Administrative Duties
The duties of administration covered those necessary for a general control of research, of supply, of training, and the operation of special gas troops. At first the Chief of the Gas Service comprised the whole of the Service since he was without personnel, material, rules, regulations, or anything else of a chemical warfare nature.
The experience in getting together this organization should be sufficient to insure that the United States will never place on any other man’s shoulders the burden of organizing a new and powerful service in the midst of war, 4,000 miles from home, without precedent, material, or anything else on which to base action. It is true the Americans had available the experience of the English and the French, and it should be said to the credit of both of these nations that they gave of their experience, their time, and their material with the greatest freedom and willingness, but just as Americans are Americans and were Americans in 1917, just so the methods of the French and English or of the enemy were not entirely suitable to American conditions.
If there is any one thing needed in the training of U. S. Army leaders of today and for the future, it is vision—vision that can foresee the size of a conflict and make preparations accordingly. We do not mean vision that will order, as happened in some cases, ten times as much material as could possibly be used by even 5,000,000 troops, but the sort of vision that could foresee in the fall of 1917 that 2,000,000 men might be needed in France and then make preparations to get materials there for those troops by the time they arrived.
In order to cover the early formative period of the C. W. S. in France and to show some of the difficulties encountered, the following running account is given of some of the early happenings without regard to the subdivisions under which they might properly be considered.
Assignment of Chief of the Gas Service. Sailing from the United States on the 23d of July, 1917, Fries arrived in Paris on the morning of August 14, 1917, and was immediately assigned the task of organizing a highway service for the American Expeditionary Forces. Five days later and before the highway order was issued, he was asked what he would think if his orders were changed so as to make him Chief of the newly proposed Gas Service. Being given one night to think it over he told the General Staff he would undertake the work. The road work was immediately closed up and on the 22d of August the organization of a Gas Service was actively started.
At that time some information concerning gases and gas troops had been gathered by Colonel Barber of the General Staff. Likewise, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Hugh A. Drum had made a rough draft of an order accompanied by a diagram for the establishment of the Gas Service. This information was turned over to Fries who was told to complete the draft of the order, together with an organization chart, for the action of the Commander-in-Chief. After one and a half days had been put on this work the draft and chart were considered in good enough shape to submit to General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief.
First Trip to British Gas Headquarters. Noting that the proposed organization provided for the handling of 4-inch Stokes’ mortars by gas troops, General Pershing asked why this work could not be done by regular trench mortar companies. He was told that gas operations were too technical and dangerous to be intrusted to any but especially trained troops, and that, furthermore, it was understood that 4-inch Stokes’ mortars were used only by the British troops. General Pershing said, “You had better beat it to the British Gas Headquarters in the field and settle definitely that and certain other minor points.” Fries told him he was only too glad to do this, and, having completed preparations, left on the morning of August 25th with Colonel Church and Captain Boothby, both of the Medical Department, for St. Omer, Headquarters of the British Gas Service in the Field.
Colonel Church of the Medical Department had been in France nearly one and a half years prior to the entry of the United States into the war, and had taken sufficient interest in Gas Warfare to collect considerable information and a number of documents from French sources bearing on the defensive side of the subject. Captain Boothby had done the same with the British, including a course in a British Gas Defense School. On this trip they took up the defensive side with the British, while Fries took up the offensive side of the Service. The latter included gases used, gas troops, and ammunition and guns used in Gas Warfare by the Artillery and other branches of the Service. The trip included a brief visit to the headquarters of the First British Army in the vicinity of Lens, where the British Gas Service had a large depot of offensive gas material.
