CHAPTER I.
Boundary of Texas defined by Almonté—Description of Texas—Rivers of Texas—Army of observation—General Taylor—Army of occupation—How formed—Difficulty of landing in Texas—Aransas bay—Army lands at St. Joseph's island—Kinney's rancho—Corpus Christi—State of the army during the winter—Sufferings of the troops—Alarms of war—General Gaines's views—Necessity of ample preparation—Our first aggressive war.
The scene of our observation is now about to change from the cabinet to the field. The theatre of war properly attracts our attention, and the spot of earth which was the chief cause of dispute between Mexico and the United States, and where our armies assembled, justly demands our first notice.
Texas, until she attained the rank of an independent State, seems to have been almost an unknown country even to the Mexicans. This was natural for a people who are not essentially agriculturists, but pass their lives as herdsmen, miners, or merchants, and whose central government is far removed from its outposts.
In the year 1834, General Almonté was deputed by the Mexican authorities to visit this northern province, and prepare a statistical report upon its extent and character. According to this valuable document, Texas proper lies between 28° and 35° of north latitude, and 17° and 25° of longitude, west from Washington. It is bounded on the north by the territory of Arkansas; east by Louisiana; south by the Gulf of Mexico and State of Tamaulipas; and west by Coahuila, Chihuahua, and New Mexico. Almonté was informed, by the State government of Coahuila and Texas, that instead of the Rio de las Nueces forming the boundary between Coahuila and Texas, as the map denoted, the true limit commenced at the embouchure of the Rio Aransaso which it followed to its source, whence it continued by a direct line until it reached the junction of the Medina with the San Antonio, and thence proceeded along the eastern bank of the Medina to its source, terminating, finally, on the borders of Chihuahua. The territory comprised within these limits is estimated at near two hundred thousand square miles—a surface almost as extensive as that of France.[70] But, since Texas receded from the Mexican central government, these confines have been changed. By an act of her congress, in December, 1836, the boundary was declared to begin at the mouth of the Rio Grande, and thence to run up the principal stream of the said river to its source; thence due north to the 42° of latitude, and thence, along the boundary as defined in the treaty between the United States and Spain, to the beginning.[71]
The great body of the territory of Mexico is rich in upland vallies, extensive plains, noble mountains, fertile soil, beautiful groves, and rich mines, but it is almost entirely deprived of rivers, whilst Texas is singularly favored in this respect. On the east, the Gulf of Mexico affords her an extensive sea coast indented by the mouths of the Sabine river and lake, the Rio Naches, the Rio Trinidad, the Rio San Jacinto, Galveston bay, the Rio Brazos, Matagorda bay, the Rio Colorado, the Rios San Antonio and Guadalupe, Aransaso bay and the Rio Grande, besides numerous smaller streams that drain her soil and almost cover it with an interlacing network of water.
Texas presents to the traveller three distinct natural regions. Along the shores of the gulf from the Sabine to the Rio Grande, a flat country extends from thirty to one hundred miles in the interior, widening, towards its centre on the Colorado, and gradually diminishing towards the Nueces. The sandy wastes and lagunes of the coast give place, at some distance in the interior, to a rich alluvial country, diversified by skirts of timber, insulated groves, and open prairies. A large portion of this part of Texas is described as being singularly free from those large collections of stagnant water, which, combined with a burning sun and prolific vegetation, create malaria in our southern States.
