EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.

TRENCHES.

21st September. There was fairly lively shelling at dawn, but the situation was reported quiet at 7 30 a.m. The front was continually patrolled before daylight and no signs of the enemy found. During the morning a further Officers’ patrol worked forward to KEIR FARM and confirmed the previous report that it was practically non-existent. On the afternoon of this day the strength of the Companies in the line was reported at 90, though it was known there were still many more men of this unit who had become merged in the Battalions on either flank.

At about 4 40 p.m. the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, on the left of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, attacked and occupied SCHULER FARM. Owing to the small amount of resistance encountered it was decided that the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers should take CROSS COTTS and that then the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment should conform by moving forward to the new alignment. The attack on CROSS COTTS, however, never materialised, as at 6 30 p.m. heavy enemy counter-attacks were launched on Hill 37 on our right, and on the London Division on our left, the front held by this unit simply being subjected to an intense bombardment. Our artillery promptly replied to the S.O.S., and no enemy succeeded in reaching our lines.

During the ensuing night a further effort was made to complete the reorganisation by separating the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. This unit took over the south, viz., 200 yards of the KEIR sector, extending approximately from D 13 d 23 32 to D 13 d 23 75. By this means a few more men were collected together. The Battalion was then organised on a two-Company frontage with two Companies in support, and the whole line was straightened and pushed forward an average depth of 50 yards. It was found that the only practicable way of doing this was by arranging a system of guide wires of a fixed length, which were taken out by posts in advance and, after their direction, etc., had been checked, the rear wave advanced along them by Platoons and took up the new alignment. It was intended that this process should be repeated by leap-frogging the two waves until the YELLOW LINE was reached, but owing to the still imperfect state of organisation, it was decided to postpone this movement until the following night.

During this night, however, guide wires were laid from the main line to the isolated Lewis gun posts 100 yards in front. This ensured cohesion and gave the most forward men confidence. Guide wires were also made from the main line of resistance to Battalion Headquarters to facilitate the work during the night of carrying parties bringing up S.A.A. and food.

The enemy’s artillery was quiet during the night, but our own was very busy, apparently with gas shells, upon the enemy’s batteries.

Killed:—Second Lieutenant H. Holden and two Other Ranks.

Wounded:—Two Other Ranks.

22nd September. There was a certain amount of shelling about dawn, otherwise the day was quiet.

As soon as it was dark, the right of the Battalion was advanced 150 yards and connected with a machine gun in a shell hole near KEIR FARM about D 13 d 60 55. This movement, which was successfully carried out with the help of guide wires, brought our line round in such a way as to face the enemy, whose position now ran approximately north-west—south-east. Connection was also maintained with the 165th Brigade on our right, but in view of the fact that the latter were being relieved, it was not considered advisable to carry out any further advance, so as to avoid any possibility of bringing down an enemy S.O.S. barrage.

The usual posts were pushed out in advance of the new line.

Owing to the exhaustion of several Officers in the line, two were brought down for a rest to Battalion Headquarters, and the Signalling and Intelligence Officers took over control of the Companies. The night was quiet. Two Companies of the 2/6th North Staffordshires came into support to our Brigade.

Casualties:—Two Other Ranks wounded.

23rd September. The day passed without incident. Patrols before dawn saw nothing of the enemy. An S.O.S. was sent up on our right at 3 50 p.m., but nothing materialised.

At 5 p.m. the enemy heavily bombarded our positions, and our front line system and the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters were heavily bombarded for three hours. By 8 15 p.m. all was quiet again and the relief was begun. The relieving unit was the 2/6th North Staffordshires (59th Division), who took over our frontage with one Company. Relief was completed without casualties about 11 p.m.

A special effort was made to secure identifications before being relieved, and a patrol that went out with this object in view returned with two prisoners, who were encountered in NO MAN’S LAND. The capture of these prisoners proved the presence of the third German Division opposite this part of the line since the attack was launched on the 20th.

Upon relief, Companies concentrated at St. Jean, where, after hot tea had been supplied from the cookers, a train was provided to take the Battalion to VLAMERTINGHE.

24th September. The Battalion arrived at camp south of VLAMERTINGHE at 4 30 a.m. Morning was spent in resting, etc. At 3 p.m. the Brigade entrained and travelled from VLAMERTINGHE to POPERINGHE, detrained at POPERINGHE, and boarded ’buses at a point about one mile south-west of the town. By this means we went to WATOU area, and were accommodated in tents at Hill Camp (K 12 d 7 8).

143 Other Ranks from reinforcement camp.

11 Other Ranks from base.

TELEGRAMS:

“Please convey to all ranks 55th Division the Army Commander’s congratulations on the fine record of the Division during the hard fighting of the past two months. The Army Commander wishes specially to thank all ranks for their splendid efforts, which have contributed greatly to the success of the last attack and to wish them all good luck and success in the future. Despite their long period in the line prior to commencement of operations they have well maintained and increased their high reputation.

“FIFTH ARMY.”

“Brigadier-General Stuart and all ranks West Lancashire Reserve Brigade send heartiest congratulations to West Lancashire Division on their splendid success.”

“Well done, 55th West Lancashire Division! Accept my most hearty congratulations. I sincerely trust your losses are not heavy.

“DERBY.”

To All Ranks of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division.

I regret that owing to the move of the Division I have not been able to see all units since the fight on 20th September. I hope to do so later as opportunity offers.

The messages received from higher Commanders and others since the battle have been published from time to time as received and have no doubt been read by all ranks, who will see from these messages how well the higher Commanders have appreciated the work of the Division.

In addition, I have recently been allowed to see the reports on the Division rendered to General Headquarters by the Army and the Corps in which we served. In these reports the Division is spoken of as “a good fighting Division possessing the right spirit” and as “a first-rate Division.” I know that all ranks throughout the Division will share the pride that I feel myself in reading those opinions of the Commanders under whom we have served.

I have also had the advantage of reading scores of stories of individual courage, determination, endurance, and self-sacrifice, narrated by Commanding Officers in bringing the services of individuals of all ranks to notice for recognition. These stories increase my pride in the Division and my confidence in it.

The West Lancashire Division had a good reputation before the recent fighting in front of Ypres. You have now won for it a reputation second to none in the Expeditionary Force, and every soldier in the Division may well be proud of belonging to it. That reputation I feel confident you will cherish and maintain. We are now in an easy part of the line, but ordinary trench duties demand constant alertness, endurance, and conscientious observance of orders; besides it is up to us at all times to take advantage of any opportunities for aggressive action which will cause loss or damage to the enemy. It is by such action, as well as by smartness and good discipline when out of the line, that the great reputation of the West Lancashire Division can, and I am sure will, be kept up by each soldier in it, of every rank.

H. S. JEUDWINE,

55th Division Headquarters,

Major-General,

10th October, 1917.

Commanding 55th Division.

The following decorations were awarded in respect of the battle and announced on 11th November:—

MILITARY CROSSCaptain A. T. Houghton.
Second Lieutenant S. A. H. Pruden.
Second Lieutenant L. Brooke.
D.C.M.200051C.S.M. Roberts, H.
200077Corporal Prescott, S.
MILITARY MEDAL200782Private Parks, T.
201197Corporal Thompson, J.
200682Private Coupe, F.
200895Lance-Sergeant Knowles, R.
12154Lance-Corporal Cayton, R.
290665Private Pendlebury, T.
202967Private Yates, W.
291178Private Goodwin, H.
201350Corporal Robinson, J.
29679Private Parkinson, T.
34304Private Jones, T.
16940Private Cunningham, D.
202099Private Wyre, F.
200756Lance-Corporal Gorton, F.
201542Sergeant Bell, H.
6693Lance-Sergeant Murphey, J.
200352Private Thistleton, T.
238002Private Roocroft, W.

CHAPTER VIII.
CAMBRAI, 25th September, 1917 to 6th December, 1917.

At WATOU we began once more to pull the Battalion together and bring it up to strength, and reinforcements began to come in. Captain Duggan, M.C., from the 10th Battalion, joined us here, also Second Lieutenants J. O. Firth, J. H. Livesey, H. Ramsbottom, and P. Adamson, and 18 Other Ranks.

