EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY—Continued.

At 12 midnight, July 31st/August 1st, the Battalion held a line of resistance just in front of the Black Line. At 1 15 a.m. completion of relief by the 165th Infantry Brigade was reported, and the remnant of the Battalion were ordered to concentrate in our original front line between Warwick Farm and Lone Street. This was done, and Battalion Headquarters was established at the mined dugouts in Oxford Trench. At 10 a.m. Headquarters was transferred to the mined dugout at WIELTJE.

Meanwhile an effort was being made to collect our stragglers. During the withdrawal a great many men had become separated from their Platoons, and by 2 p.m. on the 1st of August only 90 of our men had assembled in the old front line. In ones and twos they were eventually brought in, though some remained behind with the 165th and 166th Brigades in the Black Line till 24 hours or more after the Battalion had been relieved.

The weather was desperate; rain was pouring down all day, and the trenches were in a terrible state. Four or five derelict tanks could be counted, stuck deep in the mud, either in our old front line or in the German original front line. The day was fairly quiet, and there was only a little shelling in the vicinity of WIELTJE.

About mid-day the enemy counter-attacked on the front of the Division on our right, and succeeded in making a small breach in the Black Line. In the evening of this day a cooker was brought up with hot tea, etc., for the men.

Lieutenant G. J. Fismer, R.A.M.C., reported for duty vice Captain R. W. Shegog, R.A.M.C., died of wounds.

Casualties:—Officers: Lieutenant C. L. Hore, M.C., to Field Ambulance sick; Other Ranks: Nil.

With reference to the attack in which the Battalion took part, the following points are of interest:—

1. Ammunition ran short in every Company, a proof of the fact that the rifle has again come to its own as the chief weapon of the infantryman.

2. It is estimated that quite 90 per cent. of the casualties were caused by machine gun fire and snipers.

3. Casualties amongst Officers were exceedingly heavy, and great responsibility devolved upon N.C.O.’s. This fact emphasised the necessity for careful preparation, by means of daily lectures and demonstrations to all Platoon Sergeants and Section Commanders.

4. It is generally agreed that on this occasion the men were far too heavily laden. It is thought that in an attack of this kind, when a distance of several thousand yards has to be traversed, it is far better to go lightly equipped, and to trust to the probability of being able to get additional supplies of water and rations from the rear as soon as darkness falls.

5. All systems of communication, except runners, broke down. Visual was impossible owing to the dull mist which prevailed, and wires, when once laid, were soon broken.

6. Tanks were a failure (except possibly in one case), the ground being far too wet and heavy. One tank is said to have done useful work in co-operation with the infantry in reducing Somme Farm.

7. Aeroplanes for some reason failed us, the R.F.C. evidently considering the bad visibility sufficient reason to cancel flying. This was particularly unfortunate, as the enemy were not slow to take advantage accordingly, and three hostile machines are reported to have been flying over our positions practically all the time that consolidation was in progress. In one case a machine gun was fired at our troops.

8. Lastly, many acts of extreme gallantry and devotion to duty were reported after the fighting of the 31st July, on the part of all ranks of the Battalion.

In fact the 55th Division as a whole, and particularly the 164th Brigade, will ever be remembered for its share in the attack which started the third battle of YPRES. The 164th Infantry Brigade in particular can ever be proud of the advance from the Black Line to the Green Line.

Copies of the following messages and letters are attached:—

(1) From Major-General H. S. JEUDWINE, C.B., G.O.C. 55th Division, to Brigadier-General C. I. STOCKWELL, D.S.O., Commanding 164th Brigade.

(2) 55th Division Special Order of the Day.

(3) Letter from 5th Army Headquarters to XIX. Corps.

(4) 5th Army Commander’s Congratulations.

Fifth Army.

2nd August, 1917.

Appendix to D.R.O.’s of 7th August, 1917.

Army Commander’s Congratulations.

1. The Army Commander wishes to offer his heartiest congratulations to the troops under his command on the success gained by them on July 31st.

2. For a fortnight prior to the attack the enemy has maintained a heavy and continuous artillery fire, including an unprecedented use of H.V. guns against back areas and a new form of gas shell, all of which caused severe casualties. Despite this and the fact that the forward area was dominated by the enemy at all points, the necessary preparations for the battle were completed and the difficult forward march and assembly of nine Divisions successfully carried out and the assault launched. This alone constitutes a performance of which the Army may well be proud.

3. As a result of the battle, the enemy has once again been driven by the 1st French Army and ourselves from the whole of his front system on a front of about eight miles, and we are now firmly established in or beyond his second line on a front of seven miles.