Westward of this level skirt, begins the rolling region. The land gradually swells in gentle undulations, "covered with fertile prairies and valuable woodlands, enriched with springs and rivulets." Farther westward still, these beautiful hills tower up into the steeps of the Sierra Madre, that great chain of gigantic mountains, which, broken at the junction of the Rio Grande with the Puerco, takes thence a north-easterly course, and enters Texas near the source of the Nueces. These elevations are of the third and fourth magnitude, and abound with forests of pine, oak, cedar, and an extraordinary variety of shrubbery. Wide vallies of alluvial soil, commonly susceptible of irrigation from copious streams in the highlands, wind through the recesses of these mountains and afford a delightful region for the purposes of agriculture. The table lands beyond these ranges have been but little explored, and still less is known of the northern region extending to the 42° of north latitude, as well as of that portion lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. But such, in brief, is Texas from the gulf to the mountains;—a country adapted alike to the planter, the grazier and the farmer, while it offers to commerce a wide extent of sea coast whose harbors may be made perfectly secure by the skill of modern science.[72]
I have already stated that in 1844 President Tyler stationed an army of observation under General Taylor, at fort Jesup, as soon as he negotiated the annexation treaty.[73] This corps, but poorly sheltered from the weather, and in an inhospitable climate, was, for a long time, left inactive on the banks of the Sabine. In midsummer of 1845, after the joint resolution was passed, and when our difficulties with Mexico began to thicken, it was at length ordered to advance, under the same commander, towards the southern frontier of Texas. The army then consisted of but two regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, and a single company of artillery, in all about fifteen hundred efficient men. As the climate was known to the sickly, the war department despatched only such an unacclimated force as was deemed absolutely necessary to protect a tropical region in the month of July, awaiting the colder months before its numbers were increased. This body was called the army of occupation, whose appointments seem to have been extremely imperfect. "The dragoon regiment had just been formed from a rifle corps; half of its men were raw, undisciplined recruits, and many of them unable to ride, while their recently purchased horses were small, weak and undrilled. The infantry regiments were enfeebled by their long exposure, in miserable tents, to the withering heats and drenching rains of a low southern latitude; and the artillerists were without their guns. Towards the end of June, 1845, a company of the last mentioned arm of the service, equipped as infantry, at fort Moultrie, was ordered to New Orleans. This body, armed only with muskets, sailed from Charleston on the 26th of the month, and on its arrival in Louisiana on the 19th of July, found that it was destined for service in Texas. The instructions to the commanding officer informed him that his company was to be mounted and equipped as flying artillery for the campaign under Taylor; that horses would be sent him and a battery shipped from New York, upon the arrival of which he was to join his general at the mouth of the Sabine."[74] Fortunately for these troops they encountered General Taylor in New Orleans, though they were obliged to depart without their ordnance, which did not reach them for two months afterwards, while their horses were even still longer in attaining their destination.
The war in Texas, and the unsettled state of that country, had prevented the preparation of an accurate map, or indeed, even of a survey of the coasts or interior. It was difficult, therefore, to find any one in New Orleans acquainted with the harbors and rivers of the new State, or who was willing to incur the responsibility of directing the army's steps. The topographical bureau at Washington had, with infinite pains and ingenuity, constructed a map of the country from the scant materials in its possession; but this chart has since been proved to be almost entirely useless as a guide.
However, after considerable difficulty, General Taylor procured a pilot for large wages, who professed a thorough acquaintance with the Texan waters, and a particular knowledge of his destination at Aransas bay. This individual was immediately put in charge of one of the transports loaded with troops, and under his lead, the commander in chief sailed from New Orleans with three ships and two steamers in search of the port of his disbarkation. The blundering pilot grounded his vessel among the breakers where it would inevitably have been wrecked, had it not been extricated by timely assistance, while the captain of another transport coasted the low shores of the gulf for several days, in sight of land, seeking an inlet, and when his ship was at length anchored off St. Joseph's, he asserted that it was the island of Espiritu Santo.[75]
This bay of Aransas was perhaps one of the most unsuitable for the disbarkation of troops on the coast of Texas, and was selected in utter ignorance of the country. Indeed we seem to have committed two great and often fatal errors in warfare when we contemplated hostilities with Mexico—first, in despising our foe; and secondly, in failing to inform ourselves of his country's geography.
