Supply
As previously stated it was decided early that the Chemical Warfare Service should have a complete supply service including purchase, manufacture, storage and issue, and accordingly separate supply depots were picked out for the Gas Service early in the fall by Col. Crawford. Where practicable these were located in the same area as all other depots though in one instance the French forced the Gas Service to locate its gas shell and bomb depot some fifteen miles from the general depots through an unreasonable fear of the gas.
Manufacture of Gases. Due to the time required and the cost of manufacturing gases, an early decision became imperative as to what gases should be used by the Americans, and into what shells and bombs they should be filled. As there was no one else working on the subject the sole responsibility fell upon the Chief of the Gas Service. The work was further complicated by the fact that the British and French did not agree upon what gases should be used. The British condemned viciously Vincennite (hydrocyanic acid gas with some added ingredients) of the French, while the French stated that chloropicrin, used by the British principally as a lachrymator, was worthless. Fries felt the tremendous responsibility that rested upon him and finally after much thought and before coming to any conclusion, wrote the first draft of a short paper on gas warfare. In that paper he took up the tactical uses to which gases might be put and then studied the best and most available gases to meet those tactical needs.
Without stating further details it was decided to recommend the manufacture and use of chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, bromoacetone and mustard gas. As the gas service was also charged with handling smoke and incendiary materials, smoke was prescribed in the proportion of 5 per cent of the total chemicals to be furnished. The smoke material decided upon was white phosphorus.
The paper on Gas Warfare was then re-drafted and submitted to the French and British and written up in final form prescribing the gases above mentioned on October 26. Following this a cable was drawn and submitted to the General Staff. After many conferences and some delay the cable went forward on November 3.
Cable 268, November 4, 1917
Paragraph 12. For chief of Ordnance. With reference to paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, desire prompt information as to whether recommendation is approved that phosgene, chloropicrin, hydrocyanic acid, and chlorine be purchased in France or England and filling plants established in France for filling shells and bombs with those gases.
Subparagraph A. Reference to your telegram 253, recommend filling approximately 10 per cent all shells with gases as given below, but that filling plants and gas factories be made capable of filling a total of 25 per cent. Unless ordinary name is given, gases are designated by numbers in chemical code War Gas investigations. Of 75 millimeter shells fill 1 per cent Vincennite, 4 per cent phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent chloropicrin, 2½ per cent mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. According to French 75 millimeter steel shells should not be filled with Vincennite more than three months before being used. No trouble with other gases or other sized shells except that bromoacetone must be in glass lined shells. Of 4.7 inch shells fill 5 per cent with phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent with chloropicrin, 2½ per cent with mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. Provide same percentage for all other shells up to and including 8 inch caliber as for 4.7 inch shells. 4 inch Stokes’ mortar will use same gases and smoke shells and in addition thermit. 8 inch projector bombs will use the same as the Stokes’ mortar and also oil to break into flame on bursting. Cloud gas cylinders will be filled with 50 or 60 per cent phosgene, mixed with 40 to 50 per cent chlorine, or phosgene and some other gas. Renew recommendation that filling plants be established in France to provide sudden shifts in gas warfare of all kinds, as well as for filling all 4 inch Stokes’ mortar bombs, 8 inch projector bombs and cloud gas cylinders. It is strongly recommended that efforts be made to produce white phosphorus on large scale for its usefulness both as smoke screens and to produce casualties.
Subparagraph B. For the Adjutant General of the Army. With reference to paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, desire information as to whether recommendation is approved that an engineer officer assisted by Professor Hulett be assigned to Gas Service in Washington to handle all orders and correspondence concerning gas.
Subparagraph C. For Surgeon General. With reference to paragraph 2 your cablegram 205, and paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, what is status of chemical laboratory for France? Also have the 12 selected Reserve Officers for training in gas defense sailed for France?
