APPENDIX C.
For these letters see Appendix A².
[APPENDIX D.]
Copy of the answer written by the Ulema undersigned, to the Sheikh Abdel Kader Ibrahim, and to the son of En Najoomi, dated 23rd Zu’l Kadi, 1301.
In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate, the Destroyer of him who is obstinate against His religion. Blessing and peace be on our Lord Mahomed and his successors, who have established the foundations and the solid pillars (of the faith).
God has sent down[261] in His glorious book, through which cometh nothing false, neither in its direct teaching nor in what may be deduced therefrom. This has been sent down by the All Wise and All Worthy of Praise (saying), This day I have completed[262] your religion for you, and I have perfected unto you My grace, and have granted unto you Islam as (your) religion; which is the last verse sent down to the Chosen One (Mahomed). After this let no one heed any saying or accept any act which is not dictated in the Book or the Soonna. But if there had been any (fresh) Revelation on which reliance could be placed for superseding any law of the (established) laws of Islam, it would involve accusing the precious Book of lying; for after completion no new thing can be added.
Moreover, it has been unanimously agreed that (anything claiming to be) a revelation of the prophet, on whom be blessing and peace, if its sense differ from the Law, that revelation is not to be acted upon, but must be set aside; and it is one of the absolute conditions of him who contends (for the faith) that he should not violate the unanimous agreement, that he who utters the double confession (of faith in God and the prophet) has (thereby) secured safety for his life and his property, unless by the Law (right) of Islam as is written in the Hadith;[263] and this Law (right) of Islam has been defined in the whole of the true Hadiths (namely) that breach of chastity and murder are contrary to Law (right) and (constitute) apostacy from Islam. And among apostates (is he) who forsakes his religion and causes schism in congregation as is (found) in the Hadiths.
Now this pretender to the office of Mahdi is causing schism in the congregation and has broken the staff (unity) of Islam, and has ruined the abodes of the Moslems, plundered their property, dishonoured their women, and made some tyrannize over others, as is in accordance with their apostacy, because they have made lawful the killing of the faithful, the dishonour of their women, and the plunder of their property, and calling them Kafirs (infidels) without cause, though these are observing (or defending) the laws of religion, and walking in the firm road (way of truth); moreover, the majority of his followers are sorely troubled by what they have seen of slaughter, infamy, pillage, and taking of captives, nor are they with him body and soul (heartily), the proof of which is that only a few days passed before some of them came to seek assistance from the Government against oppression, famine, and nakedness.
A number of letters have come, some of them from you, in which are a number of erroneous statements, wherein the Sheikh el Akbar says that the Most High God has appointed for the Mahdi a divine host of Ministers (Vizirs), whom God has reserved for him in the depths of His secret councils; He has revealed them declaring and witnessing about the Creation, and that which God has commanded for His servants; also that the Mahdi does nothing except by their counsel; and that they are Persians (foreigners), not one of them is an Arab, yet they speak nothing but Arabic; that they have a chief, Hafiz, who is not of their race, who has never at all rebelled against God; he is the chief of the Vizirs. Their number does not exceed nine, nor is it less than five. To every six there is a Vizir, who has special knowledge and functions. Here ends the quotation.[264]
But where are these foreign Vizirs, and that one among them who professes that he is an Arab? and what about their excess above that number?
And with all this you accuse us Ulema of error from the way of truth, and say that you know what others do not know; whereas, between you and him that has even the very least knowledge, there is a very wide gulf.
And in those letters you address His Excellency the Governor-General (Gordon) as Sáadat,[265] and yet they contain accusations of his being a Kāfir (infidel). Is not this to use terms which contradict each other?
In them you also say that the certain proof as to this being indeed the Mahdi, the Expected One, on whom be peace, was accepted by you at the very beginning of his manifestation, and forbids you to receive letters or to reply to them.
Also in some of your letters you say that you have been among the number of his Vizirs for the last thirty years. How is this after what you wrote lately under your seal to your Sheikh el Abeed, that whoever believes that this Mahomed Achmet is the Mahdi must needs be a Kāfir (infidel), because there has not come any Hadith, or revelation, or Athar, but shows to all the world the true nature of this man; therefore to believe in him would involve giving the lie to him, on whom be blessing and peace, who is, above all, worthy to be believed?
Here is contradiction? Since your love of the world has actually perverted you even into saying of him, “Peace be on him.”[266] (‘Alaihy es salaam.)
But the Prince[267] (of the faith), Abd el Ghani, the Nablusi, said in his book, the Hadik en Nadih, the commentary on the Mahomedan religion, No one ought to be distinguished by the salaam (after his name) excepting the prophets, for one cannot say, Ali, on whom be peace (salaam); and this rule applies both to living and dead alike, excepting that a person present may be addressed thereby, for people say, Peace be upon thee. Here ends the quotation.
You have pretended that the coming of the Imam the Mahdi, the Expected One, is proved for us and for you in the ancient books, and that it is impossible for you to incline unto us, and that the hostility of the Ulema against the Imam the Mahdi and their giving the lie to him are both proved and mentioned in the ancient books, and you call the attention of the Ulema to the book Keshef el Ghummah ‘an jamia’ el ummah of Shaàrani. But here, if you meant this for the ignorant who do not know the ancient books or Keshef el Ghummah, that might do, for there is not in all the ancient books any reference or allusion which concerns or points to any Mahdi. Nay, it has been denied by the greatest men as being unsupported by any Hadith or testimony, and it originates with the Shiahs, who pretend that our Lord Mohammed, son of the Hanafiyeh, will appear, and also his father ‘Ali, in the clouds. But, if we admit the sayings which seem to prove that there will be a Mahdi, where is the Khorassani, brother of him who is appointed Mahdi who is to prepare the way for him before his appearing? and where is the Safiyān who was to be king before him? and where is the arm which was to appear with the hand pointing (as if to direct)—This is the Mahdi. Follow him? And where is the dwindling of the Euphrates displaying the mountain of gold? Or have you found in him the tokens revealed by the prophet of God, on whom be blessing and peace, that the Mahdi will not disturb any who is sleeping nor will he shed blood. But there are proofs to you and to all that he has shed blood, and has disturbed sleepers to so great an extent that you have made bold to say that he will destroy all governments. Now if what is said about him and what you tell us about him (be true), what would be the fruit of joy and favour to those who submit to him, since the end is destruction?
Now the old books still exist. Produce, therefore, someone who can show us what you have asserted, for we have found no trace of your assertions as you have set them forth, especially because it is known to everybody who knows this man who pretends to be Mahdi that he has neither tribe nor relations of illustrious origin, and the tribe of which he comes is very small indeed, nor is it (strong enough) to give victory in any matters of religion to him who may come forth from it; and as to his standing alone and separate from any family, which you have put forward as indicating the validity of his claim, that in truth is a notable proof of its worthlessness; for, as the learned Imam Ibn Khaldoon said in his preface, of which we extract a literal copy and send it to you herewith, from which you will learn that he is not justified in his claim, and that the religious mission without (the support of) family will not abide, for every matter of public concern absolutely needs (the support of) family; and a following and mob of ignorant folk cannot be called family; but (the support of) family consists in ancestry and kindred, in whom support is to be found. Let not his pretension deceive you in that he says he is of the house (of the prophet), for this is not known or proved amongst people of position. But, if that were granted, have you seen with him any of the kindred of the prophet who help him to victory? The whole of his arguments in favour of his claim (establish) the contrary, and his proofs and evidences are such as decide against the truth of his claim. And if you had looked with the eye of justice, and followed the right, you would not have believed in this pretension, or have called on people to respond to it, while threatening them with death, pillage and more. But it was your duty to advise[268] the Moslems and not to take up arms against them. Have ye not read, He who kills a believer intentionally merits Jehennam everlastingly, and the wrath of God and His curse are upon him, and great torment is reserved for him? Or (have you read) the Hadith—He who has borne arms against us is not of us? Or the command of the prophet, on whom be blessing and peace (who says), In killing Also the Hadith—He is a believer to whom people have confided their property and their lives, and he has accomplished the Hegira who flees from sin and transgression. The believer is the mirror of the believer, and the believer is brother to the believer who shelters him from harm, and protects him from his pursuers? Also the Hadith—Whoever casts a look upon his brother believer to terrify him unjustly, God will terrify him in the day of Resurrection? Also the Hadith—The believers are as one man. If he accuse his head, he accuses the whole body; and if he accuses his eye, he accuses the whole (body)? Also the Hadith—The (true) Moslem is he from whose hand and tongue Moslems are safe, and the believer is he to whom people have confided their blood (life) and their property? We have looked at the preface of Keshef el Ghummah, and found that the author said in it—The prophet, on whom be peace, announced to me that this book will remain until the appearance of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, and his followers will profit by it, and by it will be able to dispense with the advice of the Mahdi in most matters of religion, for when he, on whom be peace, is come, he will do away with contradictions and differences of opinion on the earth, so that in his days there will remain none but the pure faith, and the body of the Ulema of his day will be secretly hostile to him. But there is not found in it that the Ulema err from the way of truth, but (there is found) they are to be excused for their thought when they see him differing in doctrine from the doctrine of their Imams on account of their conviction that there is no authority above the authority of their Imams; yet they would submit to him for fear of his power and through coveting the wealth he possesses, for he and the prophet are brothers, and no one will oppose him but will fail. Also in the Hadith (it is found) that they (? he) will follow the steps of the prophet, blessing and peace on him; he will be infallible, and he will not decree as to what is lawful or unlawful excepting as he, on whom be blessing and peace, would have decreed if he had been alive. He will not surpass any of their Imams in knowledge and thought in the least. This is what ought to be acted upon, and this as regards him who has attained such a degree of profound knowledge (of religion) that he has arrived at differing (ventures to differ), though the Imams are against him. But your Imam has not attained this degree of profound knowledge, for he knows nothing of the six sciences on perfection, on which this profound knowledge depends. Besides which, he has forsaken the axioms which are among the essentials of religion. But the Sha’arāni himself, from whose book you quote as guide, has said in his book El Yawakeet w’el Jowahir (‘Rubies and Jewels’) that the Mahdi is to be son of Hassan el Askari, and his birth will be in the night of the middle of Sha’abān, two hundred, fifty and five, and he remaineth until he meets Jesus the Son of Mary. (Sha’arāni) said, “Thus was I informed by Sheikh Hassan el Ar’āki when he met with me, and my lord Ali el Khowas confirmed the same.” End of the quotation. Now if his birth was in the year two hundred, fifty and five, and he is to be appointed Mahdi as a youth, as is found in the Hadiths, and (seeing that) from since then that one thousand and forty-six years have passed, while the age of your Imam does not amount to the tenth part of those years, how can you quote the evidence of Sha’arāni on your side and convict us of error by him, while he is quite clear in (saying) that which contradicts this pretension? Whereas if he (the Mahdi) had laid claim to sovereignty, that would have been more agreeable to his (Sha’arāni’s) saying:—He has made his claim because the people followed him. For the Governor-General here does not prevent any one from going to him or to any one else, but the roads are open to all who please; notwithstanding which the people do not cease to come in crowds and crowds, desiring the protection of his government; and he protects them, and is beneficent to them, and provides for them; whereas it is just the opposite with those who go to you, even the envoys. And if you doubt this, stop the seizing of booty and the killing of deserters, and pillage after fighting, and see after that who will follow you? For without doubt there are those who do so under compulsion, and are distressed thereat, and wrongly imagine that this is from the Turkish Government. But now we and you are here in the Soudan, and there is not one here of the Turkish Government. If you were to come to Kartoum you would not find a Turk. Why, then, is this war? Is it for the ruin of religion, the slaughter of Moslems, for the overthrow of houses and mosques, for the burning of the books of the religion of Islam and the killing of the Ulema, or to close the way against the pilgrimage of the Hajj (to Mecca)? And this is (your) Mahdi’s work! Now, because it has been declared in the Sabbeehh that religion is sincerity to God and His prophet, and His Imāms the Moslems and their people, we have written this unto you, in the hope that you will understand it and will act accordingly before you are hemmed in by the evil of your deeds. And as to this business, since its close and end are close at hand, we remind you thereof, and if that which we have enlarged upon is not sufficient for you, then let your Ulema and your notables come to examine the matter in a place where both parties will feel secure. For there is the Book and the Soonna, and let them bring about union between us, and God will guide whom He will and cause to err whom He will. But if this does not commend itself to you—although it is enjoined in the saying of the Most High,—If you should differ in anything submit it to God and His prophet, if ye be believers in God and in the last Day;—(then) attend to our proposal and come; let us call our sons and your sons, and our wives and your wives, and ourselves and yourselves, and consult, and lay the curse of God upon the liars. And be not misled by that which you have mentioned about the slaughter of Moslems in Kordofan and in the engagement with your Sheikh el Abeed, for this is nothing in comparison with what happened to the Moslems in the raid of Tithār and the slaughter of Nebuchadnezzar in the Holy House,[269] and the destruction thereof, and the war of Tamerlane, and others beside, which are written in the books, as will be understood on referring to them; also in the last war, in which were martyred, by the Beni el Asfar,[270] a number of Moslems past counting. And after the great wars and destruction of countries the Moslems have not seen any result injurious to the faith. Was not the Caaba overthrown by the engines of war? Were not the Imām Hussein and his family slain at Kerbela? Now, if all this proves that he who conquers has right on his side, why, then, did you not follow the conquering government which subjugated the Moslem countries? Moreover, as to the two engagements you have mentioned, and those who were killed in them, some of them were killed by thirst and some by treachery. And it is well known that war resembles the buckets (on a wheel like see-saw; one up, the other down). We are ashamed to reply to the foolish comparison you draw about the raid of Badr and that of Ohod, as we are also ashamed to reply to your Imam, who places on a level with the righteous Khalifs those weak (miserables), poor in faith, who are like brute beasts and even more ignorant. Were we to answer that, it would take too long, wherefore we lay hold of the reins of our pen and stop it from running in that Maidān (race-course). And God will direct in the right way. Signed and Sealed. Endorsed— “Letter from Faki Mustapha to Cassim el Moos, Melet of Shaggyehs. No seal to it.” In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate, the bountiful Ruler. Blessing upon our lord Mahomed; and on his successors and peace. From the servant of his Lord (without Whom he has no strength), the Fakeer of God Ahhmed el Mustafa the humble theologian, faithful to Mohammed, to the beloved and virtuous Cassim el Mousse, the Melek (king) whom may God ever preserve. After wishing you abundance of peace, I greatly desire (to see) you. May God never separate me from you or deprive me of you. And it is well known to your honour that after seeing you, and (after) your enlisting in our ranks (in faith), besides the previous friendly ties which draw us nearer to each other, that we have been very anxious about you and still think of you night and day; and more especially when you were in Baghshuda, and as was believed, near the Imâm, on whom be peace. Until (we heard that) the Most High God has delivered you in His mercy and goodness; and when you came to this town, inhabited by oppressors. And (when) it was the will of God that thou shouldst enter into this town our anxiety about thee increased on account of what we know of the power of the Mahdi, which no Government can withstand. And when a party of his enemies were destroyed we made inquiries as to those who were slain, being anxious (feeling compassion) for thee. And we pray to the most High God, publicly and privately, to deliver thee out of it (the city) in safety. And when we heard that you had departed from it to the Halfai, we returned thanks to God for the sake of your children and of our children, (both) for your safety and for your departure from among them. Praises be to God for this. We declare to you, O Beloved! that as to truth (of the mission) of this Mahdi (that) our being in his service is sufficient for you, if you believe in us. Do not pay attention to the Ulema of Kartoum who pretend that Gordon is right whilst he is the most determined of enemies to those who believe in the glorious Koran. But it was predicted, before his appearing, that the Ulema would be hostile to him and that he would kill them. Also that the nobles would be hostile to him and that he would fight them and kill some of them even (if they took sanctuary) under the curtains of the Kaaba (at Mecca). And this man is that very Mahdi who will perform those deeds. And as soon as we were convinced of the truth of his mission, we arose and submitted unto him. We left off study of the glorious Koran, and the (public) prayers on Fridays, and laid hold of him because he is the unfailing support (= rock, a phrase applied to God). We have not ceased to think of you, and when you were in Kartoum we tried to get the safe conduct, and we obtained it, for yourself and for your property and your children and your wives and all your followers—explicit, sealed and signed, and beyond chance of fraud or pretence. God is my witness in what I say. I tried to get that good tidings into the town to you, but could not find the way till God heard my prayers and did not disappoint my hopes concerning you, so that your wife and her mother came to the Mahdi, on whom be peace, and I obtained their safe conduct. I am most deeply anxious about you lest you should be (imprisoned) again with those people, whose ways God hath straitened (who are in difficulties), for the Imâm, the Mahdi himself (on whom be peace), has arrived at Schatt fifteen days ago. And he has honoured us these two days by writing (from him). If it is in your power to bring away with you all you have of arms and ammunition and ships (steamers), meet us with them—that will obtain for you great honour in the sight of the Imâm, and of his honourable followers; but if not, God will not require of any man more than he is able to do (quotation from the Koran). Then come by yourself, and if you leave behind you any property do not mind it, for you will obtain that at the conquest (of the city) without diminution. Be not troubled as to what has happened between you and the Fakeers in the East. It is a small matter considering the indulgence of the Imâm, on whom be peace. What you did will not be accounted as misdeeds compared with the misdeeds of Salehh Lik when he killed the Yakoobāt, and plundered their property; and the sons of the Mukâtify, and plundered their property, and took their children, although they were noble. In spite of all that, he is nearer than any other man to the Imâm, who has forgiven him, and given him full pardon. Do not take account of what you have done, but come out to us secretly, if not openly—that we may convince you of the truth (genuineness) of the Mahdi—by whom in His mercy God has strengthened our weakness. But beware of delay, for I fear that after his arrival here you will not find the way (open) to come to us, nor will our entreaties avail. Do not heed the ignorant talk of the Ulema of Kartoum, or to the pretences (ideas) of people who heed carnal things rather than sacred. Wherefore God has sealed their hearts so that they do not know. They are (foolish) like ostriches, yea they are inferior (to them). Oh, my beloved, come by yourself—or with those who are with thee if thou canst—but beware!—beware of delay. I warn you earnestly against going back to Kartoum after God has brought you out from thence. Hasten to us that we may help you before it be too late. The time of the Turks is over. The rope (line) of their dominion is cut (severed), and what God has cut cannot be mended. Do not hang upon (attach yourself to) that which has been cut, and which is declared by the chosen (people) of God to be indeed cut; as was declared by His prophet, on whom be peace. Now, according to what we know of your intelligence and knowledge (we say) do not be misled by the changes of this life,—for the days are few. (It is only for a time.) Peace be with you. (Signed)——The Fakeer of God, Ahhmet el Mustafa, The theologian, the faithful one of Mohammed. I have no seal. Dated 19 Zu’l Kâdi, 1301. September 10, 1884. Postscript.—I inform you that Gordon and the Ulema of Kartoum have had one of their mails captured in Metemma by a one-eyed man, named Mahomed Ahhmed—(going) to the Governor-General of Egypt (? Cairo). But as to Gordon’s letters, he says in them that he and those with him will perish if they are not reinforced within these two months, as they are in want, and have nothing left in their hands but Kartoum only. The sum of 55,000 guineas at Berber has been taken by the Fakeers, and the letter of the Kartoum people tells him that they have been lost. From this it is evident to you that there is no help for them. Therefore do not remain with them with your family. The wise man looks after himself. (Signed) Ahhmet el Mustafa. Same date. You will receive an answer to his honour Ahhmed Bek Ali Jallâb secretly sent to him, and hand his answer to bearer. Peace (to you). Same date. A Proclamation from Gordon, addressed to the people of Kartoum, preceded his arrival. He told them that, knowing of the general regret caused by the severe measures of the Government for the suppression of the slave traffic, and the seizure and punishment of all concerned, according to convention and decree, he had resolved that none should interfere with their property, and that henceforth whoever had slaves should enjoy full right to their service, and full control over them. When the terms of this document reached Europe, a storm of indignation was raised against both the law and the giver. Its terms were greeted as an insult to the honour of England, and as a violation of all the traditions of philanthropy. Few paused to consider who was the author of the concession, few to consider what that concession meant; almost all were as ready with their blame as but a short while before they had been prodigal of their praise. The implacable enemy of slavery was now its friend, and in the name of England had declared his change of front. What would the world say to this, and what could England say to the man who, however exceptional his character and career, had thus misrepresented her? Perhaps this proclamation, in Europe the motive of so much silliness and ill-feeling, did more than anything else towards enabling Gordon to win Kartoum. From the moment it reached the town the attitude of the inhabitants changed; sullen apathy was converted into joyful expectation, and thousands who had been ready to welcome the Mahdi became eager to show homage to Gordon. It was altogether a brilliant diplomatic conception, the work of a man who thoroughly understood the character of the people whom he addressed. It restored to those people rights of which they had been robbed, and which they were now in a position to regain for themselves whenever they would. Yet in the simple gift of what was already theirs lay the opportunity of avoiding much bloodshed and misery—an opportunity which Gordon’s insight into national characteristics enabled him to understand, and his rapidity of action enabled him to grasp. By the treaty of 1877, the Soudanese were permitted to hold their slaves until the year 1889; and this treaty was made when Egypt had no notion of relinquishing her possession of the country. Yet it was known to be useless, as its conditions could never have been carried out. The avowed object of Gordon’s mission to the Soudan was to remove the Egyptians, and to hand it back to its own children, an operation which in itself involved the permission to hold slaves for ever. Had Gordon said, “I come to concede you the Soudan, which is, when I leave, to be governed as you wish, but after 1889 you must not hold slaves,” the Soudanese, and the whole of Europe, would have thought him mad; but as he said, “I come to concede to you the Soudan, which is, when I leave, to be governed as you wish, so that you will have the right to hold slaves as long as you like,” it was only the Soudanese who were able to see the sense and value of the concession, and to call its author mad was a privilege reserved for certain European philanthropists.