Main Principles of Scheme.
Future Types of Fighting Vessels.
Four classes only of fighting vessels.
Uniform armament (except torpedo attack guns) in all classes of fighting vessels.
Inviolate watertight bulkheads.
Subdivision of magazines.
Protection of magazines.
Abolish Ram.
No guns on main deck (so splendid light and airy accommodation for officers, and crew, with huge square ports and magnificent deck space).
Reduction of all weights and scantlings.
“Out of Date” Fighting Ships.
Removal as soon as possible of all “out of date” ships (that is, ships unfit for fighting).
To abolish gradually the employment of all slow vessels below 1st Class Armoured Cruisers.
To substitute efficient fighting vessels with nucleus crews for all the stationary obsolete vessels now in commission, and also for all the training vessels and all the Coastguard Cruisers.
Revision of Stations.
South Atlantic, West Indies, and Cape to form a squadron under chief command of the Admiral of the Cape Station, who will be a Vice-Admiral in the future with three Rear-Admirals under him.[6]
The Commander-in-Chief in China to have the chief command and strategic handling of the squadrons in China, Australia, East Indies, and Pacific. He can be a full Admiral with two Vice-Admirals and two Rear-Admirals under him. The object is to employ Flag Officers as much as possible at sea.
Effective Cruisers to be substituted for the present varying types of vessels forming all these squadrons.
Personnel.
Reduction in entry of Boys, and increase of entry of Non-continuous Service Men and of “Northampton” lads.
Introduction of new system of Reserve (long service tempered by short service!)
Nucleus Crews.
Two-yearly commissions to be instituted, and with no material change of officers and men during the two years.
All the fighting vessels in Reserve to have an efficient nucleus crew of approximately two-fifths of the full crew, together with all important Gunnery ratings as well as the Captain of the ship and the principal Officers.
The periodical exercise and inspection of the ships by the responsible Flag Officer who will take them to the war.
This Flag Officer will suffer for any want of efficiency and preparation for war of these vessels. These vessels to be collected in squadrons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, according to the Station to which they are going as the reinforcements.
Signals.
Revision of our methods of Signalling to be based on the class of Signals that will be used in war.
To abolish all systems and all Signals that are only of use in peace time.
The Signal and Exercise Books of the Fleet to be ruthlessly revised and cut down with this in view.
The present establishment of Signalmen on board all vessels to be reduced to the numbers that are necessary in war (present system of superabundance of Signalmen embarked in Flagships criminally wrong).
Defence of Naval Ports.
Modern conditions necessitate certain floating defences requiring seamen to manipulate them. Soldiers apparently can’t do it!
Divided control of defence of Naval Ports impossible between Navy and Army.
Admiralty must have sole responsibility that all our Naval Arsenals are kept open for egress and ingress of our Fleet in war.
Local defences should, therefore, apparently be under the Naval Commander-in-Chief.
But all these arrangements for any such transfer of responsibility from War Office to Admiralty must be so planned as to obviate all possibility of Fleet men being used for shore work in war, and there must be no risk of lessening the sea experience of the officers and men of the Fleet; hence it will be imperative that there should be an entire transference of the whole of the Garrison Artillery from Army to Navy, as well as the responsibility for all ordnance.
All this involves so immense an addition to the responsibilities of the Admiralty, apart from the one chief function of the Navy of seeking out and fighting the enemy’s fleets, that we have to hesitate; but we can’t let matters go on as at present.