CHAPTER II.
Our position at Corpus Christi—Instructions to Taylor as to the boundary of the Rio Grande—Taylor's views—Review and history of the boundary question—Letter from Mr. Adams—Santa Anna's agreements with Texas, &c.—March to the Rio Grande ordered—Justification in a military point of view of the occupation of the disputed territory—Anecdote of Frederick the Great—War in Silesia and Austria—Madison's conduct to Spain in 1810—Right of declaration of war—Justifiable causes of war—Opinion of Sir J. Mackintosh—War and diplomacy contrasted.
One of the most inclement winters in the Gulf of Mexico had passed in the comfortless manner described in the last chapter. Our attempts to negotiate with Mexico were repulsed, and although our minister had not yet returned to the United States—having delayed at Jalapa with the hope of finding Paredes more accessible than Herrera—every thing indicated an ultimate defeat of diplomacy.
Meanwhile our forces at Corpus Christi were gradually augmenting, under the command of Generals Taylor and Worth. In October, 1845, the troops amounted to near four thousand, and General Taylor made every preparation, by reconnoissances between the Nueces and the Rio Grande for the ultimate defence of soil which had been claimed by our government as part of Texas.[81]
As a military man it was not his duty to affix the boundaries that were to be the subject of negotiation or war; but simply to ascertain precisely the extent of defence required along a disputed territory, and to dispose his troops accordingly.[82]
In October, 1845, therefore, General Taylor reviewed the instructions from the war department, and, seeing that he had been ordered to select and occupy near the Rio Grande such a site as would consist with the health of the troops, and was best adapted to repel invasion, he ventured to suggest an advance of his army. This however, was done by him whilst he felt great diffidence in touching topics that might become matter of delicate diplomacy. Nevertheless, taking a soldier's view of the topographical and not the diplomatic question, he informed our government, that if it made the Rio Grande an ultimatum in adjusting a boundary, he doubted not that the settlement would be facilitated by taking possession, at once, of one or two suitable points on, or quite near, that river. At these spots, our strength would be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken, while the position of our troops at the remote camp of Corpus Christi, with arid wastes between them and the outposts of Mexico, altogether failed to impress that government with our readiness to vindicate by force of arms our title to the country as far as the Rio Grande.[83] Moreover, General Taylor felt encumbered by the orders from our war department of the 8th July, in which he was told that Mexico held military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, whose forces he should not disturb until our peaceful relations were finally destroyed.[84]
Accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1846, our commander-in-chief was directed to advance with his troops to the Rio Grande.[85] This movement was made in consequence of the anticipated failure of our negotiations, clearly indicated by the conduct of the Mexican government immediately upon the arrival of Mr. Slidell in the capital. But before these orders were despatched to General Taylor, he had already in August, 1845, been apprised of his duties in the event of hostile demonstrations on the part of the enemy. In case of an invasion of Texas by the Mexicans, he was directed to drive them back beyond the Rio Grande; and, although it was desirable that he should confine himself as much as possible to defensive measures, yet, in the event of such a repulse, he was authorized to seize and hold possession of Matamoros and other places on the soil of Mexico.
This resolution of our government was made the subject of grave complaint by persons who opposed the war. The order to advance from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande was alleged to be an act of invasion, and consequently, that hostilities were commenced by us and not by Mexico.