On the 26th we marched to HOPOUTRE, where we entrained and moved out at 9 30 a.m., travelling in cattle trucks via ARRAS to BAPAUME, where we arrived about 7 p.m. Thence we marched through desolate and ruined country to a pile of ruins labelled YTRES, where we shared a canvas camp with a Battalion of the Buffs for the night; they left the following morning.

Major Crump rejoined us from England on the 30th.

We stayed at YTRES resting, bathing, reorganising, and training, till 3rd October, when we left the 4th Corps area and marched to a canvas camp at AIZECOURT-LE-BAS in the 3rd Corps area; the camp was on a hill top, and it was bitterly cold. From here reconnaissances of the new forward area were carried out, the 164th Brigade being in Divisional Reserve.

Second Lieutenant Easterby came back on the 5th, and on the 10th Second Lieutenants J. L., W. H. F., and F. C. Smith, D. Carmichael, J. E. F. Nicholson, R. B. Wilkinson, and C. Taylor joined us as Officer reinforcements, followed by Second Lieutenants L. Frost, F. G. Green, and C. Milne on the 13th.

On the 12th we marched to VILLERS FAUCON into billets; the following day Companies moved forward to LEMPIRE, where we became support Battalion to the right Brigade.

The country in which we now found ourselves was a pleasant change from FLANDERS; the soil was chalk like the south-east of England, and the scenery was, or had been, similar; but the Germans in their retirement had systematically destroyed everything—cut down every tree, blown up every house and structure down to the very telegraph poles, and poisoned the wells—it was a desolate and dead country. Curiously enough, he had left the cellars intact, and as these, even under wattle-and-daub houses, were solidly built of brick, with arched brick roofs, they made excellent, if rather dark, hiding-places and billets.

We never quite understood these cellars, so much better than the houses to which they belonged; some said they were specially built as wine cellars, that being once a wine country; others favoured the theory that they were specially designed as refuges in war time.

From LEMPIRE, which corresponded to YPRES in this sector, we sent working parties up the line every night. A Company had four posts, known as LEMPIRE CENTRAL, LEMPIRE EAST, YAK and ZEBRA POSTS, which were manned day and night, the garrisons showing no movement during the daytime.

On the 18th we relieved the 1/4th KING’S OWN in the right Battalion sub-sector of the Brigade front. The line was in truth no line, but a string of posts connected by trenches apparently freshly dug in the stiff clay which here overlay the chalk; each post provided with a mined dugout for the garrison—rather a pleasant place, we thought, on first acquaintance, as we were told that horses could be ridden (and were, just at first) right up to the front line!

On this occasion Companies were disposed as follows:—

GILLEMONT POST, the only place which showed signs of wear, was held by D Company, with one Platoon of A, as Left Front Company; CAT POST by C as Right Front Company; DUNCAN and DOLEFUL POSTS by A as Support Company; and KEN LANE, a sunken road lined with dugouts, by B, the Reserve Company, and Battalion Headquarters.

Of course, previous to our taking over the sector, the Divisional artillery had begun to wake up the Hun by concentration shoots, which were continued at intervals—the retaliation was mostly in the shape of Minenwerfer on GILLEMONT POST, which reminded us, on that account, of RAILWAY WOOD.

During the five days we had plenty to do in becoming acclimatised and establishing the old trench routine again with a new set of Officers and men; very few were left now of the June lot, and many of the N.C.O.’s had never seen a trench before. Here Second Lieutenants W. G. E. Taylor, C. A. Rush, Hornby, and 12 Other Ranks reinforced us. A perpetual source of joy to the old ones these drafts were; first they had to be taken down and “put through it,” and then taught how to behave, if they didn’t know, but somehow or other at the end of a fortnight, they seemed to have settled down and become part of us.

The 1/4th KING’S OWN relieved us on the 23rd, and we went back to ST. EMILIE, whence, during the next few days, we provided working parties for the front line, going into the line again on the 29th, when we relieved the 1/5th South Lancashires in the BIRDCAGE sector—the relief was completed without casualties by 8 30 p.m. The Medical Officer, who had had a pretty stiff time on 20th September, went sick that night, and Captain E. Watson Williams, R.A.M.C., took over his duties.

On the 30th October the enemy trench-mortared our front line, killing three and wounding nine men; otherwise the tour was quiet, and on 1st December we were relieved by the 1/9th King’s Liverpool Regiment and went by light railway to HAMEL or TINCOURT—it was a double village, and usually known by this latter name. It was stated above that every village in the area had been destroyed—this place was an exception, as some of the civil population had been left there by the Hun, so that we found it almost intact. The Companies’ billets had wire beds in them, and we added to these while we were there. Our total strength at this time was 39 Officers and 777 Other Ranks—the fighting strength being 24 Officers and 546 Other Ranks, so that in numbers, at any rate, we had partly recovered from our losses in the SALIENT.

Map No. 4

GILLEMONT FARM SECTOR
November, 1917

We had a very pleasant time at HAMEL till the 16th, when we returned to ST. EMILIE; during the period Captain Buckmaster assumed command of B Company and Second Lieutenant Pruden became Adjutant of the Battalion, a position he retained till the Armistice. Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle had been at Brigade since the 13th, commanding the 164th Brigade during the absence of Brigadier-General Stockwell on leave, afterwards going on leave himself, and Major Crump had been in command of the Battalion.

On the 16th we moved back to ST. EMILIE, and on the 17th we relieved the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment in the GILLEMONT sector.

On the morning of the 18th November, the Battalion was disposed as follows (see map):—

Front line—D Company, under Lieutenant Shippobottom, in CAT POST.
C Company, under Lieutenant Lonsdale, in GILLEMONT FARM sector.
SupportsB Company, under Captain Buckmaster, in DUNCAN and DOLEFUL POSTS.
ReserveA Company, under Captain Houghton, in KEN LANE with Battalion Headquarters.

Major Crump was in command of the Battalion, and attached to A Company was a raiding party of 19 in training for a raid, under Lieutenant Adamson. At 5 30 a.m. the Boche opened a hurricane bombardment on the GILLEMONT FARM sector with trench mortars, including 80 heavy minenwerfer brought up the night before, and reduced the front trench to a shapeless mass of craters: out of 12 posts[I] only Sergeants Hartley and Hogg and half-a-dozen men were left alive; all the rest, with the Officer (Lieutenant Firth) and Sergeant on duty, who were found at the head of the communication trench under two feet of earth, were killed and buried.

About 200 Huns entered our line in three places, equipped with spades and rations, and worked forward bombing, and things looked serious; but Lieutenant Lonsdale, though badly shaken, kept his head, organised his Headquarters details into a firing line who held up the enemy advance, and managed to telephone to Battalion Headquarters, and A Company was ordered to counter-attack.

The barrage which had been put down on KEN LANE was by this time falling off, and, as the men were standing to, Lieutenant Adamson was able to push off at once with his raiders and one Platoon of A, followed by the rest of A under Captain Houghton, with very few casualties. As soon as the enemy saw the first wave come over the hill he began to retreat rapidly, but not before the counter-attackers and the gallant remnant of C had bayonetted a score or so. Some of the Huns had entered D Company’s line and caused a few casualties there, among others Lieutenant Shippobottom, a very promising young Officer, who was caught by a bomb as he came out of Company Headquarters.

This affair was reported in “THE TIMES” as follows:—

9 30 p.m.—At dawn this morning a strong hostile raiding party attacked our trenches in the neighbourhood of GUILLEMONT FARM, south-east of Epehy [north-west of St. Quentin], and effected an entry at certain points. Our troops counter-attacked across the open, and after sharp fighting, in which we captured a few prisoners, ejected the enemy.

Lieutenant Adamson received the M.C. for his excellent leadership—the way he worked round the flanks of the hill was pretty to watch, and Sergeants Hartley and Hogg also received the M.M. for their stout fight with a few men against overwhelming odds.

It fell to A Company to clear up the mess, and they took over the sector that night; the men were dead beat, the front line blown to bits, and lateral communication interrupted to such an extent that four Officers were on duty simultaneously the whole night through.