Order Forming Service. Returning on the 28th of August the order, together with a chart organizing the Service, was completed and submitted to the General Staff. This was published as G. O. 31, September 3, 1917. As a result of a study of the information submitted by Colonel Barber and General Drum, together with his own observations of British organization and work, Fries decided it was advisable to make the Service cover as complete a scope as possible and to make the order very general, leaving details to be worked out as time and experience permitted. This proved to be a very wise decision, because the entire absence of gas knowledge among Americans either in France or the United States made it necessary to build from the bottom up and do it rapidly. At that time, and at all times since, it was found utterly impossible to separate the defensive side from the offensive side. Indeed, many of the worst troubles of the British with their Gas Service throughout nearly the whole war arose from such a division of duties in their Service. Thus, the development of masks must be kept parallel with the development of gases and methods of discharging them. Otherwise a new gas invented may penetrate existing masks and preparations be carried far towards using it before the development of masks are undertaken to care for the new gas. Obviously a gas which our own masks will not take care of cannot be safely used by our own troops until new masks are developed to protect against it.
American and British Masks. Just prior to Fries’s assignment as Chief of the Gas Service twenty thousand American-made masks or box respirators were received from the United States. Through the energy of Captain Boothby several of these had been sent at once to the British for test. The test showed that the granules in the canisters were entirely too soft, the charcoal of poor quality, and more than all else, the fabric of the face piece was so pervious to gases that chloropicrin became unbearable to the eyes in less than a minute under the standard test used by the British. A cable containing this information had been framed and sent to the United States just prior to Fries’s appointment as Chief of the Service.
August 23d, the day after Fries took charge, it was decided to adopt the British mask or box respirator as the principal mask and the French M-2 as an emergency, both to be carried by the soldier, the French M-2, however, to be used only when the British mask became lost or unfit for use. A requisition for one hundred thousand of each was at once submitted and very shortly approved by the General Staff.
Getting Gas Supplies. It should be stated here that inasmuch as no Gas Service had been organized in the United States, no money appropriation had been made for it, thereby making it necessary for the Gas Service to obtain all its supplies through other departments ordinarily handling the same or similar materials. Thus defensive supplies were obtained through the Medical Department and offensive supplies through the Ordnance Department, while other miscellaneous equipment was obtained through the Engineer Department, the Quartermaster Department, or the Signal Corps. This procedure proved exceedingly embarrassing, cumbersome and inefficient. To begin with it was necessary to get some agreement between the departments as to what each would supply. This was very difficult, resulting in delays and consumption of time which was urgently needed on other work.
Not only was there trouble in getting orders accepted and started on the way but following them up became practically impossible. None of the Departments furnishing the materials were especially interested in them nor in many instances did they realize the vital nature of them. Accordingly in order to get any action it was necessary to continually follow up all orders and doing this through another department created friction and misunderstanding. Officers of these departments took the attitude that the whole question of obtaining supplies should be left to them, once the requisition was turned in. This could not be done. The Chief of the Gas Service was absolutely responsible for gas supplies, and he fully realized that no excuses would be accepted, no matter who stood in the way. It was necessary to get action. Finally the matter was settled, some six months after the Service was organized, by giving the Chemical Warfare Service the right of direct purchase.
Purchase of Offensive Gas Supplies. Realizing the difficulty that would probably be encountered in getting supplies at all times from the British and French, two requisitions for offensive gas supplies to be purchased from the British were submitted on September 8th and 10th respectively. It would seem proper to state here that investigation showed the British gas organization to be far superior to the French. Indeed, the latter practically had no organization.
Consequently it was determined to purchase complete equipment for gas troops and for the defensive side of the service from the British and to make no attempt to produce new materials, methods or equipment until ample supplies of the standard equipment of the British were at hand or in process of manufacture or delivery. This was another exceedingly wise conclusion. No supplies of any kind were received from the United States for the next eight months, and then only masks and certain defensive supplies. Indeed, no cylinders, mortars, projectors or artillery shell containing gas were received from the United States until just before the Armistice, though gas had been available in the United States for months in large quantities, over 3,600 tons having been shipped in one ton containers to the English and French. The Ordnance material was what was lacking.