—The Story of Chinese Gordon, pp. 70-73. v. ii. Private. From the Mudir of Kartoum to the Governor-General of the Soudan. [This Report was made by H.E. Hussein Pasha, Mudir in the neighbourhood of Aloob in Kordofan, and it remained passing from hand to hand among the rebels till we heard of its existence. We demanded it, and received the following copy, which I transmit just as it is.] On Saturday, 2nd of Moharram, 1301, was accomplished the arrival of the detachment of troops in the vicinity of Aloob, which is near the government seat of Kordofan, by the will of the Creator. On inspection of them (the troops) it was found that they had suffered from excessive thirst and the not finding sufficient proper drinking water for the detachment, on account of the loss, six days before, of the guide who was appointed to lead the way, and on account of ignorance of the places where drinking water was to be found. The consequence of which was to throw the square into a state of confusion, to the extent that privates could not recognise their companies nor officers their men. The transport also was scattered—I mean that the animals were scattered singly (without control). It was then that Monsieur Hicks, commander of the detachment, ordered the men and officers to collect in order. But as one of the commanding officers of the detachment disobeyed, he referred the matters to Alî ed Deen Pasha, to see to bringing the detachment into order. But his Excellency answered him that he himself was the commander, and responsible. The consequence of which was to cause universal weakness and paralysis. We met a body of troops and were all surrounded in one place, and on account of what I have said—and for want of water until Sunday, as we did not find enough to last till then—and thus, it was impossible to escape destruction. But oh, alas for the Government authorities![271] who are (themselves) secure from danger. But if the will of the Most High God has ordained our death, (so far) delayed, it will be from thirst and not from anything else. I, the writer of this report, am called Hussein Pasha, Mudir, an officer of the Home Government in the army, a native of Egypt—one of those raised from the ranks; and I adjure you by God, who (may) see what I have written, (if) you are believers in God and his prophet that you will make this known to the Government authorities. The will of God be done, and there is no escape from the decree of God, Who hears and knows all things. May your life be prolonged. Written Friday, 19 September, 1884, 8 o’clock 12 minutes. Marked in the corner 77. Letter from General Gordon to Ibrahim Abd-el-Kader, Kâdi of Kalakla. This moment we have received a letter from the General of the English troops (stating) that the English troops who arrived in Dongola have killed the Fakih (theologian) El Huda and the Shareef Mahhmood who was sent from Mohamet Achmet for the blockade of Dongola—and they have (also) killed all the dervishes who were with them; and they are marching straight on Berber; and that the steamers we sent last week have arrived at Berber and found it perfectly desolate and empty. They entered it and seized the two steamers which were lying there. And (the General states) that Mahomet el Khair fled from them, and that before this he had deluded the people and told them to come to him to meet the army ready for Berber; some of them would not go, but some of them went to him, and when they asked him for their expenses he sent them to an empty room to take the cash. When they found no cash there he told them that it was in the possession of a Jin (demon). They were astonished at this. But when they found that the whole thing was deceit from beginning to end they returned to the places whence they came. Now, because you are one of our old friends, and because the brotherhood between us is a fact known to all people, we send you this news which we received seven days ago; and now we have very greatly strengthened the defences of Kartoum and its mines. We are now preparing an earthquake by means of electricity, and I fear for you on its reaching your place; nor do we wish you to be among the others (when it takes effect). Tell the son of Najoomi and Abu Kerjah to go to Dongola. It is better for them; and later on, when we are arranging matters, we will make them Sultans. Do not say that Kartoum is starving, or eating dogs and asses. I swear that such provisions are not to be found with you as are to be found in Kartoum—both eatables and drinkables. We do not desire your immediate submission to the Government, lest Mohamet Achmet should suspect you; nor should we wish you to obey Mohamet Achmet, but that you should remain neuter until you see what will happen. As I know that you need soap for washing your faces, I here send you a small box of that wherewith we wash our faces. Salute the son of Najoomi from me, and tell him (that) to-day there came to us a man from your side, like a peacock, from the quantity of coloured patches ornamenting his mantle, so that the inhabitants were astonished at him. A letter from the Ulema to Mohamet Achmet is also sent to you. Please forward it to him safely. 30th of Zu’l Kadi. Sept. 21, 1884. From Abd el Kâder Ibrahim, Kâdi of Kalakla, to General Gordon. In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. Praise be to God the bountiful Ruler—with blessing on our lord Mahomet, and peace. From the servant of his lord Abd el Kâder Ibrahim—the Kâdi of Kalakla to Gordon Pasha. Three times have we warned you, sufficiently for people who have sense; and all on account of your friendship for us, of which you spoke in your letter. This was for your safety and for the safety of the poor and of the Moslems who are with you in the city. But neither our warnings nor our arguments have taken effect upon you. You write to us every time that you are steadfast in denying (the mission of) this Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace. But nothing has led you to this false conclusion except the enmity between the Moslems and the infidels—and the sayings of the wicked Ulema who are with you at Kartoum as well as the love of supremacy and of this life—and the desire to continue therein. O delusion! delusion! (go to! go to!) But know that all that thy informants have told thee, and of which thou hast told us, is false; for had there been anything in it we were better informed than (any such things taken place we had better opportunities of knowing it than) thou; because the post and (other) communications pass by night and by day in all parts (of the country) which has submitted to the Mahdi, upon whom be peace. And if such things as you mentioned were to happen that would not weaken his title to be Mahdi. But the Imâm the Mahdi, upon whom be peace, is victorious; and beyond all doubt he will destroy all rebels and hypocrites, although he were left alone in the world without a man with him, as has been proved by evidence and by eye-witnesses. Such communications as you send do not please the hearts of the auxiliaries (of the Mahdi)—especially of their Emirs—for by God, they are firmly resolved and determined, and every one of them comes and goes (being) willing to die; and they are not afraid of threats by word or deed. But under all circumstances they trust in God. For this Mahdi is right. English troops or chemicals (electricity) or stores of ammunition will not avail against the Mahdi. What will avail (you) is to return to the truth and cast away what is false; and for all to submit and surrender to this Imâm, upon whom be peace. There is no deliverance or safety excepting in him; and if you really have friendship for me, as you say, listen to my words and benefit by them, and surrender yourselves with the Moslems,—otherwise the day will soon come when you will learn who has been the greatest liar. As to the box of soap sent by your messenger, it has reached us, and here we send it back to you rejected; because your sending back the present of the Imâm the Mahdi—upon whom be peace—compels us to return your present. And how could we do otherwise than return it, when you sent back the present of the Vicegerent upon Earth of God, and His prophet, upon whom be blessing and peace? Whereas acceptance of a present promotes goodwill. In fine, this letter now (last) sent has done nothing but increase the ill-will; for if you and the people of the city had known the facts about the auxiliaries of the Imâm, upon whom be peace, who are now (in arms) against and around the city, you would not have written this, but you would simply have surrendered—if so be that God wills your safety and that of those that are with you. This is my advice to you. (Surrender.) God is the guide into all truth, and unto Him all return and submit. (Signed) Abd el KÂDER Ibrahim. Written last day of Zu’l Kadi, 1301. Sept. 21, 1884. From Abderrahhmân en Najoomi and Abdallah en Noor to Gordon Pasha. In the name of God the merciful and compassionate. Praise be to God the bountiful Ruler, with blessing on our lord Mahomed and his successors, and on whom be peace. From the servants of their Lord Abderrahhmân en Najoomi and Abdallah en Noor to Gordon Pasha, representative of England and of the Khedive. May God guide him into truth. Amen. We have to state to you that as to thy presence in the Soudan this last time, and thy first letter to the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace, and as to thine appointment by the Khedive; the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace, has written to thee, and has shown thee the truth in leading thee to God; and also that which concerns thy salvation and that of those with thee, and how thou mayest attain salvation in this world and in the next. Thou hast replied to his Highness (in a manner) contrary to that (which was) expected (of thee) rejecting the truth, whether for or against thee. After we arrived with our hosts to fight thee and drive thee into submission—willingly or unwillingly—the Imâm, out of compassion for thee and those with thee, a second time exhorted thee to surrender to the command of God and his prophet, and gave thee the covenant (in the name) of God and His promise that if thou didst surrender thou shouldst be (assured of) safety, with thy children, thy property, and all that thou hast, (thus) securing to thee the same (privileges) as to us, and the same (duties) as are required of us. You have received that letter of his by his messengers the Moslems whom he appointed from thence to advise thee, after our arrival in this (desert) Deem. But neither you nor those with you have accepted the call (wherewith) God and His prophet have called you. You answered as you did to our lord, and you demanded a thing of Abd el Kâder Ibrahim, when el Jâber the Moslem came (to thee), (who was) one of the messengers sent to thee for negotiation—(but) thou didst send him back. Yet we had sent him to thee in our intention for good and in our goodwill towards thee and towards those with thee. And we wrote to you the advice which reached you. Nevertheless, you did not listen to the truth nor accept it—because the will of God must be accomplished. We had therefore resolved not to correspond any more with you, nor to communicate with you except by the sword and such like weapons, until we have destroyed your glory and your strength departs (from you) and we pluck you out by the roots when we seize you in our grasp. However, yesterday your messenger arrived with a letter from you to our brother Abd el Kâder Ibrahim, in which you deceitfully counsel him and try to seduce him from his religion, and in which you tell him to desire us and Aboo Kerja to go to the Dâr el Gharb (West) (as being) better for us—because when you are arranging matters you will make us Sultans. But every man of sense knows that all things are in the power of God and not in your hand, nor in that of those who appointed you, nor in that of the English, on whom you depend. And you lie unto the people with you about their arrival (the English) at Dongola, and about their killing Sheikh Ahhmed el Huda and the Shereef Mohammed; and that they were going straight to Berber; and that Mahomed el Khair[272] the Emir of Berber ran away from them, and made fools of the men with him when they asked him for their pay. As to your promise of making us Sultans when you settle the affairs of the country as stated in your letter, and your statement that the steamers sent last week by you had found Berber desolate and deserted, and that the two steamers found there had been captured, we have learned from this letter of yours that the steamers you sent did not seize anything at Berber except only the steamers, and it is known to all the world that the Moslems captured a quantity of Government stores which were in Berber. But you do not mention having seized any of them—only the steamers. Lying does not become a Pasha such as you. And we received the day before yesterday a letter from Mahomed el Khair telling us that he was on the shore—both east and west—ready to fight your steamers. And, please God, they (the steamers) with the guns, will not go back to you a second time. But the last will overtake (redeem) the first, and you will not hear of them again. We did not think that with your intelligence and your knowledge that God has strengthened us in His earth, you would have told us lies or tried to frighten and deceive us, and those who are with us, by talking of things (already better) known to us, and of which we have constant information, (receiving) news day and night from all parts of the world. And you seem to have chosen for us, that we should go back to the West (Dâr el Gharb;) trying to deceive and mislead us through desire for the life of this world, and (as though) we covet (the dignity) of being Sultans and (to have) dominion. But we call upon thee to come to God and His prophet, and to follow the right faith, and to reject the religion in which thou art, and to adopt the religion of our prophet Mahomed, on whom be blessing and peace; and the fellowship of his Khâlif Mahomed, the Mahdi, on whom be peace. If thou wilt do this thou shalt have honour in this world and in the next. Otherwise, if thou dost still look forward to the coming of the English, who, as thou pretendest, have reached Dongola, and are going to Berber, know for certain and be sure—and accept the advice we give thee on the subject—that all the Soudan country, except Kartoum and the towns of Sennaar and Dongola, is all of it in the hands of the Mahdi, and in the possession of his honourable friends. From the extreme border of the Soudan to Suakin, and to Reef, no one shares with them (in the possession thereof). The Government who sent thee as Governor-General does not possess a single hand-breadth of ground. The English came several times to Suakin. They were killed (fought) by one of the lieutenants there—Oshman ibn Aboo Bekr Digna—who has captured all their armies and the booty thereof. Therefore, look to thy own safety elsewhere without (relying on) them, and prepare thyself for what may happen to thee before their arrival. For the whole English Government (nation) could not pass by way of Suakin or Dongola. But even if the English were to come God would kill them by the hand of His faithful before they (could) reach you. Know that the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace, has sent us for the sole express purpose of fighting thee and as advance-corps to prepare the way of his army and of his Highness. But whereas thou hast been appointed Governor on behalf of two eminent Governments—and as thou sayest that thou hast come to arrange the affairs of the Soudan—thou wilt not find a better opportunity for carrying out thy intention and desire successfully than (now) in these two days before the arrival of the whole army. But if thou and those with thee in the town delay—awaiting the English—till after the arrival here of the whole army and the noble presence (of the Mahdi) you will be disappointed in your hope and desire. Therefore it (will be) much better for thee to collect all thy forces and come out to meet us beyond the fortifications, from which we are but an hour distant. Then thou and thy men may attain your wish, and go back to your fortress, happy in having fought us. But if thou dost delay until the arrival of the whole army and of the noble presence, we are certain that you will not then think of fighting or of hoping to possess (conquer) any more. It can therefore only be your excessive fear of us which prevents your coming out and fighting us. Soon, please God, thou and those with thee will be in our grasp, and will taste the sore evil (result) of your unwillingness to follow the way of God. Know oh! Excellency Gordon, that whereas thou hast said in thy letter to Abd el Kâder Ibrahim that thou wast diligently working in preparing an earthquake, and didst fear for him when it should reach him, that thy saying is nonsense, unworthy for an intelligent being to utter. Has the Earth, indeed, brought out to thee her demons? (for thy service). Thou hast tried to frighten him by saying that thou wast coming out thyself to fight and kill us, and didst order him to leave us. But this (coming out to fight) would have pleased us better. The earth is (become) too straight for thee, wide though it be, and thy ways (of escape) are cut off. Look out for thyself (to find) way of escape from the judgments (vengeance) of God and of His prophet. For we have thee by the hair of the head, through the power of God and his will. As to the answer sent by the Ulema to the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace, we have sent it by a special messenger to be placed in his hands. But do not thou rely on the lies they tell in it, because since the reply which they sent by Jāber the Moslem, in which they denied in the strongest terms (the validity of the claim of) the Mahdi, they sent messengers and letters to the Mahdi, on whom be peace, apologizing for what they wrote to him, and for what they may (in future) write, making oath to him that they are compelled by you to utter these things for fear of their life, and (only do so) pending the arrival of his noble presence, and they pray him not to have any ill-will against them for what they may say. If thou hast sense, do not regard what they write, but have it sent through you. And whatever you may find to your interest and for the prolongation of thy dominion, about which thou art deluded, and from which thou shalt soon depart, please God, do it without their advice or counsel, for all they show thee is only deceit, till they (can become) master of their opportunity to join the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace. As to the favour which God has granted to Sheikh Ahhmed el Huda and Shereef Mahmood and the faithful ones with them to die as martyrs, that is the ultimate object (of desire) for all followers of the Imâm the Mahdi, on whom be peace, and what they have promised him (to do), and what they pray God may honour them (in granting to them). We pray God to grant us the favour He has accorded to them, and to bestow on us the honours of martyrdom, pleasant in His sight. And we continue in prayer to God to make us among His beloved ones honoured by Him with martyrdom. For He has the power to do this, and to Him it appertains to hear (prayer). What we have said is enough. God has the guidance in His hand. (Date and Seals cut off.) [The length of these letters, and the persuasions used, even the great sheet of paper and the writing of the letters, testify to the great respect in which General Gordon was held. The subterranean earthquake or mine—to be produced by chemicals or electricity—is mentioned in this letter in reply to the mention made in General Gordon’s former letter. These chiefs do not believe he could do such a work except by aid of demons or Jins. Where, in exhorting General Gordon to surrender, they point out his critical condition, and use the phrase, “We have thee by the hair of the head,” this is in allusion to the conqueror’s hold upon a prostrate foe (by the one lock of hair which Moslems have on their heads), just at the last moment, when the sword is uplifted to slay.] Letter from General Gordon to the Honourable the Sheikh Abderrahhmân en Najoomi. Yesterday we wrote to you (as to) the arrival of the English troops in the neighbourhood of Merowé, and to-day also we have received letters from the troops, and herewith we send you a specimen of the correspondence; and although it it is very minute we have read it with a magnifying glass. But you must open your eyes well that you may yourselves see its minute letters. English troops have arrived in the neighbourhood of Merowé; ten regiments, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and the rest are behind them in Dongola and Wady Halfa. (We are informed) that the Mudir of Dongola has killed the Fakir (Theologian), Ahhmed el Huda, and the Shereef Mahmood, who is the uncle of Mahomed Achmed, sent from Kordofan. Every one of their host was destroyed. Other information has reached us by special messenger from Berber, that our steamers have entered and are awaiting the arrival of the army. Before now we announced in one of our proclamations issued to the inhabitants after our arrival, that we had repeatedly advised the people to give up (their rebellion) but they did not return (to allegiance) and that we should be obliged to bring English troops to this country to chastise the rebellious and bring them to submission. But I suppose you considered these words to be lies until this army arrived near to Berber, (an army) which no strength of theirs could withstand. A few days ago we sent you notice to go to Kordofan and remain there, and that we would make you one of the Sultans of the West. You had better listen to this advice and go with your men and be happy with them, obeying your Sultan Mahomed Achmed. Information has reached us that you have made contracts with the Arab sheikhs for bringing provisions upon their camels, (for) about 1000 camels, and (that) the sheikhs received from you a quantity of ready money for buying provisions and ran away from you. All the Soudan soldiers hate you and have come to us; but if we are bad, as you imagine, these soldiers would not have followed us. Mahomed Achmed informs us that he ordered Aboo Kerjah to convert us to his faith, but this fellow understands drinking Merissa (i.e. date-beer) better than anyone else, and we think he may teach us Merissa-drinking. Please God, the soap we sent yesterday to Sheikh Abd-el-Kader, to wash his face with, may be found like (as good as) the towel which Mahomed Achmed sent to Mr. Costi (Cuzzi) Moosa to wipe his face with.[273] The guns we fired yesterday were (in rejoicing at) news of the coming army. Therefore the first and best thing (for you to do) is to consider the news sent you herein enclosed, and arise and go back to your places with whatever you have of guns and such like, as the air is bad here. But Sheikh Ibrahim Abd-el-Kader may remain in his place as his home is in the neighbourhood of Kalakla, and as he is one of our friends and an owner of crops in this district. But if you do not listen to this advice, one of these days you will arise in the morning and find yourselves in a tremendous earthquake.[274] As for the cannon you fired at us yesterday, they killed about 20,000 of our soldiers, so that we were altogether tired out with burying the dead, and this is as war should be. After writing this we received your last letter, and as you do not accept the advice, remain where you are with Sheikh Abd-el-Kader as you now are. Gordon Pasha in Kartoum. (Signed) C. G. Gordon. Date 2nd Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301. Aug. 24, 1884 (On the back of General Gordon’s letter.) Reply to General Gordon. In the name of God the Merciful and the Compassionate. From Abderrahhmân en Najoomi and Abdallah en Noor to Gordon. Yesterday we sent you an answer to your letter brought to us by your messenger, who is going back, in which we told you to come out of the fortress to meet us in fight before the arrival of the standards (troops) sent to us from the Imâm Mahomed, the Mahdi, on whom be peace, as we are now near to you—within eyesight. And (as) probably you will not have another opportunity after these two days. But you have not done so. Even to-day we have received your letter and proclamation, both sealed and signed by you, which are not satisfactory answers to our letter. But you put in them nonsense—like unto dreams. But we are better informed than you; for the hands (power) of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, are over the whole world; and he receives news from all parts thereof. We are not inside a fortress listening to the sayings of hypocrites, who run away like slaves, and the like—on whose authority you issue lying and deceitful proclamations. You mention in your answer[275] that you have received a letter from the troops; but on looking at it we find (that it is) a proclamation from you, with your own seal, and not from the army. How can you say so, and contradict yourself? From this we learn that all your sayings are lies. And after this let there be no more letters or communications between us and you; but (only) war. The proclamation is enclosed (returned).Zu’l Kadi 23rd, 1301.
September 14th, 1884.Moosa Mahomed, Mufti of theMejlis of Kartoum. Sheikh el Emin Mahomed,President and distinguishedone (Primus) of the Ulema ofthe Soudan. Shākir Effendi, Mufti of theCourt of Appeal of theSoudan. Sheikh Hussein el Madhi,Professor of Science at theMosque. Mahamed Khowajli, Supreme
Kādi of the Soudan.[APPENDIX E.]
[APPENDIX E¹.]
[APPENDIX F.]
[APPENDIX G.]
[APPENDIX K.]
[APPENDIX L.]
[APPENDIX M.]
| (Signed) | Abderrahhmân en Najoomi, Abdallah en Noor. |
This letter is without any of the usual forms of civility at the top, and is addressed simply “to Gordon,” without any title, and on the back of his own letter. It is also written high up, near the top of the sheet, as from a superior to one greatly his inferior.
[APPENDIX N.]
Letter from Lieut-Colonel Stewart, C.M.G., to General Gordon.
Island of El Hassa Heya, 4 miles south of Berber,
14th September, 1884.