The following day was spent in making further clearance, and special parties from Battalion Headquarters and Pioneers carried on through the night.

The raiders who went to CAT POST did not enter our trenches, but bombed them from the parapet, doing some damage and causing a few casualties. They then returned to their own lines.

The enemy left two unwounded prisoners in our hands, two wounded prisoners, and about ten dead were left in our trenches.

Our casualties were:—Second Lieutenant J. A. Firth, killed; Second Lieutenant F. Shippobottom, wounded, died of wounds in hospital; Second Lieutenant R. Hornby, slightly wounded, remained at duty; 11 Other Ranks killed, 21 Other Ranks wounded, 48 Other Ranks missing—many of these being buried in the destruction of the trench.

The following extracts from the War Diary refer to our share in the CAMBRAI attack:—

19th November. The work of reorganisation was completed, and the repairing of the trenches went on. At 1 p.m. orders were received that it was Y day, and the preparation for the attack to be made on Z day started at once. Our artillery and trench mortars completed their wire cutting programme. Enemy shelled our supports with 5.9’s and 4.2’s during the day.

D Company, who were holding CAT POST sector, were ordered to remain there and to push posts into the GILLEMONT sector when the assaulting troops moved forward.

At 2 30 p.m. A Company sent 50 Other Ranks to the 164th Trench Mortar Battery as carrying parties for guns moving forward, and 20 Other Ranks to the 164th Machine Gun Company as carriers to their guns moving forward. Between 11 p.m. and 12 midnight the remainder of A and C Companies, who were holding the GILLEMONT sector, were relieved by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, who were to assault the GILLEMONT defences of the enemy in the morning. On relief these Companies proceeded to KEN LANE and were held in Battalion reserve.

B Company, who were in support at DUNCAN and DOLEFUL posts, took up dispositions as follows during the night:—

One Platoon as permanent garrison FLEECEALL POST.

One Platoon as permanent garrison GRAFTON POST.

One Platoon as permanent garrison ISLAND TRAVERSE.

Owing to our losses in Lewis gun personnel, sustained in the raid on the 18th, we were unable to carry out a programme of Lewis gun fire for barrage purposes that had been allotted to us. This was taken over by the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment, with the assistance of two Lewis gunners from the Platoon of B Company in FLEECEALL POST.

The evening and night was very quiet; there was no enemy activity whatever.

Two Other Ranks to Field Ambulance sick.

20th November. Z day. At 2 a.m. the Battalion was disposed as follows:—

HeadquartersKEN LANE.
D CompanyCAT POST SECTOR.
B CompanyHeadquarters and one Platoon, FLEECEALL POST; one Platoon, GRAFTON POST;one Platoon, ISLAND TRAVERSE.
A and C Companies70 Other Ranks detached as carrying parties; remainder at KEN LANE, with one Platoonorganised to occupy DOLEFUL POST if required.
Aid PostDUNCAN POST.
ZERO hour was at 6 20 a.m.

The duty allotted to us was permanently to hold the Brigade front and on no account to move forward in support of the assaulting Battalions.

The attack on GILLEMONT was at first successful, but by 1 p.m. all our troops were driven back to our original front line. The attack on the KNOLL was unsuccessful owing to the wire not having been cut.

Our garrison in the original line stood fast all through.

The enemy heavily shelled our front and support lines, especially DUNCAN POST, throughout the day and succeeding night.

Our casualties were:—One Other Rank killed, eight Other Ranks wounded, three Other Ranks missing.

At 8 p.m. the posts at FLEECEALL, GRAFTON, and ISLAND TRAVERSE were relieved by the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment and 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, and on relief proceeded to DUNCAN POST. At midnight the entire Company (B) was organised into a wiring party, and commenced wiring in front of the GILLEMONT sector.

The carrying parties attached to the Trench Mortars and Machine Guns were returned to A Company at KEN LANE by 10 p.m., except one party of 20 Other Ranks which did not arrive till the 22nd. At 10 p.m. A and C Companies commenced to relieve the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment in the GILLEMONT sector.

Two Other Ranks to Field Ambulance sick.

21st November. At 1 p.m. the relief of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment was completed. The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment proceeded to KEN LANE and SART FARM. The day was quiet; the work of clearing the trenches and reorganising was continued. At 2 p.m. one Platoon B Company relieved a Company of the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment in DOLEFUL POST.

22nd November. The day was abnormally quiet. Three daylight patrols were sent out to discover any signs of an enemy retirement. Enemy front line was found to be held in force. At 8 p.m. the Battalion was relieved by the 1/7th King’s Liverpool Regiment, and on relief proceeded to VAUCELLETTE Camp X 13 c, and came under command of the B.G.C. 166th Infantry Brigade. C Company did not go to VAUCELLETTE, but proceeded to billets in ST. EMILIE.

The Battalion was present in billets at VAUCELLETTE Camp by 11 p.m.

Three Other Ranks to Field Ambulance sick.

The next few days were spent in repairing billets and replacing equipment lost in the recent battle, and on the 28th we marched back to billets at VILLERS FAUCON; Major Crump left the Battalion to take over command of the 1/10th King’s Liverpool Regiment.

On the 29th, after a Warning Order, which was afterwards cancelled, we marched to VAUCELLETTE Camp, just behind the ruins of a farm of that name. Apparently the Divisional Commander had noticed, while making a tour of the forward area on the 28th, that the enemy was reconnoitring with low-flying aircraft as well as registering targets with his artillery, and knowing that movement behind the enemy’s lines was above normal, he suspected an attack on our front, hence our move.

In order to make clear the events that followed, which were by no means clear to us at the time, it is necessary to quote in extenso from the “History of the 55th Division”:—

“The Division was at this time holding a front of 13,000 yards, supported only by two Brigades of Field artillery!

“This wide frontage could not of course be continuously held; it consisted of Platoon posts, connected by travel trenches, and distributed in depth so far as circumstances allowed. But with such a wide front an effective distribution in depth was impossible with the troops available. On the morning of the attack, the portion of the line extending from BANTEAUX RAVINE to WOOD ROAD was held by the 1/5th South Lancashires. South of them in the HONNECOURT sector were the 1/5th North Lancashire Regiment, and in the OSSUS sector the 1/10th King’s Liverpool Regiment. The 1/5th King’s Own were in support. The 165th Infantry Brigade on the right was disposed as follows:—1/6th King’s Liverpool Regiment from OSSUS WOOD to HEYTHROP POST; 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment from GRAFTON POST to EGO POST; and 1/7th King’s Liverpool Regiment southwards from this point to CAT POST and NEW POST. The 1/9th King’s Liverpool Regiment were in support. The 164th Infantry Brigade were in Divisional reserve.

Map No. 5

The
VAUCELLETTE FARM AREA
Nov. 30th, 1917

“At seven o’clock on the morning of the 30th, in thick fog, a very heavy bombardment broke out upon the whole Divisional front, and all tracks and roads were heavily shelled. Almost simultaneously a message was received at the Headquarters of the 166th Brigade in EPEHY, from the 35th Brigade, which was on our immediate left, stating that the 1/5th South Lancashires were being heavily trench-mortared and that the S.O.S. had gone up. Communication with this Battalion was at once attempted, but without result, and save for a visual signal message received at 7 43 a.m. stating, ‘We know nothing yet, O.K.,’ nothing further was heard from the 1/5th SOUTH LANCASHIRES, nor did a man of that Battalion return.

“It was presently, however, to be made clear that the enemy had broken through somewhere on the left of the 1/5th South Lancashires, and was pushing forward in large numbers and with great rapidity on VILLERS GUISLAIN. Between 7 38 a.m. and 7 45 a.m., Germans in considerable force were seen on VILLERS RIDGE, and a few moments later large numbers of British troops, not of our Division, were seen to be falling back from the direction of GONNELIEU ... just north-west of VILLERS GUISLAIN. Very shortly after eight o’clock enemy machine guns were firing on our batteries from the high ground south of GAUCHE WOOD, and enemy aeroplanes, flying as low as 100 feet, were subjecting VILLERS GUISLAIN and the ground in its vicinity to heavy machine gun fire.

