III.
Let us examine in figures what would be the result in Central Europe of the application of the principle of nationalities, which ought to form the moral base of the Allies for the reconstitution of future Europe. The French Socialist Congress at the end of 1915, in my opinion, gave an excellent definition of the principle of nationalities as we see it at work in the present war. The manifesto of the Congress declared: “No durable peace unless the small martyrized nations are restored to their political and economic independence.... No durable peace unless the oppressed populations of Europe have restored to them the liberty of shaping their own destinies” (L’Humanité, 30th December, 1915).
As nothing in this world is absolute, it is clear that the principle of nationalities cannot always receive in practice a complete application. In order to constitute States with a potentiality of life, we must take into account not only the nationalities but also the strategical, defensive, historical, and economical needs of the majority. There are besides countries like Macedonia and like certain regions of Austria-Hungary, where the nationalities are so intermingled that the application of the principle of nationality can only be relative.
On the other hand, sacrifices must sometimes be made at the cost of the principle of nationalities for the sake of the general European interest. Thus, for example, France cannot think of incorporating those who speak French in Belgium and Switzerland. The first of those people wish to remain Belgians and the second wish to remain Swiss. Their wish must be all the more respected since the maintenance of the Belgian state and of the Swiss state is necessary to the balance and the peace of Europe. There are, moreover, other parts of the continent where this consideration outweighs the principle of nationalities.
Having given these explanations and made these reservations, let us see what would be obtained in the main by the application of the principle of nationalities to the German empire. In virtue of this principle the Germans ought to restore liberty to those peoples who are included by force within their boundaries, that is to say about
| Inhabitants. | |
|---|---|
| Poles | 5,000,000 |
| Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine | 1,500,000 |
| Danes | 200,000 |
| Total | 6,700,000 |
The Germany of to-day, which numbered 68 millions of inhabitants in 1914, including the non-Germans, would be brought down to about 61,300,000, in round figures, 61,000,000 of genuine Germans.
But the logical application of the principle of nationalities would give to that Germany the liberty of absorbing those Germans of the Hapsburg monarchy who on historical, strategical, and geographical grounds can be legitimately added to Germany after its reduction from 68 to 61 millions of inhabitants. What would be the result?
Let us look back to p. 32 and examine the map which sums up the ethnographical situation of Austria-Hungary. On this map the Slav and Latin nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs, named in the margin, are indicated by different shadings. The region inhabited by Germans and that inhabited by the Magyars have been left blank. The two last ethnographic groups are separated by a dotted line. This map only gives a very imperfect idea of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn from ethnographic documents which are German and Magyar, and which are purposely falsified. In reality the Slav regions are a good deal more extensive than is indicated by the blank zones (Germans and Magyars). This is particularly true in the blank zone to the north and north-west of the purely Czech region.
Vienna, which, however, is in the centre of a perfectly blank zone, is by no means, as is generally believed, a purely German city. Her population is Slav to the amount of about one-third (Poles and especially Czechs). This fact, which is certain, is yet not recognized by any official Austrian statistics, because these are drawn up by German functionaries who have orders to falsify them. Their principal mode of garbling the figures is as follows:
In the whole of Austria every Slav or Latin, who merely knows a few words of German, is styled, much against his own will, a German. Now, all the Slavs who live in Vienna know a few words of German. This allows the German statisticians of the Austrian Government to conclude that there are no Slavs in Vienna, and to set down the number of the Slavs in all the rest of Austria at a figure considerably below the truth.
In Hungary the statistics are garbled with the same effrontery by the functionaries of the Budapest government in favour of the Magyar element.
The following, however, are the results given for the whole of the Hapsburg monarchy by the official Germano-Magyar statistics in the census of 1910:
| Round figures in tens of thousands. | |
|---|---|
| Austria. | |
| Germans | 9,950,000 |
| Czechs | 6,440,000 |
| Poles | 4,970,000 |
| Ruthenians | 3,520,000 |
| Slovenes | 1,260,000 |
| Serbo-Croatians | 790,000 |
| Italians | 770,000 |
| Roumanians | 280,000 |
| Total | 27,980,000 |
| Hungary. | |
| Magyars | 10,050,000 |
| Roumanians | 2,950,000 |
| Serbo-Croatians | 2,940,000 |
| Germans | 2,040,000 |
| Slovaks | 1,970,000 |
| Ruthenians | 480,000 |
| Total | 20,430,000 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina. | |
| Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems of Serbian origin) | 2,000,000 |
According to these figures there are 12 millions of Germans in the Hapsburg empire, but we shall see that not nearly all these 12 millions of Germans could be united to Germany. In fact:
1. As the table shows, rather more than two millions of Germans are in Hungary, where they are scattered in small groups among the other nationalities. They could not therefore be united to Germany.