My dear General,
You will no doubt be surprised at our not having yet passed Berber, but the fact is, we had several vicissitudes the first couple of days. You know already what happened the first day, how through the ignorance of the captain and the Reis, we ran into the bank and damaged our wheel. The second day the captain ran us on to a mud bank, where we stuck for four hours, and were with difficulty got off by the Saphia. This was too much for my patience. I am sorry to say I lost my temper and rather severely handled the individual, turned him out and put the second in command; on the 11th we passed safely through the Shoboloha defile. We saw the broken end of the telegraph cable which is to the south of the defile. Anchored for the night opposite the village of Om Ghirka, and on the right bank, at a small cultivated island inhabited by Shaggyeh, whose chief is Bab Bekr el Mek, a brother of Cassim el Moos. His people received us very well; supplied us with all the wood they could get. The chief came on board, complained greatly of the dervishes, but said, with the exception of the Shaggyehs all the tribes were wholly with the Mahdi. I enclose a letter which he has written you. He begs you will send soldiers, rifles, etc., when he will openly declare himself for the Government. So far as I am able to judge, the Shaggyehs are strong for the Government. At the Shaggyeh villages we passed, the people all showed their joy at our appearance by dancing and shouting. The villages were all along the right bank. The left bank was sullen, if not openly hostile. Bab Bekr reported that a boat full of dervishes had been recently up the river, collecting tithes; the Fascher steamer also appears to come up now and then. The Arabs also appear to have received news of our expedition. During that night war drums were being beaten on the left bank. On the 12th we received some shots from the left bank, and about mid-day halted at a Shaggyeh island for an hour or so, where we got some wood. The people were again friendly. Beyond this island we got into the Djaalen country. Passed Metemma, where we saw crowds of people and several flags; were fired on, but distance too great to do any harm. Soon after reached Shendy. Here we were also fired on. The Government house has been loop-holed, and there is a small breastwork wall in front of it. The Saphia threw a couple of shells into the town. Saw a man with a letter making signs to us, so stopped a little below the town, but he did not come on. Halted again at an island and looted the village on it; killed a lot of cattle and pulled the houses and Sakkéyés down. We were again fired on from the left bank, and the war drums were beaten all night. On the 13th we found both banks of the river openly hostile. Close to the low hills of Om Ali, on right bank, we saw a gathering of horse and foot; fired at them and knocked over a horseman. Below this point we had to hug the right bank very closely, and some Arabs turned out, ran alongside the steamer, waving swords and lances. We could have knocked them over with the greatest ease, but refrained, as they were so plucky. In the afternoon looted a boat going up with sugar. Halted on right bank about an hour and a half above El Duem. War drums going on all night. On the 14th we spent the day destroying Sakkéyés in a systematic manner, taking them one after another. They gave us a fine supply of wood, without which it would be absurd to go on to Berber. Should think we have destroyed fifteen to twenty Sakkéyés. This evening, when halted, have noticed a number of horse and foot come from the north to the village opposite on right bank. After looking at us for some time they retired, apparently in the direction of Damr. I suppose they came to reconnoitre, and perhaps to attack us while destroying Sakkéyés. To-morrow we shall start before daybreak, and the steamers will escort us to the other side of Berber. I think everything now is in fair working train, and am sanguine of getting through all right.
At the village of Bab Bekr, an Egyptian soldier came on board who had belonged to the Berber garrison. He had been sold for fourteen dollars to a certain sheikh, who is said to have a lot more of his comrades. I shall send him on as baksheesh to the Khedive. So far as I am able to judge, with the exception of the Shaggyeh, the whole country is with the Arabs; have no certain news about Dongola, beyond that the garrison is strong. Some have told us there is a large Egyptian force there, but others appear to have no knowledge of it. Cannot say much in favour of the men on Saphia and Mansowrah. They will think of nothing but loot, will not work, and scatter about in the most dangerous way. Omar Bey appears to have little control over them. I must, however, say that both he and the steamer captain have done everything in their power to assist me, and more especially the captain of the Mansowrah.
Both Herbin, myself, and Power, wish to be remembered to you. You may depend upon it that I shall do everything in my power to assist you. Thanking you for the very great kindness with which you have overlooked my shortcomings, and praying that the blessing of the Almighty may abide with you,
I remain, my dear General,
Yours very truly,
O. H. Stewart.
P.S.—How I wish you were with us.
I have advised Omar Bey on account of the very indifferent quality of his troops, who are no better than an armed mob, to be very careful how he lets them land anywhere. He tells me he has now fuel sufficient to remain two days at Berber, and steam again some distance up the river, and that he does not intend to allow them to land. I confess I think he shows his discretion. The incident I mentioned of the Arabs running alongside our steamer and defying us with sword and lance, impressed me vividly with their daring and recklessness. I am afraid our miserable troops would be scattered as chaff before the wind by them. As far as Shendy you may consider the right bank, if not wholly friendly, is not at any rate openly hostile.
With that exception the whole country so far as I have seen is hostile. The Djaalen have I am afraid gone over heart and soul to the Arabs. All our successes and failures are known everywhere. Mahomet Ali Pasha’s defeat is perhaps exaggerated.
I forgot to mention that the country is in fine cultivation, and the people working away at their irrigation as if nothing was the matter. South of Shendy on right bank they did not run away at our approach, and even north of that place some few remained and looked at us unconcernedly. Most however, north of Shendy, ran away, or fired at us.
Letter from Monsieur Herbin, the French Consul, to General Gordon.
15 Septembre 1884.
Mon Général,
Avant de passer Berber permettez-moi de vous remercier encore mille fois de toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour moi et de vous affirmer que je n’oublierai jamais le charmant accueil que le Consul de France a trouvé auprès du “O Komudar,” M. Herbin—auprès du Général Gordon.
Malgré les ennuis que vous a causé Mahomet Achmet, je ne regretterai pas, je vous assure, mon voyage à Khartoum, car j’espère que vous me permettrez, plus tard, de vous rappeler que je m’y trouvais en même temps que vous.
Avec les vœux que je fais pour que les événements soient dirigés par Dieu dans un sens qui vous soit favorable, recevez, mon Général, l’assurance de mes sentiments de profond respect et d’absolu dévouement.
Herbin.
P.S. Vous me pardonnerez, n’est-ce pas, de vous écrire au crayon.
A Son Excellence,
le Général Gordon,
Khartoum.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IV.
[APPENDIX P.]
Letter from Abou Gugliz to General Gordon.
In the name of God the Almighty and merciful, and praise be to our Prophet Mahomet and his relations.
From the servant of God Mahomet Osman Abou Gugliz to Gordon Pasha, the beloved by England, and the Khedive, may God beguide him to the true faith. Be it known to you that the bearer, Fatmah, has been seen by the Fakeers, and they thinking she was a spy, they imprisoned her. It is true that she is suspicious, being from the inhabitants of Kartoum. When I saw her I forgave her, and have released her from prison, and left it to her choice whether to remain here or go back to Kartoum—she preferred going back, therefore I send her; if she is a spy ask her, and she will tell you—if not, treat her as you think right.
23 El Hejah, 1301.
October 13th, 1884.
Seal.
[APPENDIX Q.]
From Fakirs El Sayet Eltahen and Hamed Idreer to Commandant Omdurman Fort.
In the name of God, the Merciful and Almighty, praise be to Him and our prophet.
From El Sayet Eltahen and Hamed Idreer to Issat Osman Bey, the Colonel and Commander of Omdurman Station, and to all officers with him, our brethren in God. After many salaams and anxiety to see you, we write as friends and companions of the same religion, and as there has been no animosity or hatred existing between us up to the present day, we inform you that the Government of Egypt is no more under the Turkish Empire, but the English have taken possession of it, and you, being Arabs and Moslems, how would you then remain with the infidels and join Gordon, who has no one except slaves and other very low class of people, and Kartoum being surrounded on all sides with great numbers of troops, notwithstanding the approach of the Descendent of the Prophet, our Iman, and the Iman of all Moslems, Mohamed Achmet, the Mahdi, son of Abdullah, who has come to a very short distance from Omdurman with an unlimited number of troops, how Kartoum can oppose them. When we saw these signs, we have hastened to write to you these lines, and ask you to come with all your belongings and join our Emir, and that you should be admitted into the fellowship and take security. You had better not delay until Wednesday, because the Immaum is expected either to-morrow, Tuesday, or Wednesday. So do not procrastinate one single day. Come before the Immaum comes, and you will be well received and well treated; the same as happened to those who have come before you. You are, no doubt, aware of the mercy of our Emir Ahmad el Mostapha; and the Mahdi has sent orders to the said Emir, and instructed him that all who come out from Kartoum or from the fort should be given security and receive no harm. Therefore, you should send two messengers to meet us, and inform us of your designs; and we hope to be the cause of your safety. Let it be known to you that our Emir is like the ark of Noah—whoever comes to it will be saved, and who refuses will perish in deluge; so do not procrastinate not one day. The Emir was in communication with you at first, to send messengers from your part, in order to come to an understanding; but now there is no time for that. One single day will be enough to cause your perish. On account of friendship we send you this advice; and God is a witness of the truth of our statement. You are strangers in this country, but not strangers to our religion; but Gordon is a stranger to both. Now then, would you leave us and join him? We are told that Gordon Pasha is telling you that the English are coming. What if they come? What can they do to our troops? We are very certain that the English who are at Suakin have all perished by Osman, and those who are at Assouan are besieged there, and have fortified themselves there, and given up the Soudan; so all the projects of that infidel are failing, and also the steamer of Stewart Pasha and the Consul was caught at the cataract, and those who were on board were all killed. We send you also a letter addressed to Farratch Pasha el Zeeb. Should you think right, send it to him; and, if you fear the result, tear it up and destroy it. Leave the others and come and be saved. We are here near you; come to us secretly, and leave those infidels to their fate. Send Ibrahim your servant, with those you chose to send as messengers, as he is trustworthy, and we can deliver any secret to him. We await your early arrival, so as to go together with Emir Mustapha, on Tuesday the 23rd El Hajah, to the Mahdi. Peace be upon him!
| (Signed) | Hamed Idrees. El Sayet Eltaher. |
From Faki Mustapha to Commandant Omdurman Fort.
In the name of God, &c., &c.
From the servants of God, Ahmed el Mustāpha, the Governor of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, son of El Iffah el-Ameen to Issat Osman Bey Caimmakam of the Omdurman Station, and to all the officers and soldiers, may God direct the right.
Good friends, we have so often called you to God and to His Apostle, and to his Mahdi (Reformer), on whom be peace, in our letters, but you have neither come nor sent us messengers. But inasmuch as the Fakirs performing patrol duty, and the sentinels tell us that you do not fire upon them if they fire at you, and if they pass close by you you do them harm, hence we hope good of you, and hope of God that you will be directed to the Mahdiship. And now the man of the times has come, the Iman of all Moslems, the successor of God’s Apostle our Lord Mahomed the Mahdi [Reformer], son of Abdullah, to a place near to us one day’s journey from our camp. Out of solicitude for God’s creatures we have taken the trouble to write this to you after having done so already repeatedly; and we have sent you your Brethren, Saddeek, son of Taher, and Hamid el-Shâyib, in order that you should meet them outside beyond the Fakeers, and agree with them on the plan which shall spare your property and children, and write you to us before the arrival of the Mahdi, lest you be lost with those who are lost, which God forbid. You know our solicitude for the people, and that we do not interfere with the property or lives without legal authority. Therefore do not fear us, neither the Imâm, on whom be peace, and who is better than we and better than all God’s creatures, excepting God’s Prophet. Therefore you shall have security from God, His Prophet, His Reformer [Mahdi], and security from me also, who am God’s humble servant. Keep this as a document to witness against us, sealed with my seal, both in this world and the next, that if the least harm befall you, your children, or your property, if you write yourself to me this night, which is the night before Tuesday the 24th el-Hijjah, for fear lest you delay further you will find no other opportunity of reaching us, and will perish. We have already informed you that this Mahdi is the true and expected Reformer who shall possess the eastern parts and the western parts of the earth. Will he therefore be too weak to conquer Kartoum, in which there are only base people and people having no following? And we know perfectly the number; and they are in want of their relief from the North, which has been cut off; and the steamer called Kartoumiah has been taken, and the Fakeers have killed those who were in it, and it was sunk over against Gordon like the people of Seba. Do not therefore destroy yourselves with him. Those admonished you out of pity for you that you may be among those who are saved, not among those that perish. If you listen to my words, come out to your Brethren, and afterwards come to us, and we will speak about that which will be for your interest, that is to say, we will agree with you on the delivery of the sentinels by night, so that the morning will find the Fakeers there, and will find you with your property with your Brethren here in the camp, and to-morrow we will meet the Imâm near here, and you will have saved yourselves. But if you reject our words you will rue it, and I have thus admonished you.
(Signed) Ahmad Mustapha el-Ameen.
October 13, 1884.
23 Hijjah, 1301.
P.S.—Herewith is a letter to Ferratch Pasha el-Zeeb, if you send it by some one who will keep the secret all right. But if any harm come to you therefrom, then let it alone and save yourselves, and if you come to us now, and one piastre of your property be lost, or one drop of your blood, I am responsible, for this is a document against me. Besides, Our Sovereign Lord the Imâm has given security to all who come over to us from the people of Kartoum, and from your fort, and there is no fear.
[L. S.]
[APPENDIX R.]
Letter from Slatin Bey.
A Son Excellence Gordon Pacha,
Gouverneur Général du Soudan.
Excellence,
J’ai me permi d’écrire à votre Excellence une lettre en allemande dans laquelle je vous offre mes services. J’ai été obligé d’écrire à votre Excellence en allemande parce que on a brûlé mon Dictionnaire française croyat c’est une livre de prière crétienne. J’espère de trouver l’occasion de m’uni avec votre Excellence et l’acceptation de mes services. J’espère que vous vous portez bien et prie Dieu qui vous donne la siege.
Votre
Dévoué et obéissant serviteur,
Slatin.
Une de vos Sandechaque, Abdel Habin, a écri une lettre ici demandant le pardon, comme j’entende veulent les Scheigines quitte le Halfai et sê uni avec les partisans du Mahdi pas par l’enémitié contre votre Excellence, non seulement par peure pour leurs femmes et enfants.
J’entends que votre Excellence m’ont écri une lettre, me je ne l’ai pas reçu; on dit que le Chalifa Abdullah l’a brûlé.
Letter from Slatin Bey.
His Excellency Gordon Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan:
Your Excellency,
I have learnt through George Calamatino, the bearer of the letter from Mahomet Achmet, that your Excellency, not knowing the true facts of the case, judges my proceedings and capitulation disparagingly. I therefore take the liberty of informing you of the true state of affairs as they are and as they have been, and beg that you may form your opinion of me accordingly.
Since my appointment as Governor of Darfur, I have been engaged in warfare with Sultan Haroun and Dud Benga, and when the revolution, caused by Mahomet Achmet broke out, I was left in Darfur without officers; some of them had been killed, some had been dismissed by the Government, and the few remaining ones were not fit to take a command. At the first outbreak, even of hostilities which were simultaneous with those of Achmet el Arabi in Egypt, I was compelled personally to take a command. After several battles, all more or less unsuccessful, the Arabian officers who bore me a grudge and firmly believed in the victory of Achmet el Arabi over the Europeans, gave out among the soldiers as their opinion, that the cause of my defeat lay in my being a Christian. In order to stifle these injurious opinions, I gave out that I had for some years already practised the Mahomedan religion and now publicly proclaimed my conversion. By this step I had regained the confidence of my soldiers, inspired them with hope, had given them a happy confidence, uprooted malicious intrigues and conducted several successful battles until the annihilation of the army in Kordofan commanded by Hicks.
Whether by my conversion I committed a dishonourable step is a matter of opinion—it was made more easy to me because I had, perhaps unhappily, not received a strict religious education at home.
I commanded in Dara against the tribes known to your Excellency as Razagat, H. L., &c., and in spite of great loss of life and want of ammunition, we were full of glad confidence in Hicks’ reserves, but after the annihilation of the latter the demoralised troops refused to fight any longer. I had now at my disposal about 700 soldiers, counting sick and wounded, and for each gun ten to twelve dozen cartridges. Officers and men demanded capitulation, and I, standing there alone and a European, was compelled to follow the majority and compelled to capitulate. Does your Excellency believe that to me, as an Austrian officer, the surrender was easy? It was one of the hardest days of my life.
By submission and obedient behaviour I have attained a certain degree of confidence amongst the local magnates, and have thus received permission to write to you, because they are of opinion that by these lines I am requesting your Excellency to surrender.
Should your Excellency not despise my feeble services and small knowledge of tactics, I beg to offer you my help, with no desire for a higher post of honour only from devotion and friendship for your Excellency and the good cause. I am ready with or under you, for either victory or death. My few faithful ones here, my fortune, &c., all—all will I gladly desert to die, if God so please, an honorable death.
Should you accept my services, I beg your Excellency to write me an answer to these lines in French, but in Arabic the following letter:
“Seek to obtain the permission of Seid Mohamed Ebn Seid Abdullah,[276] to come to Omdurman in order to discuss with you the possibility and conditions of surrender.”
By showing this letter I hope to obtain permission and opportunity to come to Omdurman and to unite with you. It now remains with your Excellency to accept or refuse my services.
May God give you the victory.
Your Excellency’s
Most gratefully devoted,
Slatin.
Sandjak Saleh Bey, as well as Ata Aga and all other sheiks here, assure your Excellency of their fidelity and devotion, and regret the miserable circumstances which force them to remain with the supporters of Mohamet Achmet until help arrives in order to preserve their wives and children.
[APPENDIX S.]
Lettre de Slatin Bey à Mr. Hansall.
(Traduction française.)
Le Maigdi vient, mais il n’y a pas beaucoup de monde avec lui, et si les soldats et les habitants de Kartoum sont suffissants et ne partagent pas les avis des rebelles, vous n’avez rien à craindre.
Faites tout ce que vous pouvez, que je remontre personnellement son Excellence Gordon pasha, parce que je puis lui donner des nouvelles plus sincères et plus exaits que ses spiones.
Avisez S. E. que, s’il accepte mes services à Kartoum, je puis la annoncer toujours tout ce qu’il arriverai chez les rebelles.
Mais je désire lui parler d’avance de vive voix.
Faites mes compléments à tous les Européens et à tous les indigènes.
Si les hommes de Kartoum sont bien énergique et bien forts, ils doivent être bien sûrs qu’ils gagnent tout ce qu’ils veulent. Plût à Dieu que je vous revoir à Omdourman ou à Kartoum. Je désire beaucoup que S. Excellence me donne la promesse, qu’il ne rendra pas jamais le Kartoum aux rebelles, parce que en ce cas je soupirai beaucoup des Arabes, qui vont me tyranniser et me tuer après.
Aussi vos soldats et les habitants de Kartoum doivent prendre patience et attendre un et demi deux mois jusqu’ils arrivent les secours.
Il y a ici le nouvelle, que le petit bateau que vous avez envoyé à Dongola est pris des rebelles à Wady Gama, mais ce nouvelle n’est pas bien sûr, parce que quelques autres disênt le contraire.
[THE INSURRECTION OF THE FALSE PROPHET, 1881-83, TO THE DEFEAT OF HICKS’S ARMY.][277]
For many years the creed of Mahomed has been making immense strides in Central Africa, where it seems to have a peculiar fascination for the native races. The number of converts has been estimated at from eight to twelve millions, and the idea of the regeneration of Islam by force of arms has gained a strong hold among them. On the appearance of the False Prophet in the summer of 1881, thousands flocked to his standard.
Biography of the Mahdi.
The person in question is a Sheikh named Mahomed Achmet, the son of a carpenter, and a native of Dongola. He was born about the year 1848, and educated in a village near Kartoum, where he studied religion. In 1870 he became a Sheikh, and after a short stay at Kaka, near Fashoda, took up his residence on the island of Abba, in the White Nile. There he gradually acquired a great reputation for sanctity, and in time assembled a considerable number of dervishes, or holy men, round him. He augmented his influence by marrying daughters of the leading chiefs of the Baggara Arabs,[278] and, by his power and tact, succeeded in uniting the various tribes.
In May 1881, when living at Marabieh, near the island of Abba, he first advanced his claims to being the Messiah, or Prophet foretold by Mahomed. By his followers he was styled “El-Mahdi,” more usually, but incorrectly written “El-Mahdi.” This is an Arabic word meaning simply a “Leader” or “Guide,” and is not found in the Koran. In the early days of Islam, it was not unfrequently used as a name or title. The notion which prevails among Moslems generally, regarding the expected great “El-Mahdi,” is, that he will be a descendant of the Prophet, and will appear towards the end of time to uproot wickedness, to avenge the blood of the Imams who were slain unjustly, and to establish a reign of righteousness on the earth.
The Ulema[279] of Kartoum did not hesitate to pronounce against Mohamed Achmet, and he was likewise discredited at Cairo and Constantinople, and soon became known as the “False Prophet.” Among many reasons for disbelief, one was, that the Redeemer of the World, promised in the Koran, would come from the East, and not from the West.
The intentions of Mahomed Achmet, as set forth in various proclamations, were as follows:—
To gain over the whole of the Soudan to his cause, then march on Egypt and overthrow the false-believing Turks, and, finally, to establish the thousand years’ kingdom in Mecca, and convert the whole world.
The principles of his teachings were universal equality, universal law and religion, and community of goods. All who opposed his mission were to be destroyed, whether Christian, Mahomedan, or Pagan.
Causes of rebellion.
The religious fanaticism of the native tribes of the Soudan was, however, only one of the many causes of the insurrection which broke out after the appearance of the Mahdi. The principal one appears to have been hatred of the Government, due to—
(1.) The venality of the Egyptian officials, and the oppressive and unjust manner of collecting the taxes, and especially to
(2.) The suppression of the slave trade. Most of the supporters of the Mahdi, more especially the Baggara tribes, owe all their wealth to the traffic in slaves, which the Egyptian Government has now for many years been taking measures to put an end to.
The time selected for the rising was after the garrisons of the Soudan had been diminished for reasons of economy. Lieut.-Colonel Stewart is, however, of opinion that the military weakness of Egypt was not any real cause of the rebellion, as he believes the troops in the Soudan would have been sufficient to quell it had they been properly handled.[280]
1881. July.
In July, 1881, the attention of Raouf Pasha, the Governor-General of the Soudan, was drawn to the pretensions of the Mahdi; and he sent a commission of inquiry from Kartoum to interview him, and ascertain the true state of affairs.
11th August.
Military expedition sent to bring the Mahdi to Kartoum.
On their return, it was determined to send a military expedition to Marabieh to bring the Mahdi to Kartoum. A force of 200 men left the latter place by steamer on the 11th August, reaching Djeziret Abba in 15 hours. There they disembarked, and advanced towards the residence of the Mahdi. When quite close to it, they suddenly found themselves in the presence of 4000 to 5000 of his followers, armed with swords and lances. The troops fired one volley, but were almost immediately overpowered, and forced to retire, leaving behind them 120 of their party dead, among whom were the two officers.