It may be pardoned if we pause awhile to consider a subject of such vital importance. The solution of the question was placed by one party upon the determination whether the Rio Grande was the boundary between Texas and Mexico before the battle of San Jacinto; and, if not, whether it has been made so since by competent authority. Up to that period it was asserted to be a recognized fact that the Nueces was the western boundary of Texas. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in his controversy with Don Luis De Onis, upon the Spanish boundary question, in March, 1818;[86] and Messieurs Pinckney and Monroe, in their argument with Cevallos at Madrid in April, 1805,[87] claimed the Rio Grande as the true limit between the United States and Mexico, by virtue of the ancient rights of France and the treaties between that sovereignty and the Spanish king.[88] It was asserted, therefore, that by the cession of Louisiana all the rights of France over Texas, as an integral part of her territory, accrued to us; and consequently that when the State of Texas was united to this country it was only re-annexed with what were claimed to be its ancient limits. But this was not a true statement of the controversy, for after our treaty with Spain the aspect of the affair changed. The question then was no longer what had been the boundary under the laws between France and Spain, or between Spain and the United States,—but what were the limits either under the colonial government of the Mexican viceroyalty, or under the laws of Mexico, when she became an independent republic. It was asserted that no map or geography existed since the establishment of the republic that did not lay down the boundary north of the Rio Grande. The map of Texas, compiled by Stephen H. Austin, the parent of Texan colonization, published at Philadelphia in 1835, and setting forth all the Mexican grants in Texas, represents the Rio Nueces as the western boundary. General Almonté in 1834, as I have previously stated, alleged, upon the authority of the State government of Coahuila and Texas that the boundary between them was even east of the Nueces. This was probably in accordance with the ancient Spanish division; for, in 1805 Cevallos declared to our ministers at Madrid that the province of Texas, "where the Spaniards have had settlements from the 17th century, was bounded on the east by Louisiana, and contains the extensive country which lies between the river Medina where the government of Coahuila ends, and the post now abandoned." Authorities to this effect might be extensively multiplied.[90] Brazos de Santiago was a Mexican port of entry, which continued to be held up to the period of hostilities, and Laredo was a small Mexican town, occupied by a Mexican garrison. If such was the geographical division between Texas and Mexico on the lower Rio Grande, near its mouth in the gulf, it was asserted that there could be infinitely less right to claim it as a limit nearer its source, since Santa Fé, the capital of New Mexico, had never been within the jurisdiction of Texas, and since the boundaries of Chihuahua commenced near the head waters of the Nueces.
These were some of the arguments used by individuals who deemed the march to Point Isabel an invasion of Mexican territory. It is just that a few reasons should also be presented on behalf of those who believed it to be lawful or expedient.
When Santa Anna was captured after the battle of San Jacinto in 1836, the leading men in Texas had great difficulty in rescuing him from popular vengeance for the massacres he had committed. The victory over the central chief—the despot and dictator of Mexico—was generally believed to be a crowning measure of success, for the bitter persecutor soon dwindled into the humble supplicant, and pledged his name and his oath to secure the independence of the rebellious State. Accordingly, with every appearance and promise of good faith and honor, he executed contracts with the Texan authorities which deserve consideration in discussing this question. On the 14th of May, 1836, at Velasco, two of these documents were signed by Santa Anna, Burnet, Collingsworth, Hardiman and Grayson,—the first being a public, and the second a secret convention between the parties. The third article of the first paper stipulates that the Mexican troops shall evacuate the territory of Texas, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande, while the fourth article of the secret agreement declares that a treaty of amity, commerce and limits shall be made between Mexico and Texas, the territory of the latter power not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del Norte, or Rio Grande. In conformity with these contracts, Texas set free the prisoner, whose "prompt release and departure for Vera Cruz," according to their tenor, "were necessary for the fulfilment of his solemn oath," to obtain a recognition of the independence of Texas, and to dispose the Mexican cabinet for the reception of commissioners.[91]
Santa Anna returned to his country in disgrace after his disastrous campaign, and lurked in retirement at his farm until the French attacked Vera Cruz, when he threw himself again at the head of the departmental forces. In the action he fortunately lost a limb, and by the skilful display of his mutilation in defence of Mexico, he renewed his claims to national gratitude. Instead, however, of using his influence to obtain the treaty, promised as the boon for his life, he became at once the bitterest foe of Texas, and pledged himself to fight "forever for its reconquest." Texas, meanwhile, acting in good faith, and presuming to adopt the spirit and letter of the convention with Santa Anna, whom she naturally regarded as the dictator of Mexico, passed the act of December 19, 1836, establishing the Rio Grande as her boundary from the gulf to its source. Besides this, her congress created senatorial and representative districts west of the Nueces; organized and defined limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande; created courts of justice; spread her judicial system over the country wherever her people roamed, and performed other acts of sovereignty which we are compelled not to disregard. It cannot be contended that these acts and agreements were alone sufficient, under the laws of nations, to confer upon Texas unquestionable rights over the soil between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, for a contract with the captive president and general was not legally binding; but it is equally clear that all these arguments of the old authorities as to the original boundary, and all the new claims set up by Texas, under her statutes, as well as stipulations with Santa Anna, made that territory a disputed ground whose real ownership could only be equitably settled by negotiation. The strong language of both the contracts, just recited, seems to concede the fact that the president of Mexico regarded, at least the lower Rio Grande, as already the real boundary between Mexico and Texas, notwithstanding the opinion of Almonté in 1834; and consequently that it was neither the subject of treaty or agreement at that moment, nor could it become so afterwards when commissioners were appointed.
