gen. | Its | Theirs |
| Obj. | It | Them. |
My, thy, our, your, their, being the representatives of nouns, have the essential character of pronouns. Thus, when Decius says to Cato, “Cæsar is well acquainted with your virtues,” the pronoun is employed as a substitute for Cato’s. As they express not only the subject, but also the relation of property or possession, they are by some grammarians considered to be the genitives of their respective substantive pronouns. In usage, however, they are distinguished from the English genitive by their incapacity to stand alone. Thus we say, “It is the king’s,” “It is yours;” but we cannot say, “It is your,” the presence of a noun being necessary to the last expression. They are, therefore, more correctly named pronominal adjectives. For the purpose of denoting emphatically the relation of possession or property, the word own is frequently joined to them, as, my own, thy own, our own. And to mark the person with emphasis, they are compounded with the word self; in Saxon, sylf; from the Gothic silba, ipse: thus, myself, thyself; ourselves, yourselves. Theirselves is now obsolete, themselves being used in its stead.
The pronouns of the first and second persons are either masculine or feminine. The reason is, says Mr. Harris, because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed is generally obvious. This explanation, which has been adopted by most grammarians, appears to me unsatisfactory and erroneous. Others have said that the pronouns of the first and second persons have no distinction of sex, because all distinction of this kind is foreign to the intention of the speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun I, means the person who speaks, be it man or woman; and when he employs the pronoun thou, means the person addressed, without any regard to the sex of the individual. This matter seems sufficiently plain. Language, to be useful, must be perspicuous and intelligible, exhibiting the subject and its attributes with clearness and precision. If it should be asked why the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, Mr. Harris would answer, “to mark the sex.” If it were inquired whence arises the necessity of marking the sex, he would answer, and very justly, “in order to ascertain the subject of discourse.” It is obvious, therefore, that to note the sex is not the primary object, and that the principal aim of the speaker is to discriminate and mark the subject. The pronouns of the first and second persons have no variety of form significant of sex, because the speaker and the person addressed are evident without it. Mr. Harris, therefore, should have said that the pronouns in question have no distinction of gender, not because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed, but because the persons themselves, are in general obvious, without the aid of sexual designation. The intention of the speaker is not to denote the sex, but the person spoken of, whether male or female; to ascertain which person, if absent, the discrimination of sex is generally necessary. The sex, therefore, enters not as an essential, but as an explanatory circumstance; not as the subject of discourse, but to distinguish the subject. Where the person is present, and is either the speaker or the person addressed, discrimination of sex becomes unnecessary, the pronoun itself marking the individuals. When the person or subject of discourse is absent, the distinction of sex serves frequently to determine the subject. Hence the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, he for the masculine, she for the feminine, and it for the neuter.
The four personal pronouns, I, thou, he, and she, have three cases, viz., the nominative or leading case, expressing the principal subject, and preceding the verb; the genitive case, whose form and office have been already defined; and the objective, accusative, or following case, (for it has obtained these three names,) expressing the object to which the energy is directed, or the subject acted upon. This case follows the verb.
Mine, thine, hers, theirs, his, yours, ours, are truly pronouns in the possessive or genitive case. Johnson has indeed said that my and mine are words precisely synonymous, my, according to him, being used before a consonant, and mine before a vowel; as, my sword, mine arm. It is doubtless true that mine and thine are sometimes used as my and thy, which are not substantive pronouns, but pronominal adjectives; but that they are not precisely synonymous or mutually convertible, is obvious; for my and thy cannot be used for mine and thine, though mine and thine, as has been observed, may be used for my and thy. Example: “Whose book is this?” I cannot answer, “it is my,” but “it is mine.” We may indeed say “it is my book;” but the addition of the substantive is necessary.
As my and mine, thy and thine, our and ours, your and yours, their and theirs, are not mutually convertible, they cannot be regarded as synonymous each with its fellow.
This and that, which have improperly been referred by some to the class of pronouns, have been considered already. The former makes in the plural these, the latter those.
The relative pronouns, so called because they directly relate or refer to a substantive preceding, which is therefore termed the antecedent, are who, which, that.
The pronoun who is of the masculine or feminine gender, referring to persons, male or female. The pronoun which is neuter. That is common to the three genders.
| Sing. and Plur. | Sing. and Plur. | |
| Nom. | Who[34] | Which |
| Gen. | Whose | Whose |
| Obj. | Whom | Which. |
Lowth and several other grammarians have asserted that the pronoun which admits no variation. Numberless examples, however, from the best authors might be cited to disprove this assertion. Shakspeare occasionally uses whose as the genitive of which; and, since his time, writers of the highest eminence have employed it in the same manner.
“Of man’s first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste.”—Milton.
“The lights and shades, whose well-accorded strife
Gives all the strength and colour of our life.”—Pope.
“A true critic is like a dog at a feast, whose thoughts and stomach are wholly set on what the guests fling away.”—Swift.
This usage is favourable to conciseness, and can very seldom create ambiguity. Where obscurity indeed is apprehended, the periphrasis, of which, should be adopted. I have, therefore, given whose as the genitive of which; not only because this usage is sanctioned by classical authority, but likewise, because the other form, of which, is frequently awkward and inelegant.
Who is applied to persons, that is, to animals distinguished by rationality, or represented as possessing it.
“The man who has no music in himself.”—Shakspeare.
The antecedent man, being a person, is followed by who.
“A stag, who came to drink at a river, seeing his own image in the clear stream, said thus to himself.”
Here the stag is represented as possessing reason and speech, and therefore the pronoun who is employed. In mythological writings in general, such as the Fables of Æsop, inferior animals are very properly denoted by the personal relative.
Which is applied to things inanimate, and creatures either devoid of all indications of rationality, or represented as such. “The city, which Romulus built, was called Rome.” Here which is used, the word city being the antecedent, to which it refers.
“The sloth, which is a creature remarkable for inactivity, lives on leaves and the flowers of trees.” Here the sloth, an animal hardly possessing sensation or life, is expressed by which.
The rule here given for the use of these pronouns is not uniformly observed, several good writers occasionally applying them indifferently to inferior animals, without any determinate principle of discrimination. It would be better, however, were this rule universally followed; and if such modes of expression as “frequented by that fowl, whom nature has taught,” were entirely repudiated.
Priestley, whose doctrine on this subject seems nearly to coincide with ours, has even objected to the application of the pronoun who to children, because this pronoun conveys an idea of persons possessing reason and reflection, of which mere children are incapable. He, therefore, disapproves of Cadogan’s phraseology, when he says, “a child who.”
That is applied indiscriminately to things animate and inanimate, and admits no variation.
The pronouns who, which, and that, are sometimes resolvable into and he, and she, and it. Mr. Harris, indeed, has said, that the pronoun qui (who) may be always resolved into et ille, a, ud (and he, and she, and it). This opinion, however, is not perfectly correct; for it is thus resolvable in those examples only in which the relative clause does not limit or modify the meaning of the antecedent. If I say, “Man who is born of a woman, is of few days, and full of trouble,” the relative clause is not restrictive; I may, therefore, resolve the pronoun, and say, “Man is of few days, and he is born of woman.” “Light is a body which moves with great velocity,” is resolvable into “Light is a body, and it moves with great velocity.” But when the relative clause limits the meaning of the antecedent, the relative is clearly not thus resolvable. “Virgil was the only epic poet, among the Romans, who can be compared to Homer.” The signification of the antecedent is here restricted by the relative clause: we cannot, therefore, by resolution, say, “Virgil was the only epic poet among the Romans, and he can be compared to Homer;” for the former of these propositions is not true, nor is the sentiment, which it conveys, accordant with the meaning of the author.
The pronoun what, if not employed interrogatively, is equivalent to that which; and is applicable to inanimate things only, as, “I believe what I see,” or “that which I see.”
What admits no variation.
The relative pronouns who, which, are often used interrogatively, and are, therefore, in such cases considered as interrogatives. When thus employed, it is the opinion of the author of the British Grammar, that they still retain their relative character. “The only difference,” says he, “is this, that the relative refers to an antecedent and definite subject, and the interrogative to something subsequent and unknown.” The example which he adduces in support of his opinion is the following: “Who first seduced them to that foul revolt?” “The very question,” says he, “supposes a seducer, to which, though unknown, the pronoun who has a reference.” Answer, “The infernal serpent.” He continues, “Here, in the answer, we have the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the who in the interrogation is as much a relative as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all. It was the infernal serpent who seduced them.” Others adopt an opinion diametrically opposite, contending that who and which are properly interrogatives, and that even, when used as relatives, they still retain their interrogative character. This theory a few examples will sufficiently illustrate.
“The man who?” (which man?) his character follows, “has no music in himself.”
“The city which? (what city?) Romulus built was called Rome.”
“Happy the man whose cautious feet.”
“Happy that man who? his (whose) cautious feet.”
“Light is a body which? (body) moves with great velocity.”
Of these two theories I have no hesitation in adopting the former. My reasons are these. The intention of language is to communicate our sentiments; to express what we think, feel, perceive, or desire. Hence its general character is indicative or assertive. “I believe,” “I wish,” “I see,” are affirmative sentences; and whatever variety of forms the phraseology may assume, they are all strictly significant of assertion, and all resolvable into the language of affirmation. “Go,” “teach,” “read,” are equivalent to, “I desire you to go,” “to teach,” “to read.” “Have you finished your task?” means, when the sentiment is fully expressed, “I desire to know, whether you have finished your task.” Ellipses of this kind are natural. They spring from an eagerness to impart to the vehicle of our thoughts a degree of celerity, suited to the promptitude with which the mind conceives them. Vehemence or passion, impatient of delay, uniformly resorts to them. The assertive form of expression I therefore conceive to be the parent whence every other is derived, and to which it is reducible. If this be the case, no interrogative, conceived purely as such, can claim so early an origin as definite or affirmative terms. Hence we may conclude, that who, which, when, where, were at first used as relatives, and came afterwards, by implication, to denote interrogations.
Again, we know that the meaning of an expression is frequently collected, not so much from the strict import of the terms, as from the tone or manner in which it is delivered. If I say, “he did it,” the sentence is affirmative; yet, by the tone of voice or manner of the speaker, this affirmative sentence may denote an interrogation. Thus, “he did it?” by an elevation of the voice, or the mode of notation, maybe rendered equivalent to “did he do it?” “Who did it” is in like manner an affirmative clause; but it is obvious that this form of expression, like the other now adduced, may be likewise employed to note an interrogation, thus, “Who did it?” And it is evident, that, if the ellipsis be supplied, the sentence would read thus, “I want to know who did it.” The preceding clause, however, is sufficiently supplied by the manner of the speaker. An ellipsis of this kind seems to be involved in every interrogation. If I say, “did he do it?” it is equivalent to “tell me, if he did it.” Accordingly, we find that the Latins, in such interrogations, employed only the latter clause; for an (whether), which is termed an interrogative, is, in fact, nothing but the Greek ἂν, synonymous with si (if) among the Latins. “An fecit,” did he do it? is therefore strictly equivalent to “si fecit” if he did it, the former clause “tell me,” being understood, and its import supplied by the manner of the speaker, or the mode of notation.
Besides, let any person ask himself what idea he annexes to the word who, considered as an interrogative, and I am persuaded he will be sensible that he cannot form any distinct conception of its import.
I am inclined therefore to think that interrogatives are strictly relatives: and that these relatives, by the aid of voice, gesture, or some explanatory circumstance, answer the purpose of interrogation.
In using these pronouns interrogatively, it is to be observed, that who and which are each applied to persons, which is not the case when they are employed as relatives. This difference, however, is to be observed, that when the pronoun which is used interrogatively, and applied to persons, it is generally, if not always, understood that the character of the individual, who is the object of inquiry, is in presence of the inquirer, or is in some degree known. Who is more indefinite. If I say, “which is the man?” I mean “who of those now before me?” or of those who have been described? Agreeably to this notion, we say, “which of the two,” not “who of the two,” was guilty of this crime?
If I say, “Who is the man that will dare to affirm?” it implies that I am entirely a stranger to him, and that I even doubt his existence. “Which is the man?” not only implies his existence, but also that the aggregate of individuals, whence the selection is made, is known to me.
What is also used interrogatively, and is employed in introducing questions, whether the subject be persons or things, as, “What man is that?” “What book is this?” When no substantive is subjoined, it is then wholly indefinite, as, “What is man that thou art mindful of him?” When we inquire, therefore, into the character of any person, and not for the individual himself, it is to be remembered that we employ this pronoun, and not who or which.
There seems to be the same difference between who and what definite, as between who and which. If I say, “What man will dare to affirm this?” and “Which man will dare?” &c., it is obvious that the former interrogatory is more indefinite than the latter; the one implying a total ignorance of the individual, and some doubt of his existence; the other, that he is one of a number in some degree known to the inquirer.
When any defining clause is subjoined, either may be used, as, “What, or which, man among you, having a hundred sheep, and losing one, would not leave the ninety and nine?”
The pronoun whether is equivalent to “which of the two.” It is the Teutonic word wether, bearing the same relation to wer, “who” or “which,” as either does to ein, “one,” and neither, newether, to nie or nehein, “none.”
This word, though now generally employed or considered as a conjunction, is in truth reducible to the class of words which we are now examining, and is precisely synonymous with uter, tra, trum, of the Latins. “Whether is it easier to say?”—Bible.
Here whether is truly a pronoun, and is the nominative to the following verb.
“Whether is greater, the gold or the temple?”—Ibid.
In these examples, whether is precisely the same with “which of the two.” It seems now to be giving place to the word which, as the comparative, when two things are compared, is often supplanted by the superlative. Thus we often say, when speaking of two, “which is the best,” instead of “whether is better.” The Latins almost uniformly observed the distinction:—“Uter dignior, quis dignissimus?”—Quint.
The pronoun it is used indefinitely, and applied to persons or things.
Dr. Johnson has objected to the use of this pronoun in those examples wherein the pronouns of the first or second persons are employed; and Dr. Lowth has censured it when referring to a plural number, as in the following example:
“’T is these, that give the great Atrides spoils.”—Pope.
I concur, however, with the learned author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, who regards the objections of these critics as, in this instance, of no weight. For when a question is asked, the subject of which is totally unknown, there must be some indefinite word employed to denote the subject of the interrogation. The word which we use for this purpose is it, as, “Who is it?” “What is it?” This phraseology is established by universal usage, and is therefore unexceptionable. This being the case, there can be no impropriety in repeating in the answer the indefinite term employed in the question. We may therefore reply, “It is I,” “It is he,” “It is she.”
Now, if the term be admitted in questions and answers where the subject may be either male or female, and of the first, second, or third person, it surely is admissible in those cases also where the subject is in the plural number. Nay, to use in the answer any other word to express the subject than that by which it is signified in the question, would be in all cases, if not productive of ambiguity, at least less precise. “Who is it?” says a master to his servant, hearing a voice in the hall. “It is the gentlemen who called yesterday,” replies the servant. Who sees not that “they are the gentlemen,” would be an answer less accordant with the terms of the question, and would less clearly show that “the gentlemen,” and “the subject of inquiry,” both being denoted by one term, are one and the same? Had the master known that it was the voice of a gentleman, and that there were more than one, and had he accordingly said, “Who are they?” the answer would have properly been “They are the gentlemen.” But when the question is “Who is it?” I apprehend the only apposite answer is, “It is the gentlemen,” the identity of the terms (it being repeated) clearly evincing an identity of subject in the question and in the answer; in other words, that the subject of the inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same.
I conclude with observing, that, though I have here considered the word that as a pronoun, there can be no question that in its import it is precisely the same with the demonstrative that, which has been already explained. “The house that you built is burned,” is resolvable thus, “The house is burned, you built that.”
CHAPTER IV.
OF THE ADJECTIVE.
An adjective has been defined by most grammarians to be “that part of speech which signifies an accident, quality, or property of a thing.” This definition appears to me to be somewhat defective and incorrect: for the adjective does not express the quality simply, but the quality or property, as conjoined with a substance; or, as grammarians have termed it, in concreto. Thus, when we say “good man,” goodness is the name of the quality, and good is the adjective expressing that quality, as conjoined with the subject man. Accordingly, every adjective is resolvable into the name of the thing implied, and any term of reference or conjunction, as of, with. Thus “a prudent man” is equivalent to “a man with” or “having prudence” or to “a man of prudence.” An adjective, therefore, is that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as fool, foolish, wax, waxen. Sometimes no change is made; and the simple name of the substance, or attribute, is prefixed to the name of the subject, as sea fowl, race horse, corn field. In writing these, and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as sea-fowl, river-fish, wine-vessel.
As every appellative denotes the whole of a genus or species, the intention and effect of the adjective is, by limiting the generic meaning of the substantive, to specify what part of the genus or species is the subject of discourse. If I say “man,” the term is universal: it embraces the species. If I say “a man,” the expression is indefinite, being applicable to any individual of the kind. If I say “a good man,” I confine the term to an individual distinguished by goodness. Here man expresses the substance; and good the quality in concreto. Sometimes, on the contrary, the substantive is the general name of the quality or property; and the adjective modifies or determines its degree, as, wisdom, little wisdom. Let us take another example. The word stone is applicable to a whole species of substances. If I say round stone, I confine the meaning of the substantive to that part of the genus which is distinguished by roundness. Here the substantive denotes the matter, or substance, in general, and the adjective limits its signification, by expressing the form. Sometimes the converse takes place, as golden globe. Here the substantive is the generic name of a certain figure; and the adjective, by expressing the matter, confines that figure to the substance of gold.
Some grammarians have denominated this part of speech by the name of adjective noun; to others this designation appears inadmissible. The latter observe, that neither is the adjective the name of anything, nor is it in English variable, like the substantive. They allow, that in Greek and Latin, the designation in question is, in some degree, justifiable, because, though the noun and adjective differ essentially in office, in these languages, they agree in form; but in our language they deem it a singular impropriety[35].
I have said that the adjective denotes a substance, quality, or property, “as pertaining,” or in concreto. Now, it is to be observed, that substances do not admit degrees of more or less, in regard to their essential character. “A wooden table” cannot be more or less wooden. “An iron bar” cannot be more or less such. In these cases, the adjective, as I have already remarked, by expressing the matter, limits the form to one species of substance. The same observation is applicable to the converse circumstance, in which the form strictly limits the matter, as “triangular board.” Here it is obvious, that the substance limited to one form by the term triangular, cannot be more or less triangular. But this is not the case with qualities or properties, which may exist in different substances in different degrees. And, as it is sometimes necessary to express the existence of a quality, as greater or less in one substance than another, hence arises the utility of some form of expression to denote these relative degrees of its existence. It is in this case only, that the termination of the adjective admits variation; and then it is said to be in a state of comparison.
In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite. Hardness, for example, gravity, magnitude, genius, wisdom, folly, are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it would elude the capacity of any language to discriminate. To denote these degrees, is, therefore, utterly impracticable, as it is wholly unnecessary.
In English, as in most other languages, we employ two variations: the one to denote simple excess, or a greater degree of the quality than that which is expressed by the adjective itself; and the other to denote the greatest excess. Thus, if I compare wood with stone, as possessing the quality of hardness, I say, “wood is hard,” “stone is harder.” If I compare these with iron, I say, “wood is hard,” “stone harder,” “iron the hardest.” Thus, in truth, there are only two degrees of comparison, viz. the comparative and the superlative, the positive expressing the quality simply and absolutely.
The comparative is formed by adding er to the positive, if it end with a consonant; or the letter r, if it end with a vowel; as, soft, softer; safe, safer.
The superlative is formed by adding est, or st, as, soft, softest; safe, safest[36].
Some adjectives are compared irregularly, as,
| Pos. | Comp. | Super. |
| Good | Better | Best |
| Bad or Evil | Worse | Worst |
| Little | Less | Least |
| Much | More | Most |
| Many | More | Most |
| Near | Nearer | Nearest or next |
| Late | Later | Latest or last. |
The comparative degree is frequently expressed by the word more, and the superlative by most, as,
| Pos. | Comp. | Super. |
| Hard | More hard | Most hard. |
Monosyllabic adjectives are generally compared by annexing r or er, st or est; adjectives of two or more syllables by more and most, as, strong, stronger, strongest; certain, more certain, most certain.
Dissyllabic adjectives in y form an exception to this rule, as happy, happier, happiest.
Adjectives of two syllables ending in le, after a mute, are also excepted, as, able, abler, ablest.
Euphony seems here to be generally consulted, and the ear may be allowed perhaps to furnish the best rule.
Some form their superlative by adding most to the comparative, as, nether, nethermost; lower, lowermost; under, undermost: others by adding most either to the positive or comparative, as, hind, hindmost, or hindermost; up, upmost or uppermost. From in, we have inmost and innermost[37].
Besides this definite and direct kind of comparison, there is another, which may be termed indefinite or indirect, expressed by the intensive words too, very, exceedingly, &c., as, too good, very hard, exceedingly great.
When the word very, or any other of the same import, is put before the positive, it is called by some writers the superlative of eminence, to distinguish it from the other superlative, which has been already mentioned, and is called the superlative of comparison. Thus, very hard is termed the superlative of eminence; most hard, or hardest, the superlative of comparison.
I have said that the comparative denotes simple excess, and the superlative the greatest. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that the comparative may not be employed in expressing the same pre-eminence or inferiority with the superlative. If I say, “Of all acquirements virtue is the most valuable,” I may also convey the same sentiment by saying, “Virtue is more valuable than every other acquirement.” If it be asked, what then is the difference between the comparative and superlative? I answer,
1st. That the superlative expresses the absolutely highest or lowest degree of the quality, as when we say, “O God most high;” or the greatest or least degree, in relation merely to the subjects of comparison, thus expressing a superiority of excess above the comparative, as when I say, “In estimating the worth of these human attainments, learning, prudence, and virtue, it cannot be denied that learning is valuable, that prudence is more valuable, but that virtue is the most valuable.” The comparative expresses merely simple excess, but never the highest or lowest degree of the quality. This distinction is, perhaps, the most precise, and the most worthy of attention.
I observe, however, that the sentiment in the last example may be expressed by the comparative, but not simply, or by itself; thus, “Learning is valuable, prudence more valuable, and virtue more valuable still,” the word still implying a continued gradation. Were this word suppressed, the sentence would imply that prudence and virtue are each more valuable than learning, but would assert no superiority of virtue to prudence. The same sentiment may likewise be expressed by combining the two first, and marking simply the excess of the third, thus, “virtue is better than both.”
2dly. When we express the superiority or inferiority of one of two things, or of two aggregates, we almost always use the comparative. Thus, speaking of Cæsar and Cato, I say, “Cato was the more virtuous, Cæsar the more eloquent;” or of two brothers, we say, “John was the elder.”
In such cases the superlative is sometimes employed, as, “the best of the two,” instead of “the better of the two.” The former phraseology, however, is more consonant to established usage, and is in every case to be preferred. “Whether is it easier to say, ‘take up thy bed and walk,’ or to say, ‘thy sins are forgiven thee?’” that is, which of the two is “easier,” not “easiest,” the simple excess of one thing above another being here denoted.
3dly. When we use the superlative, we always compare one thing, or an aggregate number of things, with the class to which they belong, or to which we refer them; whereas, when we use the comparative, except in the case just mentioned, the things compared either belong, or are conceived as belonging, to different classes, being placed in opposition to each other. Thus, in comparing Socrates, who was an Athenian, with the other Athenians, we say, “Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians;” that is, “of,” “out of,” or “of the class of Athenians.” Hence in Latin the superlative often takes the preposition ex (out of) to denote that the object compared belongs to the order of things with which it is compared; the comparative very rarely.
Now the same sentiment may be expressed by the comparative; but then the Athenians and Socrates, though belonging to one species, are conceived as mutually opposed, and referred to different places, whereas the superlative refers them to one common aggregate. Thus, if we employ the comparative, we say, “Socrates was wiser than any other Athenian.”
Agreeably to the observation now made, we cannot say, “Cicero was more eloquent than the Romans,” or “than any Roman;” because Cicero was himself a Roman, one of the class with which he is compared, and could not therefore be more eloquent than himself. As the objects compared belong, therefore, to one class, and are not two individuals, nor two aggregates, the comparative cannot be employed, unless by placing them in opposition, or referring them to different places, as, “Cicero was more eloquent than any other Roman.” Here the word other denotes that opposition, that diversity of place or species, which, in all cases but the one already mentioned, is essentially implied in the use of the comparative.
I have observed already, that when the superlative is employed, the things compared are referred to one aggregate; and that when the comparative is used, they are contradistinguished by a different reference. This distinction obtains uniformly, unless when we compare only two individuals, or two classes, both referred to one aggregate, as “the elder of the Catos,” “of these two nations (speaking of the Greeks and Romans), the latter were the more warlike.” In such examples as these, the comparative, while it retains its own distinctive character, denoting simple excess, partakes also of the nature of the superlative, the objects compared being referred by the preposition to one and the same aggregate. But as the superlative is always followed by of, and the comparative, in every case except the one now mentioned, followed by than, some writers say, “the eldest of the two,” “the latter were the most warlike.” This phraseology, however conformable to the generally distinguished usage of the comparative and superlative, is repugnant to the characteristic power of these degrees, by which one denotes simple excess, while the other heightens or lessens the quality to its highest or lowest degree.
From the preceding remarks will appear the impropriety of saying, “Jacob loved Joseph more than all his children.”[38] Joseph being one of his children, the sentiment expressed involves an absurdity: it should be “more than all his other children.” “In the beginning of the 16th century, Spain is said to have possessed a thousand merchant ships, a number probably far superior to that of any nation in Europe in that age.” (Robertson’s America.) It should be, “that of any other nation in Europe:” for, Spain being one of the European nations, she could not possess a number superior to her own. The comparative required the terms to be contrasted by the word other.
“Adam
The comeliest of men since born
His sons. The fairest of her daughters Eve.”—Milton.
“Adam,” the antecedent subject of comparison, is here improperly referred to the aggregate of “men since born.” To this aggregate he cannot be said to belong, not having been “born,” nor being reducible to the class of “his own sons.” Eve also is referred to a species of which she was no part. In neither of these comparisons can the second term include the first; yet the preposition refers them to one class. Such phraseologies as these, though not ungrammatical, involve an absurdity, and should therefore be dismissed.
Adjectives, whose signification does not admit intension or remission, cannot be compared. Among these are to be reckoned, 1st, All words expressive of figure, as circular, square, triangular, perpendicular, straight; for it is obvious, that if a body or figure be triangular, or square, or circular, it cannot be more or less so. It is either circular, or not circular; triangular, or not triangular; straight, or not straight. If the affirmative be the case, gradation from more or less, or conversely, is impossible; if the negative be true, then the attributes denoted by these adjectives do not belong to it; and therefore the epithets circular, triangular, straight, &c., are inapplicable. Hence such expressions as these, “place the staff more erect,” “make the field more triangular,” are highly improper. We should say, “set the staff erect,” “make the field triangular.”
2dly. All adjectives whose signification, in their simple form, implies the highest or lowest possible degree, admit not comparison, as, chief, supreme, universal, perfect, extreme, &c. Hume, speaking of enthusiasm, says (Essays, vol. i. p. 72), “it begets the most extreme resolutions.” Extreme implies the farthest, or the greatest possible, and cannot admit intension.