After this, the Mahdi sent emissaries to all the neighbouring chiefs, calling on them to join him.
Concentration of troops at Kawa.
The Governor-General, on hearing of the disaster, ordered all the available troops from Kartoum, Sennaar, Fashoda, Kordofan, and Berber to assemble near Kawa, on the White Nile. The garrisons were left so weak that hardly sufficient troops remained to carry on the ordinary duties.
1881.
Great excitement prevailed in Kartoum, which had no defences of any kind; and the inhabitants commenced to agitate for the construction of earthworks. Fears were entertained that the insurrection would spread rapidly, and even that the slaves, who formed more than half of the population of the town, would rise. Many were of opinion that a large garrison of Egyptian troops was absolutely necessary to ensure safety.
August. Inactivity of the troops at Kawa.
By the end of August 1881, 1,400 troops were concentrated near Kawa. There they remained idle for more than a month, and then dispersed to their quarters without having made the slightest attempt to follow the Mahdi, who had retreated into the mountainous district of Takalla.[281] It is probable that, had he been resolutely attacked, he would have been defeated, his followers would have deserted him, and the rebellion, with all its disastrous consequences, would have been crushed.
8th December.
Defeat of Rashid Bey at Jebel Gadir.
Rashid Bey, the Mudir of Fashoda, twice asked to be allowed to march against the Mahdi, but on both occasions permission was refused. At length, acting on his own responsibility, he set out with 400 regular soldiers, and 100 Shilluk negroes, led by their chief Kaikun, and after a four days’ march reached the camp of the Mahdi, on the mountain of Gadir,[282] on the 8th December. In the fight which ensued, Rashid Bey and the greater part of his troops, including the Shilluk Chieftain, were cut down by the Baggara horsemen. But few escaped to carry the news of the defeat to Fashoda. A large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores fell into the hands of the Mahdi.
Great fears for the safety of Fashoda were entertained at Kartoum, and 200 soldiers were immediately sent there by steamer.
1882.
15th March.
It was becoming more evident every day that a regular campaign would be necessary to quell the rebellion, and that reinforcements of men and matériel were absolutely necessary. Large numbers of irregular troops from the Shaikiyeh,[283] Dongola and Berber districts were enrolled, and armed at Kartoum. Nubir Yussuf Pasha, who had formerly seen service under Gessi Pasha,[284] was put in command of them. On the 15th March he left Kartoum with a force 4000 strong to operate against the rebels in the Shilluk country, but by the time he reached Kawa, several hundreds of the irregular troops had already deserted, and gone over to the enemy, and he remained there with the rest of his force inactive for several weeks.
4th March.
Appointment of Abdel Kader Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan.
Raouf Pasha, the Governor-General of the Soudan, was recalled to Egypt on the 4th March, and Abdel Kader Pasha was appointed to succeed him. Pending the arrival of the latter, Giegler Pasha assumed temporary charge of the Soudan.
Taking advantage of the concentration at Kawa, the rebels attempted to make themselves masters of the district of Sennaar, and had many minor successes.
6th April.
Defeat of the garrison of Sennaar.
On the 6th April, the garrison of the town of Sennaar attacked a large force of Arabs, led by a nephew of the Mahdi, who were encamped in the neighbourhood, but the attack was repulsed, and the Egyptian troops, having suffered great loss, retreated to the town, and shut themselves up in the Government buildings, which they succeeded in defending.
1882.
They were followed by the rebels, and for three days the greater part of the town was given up to murder, plunder, and fire. Many of the inhabitants, as well as 14 foreign merchants, 9 officers, and more than 100 soldiers, were killed. The losses of the rebels were also very considerable. As soon as the news reached Kartoum, reinforcements were ordered to Sennaar from Kalabat,[285] Katarif,[286] and Kawa. On the arrival of a detachment from the last-mentioned place, the rebels retired towards Karkoj,[287] which had already been some time in their hands.
Spread of the rebellion.
About this time the Shilluks[288] were reported to be in revolt, and the news from Darfur was far from re-assuring. The insurrection appeared to be gaining ground in every direction, and the position of the Government was becoming most critical.
15th April.
On the 15th April a detachment of 200 troops left Kartoum, and proceeded up the western bank of the Blue Nile. About the same time some Bashi-Bazuks, under Ali Kashef, arrived at Abou-Haraz (at the junction of the Blue Nile and the Rahad) from Katarif, to act on the eastern bank of the Blue Nile in conjunction with several thousand Shukuriyeh,[289] under the Sheikh Aud-el-Kerim Bey. By operating on both flanks, hopes were entertained of speedily restoring tranquillity in the Province of Sennaar. No engagement of importance took place till the end of the month, when 150 Egyptian troops were cut to pieces by the rebels near Mesalameh.
During April the Mahdi with the bulk of his followers still remained on the mountain of Gadir.
State of affairs in Kordofan.
1882.
News received from Kordofan stated that 15 soldiers at the frontier Post of Abu Haraz (west of El-Obeyed[290] on the way to Shaka[291]) had been killed, and that 150 soldiers stationed in Nuba,[292] for the suppression of the slave trade had been recalled to El-Obeyed. The inhabitants of the last-mentioned place were arming themselves, and constructing entrenchments. 6000 rebels were reported to be encamped in the neighbourhood, and an attack was expected.
3rd May.
Defeat of the rebels at Abou Haraz by Giegler Pasha.
By the end of April a considerable force had been collected on the Blue Nile, and Giegler Pasha placed himself at the head of it. On the 3rd May he attacked the nephew of the Mahdi, Sherif Ahmed Taha, near Abou Haraz (on the Blue Nile). The fight was obstinate, and the troops made but little progress till Sheikh Aud-el-Kerim Bey came to his assistance with a large body of Shukuriyeh, 2000 of whom were mounted, and clad in armour.
The rebels were at length overpowered. The Sherif was amongst the slain, and his head was sent to Kartoum, and publicly exposed. In the telegrams announcing the victory, Giegler Pasha made no mention of the assistance he had received from the Shukuriyeh, but spoke only of the bravery of the Khédivial troops.
25th May.
On the 25th May Giegler Pasha appears to have gained another victory over the rebels in the neighbourhood of Sennaar, in which 800 of them, including their chief, were killed.
11th May.
Arrival of Abdel Kader Pasha at Kartoum.
Abdel Kader Pasha reached Kartoum on the 11th May, and assumed the duties of Governor-General of the Soudan.
16th May.
Revolt of the Hassaniyeh Arabs.
On the 16th May the tribe of Hassaniyeh Arabs, living along the road from Kartoum to Kordofan, having been reported to be in revolt, 200 soldiers were sent to Tur-el-Hadra, on the White Nile. They were to be followed by 600 more.
1882.
Communication with Darfur, Sennaar, and Fazokl was interrupted.
At Kartoum the formation of irregular regiments of Shaggyah and Dongolese was being actively pushed forward. Reinforcements were coming in from Berber, and were mostly sent on to Kordofan, where great insecurity prevailed. Large quantities of warlike stores and some guns were reported to have reached Berber from Cairo.
27th May.
Rashid Pasha appointed Governor of Kordofan.
3rd June.
On the 27th May Rashid Pasha, Chief of the Military Posts along the Abyssinian frontier, reached Kartoum, and left on the 3rd June for Kordofan, whither more than 1000 troops had already preceded him. It was supposed that he was to be appointed Hokmdar of Darfur, Kordofan, and Dongola.
Of the doings of the Mahdi, and the state of affairs in Darfur, there was no news.
9th June.
The Mudirieh of Sennaar was still far from being pacified, and, on the 9th June, a force of 20,000 rebels was reported to be a day’s march from the town of that name. The insurrection was also reported to be spreading to the districts south of Karkoj.
7th June.
Defeat of Yussuf Pasha near Jebel Gadir.
Towards the end of May Yussuf Pasha, who had done little or nothing since March, was ordered to advance from Kawa against the Mahdi, still supposed to be somewhere near the mountain of Gadir. After great delays he set out with a large disorganized force of several thousand men and swarms of camp followers. The rains had begun, and progress was slow. On the 7th June he was face to face with the rebels in a densely wooded country. A seriba (or stockade of prickly shrubs) was commenced, and the troops were formed up inside it in a hollow square. The rebels, however, broke in upon them, and defeated and utterly routed the whole force. This crushing defeat gave a fresh impetus to the insurrection.
13th June.
1882.
Despatch of reinforcements to Fashoda.
On the 13th June 400 men were sent by steamer to reinforce the garrison of Fashoda, and on the 29th a battalion, which had arrived at Kartoum from Senheit,[293] was also sent on there. These reinforcements were placed under the command of Rashid Pasha, whose orders had been altered, and who had only accompanied the troops for Kordofan as far as Tur-el-Hadra.
Events in Darfur. 17th June.
20th July.
News from Darfur was scant and unreliable. It was rumoured that an attack on Omohangah on the 17th June had been repulsed; but that towards Shaka an Egyptian force of 1000 men had been almost annihilated on the 20th July.
28th June.
Defeat of the rebels at Bara.
In Kordofan the rebels attacked Bara[294] on the 28th June, but were repulsed, it is said, with a loss of 32,000 men. At the same time large bands infested the neighbourhood El Obeyed, and water, fuel, and grain were already reported to be scarce in that town.
July.
Early in July the insurrection was rumoured to have spread to the provinces of Bahr-el-Ghazel Shaka, and the Equator, but the reports turned out to be exaggerated, and the movement never obtained any hold in those parts.
June and July.
Formation of slave battalions.
1882.
Towards the end of June the works of defence for the protection of Kartoum were commenced to the south of the town. It began to appear doubtful whether the irregular troops would be able to make head against the rebellion, and reinforcements from Cairo were not arriving. It was then resolved to form negro battalions, and every slave-owner in Kartoum was called upon to give up a certain number of slaves for the purpose. By this means it was estimated that 2000 troops could be obtained. The same system had been followed two years before, during the mobilization of the army for operations against Abyssinia. It had the double advantage of increasing the troops, and diminishing the number of slaves, who it was feared might revolt.
The foreign inhabitants, having no slaves, decided to give assistance in kind, and sent 525 ardebs[295] of dhoora,[296] worth 360 pounds sterling, towards the sustenance of these newly raised battalions.
August.
Proclamation of a state of siege at Kartoum.
In August a state of siege was proclaimed in Kartoum. Five forts had been constructed, each armed with one gun. The town was divided into four military sections, and pickets patrolled the streets both day and night. A rising in the town was expected, simultaneously with an attack from without.
As a further protection, it was decided to cut a canal south of the town, joining the two branches of the Nile, but the commencement of this work appears to have been delayed till November.
Revolt of the Kababish tribe.
The Kababish Arabs, an important tribe occupying a large tract of country between Kordofan and Dongola, were in revolt, and a large force of them were menacingly encamped within a day’s march of Kartoum.
July and August.
During July and August many minor engagements were fought upon the lines of communication between the White Nile and Kordofan, which almost always resulted in favour of the rebels. The commercial town of Shatt, on the road from Duem, on the White Nile, to El Obeyed, was totally destroyed by them, the male population was put to the sword, and the women and children were carried off into captivity.
August.
In the beginning of August the insurgent forces were divided into three principal groups:—
Distribution of the insurgent forces.
1882.
The Mahdi, with the bulk of his forces, was still on the mountain of Gadir, in the Takalla district; a second army was wasting Kordofan, and a third stretched along the White Nile from Duem to Djezirit Abba, on the western bank, and from Kawa to Marabieh on the eastern.
19th August.
On the 19th August the rebels were defeated near Bara, and El Obeyed was subsequently revictualled.
28th August.
Defeat of the rebels near Duem.
The rebels operating along the western bank of the White Nile, under Ahmed Woad-el-Makashef, were attacked by the Egyptian troops near Duem on the 28th of August, and routed, leaving 3500 dead on the field of battle. This defeat frustrated the projected march on Kartoum.
Advance of the Mahdi into Kordofan.
After this the Mahdi took the field in person, and advanced on El Obeyed, around which an earthen rampart, armed with a few guns, had been thrown up. The garrison consisted of 6000 men, armed with Remington rifles. The rifles had been sent there in June by Abdel Kader Pasha, in anticipation of a siege.
The rebels were armed with spears and matchlocks.
8th, 11th, 14th September.
Assaults of El Obeyed.
On the 8th of September the Mahdi made a desperate assault on the town, but was repulsed with great slaughter, his losses being reported to be from 12,000 to 15,000 killed, while those of the garrison are put down at 288. Two brothers of the Mahdi and several insurgent chiefs were among the slain. The attack was repeated on the 11th and 14th September, but on both occasions without success. The rebels fought with the greatest fury, quite regardless of death. Their losses in the three assaults are said to have reached the enormous total of 40,000.[297]
1882.
Appeal to the loyalty of the Arabs, and promise of rewards.
In presence of the disaffection of many of the regular troops, the Governor-General of the Soudan issued an appeal to the patriotism of those of the Shukuriyeh, Dabaina, and Kababish tribes who still remained loyal, urging them to take the field against the rebels, and promising the remission of one year’s taxes. He further undertook to pay £2 for every dervish (as the followers of Mahdi were called) captured, dead or alive, and £18 for every chief.
All booty was to remain the property of the captors. The result was that shortly afterwards several thousand volunteers joined the troops at Kawa.
3rd September.
On the 3rd September, 300 negro recruits reached Kartoum from Lardo in the Equatorial provinces, and these were shortly followed by 1100 Bazingers, (untrained soldiers from Dar-Fertit[298]), sent by the Mudir of the Bahr-el-Ghazel district.
Defeat of a large relief column sent to Kordofan. 25th October.
1882.
Defeat of the Mahdi near Bara.
A relief column of two battalions of regular troops and 850 Bashi Bazouks, altogether 3000 strong, under Ali Bey Satfi, set out from Duem towards the end of September to attempt to raise the siege of Bara. It suffered terrible privations on the way, the rebels having filled in all the wells along the road between Abu Shoka and Bara (seven days’ march). The troops had almost nothing but the juice of wild melons and dhoora stalks to quench their thirst. They were continually harassed by the enemy, but were not attacked in force till they approached El Kona, when Ali Satfi Bey and all the senior officers were killed. The losses of the Egyptians amounted to 1100, besides 1150 rifles and a large quantity of stores and ammunition. The remainder of the troops were at length rallied by a captain, and succeeded in driving off the enemy. They then continued the march to Bara, and were met some distance from the town by the garrison, which had come out to their assistance. The Mahdi was then encamped at a water station in the neighbourhood of Bara. On the 25th October the garrison made a sortie, and attacked and defeated him, but subsequently retired within the entrenchments.
After the repulses at El Obeyed and Bara, the Mahdi was deserted by many of his followers, and his forces in Kordofan appear to have been quite shattered for the time. So much was the danger for Kordofan thought to be over, that, when the Mudir of Darfur appeared at Omchanga about the end of October with a considerable armed force, his proffered assistance was declined.
Demand for reinforcements from Cairo.
A report having reached Kartoum that the above-mentioned relief column had been totally destroyed, the Governor-General telegraphed to Cairo that he must have reinforcements of at least 10,000 men. He stated that without a large force at his disposal the insurrection would spread through all parts of the Soudan, and that then the pacification of the country would require an army of at least four times the strength of that for which he asked.
During Arabi’s short tenure of power, he had but little time to devote to the affairs of the Soudan, and no reinforcements were sent there; in fact, orders were actually given for some of the troops to be withdrawn from there to Egypt to assist in the war against the English.
After the occupation of Cairo, the suppression of the rebellion in the Soudan was one of the first questions to occupy the attention of the Government of the Khedive. Various plans were suggested, and it was at length decided, after the receipt of the previously-mentioned telegram from Abdel Kader Pasha, to enlist about 10,000 officers and men who had fought under Arabi for service in the Soudan. At the request of the Khedive several English officers were appointed to the staff of this force.
November.
1882.
Despatch of reinforcements to the Soudan.
By the beginning of November between two and three thousand troops had already been concentrated at the “Barrage” on the Nile near Cairo, and were being equipped for the expedition.
The first detachment, one thousand strong, left Suez for Suakin, whence they were to march to Berber on the 14th November.
Desertions from the depôt at the “Barrage” were very frequent. They were due to a rumour among the soldiers that they were to be transported to the Soudan as prisoners. The arms and ammunition required for the expedition were forwarded to Suakin, separately from the troops, as a measure of precaution.
On the 12th December 1500 troops left Cairo for the Soudan, bringing up the total contingent already sent to 5000.
Thanks to the energy of Al-ed-Deen Pasha, Governor of the Red Sea provinces, steps were taken at Suakin for the speedy despatch of the reinforcements as soon as they arrived from Suez. No delays occurred, the necessary supply of camels for the transport of baggage and stores having always been prepared beforehand. Throughout the revolt of Arabi, Al-ed-Deen Pasha had remained loyal, and had inspired such respect for the Khedive that even natives, who may have entertained sympathy with the rebellious movement, did not dare to commit any overt act of hostility, and thus public order and tranquillity were never for a moment disturbed in the provinces over which he was Governor.
By the 9th January, 1883, the arrivals of soldiers at the depôt at the “Barrage” had reached 9500. The departures were already 7700. They included 100 dismounted cavalry, 100 gunners, and nine battalions of infantry, formed into three regiments. The 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment was on the point of leaving.
By the middle of February the last of these reinforcements for the Soudan had left Egypt.
1882.
12th November.
About the 12th November, 1882, a rebel Sheikh attacked Duem, but he was defeated and captured, and subsequently hanged at Kartoum.
15th November.
Construction of a canal south of Kartoum.
On the 15th November the long projected canal south of Kartoum was commenced, eight hundred to a thousand yards in front of the town. Its dimensions are as follow: length, when the rivers are in flood, 5900 yards; when at low water, 6700; depth of ditch, 8 feet; width at top, 17 feet; at bottom, 10 feet; slopes steep; width of parapet at bottom, 20 feet; at top, 14 feet; height, 7 feet. The principal defects of the parapet are its great length, and the absence of flanking defence. The idea of constructing a defensive canal, and turning Kartoum into an island, originated with Musa Pasha in 1864.
December.
State of the garrisons of El Obeyed and Bara.
The garrison of El Obeyed was reported to be still fairly well supplied with food on the 12th December, and to be in good spirits. A few days previously it had sallied out and attacked Sheikh Mennoo, the leading rebel chief in the neighbourhood, killing about 70 of his people.
At Bara,[299] the garrison was badly off for food, and in a depressed condition. Some of the irregular officers with their men had deserted to the rebels. The Mahdi, with the bulk of his forces, was encamped round the town. His ranks had been much thinned by desertion and sickness, but, on the other hand, he was gaining fresh adherents every day. For the moment he had ceased to take the offensive, and was contenting himself with blockading Bara and El Obeyed, while the Makashef operated with a large force on the Nile.
Darfur was so far quiet, though the Mahdi was reported to be doing his utmost to stir up the tribes.
16th December.
Arrival of Lieut.-Col. Stewart, 11th Hussars, at Kartoum.
On the 16th December, Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, of the 11th Hussars, arrived at Kartoum.
1882.
Owing to the absence of any trustworthy information, he had been sent by the British Government to inquire into the true state of affairs in the Soudan.
December.
Two battalions of reinforcements from Egypt (the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 1st Regiment) reached Kartoum early in December, and formed a camp at Omdurman on the left bank of the Nile, opposite Kartoum.
Almost immediately after their arrival there were rumours of fresh outbreak in the neighbourhood of Kawa, and later on, in those of Sennaar and Mesalamieh on the Blue Nile. Instead of forming a relief column for Kordofan, it was deemed necessary to employ these battalions first in restoring order on the banks of the Blue and White Niles. The 1st battalion was sent to Shawal on the White Nile, and on the evening of the 30th December the 2nd battalion left by steamer for Mesalamieh.
The Makashef, with a large force, was at Sibel threatening Sennaar, and was causing a great deal of trouble.
Abdel Kader Pasha gave orders for four companies at Sennaar and the garrison of irregulars at Abut (immediately north of Sibel) to make a combined attack on the last-mentioned place. It was to support this attack, which was ordered for the 4th January, that the 2nd Battalion 1st Regiment was sent to Mesalamieh.
31st December.
Repulse of the rebels at Abut.
The attack was, however, anticipated by the Makashef, who took the offensive, and attacked the detached post of Abut on the 31st December. He was repulsed, but succeeded in interrupting all communication between Mesalamieh and Sennaar.
1883.
1st and 2nd January.
On the 1st January the four companies at Sennaar left for Sibel. The following day they were attacked while on the march, and all but about eighty surrendered to the rebels after making but little, if any, resistance.
January.
Reinforcements from Egypt.
By the beginning of January the undermentioned reinforcements had arrived from Egypt, viz.: infantry, 5 battalions (4170 men); artillery, 180 men, with 10 mountain guns and 10 rocket troughs; cavalry, 97 Circassians clad in chain armour. A few mules had accompanied the artillery, but there were no horses with the cavalry. With the exception of the two battalions, which had gone to Shawal and Mesalamieh, the whole of this force was encamped at Omdurman, near Kartoum. The troops were working at elementary drill and tactics, and making some progress, but the officers were, as a rule, ignorant, and incapable of grasping the meaning of the simplest movement, unwilling to assume any responsibility, and totally devoid of initiative.
Many of the troops had superstitious ideas regarding the power of the Mahdi, and others thought that the Khedive had only sent them to the Soudan to get rid of them.
They were dressed in long white cotton shirts and native cotton trousers. Most of them wore coarse leather sandals. Each man had a grey overcoat and hood. The infantry were all armed with Remington rifles.
The tactics of the Egyptians in the presence of the enemy were to form battalion or double company squares. The troops were formed in three ranks, to give them confidence. Each man was provided with four or five crow’s feet (iron spikes with four points), which he was instructed to throw in front of him on the approach of the enemy. The rebels usually attacked in several masses.