When Texas was annexed to the United States she was received with these asserted limits, though she did not join the Union with any specific boundaries.[92] It was thought best by both parties to leave the question of confines open between Mexico and our country, so as not to complicate the national entanglements. After the congress of the United States and convention in Texas had acted upon the joint resolution it was impossible for us to recede. The course of our presidents, therefore, was at once pacific and soothing towards Mexico. For although they believed that republic had no right to be consulted as to the annexation of Texas, a free and independent State, they nevertheless admitted all her natural and just privileges in regard to boundary. Mr. Tyler and Mr. Polk therefore despatched envoys to Mexico with the offer of liberal negotiations as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. But the chargé and minister of Mr. Tyler were scornfully rejected, while Mr. Slidell, as has been already related, was refused an audience upon frivolous pretences at a moment when the Mexican secretary was secretly craving to receive him.[93]
In such a juncture what was the duty of the United States? It is an easy matter for speculative philosophers or political critics to find fault with the conduct of statesmen and to become prophets of woe after the occurrence of events they deprecate. But such men are timid actors on the world's stage, and especially in such a theatre of folly as the Mexican republic. Governments have but two ways of settling international disputes,—either by negotiation or war,—and, even the latter must be concluded by diplomacy, for nations rarely fight until one of them is completely annihilated. Negotiation, or the attempt to negotiate, had been completely exhausted by us. Meanwhile Mexico continued to excite our curiosity by spasmodic struggles in nerving her people for the war, as well as by gasconading despatches which breathed relentless animosity to our country for the annexation of Texas. Nevertheless, this sensitive and vaunting nation would neither make peace, establish boundaries, negotiate, nor declare war. Was it reasonable that such a frantic state of things should be permitted to continue? Could this perverse aversion to fighting or friendship be tolerated? Were our countries to conclude an eternal compact of mutual hatred and non intercourse? Was such childish obstinacy and weakness to be connived at in our country? Was it due to common sense, justice, or the preservation of a good neighborhood that we should remain supine under insane threats and dishonorable treatment? We asserted that, upon the Texas question, we had rightly no dispute with Mexico, except as to the boundary involved in the territory our forces were then occupying or about to cross. We did not design discussing our right to annex Texas. That was an act accomplished and unalterable. It was, doubtless, exceedingly convenient for Mexico to maintain this pacific state of quasi-war and to reject, alike, our amity and hostilities, as long as she owed us many millions of dollars and refused either to pay principal or interest, or to conclude a treaty for the settlement of unadjusted claims. Whilst her government was able to enforce non-intercourse, it was free from importunity and payment. But this adroit scheme of insolvency was unjust to our citizens, and only served to augment the liabilities of Mexico. What then remained to be done? The reply may be found in a significant anecdote related by Mr. Adams in a speech in congress on the Oregon question, on the 2d of January, 1846.