I am aware that usage may be pleaded in favour of “more and most universal, more and most perfect.” This usage, however, is not such as will sanction the former of these phraseologies; for good writers generally avoid it. Besides, there is no necessity for resorting to this mode of expression, as we have an attributive appropriate to the idea intended: thus, instead of saying, “Literature is more universal in England than America,” we should say, “Literature is more general.” It is almost unnecessary to observe, that literature in England is either universal, or it is not; if the former be true, it cannot be more than universal; if the latter, the term is inapplicable. The word general does not comprise the whole; it admits intension and remission: the adjective universal implies totality. A general rule admits exceptions; a universal rule embraces every particular.
The expression “more perfect” is, in strictness of speech, equally exceptionable; usage, however, has given it a sanction which we dare hardly controvert. It has been proposed, indeed, to avoid this and similar improprieties, by giving the phraseology a negative, or indirect form. Thus, instead of saying, “A time-keeper is a more perfect machine than a watch,” it has been proposed to say, “A time-keeper is a less imperfect machine than a watch.” This phraseology is logically correct, perfection being predicable of neither the one thing nor the other; it might likewise, in many cases, be adopted with propriety. In the language of passion, however, and in the colourings of imagination, such expressions would be exanimate and intolerable. A lover, expatiating with rapture on the beauty and perfection of his mistress, would hardly call her, “the least imperfect of her sex.”
In all languages, indeed, examples are to be found of adjectives being compared whose signification admits neither intension nor remission. It would be easy to assign several reasons for this, did the discussion belong to the province of the grammarian[39]. Suffice it to say, that such phraseologies should never be admitted where the language will furnish correct, and equally apposite, expressions.
I observe also, that as those adjectives whose signification cannot be heightened or lessened admit not comparison, so, for the same reason, they exclude all intensive words. The expressions, so universal, so extreme, and such like, are therefore improper. The former is indeed common enough; but it is easy to see, as it has been already remarked, that whatever is universal cannot be increased or diminished; and that what is less than universal, cannot be characterized by that epithet. The phrase so universal implies a gradation in universality, and that something is less so than an another; which is evidently impossible.
It has been questioned, whether prior, superior, ulterior, exterior, and several others, which have the form of the Latin comparative, should be deemed comparatives. I am inclined to think, they ought not, for these reasons; 1st, They have not the form of the English comparative; 2dly, They are never followed by than, which uniformly accompanies the English comparative, when the subjects are opposed to each other, or referred to different classes; 3dly, It is not to be conceived, that every adjective, which implies comparison, is therefore a comparative or superlative, otherwise preferable (better than), previous (prior to), might be deemed comparatives; 4thly, Many of these have truly a positive meaning, not implying an excess of the quality, but merely the quality, as opposed to its contrary. The interior means simply the inside, as opposed to the exterior or outside; the anterior, “the one before,” opposed to posterior, “the one behind.”
I dismiss this article with observing, that the signification of the positive is sometimes lessened by the termination ish; as, white, whitish; black, blackish. Johnson remarks, that the adjective in this form may be considered as in a state of comparison; it may properly be called a diminutive.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE VERB.
A verb has been defined to be “that part of speech which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer;” or more correctly, “that part of speech which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject,” as “I strike,” “I am wounded,” “I stand.” Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech. The adjective expresses an accident, quality, or property of a thing in concreto; that is, when joined to the name of a substance, it expresses that substance, as accompanied by some attribute: in other words, it limits a generic name, confining it to that part of the kind, which possesses the character, which the attributive specifies; but it affirms nothing. Thus, if we say, “a wise man,” which is equivalent to “a man with,” or “having wisdom,” there is no affirmation; an individual is singled from a species, under the character of wisdom, but nothing is asserted of this individual. If we say “the man is wise,” there is something affirmed of the man, and the affirmation is expressed by is. If the attribute and the assertion be combined in the expression, as in Latin vir sapit, it is obvious that the essence of the verb consists, not in denoting the attribute wisdom, but in affirming that quality, as belonging to the subject; for, if you cancel the assertion, the verb is immediately converted into an adjective, and the expression becomes vir sapiens, a wise man.
The simplest of all verbs is that which the Greeks call a verb of existence, namely, the verb to be. This verb frequently denotes pure affirmation, as “God is good,” where the verb, or copula, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the attribute denoted by the following word. Hence, as it expresses mere affirmation, the Latins call it a substantive verb, in contradistinction to those verbs which, with an attribute, denote assertion, and were called by some grammarians adjective verbs.
Sometimes it predicates pure or absolute existence, as “God is,” that is, “God exists.” In the following example it occurs in both senses. “We believe that thou art, and that thou art the rewarder of them who diligently seek thee.”
As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents, or properties. The former are the names of things, the latter what we say concerning them. These two, therefore, must be the only essential parts of speech; for to mental communication nothing else can be indispensably requisite, than to name the subject of our thoughts, and to express our sentiments of its attributes or properties. And as the verb essentially expresses affirmation, without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has been hence considered as the principal part of speech, and was therefore called, by the ancient grammarians, verb, or the word, by way of eminence. The noun, however, is unquestionably of earlier origin. To assign names to surrounding objects would be a matter of the first necessity: the next step would be to express their most common actions, or states of being. This indeed is the order of nature—the progress of intellect.
Mr. Tooke observes that, “the verb does not imply any assertion, and that no single word can.” “Till one single thing,” says he, “can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an assertion or affirmation: for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing.” This theory he illustrates by the tense ibo, which he resolves thus:
| English | Hi[40] | Wol | Ich |
| Latin | I | Vol | O |
| Greek | Ι | Βουλ | Εω. |
The first of each triad are the simple verbs, equivalent to go. The second are the verbs Wol, Vol, Βουλ, denoting will. The third are the pronouns of the first person. Whatever opinion may be formed respecting the truth of this analysis, its ingenuity will not be questioned. There are two objections, however, by which its justness may possibly be controverted. The first is, if the personal pronouns are contained, as Mr. Tooke says, in the Greek and Latin terminations of the three persons of their verbs, why is the pronoun repeated with the verb? If the o in volo be an abbreviated suffix for ego, why do we redundantly say ego volo? Now, in answer to this objection, it might be observed, were we disposed to indulge in mere hypothesis, that the involution of the pronoun may have eluded the attention of the Latins; or, if this explanation should be deemed too improbable, it may be supposed that usage, against whose decree there is no appeal, may have established the repetition of the pronoun at the expense of strict propriety. One thing particularly deserves attention, that the pronoun was seldom or never used, unless in cases where emphasis was implied, or an antithesis of persons was to be strongly marked. But without resorting to conjectures, which may be deemed vague and unsatisfactory, we may appeal to a fact which is decisive of the point in question. I have already observed, that in the Hebrew language we can distinctly mark the pronouns suffixed to the verb; yet we find the Hebrew writers repeating the pronouns even in cases where no emphasis is intended. Thus, in Gen. xlviii. 22, Ve-ani nathatti, “and I have given;” Job xix. 25, Ve-ani iadahgti, “and I knew;” Deut. ix. 2, attah iadahghta, ve-atta shamahgh ta, “thou knowest, and thou hast heard.” In these examples, the pronoun is both incorporated with the verb and repeated by itself. Whatever may be the abstract propriety of this phraseology, its existence in Hebrew is sufficient to obviate the objection proposed.
Again, it may be urged, if the pronoun ego be suffixed to the verb, why do not all the tenses in the first person singular end in o? This second objection may also be partly, if not entirely, removed. The Latin language appears to be a commixture of Greek and one of the northern languages. This commixture will account for the first person singular sometimes ending in o, in imitation of the Greeks, and at other times in m, in imitation of the Celts. The present tense of the Gaelic, a dialect of the Celtic, proceeds thus: sgriobh-aim, “I write,” sgriobh-air, sgriobh-aidh, sgriobh-amoid, sgriobh-aoidhesi, sgriobh-aidsion. Here, as Whiter observes, we have something resembling the Latin verb scribo: and it is to be remarked that the first person singular ends in m, which the Romans most probably adopted as one of their verbal terminations. And could we prosecute the inquiry, and investigate the structure of the Greek and Celtic tenses themselves, we should doubtless find, that they involve, along with the radical word, one or more terms expressing the accessary ideas of action, passion, state, person, time, and so forth. The same theory, we are persuaded, may be applied to all languages, in which the tenses are formed by variety of termination.
Nothing, I conceive, can be more evident, than that the inflexions of nouns and verbs, how inexplicable soever they may now prove, were not originally the result of systematic art, but were separate terms significant of the circumstances intended, and afterwards, by celerity of pronunciation, coalesced with the words of which they now form the terminations.
It has been observed, that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. This theory, I have remarked, is controverted by Mr. Tooke. It must be obvious, however, from the preceding observations, that the difference between the opinion of this eminent philologist, and that which is here delivered, is more apparent than real. For Mr. Tooke will not deny, that an affirmation is implied in ibo; he merely observes, that every assertion requires “a couple of terms.” Now it is of little moment to the point in question whether the two terms be incorporated in one, as in lego, or remain separate, as “I read.” In either case the verb affirms something of its nominative, whether that nominative appear in a simple or in a compound state. Sometimes the affirmation is expressed by a separate and appropriate sign, as ille est dives, “he is rich:” and the verb of existence (to be) is supposed, by several critics and philologists, to have been coeval with the earliest infancy of language. In English, the affirmation, and also the action, are frequently denoted, simply by the junction of the name of the attribute with the nominative of the subject, whether noun or pronoun. Thus, if we say, “my will,” “the children’s will,” there is no affirmation implied, and the term will is considered as a mere name. But if we say, “I will,” “the children will,” it becomes invested with a different character, and affirms the volition to belong to the subject. Thus also, “the hero’s might,” “the hero might,” “my ken” (my knowledge or ability), “I ken,” I can, or I am able; “my love,” “I love.” Mr. Tooke observes, that when we say “I love,” there is an ellipsis of the word do. This appears to me a probable opinion, though not entirely unobjectionable. For though we find the auxiliary more frequently used in old English than in modern compositions, yet it does not occur so frequently as, according to this hypothesis, we should naturally expect. Mr. Tooke indeed admits the fact; but observes, that Chaucer had less occasion to use it, because in his time the distinguishing terminations of the verb still remained, though they were not constantly employed. Now I find, as Mr. Tyrwhitt remarks, that Chaucer seldom uses the word do as an auxiliary, even in those cases where the verb and the noun are identical. This circumstance might lead us to infer that the English present was derived from the Saxon, by dropping the termination, as ic lufige, I love; the affirmation and the action being sufficiently obvious from the construction, and that it was originally optional to say either “I love,” or “I do love.” Be that as it may, the assertion expressed by “I do,” equivalent to “I act,” appears clearly to be signified by the junction of the nominative pronoun with the sign of action. Whether a note of affirmation was at first separately employed, and afterwards involved in the verbal termination, or whether the affirmation be merely inferred and not signified, this is certain, that it is by the verb, and the verb only, that we can express affirmation.
As every subject of discourse must be spoken of as either doing or suffering something, either acting or acted upon; or as neither doing nor suffering; hence verbs have been divided by all grammarians into active, passive, and neuter.
The verb active denotes that the subject of discourse is doing something, as, I write; the passive verb, that the subject suffers, or is acted upon, as, the book is burned; and the neuter denotes neither the one nor the other, but expresses merely the state, posture, or condition of the subject, as unaffected by anything else, as, I sit, I sleep, I stand.
Action, energy, or motion may either be confined to the agent, or pass from him to something extrinsic. Hence active verbs have been divided into transitive and intransitive. An active transitive verb denotes that kind of action by which the agent affects something foreign to himself, or which passes from the agent to something without him, as, to beat a drum, to whip a horse, to kill a dog. Beat, whip, kill, are active transitive verbs; and it is the characteristic of these verbs that they admit a noun after them, denoting the subject of the action.
An active intransitive verb denotes that species of action or energy, which passes not from the agent to anything else; that is, it expresses what has been termed immanent energy. Hence an intransitive verb does not admit a noun after it, there being no extrinsic subject or object affected by the action. Thus, I run, I walk, the horse gallops, are examples of active intransitive verbs[41].
Webster, in his Dissertations on the English Language, delivers it as his opinion, that the division of verbs into active, passive, and neuter is incorrect; and that the only accurate distribution is into transitive and intransitive. “Is not a man,” says he, “passive in hearing? yet hearing is called an active verb.”
It is doubtless true, that to hear, and many other verbs, commonly called active, denote chiefly, perhaps, the effect of an extrinsic or foreign act. But whether we view the matter as a question either in metaphysics or in grammar, we shall perceive but little impropriety in adopting the common distinction. For, though the verb to hear denotes, perhaps, chiefly, that a certain impression is made on the mind through the auditory organ, yet even here the mind is not entirely passive, as, were this the place for such a discussion, it would be easy to prove. I see, I hear, I feel, I perceive, denote not only the sensation in which we are passive, but also a perception, to which the consent or activity of the mind is unquestionably essential. Hence these verbs have, in all languages, been denominated active. But if the term transitive be the only correct name, it may be asked, why does Mr. Webster call this verb by that appellation? He would answer, I doubt not, “because something passes from the agent to something else.” What, then, is that something which passes? I am afraid Mr. Webster would have difficulty in answering this question, so as to justify the term transitive, without admitting the verb to be active. For, if it be not an act, an energy, or some operation of the mind, what is it, or how can it pass from one to another? The truth is, this objection of Mr. Webster to the term active in such cases, is founded neither on metaphysical nor grammatical principles; for by an active transitive verb is meant, that which admits a noun as its regimen; and, for the purposes of grammar, this name is sufficiently correct. If the point in question be metaphysically considered, it would be easy to demonstrate that, though in sensation the mind be passive, in perception it is active.
I would here observe, in passing, that there are many verbs neuter and intransitive, which, followed by a preposition, may be truly considered as active transitive verbs. These have been denominated, by the learned Dr. Campbell, compound active verbs. To laugh, for example, is a neuter verb; it cannot therefore admit a passive voice, as, “I am laughed.” To laugh at may be considered as an active transitive verb; for it not only admits an objective case after it in the active voice, but is likewise construed as a passive verb, as, “I am laughed at.” Here an obvious analogy obtains between these two and the verbs rideo, derideo, in Latin; the former of which is a neuter, and the latter an active verb. Nor, as the same ingenious writer observes, does it matter whether the preposition be prefixed to the simple verb, as in Latin, in order to form the active verb, or be put after, and detached, as is the case in English. The only grammatical criterion in our language between an active and a neuter verb is this: if the verb admits an objective case after it, either with or without a preposition, to express the subject or object of the energy, the verb may be grammatically considered as a compound active verb; for thus construed it has a passive voice. If the verb does not thus admit an objective case, it must be considered grammatically as neuter or intransitive, and has no passive voice. To smile is a neuter verb; it cannot, therefore, be followed by an objective case, nor be construed as a passive verb. We cannot say, she smiled him, or he was smiled. To smile on, according to the principle now proposed, is a compound active verb; we therefore say, she smiled on him. He was smiled on by Fortune in every undertaking[42].
As all things exist in time, and whatever is predicable of any subject must be predicated as either past, present, or future, every action, energy, or state of being, coming under one or other of these predicaments, hence arises the utility of tenses, to express the times, or relative order of their existence. In regard to the number of these tenses[43], necessary to render a language complete, grammarians have been somewhat divided in opinion.
In our language we have two simple tenses, the present and the preterperfect[44]. The latter is generally formed by adding d or ed to the present, as love, loved; fear, feared. That the suffix here is a contraction for did, as Mr. Tooke supposes, I can easily imagine; thus, fear, fear-did, feared, or did fear; but the question returns, whence comes the termination ed in doed, from which did itself is contracted? This query seems to have escaped the attention of the learned author[45].
Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional; in short, as they may take place in a variety of ways, they may be spoken of, as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accident of verbs, called a mood, expressing the mode or manner of existence. These modes are, in some languages, partly expressed by inflexions, partly by auxiliary verbs, or words significant of the model diversity. In English there is only one mood, namely, the indicative. The Greeks and Romans expressed by inflections the most common modes of action or existence, as conditionality, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty. In our language they are denoted by auxiliary verbs.
The English verb has only one voice, namely, the active. Dr. Lowth, and most other grammarians, have assigned it two voices, active and passive. Lowth has, in this instance, not only violated the simplicity of our language, but has also advanced an opinion inconsistent with his own principles. For, if he has justly excluded from the number of cases in nouns, and moods in verbs, those which are not formed by inflexion, but by the addition of prepositions and auxiliary verbs, there is equal reason for rejecting a passive voice, if it be not formed by variety of termination. Were I to ask him why he denies from a king to be an ablative case, or I may love to be the potential mood, he would answer, and very truly, that those only can be justly regarded as cases or moods which, by a different form of the noun or verb, express a different relation or a different mode of existence. If this answer be satisfactory, there can be no good reason for assigning to our language a passive voice, when that voice is formed, not by inflexion, but by an auxiliary verb. Doceor is truly a passive voice; but I am taught cannot, without impropriety, be considered as such. Besides, as it is justly observed by Dr. Ash, our author, when he parses the clause, “I am well pleased,” tells us that am is the indicative mood, present tense of the verb to be; and pleased, the passive participle of the verb to please. Now, in parsing, every word should be considered as a distinct part of speech: whether, therefore, we admit pleased to be a passive participle or not, (for this point I shall afterwards examine,) it is obvious that on the principle now laid down, and acknowledged by Dr. Lowth, am pleased is not a present passive, nor has the author himself parsed it in this manner. Into such inconsistencies do our grammarians run, from a propensity to force the grammar of our language into a conformity with the structure of Greek and Latin.
The same reasoning will also account for my assigning to English verbs no more than two tenses and one mood. For, if we consider the matter, not metaphysically, but grammatically, and regard those only as moods which are diversified by inflexion, (and, as Lowth himself observes, as far as grammar is concerned, there can be no others,) we find that our language has only one mood and two tenses.
This doctrine, in respect to the cases, is very generally admitted. For though the Greeks and Romans expressed the different relations by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does not follow that we are to acknowledge the same number of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions or words significant of these relations. The Latins would not have acknowledged absque fructu, without fruit, as forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged fructu, by fruit, as making an ablative or sixth case. And why? because the latter only was formed by inflexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of dative case to the combination of words to a king, or of ablative case to the expression from a king, to be a palpable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek or Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly master of his own language.
In the same manner it may be asked, what could lead him to distinguish a diversity of moods, or a plurality of voices, where there is no variety of termination to discriminate them? The distinction of circumstances, respecting the modes of existence, he expresses by words significant of these accidents; but he would no more dream of giving these forms of expression the name of moods, than he would be disposed to call from a king by the name of casus ablativus, or permit me to go the first person singular of the imperative mood. If, indeed, he were somewhat acquainted with Latin, he might, in the true spirit of modern grammarians, contend that let me go, or permit me to go, is truly the first person singular of the imperative mood; assigning as a reason for this assertion, that such is the designation of eam in Latin. With the most correct knowledge, however, of his own language only, he could never be seduced into this absurdity. A little reflection indeed might teach him, that even eam in Latin is an elliptical expression for sine ut eam, the word eam itself denoting neither entreaty nor command.
In truth, we may as reasonably contend that our language has all the tenses which are to be found in Greek and Latin, because, by the aid of auxiliaries and definitives, we contrive to express what they denoted by one word, as to contend that we have a potential, an optative or imperative mood, or a passive voice; because by auxiliaries or variety of arrangement we can express the circumstances of power, liberty, duty, passion, &c. No grammarian has yet gone so far as to affirm that we have in English a paulo post future, because our language, by definitives or auxiliaries, is capable of expressing that time. Or, what should we think of that person’s discernment, who should contend that the Latins had an optative mood, because utinam legeres signifies “I wish you would read”? It is equally absurd to say that we have an imperfect, preterpluperfect, or future tenses; or that we have all the Greek varieties of mood, and two voices, because by the aid of auxiliary words and definite terms we contrive to express these accidents, times, or states of being. I consider, therefore, that we have no more cases, moods, tenses, or voices in our language, as far as its grammar, not its capacity of expression, is concerned, than we have variety of termination to denote these different accessary ideas.
As the terminations of most verbs in languages are varied by tense and mood, so are they also varied according as the subject is of the first, second, or third person. Thus, in the only two tenses that we have in English, namely, the present and the preterperfect tenses, the second person singular of each is formed from the first, by adding st or est, as, I love, thou lovest; I loved, thou lovedst; and the third person singular of the present is formed by adding s, or the syllable eth or th, to the first as, love, loves, or loveth; read, reads, or readeth. These are the only variations which our verbs admit, in concordance with the person of the nominative singular. The three persons plural are always the same with the first person singular.
Before I proceed to the conjugation of verbs in general, I shall first explain the manner in which the auxiliaries are conjugated. Of these the most extensively useful is the verb to be, denoting simple affirmation, or expressing existence. The next is that which signifies action, namely, the verb to do. The third is the verb to have, implying possession. The others are, shall, will, may, can, &c. I begin with the verb to be.
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present Tense. | |||
| Sing.[46] | I am | Thou art | He, she, or it is |
| Plur. | We are | Ye or you are | They are. |
| Preterite. | |||
| Sing. | I was | Thou wast[47] | He was |
| Plur. | We were | Ye or you were | They were. |
| Imperfect Conditional. | |||
| Sing. | I were | Thou wert | He were |
| Plur. | We were | Ye or you were | They were. |
| Infinitive. | |||
| To be. | |||
It may seem inconsistent with the opinion which I have delivered concerning moods, to assign an infinitive to this verb; and the existence of this infinitive may appear, perhaps, a sufficient refutation of that opinion. I shall, therefore, briefly repeat what I have said, and offer a few additional observations.
I have remarked that the first care of men, in a rude and infant state, would be to assign names to surrounding objects; and that the noun, in the natural order of things, must have been the first part of speech. Their inventive powers would next be employed to express the most common energies or states of being, such as are denoted by the verbs to do, to be, to suffer. Hence, by the help of these combined with a noun, they might express the energy or state of that thing, of which the noun was the name. Thus, I shall suppose that they assigned the word plant, as the name of a vegetable set in the ground. To express the act of setting it, they would say, do plant, that is, act plant. The letters d and t being nearly allied, it is easy to conceive how the word do, by a variation very natural and common to all languages, might be changed into to; and thus the word to prefixed to a noun would express the correspondent energy or action.
In what light, then, are we to consider the phrase to plant, termed an infinitive, or to what class of words is it reducible? Previously to my answering this question, it is necessary to remind the reader, that a verb joined to a noun forms a sentence; that affirmation is essential to the character of a verb; and that, for this reason, and this only, it has been pre-eminently distinguished by the name of verb, or the word. Destroy this characteristic, and it is immediately confounded with the adjective, or the participle. It is its power of predication only, which constitutes it a distinct part of speech, and discriminates it from every other. Vir sapit, and vir est sapiens, are equivalent expressions. Cancel the assertion, and the verb is lost. The expression becomes vir sapiens, “a wise man.” This opinion, I am persuaded, requires only to be examined to be universally adopted. If this be the case, the infinitive which affirms nothing, cannot, without impropriety, be deemed a verb. It expresses merely an action, passion, or state abstractedly. Hence many grammarians have justly considered it as no part of the verb; and, in the languages of Greece and Rome, the infinitive was employed like a common substantive, having frequently an adjective joined with it, and subject to the government of verbs and prepositions. This opinion has been lately controverted by a writer of considerable eminence as a Latin scholar. But, after examining the matter with attention, I take upon me to affirm, that not a single example can be produced wherein the infinitive, as used by the Greeks and Romans, might not be supplied by the substitution of a noun. Wherefore, admitting the established principle, voces valent significatione, there cannot exist a doubt that the infinitive, which may in all cases be supplied by a noun, has itself the real character of a noun. And, if the essence of a verb consist in predication, and not, as some think, in implying time in conjunction with an attribute, which is the characteristic of a participle, then the infinitive, as it can predicate nothing, and joined to a substantive makes no sentence, cannot therefore be deemed a verb. When I say, legere est facile, “to read is easy,” it is obvious that there is only one sentence in each of these expressions. But if legere (to read) were a verb as well as est (is), then there would be two verbs and also two affirmations, for affirmation is inseparable from a verb. I remark also, that the verbal noun lectio (reading) substituted for legere (to read) would precisely express the same sentiment. For these reasons I concur decidedly with those grammarians who are so far from considering the infinitive as a distinct mood, that they entirely exclude it from the appellation of verb[48].
It may be asked, what then is it to be called? In answer to this query, I observe, that it matters little what designation be assigned to it, provided its character and office be fully understood. The ancient Latin grammarians, as Priscian informs us, termed it properly enough, nomen verbi, “the noun or name of the verb.” To proscribe terms, which have been long familiar to us, and, by immemorial possession, have gained an establishment, is always a difficult, and frequently an ungracious task. I shall therefore retain its usual name, having sufficiently guarded the reader against a misconception of its character.
Now, in our language, the infinitive has not even the distinction arising from termination, to entitle it to be ranked in the number of moods; its form being the same with that of the present tense, and probably, both in its termination and its prefix, originally identical. For, if the doctrine just proposed be correct, the word do was put before each. To this rule the English language furnishes only one exception, namely, the verb of existence, in which the present indicative is am, whereas the infinitive is to be. This, however, can scarcely be deemed an exception, when it is considered, that the present indicative of this verb was originally be as well as am; though the former be now in a state of obsolescence, or rather entirely obsolete. At the same time, as this is the only verb in which the infinitive differs in form from the present of the indicative, I have judged it necessary to note the exception, and assign the infinitive.
| Present part. | Being |
| Past part. | Been[49]. |
| TO DO. | |||
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing. | I do | Thou doest or dost | He doeth, doth or does |
| Plur. | We do | Ye or you do | They do. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I did | Thou didst | He, she, or it did[50] |
| Plur. | We did | Ye or you did | They did. |
| Participles. | |
| Present | Doing |
| Past | Done. |
| TO HAVE. | |||
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing. | I have | Thou hast | He hath or has |
| Plur. | We have | Ye or you have | They have. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I had | Thou hadst | He had |
| Plur. | We had | Ye or you had | They had. |
| Participles. | |
| Present | Having |
| Past | Had. |
| Liberty is expressed by the verb | |||
| MAY. | |||
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing. | I may | Thou mayest | He may |
| Plur. | We may | Ye or you may | They may[51]. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I might | Thou mightest | He might |
| Plur. | We might | Ye or you might | They might. |
| Power or ability is expressed by | |||
| CAN. | |||
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing. | I can | Thou canst | He can |
| Plur. | We can | Ye or you can | They can[52]. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I could | Thou couldst | He could |
| Plur. | We could | Ye or you could | They could. |
Futurition and duty are expressed by the verb shall, but not each in the three persons.
| Indicative Mood. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing.[53] | I shall | Thou shalt | He shall |
| Plur. | We shall | Ye or you shall | They shall. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I should | Thou shouldst | He should |
| Plur. | We should | Ye or you should | They should. |
| Volition and futurity are expressed by the verb to will. | |||
| Present. | |||
| Sing. | I will | Thou wilt | He will |
| Plur. | We will | Ye or you will | They will[54]. |
| Preterperfect. | |||
| Sing. | I would | Thou wouldst | He would |
| Plur. | We would | Ye or you would | They would. |
Priestley and Lowth, who have in this been followed by most other grammarians, call the tenses may, can, shall, will, absolute tenses; might, could, should, would, conditional. That might, could, should, would, frequently imply conditionality, there can be no question; but I am persuaded that the proper character of these tenses is unconditional affirmation, and for these two reasons:
1st. Their formation seems to indicate that they are preterites indicative, proceeding from their respective presents, in the same manner as did from do, had from have, and having therefore the same unconditional meaning. Thus, I may, is equivalent to “I am at liberty;” I might, to “I was at liberty;” I can, means “I am able;” I could, “I was able;” I will, “I am willing;” I would, “I was willing.”