Obtaining Personnel. On September. 8, Colonel R. W. Crawford was assigned to duty with the Gas Service. This matter of obtaining personnel became immediately, and continued for almost a year to be, one of the most serious difficulties facing the new Gas Service. The troubles here again were the same as those in respect to supplies. None of the old departments were especially interested in gas and hence none of them desired to let good officers be transferred.
Officers were scarce in the early days in France in every department of the Service, consequently a new department with no organization in the United States and no precedents or opportunities for promotion made the obtaining of officers almost a matter of impossibility. Further than this, while the Engineer Department was at first supposed to furnish most of the officer personnel, it failed to do so, apparently looking upon the Gas Service as an unimportant matter when compared with the regular work of the Engineers. It was necessary to make direct application to the Chief of Staff to obtain Colonel Crawford and shortly thereafter to cable directly to the United States for officers. A year later enough officers were obtained but only after the organization of a separate Service in the United States.
Supplies for Gas Troops. Colonel Crawford was at once put in Charge of all supplies for the Gas Service, including the location and construction of separate depots for that Service. Prior to this the General Staff had decided to have chemical supplies stored in depots separate from those of other supplies on account of the poisonous nature of the gases which might prove very annoying if leakage occurred near any other class of supplies. Colonel Crawford took hold of this work with zeal and energy and so conducted it as to relieve the Chief of the Gas Service of all anxiety in that matter. As before stated, on the 10th of September a requisition for a very large quantity of offensive supplies for gas troops was submitted to the General Staff for approval. Inasmuch as this involved approximately 50,000 gas cylinders, 50,000 Liven’s drums, with at least 20,000 Liven’s projectors and a large number of Stokes’ mortars and bombs, there was considerable difficulty in getting it approved. Finally Colonel Malone of the Training Section, who took an active interest in the Chemical Warfare Service, got it approved. Then began the difficulty of getting the order placed and of trying to expedite the filling of the order on time. These difficulties were never overcome until after the entire purchase of supplies was, as previously related, taken care of by the Gas Service.
First Inter-allied Gas Conference. The first inter-allied gas conference was held in Paris on September 16th, and consisted of American, British, French, Italian, and Belgian delegates. The conference busied itself mainly with questions of the medical treatment of gassed cases and of defense against gas.
Mustard Gas. The principal topic under consideration at this conference was the effects of the new mustard gas first used at Ypres against the British on the nights of the 11th and 12th of July, 1917. The British suffered nearly 20,000 casualties from this gas during the first six weeks of its use, and were so worried over it that the start of the attacks carried out later in the fall of 1917 against Ypres were delayed several days. The casualties were particularly heavy because the smell of the gas was entirely new and not unpleasant and because of the delayed action of the gas, whereby men got no indication of its seriousness until 4 to 8 hours after exposure. For these reasons men simply took shelter from the bombardment without putting on masks or taking other precautions. As a result of the Paris conference a long cable was sent to the United States asking among other things that immediate report be made on the possibilities of producing ethylene chlorhydrin, one of the essentials in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only method then known.
Within two weeks after this conference, there occurred an incident which illustrates the very great danger in taking the views of any one man unless certain that he is in a position to be posted on all sides of the question under discussion. A high British official was asked what he had heard in regard to the new mustard gas, and what and how it was considered. He said with emphasis that the British had no further fear of it since they had learned what it was and how to take care of themselves and that it had ceased to be any longer a problem with them.
Fries, knowing what he did, was convinced that this did not represent the attitude of the British authorities who knew what the gas was doing, and the statement was not allowed to influence the American Gas Service in the least. This was a very fortunate thing as events later proved. It should also be added that a quite similar report was made by a French officer in regard to mustard gas some time in the month of October. The French officer had more reason for his attitude than the British officer as up to that time mustard gas had not been largely used against the French. However, both cases simply emphasize the danger of accepting the views of any man who has seen but one angle of a problem so complicated as gas in war.