“At 8 15 a.m. the enemy were seen to be advancing in strong force southwards from the north of the cemetery—i.e., on the western side of VILLERS GUISLAIN. The position of the village was precarious.

“Meantime, as late as 7 57 a.m., the 1/5th North Lancashire Regiment had reported: ‘No Infantry action,’ but at 8 15 a.m. a message was received from the Liverpool Scottish on their right, stating that the enemy was advancing from his trenches at OSSUS 2. A quarter of an hour later an indistinct message from the 1/5th North Lancashire Regiment was received at the Headquarters of the 166th Brigade, to the effect that the enemy was through on the left—the line was then cut.

“By 8 20 a.m. the enemy were reported to have penetrated our lines at HOLT’S BANK, and a few moments after large bodies of the enemy were seen in PIGEON QUARRY—north of the Liverpool Scottish and between them and the 1/5th North Lancashire Regiment. Almost simultaneously the enemy were reported to be coming over in extended order and in large numbers, wave after wave, to EAGLE QUARRY, on the 165th Brigade front, and also to be advancing on FLEECEALL POST on the south. By 9 15 a.m. the enemy had penetrated the Divisional front from the BIRDCAGE northwards for about 800 yards, and were even reported to have been seen in GLOUCESTER ROAD. VILLERS GUISLAIN, turned from the north and eventually surrounded, was reported at 9 30 a.m. to be in enemy hands, and a little over half an hour later the enemy had succeeded in progressing to within a few hundred yards of VAUCELLETTE FARM. He got no further, for there he met the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires.”

All Press accounts are strangely silent about the work the Battalion did at VAUCELLETTE FARM on the 30th November, 1917.

The scene of the action was the col or ridge at the head of the valley which runs along the northern edge of VILLERS GUISLAIN and up towards the south-east (see map); this ridge commanded the railway for a considerable distance, and by holding on to it we were able to keep the Hun off CHAPEL HILL; had he occupied this feature and mounted machine guns there, most of the area of open grass land between HEUDECOURT and PEIZIERE would have been under direct fire, with obvious consequences, whereas its retention by us kept this covered, and also covered the flank of the Guards when they counter-attacked and drove the Boche back out of GOUZEAUCOURT.

The front had been very quiet and the possibility of trouble seemed to most of us very remote, but all precautions were taken, and before we turned in on the night of the 29th, Colonel Hindle’s orders as to the issue of bombs, extra bandoliers, haversack rations, and filling of water-bottles were carried out to the letter. At the same time Company boxes, gramophones, etc., were with us, and we spent a cheery evening, with little thought for the morrow.

At dawn the next day heavy firing was heard to the north, but at first we put this down to the aftermath of the CAMBRAI push and paid little attention to it; by degrees it increased in violence, and the Commanding Officer gave the order to stand-to, but carry on with breakfasts, which were just ready—this was at 7 50 a.m. Soon after he sent Lieutenant Fazackerley (Intelligence Officer) forward to find out what was going on, and Lieutenant Johnson to 166th Brigade for orders, our own Brigade Headquarters and three Battalions being still back at HAMEL resting.

About 8 30 a.m. information was brought by Lieutenant Fazackerley that the enemy was advancing all along our immediate front, and the Commanding Officer at once sent for Company Commanders at the double; one of us, who knew him well, afterwards said it was the first time the Commanding Officer had ever been in a hurry. In a few words he made his dispositions: A Company to hold the left under Captain Houghton; B Company, under Captain Buckmaster, the centre in front of the farm; and D Company, under Captain Matthew, to the right at the head of the LINNET VALLEY. By this time straggling remnants of the Division on our left were to be seen crossing the railway; a few were collected and taken forward by A Company.

The Companies standing in readiness were at once led forward by their Commanders, and took up positions as shown on the map, gaining the crest at the moment when a party of Huns was in the act of crossing the railway just south of CHAPEL CROSSING; A Company caught them before they reached dead ground and wiped them out, while a Lewis gun mounted on the railway and a Platoon beyond it secured the approach up the valley. It is difficult to estimate the number of Huns shot down by this Company alone in the first five minutes—the countryside was alive with them, advancing in small patrols with light machine guns.

The enemy had also stationed heavy machine guns in various buildings, especially a Beet Factory to our front, and during the whole action our troops were subjected to continuous and accurate traversing fire from these, and to a certain amount of shelling.

From this point our War Diary will speak for itself:—

30th November, 7 40 a.m. “Stand-to” order received from 166th Infantry Brigade. Intelligence Officer and scouts sent forward to reconnoitre.

9 a.m. Our infantry and artillery observed retiring on our left in the direction of HEUDECOURT. Artillery reported they had abandoned guns in VILLERS GUISLAIN. Battalion Headquarters, under R.S.M., sent forward to form line on north-east side of VAUCELLETTE FARM, where they immediately came under machine gun fire from the enemy advancing from VILLERS GUISLAIN.

A Company were ordered up on their left, and had to fight hard to reach their position; the enemy had already seized Chapel Crossing. All the Officers of this Company eventually became casualties.

B and D Companies were ordered to continue the line on the right of Headquarters on the east side of VAUCELLETTE FARM. All Companies were quickly in position; fire was opened, and the enemy ceased to advance and took up a position on a line running from the BEET FACTORY to CHAPEL CROSSING. At the time there were no troops in position on our right or left flanks. This state of things prevailed until dusk, when the Canadian Mounted Brigade arrived.

11 a.m. Orders were received from the 166th Infantry Brigade to clear enemy from VILLERS GUISLAIN. Battalion ordered to advance in extended order to clear enemy from VILLERS HILL. This they proceeded to do, led by Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle, D.S.O.

The men were firing from the hip as they advanced, and the foremost line of the enemy began to retire. The advance was successful until the centre of the line reached a point about 200 yards from the crest of the hill, when ammunition ran short. At this time fresh enemy troops advanced over the hill in considerable strength.

The Colonel was killed, and all three Company Commanders became casualties. The Adjutant took command of the Battalion and ordered a withdrawal to VAUCELLETTE FARM. This was carried out slowly, under covering fire from the left flank.

A defensive line was established on the east side of VAUCELLETTE FARM, and the men commenced to dig themselves in with their entrenching tools, under cover of Lewis gun fire. A supply of ammunition was brought up by stretcher-bearers returning from the Aid Post.

11 30 a.m. At this time Major Crump, who was reconnoitring under orders from the G.O.C. (166th Infantry Brigade) established a post on the EPEHY—VILLERS—GUISLAIN ROAD, consisting of one Vickers gun and team, one Officer and 30 Other Ranks of various units. The gun in this post did great execution amongst the enemy in LEITH WALK, and effectually prevented him from advancing further.

12 15 p.m. A composite Battalion of the 12th Division arrived as reinforcements, one Company being sent to strengthen our garrison in front of the farm, two Companies continued our line northwards, and one Company was kept in the camp as local reserve. Touch was obtained on the left with the 9th Essex Regiment.

12 55 p.m. Major Crump having completed reconnaissance and reported to 166th Infantry Brigade, was ordered by the G.O.C. to assume command of the Battalion and to take with him two Vickers guns and teams and supply of ammunition for LONE TREE POST (EPEHY—VILLERS—GUISLAIN ROAD). One gun was sent to right flank of the post to command the LINNET VALLEY, the other to VAUCELLETTE FARM. Soon afterwards touch was obtained with 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment on our right.

1 30 p.m. C Company arrived as reinforcements and were sent into the trench south of the farm, in front of the railway. After this the consolidation of the line was carried on by the men with the entrenching tool, only a few picks and shovels being available. This was eventually remedied by the arrival of the Battalion mobile reserve of S.A.A. and tools, so that, with the help of the composite Battalion (12th Division), a fire trench was dug across the whole front of the farm, and a considerable amount of wire put out soon after dark.

5 p.m. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade, under Brigadier-General Seeley, arrived at rear line of VAUCELLETTE Camp. One regiment dismounted and reinforced our line. One Regiment dug a support line west of the farm. C Company were relieved at 11 p.m. by the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, and went into the line east of the farm to assist in the consolidation of the position.

