EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
YPRES.
15th September. Fairly quiet day.
One Other Rank reinforcement. One Other Rank to Field Ambulance sick.
16th September. About 10 45 a.m. 10 enemy aeroplanes dropped bombs in the vicinity of the camp, causing one casualty. Road near camp heavily shelled at dusk.
Two Other Ranks wounded.
17th September. Situation normal. Reconnaissance of forward area carried out. W day in connection with forthcoming operations.
One Other Rank killed in VLAMERTINGHE.
18th September (X day). Day spent in fitting out, etc. On the evening of this day the Battalion moved forward to the Congreve Walk—Liverpool Trench line, running through the village of St. Jean. Our artillery were very active throughout the night.
Two Other Ranks wounded. One Other Rank died of wounds.
ST. JEAN (TRENCHES).
19th September. Commencing at dawn, our artillery opened the 24 hours’ bombardment preparatory to the attack. The enemy’s reply during the day was exceedingly feeble.
Commencing 9 30 p.m., the Battalion moved off from ST. JEAN by Platoons at 200 yards’ distance, via the WIELTJE—GRAVENSTAFEL road. The night was quiet, and there was practically no hostile shelling.
Battalion Headquarters were established at CAPRICORN KEEP (C 18 d 55 65) at 11 p.m. The KEEP consisted of six very strong dugouts of reinforced concrete. Three were taken over as headquarters by this unit and three by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Casualties:—Two Other Ranks killed; three Other Ranks wounded.
20th September. The Battalion was reported in position of assembly at 1 a.m. The lines to be taken up by the various waves were marked by tape, which had been laid as soon as darkness permitted. When once in position the assaulting troops lay in shell holes until ZERO hour. A continuous drizzling rain made the ground sticky and the going bad. The line of assembly was a north—south line running through SOMME (D 13 c 50 25). During the night things were fairly quiet, though lively artillery fire developed on our right soon after 3 a.m.
ZERO hour was at 5 40 a.m., at which time the artillery barrage opened.
The 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment moved forward from the assembly position in rear of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment. The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment had for its objective (1) the RED DOTTED LINE and (2) the YELLOW LINE, and it was intended that the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment should “leap-frog” at the YELLOW LINE and capture and consolidate the GREEN LINE.
The enemy barrage was promptly opened on the approximate line of our assembly position—a proof that the enemy were fully prepared for the attack. This caused the three rear waves, i.e., the four Companies of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, to close well up on to the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, and it appears that in a good many cases this was overdone, causing the two units to be intermingled and considerably undermining the principles of organisation.
The creeping barrage was being governed by two new principles, tried for the first time and designed to combat and counteract the enemy’s new system of defence:—(1) there were two definite pauses in the barrage, during which it was intended that Companies should replace casualties from the rear and generally reorganise; (2) the barrage started to move forward at the rate of six minutes every hundred yards and later at the rate of eight minutes every hundred yards.
The attack to commence with went well, though a great many casualties were inflicted by enemy machine gun fire, which from the start was very well directed. AISNE FARM was reported taken at 6 5 a.m., though a Platoon of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires had to give assistance in the attack on this strong point. A message timed 8 17 a.m. stated, “Attack appears to be going well.”
The first pause was made on the RED DOTTED LINE, though apparently very little reorganisation was found practicable. Soon after moving forward again considerable trouble was caused by hostile machine guns on the flanks bringing enfilade fire to bear on our advancing troops. According to reports received, this was particularly the case on the right, where the left Battalion of the 165th Infantry Brigade was held up before GALLIPOLI, as a result of which an enemy machine gun on Hill 37 was playing havoc with the waves in the valley through which we were advancing.
The result of these obstructions on either flank was that the men of this Battalion in many cases inclined outwards, leaving an exceedingly thin line facing the original objective. In some cases whole Platoons found themselves attacking strong points on the frontage of other Battalions. Particularly was this so in the case of GALLIPOLI, in the ultimate capture of which men of this Battalion very materially assisted.