Aransas bay lies between the south end of St. Joseph's and the northern point of Mustang island, quite close to the latter, and almost at right angles with the coast. It has a narrow but shifting sand bar at its entrance, upon which the depth of water varies according to the action of the winds. The bay is about twenty-five miles in length and twelve in width, but is obstructed by a shoal and a range of islands that traverse it.[76]
On the third of August our whole army had landed on St. Joseph's island, about thirty miles from the Rio Nueces, across which it was to pass to its proposed encampment on Corpus Christi bay, near a smuggling village known as Kinney's rancho. As Corpus Christi and Aransas bays are connected by a shallow and winding channel, it was at once discovered that steamers were altogether inadequate for the transportation of troops from the islets to the mainland; and our forces would have remained where they disembarked had not a few skiffs of light draft, together with some sail and row boats, been obtained in the neighborhood at considerable expense. In these frail vessels a detachment of forty men, armed only with muskets, crossed the Nueces, and landed on the stormy coast as pioneers in a country asserted to be Mexican. Had the authorities of that republic been prepared to resist our landing, a few field pieces might have presented the alleged invasion, as our general was unable to protect the disembarkation of his troops by cannon. In addition to these mistakes, the 2d regiment of dragoons was not despatched from fort Jesup in time to co-operate with our forces when they first landed at Corpus Christi; and, as the artillery had not yet been forwarded from our arsenals, the campaign may be said to have commenced with infantry alone. This was a novelty in military science, and indicated an ignorance of war, an unpardonable imprudence, or a conviction that the whole drama was got up only to intimidate an enemy we despised.
It is impossible to narrate every circumstance of interest that occurred during the encampment of our forces west of the Nueces, a position taken by General Taylor with the concurrence of the war department. But a history of this war would be incomplete were not the position as well as the condition of our army accurately stated. Our government, relying probably on the acknowledged feebleness of Mexico, and on the fact that she had not yet declared war, imagined that the mere presence of American troops would pacify Texas or prevent hostilities. This was an unfortunate mistake, especially in the unsettled condition of things; for in May, 1845, Mr. Donelson, our chargé to Texas, had warned the government to be prepared for an immediate blow upon Mexico, if she should unfortunately declare war against us, and that declaration might have been expected at any moment.
The details of the organization of our forces seem, nevertheless, to have been sadly neglected. Sailing vessels, alone, were relied on to convey despatches to General Taylor; and, from the wreck of one of them, a drummer boy, strolling along the beach, on the 15th of August, rescued a valuable package containing the proclamation of the Mexican government in which the people were summoned to unite in an army for national preservation, under the sonorous title of "Defenders of independence and the laws."[77] The day after this despatch was received, the smugglers along the coast reported that Arista was rapidly advancing to attack us with three thousand choice troops. Without artillery to defend the camp, or dragoons to act as scouts, our general could do nothing but order entrenchments to be thrown up. Entrenching tools, however, had not been furnished; and, with only a few old and broken spades the troops labored briskly, and erected, in a few days, a solid field-work a few yards from the beach, protected in the rear by the bay. But the battery had not yet arrived, nor was Gen. Taylor able to obtain from the sloop of war St. Mary's, which was on the station, any guns of a suitable calibre. Fortunately, however, he procured three pieces, indifferently equipped, and a small supply of ammunition, from the citizens of Corpus Christi. These guns added materially to the strength of our position in case we were attacked, but were entirely unsuitable for field service.[78]
The proclamation to which we have alluded, and the rumors of vigorous hostility on the part of Mexico, produced great alarm in the United States, especially along our southern frontier. In New Orleans, indignation was openly expressed that our gallant men had been despatched on this forlorn enterprize without the amplest means of defence and attack, while our arsenals were filled with all the munitions of war. A large force of volunteers was, therefore, ordered out in the south, while two companies of artillery were immediately despatched to Taylor's succor under the command of Maj. Gally.