January.
Defeat of a detachment of troops near Jura Hadra.
Early in January news was received of a disaster on the eastern bank of the White Nile. A detachment of 190 men had been sent from the fort of Jura Hadra in a northerly direction to repair the line of telegraph to Kartoum. When a short distance from the fort, they were attacked by some rebels under Fakir Owde.[300] The troops formed square as usual, but after a short resistance commenced to give way, the square was broken, and many were killed. Half the party, however, managed to rally, and held out until a reinforcement came to their assistance from Jura Hadra.
1883. 2nd January.
On the 2nd January, Abdel Kader Pasha left Kartoum by steamer to take personal command of the troops operating between the Blue and White Niles. He did not reach Mesalamieh till the 7th, having stopped frequently on the journey to interview the chiefs of the villages on the banks of the river.
The town of Mesalamieh is six miles west of the river. On arrival, the Pasha proceeded immediately to inspect the battalion encamped there (2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment), and informed the officers that he intended to march with as small a baggage train as possible. They protested, and made all kinds of difficulties, but it was finally decided that each company should be accompanied by four camels only.
8th January.
Advance on Abut.
On the 8th January, the battalion, with some irregular troops under Saliha Bey, and some Shukuriyeh horsemen, started for Abut. The order of march was in company column with scouts on both flanks, and advance and rear guards. The country traversed was a treeless but well-cultivated open plain, with many villages and plenty of water. The crops consisted chiefly of dhoora (maize) and cotton. There were also many large herds of cattle, and flocks of sheep. The inhabitants were very friendly, and freely supplied the troops with water, and even with bread.
At 8 p.m., a halt was made at the Faulla (pond) of El-Sunga. The troops bivouacked, protected by a bank which had, on a previous occasion, been thrown up round the pond. Ten men per company were employed to patrol during the night some 500 yards from the camp.
9th January.
On the 9th, the column started at 7 a.m. The order of march was the same as on the preceding day. Two miles from the bivouac, the village of Effena was passed. This was the last inhabited village met with on the road. Further on they were all deserted, the inhabitants having gone off willingly, or unwillingly, to join the rebels, leaving their crops standing, and ready for harvesting.
1883.
At 1.30 p.m. the village of Abut was reached. It is a small military station, and had a garrison of 350 men, who were encamped in a zeriba with trench near the well. When attacked on the 31st December, only 150 of the garrison were present, 200 men under Osman Agha had arrived since then. Two new zeribas were at once constructed, one for the regular troops, and another for the irregulars. Reconnaissances were pushed in all directions, but especially along the roads leading to Kawa viâ Waliya, and to Manasra, south of Sibel.
Finding then that the quelling of the insurrection in the province of Sennaar would be a more difficult task than he had anticipated, the Pasha determined to call up the battalion from Shawal,[301] and to send for another from Kartoum.
10th January.
The 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, left Kartoum accordingly on the afternoon of the 10th January, and proceeded up the Blue Nile in twelve sailing boats.
11th January.
On the 11th January, Abdel Kader was still at Abut. On that date his attention was to await the arrival of the 3rd Battalion, and then march on Sennaar. Reports had come in that that town was hard pressed by a large body of rebels, that Karkoj was again in their hands, that the tribe of Rufaa el Sherk,[302] under Sheikh Sherif el Hindi, was in full revolt, and the last mentioned was doing his best to induce Aud el Kerim Bey, the powerful Sheikh of the Shukuriyeh, to join the movement.
12th January.
1883.
On the 12th, however, it was reported that the Sheikh Wad el Kerif, at the head of a large force, was marching from Maatuk to attack Abdel Kader, that he was forcing all the men of the districts through which he passed to join him, and that Fakir Moosa, who was commanding the rebels in the neighbourhood of Kawa, would co-operate with him.
This news compelled the Pasha to reconsider his decision, and, instead of advancing on Sennaar, he resolved to await the approach of the Wad el Kerif.
16th January.
Despatch of troops to Karasah.
Revolt of the Husseinyeh Arabs.
On the White Nile, the Hassaniyeh nomads were again giving trouble. To pacify this tribe, and the villages in the neighbourhood of Karasah,[303] the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, left Kartoum on the 16th January in two steamers, and proceeded up the White Nile. It was accompanied by the Vakeel[304] of the Mudiriyeh and some Ulemas. These officials were directed to enter into communication with the people, and to try to induce them to submit quietly. The orders given to the battalion were to disembark when still a little north of the village, and then advance in close order.
18th January.
Defeat of the Egyptians at Karasah.
On the 18th, the steamers reached the neighbourhood of the village. Here one of the steamers ran aground in the middle of the river. The other, on board of which was the Bimbashi[305] with five companies, pushed up right abreast of the village. Three companies immediately disembarked, lined a low sand dyke parallel to and about 500 yards from the river, and opened fire on some rebels who were about 2000 yards off. The latter advanced to the attack, but the severity of the fire forced them to incline away to the right and left as they approached.
1883.
Three or four horsemen of the right-hand party succeeded in penetrating between the dyke and the river, and fell upon the two companies which had disembarked last, and were not yet formed up. This was the signal for a regular panic, and the flight of all the Egyptians to the river. The rebels did not pursue. In the confusion the Bimbashi was killed, some accounts say by his own men, others by the enemy.
The other steamer with the three remaining companies of the battalion having by this time come up, a council of war was held, when it was decided that the battalion was not strong enough to advance, and that reinforcements of men and guns from Kartoum were absolutely necessary. The rebel force did not in reality exceed 400 men.
26th January.
During the next few days the battalion remained quietly on board the steamers off Karasah. On the 26th January, the Bimbashi of the 2nd battalion of the regiment arrived from Kartoum to replace the Bimbashi who had been killed. The steamers were then lying about two and a half hours’ march from the village. An advance was ordered for 3 a.m. on the 27th so as to attack the village at daybreak, and take the rebels by surprise. But, on the remonstrances of nearly all the officers, who said that they would certainly be killed if they marched in the dark through an unknown country, the order was cancelled, and that day nothing was done except a short reconnaissance inland. The Bimbashi, however, decided to attack on the 28th. After the orders were issued five of the senior officers proceeded to report themselves sick.
28th January.
At 3.30 a.m. on the 28th the battalion marched off. It was formed up in a square, preceded by an advance guard and scouts, and at daybreak was within about 800 yards of the village, from which it was separated by a long, narrow strip of forest.
Two companies were ordered into the forest to reconnoitre the path leading to the village, but the officers refused to advance, saying that they and their men would certainly be killed.
1883.
During the delay and discussion that followed, some soldiers, disobeying orders, fired at some cattle that were grazing near by. This gave the alarm to the rebels, and in a few minutes nine or ten horsemen appeared at the edge of the wood. By galloping about and waving their swords, these men engaged the attention of the troops, and gave time for the removal of the women and cattle from the village. When this was accomplished, the rebel foot advanced through the wood, and the troops immediately began to fall back. The rebels, who did not exceed 350, and had no firearms, followed them till within about half an hour’s distance of the steamer, but generally keeping out of rifle range. It is estimated that about thirty of them were killed or wounded. A few hours after the return of the troops to the boats, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, as well as two guns and a rocket trough, arrived from Kartoum with the Kaimakan[306] of the regiment. These reinforcements had been sent on receipt of a direct order from the Khedive.
The rebels appear to have been subsequently attacked and defeated, but there does not appear to be any account of the engagement.
24th January.
The 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and 225 Bashi Bazouks, without horses, arrived at Kartoum from Egypt on the 24th January. 650 camels for transport purposes had already been collected at Kartoum, and 400 were expected in a few days from Dongola. According to the lowest estimate, 300 camels per battalion would be required for the Kordofan expedition, to be distributed as follows:—For rations, 115; water, 75; ammunition, 52; officers, 25; sick hospital, &c., 33.
1883.
On the 23rd January, Hussein Pasha Serri, the senior military officer at Kartoum, received a telegram from the Khedive ordering him to suspend all operations and to concentrate all the troops at Kartoum, pending the arrival of some English staff officers at Cairo. The fact of the Khedive communicating direct with this officer instead of with Giegler Pasha, the representative of Abdel Kader, caused a great deal of unpleasantness. This order was communicated to Abdel Kader, then at Abut, who replied that, if he withdrew the troops to Kartoum the rebellion would unquestionably extend in the eastern provinces, and that, if the expedition did not soon leave for Kordofan, that province would be lost, and with it Darfur.
24th January.
To return to the operations of Abdel Kader. About the 24th January a party of rebels pillaged the village of Mangalla, which, together with some others of the south and south-west of Abut, had submitted to the Government of the Khedive.
Hearing of this, the Pasha, having been joined by the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, determined to advance against a large body of rebels, reported to be about eight hours’ march from his camp.
27th January.
Defeat of the rebels near Maatuk.
Early on the 27th he moved towards the village of Maatuk. When about three hours from it, the rebels were observed on a plain on the further side of a small wood. The troops were at once halted in the open, about 500 yards from the wood, and formed into square.
The rebels, after a short halt for prayer, advanced through the wood, but, contrary to expectation, halted again at the near edge, and Wad Eyoub, a revolted Benluk Bashi of irregulars, with some negroes, opened fire on the troops, killing one and wounding five. The square then fired, and after some minutes the rebels commenced to retire, pursued by the irregular cavalry. In this affair Faki Moosa was wounded. The losses of the rebels are estimated at 600 killed and wounded.
1883.
In the retreat the rebels broke up into two parties, one, under Sheikh Wad-el-Kerif, went in a south-westerly direction towards Göz Abu Djuma,[307] and the other, under Faki Moosa and Faki Mohammed Abu Shneb, retired to the village of Baatuk on the road to Kawa.
28th January.
Against the latter, the Pasha directed the whole of his available cavalry and camel corps, altogether about 300 men. This force came up with the rebels at 3 a.m. on the 28th, and totally defeated them, killing Abu Shneb.
1st February.
On the 1st February Abdel-Kader, with his two battalions, reached Kawa, where he met the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, from Shawal. On the 3rd February this force was increased by the arrival of the 1st and 2nd battalions 2nd Regiment, which had marched along the river bank from Karasah, performing, according to their own account, prodigies of valour on the road.
3rd February.
On the 3rd February Abdel-Kader left Kawa by steamer for Kartoum leaving orders—
(1.) That the three battalions of the 1st Regiment were to march at once to Wad el Medinet on the Blue Nile, where he would join them about the 15th for an advance on Sennaar; and
(2.) That the two battalions of the 2nd Regiment, under the Kaimakan, were to attack the rebels at Abu Djuma.
Disaffection among the Kababish Arabs.
Towards the end of January it was rumoured in Kartoum that the Kababish Arabs had gone over to the Mahdi, or rather to the Faki Manne, who commanded the rebels in Northern Kordofan. As the Kababish extend as far north as Dongola, fears were entertained that the rebellion might spread to that province, and early in February it was reported that the natives about Debbeh[308] were becoming very restless. Some Bashi Bazouks were sent there to maintain order.
10th February.
1883.
About the 10th February the troops in the camp at Omdurman comprised:—
| 4 | battalions of Egyptian infantry (3200 men). |
| 420 | Bashi Bazouks. |
| 1,100 | Negro recruits. |
| 90 | dismounted cavalry, and a few artillerymen. |
Their health was very good.
Surrender of Bara, 5th January.
On the 11th February, a messenger arrived at Kartoum from the west confirming the rumours that Bara had fallen on the 5th January. The garrison were said to be fairly well treated by the Arabs, and only the officers were kept in confinement. By this surrender 2000 troops, besides a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the rebels.
Siege of El Obeyed.
Four days afterwards the news arrived that El Obeyed had capitulated on the 17th January, and that the whole of Kordofan was in the hands of the Mahdi.
After the repulse of the assaults on El Obeyed, in September, 1882, various plans were proposed for attacking the Mahdi, but the Council of War was always of opinion that the troops available were too few, and the garrison relapsed into a state of inactivity, which continued, so far as any operations of importance are concerned, till the end of the siege. Small sorties of two or three hundred men were, however, of frequent occurrence, generally resulting in the capture of some cattle and grain.
The besiegers, on their side, established themselves comfortably around the town, some availing themselves of the ruined houses, and others building straw huts, and patiently awaited the inevitable surrender.
Such was the attitude taken up by both sides till the 13th January, by which date the supply of food was almost exhausted, and everything eatable was being sold at fabulous prices.
1883.
On the 14th, the Mahdi sent letters to Mahmoud Said, the Governor of the Western Soudan, and all the principal officers, telling them that they had held out long enough, and, if they would surrender, he would guarantee the safety of their lives. On the 16th, a party of rebels appeared outside the entrenchments to open negociations for a capitulation. Mahmoud Said Pasha was not present at the interview which followed, but the greater part of the garrison appear to have agreed to the terms that were proposed.
17th January.
Surrender of El Obeyed.
During the night many of the garrison deserted. At daybreak on the 17th the insurgents advanced against the town in force. The Pasha ordered what remained of the garrison to fire, but the infantry refused to do so, and passed over to the enemy, while the artillery fired a few salvoes in a direction that could do no harm to the assailing force. The Pasha then understood that he was completely abandoned by his men, and consented to surrender and make submission to the Mahdi, who was then at an hour and a half’s distance from the town.
On entering the town, the Mahdi proceeded immediately to the principal mosque.
Mahmoud Said Pasha, and Ali Sherif Bey, the Mudir of Kordofan, were at first treated with consideration, but, on their refusal to give up their money they were seized and imprisoned. 8000l. sterling in gold was found concealed in the house of the former, and 7000l. in that of the latter.
Altogether, although little or no money was found in the public treasury, the Mahdi is said to have taken more than 100,000l. from the officials and notables. He kept all the booty for himself, and distributed none of it among his followers. This was a source of great dissatisfaction, and subsequently caused many to waver in their allegiance.
1883.
The garrison at the time of the surrender numbered about 3500. They were made to swear fidelity to the Mahdi, enlisted in his service, and told off by companies to the various banners. About 6000 Remington rifles, five guns, and one rocket trough passed into the hands of the rebels. As regards provisions, only 200 ardebs[309] of dhoora were found in the town. Towards the end of the siege famine had prevailed, and the inhabitants had kept themselves alive by chewing raw india-rubber, varied with a small ration of dhoora.
All the books and Government papers were destroyed and the town was completely looted.
The Mahdi took up his residence in the Government House, and appointed a Governor of the town, but did not make any attempt to form a regular administration. The following is a translation of a proclamation issued by him:—
Proclamation issued by the Mahdi.
“From the servant of his Lord Mohammed el Mahdi, son of Said Abdallah, to all the fervent proselytes.
“We have appointed as your Prince our dear Sheik Mansour, son of Abd el hakem. Execute his orders and commands, and follow him in the path of battle.
“He who submits to him submits to us; he who disobeys him disobeys us, and disobeys God Himself and His Prophet. Let all show penitence before God, and abandon all bad and forbidden habits, such as the degrading acts of the flesh, the use of wine and tobacco, lying, bearing false witness, disobedience to parents, brigandage, the non-restitution of goods to others, the clapping of hands, dancing, improper signs with the eyes, tears and lamentations at the bed of the dead, slanderous language, calumny, and the company of strange women. Clothe your women in a decent way, and let them be careful not to speak to unknown persons. All those who do not pay attention to these principles disobey God and His Prophet, and they shall be punished in accordance with the law.
“Say your prayers at the prescribed hours.
1883.
“Give the tenth part of your goods, handing it to our Prince, Sheikh Mansour, in order that he may forward it to the treasury of Islam. “Adore God, and hate not each other, but assist each other to do good.”
At the bottom of this, the seal of the Mahdi was affixed.
13th February.
Advance of Abdel Kader towards Sennaar.
On the 13th February, Abdel Kader Pasha left Kartoum to rejoin the troops at Wad of Medinet, who had marched from Kawa. He proceeded thence towards Sennaar, his force consisting of the three battalions of the 1st Regiment, about 600 Bashi Bazouks, some Sakkeyer horsemen, and a few guns and rocket troughs.[310]
On the 22nd February he reached Meshoa-el-Dakhin, about eight hours’ march from Sennaar. That evening, about 8 p.m., a large body of rebels under the Makashef, who had raised the siege of Sennaar, approached the camp. Some shots were exchanged, but the rebels, finding the soldiers on the alert, retired. The following day, Friday, a halt was made, and the neighbourhood was thoroughly reconnoitred. Abdel Kader received a letter from the Makashef, in which, after testifying to the divine mission and the invincibility of the Mahdi, he invited the Pasha to submit, saying that he had a regard for him, and was anxious to spare his life and spiritual hereafter.
24th February.
Defeat of the rebels at Meshra-el-Dai.
Early on the 24th, the march was continued. On approaching Meshra-el-Dai, the Makashef was discovered with 10,000 or 12,000 followers in some bushy ground close to the river. The guns and rockets at once opened fire on them. After some time the rebels came out into the open and attacked the troops.
1883.
They advanced with great determination, but after a severe fight were dispersed and pursued by the Cavalry; the engagement lasted from 10 a.m. till 1 p.m. Of the troops 27 were wounded. The rebel loss was estimated at 2000 killed, including Sheikh Woad el Kerif, of Maatuk notoriety. Many of the rebels fled into the river, where they were cut down by the cavalry. The Makashef succeeded in escaping. Some of the rebels used firearms, and Abdel Kader had a narrow escape, his watch-chain being broken by a bullet.
25th February.
Saturday night the troops remained halted, but on Sunday the 25th the march was continued to Sennaar. The inhabitants of the villages along the road came in, and tendered their submission.
The route between Sennaar and Kartoum, both by land and water, was reported to be safe. A regular postal service was immediately reestablished, and steps were taken for repairing the line of telegraph.
After the defeat at Meshra-el-Dai on the 24th, the insurgents appear to have split themselves up into three bodies; one under Abdul Ghaffar retired to Karkoj and joined Faki Sherif, another under the Makashef took up a position at Jebel Sekhédy, about six hours west of Sennaar, and a third came into Sennaar and gave themselves up.
4th March.
Defeat of the rebels at Sekhédy.
Abdel Kader’s scouts having brought in intelligence of the Makashef’s whereabouts, a force of 1200 irregulars, made up of Shukuriyeh and Aburoff Arabs, under Saleh Agha, was directed against him. An engagement took place on the 4th March at Sekhédy, which resulted in the total defeat of the rebels, who lost 547 killed, among whom were Sheikhs Omr and Amr, brothers of the Makashef, and Sadyk, his nephew. The casualties among Saleh Agha’s force were only two men wounded.
Abdel Kader then proposed marching south up the Blue Nile, and pacifying the country as far as Karkoj, after which he intended to cross the river, and advance eastward against the revolted Rufaa-el-Sherk and Kawakli tribes in the country between the rivers Dinder and Rahad. But, as will be seen further on, he was superseded before he had time to carry out these plans.
20th Feb.
Arrival of Pashas Al-el-din and Suleiman.
1883.
Nyasi at Kartoum.
On the 20th February, the Pashas Al-ed-Din and Suleiman Nyasi reached Kartoum. The latter was to take command of the troops, but the mission of the former was kept secret, though it was rumoured that he was to be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan.
4th March Arrival of Colonel Hicks at Kartoum.
On the 4th March Colonel Hicks[311] reached Kartoum, and with him the undermentioned English Officers, viz.:—Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J. Colborne,[312] Lieut.-Colonel de Coetlogon,[313] Major Martin,[314] Major Farquhar,[315] Captain Warner, Captain Massey,[316] Captain Evans, Captain Walker,[317] and Surgeon-Major Rosenberg.
Colonel Hicks had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of the Soudan, with local rank of Major-General, but it was intended that he should direct, and be responsible for, all preparations and operations—in fact, that he should in reality be the Commander-in-Chief, while nominally holding a subordinate post.
The Mahdi’s movement being, at any rate ostensibly, a religious one, it was deemed inadvisable to place at the head of the Egyptian Army of the Soudan a foreigner and a non-Mussulman, lest the insurgent leader might make capital out of this to arouse still further the fanaticism of his followers.
Suleiman Nyasi, whose military career dates back to the days of Mahomet Ali and the Crimean War, was consequently named to the chief command, but on the understanding that he was to pay strict attention to, and carefully follow out General Hicks’s instructions and plans, but his indolence, apathy, ignorance, and in many instances apparent malignity and jealousy, caused him frequently to act in anything but the spirit of the instructions given him at Cairo.
1883.
8th March.
Departure of Lieut.-Col. Stewart for Egypt.
On the 8th March, Lieut.-Colonel Stewart left Kartoum for Egypt, travelling by way of Sennaar, Katarif, Kassala, and Massowah.
18th March.
On the 18th March, Major Farquhar, who had been on a reconnaissance up the White Nile, returned to Kartoum. He reported the inhabitants along the western bank of the river to be hostile.
Four thousand five hundred rebels and 1800 Baggara Arab Cavalry were assembled about Marabieh and Abu Djuma, and at Jebel Ain there was a considerable body, which had lately been reinforced from Kordofan. The Baggaras had quarrelled with the Mahdi regarding the booty taken at El Obeyed, and had seized and carried off some of it. The troops at the posts along the river were in rags, and from four to six months in arrears of pay.
News from Kordofan stated that the Mahdi’s force was about one hundred thousand strong, that it had dispersed for the moment, but could be quickly reassembled. The chiefs met at El Obeyed every Friday for orders, but the Sheiks of the Baggara did not attend.
Taking advantage of this discontent, General Hicks was trying to open communications with the last-mentioned, and hoped to arrange a meeting at Dem.
26th March.
Proclamation of Al-ed-Deen Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan.
On the 26th March Al-ed-Deen Pasha was publicly proclaimed at Kartoum as Governor-General of the Soudan, and, on the same day, Hussein Pasha left for Sennaar to inform Abdel Kader Pasha of his removal from office, and to relieve him of his military command.
1883.