Our casualties were:—Killed: Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle, D.S.O.; Second Lieutenant J. H. Livesey.
Wounded and Missing (afterwards reported killed): Captain R. N. L. Buckmaster.
Wounded: Captain A. T. Houghton, M.C.; Captain F. K. Matthew, Second Lieutenant E. M. Easterby, Second Lieutenant R. B. Wilkinson, Second Lieutenant P. Adamson, Second Lieutenant F. G. Green, Second Lieutenant J. E. P. Nicholson.
Other Ranks: Killed 11, Wounded 84, Missing 15.

Writing to express his sympathy with Alderman R. Hindle, Chorley, on the loss of his son, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle, D.S.O., Major-General H. S. Jeudwine said:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Hindle’s death was a great blow to all of us. To his Battalion it seemed irreparable. His never-failing keenness, his courage and determination, were of inestimable value, and had made his Battalion one of the finest, if not the finest, in the Division. His cheerfulness and modesty endeared him to everybody. His Battalion did splendid work under his leadership in the attack in front of Ypres. There he came safely through great dangers, though he never spared himself.

“The last action was quite unforeseen,” the letter continues. “When the German attack appeared probable it fell to him and his Battalion to occupy a position of great importance. I saw him on the day preceding the attack and gave him orders which he carried out most loyally, as I had the utmost confidence he would. He was killed almost instantaneously at the head of his men, where he always was when there was danger.... It will, I am sure, be some consolation to you to know that the fine fight he made with his Battalion was the means of definitely checking the German advance in that part of the field, and of preventing their reaching a position which would have endangered large forces.”

VAUCELLETTE CAMP.

1st December. At 1 a.m. the Battalion was relieved by the composite Battalion of the 12th Division, and on relief went into Brigade reserve at the railway dugouts (W 23 b) 57 c S E. The day was spent in reorganising the Battalion. At 11 p.m. the Battalion was relieved by the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and proceeded by route march to billets at HAMEL, arriving at 3 a.m.

Second Lieutenant J. Johnson wounded. One Other Rank to Field Ambulance sick.

Extract from a letter received by the G.O.C. 164th Infantry Brigade from the G.O.C. 55th Division:—“I saw the Corps Commander to-day, and he said that they (i.e., the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) had saved the situation. He had seen the Commander-in-Chief, and he had agreed.”

CHAPTER IX.
THE GIVENCHY PERIOD, 7th DECEMBER, 1917, to 3rd SEPTEMBER, 1918.

On the 6th December, 1917, the remnant of the Battalion marched back from TINCOURT to Canvas Camp, FLANICOURT, arriving there at 12 30 p.m.

The next day we spent in putting up more tents and cleaning up. Captain Duggan, M.C., and Captain Hore, M.C., rejoined us from England and 22 Other Ranks from the reinforcement camp.

On the 8th we entrained at 10 a.m. and were taken to MAROEUIL, and marched in pouring rain to billets at LATTRE ST. QUENTIN, arriving there at 2 30 a.m., where we rested all the following day.

On the 10th we marched to TINCQUES, and the following day to BRYAS.

On the 11th we marched to HENCHIN, and the following day to DELETTE, where 11 Other Ranks reported as reinforcements. Here we entered on a long course of training.

On the 22nd news came that Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Crump had been mentioned in despatches.

On Christmas Day, after Church Parade, we had a splendid Battalion Dinner in the local hall and a concert in the evening.

Snow fell on the 26th and interfered with training.

Our total casualties for the year 1917 are recorded in the War Diary as follows:—

KilledWoundedMissingWounded &
Missing		GassedDied of
Wounds		Sick to
F.A.
Officers1431220119
Other Ranks1376271590111 520
Totals1516581612112539

JANUARY, 1918.

On New Year’s Day we found ourselves still at DELETTE, where we had an excellent dinner. Congratulations were received from the King, the Commander-in-Chief, the Army Commander, and the Divisional Commander. The following days were spent in Company training and bathing. There was a snowstorm on the 8th. There were good ranges here, and one of the Companies was on the range every day.

W.O.s and N.C.O.s, DELETTES, 1918.

On the 14th the New Year’s Honours List came out. The Military Cross for Captain Matthew; Captain Buckmaster, Corporal J. Collier, Lance-Corporal J. Baker, and Private J. Maher being mentioned in despatches. Second Lieutenant Ramsbottom joined us as a reinforcement.

On the 19th the Brigade was inspected at COYAQUE by the Army Commander, General Horne, who took the opportunity of welcoming the Brigade to his Army. The following Officers joined for duty:—Captain T. D. Collett, Second Lieutenants H. A. Latham, J. Dawson, W. Hughes, N. Smith, and T. Stanley.

On the 20th the award of a Bar to the Military Cross to Captain Pruden and the Military Cross itself to Second Lieutenant H. Fazackerley were announced.

There were regular lectures during the period on a variety of subjects, and many keen football matches were played.

On the 25th another batch of Officers—Lieutenant G. B. Wardle and Second Lieutenants O. R. Cooper, R. Hodgson, G. H. Frost, E. H. Studdard, and L. O. Halliwell—joined us, followed, on the 30th, by a draft from the 1/5th North Lancashires, consisting of:—Captains R. W. B. Sparkes, M.C., and B. J. Phillips, Second Lieutenants J. S. Hampson, T. H. Scott, W. E. Pasley, J. H. Friar, F. Greaves, A. James, T. McLachlan, M.C., J. T. Taylor, and 163 Other Ranks.

On the 31st the total strength of the Battalion was 56 Officers (including the Medical Officer and the Padre) and 942 Other Ranks, there being actually 43 Officers and 631 Other Ranks serving with the Battalion.

Two more Officers, Second Lieutenants Beresford and Horsfall, and two Other Ranks arrived on the 2nd February, and Second Lieutenants Symes and G. Haworth came on the 3rd, Second Lieutenant R. Smith on the 4th, and Second Lieutenants G. Kirkby and H. Bailey on the 6th.

We had never been so strong in numbers since the battle of FESTUBERT, and the rest and daily training had improved our morale, so that when we moved away from DELETTE on the 7th February we presented a very different spectacle to the handful of survivors who had mustered after the VAUCELLETTE FARM affair at the end of November, 1917.

Esprit-de-corps is a wonderful thing, and has been noticed by many people during the war. Officers and men rejoining their Companies after perhaps two years’ absence would find awaiting them the same Company they had left, although perhaps no Officer and only half-a-dozen men remained of it, and though on this date the Commanding Officer was the only Officer still present who had left England with the Battalion, and there were probably not more than 20 of the originals with him, yet in some indefinable way the Battalion was the same one. Not perhaps so thoroughly grounded in some ways as it originally had been, but with all the cumulative experience of three years of war governing its every move.

On the 7th February, escorted by the Divisional Band (which was generally considered an ominous sign), we marched to ESTREE-BLANCHE, and arrived there very wet about 12 noon. Six men were sent to Field Ambulance sick.

The following day we marched on to CANTRAINNE, arriving there at 3 p.m., again very wet, and on the 9th on to FONGUIERES, where all were present and billeted by 1 p.m.

Sunday was devoted to Church Parade and cleaning up, the strength of the Battalion being recorded as 51 Officers and 708 Other Ranks. Second Lieutenant P. Adamson, M.C., rejoined us here.

The next three days were spent in training and preparations for the trenches and reconnaissance of the forward area, in this case the LA BASSEE CANAL sector.

On the 14th we relieved the 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers by daylight. Companies marching via BETHUNE and the canal bank. Relief was completed by 4 30 p.m.

Here we found civilians living in the “village line,” and small shops! Our dispositions were on a different principle to those which obtained at YPRES, all Companies being in the front line, in the order, from right to left—C, B, A, and D, each Company being disposed in depth. C Company was on the south of the canal, the remainder on the north. Battalion Headquarters was at KINGSCLEARE.

Here we took up again the old trench routine, nightly patrols, working on the trenches, and so forth.

