BERLIN NOTE.
Whatever light friction there may have been between Russia and Austria in the Spring of 1876, it seems to have been smoothed over, probably by the intervention of the third disinterested partner in the Alliance; for on Saturday, the 13th May 1876, Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, received an invitation from Prince Bismarck to call on him that day in order to meet Count Andrassy and Prince Gortchakoff, together with the Ambassadors of France and Italy; M. de Bülow and Baron Jomini were also present at the interview. “After a few preliminary words from Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortchakoff and Count Andrassy confirmed the cordial understanding that exists between them, and expressed their sincere hope and anxious desire that the Governments of England, France and Italy, who have given their moral support to the attempted pacification of the Herzegovinians, will equally agree to support the further attempts they have now met to concert, in consequence of the alarming state of affairs in Turkey. Baron Jomini was then invited to read the enclosed document to us, and the proposal to which they solicit the co‐operation of the Great Powers.... Prince Gortchakoff observed that he and Count Andrassy would remain till Monday (15th inst.) at Berlin, and that they hoped the Governments of England, France and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the telegraphic summary of their proposal, before they left.”[79]
It is no part of the purport of this book to comment on the procédés of the “three Allied Powers” vis‐à‐vis of the other so‐called Great Powers, England, France and Italy. That is a matter of their interior ménage. We are exclusively concerned with their conduct, severally and collectively, towards Turkey. If it were otherwise, one might have something to say concerning the strangeness and singularity of the proceeding among Great Powers, supposed to stand on a footing of equality, of three of their number convoking the rest to hear a document of the very highest international importance read to them for their assent to it, if possible by telegraph, within two days! But let us proceed with the narrative.
The document referred to, which goes in history by the name of the “Berlin Note,” was a very curious document. It started with the declaration that “the alarming tidings which come from Turkey are of a nature to impel the three Cabinets to draw closer their intimacy. The three Imperial Courts have deemed themselves called upon to concert among themselves measures for averting the dangers of the situation, with the concurrence of the other great Christian Powers.” After referring to the history of the question up to the Andrassy Memorandum, by which the Powers acquire a moral right and an obligation to insist on “pacification,” and enumerating the causes that have prevented the success of that action, and especially the agitation caused by the prolongation of the strife in other parts of the Turkish Dominions, and laying stress on the deplorable events at Salonica, it declares that it is most essential to establish certain guarantees of a nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full application of the measures agreed upon between the Powers and the Porte.”
As the first step in this direction, the three Imperial Courts propose to insist with the Porte on a suspension of arms for two months, and to open negotiations between the Porte and the rebel delegates on the basis of the wishes that the latter have formulated, and which may be enumerated as follows:—
(1) That materials for the reconstruction of their houses should be provided the refugees by the Turkish Government.
(2) The appointment of a mixed commission to superintend reforms.
(3) The concentration of the Turkish troops on some points to be agreed upon.
(4) Christians and Mussulmans to retain their arms.
(5) The Consuls or Delegates of the Powers to keep a watch over the application of the reforms in general, and on the steps relative to the repatriation in particular.
And then the Note concludes: “If, however, the armistice were to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.”
It is not intended here to criticise at length these five heads, but one interesting and significant point must be noted. The Note says, in a passage underlined above, that these five heads were framed “on the basis of the wishes formulated by the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Delegates.” Who were these Delegates? On the 27th May, the Times quoted an article from the Nord of April 1876, in which another Note was addressed by one Golub Babitch, in the name of the Bosnian insurgent chiefs, confirming full powers on one Gabriel Vasilitchki (a Russian subject who had made himself very busy in these matters) to treat on their behalf for peace on the basis of four points which were absolutely identical with four points of the Berlin Note.[80] Now, who was this Golub Babitch, who describes himself in this Note as “voivode,” and who signs in the name and on the behalf of the “chief Bosnian chiefs”? Mr Consul Freeman, who was by no means prejudiced against the insurgents or in favour of the Turks, and knew his monde well, describes him. He was a “former brigand,” now the chief of one of the principal bands, consisting of 3000 men, all well armed, that had invaded Bosnia.[81]
This, then, was the source of the inspiration of the five heads of the famous Berlin Note. It might certainly be more justly described in history as the “Golub Babitch Note.” The five heads, however, seem to have been admirably adapted to secure the object perhaps intended, viz., to perpetrate and aggravate the bloodshed between the armed Mussulmans and the armed returning refugees, and so by “bleeding Turkey to death” to justify the action of the last and most important notice thrown in carelessly, and almost as an afterthought, and at the end of the Berlin Note, but which was, of course, the whole point of it, viz., that if the measures proposed did not produce their effect (or, let us add, produced the exactly opposite effect), “the three Imperial Courts would consider it necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement,” etc., etc. If ever there was a case of the sting being in the tail, it was in this “Berlin Note.”