General Hicks and his Staff left Kartoum on the 3rd April by steamer, and reached Kawa on the 6th. A force of about 5000 men had been collected at the latter place, consisting of—
| 5½ | battalions of regular infantry,[318] |
| ½ | battalion of negroes, |
| 5 | guns, |
| 2 | Nordenfeldts, and |
| some Bashi-Bazouks. |
10th April. Reconnaissance up the White Nile.
On the 10th April General Hicks made a reconnaissance up the river. He started at 6 a.m. on the steamer Bordeen, taking with him one mountain gun, two Nordenfeldts, and 50 Bashi-Bazouks. After proceeding for about an hour and a-half, the steamer was fired on from the western bank. Higher up shots were fired from many places, especially opposite the island of Abba, where the rebels had constructed trenches along the banks. But a few shells, and some rounds from the Nordenfeldts and rifles, soon drove them inland. Owing to the failure of fuel, the reconnaissance could not be continued as far as the ford of Abu-Zed. The steamer returned to Kawa at 5.30 p.m.
1883.
On the 14th April, General Hicks telegraphed to Cairo that he was anxious to get to Jebel-Ain (eight marches distant), where the rebels were concentrating, as soon as possible, but that his supplies were insufficient as he had only enough for from 15 to 20 days with him, and nothing was obtainable in the country. The administration of the army was most difficult, owing to the want of proper departments, and the troops were several months in arrears of pay. The steamers were out of repair, and too few in number to do all that was required of them—viz., to bring up supplies of ammunition and food, take possession of the ford at Abu-Zed, and patrol the river and stop communication between the banks. There was no store of fuel, all had to be cut as required.
23rd April.
Seizure of the ford of Abu-zed.
It was not till the 23rd April that the main body, nearly 5000 strong, set out from Kawa. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, General Hicks himself with a small force had proceeded up the river on the 22nd to reconnoitre, and seize the ford of Abu-Zed. On arrival at the ford, it was found to be in possession of a small body of rebels, who were driven off without much difficulty. General Hicks remained there on the 23rd, placing boats containing Bashi Bazouks under the command of Jahier Bey, in échelon across the stream, in which position they could command a very considerable length of the ford (which extends about a mile), and support one another in case of any attempt to force the passage.
He left on the morning of the 24th to continue the reconnaissance up the river. The banks were found to be occupied by straggling groups of Arabs, with whom shots were exchanged.
On the 25th, the Chief of the Shilluk village of Musran reported that the rebels had left Jebel-Ain and were marching in force under the Makashef to attack the “Turks” on the march from Kawa.
Having ascertained that this information was correct General Hicks steamed back to the ford, warned Jahier Bey, and, during the night, dropped down the river to join the army, which was then encamped opposite the northern end of the island of Abba.
29th April.
Battle of Marabieh and death of the Makashef.
1883.
Being in a favourable position, it remained halted on the 26th and 27th in expectation of an attack. On the former date some rebel cavalry appeared, but were driven back with a few shells, and on the night of the 27th there were several false alarms. The march was resumed on the 28th. On the following day tents were struck as usual, at daybreak, and the order was given to march at seven a.m. About nine a.m.[319] Colonel Farquhar, who had been reconnoitring in front, reported that the enemy was about two miles off, and advancing at a rapid pace. About a quarter of an hour afterwards they appeared in considerable numbers, both cavalry and infantry, and spread out towards the flanks with a view of attacking the angles of the square in which the Egyptian troops were formed.[320]
They then advanced quickly, led by chieftains on horseback with banners borne in front of them. There was considerable delay in getting the guns into action,[321] but the rebel cavalry broke as soon as the shells commenced falling among them, and moved off the field. The infantry still came on boldly, and, although shot down in numbers, succeeded in getting close enough to the square to throw some spears into it. But few of the enemy were armed with rifles.
1883
After half an hour’s fighting, during which the Egyptian troops behaved steadily and well, though they appeared to have fired too high,[322] the rebel force was completely broken up, and fled in confusion. Owing to the absence of cavalry, the pursuit was not as vigorous as it would otherwise have been. The strength of the rebels exceeded 5000 men. Their losses in killed and wounded were about 500. The Makashef, his son, and several chiefs were among the slain.
The Khedival troops lost two killed and five wounded.[323]
After the action General Hicks, anticipating that an immediate attempt would be made by the rebels to cross to the western bank of the river at some point above the ford of Abu-Zed, embarked on board the steamer Bordeen at Gozabonne-Gomme, and proceeded up the river, taking with him two Nordenfeldt guns, a rifled howitzer, and 150 Bashi Bazouks. At the ford of Abu-Zed he picked up the steamer Fascher, with Jahier Bey and 90 Bashi Bazouks.
1st May.
On the 1st of May, the rebels were found to be crossing in large numbers at a regular place of passage, about 10 miles below Jebel Ain. They were driven inland from both banks with some loss. Numbers had already crossed, but a large body with camels and baggage still remained on the eastern bank. In the hope of capturing these, General Hicks sent to Sulieman Pasha asking him to hurry on as fast as possible. But the Egyptians had no cavalry, and the infantry marched so slowly that it took them more than two days to accomplish the twelve miles between their camp and the place of passage.
1883
General Hicks himself went towards Jebel Ain, landed, and sent a party up the mountain. On their return they stated that not a sign of a rebel was to be seen, and the Shilluks also reported that the district had been evacuated.
May 3rd.
On the 3rd May General Hicks rejoined the main body, then encamped near Jebel Ain. Suleiman Pasha was anxious to march through the district, as he was of opinion that there were several tribes in the neighbourhood to whom it was of importance to show the army. But it was finally decided to return to Duem at once, and prepare for an attack on Schatt, where the rebels were reported to be assembling in large numbers.
Moral effect of the victory at Marabiyeh.
The victory of the 29th had a very great moral effect and many of the Baggara and other chiefs subsequently surrendered. General Hicks, unaccompanied by any troops, received several of them on the western bank of the river, and thus gave confidence. Negotiations with the Kababish Arabs were also in progress.
Withdrawal of the army to Kartoum.
Towards the end of May the rebels, who had been threatening Duem, dispersed, and it was reported that the western bank of the river was free from hostile bands. The main body of the army was then withdrawn to Kartoum, leaving garrisons at Kawa and Duem. On the Blue Nile, Sennaar and Wod-Medinet were garrisoned.
The expedition to Kordofan could not be undertaken till after the rains, when the wells in the desert would be full, and pools of water would have been formed.
Estimate of the expenses of the war.
On the 15th May, the Governor-General of the Soudan telegraphed to Cairo that he had only £40,000 in the treasury at Kartoum, and that he thought it inadvisable to enforce the taxes for fear of producing further disaffection among the natives.
1883.
Arrears to the amount of £81,000 were still owing in the Mudiriyehs of Kartoum and Sennaar for pay, food, and transport. He was anxious that in future all salaries should be paid punctually both to the officials and to the military, and that the Government should be able to meet its other expenses at the proper time. He requested that large sums of money might be forwarded to him, and estimated at £46,000 his monthly expenditure for the troops at Kartoum, Sennaar, the military posts on the White and Blue Niles, Fashoda, the Equatorial Provinces, and Bahr-Gazelle, but exclusive of those at Dongola, Berber, and in the Red Sea Provinces.
Amount of money to be forwarded from Cairo to meet the expenses entailed by the rebellion.
In reply to the above Cherif Pasha telegraphed on the 11th June, that the undermentioned amounts would be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General during the current year, viz.:—
| £ | |
| Seven months’ pay for the army actuallyengaged in the war | 13,000 |
| Rations for seven months | 32,000 |
| Forage (Fourrage) | 37,500 |
| Purchase of camels | 25,000 |
| Arrears | 80,000 |
| ———— | |
| 187,500 | |
| But the amount actually in theTreasury at Kartoum was to bededucted from this | 40,000 |
| ———— | |
| £147,500 | |
| ══════ |
leaving £147,000 to be sent from Cairo.
Reinforcements to the number of 3000 men were to be sent to the Soudan, but all the expenses connected with them, which were estimated at £40,000, would be defrayed by the Egyptian Government.
For the expenses of the Civil Administration and the pay of soldiers not actually engaged in the war, the Governor-General was ordered to do the best he could with the revenues of the Soudan, as the Egyptian Government would not be able to furnish him with more than the sums already specified.
13th May.
1883.
2nd August.
Removal of Suleiman Pasha from the command of the army of the Soudan.
On the 13th May General Hicks telegraphed to Cairo requesting that he might be put in indisputable command of the army, as otherwise he could not be responsible for the success of the expedition to Kordofan. It was subsequently rumoured on several occasions that he had requested to be relieved of his post on account of the systematic obstructions he met with from native officials. These reports were always officially contradicted. However, on the 2nd August, Reuter’s agent at Alexandria announced that the Governor-General of the Soudan had been appointed to command the troops in that province, and that Suleiman Pasha had been recalled, and appointed Governor of the Red Sea Provinces. By this means it was expected that General Hicks would regain complete liberty of action, though Al-ed-Deen Pasha was to accompany the expedition to Kordofan.
During the absence of the latter, Hussein Bey, Lieutenant-colonel of the 2nd Regiment, was to act as his deputy at Kartoum. Rashid Pasha, who was then Governor of the Red Sea Provinces, was to be given the command of one of the brigades of the Expeditionary Force.
Position of The Mahdi.
1883.
The Mahdi only remained master of Kordofan. All reports from there tended to show that serious dissensions had broken out between him and his chiefs, and that the number of his adherents was daily diminishing. His position appeared to be getting critical. From the north he was threatened by the Egyptian army, and to the east the White Nile, which was constantly patrolled by Egyptian boats, would bar any attempt at escape in that direction. On the south King Adam of Takallé had sworn to kill the Mahdi if he attempted to pass through his country to Jebel Gedir, whither he had sent his family and most of the booty captured at El Obeyed. King Adam was also taking steps to arrange with Sheikh Asaker, chief of the Baggara Gimeh Arabs, inhabiting the desert from the island of Abba towards Takallé, a joint offensive movement against southern Kordofan. In the middle of July it was stated that the Mahdi had given up all hopes of resistance, and was only anxious about his personal safety; and that it was his intention to try to reach the copper mines in the south-west of Darfur, not far from Jebel Mara. In order to do this, however, he would have to make a long detour to avoid an encounter with the force under Slatin Bey, Governor of Darfur.
Operations in Darfur.
Very little news has been received of the real state of affairs in that far-off province. It appears that, on receipt of orders from Cairo, a messenger was despatched from Kartoum to El Fascher in April of the present year with the following instructions for Slatin Bey—viz., to concentrate the garrisons of Darfur at El Fascher, attempt to organise a national Government under a descendant of one of the former kings, and then withdraw from the country, either to Dongola or Bahr el Ghazel. Report states that Slatin Bey subsequently evacuated El Fascher, defeated a tribe of hostile Hamr Arabs, and then intrenched himself at Omchanga, in an important strategical position on the road to El Obeyed, where he awaited the arrival of the garrison of Foga before undertaking any further operations.
Letter from Slatin Bey, Governor of Darfur.
The above-mentioned orders do not appear to have reached Slatin Bey, for on the 30th June he wrote as follows to the Governor-General of the Soudan from Dara, 200 miles south of El-Fascher:—
“Up to this date I have fought 27 battles of more or less importance, and have been twice wounded. I am besides suffering from Guinea worm, and have consequently been obliged to retire on Dar Demittala, but not before killing in battle the Khalifa of Mohammed Ahmet, Bishari Wal-ud-Bakis.
“I have not only to fight external but internal enemies. Many of the Arab officers intrigue against me, and seek to undermine my authority. They spread rumours that Arabi has driven all the Europeans out of Egypt, and that I myself have been deprived of my functions.”
✳✳✳✳✳
1883.
“After the commencement of the rainy season, fighting will begin again with the Razagatt, Habanieh and Mali Arabs, and I am greatly in need of help, for my best officers and men have fallen, and ammunition is beginning to draw to an end.”
✳✳✳✳✳
“I ask your Excellency to send me a letter not in cypher, setting forth my absolute power, and I take upon myself, as long as I am alive, the responsibility of keeping the Province of Darfur for the Government.”
✳✳✳✳✳
The above letter reached Kartoum in August. It was in reply to one from Giegler Pasha, dated 14th March, 1883, which, Slatin Bey stated, was the first direct news he had received from Kartoum for more than a year.
20th August.
Appointment of General Hicks as Commander-in-Chief of the Expedition to Kordofan. Plan of campaign.
On the 20th August, General Hicks received a telegram from the Khedive appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the expedition to Kordofan, with the rank of General of Division. His original plan was to leave Kartoum about the 8th of September, and march up the White Nile as far Berair,[324] with 8600 infantry, 1400 cavalry and Bashi Bazouks, one battery of Krupp field guns, two batteries of mounted guns, and one battery of Nordenfeldts, and 5000 camels.
1883.
Leaving the river at Berair, he proposed to march first on Bara,[325] and then on El Obeyed, appearing before the last-mentioned place with 7000 men, which it was considered would be sufficient to overcome the Mahdi. About 3000 were to be employed in keeping open the line of communications. But the idea of establishing a line of fortified posts between the Nile and Kordofan was subsequently abandoned, and it was decided that the whole force should advance together, without attempting to keep up any communication with the rear. The reason for adopting this course was, that reports were brought in that large numbers of hostile Arabs were likely to reappear on the line of march after the passage of the army, and there would be great difficulty in inducing small bodies of Egyptian troops to escort convoys of stores between the posts.
The Egyptian officers attached to the force were inefficient, and, as a rule, apathetic; they carried little or no respect, and had but slight authority over their men. To bring the army into a state of efficiency, feed it, provide transport, and procure intelligence, taxed the energies of General Hicks and his small European Staff to the utmost. His greatest anxiety was regarding the water supply during the march, for Kordofan is the driest province in the whole Soudan. The wells along the roads across the desert contain but little water, except immediately after the rains, and it was feared that even then there would be insufficient for a large force accompanied by horses, mules, and several thousand camels.
On leaving the Nile, provisions for sixty days were to be carried with the army.
Rashid Pasha, who was to have commanded a brigade, telegraphed from Kassala that the Arabs in the neighbourhood were in a state of great excitement, and he thought it would be best for him to remain there till it had subsided.
9th September.
Departure of the army from Kartoum.
1883.
On the 9th September the main body set out from Kartoum, and, passing Berair, reached Duem[326] on the 20th. No hostility was shown along the route, though many of the inhabitants fled on the approach of the troops. The heat was intense, and there was considerable loss of life among the camels during the march. The line of telegraph had been destroyed.
On the 23rd September, an advanced force, consisting of three battalions and six guns, seized the first water station, fifteen miles from Duem, without encountering any resistance.
General Hicks did not leave Kartoum till the 28th September, when he proceeded up the river by steamer to Duem, and then joined the main body.[327]
30th September.
On the 30th September the army encamped at a place 30 miles south-west of Duem. The heat was still intense, and the camels were dying in considerable numbers.
Tactics of the Egyptian army.
The square continued to be used as the fighting formation. Great precautions were taken on the line of march. The army marched in three columns prepared instantly to form square, with the camels and stores in the centre, the guns in the front faces, and the Nordenfeldts at the angles. Through constant practice, the men had become very perfect in this manœuvre. When camping square was formed, two tents per company were pitched behind piled arms. When possible a zeriba, or dense abattis of thorny bushes was formed round the square. In case of sudden attack on the march, each soldier carried four crows-feet, which he was to throw to a distance in his front to check the rush of the assailing forces.
7th October.
1883.
On the 7th October the army appears to have reached Sangi Hamferid, 45 miles south-west of Duem, where it remained halted for several days, owing to the uncertainty of the water supply in front. At the camp there was no water except on the surface in depressions of the ground. The camels were dropping, but the troops were in good health.
9th October.
On the 9th October Colonel Farquhar made a reconnaissance 30 miles forward, and ascertained that the pools were barely sufficient for a rapid march to Sarakna, at which village there are a few wells.
The enemy was still retiring, and sweeping the country bare of cattle. The uncut harvest supplied ample forage.
Spread of the rebellion to the neighbourhood of Suakin.
August.
In the beginning of August rumours reached Suakin that emissaries of the Mahdi were inciting the Arabs in the neighbourhood of Sinkat[328] and Erkowit[329] to revolt. On the 2nd Tewfik Bey, the Governor of Suakin, left for Sinkat, to inquire into the true state of affairs. He there learned that Osman Digma, a well-known slave-dealer, assisted by his nephews, Ahmed and Fagi Digma, had raised the Erkowit, Sherah, Mishab, Migadaff, and Bishirieh tribes in the name of the Mahdi. All these are small tribes, living in the Erkowit district; but the more important Langeb tribe, living in the neighbourhood of Toka, were said to be preparing to rise.
5th August.
Defeat of the rebels at Sinkat.
1883.
Tewfik Bey immediately summoned Digma to come to him at Sinkat. He arrived on the 5th August, but accompanied by about 1500 armed followers, and demanded, in the name of the Mahdi, the surrender of Sinkat and Suakin, with all the arms and treasure they contain. These demands being, of course, refused, Digma attacked the barracks and the summer residences of the Suakis spread over the plain. The inhabitants defended themselves, and, with the assistance of the troops, drove off the rebels after an hour’s fight. Digma was severely wounded, and his two nephews and sixty-three other rebels were killed. The number of their wounded is unknown. On the Government side, seven soldiers and Suakis were killed or died of their wounds.
The rebels retired to Erkowit, and it was reported that they were much discouraged by their defeat.
By the 13th August the garrison of Sinkat, which on the 5th was only 100 strong, had been increased to 200. On that date there were 100 soldiers, forty of whom were artillerymen, and six Krupp 9-pounders at Suakin. Some measures were being taken for the defence of the town.
Uneasiness at Berber.
Some uneasiness was also felt at Berber, and, in consequence, the Mudir of that place detained there two battalions of infantry, which arrived early in August, on their way to Kartoum.
It was reported that the last detachment of reinforcements for General Hicks, consisting of 200 infantry and 300 Bashi-Bazouks, had been abandoned by their camel-drivers and camels at a place called Kokreb, about half-way between Suakin and Berber. What became of the troops after the loss of their baggage and camels is not stated.
Although the attack on Sinkat had been repulsed with loss, the appearance of the enemy in the rear of General Hicks, and more or less commanding his line of communications, was sufficiently serious to cause much uneasiness at Cairo.
24th August.
Despatch of reinforcements to Suakin.
300 troops were despatched from Egypt to Suakin about the 24th August, and they were to be followed by further large reinforcements.
The telegraph line between Suakin and Sinkat was cut on the 10th August. On the 8th October it was reported that communication between those places and Berber, which had been interrupted for some time, had been reestablished.
1883.
Annihilation of a detachment of Egyptian troops between Suakin and Sinkat.
18th October.
On the 18th October, however, two officers and 156 Egyptian soldiers were killed by the Arabs in a mountain defile, about 20 miles from Suakin. They were on their way to support Tewfik Bey, who was said to be surrounded by rebels at Sinkat.
5th November.
Destruction of a detachment of Egyptians at Tokar, and death of Commander Moncrieff, late R.N.
1883.
On the 5th November, a body of Egyptian troops, variously estimated at from 250 to 500 men, were attacked near Tokar[330] by a band of insurgents, and completely routed. They are said to have thrown their arms away and taken to flight, notwithstanding the efforts of their commander to rally them. The reports are not very clear as to whether the Egyptians were merely making a reconnaissance, or were attempting to reach Kartoum by way of Kassala. Commander Moncrieff,[331] late R.N., the British Consul at Suakin, who had accompanied them from that place, was among the killed.
The latest accounts state that Tokar is still held for the Egyptian Government by a small body of troops and some convicts. A panic had set in at Suakin, and the inhabitants were leaving for Jeddah.
9th September.
Departure of General Hicks’s Army from Kartoum.
On leaving the camp at Omdurman,[332] on the morning of the 9th September, the order of march was as follows, viz.—Two guides, mounted on camels, led the way. Behind them rode a detachment of men in armour, followed by the general staff. Then came a battalion of infantry in line, with several battalions in column in rear of each of its flanks. The artillery marched between the columns of infantry. Another battalion in line formed the fourth side of the infantry square.[333] A detachment of cavalry completed the fighting force. Behind it came a long train of pack animals, led and protected by Bashi-Bazouks. The rear was brought up by irregular cavalry.
Marching-out strength.
The marching-out strength was 10,000 men, 4 Krupp field guns, 10 mountain guns, 6 Nordenfeldts, 500 horses, and 5500 camels.
Al-ed-Deen Pasha, the Governor-General of the Soudan, started at the same time, proceeding as far as Duem by steamer. He took in his suite several notables of great influence, who were to be considered as hostages, and answerable with their lives for any disturbances that might break out in Kartoum during their absence.
Precautions on the march.
1883.
On the march every precaution was taken to guard against surprise. The troops were always under arms, and lined the “zerebas” an hour before daybreak, the usual time for an Arab attack. The cavalry used to go out at dawn, and not till then were the tents allowed to be struck and the camels loaded. An hour later the whole force marched off. Owing to the enormous number of camels, progress was slow. After twelve days’ marching, Duem, 110 miles from Omdurman, was reached, and the army rested for four days. The heat was intense, and both men and camels suffered considerably.
On quitting the Nile, General Hicks’s original intention had been to retake Dara,[334] before marching on El Obeyed, but he altered his plans at the request of King Adam of Takallé, who promised assistance in the event of the army entering Kordofan from the south.
30th September.
1883.