"After negotiating"—said he—"for twenty years about this matter we may take possession of the subject matter of negotiation. Indeed, we may negotiate after we take possession, and this is the military way of doing business. When Frederick the Great came to the throne of Prussia he found that his father had equipped for him an army of a hundred thousand men. Meeting soon after the Austrian minister, the latter said to him: "Your father has given you a great army, but ours has seen the wolf, whilst your majesty's has not." "Well—well!" exclaimed Frederick, "I will soon give it an opportunity to see the wolf!" Frederick then added, in his memoirs:—"I had some excellent old pretensions to an Austrian province, which some of my ancestors owned one or two centuries before; accordingly I sent an ambassador to the court of Austria stating my claim, and presenting a full exposition of my right to the province. The same day my ambassador was received in Vienna, I entered Silesia with my army!"[94]
Such would be a prompt and impulsive answer to the manifold prevarications of seditious Mexico. But the army we advanced and the country we occupied, were neither the army of Frederick nor the pleasant vales of rich and populous Silesia. A nearly desolate waste, stretched from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, barren alike in soil and inhabitants, and tempting none to its dreary wilderness but nomadic rancheros or outlaws who found even Mexico no place of refuge for their wickedness. It was, surely, not a land worthy of bloodshed, and yet, in consequence of its sterility, it became of vast importance on a frontier across whose wide extent enemies might pass unobserved and unmolested. With the entire command of the Rio Grande from its source to its mouth in the hands of our enemy, and the whole of this arid region flanking the stream and interposing itself between Mexico and our troops, it is evident that our adversaries would possess unusual advantages over us either for offensive or defensive war. The mere control of the embouchure of the river was no trivial superiority, for, on a stormy and inhospitable coast, it was almost impossible to support an effectual blockade and thus prevent the enemy from being succored along his whole frontier with arms and provisions from abroad. By seizing, however, the usual points of transit and entrance on the lower Rio Grande many of these evils might be avoided; and, if Mexico ultimately resolved on hostilities, we should be enabled to throw our forces promptly across the river, and by rapid marches obtain the command of all the military positions of vantage along her north-eastern boundary.
The foresight of Frederick the Great disclosed to him the military value of Silesia in the event of a war with Austria, and it was probably that circumstance, quite as much as his alleged political rights, that induced him to enter it with an army on the day when he commenced negotiations. He began the war with Austria by surprising Saxony, and, during all his difficulties, clung tenaciously to the possession of Silesia. Saxony was important as a military barrier covering Prussia on the side of Austria, while Silesia indented deeply the line of the Austrian frontier and flanked a large part of Bohemia.[95] Thus Saxony and Silesia formed a natural fortification for Prussia, just as the deserts of the disputed land, when in our rear, covered the undefended confines of Texas at the same time that they gave us the keys to the enemy's country at Point Isabel and Matamoros.
It may be asserted that, when vacant or nearly vacant territory is in controversy between two nations, and forms the only subject of real dispute between them, it would be better for both to refrain from an attempt to occupy it, provided they are willing to arbitrate the quarrel, or settle it by diplomacy. But, when both parties assert claims, both have equal rights to enter it, when negotiation fails. The decision is then to be made only by intimidation or war. There is no alternative by which collision can be escaped, and it is the duty of the wiser of the disputants to place his national forces in such an advantageous position as either to defend his acknowledged territory or force himself to be driven from the soil he claims. "I do not consider the march to the Rio Grande to have been the cause of the war"—said a distinguished statesman, "anymore than I consider the British march on Concord or Lexington to have been the cause of the American revolution, or the crossing of the Rubicon to have been the cause of the civil war in Rome. The march to the Rio Grande brought on the collision of arms, but, so far from being the cause of the war, it was itself the effect of those causes."