Lord Derby was not deceived either as to the intrinsic value, or worthlessness, of the four points which he politely but mercilessly dissected in an interview with Count Munster, the German Ambassador in London, on the 15th of May 1876,[82] nor was he intimidated by the “still closer intimacy of the three Imperial Courts,” which the Note ostentatiously declared. France and Italy thought fit to adhere to it. The rejection of it by England made its rejection by Turkey doubly certain. It was certain in any event. The courteous but unshakeable resolution of the English Cabinet to have nothing to do with the Berlin Note, in spite of the “still closer intimacy of the three Imperial Courts,” and the adherence of the other two Cabinets, brought the whole proposal down like a house of cards. But the allied quiver was not empty.
A stage, however, was reached in the Berlin Note which it is necessary to note carefully, as a new departure, involving a readjustment of compasses all round, became henceforth necessary.
We have seen the apparently unaccountable hurry that Austria was in to get matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina diplomatically settled to her satisfaction. The Consular intervention in August 1875, the Andrassy Note in December 1875, General Rodich’s parley with the insurgents in April 1876, and the Berlin Memorandum on 15th May 1876, were the different stages of this pragmatical interference. The reason was clear. Austria was quite well aware, through her Intelligence Departments, that Russia was making superhuman, albeit unofficial, efforts to catch up the advance that Austria had secured for her operations in the Turkish provinces, and that every day made it less probable that the lead in the negotiations would be left in her hands.
We shall see that from this moment, i.e., on the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, Austria’s precipitation no longer exists, and that she takes ample time to readjust her compass to the altered condition of things. The principal object of this Appendix being to describe the conduct and follow the policy of Austria in these matters, it is necessary to examine a little more closely the relations of Austria with Montenegro, end the part played by this principality in this so‐called rebellion.
It was generally taken for granted that Montenegro was completely and exclusively under Russian influence and protection, that it was a citadel and outpost of Russia in this part of the world, and that its prince moved in obedience to orders from St Petersburg alone. This belief, which assumed the character of an axiom in men’s minds, served admirably the purpose of Austria in the general mystification with which it suited her to surround her policy at this time.
As the active and effective action of Montenegro in the insurrection was a secret to none in Europe, and as Russia exclusively pulled the strings which moved its prince, it was obvious that Russia was at the bottom of the Herzegovinian insurrection which Austria was doing all she could to assist the Porte in suppressing—quod erat demonstrandum. Now, there can be no doubt that Russia had for a very long time past preponderating influence in the Black Mountains, and that during the whole period that Austria followed what we have called her “normal policy” with respect to the Ottoman Empire, the influence of Russia over Montenegro was exclusive of any other followed in the nature of things; but Consul‐General White, at any rate, knew better than to suppose that this meant that no steps had been taken by Austria (and the nature of the steps is evident) to acquire that influence over the prince that the “new policy” of Austria rendered desirable and necessary. In a despatch of the 25th of February 1876, Consul‐General White, writing from Belgrade to Sir H. Elliot, says: “I beg to inform Your Excellency that I have been assured, from a source which I have hitherto found reliable, that the chief reason that has prompted Prince Milan to assume a bolder and quasi‐martial attitude is the growing suspicion in his mind that a bait in the shape of an accession of territory was about to be offered by Austria on behalf of the Porte to the Prince of Montenegro. This opinion is strongly entertained here by persons who are supposed to be well acquainted with the nature of the relations which have existed during the last two years between the Court of Vienna and that Prince.”[83]
Not only did money pour into the principality, and arms, munitions and military science, as we shall presently see, were lavishly provided to these interesting mountaineers, but when the conditions of peace between Servia and Montenegro on one side, and the Porte on the other, came to be discussed (in the month of August 1876), Austria, who opposed the claim for any accession of territory to Servia, advocated a considerable extension for Montenegro. There can be slight doubt that this was one of the conditions of the bargain arranged “during the last two years between the Courts of Vienna and that Prince.” It is, of course, a noteworthy coincidence that the two years mentioned at the beginning of these intimate relations brings us exactly to the date when Count Andrassy became Chancellor of the Austro‐Hungarian Empire.