2dly. They are used to express unconditional meaning. If we say, “This might prove fatal to your interest,” the assertion of the possibility of the event is as unconditional as absolute, as, “This may prove fatal to your interest.” “This, if you do it, will ruin your cause,” is precisely equivalent to, “This, were you to do it, would ruin your cause;” equivalent as far, at least, as the unconditional affirmation of the consequence of a supposed action is involved[55]. “I may write, if I choose,” is not more absolute than “I might write, if I chose.” If I say, “I might have gone to the Continent,” the expression is as unconditional as, “I had it in my power,” “I was at liberty to go to the Continent.” “Can you construe Lycophron?” “I cannot now; but once I could.” “May you do as you please?” “Not now; but once I might.” Is there any conditionality implied in the latter clause of each of these answers? Not the least. They are unconditionally assertive. The formation of these tenses, therefore, being analogous to that of preterites indicative, and their import in these examples, as in many others which might be adduced, being unconditional and absolute, I am inclined to consider them as preterites indicative, agreeably to their form, and as properly unconditional in respect to signification.
I observe, however, that though might, could, would, should, are preterite tenses, they are frequently employed to denote present time[56]; but in such examples care must be taken that congruity of tense be preserved, and that the subsequent be expressed in the same tense with the antecedent verb. Thus I say, “I may go if I choose,” where the liberty and inclination are each expressed as present; or, “I might go if I chose,” where, though present time be implied, the liberty is expressed by the preterite, and the inclination is denoted by the same tense.
Before I proceed to show how these auxiliary verbs are joined with others, to express the intended accessary ideas, I shall offer a few observations on the participle.
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE PARTICIPLE.
A participle is a part of speech derived from a verb, agreeing with its primitive in denoting action, being, or suffering, but differing from it in this, that the participle implies no affirmation[57].
There are two participles, the present, ending in ing, as reading[58]; and the perfect or past, generally ending in d or ed, as heard, loved.
The present participle denotes the relatively present, or the contemporary continuation of an action, or state of being. If we say, “James was building the house,” the participle expresses the continuation of the action, and the verb may be considered as active. If we say, “the house was building, when the wall fell,” the participle, the same as in the preceding example, denotes here the continuation of a state of suffering, or being acted upon; and the verb may be considered as passive. This participle, therefore, denoting either action or passion, cannot with propriety be considered, as it has been by some grammarians, as entirely an active participle. Its distinctive and real character is, that in point of time it denotes the relatively present, and may therefore be called the present participle; and, in regard to action or passion, it denotes their continuance or incompletion, and may therefore be termed imperfect. In respect to time, therefore, it is present; in respect to the action or state of being, it is continued or imperfect. But whether it express action or passion can be ascertained only by inquiring whether the subject be acting or suffering; and this is a question which judgment only can decide, the participle itself not determining the point. If we say, “the prisoner was burning,” our knowledge of the subject only can enable us to determine whether the prisoner was active or passive; whether he was employing fire to consume, or was himself consuming by fire.
The other participle, ending generally in ed or d, has been called by some grammarians the passive participle, in contradistinction to the one which we have now been considering, and which they have termed the active participle. “This participle has been so called,” says the author of the British Grammar, “because, joined with the verb to be, it forms the passive voice.” If the reason here assigned justify its denomination as a passive participle, there exists the same reason for calling it an active participle; for, with the verb to have, it forms some of the compound tenses of the active voice. The truth is, that, as those grammarians have erred who consider the participle in ing as an active participle, when it in fact denotes either action or passion, so those, on the other hand, commit a similar mistake, who regard the participle in ed as purely passive. A little attention will suffice to show that it belongs to neither the one voice nor the other peculiarly: and that it denotes merely completion or perfection, in contradistinction to the other participle, which expresses imperfection or continuation. If it be true, indeed, that the participle in ing does not belong to the active voice only, but expresses merely the continuation of any act, passion, or state of being, analogy would incline us to infer, that the participle in ed, which denotes the completion of an act or state of being, cannot belong exclusively to the passive voice; and I conceive that, on inquiry, we shall find this to be the case. If I say, “he had concealed a poniard under his coat,” the participle here would be considered as active. If I say, “he had a poniard concealed under his clothes,” the participle would be regarded as passive. Does not this prove that this participle is ambiguous, that it properly belongs to neither voice, and that the context only, or the arrangement, can determine, whether it denote the perfection of an action, or the completion of a passion or state of being? When I say, “Lucretia stabbed herself with a dagger, which she had concealed under her clothes,” it is impossible to ascertain whether the participle be active or passive, that is, whether the verb had be here merely an auxiliary verb, or be synonymous with the verb to possess. If the former be intended, the syntactical collocation is, “she had concealed (which) dagger under her clothes:” if the latter, the grammatical order is, “she had which dagger concealed:” and it requires but little discernment to perceive that “she had concealed a dagger,” and “had a dagger concealed,” are expressions by no means precisely equivalent.
I need not here remind the classical scholar, that the Latins had two distinct forms of expression to mark this diversity; the one, quem abdiderat, and the other quem abditum habebat. The latter is the phraseology of Livy, describing the suicide of Lucretia. His words, if translated, “which she had concealed,” become ambiguous; for this is equally a translation of quem abdiderat. It is observable also, that the phrase quem abdiderat would not imply, that the dagger was in the possession of Lucretia at the time.
The participle in ed, therefore, I consider to be perfectly analogous to the participle in ing, and used like it in either an active or passive sense; belonging, therefore, neither to the one voice nor the other exclusively, but denoting the completion of an action or state of being, while the participle in ing denotes its continuation.
In exhibiting a paradigm of the conjugation of our verbs, many grammarians have implicitly and servilely copied the Latin grammar, transferring into our language the names both of tenses and moods which have formally no existence in English. “I may burn,” is denominated, by the author of the British Grammar, the present subjunctive; “I might burn,” the imperfect subjunctive; “I may have burned,” the preterperfect; and so on. This is directly repugnant to the simplicity of our language, and is in truth as absurd as it would be to call “we two love,” the dual number of the present tense; or “he shall soon be buried,” a paulo post future. Were this principle carried its full length, we should have all the tenses, moods, and numbers, which are to be found in Greek or Latin. It appears to me, that nothing but prejudice or affectation could have prompted our English grammarians to desert the simple structure of their own language, and wantonly to perplex it with technical terms, for things not existing in the language itself.
I purpose, therefore, in exhibiting the conjugation of the English verb, to give the simple tenses, as the only ones belonging to our language; and then show how, by the aid of other words combined with these, we contrive to express the requisite modifications, and various accessary ideas.
| Indicative Present. | Preter. | Part. Perf. |
| Write | Wrote | Written. |
| Present Tense. | |||
| S. | I write | Thou writest | He writes or writeth |
| P. | We write | Ye or you write | They write. |
This tense is by some grammarians called the present indefinite; while by others it is considered as either definite or indefinite. When it expresses an action now present, it is termed the present definite, as,
“I write this after a severe illness.”—Pope’s Letters.
“Saul, why persecutest thou me?”—Bible.
“This day begins the woe, others must end.”—Shakspeare.
If the proposition expressed be general, or true at all times, this tense is then termed the present indefinite; as, “The wicked flee, when no man pursueth.”
“Through tatter’d clothes small vices do appear;
Robes and furred gowns hide all.”—Shakspeare.
| Preterperfect. | |||
| S. | I wrote | Thou wrotest | He wrote |
| P. | We wrote | Ye or you wrote | They wrote. |
This tense is indefinite, no particular past time being implied.
These are the only two tenses in our language formed by varying the termination; the only two tenses, therefore, which properly belong to it.
| Present Progressive, or continued. | |||
| S. | I am writing | Thou art writing | He is writing |
| P. | We are writing | You are writing | They are writing. |
This tense denotes a present action proceeding. In regard to time, it has been termed definite; and, in respect to action, it differs from the other present in this, that the former has no reference either to the perfection or imperfection of the action; whereas this denotes that the action is continued and imperfect.
| Present Emphatic. | |||
| S. | I do write | Thou dost write | He doth or does write |
| P. | We do write | Ye or you do write | They do write. |
This form of the verb is emphatic, and generally implies doubt or contradiction on the part of the person addressed, to remove which the assertion is enforced by the auxiliary verb. In respect to time and action, it is precisely the same with I write.
“You cannot dread an honourable death.”
“I do dread it.”
“Excellent wretch! perdition seize my soul, but I do love thee.”
Cancel the auxiliary verb, and the expression becomes feeble and spiritless. This is one of those phraseologies, which it would be impossible to render in a transpositive language. Di me perdant, quin te amem, is an expression comparatively exanimate and insipid.
| Preterite, Indefinite, and Emphatic. | |||
| S. | I did write | Thou didst write | He did write |
| P. | We did write | You did write | They did write. |
as, “This to me in dreadful secrecy impart they did.” The emphasis here, however, may partly arise from the inverted collocation. The following example is therefore more apposite. “I have been told that you have slighted me, and said, I feared to face my enemy. You surely did not wrong me thus?” “I did say so.”
This tense is indefinite, in respect both to the time, and the completion of the action.
| Preter. Imp. &c. continued. | |||
| S. | I was writing | Thou wast writing | He was writing |
| P. | We were writing | Ye were writing | They were writing. |
This tense denotes that an action was proceeding, or going on, at a time past either specified or implied, as “I was writing when you called.”
| Preterperfect. | |||||
| S. | I have | Thou hast | He has | } | written. |
| P. | We have | You have | They have | } | |
This tense expresses time as past, and the action as perfect. It is compounded of the present tense of the verb denoting possession and the perfect participle. It signifies a perfect action either newly finished, or in a time of which there is some part to elapse, or an action whose consequences extend to the present. In short, it clearly refers to present time. This, indeed, the composition of the tense manifestly evinces. Thus, “I have written a letter,” means “I possess at present the finished action of writing a letter.” This phraseology, I acknowledge, seems uncouth and inelegant; but, how awkward soever it may appear, the tense is unquestionably thus resolvable.
1st. It expresses an action newly finished, as, “I understand that a messenger has arrived from Paris,” that is, “newly,” or “just now,” arrived.
2dly. An action done in a space of time, part of which is yet to elapse; as, “It has rained all this week,” “We have seen strange things this century.”
3dly. An action perfected some time ago, but whose consequences extend to the present time; as, “I have wasted my time, and now suffer for my folly.”
This tense has been termed, by some grammarians, the perfect indefinite, and “I wrote,” the perfect definite. The argument which they offer for this denomination is, that the latter admits a definitive, to specify the precise time, and the former rejects it. Those who reason in this manner seem to me not only chargeable with a perversion of terms, but also to disprove their own theory. For what is meant by a definite term? Not surely that which admits or requires a definitive to give it precision; but that which of itself is already definite. If, therefore, “I wrote,” not only admits, but even requires, the subjunction of a defining term or clause to render the time definite and precise, it cannot surely be itself a definite tense. Besides, they appear to me to reason in this case inconsistently with their own principles. For they call I am writing a definite tense; and why? but because it defines the action to be imperfect, or the time to be relatively present[59]. But if they reason here as they do in respect to the preterite tenses, they ought to call this an indefinite tense, because it admits not a definitive clause. They must, therefore, either acknowledge that I have written is a definite tense, and I wrote, indefinite; or they must, contrary to their own principles, call I am writing indefinite.
Dr. Arthur Browne, in an Essay on the Greek Tenses[60], contends, that I wrote is the perfect definite, and I have written the perfect indefinite. “I wrote,” says he, “is not intelligible without referring to some precise point of time, e.g. when I was in France. Why, then, does Dr. Beattie say I wrote is indefinite, because it refers to no particular past time? No: it is indefinite because the verb in that tense does not define whether the action be complete or not complete. And why does he say, I have written is definite in respect of time? for it refers to no particular time at which the event happened. Put this example: A says to B, ‘I wish you would write to that man.’ ‘I have written to him,’ the sense is complete; the expression is not supposed to refer to any particular time, and does not necessarily elicit any further inquiry. But if B answers, ‘I wrote to him,’ he is of course supposed to have in his mind a reference to some particular time, and it naturally calls on A to ask when? It is not clear, then, that I wrote refers to some particular time, and cannot have been called indefinite, as Dr. Beattie supposes, from its not doing so?”
Dr. Browne’s argument is chargeable with inconsistency. He says, that because I have written elicits no farther inquiry, and renders the sense complete, it denotes no determinate time; and that I wrote refers to a particular time, prompting to farther inquiry. This at least I take to be the scope of his reasoning; for if it be not from their occasioning, or not occasioning, farther interrogation, that he deduces his conclusion concerning the nature of these tenses, his argument seems nothing but pure assertion. Now, so far from calling that a definite tense, which necessarily requires, as he himself states, a defining clause to specify the point of time, I should call it an indefinite tense. He admits that I wrote refers to time past in general, and that it requires some farther specification to render the time known, as I wrote yesterday. In this case, surely it is not the term wrote, but yesterday, which defines the precise time; the tense itself expressing nothing but past time in general.
For the same reason, if, as he acknowledges, I have written elicits no farther inquiry, it is an argument that the sense is complete, and the time sufficiently understood by the hearer. Besides, is it not somewhat paradoxical to say that a tense which renders farther explanation unnecessary, and the sense complete, thus satisfying the hearer, is indefinite? and that a tense which does not satisfy the hearer, but renders farther inquiry necessary, is definite? This, to say the least, is somewhat extraordinary.
The observations of Lord Monboddo on this subject are not inapplicable to the point in question: I shall therefore transcribe them.
“There are actions,” says he, “which end in energy, and produce no work which remains after them. What shall we say of such actions? cannot we say, I have danced a dance, taken a walk, &c., and how can such actions be said in any sense to be present? My answer is, that the consequences of such actions, respecting the speaker, or some other person or thing, are present, and what these consequences are, appears from the tenor of the discourse. ‘I have taken a walk, and am much better for it.’ ‘I have danced a dance, and am inclined to dance no more.’”
The order of nature being maintained, as Mr. Harris observes, by a succession of contrarieties, the termination of one state of things naturally implies the commencement of its contrary. Hence this tense has been employed to denote an attribute the contrary to that which is expressed by the verb. Thus the Latins used vixit, “he hath lived,” to denote “he is dead;” fuit Ilium, “Troy has been,” to signify Troy is no more. A similar phraseology obtains in English; thus, “I have been young,” is equivalent to “now I am old.”
| Preter Imperfect. | |||||
| Sing. | I have been | Thou hast been | He has been | } | writing. |
| Plur. | We have been | You have been | They have been | } | |
This tense, in respect to time, is the same as the last, but implies the imperfection of the action, and denotes its progression.
| Preter Pluperfect. | |||||
| Sing. | I had | Thou hadst | He had | } | written. |
| Plur. | We had | Ye or you had | They had | } | |
This tense denotes that an action was perfected before another action was done.
| Plusquam Preterite Imperfect. | |||||
| Sing. | I had been | Thou hadst been | He had been | } | writing. |
| Plur. | We had been | Ye had been | They had been | } | |
This tense, in respect to time, is more than past, and in respect to action is imperfect. It denotes that an action was going on, or in a state of progression, before another action took place, or before it was perfected; as, “I had been writing before you arrived.”
| Future Indefinite. | |||||
| Sing. | I shall | Thou shalt | He shall | } | write. |
| Plur. | We shall | Ye or you shall | They shall | } | |
| OR | |||||
| Sing. | I will | Thou wilt | He will | } | write. |
| Plur. | We will | Ye or you will | They will | } | |
These compound tenses denote the futurity of an action indefinitely, without any reference to its completion. The meaning of the several persons has been already explained.
| Future Imp. Progressive. | |||
| I shall or will be | We shall or will be | } | |
| Thou shalt or wilt be | Ye shall or will be | } | writing. |
| He shall or will be | They shall or will be | } | |
This tense agrees with the former in respect to time, but differs from it in this, that the former has no reference to the completion of the action, while the latter expresses its imperfection and progression.
| Future Perfect. | |||
| I shall have | We shall have | } | |
| Thou shalt have | Ye shall have | } | written. |
| He shall have | They shall have | } | |
This tense denotes that a future action will be perfected, before the commencement or completion of another action, or before a certain future time; as, “Before you can have an answer, I shall have written a second letter.” “By the time he shall have arrived, you will have conquered every difficulty.” In short, it denotes, that at some future time an action will be perfected.
As it has been a subject of great controversy among grammarians, what tenses should be called definite and what indefinite, I shall now offer a few observations which may serve to illustrate the point in question.
Duration, like space, is continuous and uninterrupted. It is divisible in idea only. It is past or future, merely in respect to some intermediate point, which the mind fixes as the limit between the one and the other. Present time, in truth, does not exist, any more than a mathematical line can have breadth, or a mathematical point be composed of parts. This position has, indeed, been controverted by Dr. Beattie; but, in my judgment, without the shadow of philosophical argument[61]. Harris, Reid, and several others, have incontrovertibly proved it. But though present time, philosophically speaking, has no existence, we find it convenient to assume a certain portion of the past and the future, as intermediate spaces between these extremes, and to consider these spaces as present; for example, the present day, the present week, the present year, the present century, though part of these several periods be past, and part to come. We speak of them, however, as present, as “this month,” “this year,” “this day.” Time being thus in its nature continuous, and past and future being merely relative terms, some, portion or point of time being conceived where the one begins and the other ends, it is obvious that all tenses indicative of any of these two general divisions must denote relative time, that is, time past or future, in relation to some conceived or assumed space; thus it may be past or future, in respect to the present hour, the present day, the present week.
Again. The term indefinite is applicable either to time or to action. It may, therefore, be the predicate of a tense denoting either that the precise time is left undetermined, or that the action specified is not signified, as either complete or imperfect. Hence the controversy has been partly verbal. Hence, also, the contending parties have seemed to differ, while, in fact, they were agreed; and, on the contrary, have seemed to accord, while their opinions were, in truth, mutually repugnant.
Dr. Browne confines the term to action only, and pleads the authority of Mr. Harris in his favour. It is true, indeed, that Mr. Harris calls those tenses definite which denote the beginning, the middle, or the perfection of an action: but it is obvious, from the most superficial examination of his theory, that he denominates the tenses definite or indefinite, not in respect to action, but to time. When, in the passage from Milton,
“Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,
Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep;”
he considers “walk” as indefinite, is it in regard to action? No. “It is,” says he, “because they were walking, not at that instant only, but indefinitely, at any instant whatever.” And when he terms, Thou shalt not kill, an indefinite tense, is it because it has no reference to the completion or the imperfection of the action? No; it is “because,” says he, “this means no particular future time, but is extended indefinitely to every part of time.” Besides, if Mr. Harris’s and Dr. Browne’s ideas coincide, how comes it that the one calls that a definite tense, which the other terms indefinite? This does not look like accordance in sentiment, or in the application of terms. Yet the tenses in such examples as these,
“The wicked flee when no man pursueth;”
“Ad pœnitendum properat, cito qui judicat;”
“God is good;” “Two and two are four;”
which Harris and Beattie properly call indefinite, Browne terms definite. Nay, he denominates them thus for the very reason for which the others call them indefinite, namely, because the sentiments are always true, and the time of their existence never perfectly past. So far in respect to Mr. Harris’s authority in favour of Browne, when he confines the terms definite and indefinite to action only[62].
But I forbear to prosecute this controversy further, or to point out the inaccuracies with which I apprehend many writers on this subject are chargeable. I therefore proceed to review and illustrate the doctrine of the tenses which I have already offered.
The present time being, as I have already observed, an assumed space, and of no definite extent, as it may be either the present minute, the present hour, the present month, the present year, all of which consist of parts, it follows that, as the present time is itself indefinite, having no real existence, but being an arbitrary conception of the mind, the tense significant of that time must be also indefinite. This, I conceive, must be sufficiently evident. Hence the present tense not only admits, but frequently requires, the definitive now to limit the interval between past and future, or to note the precise point of time.
Time past and time future are conceived as infinitely more extended than the present. The tenses, therefore, significant of these two grand divisions of time, are also necessarily indefinite.
Again, an action may be expressed, either as finished, or as proceeding; or it may be the subject of affirmation, without any reference to either of these states. In English, to denote the continuation of the action we employ the present or imperfect participle; and to denote its completion we use the preterite or perfect participle. When neither is implied, the tenses significant of the three divisions of time, without any regard to the action as complete or imperfect, are uniformly employed.
The tenses, therefore, indefinite as to time and action are these:
| The Present | I write |
| The Preterite | I wrote |
| The Future | I shall write. |
The six following compound tenses are equally indefinite in point of time; but they denote either the completion or the progress of the action, and in this respect are definite.
| Its progress. | Its perfection, as |
| I am writing | I have written |
| I was writing | I had written |
| I shall be writing | I shall have written. |
I write I am writing I have written.
The first is indefinite as to time and action. If I say, “I write,” it is impossible to ascertain by the mere expression, whether be signified, “I write now,” “I write daily,” or, “I am a writer in general.” It is the concomitant circumstances only, either expressed or understood, which can determine what part of the present time is implied. When Pope introduces a letter to Lady M. W. Montague with these words, “I write this after a severe illness,” is it the tense which marks the time, or is it not the date of the letter, with which the writing is understood to be contemporary? If you and I should see a person writing, and either of us should say, “He writes,” the proposition would be particular, and time present with the speaker’s observation would be understood: but, is it not evident, that it is not the tense which defines the present now, but the obvious circumstances of the person’s writing at the time? And when the king, in Hamlet, says,
“My words fly up, my thoughts remain below:
Words, without thoughts, never to heaven go,”
what renders the two first propositions particular, or confines the tenses to the time then present, while the last proposition is universally true, and the tense indefinite? Nothing, I conceive, but the circumstances of the speaker. Nay, does it not frequently happen, that we must subjoin the word now to this tense, in order to define the point of time? Did the tense of itself note the precise time, this definitive would in no case be necessary. If I say, “Apples are ripe,” the proposition, considered independently on adventitious circumstances, is general and indefinite. The time may be defined by adding a specific clause, as, “in the month of October;” or, if nothing be subjoined, the ellipsis is supplied either by the previous conversation, or in some other way, and the hearer understands, “are now ripe.” This tense, therefore, I consider as indefinite in point of time. That it is indefinite in regard to action, there can be no question.
I am writing.
This tense also is indefinite in respect to time. It derives its character as a tense from the verb am, which implies affirmation with time, either now, generally, or always. Mr. Harris calls it the present definite, as I have already remarked; and in regard to action it is clearly definite. It is this, and this only, which distinguishes it from the other present, I write, the latter having no reference to the perfection or imperfection of the action, while I am writing denotes its continuation. Hence it is, that the latter is employed to express propositions generally or universally true, the idea of perfection or incompletion being, in such cases, excluded. Thus we say, The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but not, as I conceive, with equal propriety, The wicked are fleeing when no man is pursuing.
I have written.
As I am writing denotes the present continuation of an action, so I have written expresses an action completed in a time supposed to be continued to the present, or an action whose consequences extend to the present time. As a tense, it derives its character from the tense I have, significant of present time; while the perfection of the action is denoted by the perfect participle. But as I have shown that every tense significant of present time must be, in regard to time, indefinite, so this tense, compounded of the present tense I have, must, in this respect, be therefore indefinite.
Lowth, Priestley, Beattie, Harris, and several others, have assigned it the name of the preterite definite, and I wrote they have termed the preterite indefinite. Browne, and one or two others, have reversed this denomination. Now, that I wrote does not of itself define what part of past time is specified, appears to me very evident. This is, indeed, admitted by those who contend for the definite nature of this tense. Why, then, do they call it a definite tense? Because, they say, it admits a definitive term, by the aid of which it expresses the precise time, as, “I wrote yesterday,” “a week ago,” “last month;” whereas we cannot say, “I have written yesterday.” Now, as I remarked before, this appears to me a perversion of language; for we do not denominate that term definite, which requires a definitive to render it precise. Why have the terms the, this, that, been called definitives? Is it because they admit a defining term? or is it not because they limit or define the import of general terms? I concur, therefore, with the author of the article “Aorist,” in the “Nouvelle Encyclopédie,” when he ridicules a M. Demandre for giving the character of definite to a tense which marks past time indefinitely. This certainly is a perversion of terms.
“When we make use of the auxiliary verb,” says Dr. Priestley, “we have no idea of any certain portion of time intervening between the time of action and the time of speaking of it; the time of action being some period that extends to the present, as, ‘I have this year, this morning, written,’ spoken in the same year, the same morning; whereas, speaking of an action done in a period past, we use the preterite tense and say, ‘I wrote,’ intimating that a certain portion of time is past, between the time of action and the time of speaking of it.” To the same purpose nearly are the words of the author of the article “Grammar,” in the “Encyclopedia Britannica.” “I have written,” says he, “is always joined with a portion of time which includes the present now or instant; for otherwise it could not signify, as it always does, the present possession of the finishing of an action. But the aorist, which signifies no such possession, is as constantly joined with a portion of past time, which excludes the present now or instant. Thus we say, ‘I have written a letter this day,’ ‘this week,’ &c., but ‘I wrote a letter yesterday;’ and to interchange these expressions would be improper.”
The explanation which these grammarians have given of the tense I have written, appears to me perfectly correct, and I would add, that, though the interval between the time of action and the time of speaking of it may be considerable; yet, if the mind, in consequence of the effect’s being extended to the present time, should conceive no time to have intervened, this tense is uniformly employed.
That the aorist excludes the present instant is equally true: but that it is incapable of being joined, as the latter of these grammarians supposes, to a portion of time part of which is not yet elapsed, is an assertion by no means correct; for I can say, “I wrote to-day,” or “this day,” as well as, “I have written.” “I dined to-day,” says Swift, “with Mr. Secretary St. John.” “I took some good walks in the park to-day.” “I walked purely to-day about the park.” “I was this morning with Mr. Secretary about some business.” Numberless other examples might be produced in which this tense is joined with a portion of time not wholly elapsed.
What then, it may be asked, is the difference between this and the tense which is termed the preterite definite? I shall endeavour to explain it, though, in doing this, I may be chargeable with repetition.
When an action is done in a time continuous to the present instant, we employ the auxiliary verb. Thus on finishing a letter I say, “I have written my letter,” “I possess (now) the finished action of writing a letter.”