4. We have already captured 5,448 prisoners, including 125 Officers. Up to date the capture of eight guns, 10 trench mortars, and 36 machine guns has been reported.

5. In addition we have inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the enemy. Owing to losses during our preliminary bombardment, he was forced to bring up six fresh Divisions. Since then three more Divisions have been withdrawn shattered. Thus, in a fortnight, we have disposed of seven or eight Divisions and severely handled 10 more, several of which must be shortly withdrawn.

6. The 2nd Army on our right and the 1st French Army on our left have been as successful as ourselves. The French captures to date number 157 prisoners and three guns. The 2nd Army have also taken 390 prisoners and several machine guns.

7. Despite the weather on the day of the battle, we shot down five enemy machines and one balloon, losing only one machine ourselves.

(Signed) R. T. COLLINS,

Lieutenant-Colonel,

For Major-General, G.S.

55th (West Lancashire) Division.

Special Order of the Day.

3rd August, 1917.

To All Ranks of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division.

Before you went into action on the 31st July, I told you how confident I was that the Division would do its duty and maintain its reputation and the reputation of the grand Regiments to which you belong.

You have done more than that.

The attack you made on the 31st is worthy to rank with the great deeds of the British Army in the past, and has added fresh glory to the record of that Army.

The courage, determination, and self-sacrifice shown by Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men is beyond praise. It is a fine exhibition of true discipline, which comes from the mutual confidence of all ranks in themselves, their comrades, their leaders, and those under them. This in its turn is the product of hard training. Your doings on the 31st show how well you have turned this training to account.

You captured every inch of the objectives allotted to you. It was not your fault that you could not hold all you took. You have broken and now hold, in spite of weather and counter-attacks, a line that the enemy has strengthened and consolidated at his leisure for more than two years.

This will, I believe, be the beginning of the end. When your turn comes to go forward again you will know your own strength and the enemy will know it too.

I am proud of what you have done and am confident that with such troops ultimate victory is certain.

H. S. JEUDWINE,

Major-General,

Commanding 55th (West Lancashire) Division.

Fifth Army.

3rd August, 1917.

XIX. Corps.

The Army Commander wishes to convey his thanks and congratulations to the G.O.C. and all ranks of the 164th Brigade on their fine performance on July 31st. They carried out their task in a most gallant manner and fought splendidly to retain their hold on the ground won. All Officers showed energy, courage, and initiative in dealing with the situation, and the men under their command, in spite of heavy losses, did their utmost, by carrying out their orders, to ensure our success and the enemy’s defeat.

Great credit and praise is due to the G.O.C. 164th Brigade for the magnificent behaviour of the troops under his command.

(Signed) N. MALCOLM,

Major-General, G.S.

The Brigadier-General commanding has much pleasure in forwarding the above remarks of the Army Commander and directs that these be communicated to all ranks.

He considers that all the credit and praise is due to the Officers and men of the Brigade.

Captain,

Acting Brigade Major,

164th Infantry Brigade.

6th August, 1917.

CHAPTER VII.
REORGANISATION, AND THE BATTLE OF THE MENIN ROAD.

On the 2nd August, 1917, the remnant of the Battalion was relieved by the 9th Royal Irish Rifles (36th—Ulster—Division), and assembled at a camp near VLAMERTINGHE, where they found the members of B team and food, and had a good sleep. At 10 p.m. that night we moved in motor ’buses to the WATOU area, where we took over our old camp. Lieutenant G. M. Fismer, R.A.M.C., and one Other Rank had been wounded in coming out of the line, and Lieutenant J. E. Ratcliffe reported as Medical Officer; on the following day Lieutenant W. L. Price and Second Lieutenants R. Grisdale and A. P. Smith and 108 Other Ranks reported as reinforcements.

On the 5th we marched to ABEELE, where we entrained and travelled via ST. OMER and WATTEN to AUDRUICQ, arriving there about 5 p.m. Here we found lurries waiting to take us to our new billeting area, AUDREHEM, a pleasant village just big enough to hold us.

On the 7th, Second Lieutenant Holden came back from attachment to the R.E.’s with 23 Other Ranks, and Captain C. M. Denton and 34 Other Ranks reported as reinforcements. During the next few days Captain Houghton, Second Lieutenant Vincent and Second Lieutenant Swaine rejoined us and Major de Wend Fenton. Second Lieutenant F. Shippobottom and Second Lieutenant A. B. Fergie reported for duty along with nine Other Ranks, while on the 18th Second Lieutenant J. Hailwood and A. Martin, and on the 21st Second Lieutenants A. H. Doleman, S. A. H. Pruden, and Iners joined us, followed by Second Lieutenants H. W. C. Griffiths, H. Dance, and J. Oldham on the 22nd.