Mr Monson, the English political agent at Ragusa—afterwards sent on a special mission to Cettinje, and now H.B.M.’s Ambassador at Paris, who will certainly not be accused of prejudice against the Prince of Montenegro, by whom, on the contrary, he seems to have been quite fascinated, be it said in passing—in writing to Lord Derby from Ragusa, on the 14th June 1876, says: “The town of Ragusa, the capital of Dalmatia, is daily visited by armed insurgents who, at Vienna, are represented to be peaceful Dalmatians from the rural districts ... or Montenegrins on their travels, whose costumes would be incomplete without the traditional carbines and poniards.... During the period in which the export of munitions of war was suspended, the contraband traffic was openly carried on at Ragusa and Meglina without hindrance; cases of dynamite were passed across the frontier, to be used for the destruction of the Turkish forts and block‐houses; and it is alleged that certain military stores have been furnished to the insurgents at Grebgi by way of Ombla.... The share taken by Austrian subjects in the late battles of the Douga Pass is notorious; it is now known that 179 Crevoscians were killed during the three days’ fighting; but, as far as I am aware, no measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of such violations of neutrality.... My own conviction is that had it not been for the money spent by Russia and by Dalmatian Panslavic Committees upon certain influential chiefs, the insurrection would long since have collapsed.... If these considerations are correct, as I honestly believe them to be, it is clear that, as far as the Herzegovina is concerned, a great step in the suppression of the insurrection would be effected if the Austrian Government would dissolve the Panslavic Committees, enforce a strict surveillance of the frontier, and would absolutely forbid and put down the export of arms and ammunition to Montenegro.”[84]
The facts stated in this important despatch need no addition, and would be only weakened by any commentary.
Let us proceed with others. Consul Holmes, writing from Bosna Serai, on the 15th June 1876, to Lord Derby, says: “On the 6th inst., the authorities at Mostar announced to the Baron Rodich (Governor of Dalmatia) the fact that 1800 cases of rifles and their cartridges were being landed at Cattaro for the Montenegrins. On the 9th, Baron Rodich thanked them for their information, and said he would order an enquiry into the matter and punish any illegality. Of course, the arms will all be at Cettinje before he commences....”[85]
This is what Consul Holmes, who had resided fifteen years in the country, and who knew more of it than any foreigner alive (it was he whom the English Government lent to Baron Calice at the Conference, on account of his special knowledge of the country, and who received the thanks of both Governments for his services), says: “To people residing in these countries, and who know the real state of parties, and the true nature of the insurrection, the idea of securing pacification by concessions to the insurgents appears simply absurd. In the first place, reforms and concessions cannot be executed until pacification is obtained, and in the next, for reasons which I have frequently explained to your Lordship, those who are in arms and who keep up the insurrection, care nothing about them; they have other objects and other interests.”[86]
Such was Austria, that was at peace with Turkey, entertaining friendly relations with the Porte, and protesting in every tone of diplomatic expressions to every Cabinet in Europe her earnest and anxious desire for the pacification of the Turkish Provinces!
APPENDIX C
BULGARIAN‐ATROCITIES
The Slav Committees that had been for thirteen years “working up” the recalcitrant materials of rebellion in Bulgaria, were proceeding leisurely in their work when Count Andrassy stole a march upon them in the Herzegovina; but in spite of every effort on the part of Austria to precipitate a diplomatic crisis before the Bulgarian plot was ripe, the Slav Committees, whose venue was Bulgaria, caught him up before his work was completed. The head Slav Committee was at Moscow, and there were two central Committees at Kichenew and Bucharest. They had been established for about thirteen years, but although their activity had been intermittent, it was through their influence that the Bulgarian Church had been separated from the Greek Patriarchal, and that a Bulgarian School under Government patronage had been established at Odessa to form young Bulgarians into missionary propagandists of the Slav idea. When, however, the Herzegovina insurrection broke out, and matters were fast ripening on that side, a revival of energy at once manifested itself in the action of these Committees with reference to Bulgaria. As General Tchernagoff wrote in his paper, the Russki Mir (on 11th May 1876): “I chose the route by way of Kischenew and the Danube, along the whole course of which, commencing from the Russian frontier to the Servian boundary, Committees were formed towards the end of last year for organising the plans of the Bulgarians in their approaching struggle for independence. Commencing from Bolgrad (a Bulgarian colony that fell away from Russia and became incorporated with Roumania by virtue of the Treaty of Paris), I everywhere heard the same thing, which was to the effect that all had been done that was possible by the people for the impending struggle.... The movements of the insurgents are regulated by a fixed programme.”