2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, of Germans in Austria, those of Bohemia, to the north and north-west of the purely Czech zone, could not be united to Germany, because in that zone they are mixed up with numerous Czechs, and because the dotted line, which on the map (p. 68) separates Bohemia from the German empire of to-day, represents the historical and strategical boundaries of the kingdom of Bohemia. Now it would be impossible without these boundaries to assure the independence of the Czecho-Slovaks. Clearly we could not think of sacrificing nearly 9 millions of Czecho-Slovaks to 1 million of Germans in Bohemia, especially as these same Germans simply squatted in the country long ago by sheer violence and fraud.
3. By this fact the 10 millions of Germans, who might seem to be eligible for incorporation in Germany, are reduced to about 9 millions. These form on the map the blank group which stretches from Switzerland to the dotted line which marks the Magyar ethnographical boundary. But there are serious reasons for thinking that were a thorough investigation made of the ethnographical facts, that is to say, of the mixture of Slavs and Germans to the east of this group, and consequently between the purely Czech group to the north of Vienna and the purely Slovene group to the south of Vienna, the result of such an investigation would be to show that this German group could not in its entirety be united to Germany. As it would be out of the question here to enter into these very difficult ethnographical details, we shall, under all possible reserve, and purely for the convenience of demonstration, make the supposition that the whole of this German group should be united to Germany. But from these 9 millions of Germans we should certainly still have to subtract the Slavs who are included in this figure through the systematic garbling of the Austrian statistics. The typical example of the city of Vienna, cited above, proves this necessity. As this deception is practised on an enormous scale at the expense of the Slavs, we may allow that the true number of Germans in this part of Austria who could be geographically incorporated in Germany, amounts to not more than 7 or 8 millions. Let us take this last figure. If these 8 millions of Germans were incorporated in Germany, then Germany of to-day, reduced for the reasons indicated on p. 123 to 61 millions, would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria, by 8 millions of inhabitants. She would then have a total of 69 millions of inhabitants.
Therefore, as the present German empire had in 1914 a population of 68 millions of inhabitants, we see that the application of the principle of nationalities would allow Germany to gain on the south-west just about the equivalent of what the same principle would take from her on the circumference of the existing empire.
Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of genuine Germans be really dangerous for Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall see, the application of the principle of nationalities would have the effect of withdrawing totally from the influence of Berlin’s Pangermanism all the rest of the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.
In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabitants in Austria-Hungary of to-day about 8 millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Austro-Hungarian subjects would remain. Of this number:
Five millions of Poles would join Poland;
Four millions of Ruthenians would join Russia;
Three millions of Roumanians would join Roumania;
One million of Italians would join Italy;
Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants.
There would therefore remain a compact group composed of 29 millions of inhabitants, made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans, these last diluted in the solid mass of Magyars and Serbo-Croatians. As the Magyars and Serbo-Croatians wish to unite with the 5 million Serbians of Serbia, we thus deduce the presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34 million inhabitants, containing an infinitesimal proportion of Germans and so situated geographically that they could perfectly form United States, in which the rights of each nationality and the form of government of each State would be respected, and which, nevertheless, would constitute an economic territory extensive enough to correspond to modern needs.
The obstacle to the creation of such United States might seem to be the reluctance of the Magyars, who at present play the German game, to come to an understanding with the neighbouring nationalities. This objection disappears when we know what is unfortunately known to none but a small number of experts. Out of the 10 millions of Magyars, there are about 9 millions of poor labourers, almost all agricultural, cynically exploited by the Magyar nobility, who possess nearly all the land. Now it is these nobles, owners of enormous landed estates, who, with the Magyar functionaries whom they nominate, are Prussophile, and not even all of them are that. It must also be known that the 9 millions of Magyar proletariat are not so much as represented in the parliament at Budapest, for elections in Hungary are neither more nor less than barefaced swindles practised for the benefit of the million Magyars who sweat their poor compatriots. Now these 9 millions of unhappy peasants by no means love the Prussians. More than that, they are quite ready to fraternize with the other democratic masses represented by the nationalities which surround them. Therefore, on the day when the true Magyar people shall be delivered from the feudal nobility who oppress them, and shall become in their turn masters of their own destinies, they will certainly not stand out against the creation of the United States here adumbrated. I am quite sure of the popular feeling on this subject, for on my last visits to Budapest I was able to put myself in communication with the leaders of the Magyar democratic organizations. It was thus that I learned that even before the war they had been trying to find a basis for a mutual understanding with the other Slav nationalities of Hungary. So strong indeed was this tendency that it furnished the nefarious Count Tisza with a motive for declaring war in order to elude the democratic movement, which threatened the privileges of the Magyar nobility, of which he is one of the leaders.