The following honours were announced for gallantry in action in the recent battle:—

BAR TO D.S.O.Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle, D.S.O.
MILITARY CROSSSecond Lieutenant H. C. Vincent, B Company.
Second Lieutenant H. Lonsdale, C Company.
D.C.M.24908Lance-Corporal E. Ashton, A Company.
201260Lance-Corporal T. Butcher, A Company.
MILITARY MEDAL200057Sergeant J. Heaps, Headqrs.
201530Lance-Corporal P. Norris, B Company.
200643Sergeant J. E. Cookson, D Company.
34879Sergeant J. Cosgrove, C Company.
200809Corporal F. Pitcher, B Company.
200414Lance-Corporal W. H. Clarkson, Headqrs.
202761Private J. Spencer, D Company.
200146Private J. Bates, Transport.
200357Private J. H. Parkinson, Transport.
12910Private D. Rathbone, C Company.
31987Lance-Corporal J. Walmsley, A Company.

It is fashionable among fighting men to belittle the honours which they themselves have earned, knowing as they do that many individuals employed at bases have received decorations which were never meant to be conferred for anything except gallantry in action, while others who have abundantly deserved them have either died before they were granted or have had no witness surviving to report their conduct; it is therefore only fair to mention that when “immediate awards,” such as the above, are made to fighting men, it is as a result of reports sent in by eyewitnesses, which, in our Battalion at any rate, were tested by cross-examining those mentioned in them as to the deeds of others, the resulting list of recommendations being further checked and often cut down by Brigade.

We enjoyed our stay at AUDREHEM, knowing that our last battle had raised us to the status of Storm Troops, and that when we moved up again it would be for another attack and not back to the demoralising influences of trench life. With this in view we carefully reorganised and trained, all ranks working together keenly with one end in view—efficiency, with the result that in six weeks a tired, straggling, muddy, shaken remnant was transformed once more into a smart Battalion, well organised and equipped, and trained with special reference to attacking concrete blockhouses. Officers daily attended lectures by one of their number on some phase of the attack, and Company Commanders held daily conferences of their N.C.O.’s and senior Privates, so that however heavy might be the casualties among leaders, someone might remain with the necessary knowledge to carry on. Every fine day Companies marched with their cookers to the training area at GUEMY, and remained there all day doing progressive field training; there was football, boxing, a Divisional horse show, and other delights, as well as Brigade days, and the Commander-in-Chief himself came one day to see us at work; so the days slipped by until the 14th September. Captain Duckworth went as Second in Command to the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, and various other Officers left us sick or to other units, so that when B team had been detailed the following Officers moved up to take part in the attack:—

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Kindle, D.S.O.Commanding.
Captain A. T. HoughtonSecond in Command.
Captain R. N. BuckmasterAdjutant.
Lieutenant BardsleyTransport Officer.
Second Lieutenant BrookeIntelligence Officer.
Second Lieutenant WhitehouseSignalling Officer.
Lieutenant Radcliffe, R.A.M.C.Medical Officer.
Lieutenant E. G. BakerA Company.
Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith
Second Lieutenant H. Dance
Second Lieutenant J. Oldham
Captain F. W. S. BakerB Company.
Major Fenton
Second Lieutenant Holmes
Second Lieutenant Fergie
Captain R. H. TautzC Company.
Second Lieutenant Pruden
Second Lieutenant Grisdale
Lieutenant HoldenD Company.
Lieutenant Price
Second Lieutenant Martin
Second Lieutenant Myers

On the 14th the Battalion, including B team, marched to AUBRUICQ, proceeding thence by train to a point near YPRES, where we took over a bivouac camp near GOLDFISH CHATEAU—a muddy field with pits dug all over it, each just big enough to shelter two or three men, and covered with sheets of corrugated iron.

Aeroplane Photo taken 9th September, 1917, from a point near Pond Farm.

Since 31st July, 1917, the ground along the STEENBEEK captured by us on that day had been the scene of bloody fighting, two attempts by other Divisions to advance beyond the Black Line of the previous attack having been made and having failed, so that with small variations the front taken over by us on 15th September was identical with that held when we had come out six weeks before.