The power of declaring war is expressly reserved by the constitution to congress, and, though the president is commander in chief of the army when called into actual service, he should be extremely cautious in issuing orders or doing acts which may lead to hostilities resulting in war. Our congress was in session in January, 1846, when Mr. Slidell was rejected by Mexico, when our international relations were complicated as I have described, and when the secretary of war, by the president's direction, gave the order for Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande. This was an act that brought the armies of Mexico and the United States in front of each other; and although there can be no doubt that congress would have authorised the movement of our troops under the military advice of General Taylor,—provided the Rio Grande was to be made an ultimatum in the ratification of a treaty by our senate,—it is, nevertheless, to be profoundly regretted that the question was not previously submitted to our national representatives. At that moment the public mind was distracted between Mexico and England; but the Oregon question nearly absorbed the apparently minor difficulties with our restive neighbor. Congress contemplated the solemn probability of war with one of the mightiest nations of our age, and even some of our experienced statesmen,—as we have seen in the example of Mr. Adams,—recommended the most stringent measures of armed occupation. At such a crisis, and with a confidential knowledge of all our foreign relations, it was the duty of the president to represent these matters frankly to congress and to ask the opinion of his constitutional advisers, as he subsequently did in the settlement of the dispute with Great Britain. This prudent act would have saved the executive from needless responsibility, whilst it indicated a sensitive devotion to the behests of our constitution. Congress met whilst our troops were encamped at Corpus Christi, as an army of observation, whose hostile, though protective character, was unquestionable; yet our representatives neither ordered its return nor refused it supplies. This denoted a willingness to sanction measures which might either pacify Mexico, or impose upon that republic the immediate alternative of war. It is not improbable that congress would have adopted such a course, because, according to the pretensions of Mexico, our troops had already invaded her domains. This is an important view of the question which should not be passed by silently. Mexico, it must be remembered, never relinquished her right to reconquer Texas, but always claimed the whole province as her own, asserting a determination to regard its union with our confederacy as justifiable cause of war. The joint-resolution, alone, was therefore a belligerent act of the congress of the United States, sufficient, according to the doctrine of Mexico, to compel hostile retaliation. But, moreover, as the entire soil of Texas, from the Sabine to the Nueces or Rio Grande was still claimed by Mexico as her unsurrendered country, the landing of a single American soldier anywhere south of our ancient boundary with Spain, was quite as hostile an invasion of Mexican territory as the passage of our army from Corpus Christi to Point Isabel.
Occasions upon which the eminent right of self protection has been adopted as a principle of action in the United States, are not wanting in our political history. The circumstances in all, are of course not precisely the same, but the policy is identical. The conduct of our government in regard to General Jackson's invasion of Florida for the suppression of Indian cruelties may be referred to. But congress might have found a still more analogous case, in the dispute between Spain and the United States as to the eastern limits of Louisiana. Spain alleged that Florida extended to the Mississippi, embracing what was then a wilderness, but, now, forms the populous States of Alabama and Mississippi; while our government asserted that all the territory eastward of the Mississippi and extending to the Rio Perdido belonged of right to us by virtue of the treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of April, 1803. By acts of congress in 1803 and 1804 the president was authorized to take possession of the territory ceded by France, to establish a provisional government, to lay duties on goods imported into it; and, moreover, whenever he deemed it expedient, to erect the bay and river Mobile into a separate district, in which he might establish a port of entry and delivery.
In 1810, President Madison believing that the United States had too long acquiesced in the temporary continuance of this territory under Spanish domain, and that nothing was to be gained from Spain by candid discussion and amicable negotiation for several years, solved the difficulty by taking possession of Mobile and Baton Rouge and extending our jurisdiction to the Perdido. This possession, he took means to ensure, if needful, by military force. Mr. Madison's conduct was assailed in congress by the federalists who regarded it as an unjustifiable and offensive demonstration against Spain, but it was defended with equal warmth by the opposition,—especially by Mr. Clay,—and the Rio Perdido has ever since continued to form the western limit of Florida.[96]
When nations are about to undertake the dread responsibility of war, and to spread the sorrow and ruin which always mark the pathway of victorious or defeated armies, they should pause to contemplate the enormity of their enterprise as well as the principles that can alone justify them in the sight of God and man. Human life cannot be lawfully destroyed, assailed or endangered for any other object than that of just defence of person or principle, yet it is not a legal consequence that defensive wars are always just.[97]
"It is the right of a State," said that profound moralist and statesman, Sir James Mackintosh, "to take all measures necessary for her safety if it be attacked or threatened from without: provided always that reparation cannot otherwise be obtained; that there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining it by arms; and that the evils of the contest are not probably greater than the mischiefs of acquiescence in the wrong; including, on both sides of the deliberation, the ordinary consequences of the example as well as the immediate effects of the act. If reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and therefore no just cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining it by arms, a government cannot, with justice to their own nation, embark it in war; and, if the evils of resistance should appear on the whole greater than those of submission, wise rulers will consider an abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a sacred duty to their own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the great commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike members. A war is just against the wrongdoer when reparation for wrong cannot otherwise be obtained; but is then only conformable to all the principles of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by whom it is levied to greater evils than it professes to avert, and when it does not inflict on the nation which has done the wrong, sufferings altogether disproportioned to the extent of the injury. When the rulers of a nation are required to determine a question of peace or war, the bare justice of their case against the wrongdoer never can be the sole, and is not always the chief matter on which they are morally bound to exercise a conscientious deliberation. Prudence in conducting the affairs of their subjects is in them a part of justice."