Again: When an action is done in a space of time which the mind assumes as present, or when we express our immediate possession of things done in that space, we use the auxiliary verb. “I have this week written several letters.” “I have now the perfection of writing several letters, finished this week.”[63]
Again: When an action has been done long ago, but the mind is still in possession of its consequences, these having been extended to the present time, unconscious or regardless of the interval between the time of acting and the time of speaking, we use the auxiliary verb. Thus, “I, like others, have, in my youth, trifled with my health, and old age now prematurely assails me.” In all these cases, there is a clear reference to present time. I have must imply present possession, and that the action, either as finished or proceeding, is present to the speaker. This must be admitted, unless we suppose that the term have has no appropriate or determinate meaning.
On the other hand, the aorist excludes all idea of the present instant. It supposes an interval to have elapsed between the time of the action and the time of speaking of it; the action is represented as leaving nothing behind it which the mind conceives to have any relation to its present circumstances, as “Three days ago I lodged in the Strand.”
But, though it unquestionably excludes the present instant, or the moment of speaking, which the verb have embraces, yet it does not exclude that portion of present time which is represented as passing. All that is necessary to the use of this tense is, that the present now be excluded, that an interval have elapsed between the time of action and the time of speaking of it, and that these times shall not appear to be continuous. When Swift says, “It has snowed terribly all night, and is vengeance cold,” it is to be observed, that though the former of these events took place in a time making no part of the day then passing, yet its effects extended to that day; he therefore employs the auxiliary verb. When he says, “I have been dining to-day at Lord Mountjoy’s, and am come home to study,” he, in like manner, connects the two circumstances as continuous.
But when he says, “It snowed all this morning, and was some inches thick in three or four hours,” it is to be observed that, contrary to the opinion of the author[64] I have quoted, he joins the aorist with a portion of time then conceived as present or passing, but the circumstances which had taken place were nowise connected with the time of his writing, or conceived as continuous to the date of his letter. If he had said, “It has snowed all this morning, and is now two inches thick,” the two times would have appeared as continuous, their events being connected as cause and effect.
I wrote I was writing I had written.
The first of these, as a tense, has been already explained; it remains, therefore, to inquire, whether it be definite or indefinite in respect to action.
I observe, then, that a tense may frequently, by inference, denote the perfection of an action, and thus appear to be definite; though, in its real import, it be significant neither of completion nor imperfection, and therefore, in regard to action, is indefinite. This seems to be the character of the tenses, I write, I wrote, I shall write.
“Mr. Harris,” says Browne, “truly calls I wrote and I write indefinites, although the man who wrote, has written, that is, the action is perfected, and the man who writes, is writing, that is, the action is imperfect; but the perfection and imperfection, though it be implied, not being expressed, not being brought into view, (to do which the auxiliary verb is necessary,) nor intended to be so, such tenses are properly called indefinites.”
Though I am persuaded that Harris and Browne, though they concur in designing certain tenses indefinite, are in principle by no means agreed, yet the observations of the latter, when he confines the terms to action, appear to me incontrovertible. I would only remark, that it is not the presence of the auxiliary, as Browne conceives, which is necessary to denote the completion of the action, but the introduction of the perfect participle. Nay, I am persuaded, that, as it is the participle in ing, and this only, which denotes the progression or continuation of the action, this circumstance in every other phraseology being inferred, not expressed, so I am equally convinced, that it is the perfect participle only which denotes the completion of the action; and that, if any tense not compounded of this participle, express the same idea, it is by inference, and not directly. According to this view of the matter, a clear and simple analogy subsists among the tenses; thus,
| First class. | Second. | Third. |
| I write | I am writing | I have written |
| I wrote | I was writing | I had written |
| I shall write | I shall be writing | I shall have written. |
Now, if the progression or the perfection of an action, as present, past, or future, be all the possible variations, and if these be expressed by the second and third classes, it follows that, if there be any precise distinction between these and the first class, or unless the latter be wholly supernumerary, it differs in this from the second and third, that while they express, either that the action is progressive, or that it is complete, the first has no reference to its perfection, or imperfection.
I was writing.
This tense, like I wrote, is, in point of time, indefinite; but, in respect to action, it is definite. It denotes that an action was proceeding in a time past, which time must be defined by some circumstance expressed or understood.
I had written.
This, as a tense, derives its character from the preterite of the verb to have, implying past possession. Had being an aorist, this tense, in regard to time, must therefore be indefinite. In respect to action it is definite, implying, that the action was finished. As the aorist expresses time past, and by inference the perfection of the action, while the latter circumstance is additionally denoted by the participle, this compound tense is employed to denote, that an action was perfected before another action or event, now also past, took place.
The character of the remaining tenses seems to require no farther explanation. I proceed therefore to consider how we express interrogations, commands, necessity, power, liberty, will, and some other accessary circumstances.
An interrogation is expressed by placing the nominative after the concordant person of the tense; thus, “Thou comest” is an affirmation; “Comest thou?” is an interrogation. If the tense be compound, the nominative is placed after the auxiliary, as “Dost thou come?” “Hast thou heard?”
A command, exhortation, or entreaty, is expressed by placing the pronoun of the second person after the simple form of the verb; as,
| Write thou | Write ye |
| or | or |
| Do thou write | Do ye write: |
and sometimes by the verb simply, the person being understood; as, write, run, be, let[65]. By the help of the word let, which is equivalent to “permit thou,” or “permit ye,” we express the persons of the Latin and Greek imperatives; thus, let me, let us, let him, let them, write.
Present necessity is denoted by the verb must, thus,
| I must | Thou must | He must | } | write[66]. |
| We must | Ye must | They must | } |
This verb having only one tense, namely, the present, past necessity is expressed by the preterite definite of the verb, significant of the thing necessary, as,
| I must have | Thou must have, &c. | } | written. |
| We must have | Ye must have, &c. | } |
| Present Liberty. | ||||
| I may | Thou mayest | He may | } | write. |
| We may | Ye may | They may | } | |
| Past Liberty. | ||||
| I might | Thou mightest | He might | } | write. |
| We might | Ye might | They might | } | |
| Or, | |||
| I might have | Thou mightest have, &c. | } | written. |
| We might have | Ye might have, &c. | } | |
| Present Ability. | ||||
| I can | Thou canst | He can | } | write. |
| We can | Ye can | They can | } | |
| Past Ability. | ||||
| I could | Thou couldst | He could | } | write. |
| We could | Ye could | They could | } | |
| Or, | |||
| I could have | Thou couldst have, &c. | } | written. |
| We could have | Ye could have, &c. | } | |
Could, the preterite of the verb can, expressing past power or ability, is, like the tense might of the verb may, frequently employed to denote present time. Of their denoting past time the following may serve as examples.
“Can you construe Lycophron now? No; but once I could.”
“May you speak your sentiments freely? No; but once I might.”
That they likewise denote present time, I have already adduced sufficient evidence. Might and could, being frequently used in conjunction with other verbs, to express present time, past liberty and ability are generally denoted by the latter phraseology; thus, “I might have written,” “I could have written.” Some farther observations respecting the nature of these tenses I purpose to make, when I come to consider what has been termed the subjunctive or conjunctive mood.
| Present Duty or Obligation. | ||||
| I ought | Thou oughtest | He ought | } | to write. |
| We ought | Ye ought | They ought | } | |
| Past Duty. | ||||
| I ought | Thou oughtest | He ought | } | to have |
| We ought | Ye ought | They ought | } | written. |
The same is expressed by the verb should. Ought being now always considered as a present tense, past duty is expressed by taking the preterite definitive of the following verb.
Having shown how most of the common accessary circumstances are signified in our language, I proceed to explain how we express the circumstance of suffering, or being acted upon.
The manner of denoting this in English is simple and easy. All that is necessary is to join the verb to be with the present participle, if the state of suffering be imperfect or proceeding; and with the perfect participle, if it be complete; thus,
| I am | Thou art | He is | } | written to. |
| We are | Ye are | They are | } | |
| Preterite. | ||||
| I was | Thou wast | He was | } | written to. |
| We were | Ye were | They were | } | |
| I have been | I had been | I shall be | } | written to. |
| I may be | I might be | I could be | } | |
If the state be imperfect, the participle in ing must be substituted; thus,
| The house is building | } | |
| The house was building | } | Progressive. |
| The house shall be building | } | |
| The house is built | } | |
| The house was built | } | Perfect. |
| The house shall be built | } |
Neuter verbs, expressing neither action nor passion, admit, without altering their signification, either phraseology; thus, I have arisen, or I am arisen; I was come, or I had come.
I conclude this part of the subject with a few observations concerning the subjunctive or potential mood.
Various disputes have arisen respecting the existence and the use of this mood; nor is there, perhaps, any other point in grammar, on which respectable authorities are so much divided.
That there is not in English, as in Latin, a potential mood properly so called, appears to me unquestionable. Amarem signifies ability or liberty[67], involving the verbs possum and licet, and may therefore be termed a potential mood; but in English these accessary circumstances are denoted by the preterites of the verbs may and can; as, I might or could love.
That there is no subjunctive mood, we have, I conceive, equal authority to assert. If I say in Latin, cum cepisset, “when he had taken,” the verb is strictly in the subjunctive mood; for, were not the verb subjoined to cum, it must have taken the indicative form; but I hesitate not to assert, that no example can be produced in English, where the indicative form is altered merely because the verb is preceded by some conjunctive particle. If we say, “though he were rich, he would not despise the poor,” was is not here turned into were because subjoined to though; for though is joined to the indicative mood, when the sentiment requires it; the verb therefore is not in the subjunctive mood.
In respect to what has been denominated the conditional form of the verb, I observe, that the existence of this form appears to me highly questionable. My reasons are these:
1st. Several of our grammarians have not mentioned it; among these are the celebrated Dr. Wallis, and the author of the British Grammar.
2dly. Those, who admit it, are not agreed concerning its extent. Lowth and Johnson confine it to the present tense, while Priestley extends it to the preterite.
3dly. The example which Priestley adduces of the conditional preterite, if thou drew, with a few others which might be mentioned, are acknowledged by himself to be so stiff and so harsh, that I am inclined to regard them rather as anomalies, than as constituting an authority for a general rule.
4thly. If then this form be, agreeably to the opinions of Lowth and Johnson, confined to the present tense, I must say that I have not been able to find a single example, in which the present conditional, as it is termed, is anything but an ellipsis of the auxiliary verb.
5thly. Those who admit this mood make it nothing but the plural number of the correspondent indicative tense without variation; as I love, thou love, he love, &c. Now as this is, in fact, the radical form of the verb, or what may be deemed the infinitive, as following an auxiliary, it forms a presumption that it is truly an infinitive mood, the auxiliary being suppressed.
The opinion here given will, I think, be confirmed by the following examples.
“If he say so, it is well,” i.e. “if he shall say so.”
“Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him,” (Bible) i.e. “though he should slay.”
“Though thou detain me, I will not eat,” (Ibid.) i.e. “shouldst detain me.”
“If thy brother trespass against thee,” (Ibid.) i.e. “should trespass.”
“Though he fall, he shall not utterly be cast down,” (Ibid.) i.e. “though he should fall.”
“Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath day,” (Ibid.) i.e. “thou shouldst keep.”
There are a few examples in the use of the auxiliaries do and have, in which, when the ellipsis is supplied, the expression appears somewhat uncouth; but I am persuaded that a little attention will show, that these examples form no exception to this theory.
“If now thou do prosper my way.”—Bible. It is here obvious, that the event supposed was future; the appropriate term, therefore, to express that idea, is either shall or will. If the phrase were, “if thou prosper my way,” it would be universally admitted that the auxiliary is suppressed, thus, “if thou shalt or wilt prosper my way.” Again, when we say, “if thou do it, I shall be displeased,” it is equally evident that the auxiliary is understood, thus, “if thou shalt do it.” Now, if these examples be duly considered, and if the import of the verb to do, as formerly explained, be remembered, I think it will appear that the expression is elliptical, and truly proceeds thus, “if thou (shalt) do prosper my way.” The same observations are applicable to Shakspeare’s phraseology, when he says, “if thou do pardon, whosoever pray.” Again; when Hamlet says, “if damned custom have not brazed it so,” it is obvious that the auxiliary verb may is understood; for, if the expression be cleared of the negative, the insertion of the auxiliary creates no uncouthness; thus, “if damned custom may have brazed it so.”
I am therefore inclined to think, that the conditional form, unless in the verb to be[68], has no existence in our language.
Though this be not strictly the proper place, I would beg the reader’s attention to a few additional observations.
Many writers of classic eminence express future and contingent events by the present tense indicative. In colloquial language, or where the other form would render the expression stiff and awkward, this practice cannot justly be reprehended. But where this is not the case, the proper form, in which the note of contingency or futurity is either expressed or understood, is certainly preferable. Thus,
“If thou neglectest, or doest unwillingly, what I command thee, I will rack thee with old cramps.”—Shakspeare. Better, I think, “if thou shalt neglect or do.”
“If any member absents himself, he shall forfeit a penny for the use of the club.”—Spectator. Better, “if any member absent, or shall absent.”
“If the stage becomes a nursery of folly and impertinence, I shall not be afraid to animadvert upon it.”—Spectator. Preferably thus, “If the stage become, or shall become.”
I observe also, that there is something peculiar and deserving attention in the use of the preterite tense[69]. To illustrate the remark, I shall take the following case. A servant calls on me for a book; if I am uncertain whether I have it or not, I answer, “if the book be in my library, or if I have the book, your master shall be welcome to it:” but if I am certain that I have not the book, I say, “if the book were in my library, or if I had the book, it should be at your master’s service.” Here it is obvious that when we use the present tense it implies uncertainty of the fact; and when we use the preterite, it implies a negation of its existence. Thus also, a person at night would say to his friend, “if it rain, you shall not go,” being uncertain at the time whether it did or did not rain; but if, on looking out, he perceived it did not rain, he would then say, “if it rained, you should not go,” intimating that it did not rain.
“Nay, and the villains march wide between the legs, as if they had gyves on.”—Shakspeare. Where as if they had implies that “they had not.”
In the same manner, if I say, “I will go, if I can,” my ability is expressed as uncertain, and its dependent event left undetermined. But if I say, “I would go, if I could,” my inability is expressly implied, and the dependent event excluded. Thus also, when it is said, “if I may, I will accompany you to the theatre,” the liberty is expressed as doubtful; but when it is said, “if I might, I would accompany you,” the liberty is represented as not existing.
In thus expressing the negation of the attribute, the conjunction is often omitted, and the order inverted; thus, “if I had the book,” or “had I the book.” “Were I Alexander,” said Parmenio, “I would accept this offer;” or, “if I were Alexander, I would accept.” Were is frequently used for would be, and had for would have; as, “it were injustice to deny the execution of the law to any individual;” that is, “it would be injustice.” “Many acts, which had been blameable in a peaceable government, were employed to detect conspiracies;” where had is put for would have[70].—Hume’s History of England.
Ambiguity is frequently created by confounding fact with hypothesis, or making no distinction between dubitative and assertive phraseologies. Thus, if we employ such expressions as these, “if thou knewest,” “though he was learned,” not only to express the certainty of a fact, but likewise to denote a mere hypothesis as opposed to fact, we necessarily render the expression ambiguous. It is by thus confounding things totally distinct, that writers have been betrayed not into ambiguity only, but even into palpable errors. In evidence of this, I give the following example: “Though he were divinely inspired, and spoke therefore as the oracles of God, with supreme authority; though he were endowed with supernatural powers, and could, therefore, have confirmed the truth of what he asserted by miracles; yet in compliance with the way in which human nature and reasonable creatures are usually wrought upon, he reasoned.”—Atterbury’s Sermons.
Here the writer expresses the inspiration and the supernatural powers of Jesus, not as properties or virtues which he really did possess, but which, though not possessing them, he might be supposed to possess. Now, as his intention was to ascribe these virtues to Jesus, as truly belonging to him, he should have employed the indicative form was, and not were, as in the following sentence: “though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor.” “Though he were rich,” would imply the non-existence of the attribute; in other words, “that he was not rich.”
A very little attention would serve to prevent these ambiguities and errors. If the attribute be conceived as unconditionally certain, the indicative form without ellipsis must be employed, as, “I teach,” “I had taught,” “I shall teach.” If futurity, hypothesis, or uncertainty, be intended, with the concessive term, the auxiliary may be either expressed or understood, as perspicuity may require, and the taste and judgment of the writer may dictate; thus, “if any man teach strange doctrines, he shall be severely rebuked.” In the former clause the auxiliary verb shall is unnecessary, and is therefore, without impropriety, omitted. “Then hear thou in heaven, and forgive the sin of thy servants, and of thy people Israel, that thou teach them the good way wherein they should walk.”—Bible. In this example the suppression of the auxiliary verb is somewhat unfavourable to perspicuity, and renders the clause stiff and awkward. It would be better, I think, “thou mayest teach them the good way.” Harshness, indeed, and the appearance of affectation, should be particularly avoided. Where there is no manifest danger of misconception, the use of the assertive for the dubitative form is far preferable to those starched and pedantic phraseologies which some writers are fond of exhibiting. For this reason, such expressions as the following appear to me highly offensive: “if thou have determined, we must submit;” “unless he have consented, the writing will be void;” “if this have been the seat of their original formation;” “unless thou shall speak, we cannot determine.” The last I consider as truly ungrammatical. In such cases, if the dubitative phraseology should appear to be preferable, the stiffness and affectation here reprehended may frequently be prevented by inserting the note of doubt or contingency.
I observe farther, that the substitution of as for if when the affirmation is unconditional, will often serve to prevent ambiguity[71]. Thus, when the ant in the fable says to the grasshopper who had trifled away the summer in singing, “if you sung in summer, dance in winter;” as the first clause, taken by itself, leaves the meaning somewhat ambiguous, “as you sung,” would be the better expression.
IRREGULAR VERBS.
The general rule for the formation of the preterite tense, and the perfect participle, is to add to the present the syllable ed, if the verb end with a consonant, or d, if it end with a vowel, as
Turn, Turned, Turned; Love, Loved, Loved.
Verbs, which depart from this rule, are called irregular, of which I believe the subsequent enumeration to be nearly complete[72].
| Present. | Preterite. | Perfect Participle. |
| Abide | Abode | Abode |
| Am | Was | Been |
| Arise | Arose | Arisen |
| Awake | Awoke R | Awaked |
| Bake | Baked | Baken R |
| Bear, to bring forth | Bore, or Bear | Born[73] |
| Bear, to carry | Bore, or Bear | Borne |
| Beat | Beat | Beaten |
| Begin | Began | Begun |
| Become | Became | Become |
| Behold | Beheld | Beheld, or Beholden[74] |
| Bend | Bent R | Bent R |
| Bereave | Bereft R | Bereft R |
| Beseech | Besought | Besought |
| Bid | Bade, or Bid | Bidden |
| Bind | Bound | Bound |
| Bite | Bit | Bitten, Bit[75] |
| Bleed | Bled | Bled |
| Blow | Blew | Blown |
| Break | Broke, or Brake | Broken[76] |
| Breed | Bred | Bred |
| Bring | Brought | Brought |
| Build | Built R | Built[77] R |
| Burst | Burst | Burst |
| Buy | Bought | Bought |
| Can | Could | |
| Cast | Cast | Cast |
| Catch | Caught R | Caught R |
| Chide | Chid[78] | Chidden |
| Choose | Chose | Chosen |
| Cleave, to stick or adhere | Clave R | Cleaved |
| Cleave, to split | Clove, or Clave, or Cleft | Cloven, or Cleft |
| Cling | Clung | Clung |
| Climb | Clomb[79] R | Climbed |
| Clothe | Clad[80] R | Clad R |
| Come | Came | Come |
| Cost | Cost | Cost |
| Crow | Crew R | Crowed |
| Creep | Crept | Crept |
| Cut | Cut | Cut |
| Dare, to venture | Durst R | Dared |
| Dare, to challenge, is regular. | ||
| Deal | Dealt R | Dealt R |
| Dig | Dug R | Dug R |
| Do | Did | Done |
| Draw | Drew | Drawn |
| Drive | Drove | Driven |
| Drink | Drank | Drunk |
| Dwell | Dwelt R | Dwelt R |
| Eat | Ate | Eaten |
| Fall | Fell | Fallen |
| Feed | Fed | Fed |
| Feel | Felt | Felt |
| Fight | Fought | Fought |
| Find | Found | Found |
| Flee | Fled | Fled |
| Fly | Flew | Flown |
| Fling | Flung | Flung |
| Forget | Forgot | Forgotten |
| Forgo[81] | Forgone | |
| Forsake | Forsook | Forsaken |
| Freeze | Froze | Frozen |
| Freight | Freighted | Freighted, or Fraught[82] |
| Get | Gat, or Got | Gotten, or Got |
| Gild | Gild R | Gilt R |
| Gird | Girt R | Girt R |
| Give | Gave | Given |
| Go | Went | Gone |
| Grave | Graved | Graven R |
| Grind | Ground | Ground |
| Grow | Grew | Grown |
| Have | Had | Had |
| Hang[83] | Hung R | Hung R |
| Hear | Heard | Heard |
| Heave | Hove[84] R | Hoven R |
| Help | Helped | Holpen[85] R |
| Hew | Hewed | Hewn R |
| Hide | Hid | Hidden[86], or Hid |
| Hit | Hit | Hit |
| Hold | Held | Holden[87], or Held |
| Hurt | Hurt | Hurt |
| Keep | Kept | Kept |
| Kneel | Knelt | Knelt |
| Knit | Knit, or Knitted | Knit, or Knitted |
| Know | Knew | Known |
| Lade | Laded | Laden[88] |
| Lay | Laid | Laid[89] |
| Lead | Led | Led |
| Leave | Left | Left |
| Lend | Lent | Lent |
| Let | Let | Let |
| Lie, to lie down | Lay | Lien, or Lain[90] |
| Lift | Lifted, or Lift | Lifted, or Lift |
| Light | Lighted, or Lit[91] | Lighted, or Lit |
| Load | Loaded | Loaden, or Loaded |
| Lose | Lost | Lost |
| Make | Made | Made |
| May | Might | |
| Mean | Meant R | Meant R |
| Meet | Met | Met |
| Mow | Mowed | Mown[92] R |
| Must | ||
| Pay | Paid | Paid |
| Put | Put | Put |
| Quit | Quit, or Quitted[93] | Quit |
| Read | Read | Read |
| Rend | Rent | Rent |
| Ride | Rode, or Rid | Rid[94], or Ridden |
| Rid | Rid | Rid |
| Ring | Rang, or Rung | Rung |
| Rise | Rose | Risen |
| Rive | Rived | Riven |
| Roast | Roasted | Roasted, or Roast[95] |
| Rot | Rotted | Rotten R |
| Run | Ran | Run |
| Saw | Sawed | Sawn R |
| Say | Said | Said |
| See | Saw | Seen |
| Seek | Sought | Sought |
| Seethe | Seethed, or Sod | Sodden |
| Sell | Sold | Sold |
| Send | Sent | Sent |
| Set | Set | Set |
| Shake | Shook | Shaken[96] |
| Shall | Should | |
| Shape | Shaped | Shapen R |
| Shave | Shaved | Shaven R |
| Shear | Shore | Shorn |
| Shed | Shed | Shed |
| Shine | Shone R | Shone R |
| Shew | Shewed | Shewn |
| Show | Showed | Shown |
| Shoe | Shod | Shod |
| Shoot | Shot | Shot |
| Shrink | Shrank[97], or Shrunk | Shrunk |
| Shred | Shred | Shred |
| Shut | Shut | Shut |
| Sing | Sang[98], or Sung | Sung |
| Sink | Sank, or Sunk | Sunk |
| Sit | Sat | Sitten[99], or Sat |
| Slay | Slew | Slain |
| Sleep | Slept | Slept |
| Slide | Slid | Slidden |
| Sling | Slang, or Slung | Slung |
| Slink | Slank, or Slunk | Slunk |
| Slit | Slit R | Slit, or Slitted |
| Smite | Smote | Smitten |
| Sow | Sowed | Sown R |
| Speak | Spoke, or Spake | Spoken |
| Speed | Sped | Sped |
| Spend | Spent | Spent |
| Spill | Spilt R | Spilt R |
| Spin | Spun, or Span | Spun |
| Spit | Spat, or Spit | Spitten, or Spit |
| Split | Split, or Splitted | Split, Splitted |
| Spread | Spread | Spread |
| Spring | Sprang, or Sprung | Sprung |
| Stand | Stood | Stood |
| Steal | Stole | Stolen |
| Stick | Stuck | Stuck |
| Sting | Stung | Stung |
| Stink | Stank, or Stunk | Stunk |
| Stride | Strode, or Strove | Stridden |
| Strike | Struck | Struck, or Stricken |
| String | Strung | Strung |
| Strive | Strove | Striven |
| Strew, or Strow | Strewed, or Strowed | Strown |
| Swear | Swore, or Sware | Sworn |
| Sweat | Sweat | Sweat |
| Sweep | Swept | Swept |
| Swell | Swelled | Swelled, or Swollen |
| Swim | Swam, or Swum | Swum |
| Swing | Swang | Swung |
| Take | Took | Taken |
| Teach | Taught | Taught |
| Tear | Tore, or Tare | Torn |
| Tell | Told | Told |
| Think | Thought | Thought |
| Thrive | Throve[100] | Thriven |
| Throw | Through | Thrown |
| Thrust | Thrust | Thrust |
| Tread | Trod | Trodden |
| Wax | Waxed | Waxen R |
| Wash | Washed | Washed[101] |
| Wear | Wore | Worn |
| Weave | Wove | Woven |
| Weep | Wept | Wept |
| Will | Would | |
| Win | Won | Won |
| Wind | Wound[102] R | Wound |
| Work | Wrought R | Wrought R |
| Wring | Wrung R | Wrung |
| Write | Wrote | Written[103] |
| Writhe | Writhed | Writhen. |
DEFECTIVE VERBS.
These, as Lowth observes, are generally not only defective, but also irregular, and are chiefly auxiliary verbs.
| Present. | Preterite. | Perfect Participle. |
| Must | ||
| May | Might | |
| Quoth | Quoth | |
| Can | Could | |
| Shall | Should | |
| Wit[104], or Wot | Wot | |
| Will[105] | Would | |
| Wis[106] | Wist | |
| Ought[107] |
OF IMPERSONAL VERBS.
The distinctive character of impersonal verbs has been a subject of endless dispute among grammarians. Some deny their existence in the learned languages, and others as positively assert it. Some define them to be verbs devoid of the two first persons; but this definition is evidently incorrect: for, as Perizonius and Frischlinus observe, this may be a reason for calling them defective, but not for naming them impersonal verbs. Others have defined them to be verbs, to which no certain person, as the subject, can be prefixed. But with the discussion of this question, as it respects the learned languages, the English grammarian has no concern. I proceed, therefore, to observe, that impersonal verbs, as the name imports, are those which do not admit a person as their nominative. Their real character seems to be, that they assert the existence of some action or state, but refer it to no particular subject. In English we have very few impersonal verbs. To this denomination, however, may certainly be referred, it behoveth, it irketh; equivalent to, it is the duty, it is painfully wearisome. That the former of these verbs was once used personally, we have sufficient evidence; and it is not improbable that the latter also was so employed, though I have not been able to find an example of its junction with a person. They are now invariably used as impersonal verbs. We cannot say, I behove, thou behovest, he behoves; we irk, ye irk, they irk.