We have seen (p. 43) during Midhat Pasha’s Governorship of Bulgaria, how a raid over the frontier, following the usual tactics of exasperation, had endeavoured to excite a rising, which was promptly suppressed by the energy of the Vali. In the beginning of 1874 unrest began to show itself again in the districts of Trianova, Kezanlic, and Zagra, but, warned by the effects of neglect in a recent instance, the authorities had all the leaders of the movement arrested. Thereupon General Ignatieff made such energetic representations to the Porte, that orders arrived, not only for the release of the imprisoned, malcontents, but for the dismissal of all functionaries concerned in their arrest. The effect of this novel and original mode of dealing with an insurrection was soon apparent in the effervescence and excitement it caused among the Mussulman population throughout the Province. They saw rebel bands organising without disguise, and approaching their own hearths, the leaders of which were patronised by foreign consuls and supported by foreign embassies, whereas defensive measures on the part of their own natural leaders were discountenanced and punished.
It was in this frame of mind of the Mussulman population of the Empire, that the troubles both at Salonica and in Bulgaria occurred. In October 1875, a local rising took place in the village of Eski Zagra. Mr Vice‐Consul Brophy writes to Sir H. Elliot:—“In October 1875 everything was settled for a rising in Bulgaria, in eight or ten places simultaneously. Something occurred which made it advisable that the rising should be put off, and messengers were sent to all the centres, but the “put off” for Eski Zagra arrived twenty‐four hours late, and that town rose in the full conviction that it was being seconded by all the force of the insurgents. In fact, the émeute, revolt, rebellion, revolution, or whatever it was, of May last (1876) was to have come off in October 1875, but did not.”[87]
The Committees were not ready. But the unrest continued, and when the Provincial Governors begged the Porte to send regular troops into the district, General Ignatieff dissuaded Mahmoud Nedim, the Grand Vizier, from doing so, on the ground that “the presence of regular troops would have the effect of still further increasing the excitement.”
We will now allow Vice‐Consul Dupuis, writing on 7th August 1876, to give an account to Lord Derby of the origin of the outbreak: “This was the condition of things when, on the 2nd of May, the insurrection organised and planned by the Revolutionary Committees, established during the last thirteen years in Bucharest and Moscow, suddenly exploded at Avrat Alan. The plan of operation of the revolutionists, assisted by the village priests and schoolmasters, was to destroy the railways and bridges throughout the vilayet, to set on fire Adrianople and Philippopolis, and to attack Tatar Bazardjik with 5000 men, and seize upon the Government stores there.” An accident caused the premature explosion of the revolt. “A sergeant of Zaptiés, who had gone to Avrat Alan, either to collect taxes or to effect some arrests, was suddenly attacked by armed Bulgarians (who thought their plans had been betrayed), and had to fly for his life. Shortly after, troubles broke out at Otloukeuyi and Bellowa; at the same time, the inhabitants of several Bulgarian villages, it would appear, under the impression that the impending massacre was at hand, left their homes and fled to Otloukeuyi and Avrat Alan.