The position itself was a curious one. GIVENCHY, the scene of so much desperate fighting in 1914, was a village completely destroyed, some few remnants of walls and a mass of bricks, the remains of a large church, being all that remained of a fair-sized village; it lay on the western slopes of a small knoll, which formed the southern and western extremity of the FROMELLES—AUBERS ridge. The opposing trenches had been dug in 1914, so that the actual crest of the knoll was in No Man’s Land, and the opposing trench lines were out of sight of one another.

In the intervening years of warfare, GIVENCHY had been one of the most active mining centres on the British front, with the result that by the time the 55th Division took over, the front line on the crest of the knoll consisted of a continuous line of craters 800 yards long.

Both sides occupied the high tops of the craters, but the view was practically limited by the top of the crater opposite. The position was one of great importance—if the Germans gained possession of the whole of GIVENCHY HILL they would command the whole of LA BASSEE CANAL from where it passed through our lines to BETHUNE, as well as a large area in close proximity to what remained to France of its great northern coalfield.

The country to the north of the spur was dead flat for miles, and the roads were all overlooked from the crest of the hill. Every effort had been made to strengthen the position by the construction of a series of tunnels for shelter during bombardments, but the exits from these were not of the best. A certain amount of cementing had also been done. By April 9th the GIVENCHY—FESTUBERT area was a mass of apron fencing stretching back in depth for several thousand yards.

Map No. 6

GIVENCHY AREA
April, 1918

The dangers of this tunnel system and the difficulties of negotiating the mass of wire in this area necessitated careful practice in the action of the troops holding it. Posts were manned daily from the tunnel system, this action being timed and every Officer, N.C.O., and man thus learnt his way about the whole system of defence.

The action of the Battalion in support was definitely laid down. No counter-attack across the open was to be made on account of the number of apron fences; in the event of the enemy penetrating at any point into the line, further penetration was to be stopped by the supports, and when the enemy was pocketed he was to be cut off by movement along the trench system against his flanks and rear. All posts and strong points were wired in all round, and had orders to fight to the last even if surrounded. All this careful preparation bore fruit later, on April 9th, which was, as a battle, a most remarkable example of the value of taking the British soldier into your confidence and making him understand why he was ordered to do something.

On the 15th, seven Other Ranks joined us as reinforcements.

On the 17th, at 3 15 a.m., a silent raiding party of enemy rushed the crater post of D Company, under cover of smoke bombs. The enemy were quickly ejected, and left two dead in our lines. Our casualties were:—Second Lieutenant Westwood and two Other Ranks wounded, three Other Ranks missing.

The next day we hit back, sending a patrol into the enemy’s front line, who searched it for 200 yards without finding anybody. The attempt was repeated on the following day, and an enemy wiring party was rushed.

On the 20th the 1/4th King’s Own relieved us by daylight, and we moved into support, Headquarters and A, B, and C Companies being in the village line and D Company in LE PREOL. The following days were quiet, and we were busy repairing the defences. Seven men went sick.

On the 25th we relieved the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in the right sector, by daylight, the dispositions being similar but Companies from right to left being—D, B, C, and A. Our patrols found enemy machine gun fire very active. Second Lieutenant W. H. F. Smith went to Field Ambulance sick.

The following day was quiet, and at night our patrols were very active trying to get into the enemy’s lines to secure a prisoner. Ultimately the enemy got so “windy” that they sent up their S.O.S., and their barrage came down on our support lines. After 40 minutes’ retaliation by our guns everything became normal. Second Lieutenant James-Alfred was wounded. Thirty-two Other Ranks reinforcements joined us.

The next day was quiet, but the night was lively, four patrols being in No Man’s Land searching for enemy all night. From enemy machine gun fire we had the misfortune to lose Second Lieutenant Adamson, M.C., who was killed. Second Lieutenant Hulme was sent to Field Ambulance sick.

On the 28th there was the usual amount of artillery activity during the day. At 7 30 p.m. a raiding party, consisting of Second Lieutenants Taylor and Cooper and 28 Other Ranks, raided an enemy machine gun post but found it empty, and could not penetrate further owing to machine gun fire.

On March 21st the long-expected attack against the Allied front commenced. The 5th Army, on the right of the 3rd Army, were driven back, and the enemy almost reached AMIENS. In order to fill the hole thus made, the 1st and 2nd Armies were denuded of reserves, and as a direct result of this the 164th Brigade, which was in Divisional reserve, was constantly being rushed up to points of concentration at night in case the Boche attacked, and all ranks learnt thoroughly to dislike the code word “Bustle.” On about April 1st, at the Corps Headquarters, it was decided that the Division must risk all on the line GIVENCHY—FESTUBERT, supporting Battalions of Brigades being close up behind their battle line. The establishment of the main line of defence on the line of FESTUBERT VILLAGE made the position of GIVENCHY difficult, as the line of defence of the right Brigade holding the position was 800 yards in front of the left Brigade.

THE BATTLE OF GIVENCHY.

At about 7 a.m. on the 9th April, in thick fog which made observation impossible, the enemy appears to have attacked the left brigade of the 2nd Portuguese Division in strength and to have broken into their trenches.

Shortly after 7 a.m. an attack had developed on the right Brigade of the 40th Division, and soon afterwards the attack opened on our front. Map No. 7 is a copy of the German map which was captured by us in the course of the battle, from which the German plan can be clearly gathered.

The 164th Infantry Brigade was holding GIVENCHY, with the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment on the right and the 1/4th North Lancashire Regiment on the left, 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in support with three Companies in the Village line (a continuation of the FESTUBERT line) and one Company and Headquarters at GORRE, some distance back. On the left of the 164th Infantry Brigade, the 165th Infantry Brigade held the Village line (FESTUBERT) in strength; north of the 55th Division were the Portuguese; the 166th Infantry Brigade was in Divisional reserve; south of the canal the 1st Division held the line. The 164th Infantry Brigade and the 165th Infantry Brigade were covered by the 276th and the 275th Artillery Brigades, or rather groups.

The amount of artillery available was not great for the frontage to be covered. At 4 15 a.m. the enemy opened a heavy bombardment, reaching as far back as GORRE; this was largely a gas bombardment, but all reports showed that no mustard gas was being used, which was suspicious, as previous experiences further south had shown that, when the enemy really intended to attack, he did not use mustard gas for fear of getting into it himself.

At this time the front line Companies reported by wire that the situation was normal, but that all ranks were standing to. The morning was extremely foggy, the limit of vision being about 30 yards at the best. About 5 a.m. the code word “Bustle” was received from Brigade, and at 6 a.m. a very heavy bombardment of our front line system commenced—some of the heaviest shelling ever experienced by the Battalion.

Map No. 7—Facsimile of German Map, showing Plan of Attack, Captured April 9th, 1918

The enemy’s procedure so far had been exactly the same as that used against the 5th Army on March 21st. The shelling of the front line system increased in intensity, many trench mortars being in action.

At 8 45 a.m. the front line Companies reported that the enemy was advancing, and the S.O.S. went up from the Companies and Battalion Headquarters (SOUTHMOOR VILLA), though doubts were freely expressed as to the rockets being seen on account of the thick fog, which was accentuated by the smoke and dust of the bombardment; they were seen, however, and the artillery and machine gun barrages opened promptly. From this time onwards till midnight savage fighting went on in the front line system.

The German Divisional orders, captured during the course of the day, showed that the 4th Ersatz Division, which had been made up to strength and re-equipped, had been brought into the line for the purpose of making this attack. This Division had been specially selected for this attack, as it had for many months held the GIVENCHY—FESTUBERT front and was supposed to know the ground well. It was strengthened with storm-troops and heavy machine guns. The general plan was to attack the GIVENCHY salient on the flanks, striking towards WINDY CORNER on the north, and forwards and through SPOIL BANK to PONT FIXE on the south; each of these attacks was to be carried out by one Regiment of three Battalions, strengthened with storm-troops and heavy machine guns.

On reaching the objectives WINDY CORNER and PONT FIXE, these two attacks were to join hands, and thus cut off the main GIVENCHY position.

No direct frontal attack was to be made across the craters, but machine guns were to be mounted on the commanding crests which were to engage the garrison while the encircling attacks were in progress.