There are one or two others, which have been considered as impersonal verbs, in which the personal pronoun in the objective case is prefixed to the third person singular of the verb, as methinks, methought, meseems, meseemed; analogous to the Latin expressions me pœnitet, me pœnituit. You thinketh, him liketh, him seemeth, have long been entirely obsolete. Meseems and meseemed occur in Sidney, Spenser, and other contemporary writers; but are now universally disused. Addison sometimes says methoughts, contrary, I conceive, to all analogy.
CHAPTER VII.
OF ADVERBS.
An adverb is that part of speech which is joined to a verb, adjective, or other adverb, to express some circumstance, quality, degree, or manner of its signification; and hence adverbs have been termed attributives of the second order.
“As the attributives hitherto mentioned,” says Mr. Harris, “viz. adjective and verb, denote the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior class of them, which denote the attributes only of attributes. If I say, ‘Cicero was eloquent,’ I ascribe to him the attribute of eloquence simply and absolutely; if I say, ‘he was exceedingly eloquent,’ I affirm an eminent degree of eloquence, the adverb exceedingly denoting that degree. If I say, ‘he died, fighting bravely for his country,’ the word bravely here added to the verb denotes the manner of the action.” An adverb is, therefore, a word joined to a verb, or any attributive, to denote some modification, degree, or circumstance, of the expressed attribute.
Adverbs have been divided into a variety of classes, according to their signification. Some of those which denote
| Quality simply, are, | Well, ill, bravely, prudently, softly, |
| with innumerable others formed from | |
| adjectives and participles. | |
| Certainty or Affirmation | Verily, truly, undoubtedly, yea, yes, certainly. |
| Contingence | Perhaps, peradventure, perchance. |
| Negation | Nay, no, not, nowise. |
| Explaining | Namely. |
| Separation | Apart, separately, asunder. |
| Conjunction | Together, generally, universally. |
| Indication | Lo. |
| Interrogation | Why, wherefore, when, how. |
| Excess or Preeminence | Very, exceedingly, too, more, better, worse, best, worst. |
| Defect | Almost, nearly, less, least. |
| Preference | Rather, chiefly, especially. |
| Likeness or Equality | So, thus, as, equally. |
| Unlikeness or Inequality | Else, otherwise. |
| Abatement or Gradation | Piecemeal, scarcely, hardly. |
| To or in a place | Here, there, where. |
| To a place, only | Hither, thither, whither. |
| Towards a place | Hitherward, thitherward, whitherward. |
| From a place | Hence, thence, whence. |
| Time present | Now, to-day. |
| —— past | Yesterday, before, heretofore, already, hitherto, lately. |
| —— future | To-morrow, hereafter, presently, immediately, afterwards. |
| Repetition of times indef. | Often, seldom, frequently. |
| —— Definitely | Once, twice, thrice, again. |
| Order | First[108], secondly, thirdly, &c. |
| Quantity | Much, little, enough, sufficiently. |
On inquiring into the meaning and etymology of adverbs, it will appear, that most of them are abbreviations or contractions for two or more words. Thus, bravely, or “in a brave manner,” is probably derived by abbreviation from brave-like, wisely from wise-like, happily from happy-like[109]. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has proved, as I conceive incontrovertibly, that most of them are either corruptions of other words, or abbreviations of phrases or of sentences. One thing is certain, that the adverb is not an indispensable part of speech, as it serves merely to express in one word what perhaps would otherwise require two or more words. Thus,
| Where[110] | denotes | In what place |
| Here | In this place | |
| There | In that place | |
| Whither | To what place | |
| Hither | To this place | |
| Thither | To that place. |
CHAPTER VIII.
OF PREPOSITIONS.
A preposition has been defined to be “that part of speech which shows the relation that one thing bears to another.” According to Mr. Harris, it is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite words that are significant, and that refuse to unite or associate of themselves. He has, therefore, compared them to pegs or pins, which serve to unite those parts of the building which would not, by their own nature, incorporate or coalesce. When one considers the formidable objections which present themselves to this theory, and that the ingenious author now quoted has, in defence of it, involved himself in palpable contradictions, it becomes matter of surprise that it should have so long received from grammarians an almost universal and implicit assent. This furnishes one of many examples, how easily error may be imposed and propagated by the authority of a great name. But, though error may be repeatedly transmitted from age to age, unsuspected and unquestioned, it cannot be perpetuated. Mr. Horne Tooke has assailed this theory by irresistible arguments, and demonstrated that, in our language at least, prepositions are significant of ideas, and that, as far as import is concerned, they do not form a distinct species of words.
It is not, indeed, easy to imagine, that men, in the formation of any language, would invent words insignificant, and to which, singly, they attached no determinate idea; especially when it is considered, that, in every stage of their existence, from rudeness to civilization, new words would perpetually be wanting to express new ideas. It is not, therefore, probable that, while they were under the necessity of framing new words, to answer the exigences of mental enlargement, and while these demands on their invention were incessantly recurring, they would, in addition to this, encumber themselves with the idle and unnecessary task of forming new words to express nothing.
But, in truth, Harris himself yields the point, when he says, that prepositions, when compounded, transfuse something of their meaning into the compound; for they cannot transfuse what they do not contain, nor impart what they do not possess. They must, therefore, be themselves significant words.
But it is not so much their meaning with which the grammarian is concerned, as their syntactical character, their capacity of affecting other words, or being affected by them. In both these lights, however, I propose to consider them.
The name of preposition has been assigned to them, because they generally precede their regimen, or the word which they govern. What number of these words ancient and modern languages contain, has been much disputed; some grammarians determining a greater and some a less number. This, indeed, of itself affords a conclusive proof that the character of these words has not been clearly understood; for, in the other parts of speech, noun, adjective, and verb, the discriminative circumstances are so evident, that no doubt can arise concerning their classification.
That most of our English prepositions have signification per se, and form no distinct species of words, Mr. Tooke has produced incontrovertible evidence: nor is it to be doubted, that a perfect acquaintance with the Northern languages would convince us, that all of them are abbreviations, corruptions, or combinations of other words. A few of Mr. Tooke’s examples I shall now present to the reader.
Above, from the Anglo-Saxon ufa, high; hence bufan, on bufan, bove, above.
With, from withan, to join, of which with is the imperative; thus, “a house with a party wall,”—“a house, join a party wall;” or it is sometimes the imperative of wyrthan, “to be;” hence, by and with are often synonymous, the former being derived from beon, “to be.”
Without, from the Saxon preposition withutan, extra, sine, which is properly the imperative of the verb wyrthanutan, “to be out.” Withutan, beutan, “without,” “be out,” or “but.” The Saxon preposition occurs frequently in the writings of Chaucer, and is still used in Scottish poetry[111].
From[112], is simply the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic noun frum, “beginning,” “source,” “origin;” thus, “Figs came from Turkey;” that is, Figs came; “the source,” or “beginning,” Turkey; to which is opposed the word.
To, the same originally as do, signifying finishing or completion; thus “Figs came from Turkey to England;” “the beginning,” or “source,” Turkey; “the finishing,” or “end,” England.
Beneath, is the imperative be, compounded with the noun neath, of the same import with neden in Dutch, ned in Danish, niedere in German, and nedre or neder in Swedish, signifying the lower place; hence, the astronomical term Nadir, opposed to Zenith. Hence also nether and nethermost.
Between, “be twain,” “be two,” or “be separated.”[113]
Under, i.e. on neder.
Beyond, imperative be, and the participle past goned of the verb gan, “to go:” as, “beyond the place,” i.e. “be passed the place.”
Among, from gemong, the preterperfect of the verb mengan, to mix, used as a participle, and signifying “mixed.”
Many other examples might be produced from Tooke’s ingenious illustration of his theory; but those which I have now offered suffice to prove, that our prepositions, so far from being words insignificant, belong to the class of nouns or verbs either single or compounded.
Besides, if prepositions denote relations, as Harris admits, it is surely absurd to suppose, that they have no meaning; for the relation, whether of propinquity, contiguity, approach, or regress, &c., may be expressed, and apprehended by the mind, though the objects between which the relation subsists be not specified. If I hear the word with, I naturally conceive the idea of conjunction; the reverse takes place when I hear without. If it be said a soldier with, I have the idea of a soldier associated with something else, which association is denoted by with. What is conjoined to him I know not, till the object be specified, as, “a soldier with a musquet;” but the mere association was before sufficiently expressed, and clearly apprehended. Again, if a person say, “he threw a glass under,” I have instantly an idea of a glass, and of inferiority of place, conceiving a glass removed into a situation lower than something else. To ascertain that something, I ask, under what? and the answer may be, under the table. Now, if under had no meaning, this question would be insignificant, or rather impossible.
From the examples given, I trust the young reader sufficiently understands the difference between the doctrine of Harris on this subject, and that of Horne Tooke; nay, I think, he must perceive, that the former is merely a theory, while the latter is supported by reason and fact. The syntax of our prepositions will be afterwards explained. I shall only observe at present, that the words which are in English considered as prepositions, and joined to the objective case are these:
| Above | Beneath | Since | |||
| About | Below | Through | } | ||
| After | Beside | Throughout | |||
| Against | By | Till | } | ||
| Among | } | Down | Until | ||
| Amongst | For | To | } | ||
| Amid | } | From | Unto | ||
| Amidst | In | Toward | } | ||
| Around | } | Into | Towards | ||
| Round | Near | } | Under | } | |
| At | Nigh | Underneath | |||
| Between | } | Of | Up | ||
| Betwixt | Off | With | |||
| Beyond | Over | Within | |||
| Before | On | } | Without | ||
| Behind | Upon |
Some of these, though they are commonly joined to an objective case, and may therefore be deemed prepositions, are, notwithstanding, of an equivocal character, resembling the Latin adverbs procul and prope, which govern a case by the ellipsis of a preposition. Thus we say, “near the house” and “near to the house,” “nigh the park,” and “nigh to the park,” “off the table,” and “off from the table.”
Several are used as adverbs, and also as prepositions, no ellipsis being involved, as, till, until, after, before.
There are certain particles, which are never found single or uncompounded, and have therefore been termed inseparable prepositions. Those purely English are, a, be, fore, mis, un. The import of these, and of a few separable prepositions when prefixed to other words, I proceed to explain.
A, signifies on or in, as, a foot, a shore, that is, on foot, on shore. Webster contends, that it was originally the same with one.
Be, signifies about, as, bestir, besprinkle, that is, stir about; also for or before, as, bespeak, that is, speak for, or before.
For, denies, or deprives, as, bid, forbid, seek, forsake, i.e. bid, bid not; seek, not seek.
Fore, signifies before, as, see, foresee, that is, see beforehand.
Mis, denotes defect or error, as, take, mistake, or take wrongly; deed, misdeed, that is, a wrong or evil deed.
Over, denotes eminence or superiority, as, come, overcome; also excess, as, hasty, over hasty, or too hasty.
Out, signifies excess or superiority, as, do, outdo, run, outrun, that is, “to surpass in running.”
Un, before an adjective, denotes negation, or privation, as, worthy, unworthy, or “not worthy.” Before verbs it denotes the undoing or the destroying of the energy or act, expressed by the verb, as, say, unsay, that is, “affirm,” retract the “affirmation.”
Up, denotes motion upwards, as, start, upstart; rest in a higher place, as, hold, uphold; sometimes subversion, as, set, upset.
With, signifies against, as, stand, withstand, that is, “stand against, or resist.”
The Latin prepositions used in the composition of English words are these, ab or abs, ad, ante, con, circum, contra, de, di, dis, e or ex, extra, in, inter, intro, ob, per, post, præ, pro, præter, re, retro, se, sub, subter, super, trans.
A, ab, abs, signify from or away, as, to abstract, that is, “to draw away.”
Ad, signifies to or at, as, to adhere, that is, “to stick to.”
Ante, means before, as, antecedent, that is, “going before.”
Circum, round, about, as, circumnavigate, or “sail round.”
Con, com, co, col, signify together, as, convoke, or “call together,” co-operate, or “work together,” colleague, “joined together.”
Contra, against, as, contradict, or “speak against.”
De, signifies down, as, deject, or “throw down.”
Di, dis, asunder, as distract, or “draw asunder.”
E, ex, out of, as, egress, or “going out,” eject, or “throw out,” exclude, or “shut out.”
Extra, beyond, as, extraordinary, or “beyond the ordinary or usual course.”
In, before an adjective, like un, denotes privation, as, active, inactive, or “not active;” before a verb, it has its simple meaning.
Inter, between, as, intervene, or “come between,” interpose, or “put between.”
Intro, to within, as, introduce, or “lead in.”
Ob, denotes opposition, as, obstacle, that is, “something standing in opposition,” “an impediment.”
Per, through, or thoroughly, as, perfect, or “thoroughly done,” to perforate, or “to bore through.”
Post, after, as, postscript, or “written after,” that is, after the letter.
Præ, before, as, prefix, or “fix before.”
Pro, forth, or forwards, as, promote, or “move forwards.”
Præter, past, or beyond, as, preternatural, or “beyond the course of nature.”
Re, again, or back, as, retake, or “take back.”
Retro, backwards, as, retrograde, or “going backwards.”
Se, apart, or without, as, to secrete, “to put aside,” or “to hide,” secure, “without care or apprehension.”
Subter, under, as, subterfluous, or “flowing under.”
Super, above, or over, as, superscribe, or “write above, or over.”
Trans, over, from one place to another, as, transport, that is, “carry over.”
The Greek prepositions and particles compounded with English words are, a, amphi, anti, hyper, hypo, meta, peri, syn.
A, signifies privation, as, anonymous, or “without a name.”
Amphi, both, or the two, as, amphibious, “having both lives,” that is, “on land and on water.”
Anti, against, as, anti-covenanter, anti-jacobin, that is, “an opponent of the covenanters,” “an enemy to the jacobins.”
Hyper, over and above, as, hypercritical, or “over,” that is, “too critical.”
Hypo, under, implying concealment or disguise, as, hypocrite, “one dissembling his real character.”
Meta, denotes change or transmutation, as, to metamorphose, or “to change the shape.”
Para, denotes sometimes propinquity or similarity, and sometimes contrariety. It is equivalent to the Latin terms juxta and præter, as, “to paraphrase,” παραφράζειν, juxta alterius orationem loqui; “to speak the meaning of another.” Paradox, “beyond,” or “contrary to, general opinion,” or “common belief.”
Peri, round about, as, periphrasis, that is, “circumlocution.”
Syn, together, as synod, “a meeting,” or “coming together,” sympathy, or “feeling together.”
CHAPTER IX.
OF CONJUNCTIONS.
A conjunction has been defined to be “that part of speech which connects words and sentences together.”
Mr. Ruddiman, and several other grammarians, have asserted, that conjunctions never connect words, but sentences. This is evidently a mistake; for if I say, “a man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character,” it implies not “that a man of wisdom is a perfect character, and a man of virtue a perfect character,” but “a man who combines wisdom and virtue.” The farther discussion of this question, however, I shall at present postpone, as it will form a subject of future inquiry.
Conjunctions have been distributed, according to their significations, into different classes:
| Copulative, | And, also, but, (bot). |
| Disjunctive, | Either, or. |
| Concessive, | Though, although, albeit, yet. |
| Adversative, | But, however. |
| Exclusive, | Neither, nor. |
| Causal, | For, that, because, since. |
| Illative, | Therefore, wherefore, then. |
| Conditional, | If. |
| Exceptive, | Unless. |
This distribution of the conjunctions I have given, in conformity to general usage, that the reader may be acquainted with the common terms by which conjunctions have been denominated, if these terms should occur to him in the course of reading. In respect to the real import, and genuine character of these words, I decidedly adopt the theory of Mr. Tooke, which considers conjunctions as no distinct species of words, but as belonging to the class of attributives, or as abbreviations for two or more significant words.
Agreeably to his theory, and is an abbreviation for anad, the imperative of ananad, “to add,” or “to accumulate;” as, “two and two make four;” that is, “two, add two, make four.” Either is evidently an adjective expressive of “one of two;” thus, “it is either day or night,” that is, “one of the two, day or night.” It is derived from the Saxon ægther, equivalent to uterque, “each.”[114]
Or is a contraction for other, a Saxon and English adjective equivalent to alius or alter, and denotes diversity, either of name or of subject. Hence or is sometimes a perfect disjunctive, as when it expresses contrariety or opposition of things; and sometimes a subdisjunctive, when it denotes simply a diversity in name. Thus, when we say, “It is either even or odd,” or is a perfect disjunctive, the two attributives being directly contrary, and admitting no medium. If I say, “Paris or Alexander” (these being names of the same individual); or if I say, “Gravity or weight,” “Logic, or the art of reasoning;” or in these examples is a subdisjunctive or an explicative, as it serves to define the meaning of the preceding term, or as it expresses the equivalence of two terms. The Latins express the former by aut, vel, and the latter by seu or sive. In the following sentence both conjunctions are exemplified: “Give me either the black or the white;” i.e. “Give me one of the two—the black—other, the white.”
To these are opposed neither, nor, as, “Give me neither poverty nor riches;” i.e. “Give me not one of the two, poverty—nor, i.e. not the other, riches.”
According to Mr. Tooke, the conjunction if is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon and Gothic verb gifan, “to give.” Among others, he quotes the following example. “How will the weather dispose of you to-morrow? If fair, it will send me abroad; if foul, it will keep me at home”—i.e. “Give,” or “grant it to be fair;” “give,” or “grant it to be foul.”
Though is the same as thaf, an imperative from thafan, to allow, and is in some parts of the country pronounced thof; as, “Though he should speak truth, I would not believe him;” i.e. “allow or grant, what? he should speak truth,” or “allow his speaking truth, I would not believe him.”
But, from beutan, the imperative of beon utan, to be out, is the same as without or unless, there being no difference between these in respect to meaning. Grammarians, however, in conformity to the distinction between nisi and sine, have called but a conjunction, and without a preposition. But, therefore, being a word signifying exception or exclusion, I have not termed it an “adversative,” as most grammarians have, but an “exceptive.” In this sense it is synonymous with præter, præterquam, or nisi; thus, “I saw nobody but John,” i.e. “unless,” or “except John.”
But, from bot, the imperative of botan, to boot or superadd, has a very different meaning. This word was originally written bot, and was thus distinguished from but[115]. They are now written alike, which tends to create confusion. The meaning of this word is, “add,” or, “moreover.” This interpretation is confirmed by the probable derivation and meaning of synonymous words in other languages. Thus, the French mais (but) is from majus, or magis, “more,” or “in addition;” the Italian ma, the Spanish mas, and the Dutch maar, are from the same etymon, signifying “more.” And it is not improbable, that adsit (be it present, or be it added) by contraction became ast and at: thus, adsit, adst, ast, at. In this sense but is synonymous with at, autem, cæterum, “moreover,” or “in addition.”
It is justly observed by Mr. Tooke, that bot or but allays or mitigates a good or bad precedent, by the addition of something; for botan means “to superadd,” “to supply,” “to atone for,” “to compensate,” “to add something more,” “to make amends,” or “make up deficiency.” Thus,
“Once did I lay an ambush for your life,
A trespass, that doth vex my grieved soul:
But (bot), ere I last received the sacrament,
I did confess...”
Richard II.
“Add (this) ere I last received.”
When but means be out, or without, it should, says Mr. Tooke, be preceded by a negative; thus, instead of saying, “I saw but John,” which means, “I saw John be out,” we should say, “I saw none but John,” i.e. “none, John be out,” or “had John been out,” or, “John being excluded.” This, observes the ingenious author, is one of the most faulty ellipses in our language, and could never have obtained, but through the utter ignorance of the meaning of the word but (bot).
Yet, from the imperative of getan, “to get.”
Still, from stell or steall, the imperative of stellan, ponere, “to suppose.”
Horne Tooke observing that these words, like if and an[116], are synonymous, accounts for their equivalence by supposing them to be derived from verbs of the same import. His mode of derivation, however, appears at first hearing to be incorrect: the meaning of the conjunctions have little or no affinity to that of the verbs. Mr. Tooke himself does not seem perfectly satisfied with its truth. Both these conjunctions are synonymous with “notwithstanding,” “nevertheless;” terms, the obvious meaning of which does not accord with verbs denoting “to get,” or “to suppose.” I am inclined, however, to think that Tooke’s conjecture is founded in truth. If I say, “he was learned, yet modest,” it may be expressed, “he was learned, notwithstanding this, or this being granted, even thus, or be it so (licet ita esset) he was modest;” where the general incompatibility between learning and modesty is conceived, not expressed, the expression denoting merely the combination of the qualities in the individual mentioned. Notwithstanding indirectly marks the repugnance, by signifying that the one quality did not prevent the co-existence of the other; yet or still supposes the incompatibility to be sufficiently known. This derivation is rendered the more probable, as the word though (thof, grant) may be substituted to express the same idea, as “though (grant) he was learned, he was modest;” which is equivalent to “he was learned, yet (this granted) he was modest.” Hence many repeat the concessive term, and say, “though he was learned, yet he was modest.”
Unless. Mr. Horne Tooke is of opinion that this exceptive conjunction is properly onles, the imperative of the verb onlesan, to dismiss; thus, “you cannot be saved unless you believe;” i.e. “dismiss your believing, and you cannot be saved,” or, “you cannot be saved, your believing being dismissed.”
Lest is contracted for lesed, the participle of the same verb, onlesan or lesan, signifying “dismissed;” as, “Young men should take care to avoid bad company, lest their morals be corrupted, and their reputation ruined;” that is, “Young men should take care to avoid bad company, lest (this being dismissed, or omitted) their morals be corrupted,” &c.
That is evidently in all cases an adjective, or, as some consider it, a demonstrative pronoun; as, “They say that the king is arrived;” “They say that (thing) the king is arrived.”
Whether is an adjective, denoting “which of two;” thus, “Whether he live or die;” that is, “Which of the two things, he live or die.”
As is the same with es, a German article, meaning it, that, or which.
So is sa or so, a Gothic article of the same import.
Than, which Mr. Tooke does not seem to have noticed, is supposed to be a compound of the definitive tha, and the additive termination, en, thus, tha en, thænne, then, and now spelled than[117].
These few examples will serve to explain Mr. Tooke’s theory on this subject; and I am persuaded, that the further we investigate the etymology and real import of conjunctions, the more probable will it appear that they are all nouns or attributives, some belonging to kindred languages, and others compounds or abbreviations in our own. I am persuaded, also, that from a general review of this subject, it must be evident that adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, form no distinct species of words, and that they are all reducible to the class either of nouns or attributives, if their original character and real import be considered. But, as many of them are derived from obsolete words in our own language, or from words in kindred languages, the radical meanings of which are, therefore, either obscure, or generally unknown—and as the syntactical use of several of them has undergone a change—it can be no impropriety, nay, it is even convenient, to regard them not in their original character, but their present use. When the radical word still remains, the case is different. Thus except is by some considered as a preposition; but as the verb to except is still in use, except may, and indeed should, be considered as the imperative of the verb[118]. But in parsing, to say that the word unless is the imperative of the verb onlesan, “to dismiss,” that verb belonging to a different language, would serve only to perplex and to confound, were it even true that the etymology is correct. For this reason, though I perfectly concur with Mr. Tooke as to the proper and original character of these words, I have distributed them under the customary head of prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions.
CHAPTER X.
OF INTERJECTIONS.
An interjection has been defined to be, “that part of speech which denotes some affection or emotion of the mind.” It is clearly not a necessary part of speech; for, as Tooke observes, interjections are not to be found in books of history, philosophy, or religion: they occur in novels only, or dramatic compositions. Some of these are entirely instinctive and mechanical, as, ha! ha! ha! sounds common to all men, when agitated with laughter. These physical emissions of sound have no more claim to be called parts of speech than the neighing of a horse, or the lowing of a cow. There are others which seem arbitrary, and are expressive of some emotion, not simply by the articulation, but by the accompanying voice or gesture. Grief, for example, is expressed in English by the word ah! or oh! in Latin by oi, ei! and in Greek by οἶ, οἶ, αἶ, αἶ! Here the sounds are not instinctive, or purely mechanical, as in laughing; but the accompanying tone of voice, which is the same in all men, under the influence of the same emotion, indicates clearly the feeling or passion of the speaker. Others, which have been deemed interjections, are, in truth, verbs or nouns, employed in the rapidity of thought and expression, and under the influence of strong emotion, to denote, what would otherwise require more words to express: as, strange! for it is strange; adieu! for I recommend you to God; shame! for it is shame; welcome! for you are welcome.
The words which have been considered by our English grammarians as interjections, are the following, expressive of
1. Joy, as, Hey, Io.
2. Grief, Ah, alas, alack.
3. Wonder, Vah! hah! aha!
4. Aversion, Tush, pish, pshaw, foh, fie, pugh.
5. Laughter, Ha, ha, ha.
6. Desire of attention, Hark, lo, halloo, hem, hip.
7. Languor, Heigh ho.
8. Desire of silence, Hush, hist, mum.
9. Deliberation, Hum.
10. Exultation, Huzza.
11. Pain, Oh! ho!
12. Taking leave, Adieu.
13. Greeting, Welcome.
PART II.
SYNTAX.
Syntax is the arrangement of words in sentences or phrases, agreeably to established usage, or to the received rules of concord and government.
Sentences are either simple or complex.
A simple sentence consists of only one member, containing therefore but one subject, and one finite verb, as, “Alexander the Great is said to have wept.”
A complex sentence consists of two or more members, as, “Alexander, when he had conquered the world, is said to have wept, because there were not other worlds to subdue.”
Complex sentences are divided into members; and these, if complex, are subdivided into clauses, as, “The ox knoweth his owner | and the ass his master’s crib || but Israel doth not know | my people doth not consider.” This complex sentence has two members, each of which contains two clauses.
When a member of a complex sentence is simple, it is called indifferently a member, or a clause; as, “I have called, but ye have refused.” The two parts, into which this sentence divides itself, are termed each either a member or a clause.
When a complex sentence is so framed, that the meaning is suspended till the whole be finished, it is called a period; otherwise the sentence is said to be loose. The following sentence is an example of a period: “If Hannibal had not wintered at Capua, by which circumstance his troops were enervated, but had, on the contrary, after the battle of Cannæ, proceeded to Rome, it is not improbable that the great city would have fallen.”
The criterion of a period is, that you cannot stop before you reach the end of the sentence, otherwise the sentence is incomplete. The following is an example of a loose sentence. “One party had given their whole attention during several years, to the project of enriching themselves, and impoverishing the rest of the nation; and, by these and other means, of establishing their dominion, under the government, and with the favour of a family, who were foreigners: and therefore might believe, they were established on the throne, by the good-will and strength of this party alone.” In this sentence you may stop at the words themselves, nation, dominion, government, or foreigners; and these pauses will severally complete the construction, and conclude perfect sentences. Thus, in a period, the dependence of the members is reciprocal; in a loose sentence, the preceding are not necessarily dependent on the subsequent members; whereas the following entirely depend on those which are antecedent. The former possesses more strength, and greater majesty; hence it is adapted to the graver subjects of history, philosophy, and religion. The latter is less artificial, and approaches nearer to the style of conversation; hence it is suited to the gayer and more familiar subjects of tales, dialogues, and epistolary correspondence.