The ground over which we had to pass was commanded by two spurs—the GRAFENSTAFEL SPUR half a mile to the north, and the GALLIPOLI SPUR, part of which was within our frontage, to the south; and apart from the concrete blockhouses on our own front, every yard of our advance was raked by machine gun bullets from innumerable others on our flanks, so that until these were put out of action no advance was possible without appalling losses. Add to this the total absence of landmarks in that amorphous wilderness, where no trees, no blade of grass remained, every square yard of ground having been churned up by our shell fire—the extreme difficulty of distinguishing one blockhouse from another—the fact that Companies had been reduced to three Platoons and Platoons to only 20 men owing to lack of sufficient reinforcements—and when you have studied the maps and photographs and tried to visualise the ground, you may form some idea of what the Battalion had to do on the 20th September, 1917. The GRAFENSTAFEL ROAD was our one hope of keeping direction—the road which, as the photographs clearly show, became utterly indistinguishable from the surrounding mire within 200 yards of our starting point; when this failed, general direction was only kept by use of the compass.

The material paragraphs of the Operation Order and the official account of the battle are as follows:—

THE OPERATION ORDER.

1. (a) The 55th Division will attack on Z day. The 9th Division will be on the right, and the 58th Division on the left.

(b) The 165th Infantry Brigade will be on the right, the 164th Infantry Brigade on the left, the 166th Brigade less two Battalions will be in reserve.

(c) The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment will be in the right or KEIR sector.

The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in the centre or COTTS sector.

The 1/8th Liverpool Regiment in the left or SCHULER sector.

The 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment will be attached to the 164th Infantry Brigade and be available for the countering of enemy counter-attacks.

2. On the night 13th/14th the (German) 2nd Guards Reserve Division came into the line opposite to the 55th Divisional front and is reported to be holding the line with all three regiments up, one Battalion of each Regiment being in the line, one in support, and one in immediate reserve.

Those in reserve are located west of the PASSCHENDALE RIDGE.

3. (a) First pause of the barrageRED DOTTED LINE.
First objective inYELLOW LINE.
Final objective inGREEN LINE.

4. It is the intention to capture and occupy as a line of resistance the GREEN LINE.

The attack will be made in stages under cover of a creeping barrage.

There will be a pause of at least half an hour on the RED DOTTED LINE and again on the YELLOW LINE.

5. The plan of attack and objectives will be as follows:—

In the KEIR sector:

The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment will attack at ZERO in four waves, the first two waves extended and the second two in columns.

Objectives:—First two wavesRed Dotted Line.
Second two wavesYellow Line,

after which they will support the capture of the Green Line.

In the COTTS sector:—

The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers will attack at ZERO, in four waves.

Objectives:—First waveRed Dotted Line.
Second waveYellow Line.
Third waveGreen Line, an advanced strong point established at Green House.

In the SCHULER sector:—

Two Companies 1/8th Liverpool Regiment will attack at ZERO in two waves.

Objectives:—First waveRed Dotted Line.
Second waveYellow Line.

Two Companies will be in the hands of the Officer Commanding 1/8th Liverpool Regiment.

Five Aeroplane Photographs showing the gradual disappearance of all features and landmarks in Map square D.13.c., between June and September, 1917.

I. 15th June 1917.

II. 16th June 1917.

III. 27th July 1917. Three days before the 3^{rd} Battle of Ypres.

IV. 13th August 1917.

V. 13th September 1917. Seven days before the battle of the Menin Road.

Map No. 3

OBJECTIVES in the BATTLE of the MENIN ROAD Sept. 20th, 1917

6. The Battalion will assemble in three lines at 20 yards’ distance, the leading line being about 150 yards west of the assembly line of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment in the following order:—

First wave, from right to left—14 Platoon, 13 Platoon, 1 Platoon, 2 Platoon.

Second wave, from right to left—9 Platoon, 10 Platoon, 11 Platoon, 5 Platoon, 6 Platoon, 7 Platoon.

Third wave, from right to left—15 Platoon, machine guns, 3 Platoon.

Captain Houghton will be responsible for the taping of these lines and supplying two guides to each Company to lead them to their position of assembly.

7. Distribution of Companies during the advance:—

First wave, from right to left—Two Platoons D Company, two Platoons A Company.

Second wave, from right to left—C Company, B Company.

Third wave, from right to left—One Platoon D Company, one Platoon A Company.

The first wave will form two lines of extended order before crossing the Yellow Line.

The objective of the first wave will be an outpost line passing through FOKKER FARM—D 14 c 9 9 and D 14 d 1 5.

Garrisons will be detailed in advance:—For FOKKER FARM by A Company, and dugouts D 14 d 1 6 by D Company.

Strong points will be constructed at these points and others in between should it be found necessary, the principle being that the whole front should be:—

(a) Covered by enfilade machine gun or Lewis gun fire.

(b) Under observation.

The objective of the second wave will be approximately the Green Line.

The garrison will be detailed beforehand for the dugouts D 14 c 4 9 by B Company.