One Battalion of the northern attack had orders on gaining the position WINDY CORNER-LE PLANTIN SOUTH to turn north along the FESTUBERT VILLAGE line and clean up in co-operation with an attack by one Battalion of the Reserve Regiment.

As soon as these actions had been successful, a general advance was to be made on GORRE.

The attacking Boche had been carefully instructed that “the 55th Division is a tired Division, only fit to hold a quiet section of the line.” Before nightfall he found out his mistake. Owing to the thick fog and the amount of wire, the fighting from the commencement of the Boche attack until the afternoon consisted of isolated fights carried on all over the area by small parties of Officers and men, but all acting on a preconceived plan.

The garrisons of the strong points located the enemy by means of patrols, so that when the fog lifted at about 11 a.m. they instantly opened heavy fire with rifles and machine guns.

The enemy succeeded in getting into one half of the concrete pill box in CAVAN LANE, but the crew fought him through the gas curtain while the machine gun continued its fire northwards with excellent results, until a counter-attack, led by Captain Lonsdale, M.C., from BUNNY HUTCH tunnel entrance, freed the crew.

The enemy actually entered our lines at several places, notably GIVENCHY KEEP, PICCADILLY TRENCH, WARE ROAD, MOAT FARM, BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, HITCHEN ROAD, and WINDY CORNER, but he was very quickly driven out, except at GIVENCHY KEEP, BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, and WINDY CORNER; the situation at these three points was not really satisfactory until after mid-day.

The enemy’s northern attack failed to take any strong points covering the north flank of the GIVENCHY salient; it did succeed in taking LE PLANTIN SOUTH and in penetrating into WINDY CORNER, but was then held up by the garrison and Battalion Headquarters details in HERTS REDOUBT and SOUTHMOOR VILLA.

The enemy looted the Divisional Canteen and established his Battalion Headquarters there, thus being immediately in rear of the Battalion sector. A counter-attack by the 165th Infantry Brigade re-took LE PLANTIN SOUTH, and a local counter-attack organised by Battalion Headquarters, restored the situation at WINDY CORNER, but not before the enemy had captured our Aid Post and some 50 prisoners, including the Padre, and had sent small patrols forward toward LONE FARM, who, however, were destroyed by our advanced 18-pounders, which blew them to pieces at close range, bits of Boche being scattered on the trees and hedges in the vicinity.

Ultimately the German Battalion Commander and 120 Boches were captured in HITCHEN ROAD. These men were all found to be loaded with the contents of our Divisional Canteen; needless to say, they were quickly relieved of their loot.

The Boche continued to press his troops forward into the angle between GIVENCHY HILL and the LE PLANTIN—FESTUBERT LINE, suffering very severe losses from our heavy and continuous fire on his flanks; in many instances his own machine guns, manned by our Lewis gunners, were turned against him with excellent results. He could get no further and was completely disorganised by the fog and wire, and the situation on this flank became stabilised for the moment. The 1/4th King’s Own, who were holding the right sector of the Brigade front, had suffered very heavy losses from the preliminary bombardment, owing to the lack of shell-proof cover, the trench system having been practically destroyed.

The enemy, advancing over the flat between the southern crater and the canal, overran the main line of defence, but failed to take the most advanced sap, “Death or Glory,” situated on the bank of the canal. The garrison of this sap, consisting of one Platoon, about 18 strong (of the 1/4th King’s Own), maintained a heavy enfilade fire on the advancing enemy, causing him very heavy casualties. Though cut off for five hours, this garrison most gallantly held its position, and later in the day sallying forth, captured a machine gun and crew.

Despite the losses incurred from “Death or Glory” sap, the Boche pushed on and captured ORCHARD KEEP, the garrison of which had been destroyed by shell fire, and penetrated into GUNNERS’ SIDING, at its junction with the main communication trench, ORCHARD ROAD. He, however, failed to take either MARIE KEEP to the north or SPOIL BANK KEEP to the south. His further progress beyond GUNNERS’ SIDING was checked by supports pushed up by the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers. His endeavours to push north of GUNNERS’ SIDING were checked by the few men of the garrison and the anti-tank 18-pounder gun in the trench. This gun, though damaged by shell fire to such an extent that the breach had to be opened with a pick, fired no fewer than 150 rounds at a range of 200 yards at the enemy. Time after time the enemy tried to rush it across the open or along the trench, but were beaten off by the infantry covering the gun.

At about 10 45 a.m. the situation had stabilised on the front of our Brigade, and was as follows:—

A large number of the enemy were in the low ground in the angle between the north face of the GIVENCHY salient and the LE PLANTIN SOUTH-FESTUBERT line. Another large force were on the flat plateau between MARIE KEEP, GUNNERS’ SIDING, SPOIL BANK KEEP, and DEATH AND GLORY SAP. In other words, the enemy were divided into two, and contained in two deep pockets. At 11 a.m. the fog cleared, and there was a very marked increase in the rifle and machine gun fire, as all along the front small parties of troops, acting on their own initiative, began at once to attack the nearest Boche in flank and rear, forcing him to maintain his position in the pockets.

Orders were then issued to push every available man up to close the mouths of the two pockets. The forces available were divided into two parties, the northern of which was to seize GRENADIER ROAD, thereby closing the mouth of the northern pocket and cutting off all the enemy in it.

This force acted with great vigour, and not only gained GRENADIER ROAD, but also re-took the commanding saps on the northern craters, giving valuable observation over the flat ground to the north and the approaches to the Portuguese front.

The southern force (“King’s Own” and Lancashire Fusiliers) was ordered to move up CHEYNE WALK, regain the front line, and then move northwards, closing the mouth of the southern pocket.

This force succeeded in freeing DEATH AND GLORY SAP and regaining the main line of defence, but could not regain its crater posts owing to the complete destruction of the trenches leading to them.

These movements commenced at 11 30 a.m., and were covered by a concentrated barrage fire by our artillery on CANAL RESERVE, in which the enemy were believed to have their reserves massed. During the progress of the operations no enemy supports came up, and direct evidence is now available that this was due to the artillery barrage.

It will be remembered that early in the morning about 50 Officers and men were captured by the enemy round the First Aid Post at WINDY CORNER, among them being the Rev. L. N. Forse, Chaplain to the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. This Officer was many weeks in Germany, and on his return to the Brigade on release stated that he and ten other prisoners were taken off by the Boche to one of the trenches north of the craters. The ground in this area was covered with enemy dead, and our rifle and machine gun fire was very heavy. Later the party were moved southwards behind the craters, making for CANAL RESERVE trench. At about 11 30 a.m. the party were thirty yards or so from the trench, which was packed with about 500 enemy massed three deep. Our barrage opened and fell right in the trench, doing tremendous execution, unfortunately knocking out 23 of the Chaplain’s party. After half an hour the barrage ceased, and the remnants of the party made for the trench, but found it quite impossible to move along it owing to the Boche dead in it. The massed enemy reserves appeared to have been completely destroyed by our artillery fire.

The mouths of the pockets being closed and the enemy surrounded, it was only a matter of time before he was forced to surrender in groups.

There were many acts of bravery on the part of individual Officers and men, and many honours were won.

The outstanding features of the action were: (a) absolute preparedness for action, (b) the sending out of scouts to locate the enemy, (c) the prompt initiative shown by all ranks, which was responsible for the breaking up of the enemy’s attack and his complete defeat.

By 3 45 p.m. we had regained the whole of our defensive system, with the exception of the saps on the southern craters. As soon as darkness came on, an attack was organised by the Royal Lancaster Regiment to recover the crater saps in their area. This was very successful, a large number of prisoners being taken.

At 2 45 a.m. on April 10th, the Brigadier was able to inform the Division that the Brigade held its line intact, including the forward saps, as it had been held on April 8th.

During the afternoon of April 9th two Companies of the South Lancashire Regiment came up, one being allotted to each Battalion in the line. The Company allotted to the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment was posted in GRENADIER ROAD, with one Platoon at LE PLANTIN SOUTH, and they did yeoman service in relieving our tired men.

Throughout April 9th the action of our artillery had been admirable. Two 18-pounder batteries of the 11th Division which could fire on our front were handed over to the Brigade, and two heavy batteries belonging to the Corps placed themselves under the orders of the Brigade.