Subparagraph D. With reference to paragraph 17 your cablegram 165 and paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, Tissot has constructed simpler model of his mask for attachment to any box. Have ordered 6 which will be completed in two weeks, 3 of which will be forwarded at once. A simple type such as this may prove useful for large number of troops. Letter of permission to manufacture Tissot masks being forwarded.
Subparagraph E. With reference to paragraph 8 your cablegram 143, and paragraph 4 your cablegram 247, in considering charcoal and other fillers for canister of box respirator it should be remembered that the front is very damp, the air being nearly saturated during greater part of winter, fall and spring.
This cable is given in full to show that not later than November 4, 1917, it was known in the United States not only what gases would be required but also in what shells, bombs, guns and mortars each would be used. While a small quantity of Vincennite was recommended in this cable, another cable sent within a month requested that no Vincennite whatever be manufactured. This decision as to gases and guns in which they were to be used, while very progressive, proved entirely sound and remained unchanged, with slight exceptions due to new discoveries, until the end of the war. Without a thorough understanding of tactics a proper choice of gases could not have been made. This fact emphasizes the necessity of having a trained technical army man at the head of any gas service.
Due to the absence of a Chemical Warfare Service in the United States at this time, a very great deal of the information sent from France, whether by cable or by letter, never reached those needing it.
Smoke. About the first of December after a study of results obtained by the British and the Germans in the use of smoke in artillery shells for screening purposes, the Gas Service decided that much more smoke than had been stated in cable 268 to the United States was desirable. The General Staff, however, refused to authorize any increase, but did allow to be sent in a cable a statement to the effect that a large increase in smoke materials might be advisable for smoke screens, and that accordingly the amount of phosphorus needed in a year of war would probably be three or four times the one and a half million pounds of white phosphorus stated to have been contracted for by the Ordnance Department in the United States. This advanced position of the Gas Service in regard to smoke proved sound in 1918, when every effort was made to increase the quantity of white phosphorus available and to extend its use in artillery shells including even the 3 inch Stokes’ mortar.
Fig. 16.—Troops Advancing Behind a Smoke Barrage (Phosphorus).
Overseas Repair Section No. 1. During the latter part of November, 1917, Overseas Repair Section No. 1, under the command of Captain Mayo-Smith, Sanitary Corps, with four other officers and 130 men, arrived in France. Since mask development and manufacture in the United States was still under the Medical Department, this mask repair section was organized as a part of the Sanitary Corps. As there were at that time no masks to be repaired and no laboratory equipment or buildings for that purpose on hand and none likely to be for months to come, Captain Mayo-Smith was assigned to duty under Colonel Crawford, Chief Gas Officer with the Line of Communication, in Paris. A site for a mask repair plant was located at Châteauroux, and a site for a gas depot at Gievres was investigated. Inasmuch as there was at that time greater need for men to learn the handling of poisonous gases than to repair masks, some 40 or 50 of the company were put in gas shell filling plants at Aubervilliers and Vincennes in the suburbs of Paris, while later still others were assigned to Pont de Claix near Grenoble. The remainder of the company were used in the Gas Depot at Gievres and in the office in Paris.
It was not until the latter part of June, 1918, that the mask repair plant began operations. In the meantime these men did very valuable work in shell filling and in learning the manufacture of gases. Several of them were sent to the United States, some of them remaining throughout the war to aid in gas manufacture and in shell filling.
Construction Division, Gas Service. The Construction Division under Colonel Crawford in Paris made complete plans for phosgene manufacturing plants, for shell filling plants and for the Mask Repair Plant. These plans included a complete layout of the work for all persons to be employed in the plants. During this same time a very careful study of the possibilities for manufacturing gas for filling shell in France was made.