The objectives of the third wave will be to ensure that the first and second waves reach their objectives.

Garrisons will be detailed beforehand for dugouts D 14 c 4 4 and MARTHA HOUSE by D Company.

Dugouts at D 14 a 2 O and KANSAS HOUSE by A Company.

8. Unexpected concrete defences encountered during the advance will be garrisoned and consolidated, as soon as the final objective is taken, on the following principle: Each wave will be responsible for all ground between itself and the leading line of the wave in its rear. Should any pockets of the enemy still remain, they will be mopped up as this is taking place.

12. The reserve Battalion (1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment) will arrive in the area AISNE—HINDU COT—POND FARM about the time that the Green Line is taken.

The role of this Battalion will be to deliver an immediate counter-stroke against any hostile counter-attack.

13. Prisoners’ escorts, messengers, etc., when returning to their Companies from the rear, will take back six bandoliers of S.A.A. from the forward dumps.

14. Dress:—Fighting order, with packs instead of haversacks. Every N.C.O. and man will carry:—

Parties of men specially selected to deal with dugouts will carry two No. 23 rifle grenades.

Every rifle grenadier will carry six Hales No. 24 rifle grenades.

Shovels will be carried by every man, less runners, signallers, stretcher-bearers, and Nos. 1 and 2 of Lewis gun teams.

Men carrying shovels will not carry the entrenching tool.

Bayonets will not be fixed until immediately before leaving the assembly line.

15. The Battalion will be fitted out on the early morning of Y day. Bombs and S.A.A. will be drawn from the St. Jean dump by small parties from each Company. At the same time parties will draw shovels and sandbags from the Divisional R.E. dump, St. Jean—Wieltje Road, 600 yards west of Wieltje. These carrying parties must have returned to Congreve Walk—Liverpool Line by 5 30 a.m. on Y day. After that hour there must be no movement over the open.

16. The Brigade main dump is at C 23 c 3 1 (old German front line). Advanced Brigade dumps are established at Spree Farm (C 18 d 5 3) and at dugouts C 18 d 7 5.

17. All ranks will carry during the attack the iron ration and the unexpended portion of Z day’s rations.

Rations for Z plus 1 day will be dumped as far forward as possible. Water bottles will be filled from the water-carts on the evening of Y day.

18. Barrage map will be issued later.

19. Points for Liaison:—

With 2/5th Lancashire FusiliersKANSAS HOUSE.
D 14 a 0 2.
With 1/6th Liverpool RegimentD 14 c 5 4.
D 14 c 95 40.

20. Headquarters 164th and 165th Infantry Brigades will be the Wieltje dugout. Battalion Headquarters will be at the commencement Capricorn Keep and dugouts C 18 d 8 6; subsequent moves will be notified.

21. Aid Post:—Pond Farm, C 18 b 8 0.

22. ZERO HOUR will be 5 40 a.m.

Watches will be synchronised.

23. Communication between Companies and Battalion Headquarters will be by runner and visual.

All messages will be duplicated by a second means of transmission.

Two pigeons will be carried by D Company and two by A Company, moving in the leading wave.

Second Lieutenant Whitehurst will be responsible for:—

(a) Laying a wire from Battalion Headquarters to Brigade forward station at Pond Farm, and from Battalion Headquarters to Battalion forward command post.

(b) Establishing visual between Battalion Headquarters and Battalion forward command post about D 13 central, if practicable.

(c) Establishing relay runner posts about D 13 c 2 6, D 13 d 1 6, and Keir Farm.

Oblique Aeroplane Photograph showing our objectives in the Battle of the MENIN ROAD—(Contrast the condition of the foreground and the middle distance).

Contact ’plane can be recognised by a rectangular attachment on both lower planes and a white dumb-bell on either side of the body.

Whenever the ’plane calls for signals by sounding the klaxon horn or firing a white Verey light, the most advanced lines of infantry will:—

(a) Light flares in the bottom of a shell hole.

(b) Show Watson fans—white and coloured sides alternately 30 seconds.

The ’plane will call for signals at ZERO plus 1 hour.
ZERO plus 2 hours.
ZERO plus 2½ hours.

and at such other times as may be necessary.

S.O.S. signal is a rifle grenade bursting into two red and two green lights.

24. Second Lieutenant Brooke will be responsible for:—

(a) Keeping liaison with 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment during their advance to the Yellow Line.

(b) Establishing a Battalion forward command post about D 13 central and keeping the whole front under close observation.

25. Acknowledge in writing.

(Signed) R. N. L. BUCKMASTER,

18th September, 1917.

Captain and Adjutant,

Issued at 8 a.m.

1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.