On the 30th September, General Hicks reached Zeraiga, about 30 miles from Duem. The following despatch was probably written at Sangi Hamferid,[335] some miles further on, though neither the date nor the name of the place is stated. It was sent by hand to Kartoum, and telegraphed thence to Cairo on the 17th October. It runs as follows, viz.: “The army has arrived within 28 miles of Sarakhna. We have depended upon pools of rain-water for supply, which we have fortunately found. A reconnaissance made to-day ensures us water as far as Sarakhna. Guide information is vague. I regret that I have to abandon my intention of establishing military posts, and line of communication with base at Duem. The Governor-General assures me that the Arabs will close in on my route after the army has passed in sufficient force to prevent posts forwarding supplies; besides, the pools of rain-water—the only supply—will dry up. Water not to be obtained by digging wells. I have no information regarding water between Sarakhna and Nurabi, nor reliable information of the supply there. This causes me great anxiety. I quite expected Sarakhna to be occupied by the enemy, but the reconnaissance to-day found the place evacuated. The Arabs had left this morning. The health of the troops is, on the whole, good, which is fortunate, as we have no sick carriage. The heat is intense.”
3rd October.
Camp near Sarakhna. Last despatch from General Hicks.
The following is the last dispatch received from General Hicks. It is dated “Camp, near Sarakhna, October 3rd, 1883”:—
Reasons for advancing without securing line of communications.
“On leaving Duem, on the White Nile, to march by the Khor-el-Nil to Melbeis and El Obeyed, I decided that my line of communication should be secured by posts of 200 men each, left in strongly fortified positions in the following places: Schatt, 16 miles distant; Zeraiga, 16 miles distant; Sarakhna, 32 miles distant; Nurabi, 16 miles distant; Agaila, 24 miles distant; Johan, 32 miles distant; Abli, 28 miles distant: Beliab, 22 miles distant; Um Sheikh, 12 miles distant; Rahad, 14 miles distant; Khashil (? Kazghil), 14 miles distant; Melbeis, 25 miles distant.[336]
“At all these places I was informed water would be found.
“Large quantities of biscuits were to arrive at Duem, and as we were unable to leave a single camel at the base, 1000 were ordered to be purchased and forwarded to Duem.
“His Excellency Al-ed-Deen Pasha had already at Kartoum 300, and gave orders for the remaining 700 to be purchased and forwarded to Duem without delay.
“The biscuits would then, with ammunition and other stores, be pushed on to the front from post to post.
“Depôts would be formed at each post, and, in case of a reverse, a line of retreat secured, the troops falling back upon these depôts, where we should be certain of finding supplies of food, ammunition, and water.
1883.
“We marched to Schatt, and formed the first post and depôt there; but, before reaching Zeraiga, I was informed by the Governor-General of the Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duem, that the soldiers left at the posts would not guard the convoys; in fact, that they would be afraid to do so; that, to insure supplies being forwarded, an army would be required with each convoy; that the Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we had passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to forward the supplies; that it would be dangerous; and I would find that they would not run the risk.
“The Governor-General requested me to abandon the idea of having this line of posts—to give up my line of communications and line of retreat, and to advance with the army en l’air, with 50 days’ supply of food only, the Arabs closing in on our rear.
“I am naturally very averse to this, but if, as his Excellency assures me, it is a fact that the posts will not be supplied from the base at Duem, and supplies will not be forwarded through them, I should, in garrisoning these posts, be only weakening my fighting force without gaining any advantage. I have therefore called a Council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinions.”[337]
1883.
No news of the Expeditionary Force having been heard for several weeks, anxiety began to be felt as to its fate. Messengers were despatched from Duem along the various routes to Kordofan, but, for a long while, none of the few who returned brought any authentic information.
30th October. Rumoured defeat of the Mahdi.
On the 30th October, rumours were spread in Kartoum that the Mahdi had been defeated in several important engagements, and that General Hicks was master of the whole of Kordofan. No official confirmation of the reported victories was, however, received, and after a few days the authenticity of the news began to be doubted.
5th November.
Battle of Kazghil. Annihilation of General Hicks’s army.
1883.
At length, on the 19th November, a messenger, who had failed to deliver his despatches to Al-ed-Deen Pasha, returned to Duem, bringing news of the total destruction of General Hicks’s army. These sad tidings were soon confirmed by other persons arriving from Kordofan. Their accounts differ in detail, but most of them agree that the greater part, if not the whole, of the army was annihilated by the insurgent forces on the 4th or 5th November. The events which culminated in this terrible disaster are still shrouded in a certain amount of mystery. Nothing has been heard from any of the Europeans who accompanied the expedition, nor from any of the Egyptian Staff Officers, of a later date than General Hicks’s despatch of the 3rd October. Probably the most trustworthy account of the fighting is that given by a camel-driver, who went as servant to a native officer. He states that the army, on leaving Duem, soon met the rebels, and engaged in skirmishes with them, the Mahdi’s men being beaten, and the Egyptians losing a few Bashi-Bazouks and Shaggyehs. Thus the army arrived at Rahad, where there is a lake. There it filled up with water, and then marched towards Alouba. At the latter place there was an encounter with the rebels, in which General Hicks was victorious. On the 2nd November the army left Alouba, taking what water it could, and, while marching through a forest, was surprised by a large force of rebels. The Egyptians formed square, and, after fighting all day, finally defeated them and drove them off. On Saturday, the 3rd November, the march was resumed. Water was already becoming scarce. The rebels again appeared in force, and surrounded the army. A serious engagement ensued, in which heavy losses were suffered on both sides, but the rebels were once more beaten. That night was passed on the field of battle, and next day the army moved towards Kazghil. After proceeding for four hours, it suddenly came under a heavy fusillade from large numbers of the enemy. The troops were suffering great torments from thirst, but nevertheless fought throughout the whole day. On the 5th, when they were approaching the wells, which were only half an hour distant, the rebels, who had been concealed in the forest, again suddenly attacked the column on all sides. The Egyptians returned their fire, and a great battle raged. Towards mid-day the entire force of the rebels made a general charge with guns, swords, and spears, and General Hicks and his whole army perished, except 200 Egyptian soldiers and a few negro servants, most of whom were wounded.[338]
Of the whole of the expeditionary force, the only European supposed to be now alive is Adolf Klootz, formerly a sergeant of Prussian Uhlans, and recently servant to Major von Seckendorff. He is said to have deserted three days before the final struggle, to have commanded the insurgent artillery during the action, and to be at present an officer in the service of the Mahdi.[339]
Note—The following is the Extract of a letter from the Mahdi’s Emir at Berber to Zubair, by whom it was forwarded to Sir Henry Gordon.
Letter of the Emir Ali Mohammed Abou Saad Esshentrawi al Abadi (the Mahdi’s Emir at Berber).
“Compliments,—After the arrival of Hussein Pasha Khalifat in the Soudan, it was found that all the inhabitants were aroused by the appearance of the Imam. Since this every week a disturbance took place among the Arabs and Jahleien and others. We tried to put down the disturbances. While we were trying to do so, news came that the influence of the Imam the Mahdi was established, and that all the districts of Darfur and Bahr el Ghezel, and Kordofan, Sennaar, and Jebel Khadir, and the Arabs, all of them, were under him. Why this was so was that they saw and heard what he has done to the backsliders at the battle of Jebel Khadir and in the slaughter of Yusuf Pasha Shelali and his army of 8000 men, and in the destruction of Al-ed-Deen Pasha and his army of 36,000 men, which was altogether destroyed in a quarter of an hour. It was a fearful fight, in which you heard only the slashing of swords into the bodies. At that time we received letters from our lord the Imam strictly ordering us to fight the backsliders and to block the way against all mischief-makers whatever, which we prepared to do. Then came to us Mohammed El Kheir Ibu Abdullah, Governor-General of the district of Berber, bringing with him standards of victory prepared for the siege of Berber. When he arrived at Metemma, he wrote letters to all the districts, calling for the aid of all the tribes and Arabs. It was only a short time after that he came to Berber with an army of 40,000 men, the youngest of whom were eager to die in the field for the sake of God. This was on the 1st Rejeb, 1301. Correspondence took place between the Governor and the Pasha for the space of eight days, and on Monday, the night of the 23rd Rejeb, the battle was fought; and before break of day we had won the victory and had killed all who opposed the Mahdi, and captured the Pasha. Then all the inhabitants of Bertou, of Berkou, of Islih, of Balalah, of Baskirmah, and of Salah came into the Imam, and then his reign was established in all the Soudan, east and west. This is what happened in these parts; and know, my friend, that the world is turned upside down, and henceforward there will be nothing but preparation for the holy war in the path of God, and spending of treasure and life in what pleases Him and His Prophet. Be on your guard against the covetousness of the world.
“As to your spy, Mohammed Abou Jibali, who was sent with your men, after they came to Berber, and had seen the Governor, and had permission to go to Kartoum, when they reached Shendy the Governor thought it better that they should return to Berber—which they did on the 1st Ramadan. They were imprisoned till the 20th. Then eight mounted men came from among your relatives, and had a conference with the Governor, who then released them, and they went to your friends living near Kartoum. After they left, the spy, Mohammed Abou Jibali, was detained, and imprisoned in Berber, as before, till the 3rd of Zu’l Kādih. For your sake and friendship, &c., we have done all we could, until we secretly released him and sent him away safely to you. I hope he will arrive in safety, and will tell you how honestly we have acted for you.
“Accept, &c.
“3rd Zu’l Kādih, 1301 [about 25th August, 1884].”
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.
[APPENDIX Q.]
From Saleh Bey, Governor at Galabat.
To his Excellency the Governor-General of all the Provinces of the Soudan.
Sir,
The two envelopes enclosed were sent to your servant from his Majesty the King of Kings of Abyssinia, with a special messenger from him, and a request that we would receive and forward them to your Excellency where-ever you may be found. Therefore we now send these messengers with them. And we trust that after you have honoured them with your attention that your Excellency will quickly send back the answer to us, that we may send it to the King of Kings of Abyssinia by the two messengers who have come from his Majesty, and who are at present date with us at Kalabât (Galabat). Awaiting the said reply.
(Signed) Salehh Ibrahim,
District Inspector and Officer of Kalabât (Galabât).
Postscript.—Sir, The name of the bearer is Ali Othman.
In order not to increase expense (this) is written on ruled paper.
(Signed) Salehh Ibrahim.
1 Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
From Saleh Bey, Governor of Galabat.
To his Excellency the Honourable the Governor-General of the Soudan.
Sir,
Your servant, who stands in the attitude of service (to you), prays God with a sincere heart to grant his request and to extend His goodness towards me, in strengthening and preserving your Excellency under His shadow for the sake of the servants and subjects (of Government), and to change the condition of affairs from what they are, and to grant me the honour of seeing your Excellency, to kiss your bountiful hands, by which we have been covered with good and with blessings;—(even you who are) the destroyer of the enemies of the Government, the wicked rebels who have lost their souls and their religion, and are deprived of the benefits of the Government, from which they had obtained glory and honour; and turned, in spite of (all) that, from truth to error. May God preserve the glory of Government (so that) by presence of your Excellency you may destroy and utterly ruin the wretched Mohammed Ahhmed and his followers.
We have also to-day heard from the neighbourhood of Dukah of Abou Sitti and of Abou Haraz about what the energy of your Excellency has accomplished in beating the rebels and dispersing their people and troops, assembled for purposes of sedition.
And I beseech God most High, to whom be praise, to stretch out the sword of your Government more (and more)—(in order) to annihilate the false pretences of Mohammed Ahhmed, and to disperse his wicked hordes.
If your thoughts be directed towards your servant and the humble subject of the Government—(I have to say that) at present date I am well, under your protection, and am still continuing in the attitude of service to the Government. And oh! what a Government! (it is). How much compassion and benefit and kindness have you bestowed on us in goodness and bounty, which no man can deny? I pray in the name of God and of His prophet that your servant may never depart from this path of duty (fidelity—being) obedient to the Government openly, without hindrance—under your protection.
With regard to the subjects of the Government under the care of your servant—they do not cease to remain as they were in respect of submission and obedience (loyalty), and will never follow the ways of rebellion—by the mercy of God most High and as a result of the advantage of being under your Government.
But, Excellency, we are surrounded by the enemy on all sides; from the side of the Dukah, by the Shukryeh, by the Dhāniyeh, and by the Ja’alibiyeh: as on the side of the river, by the Rahbar; also by the Bukādi, and those rebels who follow them.
But by the influence of your Excellency no harm will come to us from them. Nor do we take account of him (the Mahdi); our Lord will make us victorious over him through the strength of the Government and the reputation of its power and majesty, from which we derive glory and honour, through your Excellency and the favour of the Khedive.
As to what we have enclosed about ——, we trust and pray for the answer. Including this time we have now written to you four times.
The messenger takes them (the letters) from here, and when he gets to Katarif, or Dukah, he finds liers in wait, and the rebels torment him on meeting him in the road.
This prevented us from writing lately, but we are in constant communication with the Mudiriyeh; and in that road we have lost two persons by (hands of) the rebels of Dhāniyeh and of Bukkād, on the road of Tumruk.
This for the information of your Excellency.
(Signed) Salehh Ibrahim,
Ma’amooor and Nāzir, of Kalabât (Galabât)
(District Inspector and Officer).
1 Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
From Saleh Bey, Governor of Salahah.
To His Excellency the Honourable the Governor-General of the Soudan.
Sir,
I have the honour to lay before your Excellency that at the beginning of the month of Rajeb, from the time of the desertion and change of conduct of the Shukriyeh and the Dhāniyeh, and the Jaalāni, and the Bukkādi, in forsaking loyalty to Government and corrupting their ways when they joined the wretch (the Mahdi) and his followers: as soon as we received news of their having thrown off their allegiance we communicated with the Mudiriyeh in the month aforesaid. And these four tribes combined together against us and besieged us on the side of Dukah, having with them one called Hussein Abd el Wāhhad, and they wrote to us as to their intention that we should follow them into error, or they would fight and hem us in. When we perceived this, and that it was then the season of autumn and the time for sowing our seed for necessary provisions—and that their wicked intention was to prevent the inhabitants from sowing their grain, and that the soldiery we had were very few; we tried by means of diplomacy and artifice with their chief Hussein, to get them to leave us during the autumn (seed time).
All that passed between us and them we have communicated in detail to the Mudiriyeh from time to time—so that there should be no misunderstanding from our silence—about what we wrote to them for putting them off by diplomacy, as it seemed best to us for bringing them to reason. And please God, after tranquillity is established, we will hasten to make copies of all the communications which have passed with them, as well as of what we wrote to the Mudiriyeh. On your seeing them you will know the zeal of your servant in upholding his office; and his exertions for honour of the Government, whose bounties overwhelm him, will appear.
And, Sir, now that autumn is over and these four tribes above mentioned are now in Katarif, and as there is great energy displayed in assembling them for the certain purpose of besieging Kalabât (Galabât), it became necessary to inform your Excellency, trusting and praying for issue of your Excellency’s order, sanctioning all that we do for the purpose of impeding and destroying those wretches before named. And with the help of the most High God your servant will do nothing but what will lead to victory, and will increase the supremacy of the Government and the destruction of its enemies. It is not to be hidden from your Excellency about Mohammed Bey Zain, that when the Mudiriyeh sent orders to the Ma’amoor (district officer) of Katarif for payment of 6000 dollars for payment of the salaries of the officials of Galabât, an officer and thirty-five soldiers were appointed to receive that amount from the officials of Katarif. And when they were coming to Galabât, Mahmood Bey, the above-named, took the money from them and left the officer to go his way. We wrote at the time to the Mudiriyeh about it, telling what Mahmood had done, and also to his Excellency, Mahmood Bey, and received his reply (denying) that the sum had been given to him at all, and refusing to have any more communication on the subject. And we made copy of what we received from him, and we wrote about him to the Mudiriyeh, and his answer is preserved by us in case of necessity.
(Signed) Salehh Ibrahim.
Nazir and Ma’amoor of Kalabat (District
Inspector and Officer).
Date, 1 of Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
Postscript.—Sir, We learn from the Mudiriyeh of Saka (by letter) of this date of what the energy of your Excellency has done there to impede and repulse the rebels. They are joyful to-day at not being besieged as hitherto, and the neighbourhood is pretty clear at present. At this date there is perfect safety on account of the water from their being surrounded. After this month the crossing of the rivers will become possible, and (then) without doubt the rebels will be able to get at them. Your servant is constantly writing to the General of his troops to be always wide awake, and to look out for the preservation and the safety of the honour of the Government.
Always, Sir, at your order,
Salehh Ibrahim.
From the Greek Consul at Adowa to General Gordon.
Adowa (Abyssinia), 5/17 August, 1884.
My dear General,
I arrived in Abyssinia on the 12/24 May, sent by my Government to aid the mission of Admiral Hewett at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor John.
Thanks to the intelligence and the good feeling of His Majesty, aided by my counsels, the mission of the Admiral has completely succeeded.
In Egypt and in England we have been for four months without news from you, in spite of all the attempts which have been made to obtain news from you.
In England they have prepared an expedition of 15,000 men for the Nile, commanded by Lord Wolseley, besides which the Emperor John will put himself in the field after the Haref with a great army. Take courage, then. Give me news of you that I may send them to England.
The messenger is sent by the Emperor John, whom I have caused to understand the urgent need of news from you. You must not detain the messenger more than two days.
I wish you all honour and glory in your mission, and
I am your devoted friend,
Mitzakis.
From Greek Consul Mitzakis, dated 24th August, to Greek Consul, Kartoum, received 20th October, 1884.
Adowa (Abyssinia), 5/17 August, 1884.
Sir,
His Majesty’s Government is much affected at the misfortunes of the Greeks in the Soudan, and has ordered me to come here, in order that by my relations with His Majesty the Emperor John, I may help the Greeks in the Soudan, and give them news.
His Majesty’s Government is much distressed about its subjects, because there has been no news for four months of His Excellency Gordon Pasha, in spite of all the efforts of the Governments of England and of Egypt.
The Most Christian Emperor John, to whom I have spoken of the great interest of England and Greece in the Soudan, has promised me to send this letter by Metemma[340] (Galabat) by a trusty messenger, who will return, bringing your answer and a letter from His Excellency Gordon Pasha, to whom I also write. Therefore I beg you to be so good as to write to me all your news, that is to say, if the siege is very strict; if the Mahdi himself is at the head of the besiegers; if you have provisions and munitions, and for how many months; how many Greeks and Europeans there are in Kartoum, together with their names; how many soldiers have you, and what is the spirit of the soldiers and the inhabitants of the town, and all other important news.
It must be thoroughly understood that you are to send back the messenger at the earliest possible moment, and give him a letter, in very small form, in order that he may conceal it in safety.
I am surprised that you have not sent any letter by Metemma or by Walkeit.
If you can send me letters by Metemma, you must address them to the Governour-General Gondar Axum-Gabroun; or by Walkeit, to the Governour Degias-Tessema.
Hoping that your siege will soon be raised,
I am, &c.,
The Consul.
[Notice.]
The English Admiral Hewett has come here, and has signed the Convention of the Emperor John with the Egyptian Government, by which Abyssinia takes Bogos,[341] Kassala, Katarif, and the right of importing and exporting merchandize and arms by the port of Massowa.
Even while I am writing, the Egyptians are giving up Bogos to Ras-Aloula (the Abyssinian Commander-in-Chief).
In England 15,000 soldiers are preparing to come to relieve Kartoum, and I trust that an expedition of from 100,000 to 200,000 brave men will start to save you.
If there is a messenger who can bring your letter to Metemma (or Galabat) or to Walkeit you can promise him whatever you wish, and we will pay him, because the English Government has a great interest in General Gordon.
I am yours, &c.
APPENDIX R (249).
From Slatin Bey.
His Excellency Gordon Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan.
Your Excellency,
I have sent two letters, one by George Calamatino and the other by my servant, without having received an answer from your Excellency, neither has Consul Hansall answered me.
Your Excellency, I have fought twenty-seven times for the Government against the enemy, and they have beaten me twice, and I have done nothing dishonourable, nothing which should hinder your Excellency from writing me an answer, that I may know what to do.
They have taken the little steamer at Dar-Djumna, after it passed the Sehelal of the Robatat, and they have brought the whole of the letters from Kartoum for Cairo here. In order to assure you that they have taken the steamer they have sent your Excellency some letters, and I have done all that I could to send your Military Journal,[342] because it may be, perhaps, of some value for your Excellency.
I hope that Consul Hansall has made a translation of my letter, in which I place all my feeble services to your Excellency’s disposal, and I have been obliged to write in German, because they have burnt my French dictionary, believing that it was a prayer book.
His Excellency Stewart Pasha, with nine men, is dead. They have taken the others to Berber.
When you have a letter for Dongola I beg you to send it me, and I will find means of sending it on.
Your scribe has written a dispatch in cipher, half Arabic and half cipher, so badly, that they have been able to decipher it, and so they have found a key to your despatches, and have also deciphered your Excellency’s despatch to his Excellency Towfik Pasha. If there are letters from Europe for me at the post I beg you to send them me, because it is almost three years since I have had any news of my family. I entreat your Excellency to honour me with an answer.
Your devoted and obedient servant,
Slatin.
I and Seid Gjoma, Mudir of Fascher, are seeking occasion to enter Omdurman to remain with you. Pray, Excellency, do your best to give us permission, because we are always in fear of spies. I pray God that He may give you success in the siege.
P.S.—If your Excellency has perhaps understood that I have done anything contrary to the honour of an officer, and if that hinders you from writing to me, I pray you give me a chance of defending myself, and judge according to truth.
[APPENDIX T.]
From the Mudir of Sennaar.
To the Governor-General of the Soudan and its dependencies, to His Excellency the Honourable.
We stated to your Excellency that on Oct. 6, 1884, we had the honour to receive the order of your Excellency, dated September 24, announcing the arrival of nine regiments of the braves of the English army and Moslems of India; artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the army, experienced in passing mountains, plains, and rough places, with new cannons and powerful horses. And our reading it to the public and publishing it in the country produced great rejoicing and happiness in all, and they augured all good and every benefit, and they are all praying for victory and success for you and for the army. And please God they are arrived at Berber and have taken possession of it, and have arrived at Kartoum. Everybody at Sennaar and the neighbourhood—Ulema, merchants, citizens, notables, officers, and soldiers—kiss the hands of your Excellency, and we proclaim about your Excellency, that by the power of God and His protection, and by the help of our prophet—on whom and on his people be the best of blessings and peace—the disturbances of the Soudan and the pretensions of the Mahdi are stopped, and nothing remains thereof but little trifles in some parts. And they will all submit to the sword of the Government.