Very few of our men reached the YELLOW LINE, though a message from the Battalion O.P., timed 8 45 a.m., stated that it appeared to be taken and consolidation commenced. Finally, therefore, a line of resistance was sited and consolidated about mid-day between the RED DOTTED and YELLOW LINE, with posts of Lewis gun teams thrown out 50 to 100 yards to the front.
The enemy was not finally dislodged from the vicinity of GALLIPOLI and the adjoining SUVLA until after 10 a.m., by which time the barrage was of no further assistance.
20th September. At 10 50 a.m. the enemy was reported massing for a counter-attack in the vicinity of NILE and FOKKER FARMS, but nothing except heavy shelling materialised on our front. Soon after 1 p.m. various S.O.S.’s were sent up, and apparently local counter-attacks, without any success, were launched on both our flanks.
In the afternoon an effort was made to reorganise the Battalion, which was now reported to consist of only four Officers and 60 rifles in the firing line. The right Battalion frontage was now being held by a mixed line of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, stiffened by two Companies of the 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment, who, as Battalion in Brigade reserve, and detailed to assist in the capture of the objective and to deal with any hostile counter-attack, had dug themselves in on a line in rear of our consolidated positions.
About 7 p.m. an Officers’ patrol went forward to reconnoitre KEIR FARM and discover whether it was held by the enemy. This patrol, however, did not succeed in its objective and lost its way, and the project had to be postponed till the following morning.
As soon as darkness allowed, an effort was made to examine our positions and to find out whether measures for defence were complete. They were found to be held by at least six Lewis guns, while there were in all four machine guns, two of which were German, and proved very useful against the enemy.
During the night patrols were sent out, and a further effort made to find the defences of KEIR FARM. KEIR FARM was not identified, and it was therefore assumed that it no longer existed as a concrete defence. No signs of the enemy were seen. The night passed without incident, though shelling on both sides was maintained fairly consistently.
Casualties:—
Officers:—
Killed—Captain F. W. S. Baker (Commanding B Company), Second Lieutenant A. B. Fergie.
Wounded—Captain R. H. Tautz, M.C. (Commanding C Company), Second Lieutenant E. G. Baker (Commanding A Company), Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith, Second Lieutenant H. Dance, Second Lieutenant J. Oldham, Second Lieutenant R. Grisedale, Second Lieutenant A. Martin, Second Lieutenant B. Myers, Second Lieutenant C. B. Holmes (died of wounds, 28th September, 1917).
Other Ranks:—Killed 23, Wounded 161, Missing 11; Total 195.
Four Other Ranks reinforcements from base.
The following notes by an Officer who was present are added to complete the account:—
At about 10 p.m. the Battalion began to arrive by Platoons, each Platoon coming up in silence, knowing we were close up to the enemy outposts, winding in single file over the uneven ground, being shown its tape, filing along it and lying down to wait for the dawn; the assembly was completed by 1 a.m.—the hour fixed, and apparently unknown to the enemy.
At this hour, to add to the discomfort, a steady drizzle set in, but a tot of rum was served out and most of the men were soon asleep, to be waked at dawn by the crash of our opening barrage.
Battalion Headquarters retired to CAPRICORN KEEP, while the Medical Officer and his men settled in POND GALLERIES. Both these blockhouses had been built of concrete by the Boche to shelter his reserves from our shelling in earlier days—during the days that followed they were severely tested, but never failed us.
At ZERO, 5 40 a.m., while it was still dark, down came our creeping barrage, and the King’s Own began to advance. Our men had been told to give them a good start and, full of eagerness as they were, would have done so had the answering enemy barrage not come down on their tails; this had been foreseen and its position judged from previous registration, and the assembly position was just in front—but only just—and the “shorts” got some of our men, causing the rest to hurry and close up on the King’s Own, who were already passing AISNE FARM. We had to complete the capture of this, and lost heavily in the process.
Under terrific machine gun fire from the front and both flanks, causing casualties at every step, the two Battalions struggled forward to get to grips with their unseen enemies, and soon arrived at the two groups of blockhouses, LOOS and GALLIPOLI, with four others lying between them.