These are the true principles by which Mexico should have judged the controversy between us, before she rejected all our efforts to negotiate, and forced our government to prepare for hostilities.
The idea of war, for mere conquest, seems now to be obsolete among civilized nations. To political dominion, as exhibited in the various governments of the old world, and in most of the new, geographical limits are definitely assigned. This fact must, hereafter, greatly modify the objects of war, by narrowing them to principles instead of territory. Principles, however, are always the fair subjects of controversy for the diplomatic art. Yet such is the perversity of human nature, that, although we are convinced of the propriety and possibility of adjusting our disputes by reason, we nevertheless go to war for these very principles, and, after having done each other an incalculable amount of injury, at last sit down like cripples, to negotiate the very matters which ought to have been treated and terminated diplomatically at first. It is, perhaps, the folly of mankind to believe that there is more wisdom in negotiators and diplomacy when nations are lame and weakened by war than when they are full of the vigorous energy and intelligence of peace!
Note.—It may be useful to record the following proclamation of General Woll, before annexation, in order to show, that the agreements between Santa Anna and the Texans in 1836, are not the only Mexican documents in existence which seemed to open the boundary question between Texas and Tamaulipas.
"Headquarters of the Army of the North, Mier, June 20, 1844.
"I, Adrian Woll, general of brigade, &c., make known:
"1. The armistice agreed on with the department of Texas having expired, and the war being, in consequence, recommenced against the inhabitants of that department, all communication with it ceases.
"2. Every individual, of whatever condition, who may contravene provisions of the preceding article, shall be regarded as a traitor, and shall receive the punishment prescribed in article 45, title 10, treatise 8, of the articles of war.
"3. Every individual who may be found at the distance of one league from the left bank of the Rio Bravo, will be regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his country; and, after a summary military trial, shall receive the said punishment.
"4. Every individual who may be comprehended within the provisions of the preceding article, and may be rash enough to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the supreme government, shall be pursued until taken, or put to death.
"5. In consideration of the situation of the towns of La Reda and Santa Rita de Ampudia, as well as of all the farm houses beyond the Rio Bravo, I have this day received, from the supreme government, orders to determine the manner by which those interested are to be protected; but, until the determination of the supreme government be received, I warn all those who are beyond the limits here prescribed, to bring them within the line, or to abandon them; as those who disobey this order, will infallibly suffer the punishment here established.
ADRIAN WOLL.
FOOTNOTES:
[81] On the 15th of June, 1845, Mr. Bancroft, as acting secretary of state, wrote to General Taylor as follows:
"The point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of Texas, where you will select and occupy, on or near the Rio Grande del Norte, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western border."
On the 30th of July, 1845, the secretary of war, Mr. Marcy, declared to him that "the Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which the republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in selecting the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the boundary line—the Rio Grande—as prudence will dictate. With this view, the President desires that your position, for a part of your forces, at least, should be west of the river Nueces."
This, and even more forcible language, was repeated in letters from the same source on the 23d and 30th of August, and on the 16th of October, 1845. In the last letter the secretary of war states distinctly that the western boundary of Texas is the Rio Grande. See Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 75, 77, 80, 81, 82.
[82] That this was General Taylor's view of the question is proved by a remark in his letter to General Ampudia on the 12th of April, 1846, on being warned by that officer to break up his camp and to retire to the other bank of the Nueces. General Taylor says: I need hardly advise you that charged as I am, in only a military capacity, with the performance of specific duties, I cannot enter into a discussion of the international question involved in the advance of the American army.—id. p. 124.