The report of Arista's progress, however, proved to be false, so that we were fortunately saved from attack. Yet the sufferings of our army did not cease with those military inconveniences. "Two thirds of the tents furnished our soldiers were worn out or rotten, and had been condemned by boards of survey appointed by the proper authorities in accordance with the army regulations. Transparent as gauze, they afforded little or no protection against the intense heat of summer or the drenching rains and severe cold of winter. Even the dews penetrated the thin covering almost without obstruction. Such were the tents provided for campaigners in a country almost deluged three months in the year, and more variable in its climate than any other region, passing from the extreme of heat to that of cold in a few hours. During the whole of November and December, either the rains were descending with violence, or the furious "northers" which ravage this coast were breaking the frail tent-poles or rending the rotten canvas. For days and weeks every article in hundreds of tents was thoroughly soaked; and during these terrible months, the sufferings of the sick, in the crowded hospital tents, were indescribably horrible. Every day added to the frightfulness of the mortality. At one time a sixth of the entire camp was on the sick list, and at least one-half unfit for service, in consequence of dysentery and catarrhal fevers which raged like a pestilence."[79] The camp was without fires, and, being situated on the edge of a vast prairie sparsely covered with muskeet trees, was but scantily supplied with wood even for the most needful purposes. The quarter-master's department furnished only the weak and stunted mustangs of the country; and the little and inefficient ponies, geared in the large harness made at the north for American horses, looked as if they would jump through their collars instead of use them for traction. With such teams only a sufficiency of wood could be drawn for cooking, and none for camp fires to comfort the sick and suffering soldiers. "As winter advanced, the prairie became a quagmire, the roads almost impassable, and as the mustangs died in large numbers, wood enough for cooking even, could not be procured. The encampment now resembled a marsh, the water, at times, being three or four feet deep in the tents of whole wings of regiments. All military exercises were suspended, and the bleak gloomy days were passed in inactivity, disgust and sullenness. The troops, after being thoroughly drenched all day, without fires to dry them, lay down at night in wet blankets on the soaked ground, as plank for tent floors was not furnished by the quarter-masters until the rainy season was over. At times the men, at tattoo, gasped for breath in the sultry night air, and, at reveille, found their moist blankets frozen around them and their tents stiff with ice. A portion of the men were kept without pay for six months, and the rest for four months, although the law strictly requires payment every two months.
"Officers and soldiers, destitute of funds, were compelled to borrow, upon the strength of pay due, of their more fortunate companions, or of the Shylocks, in search of victims, that polluted the camp. Sick soldiers, directed by their surgeons to return to the United States, had either to remain and die, or to submit to exorbitant exactions from unfeeling villains in their pension certificates and pay accounts, though the law requires the paymasters to cash them in specie.
"On the first landing of the 3d and 4th infantry at Corpus Christi, "Kinney's Rancho," though a lawless, smuggling town, under the vigorous sway of its martial proprietor, was as quiet and peaceful as a village in New England. But every fresh arrival of troops was followed by some portion of that vast horde of harpies, that are ever to be found in the train of all armies, ready to prey upon the simple and unsuspecting among the soldiers. In a short time, hundreds of temporary structures were erected on the outskirts of the "Rancho," and in them, all the cut-throats, thieves, and murderers of the United States and Texas, seem to have congregated. No sight could have been more truly melancholy than that of their bloated and sin-marked visages, as they lounged through the purlieus of this modern Pandemonium. The air, by day, was polluted with their horrid oaths and imprecations,—and the savage yells, exulting shouts, and despairing groans of their murderous frays, made night hideous. But, not content with confining their hellish deeds to their own worthy fraternity, they laid their worthless hands on the troops. Many of the soldiers, enticed to their dram-shops, were drugged with stupefying potions, and then robbed of their hard earnings, or murdered in cold blood."
General Taylor, looking to the probability of a movement against Mexico, warned the department that a ponton train was indispensable in a country wherein streams abounded and wood for bridges was scarce; but it was not despatched until after the next meeting of congress.
"Six months after the army had taken the field, there were not teams and wagons enough to transport one half of the troops; so that, in case of hostilities, had a forward movement been ordered, it could only have been effected by detachments, and, in consequence, that most fatal of all military errors would have been committed, of permitting the enemy to attack and beat in detail. The few teams furnished, it is natural to think, were the choicest to be found in the west. For, it had been said, that though the "Army of occupation" was small, the great celerity of its movements, from the superiority of the American horses, would contribute, as well as the greater bravery of its men, to make it more than a match for the largest Mexican force. Ninety yoke of oxen and several hundred mustangs were therefore bought, but not a single American horse!