The alarm then appears to have become general. The Christians were afraid that they would be massacred by the Mussulmans, while the latter were afraid that they were going to be exterminated by the Christians. The numerical strength of the insurgents was stated to be 15,000. The Mutassarifat of Philippopolis was at that time a Tatar Bazardjik. Troops were telegraphed for to the Governor‐General of Adrianople, who, it is said, replied that as he had no military force at his disposal, he thought the best plan would be to raise irregulars. On the 4th May, a meeting of some notables at Philippopolis was held, under the presidency of the Mollah, when the recommendation of the Governor‐General, for raising Nefer Ami (public soldiers) was approved of, and a decision to that effect was signed and forwarded to Adrianople. Orders were then immediately sent to different parts of the vilayet for enlisting irregulars or Bashi‐bazouks.”[88] These Bashi‐bazouks attacked Peroushtitza Batak and Klissoura and Otloukeuyi, and there is no doubt that very great excesses were committed by them. But Mr Dupuis goes on to say: “It is said, without any attempt at concealment, that the Russian Vice‐Consul in Philippopolis is solely responsible for the sad disasters which have befallen Peroushtitza. In many instances, too, the villages were set on fire by the Bulgarians themselves in order to compel their inhabitants to take up arms. The village of Singerli, now a complete mass of ruins, was in the first instance set on fire by a priest. This man, in order to force the people to rise against the Government, rushed about the place, knife in hand, telling them that their hour of deliverance had arrived, and that Russian soldiers were at hand to aid them against the Turks. I am assured, on reliable and independent authority, that the Bulgarian insurrection was carefully and skilfully planned by men possessing knowledge and experience in military tactics from foreign parts. Had their plans succeeded, and if the Bulgarians had got the upper hand of the Turks, there is little doubt the existence of Turkey in Europe would have been endangered, and the Bulgarians would have committed far greater excesses than are laid to the charge of the Mussulmans, from the fact that the former had, from the commencement of the disturbance, killed every Turk they came across, regardless as to age or sex, and by the practising upon them, in several instances, of unspeakable atrocities. Atrocities have, undoubtedly, been committed by the Bulgarians as well as by the Turks. Thus at Carlowo, it was related to me, on good authority, that a Turkish boy had both his arms flayed to the elbows by the Bulgarians; while at Otloukeuyi, the Bulgarians massacred eighty Mussulmans, and cut up a child into pieces, and publicly offered the flesh for sale, and committed other unspeakable atrocities on females.”[89]
As for the Russian Vice‐Consul at Philippopolis, Mr Gueroff, Vice‐Consul Dupuis says of him: “The news of the Russian Vice‐Consul at Philippopolis having been insulted, though repeated, is not generally confirmed. Some say, if he was not insulted, he is trying his best to provoke it by his conduct.”[90]
Sir H. Elliot, on 11th August, writes to Lord Derby: “A letter from Mr Baring, received yesterday, contains these words: ‘There is not the slightest doubt that the Russian Consul at Philippopolis had a leading part in creating the late insurrection.’”[91]
As to the menacing character of the insurrection, there is cumulative evidence to that effect. On 13th May, Vice‐Consul Brophy, writing to Sir H. Elliot, says: “I have the honour to express to your Excellency my belief that the Bulgarian insurrectionary movement, commenced in the Caza of Philippopolis, will not be confined to that district. I have some reason for thinking that the plans of the insurgents embrace six centres of revolt, most of them in the high Balkan (Kodga Balkan, Stari Planina), in each of which localities depôts of arms—rifles, revolvers, etc.—ammunition, and provisions are hidden.”[92]
The cruelties practised by the insurgents on the Turks were also beyond all doubt. They were, moreover, in strict conformity with the practice and instructions of the insurgents in all similar risings. On 12th May, Mr Dupuis informs Sir H. Elliot: “The burning of Bellowa seems to have been attended with horrible cruelties to the small Turkish guard in charge of the place, which, being overpowered, was hacked to pieces by the Bulgarians. My informant adds that, shortly after this occurrence, a party of about a hundred and fifty well‐mounted and equipped insurgents, led by the priests, presented itself in the village, declaring, with crucifixes in hand, that that was the way to exterminate Islamism.”[93] Mr Sandison, the first dragoman of the English Embassy, writing to Sir H. Elliot on 11th July 1876, says, à propos of these cruelties: “I may here quote the testimony of the artist employed by the Illustrated London News, who in his travels through Bulgaria came across the body of a Turk who had been impaled and roasted by Bulgarians. Such acts could not but lead to reprisals, and to the consequent destruction of many thousand lives, as well as of a large number of villages, amongst which must also be included a good many Mussulman ones.”[94] Consul Reade reports from Rustchuk on 19th July (1876) that “Some Bulgarian insurgents one day seized two Mussulman women, whose breasts they cut off and then put them to death.”[95]