Finally about March 1, in accordance with the strong recommendations of these men, Fries reported to General Pershing in person that the manufacture of gas as well as the filling of shell in France was inadvisable from every point of view and accordingly he recommended that gas manufacture and shell filling in France be given up. General Pershing strongly approved the recommendation and a cablegram was at once sent to the United States to that effect. The main reason for this action was the lack of chlorine, since chlorine was the principal ingredient of nearly all poisonous gases then in use. Chlorine takes, besides salt, electric power and lots of it. Electric power requires coal or water power. Neither of the latter sources were available in France. This question was gone into very thoroughly. The only place where power might have been developed was in a remote spot near Spain, and the outlook there was such that it appeared impossible to begin the manufacture of chlorine under two years. On the other hand the shipment of chlorine from the United States required from 75 per cent to 100 per cent of the tonnage required to ship the manufactured gases themselves, to say nothing of the labor, raw materials, and the machinery that would have had to be shipped in order to manufacture gas in France.
Mustard Gas. As previously stated Mustard Gas was first used by the Germans against the British at Ypres on the nights of July 11 and 12, 1917. It was not used much against the French until more than two months later. Indeed, gas was never used by the Germans to the same extent against the French as against the English. There are probably two reasons for this; first, the Germans had a deeper hatred for the British than the French; second, the British morale was higher than the French in 1917, and the German thought that if he could break down this British morale, he could win the war.
The first attack came as a surprise and accordingly got an unusually large number of casualties. As previously stated the casualties numbered about 20,000 in about six weeks. This number was considered so serious that the beginning of the series of attacks against Ypres in the fall of 1917, was delayed by the British for 10 days or two weeks until they could study better how to avoid such great losses from mustard gas. While the composition of the gas was known within two or three days, as well as the laboratory method by which it was first manufactured by Victor Meyer in 1886, it took some 11 months to develop reliable and practical methods of manufacturing it on a large scale. The Inter-allied Gas Conference in September, 1917, gave a great deal of attention to mustard gas and methods of combating it both from the view point of prevention and of curing those gassed by it.
Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands of the British they would have received far less information than they already possessed on mustard gas.
Fig. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”
Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large scale.
Delay of British Masks. As December 1 approached, and as nothing further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1, 1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.
Colonel Harrison of the British Royal Engineers was in charge of the British manufacture of masks and it is desired here to express appreciation of his uniform courtesy and great helpfulness. He exhibited their methods and facilities and assured us they could meet any requirements of ours for masks up to a half million, or even more if necessary, provided they were given time to establish additional facilities. Finally after a further exchange of cables the masks were obtained.
During December, 1917 and January, 1918, when every effort was being made to hurry a lot of masks from Havre—Havre being the British supply base in France from which the masks were issued to the United States, the severe cold and snow had so disorganized French traffic that it was extremely difficult to get cars moving at all. In an effort to get the masks, priority of shipment was obtained and two or three officers were assigned to convoy the cars. Notwithstanding convoying, one carload of 4,000 masks, mainly threes and fours, became lost and only turned up five weeks later. To make matters worse the British were sending us very many more of the small sized No. 2 masks than we could use. The loss of this carload of 4,000 number threes and fours was all but a tragedy. Indeed, in order to get the First Brigade of the First Division equipped in time it was necessary to take a large number of masks already issued to men of the Second Brigade. These masks were first thoroughly washed and disinfected and then re-issued.
This all emphasizes the great difficulties that are encountered when a new and vital service must be organized in war 4,000 miles overseas without material, home supplies, or men to draw from. This struggle to get sufficient masks to keep all men fully equipped remained very acute until in July, 1918, when the arrival of hundreds of thousands of masks from the United States made the situation entirely safe. Even then the necessity of weakening the elastics and shortening the rubber tubing of the mouthpieces on some 700,000 masks, doubled up our work tremendously, and added enormously to our troubles in getting masks to the front in time.
Notwithstanding these troubles the Chemical Warfare Supply Service never failed and finally forged to the very forefront of all American supply services. Its method of issuing supplies to troops at the front has been adopted as the standard for American field armies of the future.