In short, we may conclude that there is in Austria-Hungary and in Serbia a mass of 34 millions of inhabitants, who are practically free from Germanic elements and could form in Central Europe a confederacy of United States that might in time develop into the United States of Europe.
Thus there undoubtedly exist all the ethnographical elements which could render possible the erection in Central Europe of a very powerful triple barrier against every aggressive revival of Pangermanism (see p. 43). The erection of this barrier would form the solution of the great problem set us by the Pangerman peril. It would free for ever numerous nationalities from the Prussian yoke. It would coincide not only with the interests of all the Allies, but also with those of the whole world. For as I hope to prove in Chapter IX, the inhabitants of both South and North America would be not less vitally affected than the European Allies and Japan by the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
Therefore, the necessary but sufficient backbone of the Pangerman plan, as represented by the formula “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” can be certainly destroyed in Central Europe and there only. The net result is that the question of Austria-Hungary constitutes the crucial point of a problem which is not only European but universal, set to all the civilized States by the war which Prussianized Germany has initiated and by the execrable ambition of the Hohenzollerns.
The question of Austria-Hungary has besides an aspect of social and universal interest, which the Liberals and Socialists of Allied or neutral countries have not yet perhaps sufficiently contemplated. The supremacy of Germany over Austria-Hungary would have, in fact, a social consequence of infinite importance: a new lease of crushing and strengthened power would be ensured to the German-Austrian aristocracy, to the Magyar aristocracy of Hungary, to the German aristocracy of the German empire, and above all to the execrable Prussian Junkers, who are principally responsible for the war. This great and insolent triumph of the Junker spirit, supported by the means of universal domination which would be put at the disposal of the Berlin government as a consequence of the accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” would have a disastrous after-effect by repressing those democratic and liberal movements, which are at present developing legitimately and necessarily, not only in the Allied countries but in the whole world. Finally, it would entail fresh revolutionary crises, causing disturbances which it is of serious interest to avoid, lest ideas of social justice should lose the vantage ground of liberty which they have so painfully conquered.
These considerations, therefore, lead us to the conclusion that the final liberation of all the Latin and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary from the German yoke is a matter of universal social interest. In fact, it constitutes an essential condition of the progress of liberal ideas, of the pacific development and organization of democracy in the whole world.
CHAPTER VII.
THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN.
I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan of Bulgarian supremacy.
II. Greece and the Pangerman ambitions.
III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan.
In virtue of the geographical position which they occupy in the zone “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” the Balkan States are of extreme importance for the making or the marring of the whole Pangerman plan. Moreover, events have proved to the satisfaction of the most sceptical the influence which these States exert on the issue of the struggle. Public opinion, therefore, both in Allied and neutral countries, should note very clearly the intimate relation which exists between the Balkan factors and the universal Pangerman plan.
I can here touch only on the fundamental Balkan factors, those that have a durable and permanent character, not on the attitude of certain governments in the Eastern peninsula. That attitude for the last year has been singularly vacillating. It shifts, in fact, under the action of those parasitic German influences which, through the dynastic ties of the reigning families, backed by the threats of Berlin, sway these governments in opposition to the national interests which it is their bounden duty to defend. Moreover, simple justice compels us to acknowledge, that the diplomatic mistakes made by the Allies, especially in 1915, in consequence of their imperfect acquaintance with Balkan facts, has been singularly favourable to the success of the German influences.
Thus, for example, at Athens, the present Cabinet, formed after the arbitrary dissolution of the Greek parliament, and therefore destitute of all constitutional authority, has been instigated by King Constantine, brother-in-law of the Emperor William II., to persevere in a policy which all influential Greeks who are free to speak their minds regard as disastrous to the true interests of Hellenism. Similarly at Bukarest the attitude of the Bratiano cabinet is subjected by eminent Roumanians to searching criticism. Thus La Roumanie, the organ of M. Take Jonescu, speaking of the commercial agreement between Germany and Roumania, has recently said: “This agreement makes Roumania the dupe of Germany”[5] (see Le Journal, 20th April, 1916). The final decision of certain Balkan governments is, therefore, for the moment still in suspense, but whatever it may be, each of the Balkan peoples would infallibly see its future interests thwarted or menaced by the triumph of the Pangerman plan. It is important to clear up these prospects. So far as Montenegro and Serbia are concerned, any discussion would be superfluous, so evident is it that a German victory would mean for these two States their definite and final disappearance.