Vice‐Consul Calvert, writing from Philippopolis on 29th August 1876, says; “The Christian Commissioners, one of whom, Yovantcho Effendi, is himself a Bulgarian, state themselves to be satisfied that deeds of great atrocity on the part of the insurgents marked the commencement of the rising in May last, and that cruelties were designedly committed by the insurgents as being the means best calculated to bring on a general revolution in Bulgaria, by rendering the situation of the Christians, however peaceably inclined, so intolerable under the indiscriminate retaliation which the governing race was sure to attempt, as to force them in self‐defence to rise. Among other instances of this Blacque Bey mentioned to me that the Christian inhabitants of a village near Tirnovo related to him, how, at the beginning of the revolt, the insurgents had seized a wealthy Turk of the locality, beloved by Christians and Moslems alike, for his justice and benevolence, had buried him up to the waist in the earth, and then stoned him to death.”[96]
With reference to the invariable mode of procedure of the leaders of the insurrection for the very purpose of exciting reprisals, Sir H. Elliot, in a communication to Lord Derby, says: “The inhabitants of another village stated that at the beginning of the insurrection, they were told by the priests and the schoolmasters that the Turks were advancing, that they must leave this village or they would be killed by the Turks, and that those who objected were driven out by force. The Mussulmans who happened to be there were murdered; their number was differently estimated at twelve and thirty‐two; the village was then set on fire. The Mussulmans in the neighbourhood seeing part of the village in flames, went there and pillaged and burnt the remaining houses.”[97] The revolutionary agents from the Slav Committees had, since the recrudescence of their activity in the winter, been working zealously among the Bulgarians. On 4th May Sir H. Elliot, in acquainting Lord Derby with the movement at Otloukeuyi, says: “It was known that revolutionary agents were working actively among the Bulgarians, and that arms and ammunition have latterly been introduced in considerable quantities.”[98] They knew, too, pretty well what they were about and when to strike, so that reprisals could be most surely counted on. Consul Reade, from Rustchuk, informs (9th May) Sir H. Elliot: “I have also just heard of an event said to have occurred near Avrat Alan, which, if true, may bring on serious complications. It is said that a Circassian village in that vicinity has been burnt; if so, the Circassians, generally a lawless set, are sure to take their revenge, and this may severely tax the Government to put down, when once commenced.”[99] Prophetic words indeed! The revolutionary agents of the Committees found this work difficult in the face of the repressive measures taken. On the 16th May 1876 Consul Reade reports from Rustchuk: “Many of the revolutionary Bulgarians in Wallachia are said to be entering this vilayet, and some have already been discovered and arrested.”[100] Here, then, we have revolutionary agents coming from abroad and exciting the people already long worked upon by priests and schoolmasters brought up in Russia, to rise in rebellion and to commit every species of atrocity on the Mussulman population with the direct object of provoking them to reprisals, which could be exploited against them all over Europe. We have further the Consul of a friendly Power, one of the chief leaders of the insurrection, and the “Ambassador of the same friendly Power” at Constantinople, strongly counselling against the despatch of regular troops to districts where the Governor‐General urges the necessity of their presence, and when the Mussulman inhabitants, in their defence and under the impulse of panic and exaggerated fear of what was going to happen, without any regular force to protect them, arm irregular bands from any quarter they can procure them with, likely enough, not sufficient discrimination and examination as to their character, scenes are, no doubt, enacted, and atrocities committed, which every human being, be he Christian or Mahometan, would in cold blood deprecate and deplore.
As Sir H. Elliot says: “An insurrection or civil war is everywhere accompanied by cruelties and abominable excesses, and this being tenfold the case in Oriental countries where people are divided into antagonistic creeds and races, the responsibility and sin of those who incite a peaceful province to rise becomes doubly heavy, and they now endeavour to throw them upon others.”[101] Nobody outside Timbuctoo approves or condones cruelties, but the charge against the Ottoman authorities really amounts to their arming and employing irregular troops, Pomaks, Circassians, Gipsies, etc., over whom they could exercise very imperfect control. But as Mehemet Rushdi Pasha told the English Ambassador, “the emergency was so great as to render it indispensable at once to stamp the movement out by any means that were immediately available.”[102] Mehemet Rushdi himself, it will be remembered, only came into office after those acts had been committed. He was consequently in no way responsible, neither he nor Midhat, either for their commission or for the events that led up to them.