[83] See Senate Doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 99.
[84] Id. p. 75.
[85] Id. p. 82.
[86] American State papers, vol. 4, p. 468.
[87] Id. vol. 2, p. 662.
[88] As it may be important that the reader should understand the title to Louisiana under which the boundary of the Rio Grande was claimed, the following is a summary of its history. Louisiana originally belonged to France, but by a secret compact between that country and Spain in 1762, and by treaties, in the following year, between France, Spain, and England, the French dominion was extinguished on all the continent of America. In consequence of the treaty between this country and England in 1783, the Mississippi became the western boundary of the United States from its source to the 31° of north latitude, and thence, on the same parallel to the St. Mary's. France, it will be remembered, always had claimed dominion in Louisiana to the Rio Bravo or Rio Grande, by virtue
1st. Of the discovery of the Mississippi from near its source to the ocean.
2d. Of the possession taken, and establishment made by La Salle, at the bay of St. Bernard, west of the rivers Trinity and Colorado, by authority of Louis XIV, in 1685; notwithstanding the subsequent destruction of the colony.
3d. Of the charter of Louis XIV, to Crozat in 1712.
4th. The historical authority of Du Pratz, Champigny, and the Count de Vergennes.
5th. Of the authority of De Lisle's map, and of the map published in 1762 by Don Thomas Lopez, geographer to the king of Spain, as well as of various other maps, atlases, and geographical and historical authorities.
By an article of the secret treaty of San Ildefonso, in October, 1800, Spain retroceded Louisiana to France; yet this treaty was not promulgated till the beginning of 1802. The paragraph of cession is as follows: "His Catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the French republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations above recited relative to his Royal Highness, the Duke of Parma, the colony and province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it should be, after the treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers." In 1803, Bonaparte, the first consul of the French republic, ceded Louisiana to the United States, as fully and in the same manner as it had been retroceded to France by Spain in the treaty of San Ildefonso; and, by virtue of this grant, Messieurs Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van Buren, and Jackson contended that the original limits of the state had been the Rio Grande. However, by the 3rd article of our treaty with Spain in 1819, all our pretensions to extend the territory of Louisiana towards Mexico or the Rio Grande, were resigned and abandoned by adopting the River Sabine as our southern confine in that quarter. See Lyman's diplomacy of the United States. Vol. 1, p. 368, and vol. 2, p. 136.
The following extract from a valuable letter with which the author was favored by Ex-President Adams, who, as secretary of state, conducted the negotiations with Spain, will explain his opinions and acts upon a subject of so much importance.
Quincy, 7th July, 1847.
"Whoever sets out with an inquiry respecting the right of territories in the American hemisphere claimed by Europeans, must begin by settling certain conventional principles of right and wrong before he can enter upon the discussion.
"For example what right had Columbus to Cat Island, otherwise called Guanahani? Who has the right to it now and how came they by it? The flag of St. George and the Dragon now waves over it; but who had the right to take possession of it because Christopher Columbus found it,—the paltriest island in the midst of the ocean. European statesmen, warriors, and writers on what are called the laws of nations, have laid down a system of laws upon which they found this right. Have the Carribee Indians, in whose possession that Island was discovered by Columbus, ever assented to that system of right and wrong?
"You remember that Hume, in commencing his history of England by the Roman conquest says—"that without seeking any more justifiable reasons of hostility than were employed by the later Europeans in subjecting the Africans and the Americans, they sent over an army under the command of Plautius, an able general, who gained some victories, and made a considerable progress in subduing the inhabitants." Then, no European has ever had any better right to take possession of America, than Julius Cæsar and the Romans had to take possession of the island of Britain.
"What then was the right either of France or Spain to the possession of the province of Texas? To come to any question of right between the parties upon the subject you must agree upon certain conventional principles: where and when your question of right must become applicable to the facts; and, as between them, it was a disputed question, and had been so from the discovery of the mouth of the Mississippi river by La Salle, and from his second expedition to find the mouth of the Mississippi coming from the ocean, in which he perished.