These two groups, though the latter was off the allotted front, at once became the immediate objectives—the left hand Companies took the LOOS blockhouses one by one, nine in all, with bomb and bayonet; the Companies on the right swung round and joined the King’s Liverpool Regiment in storming GALLIPOLI; in the centre small parties of men, their Officers having been hit, took the other four and so reached the RED LINE.
Lieutenant Brooke went forward, and, with a few signallers, established a forward command post near LOOS; our machine gunners came up and turned five of the newly-taken Hun machine guns round on the enemy, and things seemed to be going well, but the hour-long pause of the barrage was too long, the hail of cross-fire from more distant machine guns still continued, and the men, who had sought cover in shell holes, were out of sight and scattered, though strenuous efforts to reorganise were made by the few leaders who remained, and with a certain amount of success. But the line had lost its cohesion, and when the barrage went on only a portion of the line saw it and attempted to follow.
Lieutenant Brooke had notified the capture of the Red Line to Battalion Headquarters, but no further message coming through, the Second in Command went forward to clear up the situation; on reaching the Red Line he could at first see no one, but soon stumbled into a shell hole full of men, and was able, running from one hole to another, to locate the whole line up to the flanks of the adjoining Battalions, and to estimate the casualties.
The barrage had already passed the Green Line and the machine guns in the blockhouses were active. Their crews could see every movement, and the troops on both flanks were stationary, so that at the moment no further advance was likely to succeed—moreover, everyone had had time to feel the reaction. So the order was given to dig in and to send out small patrols to try to occupy the ground immediately in front, and by this means the line was advanced still further.
Lieutenant Holden took charge of one of these, while Second Lieutenant Pruden supervised consolidation.
About this time the Hun seems to have realised the position, for he opened out with every gun he had, shelling the captured pillboxes and putting a very heavy barrage all round the aid post and Battalion Headquarters, but his attempt at counter-attack was beaten off by machine gun, Lewis gun, and rifle fire.
We afterwards found out that SUVLA and THE CAPITOL had not been taken, nor had CROSS COTS—had they been the cross-machine gun fire on us would have been much less intense.
No praise is too high for our stretcher-bearers, who—all through that day and the succeeding days—toiled without intermission bringing in wounded; the aid post was in the line of the Hun barrage, a concrete structure, with a passage two feet wide on the enemy side with chambers opening off it; the stretcher cases had to be dressed out in the open, while the passage was crowded with walking wounded, some of them Huns—the look of utter weariness and dejection on the faces of the latter was a thing not easily forgotten.
The runners did splendid work; a few were killed as they made their way over the shell-tossed ground—the wonder is that any escaped.
For five days the Battalion remained in those shell holes, beating off one counter-attack after another with the help of our gunners, who were truly magnificent. At first it was impossible to reorganise properly owing to the mixing of Battalions, but ultimately a definite frontage was allotted to us by Brigade, and that night we sorted ourselves out from the King’s Own and Companies were picked out and given a definite bit of line—A and B in front, C and D in close support. At the same time the line was advanced considerably, especially on the right, the posts on HILL 37 having been taken by the right Brigade.
Getting rations up to the line was a terrible business—runners and guides kept losing their way, and more than one party nearly entered Hun territory; but guide wires were laid to Companies, the C.Q.M.S.’s did their work splendidly, and the men were fed and kept going.
About 25th September we were relieved by the 59th Division, a genial lot—full strength—who seemed to expect to find trenches and dugouts! Thanks to the tapes and wires which had been laid, relief was quick, and we all dribbled back to ST. JEAN, where Companies assembled by the cookers and had hot tea and rum served out. They were actually singing—the revulsion, I suppose.
After a lot of delay we got into trucks on the DECAUVILLE railway (a metre gauge affair). The Commanding Officer was balanced on the back of the little engine, and as we started, some wit shouted out, “Don’t move, sir! You might upset her!”