With reference to the Daily News article on Turkish atrocities, which started the agitation against Turkey in England, Sir H. Elliot, writing on the 25th July 1876, says: “I have reason to believe that the credulity of the correspondent of the Daily News, whose letters on the subject of the Bulgarian atrocities attracted so much attention in England, has been imposed upon by two Bulgarian relatives of one of the presumed ringleaders of the revolt, inhabiting Philippopolis. One of these was for a time editor of a Bulgarian journal in Constantinople, and it is evident that information derived from such a source can only be regarded as untrustworthy.”[103]
As the very aim and purpose of the insurrection was to create excitement and provoke hatred of the Turk in Europe, it is no wonder if the most monstrous exaggerations passed current as peremptory truths.
Sir H. Elliot, writing on 6th July, says: “The excesses committed in the suppression of the insurrection have unquestionably been very great, as was inevitable from the nature of the force which the Porte was, in the first emergency, obliged to employ, but it is equally certain that the details which have been given, coming almost exclusively from Russian and Bulgarian sources, are so monstrously exaggerated as to deprive them of much claim to much attention. Cases of revolting cruelty have been mentioned to me in such a circumstantial manner as to make it almost impossible to doubt this truth, but which proved, on investigation, to be entirely fictitious.... Turkish ministers deny that the cruelties have been on a scale at all approaching to what they are represented; they point out that the horrors committed on Turkish women and children are passed over in silence, and they plead that they had no alternative but to use the irregular force at their disposal to put down an unprovoked insurrection fomented from abroad, the authors of which are responsible for the sufferings which have been entailed upon both Christians and Mahometans.”[104]
Some of the fictions invented were quite picturesque and dramatic. These fictions and legends were not confined to Bulgaria, and Canon Liddon and a Rev. Mr MacColl carried off the palm for ingenious credulity. On the 2nd October 1876, Sir H. Elliot telegraphs to Her Majesty’s Consul at Bosnia Serai: “Canon Liddon and a friend, who went to Servia by the Bosnian frontier, state that they saw examples of revolting cruelties practised by Turkish officers of the regular army, who have impaled, at all military stations along the frontier, men and women. Report as to truth of these statements.” On the 5th inst. the startled Consul sends the following reply: “Everything known here would make statement in your telegram of 2nd inst. perfectly incredible, but for the name of your Excellency’s informant. I will write of this by next post.”[105] The statement of the distinguished ecclesiastic created a great sensation. It turned out, however, that he had obtained his information from passengers in a steam vessel on the Save, and that they had not travelled along the frontier at all, as Sir A. Buchanan, who first reported to Sir H. Elliot, had been led to believe. “The whole story, therefore,” adds Sir A. Buchanan, “probably resolves itself, as suggested by Mr Holmes, to heads or even bodies having been exposed on poles, as I have myself seen hanging in chains during the British Protectorate of Corfu.”[106] Mr Holmes, in his report, after demonstrating the absurdity of the story, politely adds: “Now, if Canon Liddon states that he saw what he describes, of course I can say nothing to the contrary; but if he has only been assured of these atrocities, it is most certain that he has been grossly deceived, with a view to make use of his voice and influence as a means of increasing and confirming public opinion in England, in the belief of the barbarous conduct attributed to the Turks, and in hostility to them.”[107] These reverend gentlemen had evidently been the victims of, as Mr Holmes further says, “a monstrous joke,” and he proceeds to explain the matter. “After much reflection, however, the matter is, I think, as clear as possible. Near most Bosnian farm‐houses there are stakes, such as Mr MacColl describes, around which the haricot beans ... are fixed up to dry with something above them to keep off the birds.... At the time of Mr MacColl’s voyage down the Save, it is probable that most of the beans had been garnered, but a portion might have been left on one of the stakes which attracted his attention. This, on being pointed out to some practical joker amongst the officers of the steamboat, with its accidental likeness to a body, together, perhaps, with the previous conversation of the travellers, suggested the hoax, which, on seeing that it was seriously accepted, was kept up till the end of the journey.”[108]
Another and most probable explanation of this astounding story was that what Canon Liddon and his friend really saw, “was a watchman who had mounted on his stake, probably to look at the steamer descending the Save.”[109] Anybody may be mistaken, even distinguished ecclesiastics; but what, in such quasi‐sacred persons was scarcely to be expected, was the tenacity with which they stuck to the impalement theory, after it was exploded in the minds of all impartial persons. Even high dignitaries of the Church don’t like being laughed at.