Concord is the agreement of one word with another, in case, gender, number, or person; thus, “I love.” Here I is the pronoun singular of the first person, and the verb is likewise in the first person, and singular number; they agree therefore in number and person.
Government is the power which one word hath over another in determining its state; thus, “he wounded us.” In this sentence, wounded is an active transitive verb, and governs the pronoun in the objective case.
CHAPTER I.
OF CONCORD.
Rule I.—A verb agrees with its nominative in number and person, as,
We teach
He learns
where we and teach are each plural, and of the first person; he and learns are each singular, and of the third person.
Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as these, “I likes,” “thou loves,” “he need,” “you was.” In reference to the last example, the reader should observe, that you is plural, whether it relate to only one individual or to more, and ought therefore to be joined with a plural verb. It is no argument to say, that when we address a single person, we should use a verb singular; for were this plea admissible, we ought to say, “you wast,” for wast is the second person singular, and not “you was,” for was is the first or third. Besides, no one says, “you is,” or “you art,” but “you are.”
Note 2.—The nominative to a verb is known by putting the question, Who? or What? to the verb, as, I read; Who reads? Ans. I.
Note 3.—The infinitive often supplies the place of a nominative to a verb, thus, “To excel in every laudable pursuit should be the aim of every one.” What should be the aim? Ans. “To excel.”
Note 4.—As, considered now as a conjunction, but being, in its primitive signification, equivalent to it, that, or which, likewise supplies the place of a nominative, thus, “As far as regards his interest, he will be sufficiently careful not to offend.” Some grammarians suppose it to be understood
Note 5.—A verb is frequently construed with a whole clause as its nominative, thus, “His being at enmity with Cæsar was the cause of perpetual discord;” where, his being at enmity, the subject of the affirmation, forms the nominative to the verb.
Note 6.—The nominative, when the verb expresses command or entreaty, is often suppressed, as, “speak,” for “speak thou,” “honour the king,” for “honour ye the king.” It is also frequently suppressed in poetry, as “Lives there, who loves his pain?” Milton:—i.e. “Lives there a man?” “To whom the monarch;” replied being understood.
Note 7.—A noun singular, used for a plural, is joined to a plural verb, as, “Ten sail of the line were descried at a distance.” It has been already observed, that the plural termination is sometimes suppressed, as, “ten thousand,” “three brace,” “four pair.”
Note 8.—Priestley has said, that when the particle there is prefixed to a verb singular, a plural noun may follow, “without a very sensible impropriety.” But, if there be an impropriety at all, why should the phraseology be adopted? His example is this, “There necessarily follows from thence these plain and unquestionable consequences.” Nothing, we apprehend, can justify this violation of analogy. It should be, “follow.” Would Dr. Priestley have said “There is men who never reason?”
Note 9.—The nominative generally precedes the verb, and is, in some examples, known by nothing but its place. This arrangement, however, is sometimes altered, and the verb placed before the nominative.
1st. Where the sentence is interrogative, as, “Does wealth make men happy?” Here the nominative wealth follows the auxiliary: “wealth does” would denote affirmation. “Stands Scotland where it did?” Here also the nominative follows the verb, to denote interrogation[119].
2ndly. In expressing commands or request, as “go thou,” “read ye.”
3rdly. When a supposition is elliptically expressed, the conditional particle if being understood, as, “Were I Alexander,” said Parmenio, “I would accept the offer,” where “were I,” is equivalent to “if I were.”
4thly. After the introductory word there, as “There was a man sent by God, whose name was John.” “There are many who have the wisdom to prefer virtue to every other acquirement.” This arrangement is preferable to “a man was sent,” “many are,” &c.; and, as a general rule, I observe, that this collocation is not only proper but requisite, when a sentiment of importance is to be introduced to the hearer’s particular attention.
5thly. When the speaker is under the influence of vehement emotion, or when vivacity and force are to be imparted to the expression, the nominative energetically follows the verb, as, “Great is Diana of the Ephesians.” Alter the arrangement, saying, “Diana of the Ephesians is great,” and you efface the signature of impetuosity, and render the expression frigid and unaffecting. “Blessed is he, that cometh in the name of the Lord.” “He is blessed” would convert, as Campbell judiciously observes, a fervid exclamation into a cold aphorism. “Fallen, fallen is Babylon, that great city.” The energy of the last expression arises partly, I acknowledge, from the epijeuxis or reduplication[120].
6thly. The auxiliary verb is placed before the nominative, when the sentence or member begins with nor or neither, as, “Nor did we doubt that rectitude of conduct would eventually prove itself the best policy.” Thus also is placed the principal verb, as, “Nor left he in the city a soul alive.”
Besides the cases now enumerated, in which the verb should precede the nominative, there are several others not easily reducible to any precise rule. In general, however, it may be remarked, that the place of the nominative depends, in some degree, on its connexion with other parts of the sentence. “Hence appears the impossibility, that this undertaking should be carried on in a monarchy.” Impossibility being here in sense closely connected with the following words, this arrangement is preferable to that in the original. Hume says, “Hence the impossibility appears, that this undertaking should be carried on in a monarchy.”
Priestley has said, that nouns, whose form is plural, but signification singular, require a singular verb, as, “Mathematics is a useful study.” This observation, however, is not justified by general usage, reputable writers being in this case much divided. (See [p. 19].)
Rule II.—Two or more substantives singular, denoting different things, being equivalent to a plural, take a plural verb; or, when two or more substantives singular are collectively subjects of discourse, they require a plural verb, and plural representatives, as, “Cato and Cicero were learned men; and they loved their country.”
Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as this, “I do not think, that leisure of life and tranquillity of mind, which fortune and your own wisdom has given you, could be better employed.”—Swift.
Note 2.—It was customary with the writers of antiquity, when the substantives were nearly synonymous, to employ a verb singular, as, mens, ratio, et consilium in senibus est, “understanding, reason, and prudence is in old men.” In imitation of these, some English authors have, in similar instances, employed a verb singular. I concur, however, with L. Murray in disapproving this phraseology. For either the terms are synonymous, or they are not. If their equivalence be admitted, all but one are redundant, and there is only one subject of discourse; only one term should therefore be retained, and a verb singular be joined with it. If they be not equivalent, there are as many distinct ideas as there are terms, and a plurality of subjects requires a plural verb.
This observation, however, requires some limitation. It occasionally happens that one subject is represented by two names, neither of which singly would express it with sufficient strength. In such cases, the two nouns may take a verb singular; and if the noun singular should be in juxta-position with the verb, the singular number should be used; as “Why is dust and ashes proud?”—Ecclesiasticus, chap. x.
Note 3.—In such expressions as the following, it has been doubted, whether the verb should be in the singular or in the plural number: “Every officer and soldier claim a superiority in regard to other individuals.”—De Lolme on the British Constitution. Here, I conceive, the phraseology is correct. Such an expression as “every officer and soldier claims” might signify one individual under two different designations. Whether we should say, “Every officer, and every soldier, claim,” is a point more particularly questioned. We often hear correct speakers say, in common conversation, “Every clergyman, and every physician, is by education a gentleman;” and there seems to be more ease, as well as more precision, in this, than in the other mode of expression. It is unquestionably, however, more agreeable to analogy to say, “are gentlemen.”
Note 4.—It is not necessary, that the subjects of discourse be connected, or associated by conjunctions: it is sufficient, if the terms form a plurality of subjects to a common predicate, whether with or without any connexive word, as “Honour, justice, religion itself, were derided and blasphemed by these profligate wretches.”[121] In this example the copulative is omitted. “The king, with the lords and commons, constitute an excellent form of government.” Here the connexive word is not a conjunction, but a preposition; and though the lords and commons be properly in the objective case, and the king therefore the only nominative to the verb, yet as the three subjects collectively constitute the government, the verb without impropriety is put in the plural number. This phraseology, though not strictly consonant with the rules of concord, frequently obtains both in ancient and modern languages; in some cases, indeed, it seems preferable to the syntactical form of expression.
Note 5.—It is to be observed, that, when a pronominal adjective, compounded with self, is joined to a verb, the simple pronoun, which is the real nominative, is sometimes understood. “If there be in me iniquity, slay me thyself:” (Bible:) i.e. “Do thou thyself slay me.”
“To know but this, that thou art good,
And that myself am blind:”—Pope.
that is, “that I myself am blind.”
Note 6.—Where comparison is expressed or implied, and not combination, the verb should be singular; thus, “Cæsar, as well as Cicero, was remarkable for eloquence.”
“As she laughed out, until her back,
As well as sides, was like to crack.”—Hudibras.
Note 7.—When the nominatives are of different persons, the first person is preferred to the second, and the second to the third. In other words, I and you, I and he, are sylleptically the same as we; you and he the same as ye. This observation, however, is scarcely necessary, as the verb plural admits no personal inflexion: it can be useful only in determining what pronoun should be the representative of the terms collectively, as, “he and I shared it between us.”
Note 8.—In the learned languages the pronoun of the first person is deemed more worthy than that of the second, and the second than that of the third; and hence arises the syllepsis of persons which obtains in Greek and Latin. But, though we admit the figure in English, we do not precisely adopt the arrangement of the Latins; for though, like them, we place the pronoun of the second person before that of the third, we modestly place the pronoun of the first person after those of the second and third. Thus, where a Roman would say, Si tu et Tullia valetis, ego et Cicero valemus, we should say, “If you and Tullia are well, Cicero and I are well.”
Rule III.—When, of two or more substantives singular, one exclusively is the subject of discourse, a verb singular is required, as, “John, James, or Andrew, intends to accompany you;” that is, one of the three, but not more than one.
Note.—When the predicate is to be applied to the different subjects, though they be disjoined by the conjunction, they may be followed by a plural verb. “Neither you, nor I, are in fault.” This is the usual form of expression. If we consider neither in its proper character, as a pronoun, we should say, “neither you nor I, is in fault:” neither being the nominative to the verb. The former, however, is the common phraseology, and is analogous to the Latin idiom. “Quando nec gnatus, nec hic, mihi quicquam obtemperant.”—Ter. Hec. “Id neque ego, neque tu, fecimus.”—Id. “Num Lælius, aut qui duxit ab oppressa meritum Carthagine nomen, ingenio offensi?”—Hor.
Rule IV.—Nouns of number, or collective nouns, may have a singular or plural verb, thus,
“My people do not consider,”
“My people does not consider.”
This licence, however, as Priestley observes, is not entirely arbitrary. If the term immediately suggest the idea of number, the verb is preferably made plural; but, if it suggest the idea of a whole or unity, it should be singular. Thus it seems harsh and unnatural to say, “In France the peasantry goes barefoot, and the middle sort makes use of wooden shoes.” It would be better to say, “the peasantry go”—“the middle sort make;” because the idea is that of number. On the contrary, there is something incongruous and unnatural in these expressions: “The court of Rome were not without solicitude—The house of commons were of small weight—Stephen’s party were entirely broken up.”—Hume.
Rule V.—The adjectives this and that agree with their substantives in number, as,
| This man | These men |
| That woman | Those women. |
All other adjectives are inflexible, as,
| Good man | Good men. |
Note 1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, which too frequently occur, “These kind of people.” “Those sort of goods.”
Note 2.—The substantive, with which the adjective is connected, is ascertained by putting the question, who, or what? to the adjective, as, “a ripe apple.” What is ripe? Ans. “The apple.”
Note 3.—The inflexibility of the English adjective sometimes occasions ambiguity, rendering it doubtful to which of two or more substantives the adjective refers. The defect is sometimes supplied by the note termed hyphen. If, for example, we hear a person designated “an old bookseller,” we may be at a loss to know, whether the person intended be an old man who sells books, that is, “an old book-seller,” or one who sells old books, that is, “an old-book seller.” When we read the notice, “Lime, slate, and coal wharf,” we are indebted to the exercise of common sense, and not to the perspicuity of the diction, for understanding what is meant by attaching the term wharf to all the preceding nouns, while in strict grammatical construction the notice might bear a different signification.
Note 4.—Every adjective has a substantive, either expressed or understood, as “the just shall live by faith,” i.e. “the just man;” “few were present,” i.e. “few persons.”
Note 5.—The adjective is generally placed immediately before the substantive, as, “a learned man,” “a chaste woman.”
Exc. 1.—When the adjective is closely connected with some other word, by which its meaning is modified or explained, as, “a man loyal to his prince,” where the attributive loyal is closely connected with the following words.
Exc. 2.—When the verb to be expresses simple affirmation, as, “thou art good;” or when any other verb serves as a mere copula to unite the predicate with its subject, as, “he seems courageous,” “it looks strange.”
Exc. 3.—For the sake of harmony, as, “Hail! bard divine.”
Exc. 4.—When there are more adjectives than one connected with the substantive, as, “a man wise, valiant, and good.”
Exc. 5.—Adjectives denoting extent, whether of space or of time, are put after the clause expressing the measure, as, “a wall ten feet high,” “a child three years old,” “a speech an hour long.”
Note 6.—It has been doubted whether the cardinal should precede or follow the ordinal numeral. Atterbury says, in one of his letters to Pope, “Not but that the four first lines are good.” We conceive the expression to be quite correct, though the other form, namely, “the first four,” be often employed to denote the same conception. There is no contrast intended between these four and any other four, otherwise he should have said, “The first four.” If we say, “the first seven years,” it implies a division into sevens, as takes place, for example, in the terms of a lease; “the seven first years” implies no such division. The Latins, as far as I have observed, had only one mode of arrangement. “Itaque quinque primis diebus.”—Cæs. B. C. i. 5. “Tribus primis diebus.”—Ib. i. 18. That the adoption of one and the same collocation, in all cases, would sometimes mislead the reader, is evident. If we take, for example, seven objects, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and say “the first, and the three last,” we clearly refer to A, and E, F, G; but if we say “the first and the last three,” we may indicate A, B, C, the first three, and E, F, G, the last three.
Note 7.—Each is employed to denote two things taken separately, and is therefore used as singular[122]. Either is also singular, and implies only one of two; as, take either, that is “the one or the other, but not both.” Both is a plural adjective, and denotes the two collectively.
Note 8.—Every is an adjective singular, applied to more than two subjects taken individually, and comprehends them all. It is sometimes joined to a plural noun, when the things are conceived as forming one aggregate, as, every twelve years, i.e. “every period of twelve years.”
Note 9.—All is an adjective either singular or plural, denoting the whole, whether quantity or number, as, “All men are mortal.” “Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work.”
Note 10.—Much is an adjective of quantity, and of the singular number, as, “much fruit.” Many an adjective of number, and therefore plural, as, “many men.” This word, however, is sometimes construed with a noun singular, as,
“Many a poor man’s son would have lain still.”—Shakspeare.
Note 11.—More, as the comparative of much, is singular, denoting a greater quantity; as the comparative of many, it is plural, and signifies a greater number, as more fruit, or, “a greater quantity;” more men, “or a greater number.”
Note 12.—Enough is an adjective singular, and denotes quantity, as, “bread enough:” enow denotes number, as “books enow.”
Note 13.—The correlative word to the adjective such, is as, and not who. There is an impropriety in saying, with Mr. Addison, “Such, who are lovers of mankind,” instead of “Such as,” or, “Those who.”
Note 14.—The superlative degree is followed by of, and also the comparative, when selection is implied, as, “Hector was the bravest of the Trojans.” “Africanus was the greater of the (two) Scipios.” When opposition is signified, the comparative is followed by than, as, “Wisdom is better than wealth.”
Note 15.—There is an ambiguity in the adjective no, against which it is necessary to guard, and which Priestley seems to think that it is impossible to avoid in any language. Thus, if we say, “No laws are better than the English,” it may mean either, that the absence of all law is better than the English laws, or that no code of jurisprudence is superior to the English. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity is removed by saying, “There are no laws better than the English.” If the former is the sentiment to be expressed, we might say, “The absence of all law is preferable to the English system.”
Note 16.—Adjectives are sometimes improperly used for adverbs, as indifferent well, extreme bad, for indifferently well, extremely bad. An example of this error is also found in the following sentence. “He was interrogated relative to that circumstance.” Relative is an adjective, and must have a substantive expressed or understood; the question is then, what, or who was relative? The answer, according to the rules of construction, should be he. This, however, is not the meaning. The word ought to be relatively.
I am somewhat, however, inclined to think that our grammarians have been hypercritical, if not chargeable with error, in condemning such expressions as these, exceeding great, exceeding strong. This phraseology, I apprehend, has been reprobated, partly because not conformable to the Latin idiom, and partly because such expressions as these, excessive good, extreme dear, excellent well, are justly repudiated. Neither of these, however, can be deemed a sufficient reason for condemning this phraseology. For when it is said, “His strength was exceeding great,” may not the expression be considered as elliptical, the word exceeding being construed as a participle, thus, “his strength was exceeding,” or “surpassing great strength,” that is, “his strength exceeded great strength.”[123] So Shakspeare says, “it was passing strange.” Though exceedingly strong, exceedingly good, are now considered to be the preferable phraseologies, there can be no doubt, as Webster has observed, that adjectives are sometimes used to modify the sense of other adjectives; thus we say, “red hot,” “a closer grained wood,” “a sharper edged sword.”
In connection with the preceding note, we would here observe, that adjectives are used to modify the meaning of the verbs to which they refer; thus we say, “Open thy hand wide.”—Bible. “Cry shrill with thy voice.”—Ib. “He fought hard for his life.” The use of the kindred adverbs, as will be afterwards shown, would in many instances materially alter the meaning.
Rule VI.—The article a or an is joined to nouns of the singular number only, or nouns denoting a plurality of things in one aggregate, as,
| A man | An army | A thousand | A few. |
Note 1.—To distinguish between the use of a and an, it is usually given as a general rule that a be placed before consonants and h aspirated, and an before vowels and h not aspirated, as a table, a hat, an oak, an heir. In respect to a before h aspirated, it must be observed, that usage is divided. It would appear that, when the Bible was translated, and the Liturgy composed, an was almost universally used before h, whether the aspirate belonged to an emphatic or an unemphatic syllable. A change has since taken place; and some give it as a rule, to put a before h, when the syllable is emphatic, and an when the syllable has not the emphasis. This rule, however, is not universally observed; some writing “a history,” others “an history;” some writing “a hypothesis,” others “an hypothesis.” As far as easy pronunciation is concerned, or the practice of Greek and Roman writers may furnish a precedent, there seems to be no solid objection to either of these modes. The former is more common in Scotch and Irish writers than it is in English authors, with whom the aspiration is less forcible, and less common.
An is used before a vowel; but from this rule two deviations are admitted. Before the simple sound of u, followed by another vowel sound, whether signified or not, a and not an is used. Thus we say, “such a one,” “such a woman.” If the sound of “one” be analyzed, we shall find it resolvable into oo-un or won, as some orthoepists have expressed it; and woman into oo-umman. Again, before the diphthongal sound of eu, in whatsoever manner that sound may be noted, a may be, and frequently is, used. Thus we say, “a youth,” “a yeoman,” “a eunuch,” “a unicorn.” Sheridan, indeed, contends, that all words beginning with u, when it has the diphthongal sound of eu, should be preceded by a and not an. And here I must remark, that it is with no common surprise, I find Webster, in his introduction to his Dictionary, denying that the vowel u is anywhere equivalent to eu or e-oo. Who those public speakers are, whom, he says, he heard in England, and to whose authority he appeals, we are utterly at a loss to conjecture. But this we confidently affirm, that there is no orthoepist, no public orator, nay, not an individual in any rank of society, who does not distinguish between the sound of u in brute, rude, intrude, and in cube, fume, cure. His reference to Johnson, who says that u is long in confusion, and short in discussion, is irrelevant and nugatory. Dr. Webster surely has not to learn, that the vowel may be long, whether the sound be monophthongal, or diphthongal. It is strange, too, that in the very example which he quotes from Johnson, the u has the diphthongal sound, which he, notwithstanding, denies as anywhere existing.
Note 2.—A is employed to express one individual of a species without determining who or which; the denotes some particular individual or individuals; thus, “a book” means any book, “the book” some particular book; and when both articles are omitted the whole class is signified, as, “Man is born unto trouble,” i.e. “all men.” Hobbes errs against this rule when he says, “God Almighty has given reason to a man, to be a light to him.” The article should be suppressed. Pope commits a similar error when he writes,
“Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel.”
It is not any wheel that he meant to express, but a known instrument of torture, or “the wheel.”
The article a serves to distinguish between two subjects compared with each other, and two subjects compared with a third. “He is the author of two works of a different character.” If the writer meant to say that he was the author of two works of a different character from that of one previously mentioned, the expression would be correct. But he intended to signify a dissimilarity between the two productions. He should, therefore, have omitted the article, and said, “of different character,” or “of different characters.”
Note 3.—The indefinite article, though generally placed before the adjective, as, “a good man,” is put after the adjective such; and where these words of comparison occur, as, so, too, how, its place is between the adjective and substantive, thus, “Such a gift is too small a reward for so great a service.” When the order is inverted, this rule is not observed, as “a reward so small,” “a service so great.” The definite article is likewise placed before the adjective, as “the great king.” All is the only adjective which precedes the article. “All the servants,” “all the money.”
Note 4.—Pronouns and proper names do not admit the definite article, themselves sufficiently determining the subject of discourse; thus we cannot say, the I, the Alexander. If we employ the definite article with a proper name, an ellipsis is involved; thus, if I say, he commands the Cæsar, I mean, he commands the ship called “Cæsar.”
Note 5.—The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative from the determinative sense. The omission of the article, when the sense is restricted, creates ambiguity. For this reason the following sentence is faulty: “All words, which are signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”—Bolingbroke. Here the clause, “which are signs of complex ideas,” is not explicative, but restrictive; for all words are not signs of complex ideas. It should, therefore, be “all the,” or “all those words, which are signs of complex ideas, furnish matter of mistake.”
“In all cases of prescription, the universal practice of judges is to direct juries by analogy to the Statute of Limitations, to decide against incorporeal rights, which for many years have been relinquished.”—Erskine on the Rights of Juries. This sentence is chargeable at once with ambiguity and error. In the first place, it is doubtful whether a regard to this analogy governs the directions of the judge, or is to rule the decision of the jury. 2ndly. By the omission of the definite article, or the word those before the antecedent, he has rendered the relative clause explicative, instead of being restrictive; for, as all incorporeal rights are not abolished, he should have said, “against those incorporeal rights.”
There are certain cases, indeed, in which the antecedent clause admits the definite article, though the relative clause be not restrictive, thus,
“Blest are the pure, whose hearts are clean
From the defiling power of sin.”
Here the relative clause is merely explanatory, yet the antecedent admits the article. Thus also, in the following sentence, “My goodness extendeth not to thee, but to the saints, and the excellent ones, in whom is all my delight.” The relative clause is not intended to limit the meaning of the antecedent terms, and yet they admit the definite article. In all examples, therefore, like these, where the explanatory meaning admits the article, it is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, to mark the determinative sense by the emphatic words that or those. Thus, had the clause been determinative in the latter of these examples, it would have been necessary to say, “those saints, and those excellent ones, in whom is my delight.”
Note 6.—The definite article is likewise used to distinguish between things which are individually different, but have one generic name, and things which are, in truth, one and the same, but are characterized by several qualities. For example, if I should say, “the red and blue vestments were most admired,” it may be doubtful whether I mean that the union of red and blue in the same vestments was most admired, or that the red and the blue vestments were both more admired than the rest. In strictness of speech, the former is the only proper meaning of the words, though the latter sentiment be often thus expressed. If the latter be intended, we should say, “the red vestments and the blue,” or “the red and the blue vestments,” where the article is repeated. If I say, “the red and blue vestments,” it is obvious that only one subject is expressed, namely, “vestments,” characterized by two qualities, “redness,” and “blueness,” as combined in the subject. Here the subject is one; its qualities are plural. If I say, “the red vestments and the blue,” or “the red and the blue vestments,” the subjects are plural, expressed, however, by one generic name, vestments.
In the same manner, if we say, “the ecclesiastical and secular powers concurred in this measure,” the expression is ambiguous, as far as language can render it such. The reader’s knowledge, as Dr. Campbell observes, may prevent his mistaking it; but, if such modes of expression be admitted, where the sense is clear, they may inadvertently be imitated in cases, where the meaning would be obscure, if not entirely misunderstood. The error might have been avoided, either by repeating the substantive, or by subjoining the substantive to the first adjective, and prefixing the articles to both adjectives; or by placing the substantives after both adjectives, the article being prefixed in the same manner; thus, “the ecclesiastical powers, and the secular powers,” or better, “the ecclesiastical powers, and the secular,” or “the ecclesiastical, and the secular powers.” The repetition of the article shows, that the second adjective is not an additional epithet to the same subject, but belongs to a subject totally different, though expressed by the same generic name. “The lords spiritual and temporal,” is a phraseology objectionable on the same principle, though now so long sanctioned by usage, that we dare hardly question its propriety. The subjects are different, though they have but one generic name. It should therefore be, “the spiritual and the temporal lords.”
On the contrary, when two or more adjectives belong as epithets to one and the same thing, the other arrangement is to be preferred. Thus, “the high and mighty states.” Here both epithets belong to one subject. “The states high and mighty,” would convey the same idea.
Where the article is not used, the place of the substantive ought to show, whether both adjectives belong to the same thing, or to different things having the same generic name. “Like an householder, who bringeth out of his treasure things new and old.” This arrangement is faulty; both epithets cannot belong to the same subject. It should be, “new things and old.”
If both adjectives belong to one and the same subject, the substantive ought either to precede both adjectives, or to follow both, the article being uniformly omitted before the second adjective, whether prefixed to the substantive before the first, or suppressed. If, on the contrary, they belong to different subjects, with the same name, the substantive ought to follow the first adjective, and may be either repeated after the second, or understood; or it should follow both adjectives, the article being prefixed to each of them.
Note 7.—The omission, or the insertion of the indefinite article, in some instances, nearly reverses the meaning; thus,
“Ah, little think the gay, licentious proud.”—Thomson.
Here little is equivalent to “not much,” or rather by a common trope it denotes not at all. Locke says, “I leave him to reconcile these contradictions, which may be plentifully found in him by any one, who reads with but a little attention.” Here, on the contrary, where the indefinite article is inserted, “a little” means “not none,” or “some.”
In like manner, when it is said, “Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, and few there be that find it;” few is opposed to many. Thus also, “Many are called, but few are chosen.” But when it is said, “Tarry a few days, till thy brother’s fury turn;” a few is here equivalent to some, not as opposed to many, but as opposed to not none. If we say, “few accompanied the prince,” we seem to diminish the number, and represent it as inconsiderable, as if we said, “not many,” or “fewer than expectation:” if we say, a few, we seem to amplify;—we represent the number as not unworthy of attention, or as equal, at least, if not superior to expectation. In short, if the article be inserted, the clause is equivalent to a double negative, and thus it serves to amplify; if the article be suppressed, the expression has either a diminutive or a negative import.