As soon as darkness permitted, all guns north of the canal were withdrawn south of the canal, and the guns came out of their emplacements and took up positions in the open.

The 165th Infantry Brigade had maintained its main line intact, but had given up its advanced posts. No touch could be obtained with the Portuguese on the left, and early in the morning of April 10th the enemy were pushing through clear of and north of the 165th Infantry Brigade.

The 165th threw back its left flank at right angles, the defensive flank being continued by all units of the Division.

After 4 p.m. the rest of the day was spent in reorganising the posts and mopping up the few remaining enemy left in the sector. Our communication trenches were continuously shelled. At about 4 p.m. B Company, 1/5th South Lancashires, came up as reinforcements and manned our left flank from NEW CUT to WINDY CORNER.

Our casualties were:—

OFFICERS—Killed: Second Lieutenant L. Brooke, M.C.
Wounded: Second Lieutenant R. E. Horsfall, G. C. Horner, C. Haworth, and P. B. Beresford.
Missing: Chaplain L. N. Forse (prisoner of war) and Lieutenant W. H. Jenkins, Medical Officer.
OTHER RANKS—Killed 43, Wounded 100, Missing 50.

No further attacks were made on our front.

On the 10th, although enemy guns and aeroplanes were very active, an attempt was made to clear out the trenches and bury the dead.

Captain A. A. Turner, R.A.M.C., reported for duty as Medical Officer.

Captain Collett was wounded on the 11th by enemy shelling, which was heavy, especially on Headquarters in the afternoon and a barrage on our lines at 6 p.m.

Second Lieutenant Vincent, M.C., was wounded by artillery fire on the 12th.

During the 10th and subsequent days, the artillery with the 164th Infantry Brigade played a big role in breaking up many enemy concentrations against the thrown-back flank. The enemy was unable to move his men forward without coming under the observation, and very often the close fire of, our northern posts and flanks.

Thus ended a highly-successful action, in which the Battalion played an important part. Had the day gone against the Division, the Allies might have had to abandon the Pas de Calais. A glance at the map will show the seriousness of such a step.

The Brigade continued, despite heavy artillery bombardment, to hold the line until the Division was relieved by the 1st Division.

During the action of the 9th of April, and the night of the 9th and 10th, the following casualties were incurred by the Brigade:—Killed, wounded, and missing: 35 Officers, 659 Other Ranks.

The enemy lost about 600 killed in our lines and NO MAN’S LAND. No estimate can, however, be made of his casualties in his own lines, but, judging from the reports of returned prisoners of war, these were exceptionally heavy.

The following captures were made:—Prisoners: 641, including many Officers and two Battalion Commanders; 100 light and heavy machine guns, and one Regimental Band. In addition, on April 11th, an Austrian artillery Officer was killed on the Red Dragon Crater, and the identifications obtained from him were the first direct evidence of the presence of Austrians on the Western Front. A very fine range-finding instrument was captured at the same time. This instrument was presented by the Battalion to the West Lancashire Field Artillery.

The Remnant of GIVENCHY KEEP, 1920.

On the 13th the communication trenches were practically cleared of blocks. The keeps were heavily shelled in the afternoon. Fourteen men arrived from the reinforcement camp.

On the 14th enemy artillery was still very active, and all preparations were made to meet further attacks.

On the 15th the enemy annoyed us by persistent harassing fire throughout the day.

Second Lieutenant Westwood was killed and one Other Rank wounded.

The new Padre, Captain R. R. Schofield, arrived.

On the 16th, amidst active enemy artillery fire, the 1st Black Watch relieved us, the relief being completed with three casualties. We marched back to BEUVRY, where we em-’bussed and were taken to LOZINGHAM.

Captain Hore, M.C., went to England sick, and Second Lieutenant E. M. Studdart to Field Ambulance.

127 Other Ranks arrived from reinforcement camp.

The Battalion was not billeted until 4 a.m.

The next few days were spent in reorganising and training. Captain Carmichael and Second Lieutenants Greaves and Taylor and five Other Ranks going sick.

On the 22nd we went en masse to the Divisional Theatre.

On the 23rd we em-’bussed at 7 a.m. for VAUDRICOURT, where we arrived at 9 30 a.m.

An advance party was sent to take over the Support Battalion area of the GIVENCHY sector. A “B team” of seven Officers and 110 Other Ranks went to VURBURE. We em-’bussed again at 8 p.m. and went to ARMEGUIN, whence we marched to relieve the 1st Northamptons in support.

C Company were at WINDY CORNER and D Company at PONT FIXE, A, B, and Headquarters being on the canal bank. We had one man killed and one man wounded.

The next day on the whole was quiet. There was some shelling at WINDY CORNER with 4.2’s One Other Rank was killed.

The 25th was quiet up to 9 p.m., when a heavy barrage was placed on our support lines. The whole Battalion was on working parties by night. Our support lines were again bombarded at 2 20 p.m. on the 26th.

Platoons were detached and sent to the Lancashire Fusiliers and the King’s Own in case of need, and A Company remained in the VILLAGE LINE all night.

Eight Other Ranks were wounded on this and the following day.

The following are extracts from various telegrams, letters, and Press cuttings referring to the Battle of GIVENCHY:—

(SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCH.)
THE 55th DIVISION AT GIVENCHY.

Headquarters, France, Monday, 1 15 p.m.

On the morning of the German attack on April 9th, 1918, the 55th (West Lancashire) Division (Territorial) was holding a front of about 6,000 yards, extending from the LA BASSEE CANAL to just south of RICHEBOURG L’AVOUE, where its line joined that held by the Portuguese. The enemy’s attack on the southern portion of this front was delivered by all three Regiments of the 4th Ersatz Division, which was well up to strength. A captured Divisional Order issued by the General Staff of this German Division, and dated April 6th, 1918, shows that its objectives were “the ground and the British position in the triangle formed by GIVENCHY—FESTUBERT—GORRE.” The following passages from this captured order are of special interest:—

In our attack our three Regiments will be opposed by at most six Companies in front and at most two Reserve Battalions in FESTUBERT and GIVENCHY. One Battalion in Divisional Reserve is south of the LA BASSEE CANAL in LE PREOL. It will be prevented by our powerful artillery fire from taking part in the fight for FESTUBERT and GIVENCHY. The troops are elements of the English 55th Division, which, after being engaged on the SOMME, has suffered heavy losses in FLANDERS and at CAMBRAI, and was described by prisoners in March, 1918, as a Division fit to hold a quiet sector, that is below the average quality.

The order containing the passages quoted above was distributed among all Officers and Under-Officers of the 4th Ersatz Division down to Platoon Commanders, presumably with a view to encouraging the troops prior to their attack, and in the belief that the opposition met with would not be very serious. If this was his expectation the enemy was most signally disappointed.

Throughout the early part of the morning of April 9th, the 55th Division beat off all attacks on its forward zone, and maintained its line intact. Later, when the German infantry had broken through the Portuguese positions on its left, the Division formed a defensive flank facing north-east on the line GIVENCHY—FESTUBERT to the neighbourhood of LE TOURET. This line it maintained practically unchanged until relief, through six days of almost continual fighting, in the course of which it beat off repeated German attacks with the heaviest losses to the enemy, and took nearly 1,000 prisoners.

At one time, on the first day of his attack, the enemy’s troops forced their way into GIVENCHY and FESTUBERT. Both villages were shortly afterwards regained by the 55th Division as the result of a highly-successful counter-attack, in which several hundred Germans were captured. All further attempts on the part of the enemy to carry these positions broke down before the resolute defence of the 55th Division. Though he succeeded on April 11th in entering a post north of FESTUBERT, he was thrown out again by a counter-attack, and on the night of April 12th the 55th Division improved its position in this neighbourhood, capturing a German post and taking several prisoners.

Next day, during the afternoon, the enemy heavily bombarded the whole front held by the Division between GORRE and the LAWE CANAL, and subsequently attacked in strength. He was once more repulsed with heavy loss by the most gallant and successful defence of a Division which he had been pleased to describe as consisting of second-class troops.