Additional light is thrown on the course of the battle by the Platoon narratives:—
Lieutenant E. G. Baker, Commanding A Company, was hit in the head during the advance. No. 1 Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Smith, was badly wounded in the thigh before the first strong point was reached. Private Wyre fired some rifle grenades into it, after which the Platoon rushed it with men of other units, and bombed and bayonetted the enemy out. Sergeant Beaumont then led them towards SCHULER GALLERIES, when he was shot through the head about 50 yards behind the Red Line. About 16 men under Private Wyre found their way to the Red Line; others, with an Officer of the King’s Own, went forward on the left. He said he would take them to the Yellow Line, but was killed by a sniper. They were willing to go on, but had no leader till Sergeant Knowles of No. 3 came up and took a small party out under heavy cross-machine gun fire to the domed strong point on the road.
No. 2 got on all right till Lieutenant Dance was hit in the arm. They took a small strong point on the right with others helping, and also helped to take AISNE FARM, where one Hun Officer and eight men were taken.
Sergeant Knowles took eight men to the left to take the strong point in the road, but there were about 30 enemy in a trench in front of it, and he was compelled to fall back again for lack of support. Two sections helped to take the strong point in front of LOOS.
Captain Baker, Commanding B Company, was wounded at 6 30 a.m., but continued to advance; he was killed at 7 a.m. at a strong point about 150 yards to the right of LOOS. At this same point five out of the Lewis gun team of seven were put out of action (one killed and four wounded). Sergeant-Major Roberts bombed the strong point.
Sergeant Pitcher, of No. 6, with five men, assisted in the attack on the strong points at LOOS and was severely wounded. Second Lieutenant Fazackerley, during the pause in the barrage, advanced with Lance-Corporal Clayton and four men to a point on a ridge to find a possible position for Lewis gun. Here they were subject to intense enfilade machine gun fire from the right flank in the direction of GALLIPOLI, which made it impossible to advance further until the right flank had advanced.
Second Lieutenant Martin, Commanding No. 11, was badly wounded immediately after zero, and Sergeant Murphy assumed command. This Platoon assisted in the capture of AISNE HOUSE; at least 20 Germans were taken there.
In No. 10 Lance-Corporal Charnley was wounded immediately after zero, and during the pause Mr. Myers and one or two others were sniped, and when they moved forward again only one bomber remained.
In No. 9, at nightfall, Mr. Fergie, Mr. Holmes, and two Sergeants went forward to reconnoitre a forward position. The two Officers were struck by a shell and were both very badly wounded. Lance-Corporal Anderton took over command. Private Pendlebury was wounded on the afternoon of the 23rd for the third time. C Company Commander (Captain Tautz) was wounded at the first pause.
No. 13, owing to the darkness, got mixed up with the 1/4th King’s Own on the left flank, and helped the Lancashire Fusiliers to carry SCHULER GALLERIES.
D Company Headquarters Lewis gun team, when near GALLIPOLI, was shot down by machine gun fire, but Corporal Prescott retrieved the gun. Visual communication with the Battalion forward signalling post was opened from behind a dugout at D 13 b 1 0 by Private Roocroft, Company Signaller, and Private Parkinson, of B Company, and was maintained by shutter and lamp until the night of the 21st. On the morning of the 21st, Corporal Prescott and Private Goodwin, Company Runner, went forward of the line and shot some enemy snipers who had been annoying the troops in the line. On the evening of the 23rd, during an intensely heavy bombardment, Corporal Prescott volunteered and kept observation all the time, though wounded in the shoulder by shrapnel, and refused to go to the aid post until the troops were relieved.
No. 14 attacked the strong point at D 13 d 2 6 in conjunction with a party of the 1/4th King’s Own, then Second Lieutenant Holden and the remaining men of his party moved to attack GALLIPOLI, which was holding up the advance. This fight lasted about an hour.
On the 21st September, Second Lieutenant Holden, who was patrolling to KEIR FARM, was writing a message to send by pigeon when he was killed. There were four other casualties, and the pigeons were killed.
No. 15. At 10 a.m. on 21st September, Second Lieutenant Pruden took a small patrol to KEIR FARM. During the night an advanced post held by Lance-Corporal Gorton and five men with two Lewis guns was buried. One gun was in action again immediately, and the other after six hours.