"Spain had prior claims to the country, but the claim of France was founded upon the last voyage of La Salle, and by extending a supposed derivative right, from the spot where La Salle landed half way to the nearest Spanish settlement.
"Mr. Monroe and Mr. Charles Pinckney, in their correspondence with Cevallos, assumed this as a settled principle between European nations, in the discussion of right to American territory. It was not contested, but was not assented to on the part of Spain; and, having found it laid down by Messieurs Monroe and Pinckney, I argued upon it, and it was never directly answered by Don Luis De Onis, who could not controvert it without going to the Pope's Bull.[89]
"As between France and Spain therefore, I maintained that the question of right, had always been disputed and never was settled, from which opinion I have not since varied. That we had a shadow of right beyond the Sabine I never believed since the conclusion of the Florida treaty, and, it is from the date of that treaty, that Great Britain had not a shadow of right upon the Oregon territory until we have been pleased to confer it upon her."
"I am, dear sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,
J. Q. ADAMS."
To Brantz Mayer, Esq., Baltimore."
[89] Alexander VIth's Bull of Donation.
[90] See "Matthew Carey's general map of the world,"—29th map—published 1814.—Kennedy's Texas, p. 4.—Mrs. Holley's Texas.—History of Texas, by D. B. Edwards, preceptor of Gonzales Seminary, Texas, 1836, p. 14. He says:—"Texas is bounded on the north by Red river, which divides it from Arkansas, Ozark District, and New Mexico; on the south by the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio de las Nueces, which divides it from the States of Coahuila and Tamaulipas; on the east by the eastern branch of the river Sabine and the State of Louisiana; on the west by the State of Coahuila and the territory of New Mexico."
Accompanying the work is a map of Texas with boundaries, as laid down above. In a note on one corner of the map, speaking of the Rio Grande, he says: "If this river should ever become the western boundary of Texas (as desired by the inhabitants) it will add a hundred miles to its sea-coast and fifty thousand square miles to its superficies; the southern section of the surface is sandy, barren prairie, almost destitute of water; and its northern rocky, sterile mountains, nearly as destitute of timber."
[91] Primera Campaña de Tejas: by Ramon Martinez Caro, secretary of Santa Anna, pp. 122, 125.
[92] Mr. Donelson wrote to Mr. Buchanan on the 2d July, 1845, from Washington, Texas, as follows: "My position is that we can hold Corpus Christi and all other points up the Nueces. If attacked, the right of defence will authorise us to expel the Mexicans to the Rio Grande. It is better for us to await the attack than incur the risk of embarrassing the question of annexation with the consequences of immediate possession of the territory on the Rio Grande. * * * The government left for treaty arrangement the boundary question in the propositions for a definitive treaty of peace. H. of R. doc. No. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 78, 79.
[93] I am informed by Mr. Parrott, the secretary of legation who accompanied Mr. Slidell, that no form of letters of credence—or evidence of powers as "commissioner to settle the Texan dispute," would have secured a hearing for our envoy. The mob, the army, and Paredes were determined that no missionary of peace should be received from the United States.
[94] The claim of Frederick the IInd to Silesia was considered plausible. As Bohemia renounced not only the possession, but all its rights to Silesia by the treaties of Breslau and Berlin and other subsequent treaties, the kings of Prussia pretended, that by virtue of the renunciation, they became sovereign dukes of the country and not subject to the emperor in their new character. To this claim it was replied that Bohemia being an imperial State, could not, of its own authority, destroy the feudal tenure by which Silesia was attached to it, and through it to the empire. The question was rendered more intricate, for one party considered Bohemia feudal only as to the electoral dignity, but as a kingdom free and independent of Germany. The Germans argued that Silesia was part of the empire, the Prussians considered it a separate and independent State. Frederick took advantage of these "state right" doctrines to sustain his claim, as Texas took advantage of her state right sovereignty when the central despotism of Santa Anna overthrew the federal constitution of 1824.
[95] Arnold's fourth lecture on Modern History.
[96] Waite's State papers, 1809-11, p. 261; and Clay's speech on the line of the Perdido.
[97] Pufendorf, Lib. VIII, c. 6.—Note by Barbeyrac.