Note 8.—The indefinite article has, sometimes, the meaning of every or each; thus, “they cost five shillings a dozen,” that is, “every dozen.”
“What makes all doctrines plain and clear?
About two hundred pounds a year.”—Hudibras.
That is, “every year.”
Note 9.—There is a particular use of this article, which merits attention, as ambiguity may thus, in many cases, be avoided. In denoting comparison, when the article is suppressed before the second term, the latter, though it may be an appellative, assumes the character of an attributive, and becomes the predicate of the subject, or first term. If, on the contrary, the second term be prefaced with the article, it continues an appellative, and forms the other subject of comparison. In the former case, the subject, as possessing different qualities in various degrees, is compared with itself; in the latter, it is compared with something else.
Thus, if we say, “he is a better soldier than scholar,” the article is suppressed before the second term, and the expression is equivalent to, “he is more warlike than learned,” or “he possesses the qualities, which form the soldier, in a greater degree than those, which constitute the scholar.” If, we say, “he would make a better soldier, than a scholar,” here the article is prefixed to the second term; this term, therefore, retains the character of an appellative, and forms the second subject of comparison. The meaning accordingly is, “he would make a better soldier, than a scholar would make;” that is, “he has more of the constituent qualities of a soldier, than are to be found in any literary man.”
Pope commits a similar error, when, in one of his letters to Atterbury, he says, “You thought me not a worse man than a poet.” This strictly means “a worse man than a poet is;” whereas he intended to say, that his moral qualities were not inferior to his poetical genius. He should have said, “a worse man than poet.”
These two phraseologies are frequently confounded, which seldom fails to create ambiguity. Baker erroneously considers them as equivalent, and prefers that, in which the article is omitted before the second substantive. When there are two subjects with one predicate, the article should be inserted; but when there is one subject with two predicates, it should be omitted.
Note 10.—Perspicuity in like manner requires, that, when an additional epithet or description of the same subject is intended, the definite article should not be employed. It is by an attention to this rule, that we clearly distinguish between subject and predicate. For this reason the following sentence appears to me faulty: “The apostle James, the son of Zebedee, and the brother of St. John, would be declared the apostle of the Britons.”—Henry’s History of Britain. It should be rather, “and brother of St. John.” When a diversity of persons, or a change of subject is intended to be expressed, the definite article is necessarily employed, as “Cincinnatus the dictator, and the master of horse, marched against the Æqui.” The definite article before the latter appellative marks the diversity of subject, and clearly shows that two persons are designed. Were the article omitted, the expression would imply, that the dictator, and the master of horse, were one and the same individual.
Rule VII.—Substantives signifying the same thing agree in case, thus, “I, George the Third, king of Great Britain, defender of the faith.” The words I, George, king, defender, are all considered as the nominative case. “The chief of the princes, he who defied the bravest of the enemy, was assassinated by a dastardly villain:” where the pronoun he agrees in case with the preceding term chief. This rule, however, may be deemed unnecessary, as all such expressions are elliptical; thus, “the chief of the princes was assassinated,” “he was assassinated.” “He was the son of the Rev. Dr. West, perhaps him who published Pindar at Oxford.”—Johnson’s Life of West. That is, “the son of him.” Were the pronoun in the nominative case, it would refer to the son, and not the father, and thus convey a very different meaning.
Note 1.—As proper names are, by the trope antonomasia, frequently used for appellatives, as when we say, “the Socrates of the present age,” where Socrates is equivalent to “the wisest man,” so also appellatives have frequently the meaning and force of attributives. Thus, if we say, “he is a soldier,” it means either that he is by profession a soldier, or that he possesses all the qualities of a military man, whether professionally a soldier or not. According to the former acceptation of the term, it is a mere appellative; agreeably to the latter, it has the force of an attributive.
Note 2.—Two or more substantives in concordance, and forming one complex name, or a name and title, have the plural termination annexed to the last only, as, “the two Miss Louisa Howards, the two Miss Thomsons.” Analogy, Dr. Priestley observes, would plead in favour of another construction, and lead us to say, the two Misses Thomson, the two Misses Louisa Howard; for if the ellipsis were supplied, we should say, “the two young ladies of the name of Thomson,” and this construction he adds, he has somewhere met with.
The latter form of expression, it is true, occasionally occurs; but, general usage, and, I am rather inclined to think, analogy likewise, decide in favour of the former; for, with a few exceptions, and these not parallel to the examples now given[124], we almost uniformly, in complex names, confine the inflexion to the last substantive. Some proofs of this we shall afterwards have an opportunity of offering. I would also observe, in passing, that ellipsis and analogy are different principles, and should be carefully distinguished.
Rule VIII.—One substantive governs another, signifying a different thing, in the genitive, as,
| The tyrant’s rage. | The apostle’s feet. |
Note 1.—This rule takes place when property, possession, or the general relation, by which one thing appertains to another, is implied.
Note 2.—It may be considered as violated in such examples as these, “Longinus his Treatise on the Sublime.”—Addison. “Christ his sake.”—Common Prayer.
Note 3.—Substantives govern not only nouns, but likewise pronouns, as, “its strength,” “his reward.”
Note 4.—This case is generally resolvable into the objective with the preposition of, as, “the king’s sceptre,” or “the sceptre of the king;” “his head,” or “the head of him.” I have said generally, for it is not always thus resolvable. For example, the Christian sabbath is sometimes named, “the Lord’s day;” but “the day of the Lord” conveys a different idea, and denotes “the day of judgment.”
Note 5.—The latter or governing substantive is frequently understood, as, “the king will come to St. James’s to-morrow,” that is, “St. James’s palace.” “I found him at the stationer’s,” that is, “the stationer’s shop,” or “the stationer’s house.”
Note 6.—When a single subject is expressed as the common property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of the genitive, as, “this is John, William, and Richard’s house;” that is, “this is the house of John, William, and Richard.” But when several subjects are implied, as severally belonging to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all expressed in the genitive case, as “these are John’s, William’s, and Richard’s houses.” In such examples as these, the use of the genitive involves an ambiguity, which it is sometimes difficult to prevent. Thus, if we say, agreeably to the first observation in this note, “Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’s posterity were carried captive to Babylon,” one unacquainted with the history of these patriarchs, might be at a loss to determine whether “the patriarch Abraham,” “the patriarch Isaac,” and “the posterity of Jacob,” were carried captive; in other words, whether there be three subjects of discourse, namely, Abraham, Isaac, and the posterity of Jacob, or only one subject, the posterity of the patriarchs. Nor will the insertion of the preposition in all cases prevent the ambiguity. For, in the example before us, were the word “descendants” substituted for “posterity,” and the phrase to proceed thus, “the descendants of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob,” an ignorant reader might be led to suppose that not one generation of descendants, but three distinct generations of these three individuals were carried into captivity. If we say, “the posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” the expression appears to me liable to the same misconstruction with the one first mentioned. If we say, “the common posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were carried captive to Babylon,” all ambiguity of expression is prevented.
Instead also of saying, “John, William, and Richard’s house,” I should prefer “a house belonging in common to John, William, and Richard.” This expression, though laborious and heavy, is preferable to the inelegance and harshness of three inflected substantives, while it removes the ambiguity, which might in some cases be occasioned by withholding the inflexion from the two first substantives. Where neatness and perspicuity cannot possibly be combined, it will not be questioned which we ought to prefer. I observe, also, that though such phraseologies as this, “John’s, William’s, and Richard’s houses,” be perfectly consonant with syntactical propriety, and strictly analogous to the established phraseology, “his, Richard’s, and my houses,” yet, as there appears something uncouth in the former expression, it would be better to say, “the houses belonging in common, or severally (as the meaning may be) to John, William, and Richard.”
Note 7.—When a name is complex, that is, consisting of more terms than one, the last only admits the sign of the genitive, as, “Julius Cæsar’s Commentaries,” “John the Baptist’s head,” “for Herodias’ sake, his brother Philip’s wife.”
Note 8.—When a short explanatory term is subjoined to a name, it matters little to which the inflexion be annexed, as, “I left the parcel at Mr. Johnson, the bookseller’s,” or “at Mr. Johnson’s, the bookseller.” But if the explanatory term be complex, or if there are more explanatory terms than one, the sign of the genitive must be affixed to the name, or first substantive, thus, “I left the book at Johnson’s, a respectable bookseller, a worthy man, and an old friend.” In the same manner we should say, “this psalm is David’s, the king, priest, and prophet of the people,” and not “this psalm is David, the king, priest, and prophet of the people’s.”
Note 9.—In some cases we employ both the genitive and a preposition, as “this is a friend of the king’s,” elliptically, for “this is a friend of the king’s friends.” We say also, “this is a friend of the king.” These forms of expression, however, though in many cases equivalent, sometimes imply different ideas. Thus, if I say, “this is a picture of my friend,” it means, “this is an image, likeness, or representation of my friend.” If I say, “This is a picture of my friend’s,” it means, “this picture belongs to my friend.”
As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it should be avoided, unless in cases where this plurality may be implied. Thus we may say, “a kinsman of the traitor’s waited on him yesterday,” it being implied that the traitor had several or many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to “a kinsman of the traitor’s kinsmen.” But, if the subject possessed were singular, or the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple genitive; thus, if he had only one house, I should say, “this is the house of the traitor,” or “this is the traitor’s house;” but not “this is a house of the traitor’s.”
Note 10.—The recurrence of the analytical expression, and likewise of the simple genitive, should be carefully avoided. Thus, there is something inelegant and offensive in the following sentence, “the severity of the distress of the son of the king touched the nation.” Much better, “the severe distress of the king’s son touched the nation.”
Note 11.—There is sometimes an abrupt vulgarity, or uncouthness, in the use of the simple genitive. Thus, in “the army’s name,” “the commons’ vote,” “the lords’ house,” expressions of Mr. Hume, there is a manifest want of dignity and of elegance. Much better, “the name of the army,” “the vote of the commons,” “the house of lords.”
Rule IX.—Pronouns agree with their antecedents, or the nouns which they represent, in gender, number, and person, as, “They respected Cato and his party,” where Cato is singular and masculine, and his agrees with it in gender and number. “He addressed you and me, and desired us to follow him,” where us sylleptically represents the two persons. “Thou, who writest.” Here the antecedent thou being a person, the relative who, not which, is employed. The antecedent also being of the second person and singular number, the relative is considered as of the same character, and is therefore followed by the verb in the second person and singular number. “Vice, which no man practises with impunity, proved his destruction.” Here the antecedent vice not being a person, the pronoun which, of the neuter gender, is therefore employed. “The rivers, which flow into the sea.” Here also the antecedent not being a person, the relative is which. It is also considered as in the plural number; and, as all substantives are joined to the third person, which, the representative of rivers, is joined to the third person plural of the verb.
Note 1.—This rule is transgressed in the following examples: “Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit after his kind.” “There was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found in that of two persons in the same age.” Here that, referring to destinies, is put for those. “The crown had it in their power to give such rewards as they thought proper.”—Parliamentary Debates.
Note 2.—The relative should be placed as near as possible to the antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.
Note 3.—In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the following rule: “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’” The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative clause, with the antecedent man, form the predicate; and the sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am the man who command you,” the man simply is the predicate, and I who command you the subject; thus, “I who command you,” or “I your commander am the man.” This error, sufficiently obvious to every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of this Treatise. Murray’s rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.
In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every edition posterior to the publication of the “Etymology and Syntax,” the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge a rule, which he had once delivered—a disinclination perhaps accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine; but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says, “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it may agree in person with either.” So far he has transcribed the former rule; but he adds, “according to the sense.” Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to be informed, that the relative may agree with either. If after having taught the learner, that a Latin adjective must agree with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that it may agree with either of the two substantives, according to the sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition, or with extreme inattention to correctness and precision. For what would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs; and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative, in like manner, must agree with that antecedent, and that only, whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.
Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary, the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This, however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed, without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person. And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood originally, it gave some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.
The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense, is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of arrangement. Thus, “He is the hero who did it,” and “He who did it is the hero.” In the former, he is the subject, and the hero who did it the predicate; and in the latter, he who did it is the subject, and the hero the predicate.
Note 4.—The relative, instead of referring to any particular word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus, “the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree of jealousy and discontent,” that is, “which thing,” namely, the rejection of the bill.
Note 5.—The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied; as, “Who steals my purse, steals trash,” i.e. “he,” or “the man, who.” “Whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive,” Bible; i.e. “Those whom he would.” “Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.” In this example the antecedent he, and nominative to the principal verb, is understood.
Priestley has remarked that the pronouns whoever and whosoever have sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following examples. “Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have the head of whoever had advised it.”—Hume. “He offered a great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of him.”—Hume. Though the learned author seems to admit both these modes of construction, we apprehend that only one of them is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent is often understood to the relative who, and to the compounds whoever and whosoever. If the antecedent be supplied, it will be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct. “She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised,” the relative being the nominative to the verb. “He offered a great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him.” Whomsoever is a solecism: though close to the preposition to, it is not under its government. (See the following rules.)
Rule X.—If no nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be the nominative to the verb, as, “Solomon, who was the son of David, built the temple of Jerusalem.” Here who is the nominative to the verb was.
Rule XI.—But, if a nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be under the government of the preposition going before, or the noun or verb following, as, “God, whom we worship, is the Lord, by whose gift we live, and by whom all things were made.” In the first relative clause, where we is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the verb following: in the second clause, where the intervening nominative is likewise we, the relative is in the genitive case, and governed by the noun following, thus, “by whose gift,” or “by the gift of whom;” and in the third clause, where things is the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the preposition.
Note 1.—The case of the relative may always be ascertained by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded by Romulus,” i.e. “the city, which city is called Rome.” The antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verb is, which therefore agrees with it in case. “God, who sees all things, will punish the wicked,” i.e. “God, which God sees all things;” the relative, therefore, is the nominative to the verb sees, that is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put, if again expressed. “Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of princes.” Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run thus, “David loved whom,” an expression analogous to “David loved him,” or “David loved which Solomon.” Many solecisms in the construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little attention to the natural arrangement. Thus, instead of committing the error involved in the following examples, “The philosopher, who he saw to be a man of profound knowledge,” “’Twas my brother, who you met with,” “I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to,” we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology; “he saw whom,” “you met with whom,” “I spoke to whom.” It is to be observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the relative in the same state of government must invariably go before it.
Note 2.—The relatives who and which are often understood, especially in colloquial language: “The friend I visited yesterday is dead to-day,” i.e. “the friend whom I visited yesterday is dead to-day.”
Note 3.—After a comparative, both relative and antecedent are often understood. “The damage was far greater than he knew.” Here there is a comparison of two objects, the damage suffered, and the damage known; but only one is expressed. The sentence, if the ellipsis were supplied, would run thus, “The damage was far greater, than what,” or “that, which he knew.”
Note 4.—There are a few cases, which are considered by some distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use of that in preference to the pronouns who and which.
1st. After superlatives the pronoun that is generally used, as, “The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”
2ndly. After the word same, that is generally used, as, “he is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition should precede the relative, one of the other two pronouns must be employed, the pronoun that not admitting a preposition prefixed to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.” It is remarkable, however, that when the arrangement is somewhat changed, the word that admits the preposition, as, “he is the same man, that you were acquainted with.”
3rdly. That is used after who, taken interrogatively, as, “Who, that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus degraded?”
4thly. When persons and things are referred to, as, “the men and things, that he hath studied, have not contributed to the improvement of his morals.”
Rule XII.—An active transitive verb governs the accusative or objective case, as,
“He teaches me.”
“We honour him.”
Note 1.—As examples of transgression against this rule, we may adduce the following: “Who do I love so much?”—Shakspeare. “Who should I meet the other day, but my old friend?”—Spectator. “Those, who he thought true to his party.”—Clarendon.
Note 2. As substantives have no objective case, the subject or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its place, which is after the verb, as “Achilles slew Hector,” where Achilles, the agent, precedes, and Hector, the subject of the action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is reversed, as “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently produced. Thus, when Pope says, Odyss. xix.
“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”
it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,
“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”
If the son addressed the sire,
“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”
Note 3.—An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification, as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man see his brother sin a sin, which is not unto death.”—Bible. The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What have I sinned?”—Bible. It should be, “How?” or “In what?” Some intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit him down.”—Home’s Douglas. This is a poetic licence, which, in a prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very familiar language.
Note 4.—The objective case should not, if possible, be separated from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence: “Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.—Hume. The regimen is here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.
Rule XIII.—Verbs signifying to ask, teach, offer, promise, pay, tell, allow, deny, and some others of like signification, are sometimes, especially in colloquial language, followed in the passive voice by an objective case.
Note 1.—This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a very few instances, is not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek: it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him into an egregious solecism. “He allowed me great liberty,” turned passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, “great liberty was allowed me.” But we say also in English, “I was allowed great liberty.” “He promised (to) me a ship in five days,” passively, “a ship was promised me,” and “I was promised her in five days.” “She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her by her mother,” or, “though she was offered them by her mother.”
Note 2.—After verbs of giving, telling, sending, promising, offering, and others of like signification, the thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find authors of that period saying indiscriminately, “Give it us,” and “Give us it;” “Tell him it,” and “Tell it him;” “He promised me it,” and “He promised it me.” In Scotland these two modes of expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one general rule. We say, “Give it me,” “Tell it him,” “He sent it us.”
Rule XIV.—The verb to be has the same case after it as it has before it, thus denoting that the subjects are identical, or that the one term is the predicate of the other, as, “It is he,” “You believed it to be him.” In the former example, it is the nominative to the verb, the nominative case he therefore follows the verb. In the latter, it is the regimen of the verb believed, the verb to be is therefore followed by the objective case.
Note 1.—This rule is violated in such examples as “it is me,” “it was him,” “I believed it to be he,” “whom do men say that I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say that I am whom,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominative I precedes, and the objective case whom follows the verb.
Note 2.—Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be me,’ rather than ‘If it be I?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those who consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle and reprehensible.
Note 3.—The verb to be is called by logicians the copula, as connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he is wise,” “they are learned,” he and they are the subjects; wise and learned the predicates. Now, it particularly deserves the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost any verb may be used as a copula. This circumstance is the more worthy of his notice, as a conformity to the Latin idiom may lead him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt others not strictly correct[125]. Thus we say, “it tastes good,” “he strikes hard,” “I remember right,” “he feels sick;” “we came late,” “they rise early,” “he drinks deep.” I am aware that the words late, early, are in such examples considered as adverbs. It appears to me they are adjectives,—that the idiom is truly English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.
Rule XV.—When two verbs come together, the attribute signified by the one verb being the subject or object of the action, energy, or affection expressed by the other, the former is governed in the infinitive mood, as, “he taught me to read,” “I knew him to be.”
Note 1.—The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative before it, as, “he loves to study,” or “he loves study.”
Note 2.—In such examples as, “I read to learn,” where the latter phrase, though in the same form as to study, in the preceding example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be resolved like it into “I read learning,” in such examples, as Tooke justly observes, the preposition for denoting the object, and equivalent to pour in French, is understood, as, “I read for to learn.” Our southern neighbours indeed, in these examples, never omit the casual term; and Trusler has not improperly observed, that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate effect, but something remote and contingent, the words in order to, which are nearly equivalent to for, may be pertinently introduced as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the greatest dangers.”
Note 3.—The verbs to bid, dare, need, make, see, hear, feel, let, are not followed by the sign of the infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be observed, however, that in the language of Scripture the verb “to make” is often followed by to, as, “He maketh his sun to rise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is also construed with to, “I dare thee but to breathe upon my love.”—Shakspeare.
Note 4.—Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed by an infinitive, as, “your desire to improve will ultimately contribute to your happiness.” “Good men are desirous to do good.”
Note 5.—As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense: but when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which is termed the perfect of the infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb, then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when the action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed, and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology, and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus, we should say, “I expected to see you,” and not “I expected to have seen you;” because either the expectation and the seeing must be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the sight, abstractedly considered, may precede the expectation, it cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that the paper, on which I write, existed as an object of my perception, previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus, dixit me scribere, “he said that I wrote,” or “was writing,” that is, at the time of his saying so: dixit me scripsisse, “he said that I had written.”
I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases, where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed, should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious reasons we may, and often do, employ the present infinitive, or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of saying, “he promised that he would pay,” where the constructive sign of futurity is used to denote the posteriority of the payment, we often say, “he promised to pay,” employing the present tense, synonymous with the simple name, as, “he promised payment.” The Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes adopted the latter, as, denegavit se dare.—Plaut. Jusjurandum pollicitus est dare.—Id. “He refused to give,” “he promised to give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the act simply, and the time being necessarily implied.
Note 6.—The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not trespass.”
Rule XVI.—The imperative, agreeably to the general rule, agrees with its nominative, as,
“Love thou;” “listen ye,” or “you.”
Note 1.—The imperative is frequently used, without its subject, that is, the nominative being suppressed, but the person or persons being perfectly understood. “And Samuel said to the people, Fear not,” i.e. “Fear ye not.”
Note 2.—It is employed in the same way, in an absolute sense, without its subject. “Our ideas are movements of the nerves of sense, as of the optic nerve, in recollecting visible ideas, suppose of a triangular piece of ivory.”—Darwin. I agree with Webster in thinking, that there is “a peculiar felicity” in such absolute forms of expression, the verb being thus applicable to any of the three persons, thus, “I may suppose,” “you may suppose,” “one may suppose.”
Rule XVII.—Participles are construed as the verbs to which they belong, as,
“Teaching us to deny ungodliness.”
Note 1.—The imperfect participle is frequently used like a substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,” i.e. “they love to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural number, as, the outgoings of the morning.
Note 2.—Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article, it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing this rule;” in which example, this rule is the regimen of the participle observing; and that, when the definite article precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and, therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb. He therefore condemns this expression, “by the sending them the light of thy holy Spirit.” Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance, as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in support of his opinion.
In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer who does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the phraseology which he condemns.
Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which are incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every example, we have surely good reasons for repudiating a phraseology which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what must be intelligible in all.
Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either by inserting the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say either, “by sending his Son into the world,” or “by the sending of his Son.” Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichsoever of these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.” Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was heard—he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he was active—he heard.
Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be correct, the expression might be “because of provoking his sons and daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.
Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more examples might be produced to prove that these phraseologies, which Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It appears, then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this rule.
Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it, as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article, he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another, we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This position, were this the place for it, we could easily prove, notwithstanding the objections which Scioppius, Vossius, with some other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal nouns in io governed an accusative, like the verbs whence they were derived. Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem, is one example from Plautus out of many, which might be produced[126]. That the supines also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally clear: Difficile dictu was originally difficile in dictu; and misit oratum opem, misit ad oratum opem. Nor can the structure of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved, notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this supposition: Dixit libros lectum iri is resolved into dixit (id) iri ad lectum libros, where libros is the regimen of the verbal noun lectum.
Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal nouns in io, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect; nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I not conceive, that the very authority to which Dr. Lowth seems to appeal, militates against him; and that the very language, to which in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.
From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the rule given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage, nor friendly to perspicuity; while the violation of it is perfectly reconcilable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.
Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth’s argument, and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the candid and judicious critic the following remarks.
The participle in ing has either an active or passive signification; its import must, therefore, be determined by the judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever, then, is calculated to remove all misconstruction, and to render its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently, then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as, “in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is, the philosopher hearing; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted, as, “in hearing the philosopher,” or the philosopher being heard. An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent ambiguity.
If it should be said that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies, I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe, likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when the participle is not followed by of, and its insertion when it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy, will still further appear from the following note.
Note 3.—The participle in ing is construed like a noun, governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the regimen of its proper verb, as, “Much depends on Richard’s observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” In this example, the words Richard’s and his are in the genitive case, governed by the participles observing and neglecting, while these participles, having here every character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth, precisely analogous to the one now exemplified: “Much depends on the rule’s being observed, and error will be the consequence of its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that is, under the government of another noun, but without any other noun to govern it; for being observed and being neglected are not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by the preposition of, before the noun or pronoun.”
I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage, but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution. The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force, conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on his observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” Now let us try whether this sentence be not liable to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the preposition of before the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it would not be English to say, “Much depends on the being observed of the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected of it.” But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us see; “Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it.” Were the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as, “Much depends on your pupil’s composing, but more on his reading frequently.” This sentence, the author alluded to, would have approved. Let us try if it can be resolved by of: “Much depends on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him frequently.”
The author’s argument, then, if it prove anything, proves too much; it cannot, therefore, have any weight.
In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the writer’s argument involves another inconsistency. He admits that the participle in ing may be thus construed; for he approves the phrases, “his observing the rule,” and “his neglecting it.” Why then does he reject “his being” and “its being?” for the past or perfect participles observed and neglected have no share in the government, rule’s and it’s being under the regimen of the participle in ing. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more objectionable than “his being a great man did not make him a happy man;” which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.
Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose, have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead of saying, “his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause of his murdering his son,” would say, “he being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause.” This seems to me an idle affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language. For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology, the answer must be he; whereas the meaning is, that not he, but his being smitten, was the cause of his murder.
“This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester with the murder of Prince Edward.” “This,” says Mr. Baker, very justly, “is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are not ignorant.” The writer should have said, “for Hall’s charging.” “His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age induce me to transcribe them.” Here I agree with the same writer in thinking, that it would be better to consider words as in the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, as Hall’s in the preceding example, and join his words’ being applicable, equivalent to the applicability of his words, with the verb singular; thus, “his words’ being applicable to the common mistake of our age, induces me to transcribe them.” A ridiculous partiality in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, “What think you of my horse’s running to-day?” it is implied, that the horse did actually run. If it is said, “What think you of my horse running to-day?” it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected, deserves attention; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both meanings.
Note 4.—This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the same manner as the infinitive mood, as, “this conduct, viewing it in the most favourable light, reflects discredit on his character.” Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent to the infinitive in that state, as, “to view it in the most favourable light.” Both these modes of expression are resolvable, either by the hypothetical, or the perfective conjunctions; thus, “if we view it in the most favourable light.” “To confess the truth, I have no merit in the case;” i.e. “that I may confess.”
Rule XVIII.—A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative.
Note 1.—This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the nominative. Thus, “We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they lightened the ship.” The pronoun of the first person, joined to the participle, being, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is therefore put in the nominative case.
Note 2.—This rule is violated in such examples as the following, “Solomon made as wise proverbs as anybody has done, him only excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon.”—Tillotson.
“For only in destroying I find ease
To my relentless thoughts; and, him destroy’d,
Or won to what may work his utter loss,
For whom all this was made, all this will soon
Follow,”—Milton.
This seems to be the only example in which the poet has transgressed this rule; and in several instances, in which he has observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective case.
Rule XIX.—Prepositions are joined with the objective case, or govern nouns and pronouns in the accusative, as, “he ran to me,” “he was loved by us.”
Note 1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?” instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”
Note 2.—The preposition is frequently separated from its regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,” i.e. “with whom I am much delighted.”
Note 3.—The prepositions to and for are often understood, as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:” i.e. “he gave to me,” “he told to me.”
Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns, me, thee, &c., may be considered to be in the dative case, as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective pronouns, and in their form include to, as, “woe is to me.” This phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as, “wae is me,” in which me is a dative case.
The preposition by is also, in a few colloquial expressions, omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,” “he crossed the bridge,” for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”
Note 4.—A preposition, following a verb, constituting with it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to be hoped for;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by the word that.
Note 5.—The prepositions in, on, for, and from, are often understood before nouns of time and place; thus, “this day,” “next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for “on this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say, also, “He was banished England,” i.e. “from England.”
Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,” referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might be more clearly expressed; but if we intend to signify a continued deafness, we ought to say, “for” or “during some years.”
Note 6.—The preposition is improperly omitted in the following line of Pope’s:
“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”
It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “smiled at what they blushed at before,” both verbs requiring at after them, thus, “they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”
Note 7.—Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to each of the words, whose relation they express. The following sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “The ignorance of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow of this new invention.” It should be, “the progress of this new invention.” The following sentence from Johnson, is, for the same reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “The country first dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”—Rasselas. It should be, “the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris, “being in no sense capable of either intention or remission.” If it be considered, however, that the word either properly means “the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being, therefore, in strict propriety, the regimen of the preposition, the arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision of usage, that great arbitress of all language, (for at present she is divided,) Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley’s own rule, than that, which the latter recommends; thus, “capable of either (i.e. of the one or of the other), intension, or remission.”
Rule XX.—Adverbs have no government.
Note 1.—They are sometimes improperly used for adjectives, as, “After those wars of which they hoped for a soon and prosperous issue.”—Sidney. “A soon issue” is not English; an adverb cannot agree with a substantive; it should be “a speedy and prosperous issue.” Such expressions likewise as the following, though not destitute of authority, are exceedingly inelegant, and irreconcilable with analogy: “the then ministry,” for “the ministry of that time;” “the above discourse,” for “the preceding discourse.”
Note 2.—They are sometimes used like substantives, as, “a little while,” for “in a little time,” or “for a little time.” “Worth while,” “some how,” “any how,” “any where,” are examples of the same kind.
Note 3.—The adverbs whence, thence, hence, are equivalent to, “from which place,” “from that place,” “from this place;” from whence, from thence, from hence, are therefore chargeable with redundancy.
Note 4.—Never is sometimes erroneously used for ever, as, “they might be extirpated, were they never so many.” It should be, “ever so many,” i.e. “how many soever.” “Who will not hearken to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so sweetly.” It should be, “ever so sweetly;” i.e. “however sweetly,” or “how sweetly soever.”
Note 5.—Ever is likewise sometimes improperly used for never, as, “I seldom or ever see him now.” It should be, “seldom or never,” the speaker intending to say, “that rarely, or rather at no time, does he see him now;” not “rarely,” or “at any time.”
Note 6.—Priestley remarks, that the French always place their adverbs immediately after their verbs, which order, he observes, by no means suits the English idiom. “His government gave courage to the English barons to carry farther their opposition.”—Hume. It would be better, “to carry their opposition farther.” “Edward obtained a dispensation from his oath, which the barons had compelled Gaveston to take, that he would abjure for ever the realm;” better “the realm for ever.”
Note 7.—The adverb is generally placed between the auxiliary verb and the participle, as, “this is perfectly understood.” When there are more auxiliaries than one, the same author observes, that the adverb should be placed after the first. This rule, however, is by no means universally followed; for many of our best writers employ a different arrangement, and, I think, with great propriety; as, “this will be perfectly understood,” where the adverb follows both auxiliaries. The place of the adverb may, in general, be ascertained, by considering what word it is intended to qualify: and, in the last example, it should be closely connected with understood. But more on this subject in the following note.
Note 8.—The adverb, as its name imports, is generally placed close to the word, which it modifies or affects: its force, therefore, very much depends upon its position. Inattention to the proper collocation of adverbs is frequently the cause of much obscurity and misconception. To this inattention we may ascribe the ambiguity in the following sentence: “He was not honoured with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” This sentence may imply, either that he was honoured with this reward, not without the approbation of the people; or that he was not honoured with this reward, but was honoured with the approbation of the people. The latter is the meaning intended. It should therefore be, “he was honoured, not with this reward, but with the approbation of the people.” By this arrangement the sentiment is correctly exhibited—the two subjects, reward and approbation, are perspicuously contrasted, and while the former is negatived, the latter is affirmed[127].
Note 9.—Lowth observes that “the adverb should be for the most part placed before adjectives, and after verbs;” thus, “he was excessively modest,” “he fought bravely.” This is, indeed, the general arrangement; but it admits many exceptions. In no case are writers so apt to err as in the position of the word only. Its place, in my opinion, is after the substantive to which it refers, or which it exclusively implies, and before the attributive. In the following sentence of Steele’s, the collocation is faulty: “ The bridegroom sits with an aspect which intimates his thoughts were not only entertained with the joys with which he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude, and divine pleasure.” This collocation of the two adverbs implies that his thoughts were something more than entertained: whereas it is the author’s intention to say, that his thoughts were entertained with something more than joys. The sentence, therefore, should proceed thus: “The bridegroom sits with an aspect, which intimates, that his thoughts were entertained not with the joys only, with which he was surrounded, but also with a noble gratitude and divine pleasure.”[128]
When Addison says (Spec. No. 412), “By greatness I do not only mean the bulk of any single object, but the largeness of a whole view,” the question naturally occurs, what does he more than mean? It is evident that, agreeably to this arrangement, the adverb refers to mean, exclusively of all other attributes or actions, and being prefaced by a negative, implies “that he does something more than mean.” In this criticism I concur with Blair, who has expressed his disapprobation of this arrangement.
Had he, as the same author observes, placed the adverb after bulk, it would have still been wrong. For if he had said, “I do not mean the bulk only,” then the adverb, following a noun substantive, must refer to it exclusively of every other, and the clause being negative, the question would be, what does he mean more than the bulk? Is it the colour, the beauty, or what else?
Now, as Mr. Addison intended to say that he did not mean one thing, the word only should have followed the name of that thing, whether its designation was simple or complex. He should, therefore, have said, “the bulk of any single object only, but the largeness of a whole view.” According to this arrangement, the word only refers, as it ought, to “the bulk of any single object” as one idea; and the question occurs, what does he mean more than the bulk of any single object? to which the answer follows, “the largeness of a whole view.” It may, however, at the same time be observed that, consistently with the practice of some of our best writers, who place the adverb before its subject, there seems no impropriety here in saying, “I do not mean only,” i.e. “one thing,” “the bulk of a single object, but the largeness of a whole view.”
“The perfidious voice of flattery reminded him,” says Gibbon, “that by exploits of the same nature, by the defeat of the Nemean lion, and the slaughter of the wild boar of Erymanthus, the Grecian Hercules had acquired a place among the gods, and an immortal memory among men.” “They only forgot to observe that, in the first ages of society, a successful war against savage animals is one of the most beneficial labours of heroism.” In the beginning of the latter sentence the adverb only is misplaced. As it stands, the meaning is that they were the only persons who forgot: it should be “only they forgot to observe;” i.e. “one thing they forgot,” namely, “to observe.” To this erroneous collocation in Gibbon, I shall oppose a similar example from Pope, in which the adverb is correctly placed. In a letter to Hughes, speaking of the compliments which this gentleman had paid to him on his translation of Homer, he acquaints him, that he should be ashamed to attempt returning these compliments; one thing, however, he would observe, namely, that he esteemed Mr. Hughes too much not to be pleased with the compliments which he had received from him. His words, therefore, are, “I should be ashamed to offer at saying any of those civil things, in return to your obliging compliments, in regard to my translation of Homer: only I have too great a value for you not to be pleased with them;” where the word only introduces the clause, and is equivalent to “one thing is true,” or “thus much (tantum), I say, I have too great a value,” &c. Here it is obvious that the adverb, as it precedes the pronoun, does not refer to it; and that Mr. Pope’s collocation of it is perfectly correct, to express the sentiment, which he intended. Had he said, “I only,” the adverb would have referred to the pronoun, and implied that he was the only person who valued. Had he intended to say, that he merely entertained an esteem for him, but could not manifest it, then the presence of the auxiliary would have been necessary, and he would have expressed himself thus, “I do only entertain too great an esteem for you;” that is, “I do only (one thing) entertain too great an esteem.” Had he said, “I have only too great a value for you,” it would be properly opposed to, “and not too little.” Had he said, “I have too great a value only,” then value would be contrasted with some other sentiment, as when one says, he “has wealth only, but not virtue,” for example, or any other acquirement. As a violation of this rule, I adduce also the following expression of a reviewer. “We only discharge our duty to the public;” a declaration which, strictly interpreted, means “we are the only persons who discharge.” It should be, “we do only (one thing) discharge our duty;” for the writer intended to say, that he did nothing but discharge his duty to the public[129]. In justification of such inaccuracies, it is impertinent to plead, that a little attention will prevent misconception. It is the business of every author to guard his reader, as far as the language in which he writes will permit, from the possibility of misconstruction, and to render that attention to the language unnecessary. Quintilian’s maxim cannot be too often repeated to those who, by such apologies, attempt to defend any avoidable ambiguity[130].
The following sentence is justly censured by Blair, and also by Baker, in his “Remarks.” “Theism,” says Shaftesbury, “can only be opposed to polytheism or atheism.” He ought to have said, observes Baker, “Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism.” Dr. Blair concurs in opinion with the remarker. I am inclined, however, to differ from both; and think, that the sentence should run thus: “Theism can be opposed to polytheism only, or atheism;” where the adverb only refers to the noun immediately preceding, and is understood to the other, implying, that these two systems of belief are the only creeds to which theism can be opposed. If this be not the proper arrangement, it is obvious, that no definite rule can be given on the subject. For, if the adverb may be placed either before or after the substantive, to which it refers, then precision becomes impossible, and we may say, “he only” or “only he” to express the same sentiment; which collocations, I have already shown, denote ideas materially different. But, if there be a definite and precise rule for the position of this word, and if the sense be different, according to the collocation of the adverb, then I think it will appear, that it ought to be subjoined to the substantive or pronoun to which it refers; and this opinion is supported by the authority of Blair himself, in the examples which I have just now adduced. For why, unless on this principle, does he contend that the word only should be placed after the bulk of a single object? If the adverb then be, in this example, rightly placed after the substantive or complex name, to which it refers, it ought to have the same position assigned to it in every similar instance. That the adverb, in the last example, refers to “polytheism,” there can be no question; it should therefore follow, and not precede, it.
I am well aware, that many examples may be produced, wherein, with an arrangement different from that here recommended, the sense would, notwithstanding, be perfectly clear; and, perhaps, Blair’s collocation, in the last example, may be adduced as an instance. But when a rule, conducive to perspicuity, is once established, every unnecessary deviation from it should be studiously avoided, or, at least, not wantonly adopted.
The sentence, as it stands in Shaftesbury, implies that theism is capable of nothing, but of being opposed to polytheism, or atheism; “Theism can only (one thing, namely) be opposed to polytheism or atheism;” where it is evident that only refers to be opposed, agreeably to the rule now given. In the same manner, if I say, “he was only great,” it is implied, that he was nothing but great, the adverb being placed before the attributive, to which it refers. Hence the question naturally is, what was he not besides? The answer may be, “not good,” “not wise,” “not learned.” Were the adverb placed after the pronoun, it would imply, that “he was the only person who was great.”[131]
I am perfectly aware, that the rule here given will not, in all cases, preclude ambiguity; but whenever it becomes doubtful, whether the adverb is intended to affect the preceding substantive, or the following attributive, a different form of expression may be adopted, and the use of the auxiliary, along with the principal verb, will, in many instances, ensure perspicuity. This expedient, however, cannot always be employed. If we say, “The manufacturer only was prosperous,” it may be uncertain, whether the adverb is to restrict the predicate “prosperous” to the manufacturer, implying that he was the only prosperous man, or to the verb expressing past time, signifying that he was then, but is not now prosperous. If the former be the meaning intended, we may say, “he was the only prosperous man;” if the latter, we may say, “the manufacturer was once,” or “was then, the only prosperous man.”
It would have contributed much to perspicuity, if authors had adopted one uniform practice, placing the adverb constantly, either before or after its subject, whether a substantive or an attributive[132]. But, where usage is so divided, and where the adoption of a new and general rule would be now liable to insuperable objections, all that can be successfully attempted is, in accommodation to existing circumstances, to reduce the evil within narrow limits, if we cannot, by any precise rule, entirely remove it. With this view we would recommend, that when the adverb refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed at the beginning of that sentence or clause; where it refers to a predicate, it precede the predicating term; and when it has a reference to a subject, it follow its name or description. An observation, however, already made, may be here repeated, namely, that in the last case, a different collocation may often be adopted without the risk of ambiguity, and even with advantage to the structure of the sentence.
Note 10.—Adverbs, as Lowth observes, are generally placed before the adjective to which they refer. This rule, however, admits a few exceptions. The adverb enough is always placed after its adjective, as, “the reward was small enough.” The proper position of this adverb, indeed, seems to be immediately after the adjective; it is frequently, however, placed at some distance from it, as, “a large house enough.” Usage is, indeed, somewhat divided on this point, Mr. Baker, and a few others, pleading for the following arrangement, “a large enough house.” The former collocation, however, seems far the more general; and is recommended by that rule, by which the substantive and adjective should be placed in juxta-position, or as near as possible to each other. The latter is defended by the principle, that the qualifying adverb should be placed close to the adjective, whose signification it modifies. This collocation is generally, however, pronounced a Scotticism; but it is not peculiar to Scotch writers.
Rule XXI.—Conjunctions have no government.
Note 1.—In giving this rule, I differ from all other grammarians, who have erroneously, as I conceive, assigned them a regimen. Some conjunctions, says Lowth, govern the indicative, and some the subjunctive mood. This I affirm without hesitation to be a great mistake; for not a single example, I venture to assert, can be produced, in which the verb is divested of its indicative form, in consequence of its being subjoined to any conjunction. The Latins had a form of the verb, which they properly enough denominated the subjunctive mood; because, where the meaning was unconditionally assertive, they employed this form, if the clause was preceded by some particular conjunctive or adverbial term. Thus, when they said, adeo benevolus erat, ut omnes eum amarent, “he was so benevolent, that all men loved him,” though the assertion in the latter clause, be evidently unconditional, as the English shows, they changed the indicative into another form, because the verb is preceded by the conjunction ut. No similar example can be produced in English.
Lowth informs us, that, when hypothesis, conditionality, or contingency is implied, the mood should be subjunctive; if certainty, or something determinate and absolute be signified, the verb should be indicative. Now surely, if the sense require a form different from the indicative, the verb cannot be said to be under the government of the conjunction; for the verb assumes that form, not because preceded by the conjunctive term, or because it is under its government, but because the sentiment to be expressed requires that phraseology. Whether the conditional, or what Lowth terms the subjunctive, be a distinct form of the verb, or only an elliptical mode of expression, we have already inquired. See [p. 126].
Note 2.—Mr. Harris says, that the chief difference between prepositions and conjunctions is, that the former couple words, and the latter sentences. This opinion is erroneous; for conjunctions frequently couple words, as in the following example: “A man of wisdom and virtue is a perfect character.” Here it is not implied, that “a man of wisdom is a perfect character;” but “a man of wisdom combined with virtue, or a man of wisdom and virtue.” That conjunctions, indeed, do not couple at all, in that sense, at least, in which grammarians have understood the term, Mr. Tooke seems to have incontestably proved. That they sometimes couple sentences, or that instances may be produced, in which Harris’s definition will appear correct, the following example will serve as an evidence: “You, and I, and John rode to town;” i.e. “you rode,” “and I rode,” “and John rode.” But to assert, that this is their distinctive property, is to affirm what may be disproved by numberless examples. If we say, “two and two are four.” Are two four, and two four? “A B, B C, and C A, form a triangle.” Is A B a triangle? or B C? or C A? “John and Mary are a handsome couple.” Is John a couple? and Mary a couple? The common theory, therefore, is false; nor is it to be doubted, that conjunctions are, in respect to signification, and were originally in regard to their regimen, verbs, or words compounded of nouns and attributives. In explaining them, however, I divided them, as the reader may remember, into the several classes of adversative, concessive, conditional, &c. This I did, not only in conformity to general usage, and that he might not be a stranger to the names assigned to them; but likewise for this reason, that, though they originally formed no distinct species of words, but were either verbs, or compounds of nouns and verbs, they have now assumed another character, and are construed in a different manner. It is necessary, however, that he should be acquainted not only with their present use, but also with their primitive import, and classification.
How these words were degraded from their original rank, and deemed insignificant, while some, perhaps, lost their syntactical power, is a matter, I conceive, of no difficult inquiry. For, when the verbs, to which any of these words belonged, became obsolete, the words themselves, thus separated from their parent stock, and stripped of that consequence and authority which they thence derived, their extraction becoming daily more dubious, and their original value more obscure, sunk by degrees into inferior note, and at last dwindled into comparative insignificance. Besides, many of them, doubtless, were transplanted into our language without the radices; their etymology, therefore, being little known, their primitive character, and real import, would soon be involved in increasing darkness.
It is to be considered, also, that those who have dispensed the laws of grammar in our language, or assumed the office of critics, have been generally such as, though perhaps sufficiently conversant in Greek and Latin, were entirely unacquainted with the Northern languages. Accustomed, therefore, to render the conjunctions and prepositions in Greek or Latin, by synonymous English words, and unacquainted with the true character of these vernacular terms, their etymons being obsolete, or having never been used in our language, it is easy to conceive how they would naturally assign to the English words the same character and the same name which were affixed to the synonymous Latin terms. Nay, this has been so much the case, that we have ascribed an ambiguous character to several English words, referring them now to one class, then to another, merely because they agree in signification with certain Greek and Latin terms, which have been severally referred by classical grammarians to different orders. That the word whether has uniformly, in our language, the same import and the same character, denoting “which of the two,” there can be no doubt; yet, because this word answers sometimes to an, anne, num, and sometimes to uter, grammarians and lexicographers have accounted it both a conjunction and a pronoun. Utrum in Latin has shared the same fate. So far, indeed, has this spirit been carried, that we will not admit except, according, concerning, respecting, with many similar terms, to be verbs or participles, because præter, secundum, de, are prepositions. It is from this propensity to assimilate ours with the Latin language, that all these errors have arisen.
That the words now termed prepositions and conjunctions were originally verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, Tooke has, in my judgment, incontrovertibly proved. This being admitted, it appears to me highly probable, that they were primitively construed as such, joined either with the nominative or the objective case, as the verbs had either a transitive or intransitive meaning; and that they were followed by either single words or clauses. This, however, is merely conjecture, founded indeed in the nature of the words, but not supported by any evidence. In process of time, in consequence of that assimilation which naturally takes place between a living language and a dead one, much read, much written, and much admired, these words, when their origin became obscure, would, as I have remarked, be divested of their primitive character, and be considered as belonging to those classes, to which the synonymous Latin words were referred. Hence their regimen would likewise undergo a change. It would appear awkward and vicious to say now, “I saw nobody but he;” is not improbable, however, that the mode of expression was originally, “I saw nobody, be out he,” i.e. “he be out.” But I am now indulging in conjecture, the very error which chiefly has misled us in our grammatical researches. One thing, however, is certain, that several words, which were originally employed as prepositions or conjunctions indifferently, have now acquired a more fixed character, and are used but seldom in a double capacity. Of this the word without is an example. Thus, it was not unusual to say, “without you go, I will not,” where the term of exclusion, though in truth a preposition prefixed to a clause, was considered as a conjunction synonymous with nisi. This usage, unless in conversation, is now almost entirely relinquished; and the term without is now generally employed as a preposition, being prefixed to single words. It is likewise certain that in respect to signification there is no difference between conjunctions and prepositions: vidi neminem nisi eum, is equivalent to vidi neminem præter eum. In like manner, “I saw nobody but him,” is synonymous with “I saw nobody besides him;” in which examples the conjunctions nisi and but are perfectly synonymous with præter and besides, which are termed prepositions.
It may be asked, if then prepositions and conjunctions be alike verbs, or nouns, or compounds of these, and if many prepositions and conjunctions be in point of meaning identical, what forms the ground of distinction between them? It is simply this, that the former are prefixed to single words only, as nouns and pronouns, or to clauses involving an infinitive mood[133], the infinitive being strictly the name of the verb; and that they have a regimen; while the latter are prefixed to clauses, and have no regimen. This is the only distinction between prepositions and conjunctions as discriminated in modern use. Their original character is sufficiently established by Mr. Tooke.
I have said that some of these words have, in our language, an ambiguous character, being employed both as prepositions and conjunctions. Of this the word than is an example. Priestley seems to consider it as a preposition, and pleads in favour of the following expression, “you are taller than him,” not “taller than he.” “Since it is allowed,” says the Doctor, “that the oblique case should follow prepositions, and since the comparative degree of an adjective, and the particle than, have certainly between them the force of a preposition, expressing the relation of one word to another, they ought to require the oblique case of the pronoun following, so that, greater than me will be more grammatical than greater than I.” Here I cannot concur with the learned author. The same argument would prove that major quam me, would be more grammatical than major quam ego; a conclusion which is opposed by universal authority. The truth is, than must be either a conjunction or a preposition, or both. If a conjunction, it can have no government, any more than the Latin quam; unless we confound the distinction which has been just now explained, and is universally admitted, namely, that conjunctions are distinguished from prepositions, by their having no government. If it be a preposition, no argument is necessary to prove that it may be joined with an objective case; for such is the distinguishing character of prepositions. If it be either a preposition or a conjunction, it follows, that it may be construed either with or without a regimen. Lowth, with greater propriety, considers it as a conjunction; and Campbell, in his “Rhetoric,” recommends this usage as the only means of preventing that ambiguity, which necessarily arises from the employment of this word as a preposition only. For, if we use it as a preposition, we should say, “I love you better than him,” whether it be meant “I love you better than I love him,” or “I love you better than he does.” By using it as a conjunction, the ambiguity is prevented. For, if the former sentiment be implied, we say, “I love you better than him,” i.e. “than I love him;” if the latter, we say, “I love you better than he,” i.e. “than he loves you.” Whatever may have been the original character or syntax of this word, since usage is now divided, some writers employing it as a conjunction, and others as a preposition, the grammarian may, consistently with his duty, plead for that usage only, which prevents ambiguity.
The rule here recommended is generally violated, when than is joined with the relative pronoun, as, “Alfred, than whom a greater king never reigned.” “Beelzebub, than whom, Satan excepted, none higher sat.” Salmon has attempted to account for this almost universal phraseology, by saying, that the expression is elliptical, being the same as, “than compared with whom.” This explanation is forced and unnatural. It is likewise unnecessary. The simple fact is, that the word than was formerly used as a preposition, and, I believe, more frequently than it is now. Hence, doubtless, arose this phraseology.
Rule XXII.—Derivatives are generally construed like their primitives; as, “it was a happy thing for this country, that the Pretender was defeated;” or “happily for this country the Pretender was defeated.” Thus also, “to compare with,” and “in comparison with riches;”—“to depend on,” and his “dependence on the court.”
Rule XXIII.—One negative destroys another; or two negatives are equivalent to an affirmative; as, “nor have I no money, which I can spare;” that is, “I have money, which I can spare.”—“Nor was the king unacquainted with his designs;” that is, “he was acquainted.”
Note 1.—Here our language accords with the Latin. In Greek and French, two negatives render the negation stronger.
Note 2.—This rule is violated in such examples as this, “Nor is danger ever apprehended in such a government, no more than we commonly apprehend danger from thunder or earthquakes.” It should be any more.
Rule XXIV.—Interjections are joined with the objective case of the pronoun of the first person, and with the nominative of the pronoun of the second, as, “ah me,” “oh me,” “ah thou wretch,” “O thou who dwellest.”
Syntax being that part of grammar, which teaches rules not only for the concord and government, but also for the order of words in clauses and sentences, I shall subjoin the few following brief directions for the guidance of the scholar, respecting arrangement.
1st. The collocation should never invert the natural order of events, or violate the principles of reason and metaphysical propriety. It is obvious, for example, that no person can write, who cannot read. The ability to do the former necessarily implies a capacity to do the latter. It is preposterous, therefore, to say with Addison, “There will be few in the next generation, who will not at least be able to write and read.” He should have said, “to read and write.” “He was the son of a mother, who had nursed him with maternal tenderness, and had borne him in an hour of the deepest affliction.” The natural order of events should have dictated the reverse arrangement. There would be a manifest impropriety in saying “Our father is well, and alive;” the former state necessarily implying the latter. In the following passage, however, it is perhaps excusable, the answers particularly corresponding to the questions: Joseph says to his brothers, “Is your father well? The old man, of whom ye spake, is he yet alive?” They answer, “Thy servant, our father, is in good health; he is yet alive.” This error was termed by the ancient grammarians hysteron proteron; and, though not so palpably as in the preceding examples, it occurs much more frequently than an inattentive reader is apt to imagine.
2nd. The English language admits but few inflexions, and therefore little or no room for variety of arrangement. The connection of one word with another is not to be perceived, as in Greek and Latin, by correspondence of termination, but by relative position. This renders it indispensably necessary, that those words which are intimately related by sense one to another, should be closely connected by collocation. “The cunning of Hannibal was too powerful for the Pergamenians, who by the same kind of stratagem had frequently obtained great victories at land.” The relative here, by its position, must be understood as referring to the Pergamenians; whereas it is intended to refer to Hannibal. The relative clause, therefore, should have followed the name of the Carthaginian. “His picture, in distemper, of calumny, borrowed from the description of one painted by Apelles, was supposed to be a satire on that cardinal.”—Walpole. The error here is obvious. He should have said, “His picture of calumny.” “It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which nothing can protect us against, but the good providence of our heavenly Father.”—Sherlock. Here the grammatical antecedent is treasures; but it is intended to be accidents. The relative is removed from its proper subject.
3rd. As the converse of the preceding rule, it may be observed, that those words should be separated, which in juxta-position may, at first sight, or first hearing, possibly convey a meaning which the speaker or writer does not intend. “I, like a well-bred man, who is never disposed to mortify or to offend, praised both sorts of food.” As the two introductory words are capable of two meanings, would it not be better to say, “Like a well-bred man ... I praised both sorts of food.” I am aware, that the other collocation is preferable, where a particular stress is to be laid on the principal subject; but ambiguity is an error, which should be studiously avoided, and the meaning should not be left to the determination of a comma.
4th. From the preceding rules, it follows as a corollary, that no clause should be so placed in a sentence, as to be referable either to what precedes, or what follows. “The knight, seeing his habitation reduced to so small a compass, and himself in a manner shut out of his own house, on the death of his mother, ordered all the apartments to be flung open.” The clause in italics is ambiguously placed.
5th. When each of two arrangements is equally favourable to perspicuity, and equally consistent with metaphysical propriety, that should be preferred which is the more agreeable to the ear.
6th. Harsh and abrupt cadences should be avoided; and in elevated style, the clauses should swell towards the close of the sentence. This latter rule, however, which requires some limitations, belongs to the province of the rhetorician, rather than to that of the grammarian.