"Three batteries of artillery were added to the one which, at length reached the company from Charleston. Horses were sent with two of them, to manœuvre them rapidly on the field of battle, and to transport them wherever the army might go. But the third came unprovided with cavalry.
"When the New Orleans volunteers left Corpus Christi, their artillery horses were turned over to the company from Charleston. This company, having always acted as infantry, had never even seen a flying artillery drill,—half of the men could not ride,—many had never ridden at all, and, in mounting for the first time, made Mr. Winkle's mistake as to which stirrup to use. It was certainly an original idea, to convert, in a single day, a company of foot into light artillery. However, as horses had at length been given to the company from Charleston, it was the ardent desire of the lieutenant commanding, to teach his men to ride and drive, and the sabre exercise. This the loyal quarter-masters resolved to prevent, and, at the same time, to show the world how economical they were. They, therefore, refused to purchase any more hay and told the dragoons and light artillery, that they, themselves, must cut and haul the dry and sapless broom straw of the prairie, and forage their horses on that."[80]
Such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. If the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience as campaigners entitled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would have been speedily ended. Ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843, but, especially, since the inaugural address of President Polk in 1845, in which he pronounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the whole of Oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. Prudent men thought it probable that there would be war with Mexico or hostilities with England, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our powers, would materially increase each other's virulence.
At this time, General Gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. The delicate character of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made, attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as Chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning to the department. It seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in war with Mexico or England, at such a crisis, and with no preparations either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far surpassed us in applying steam to naval purposes. Long years of peace had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other conflicts had made us confident. Accordingly, he recommended the concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military science, together with the regulars commanded by General Taylor, until the spring of 1846. If war could not be averted before that period, we might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and disciplined army. He contended that the true policy of our country, in such an assault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military bandits who swayed the destinies of Mexico, whilst, on all sides, we protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an indelible impression of our justice. Thus the confidence of the best portions of Mexico would be secured, the prestige of her army promptly destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. On the other hand, General Gaines believed that if we began war without large and instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the Seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. The precipices upon the doubtful verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of these suggestions. The faithful page of history admonishes that nations as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the penalty of neglect. But politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all they promise. Without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is but a military cheat.
It is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of the gallant and prudent Gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would have marched to the city of Mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. A lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged inefficiency of Mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity of military preparation which this conflict has taught us.
A war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence, was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an additional excuse for our unpreparedness. Most of the events in this narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first and only offensive war into which we have been forced. With every known principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of Washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us to improve. But it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory of rule is the same as our own.
Note.—General Gaines, who commanded the western division, was censured by the War department for having made a requisition on the governor of Louisiana for State troops to be sent to the army in Texas under Taylor's command, at the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter. General Taylor, for more than a year previous to September, 1845, commanded one of the brigades of Gaines's division, and the latter never knew by authority that the former had been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service, until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of September. He never received a copy of the authority given to Taylor to go to Texas until after the date of his requisition for Louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of August, 1845; consequently he then considered himself responsible for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in imminent danger.—See Senate doc. No. 378, for his correspondence, and especially p. 48.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] Almonté's report. Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.
[71] Senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56.
[72] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 1.
[73] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76.
[74] An account of the army of observation and occupation, written by one of its officers, in the Southern Quarterly Review for April, 1846.
[75] S. Q. Review, ut antea, p. 442. (April, 1846.)
[76] Kennedy's Texas, chap. 2d.
[77] Niles' Reg. vol. 68, p. 305.
[78] S. Q. Rev. ut antea. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 93.
[79] S. Q. Rev. ut antea.
[80] Southern Quarterly Review, ut antea. These statements are made by an able and distinguished officer of our army, who was on the field, and is perfectly versed in all the matters he discusses.