To God belongs success, and help is in Him.
Mudir General of Sennaar,
(Signed) Hassan Sadik.
Dated 18 Zu’l Hejje, 1301.
Oct. 9, 1884.
Postscript to his Excellency.—We beg your Excellency to give orders for the quick despatch of a steamer with what we asked for in our (letter) laid before you, No. 39/14.
[APPENDIX U.]
Letter from the Mahdi to General Gordon.
In the name of God the merciful and compassionate: praise be to God, the bountiful Ruler, and blessing on our lord Mahomed with peace.
From the servant who trusts in God—Mahomed the son of Abdallah.
To Gordon Pasha of Kartoum: may God guide him into the path of virtue, amen!
Know that your small steamer, named Abbas—which you sent with the intention of forwarding your news to Cairo, by the way of Dongola, the persons sent being your representative Stewart Pasha and the two Consuls, French and English, with other persons, has been captured by the will of God.
Those who believed in us as the Mahdi, and surrendered, have been delivered; and those who did not were destroyed—as your representative afore-named, with the Consuls and the rest—whose souls God has condemned to the fire and to eternal misery.
That steamer and all that was in it have fallen a prey to the Moslems, and we have taken knowledge of all the letters and telegrams which were in it, in Arabic and in Frankish (languages), and of the maps, which were opened to us (translated) by those on whom God has bestowed His gifts, and has enlightened their hearts with faith, and the benefits of willing submission. Also (we have found therein) the letters sent from you to the Mudir of Dongola, with the (letters, &c.) accompanying, to be forwarded to Egypt and to European countries. All has been seized, and the contents are known. It should all have been returned to you, not being wanted here; but as it was originally sent from you, and is known unto you, we prefer to send you part of the contents and mention the property therein, so that you may be certified; and in order that the truth may make a lasting impression on thy mind—in the hope that God may guide thee to the faith of Islam, and to surrender; that you and your followers may surrender to Him and to us, that so you and they may obtain everlasting good and happiness.
Now first (among the documents seized) is the cipher dated Sept. 22, 1884, sent to Mustafa Jāwer, Mudir of Dongola, in answer to his letter dated 30th August, 1884, European reckoning, (saying) that you have given him the rank of Liwa—on the back of which is your telegram to the Khedive of Egypt, asking that he will confirm the said appointment. We have also taken knowledge of (extract from) the Journal (daily record) of the provision in the granary (as) seen by the Inspector Moosa Othmān, namely 3374 ardebs of dhoora; 4 ardebs and ⅓ and ¼ of wheat, &c. Also (extract from) the Journal[343] (daily register) of the ammunition seized by the Inspector Mohamed, dated Aug. 18, 1884—the number (? of cartridges) in store being 581,395.
Also of the telegram sent to the Khedive of Egypt, and Nubar Pasha, and to the English Consul-General from nineteen persons who have put their seals to it, and who are presidents of the Court of Appeal, (namely) Hassan Abdul Munam, and the members and the merchants, who pray (therein) that the Soudan Railway, which the Egyptian Government find it difficult to make, (may be) exchanged for river steamers and military stations, with telegraphic lines between the stations.[344]
Further, (there is) the letter (found) with the French Consul, written by you to him on July 12, 1884, No. 512/38, in acknowledgment of the 100 francs distributed to the poor and needy.
(There is) also your letter dated August 28, 1884, No. 35/144, sent to Nubar Pasha, and to the English Consul-General, and to the Chief of the Egyptian Treasury, with information about the 50,000 guineas sent from Egypt to Berber, and captured by the auxiliaries of the faith, and mentioning the advances (made) by the merchants at interest of one piastre per 100 piastres, with the hope of paying it back to the principals or their agents in that part.
(There is) also your communication dated August 26, 1884, No. 34/144, sent to the President of the Council, with a list of sixteen persons, in which you ask for confirmation of the rank which you have bestowed on them.
Also your letter, No. 1/141, dated August 14, 1884, to the Mohurdâr (Keeper of the Seals) of the Khedive, as to disposal of the four decorations you have given, and of which you enclose a specimen.
Also (as to) the ranks of the officers named by you, and the note containing eleven names, like Nuehr Bey Mahomed, Commandant of the Army of Sennaar, whom you made Liwa (General).
Also your telegram, dated Sept. 3, 1884, No. 23, to the afore-mentioned Mohurdâr (Keeper of the Seals), to confirm the appointment of Ibrahim Foozi, and Mohammed Nefii, and Moosa Shoki as Liwas (Generals).
Also your letters, (written) in European (language), all about the siege of Kartoum, and all about the arranging of the steamers, with the number of the troops in them, and their arms, and the cannon, and about the movements of the troops, and the defeat of your people, and your request for reinforcements, even if only a single regiment, and all about how your agent Cuzzi turned Moslem.
Also many letters which had come to you from our lieutenants, and what they contained of advice; also stating the number of Europeans at Kartoum, 3 English, 2 Austrians, 1 Prussian, 1 Frenchman, 4 Italians, 40 Greeks.
Also the diary (registry) of the arms, ammunition, guns and soldiers sealed by Faraj (Ferratch) ez Zainy, Commander of the Army, which has 2 Krupp guns and 284 shells; 11 mountain field-pieces, and their ammunition (? cartridges), numbering 2303; 2 matchlock guns and their ammunition, 315; 5 mortars and their ammunition 565; and 1 field piece, and 2 mitrailleuses without ammunition; and 8 howitzers (?) and their ammunition, 599; and 7064 Remington rifles, and 1205 percussion muskets; and 246 muskets (called) arshalik; and 127 rifles, old bore, and 19 pistols; and the ammunition (cartridges) for the Remingtons being 150,233 packets. And the number of the soldiers: 2 Liwas (Generals), 2 Colonels, 5 Lieut.-Colonels, and so on for other grades, and 2370 privates; the contingent of Bashi-Bazouk, and of the Shaggyeh and Khotriyeh and others, the amount of their strength (being) 26 divisions, numbering 4797 men. Also giving the number of the servants of the arsenal and on the steamers, ship by ship.
We have also taken knowledge of the two letters of Salehh, the Melek of the Sanjak (district) of Sanik, which he gave up to us (the Mahdi).
One of them, dated April 30, 1884, in which he threatens (this); and the second, dated May 1, in which he states that which he has already stated, and in which he asks for his reward.
We have also noted the telegram of the officials and of the presidents of courts, and of the Kadi and the Muftis and Ulema, numbering 34 sent to the Mohurdâr of the Khedive in Egypt, dated August 28, 1884, in which they ask for succour from the Egyptian Government; to which was attached your note to the Mudir of Dongola on account of his drafts. Also your cipher telegrams, one of which is dated August 8, 1884, to the Mohurdâr of the Khedive, in which you explain that on your arrival at Kartoum the impossibility had become clear to you of withdrawing the troops and the employés, and sending them to Egypt; on account of the disturbances (rebellions) in the country, and the cutting (closing) of the roads; for which reason you ask for reinforcements, which did not come until that happened which has happened to the Mudiriyeh of Berber.
Also about your coming to Kartoum with seven men after the annihilation of Hicks’s army; and your requesting a telegram to be sent to you in Arabic, in plain language about the Soudan, to show to the people of Kartoum—as the telegrams in European cipher do not explain enough, except only certain news (matters), and their meaning is not intelligible, except only certain things (which are understood).
And also (you refer) to the useless waste of time, so much so, that from your repeated promises to the people of Kartoum about arrival of reinforcements, you have appeared to them as if you were a liar.
Also (about) your asking for Turkish troops and your promise to send your representative, Stewart, and Mr. Power to Dongola, both of whom the Most High God has destroyed.
And the second (telegram) with the same date and the same tenor, to the President of the Council and the English Minister in Cairo.
And the third (telegram) dated August 28, 1884, to the Mohurdâr (of the Khedive), in which you promise to send a detachment to attack Sheikh el Obeyed; which you sent, and the Most High God has destroyed.
Also your letter to the Khedive of Egypt, without date, in which you ask to have English soldiers sent, and appoint Zubair Pasha with reinforcements for withdrawal of the Egyptian troops to Egypt, and that you (will) give the Soudan to the Sultan on the arrival of the reinforcements of 200,000 men. And (you state that) if this be not done those in the Soudan will be killed, and their blood will be on their conscience (i.e. those to whom he writes will be responsible for their deaths). And the last you say in it (is) that Mahomed Ali Pasha is the only and single one in the Soudan on whom you (could) rely to take your place. But God has destroyed Mohamed Ali Pasha, on whom you rely.
The fourth telegram is dated August 28, to the Khedive of Egypt, and to Nubar Pasha and the English Consul in Egypt, in which you say that you were expecting the reinforcements before asked for—by way of Merowé—and also state the telegrams sent to the above-named at that date; in which you speak about fighting my auxiliaries, and about your having provisions for five months.
Also the telegram, dated August 25, 1884, to the above-mentioned, in which you pretend (suppose) that Ibrahim el Obeyed has been killed. And you say that you have the news of our arrival, which, however, was not confirmed.
And your letter to the President of the Council and the English Minister in Cairo, dated August 8, 1884, in which you speak of your appointing three steamers to go and inquire as to the state of Sennaar, and that you will send soldiers to Berber by the steamers to recapture it, sending with them Stewart and the Consuls, whom the Most High God has destroyed.
And the telegram, dated August 8, 1884, sent to the President of the Council and the English Minister, in which you promise to send 2000 soldiers to Berber for recovering it, and (say) that unless the reinforcements come to strengthen Berber, when the water of the Nile gets lower the same thing will happen again to Berber which had (already) happened.
Also your telegram to the Khedive of Egypt and Nubar Pasha, dated Sept. 8, 1884, in which you say it was your purpose to remove those (the garrison, &c.) at Sennaar, but that you saw that it would not be done; and (you mention) the sorrow of the inhabitants and of the employés at Kartoum and Sennaar at the non-arrival of succour.
Also the telegram, dated Sept. 9, to the Khedive of Egypt and Nubar Pasha and to the General, in which you speak of the sending of Stewart and those with him by the small steamer, and (with) the two large steamers escorting them for protection. And that you had so many times already asked for succour, and had deep anxiety for the state of the Soudan.
And (stating) that you had received no answer whatever, so that the people had become disgusted.
Also your telegram, dated August 28, 1884, stating that (as to) the Firmān emanating from the Khedive to all the nobles and notables and people of the Soudan, announcing the withdrawal of the troops of the Government from it, and their evacuation of the country, (and) leaving it to the Soudanese to appoint rulers of the country from among the natives,—you had not been able to communicate or to show it to anybody on account of what had taken place.
Also (we have seen) the two seals engraved with our name to imitate our seal.
We never miss any of your news, nor what is in your innermost thoughts, and about the strength and support—not of God—on which you rely. We have now understood it all.
Tricks in making ciphers, and using so many languages, are of no avail.
From the Most High God, to whom be praise, no secrets can be hidden.
As to your expecting reinforcements, reliance for succour on others than God, that will bring you nothing but destruction, and (cause you to) fall into utmost danger in this world and the next.
For God most High has dispersed sedition through our manifestation, and has vanquished the wicked and obstinate people, and has guided those who have understanding to the way of righteousness.
And there is no refuge but in God, and in obedience to His command, and that of His Prophet and of His Mahdi.
No doubt you have heard what has happened to your brethren, from whom you expected help, at Suakin and elsewhere, whom God has destroyed, and dispersed and abandoned.
Notwithstanding all this, as we have now arrived at Mushra’ el Koweh’, at a day’s journey from Omdurman, and are coming, please God, to your place, if you return to the Most High God, and become a Moslem, and surrender to His order and that of His Prophet, and believe in us as the Mahdi, send us a message from thee, and from those with thee, after laying down your arms and giving up the thought of fighting, so that I may send you one with safe conduct, by which you will obtain (assurance of) benefit of the blessing in this world and the next. Otherwise, and if you do not act thus, you will have to encounter war from God and His Prophet. And know that the Most High God is mighty (able) for thy destruction, as He has destroyed (others) before thee, who were much stronger than thou, and more numerous.
And you, and your children and your property, will be for a prey to the Moslems, and you will repent when repentance will not avail. For, after the beginning of the battle were you to surrender, it would be from fear, and not willingly, and that will not be accepted.
And there is no succour or strength but in God, and peace be upon those who have followed the Guidance.[345]
Dated (Wednesday) 7th day 2nd of Moharram, 1302.
Oct. 22, 1884.
Postscript.—In one of your cipher telegrams sent to Bahhri and seized, you mention that the troops present in Bahr Gazelle and the Equator and elsewhere (number) 30,000 soldiers, whom you cannot leave behind, even though you should die.
And know that Bahr Gazelle and the Equator are both of them under our hand (power), and that both have followed us as Mahdi, and that they and their chief and all their officers are now among the auxiliaries of the Mahdi. And they have joined our lieutenant in that part, and letters from them are constantly coming and going without hindrance, or diminution of numbers.
And here inclosed are two letters of those which we have received from our agents (lieutenants) there. On seeing them thou wilt understand and know if Bahr Gazelle is (or not) in thy possession as thou thinkest, or whether it forms part and parcel of the Mahdi’s dominions.
And for thy better information, and in our compassion for thee and the worshippers of God (with thee), we have thought of adding this postscript, and so that you should see clearly what to do, this postscript was necessary.
| (Seal.) | There is no God but (God) Allah. |
| Mahomed is the prophet of (God) Allah. | |
| Mahomed the Mahdi (son of) Abd-Allah. | |
| (Year) 1292. |
This Seal is square, and very large. It is roughly engraved, and the inscription forms a triplet, each line ending with the name of God.
The letter is altogether written on one side of a very large sheet of paper.
APPENDIX U a.
(Enclosure in U.)
Letter from Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Kerkasâwi to Achmet, son of Suleiman.
In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. Praise be to God the Supreme Ruler, and blessing and peace upon our lord Mahomed and his successors with salutation.
From the Fakir of God, the humble and lowly, Mahomed Sheikh Mahomed Kerkasâwi to our brother and beloved in God, to
Achmed, son of Suleiman, Receiver General of the Treasury of the Moslems. May God preserve him. Amen!
After praying for the peace of God and His blessing and mercy upon you; if you inquire after me (I can say that) I am by God’s help in possession of all the conditions of good health.
As to the information which we have to give you (it) is that on the arrival of the Emir Karm Illah Sheikh Mohammed in the parts of Bahr Gazelle and the neighbourhood of Sirkua, your servant had been appointed to the office of gathering in the crops; and we had not received news of his arrival, excepting from the letter which reached us from the Emir Abdullah,[346] surnamed Bilbitn, in which he asked my presence at the seat of the Mudiriyeh. On my arrival at the seat afore-named, I got to know positively about that, and after that I tried, with the Emir Abdullah, to obtain the consent and surrender (of the people there) without delay.
In the interval there came two dervishes from the Emir Karm Illah; in their hands were several letters to us and to some of the brethren, and to the Emir Abdullah.
After these letters had been carefully read by us, the Emir Abdullah stopped the (carrying out of the) surrender to the Emir (Karm Illah), because no letter had been sent to him to his (own) address by his Highness.
So we and all the brethren used our utmost efforts with him, (urging) the desirableness of (his) sending a letter from him to the Emir Karm Illah, requesting him (the latter) to send (on) the letter of his Highness that it might be considered, and as to settling the mode of surrender. And this was done. When the letter was written, I received it, and went with it in company of the two dervishes above-named, and with us went the Sheikh Wakîa’ Allah Edrisi and Mahomed Sālim esh Shareef; and Haj Omar, all of them of the inhabitants of this seat (of the Mudiriyeh), they being appointed with me by order of the Emir Abdullah for bringing quickly the Proclamation written by H. E. the Mahdi.
On our arrival at (the place of) Karm Illah, and on his reading the letter of the said Emir (Abdullah), he ordered copy to be made of the Proclamation and gave it to me. Those appointed with me of the inhabitants of the seat (of the Mudiriyeh) also wrote a message as they remained with the Emir Karm Illah. On receiving the letter from the afore-named, I came back with it to the Emir Abdullah, who on reading it with intelligence, in the presence of the brethren, all of them became delighted and filled with happiness and joy which could not be exceeded.
Especially the Emir Abdullah obeyed and accepted (the terms of) the proclamation of his Highness; and so everything was settled with the help of God, the Lord to whom worship (is due).
All the brethren are longing to see his Highness, and so the letters were written from the Emir Abdullah and the brethren in the form of a deed (compact) of submission by them, and of obedience to the Emir Karm Illah, appointed by his Highness the Mahdi, which I took, and went to the town of Yānikah, the place where the afore-named Emir was encamped; and I delivered it to him, and on his reading and understanding it, his countenance expressed joy thereat. And he wrote a letter to the Emir Abdullah, informing him of his being about to leave the town of Yānikah, and to come to the seat of the Mudiriyeh on Tuesday, the 25th of Jamād el Akhar, 1301, and he gave the safe conduct for all—for themselves, their families, and their property. And, praise be to God Most High, on the day named we and the Emir Karm Illah, and the troops with him, arrived at an hour’s distance from the seat (of the Mudiriyeh). And the Emir Abdullah and all the notables and the brethren came to meet us outside of the wooden stockade surrounding the seat (of the Mudiriyeh). The meeting was like the meeting of dear friends with each other, and it was a memorable day for all that was accomplished therein, and for the filling up of (our) joy.
On our entering the Mahhkameh (Court of Justice) of the Mudiriyeh, and on the friends and the Emirs being seated, the Emir Abdullah rose, and, standing upright, uttered the two declarations of testimony, saying, “I testify that there is no God but God; and I testify that our Lord Mohammed is the prophet of God, blessing be upon him, and that the (Seyyed[347]) Lord Mohammed, son of the Lord Abdullah, he (is) the Mahdi and Khalif of God and His prophet.” Likewise (after this) the two Copts Gabriel B’abal and Sālehh Shanooda, became Moslems, and uttered the two testimonies before the Emir Karm Illah (who received their profession of faith).
After which all (the property) which was in the stores of the Mudiriyeh, situated in the seat (thereof) and elsewhere, became the property of the Treasury of Islām, as stated in the letters of the Emir Karm Illah sent to his Highness.
And we pray God Most High, to whom be praise, that He may soon grant us the favour of a journey (Hejira) to the honoured place, that we may be blessed with sight of his Excellency the Mahdi, and that we may be included in the number of the warriors on the way (for the truth) of God.
I send from me to their Excellencies (the Hanifs) the nobles, and Emirs, and friends, and acquaintances who fight for God, thousands of salaams of God so long as I live.
(Signed) Mohammed Shaikh Mohammed.
Written 17 Ramadan, 1301.
July 11, 1884.
APPENDIX Ub.
(Enclosure in U.)
In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate, &c.
From the servant of his Lord, the Fakir, Karam Illah, Sheikh Mohammed at Bahr el Gazelle to the relation of the Mahdi and Emir of the army of the Mahdi, the Khalif Abdallah Ben of the Seyyed Mohammed. May his glory be prolonged.
After paying our dutiful salutations and respectful compliments, if you inquire about us (we can say) all praise to the Most High, all is well, and I have the honour to announce to you we have captured a large number of (female) slaves as booty; and that about 1360 head of slaves have already been sent to Shakka,[348] including 200 slaves of Kanâwi (of) Alyoo, which family passes to the Moslem Treasury (i.e. their value); and this (was done) in three divisions the first time (under convoy of) the Fakir Ahhmed Mohammed, the Shakiyi; the second (party) which is considered the most numerous, (under convoy of) our brother Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasâwi, and the third under convoy of the conductor Mohammed Salehh et Toom; (being) needed for buying (barter for) horses for use of our auxiliaries, with the knowledge of our brother Mohammed el Karkasâwi. And those which may be sent to your honour to the noble camp (i.e. the Mahdi’s camp), will be also with his knowledge, as he has already been appointed from here for that purpose.
Also all the Fakirs, our auxiliaries, have been distributed in the different zerebas in order to collect the booty. And, please God, all that can be got will be sent to Shaka by degrees (as captured). And Mahomed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasâwi is my brother (son) of my father and mother—older than me, and he it is who helped us to take the town of Bahr Ghazel—and in consideration of his good management we have appointed him (to go) to Shaka to barter slaves for horses. And the slaves which may be sent to your Honour will be with his knowledge and by his instructions. And as the slaves taken as booty are exceedingly numerous in this part, and are continually arriving at the camp of the Mudir, we are much pressed in despatching them and in looking after them.
If it is agreeable to your Honour (please) to write to Sheikh Manzal Hamid, and the sons of Hamad Dodao, about their gratuitous assistance, and their surrendering the booty to our brother, Sheikh Mohammed Karkasâwi. We are at present awaiting the orders of your Excellency, (whether) to remain here or to come to you, or to wait for the drying up of the waters of the rain, out of compassion (in consideration for) the believers (the slaves) who have little infants. And we pray the most high God, to whom be praise, to bring us soon together with your Excellency.
Salaam!——(Signed)——Karam Illah Mahomed.
Dated 22 Sha’abān, 1301.
June 17, 1884.
Postscript.—My Lord, after what I have stated to you, your servant awaits your orders; if your answer is that I should wait (here) or otherwise.
This is (all) that is needful (to write). Salaam.
APPENDIX Ud.
Copy of Telegram from his Excellency Gordon Pasha to his Excellency Ferratch Ullah Bey, Commandant of Omdurmān.
Sheikh Mahomed Achmed has sent us a letter to inform us that Lupton Bey, Mudir of Bahr Gazelle, has surrendered to him, and that the small steamer in which was Stewart Pasha has been captured by him, together with what was therein. And he demands that we should surrender to him.
But to me it is all one whether Lupton Bey has surrendered or has not surrendered. And whether he has captured twenty thousand steamers like the Abbas, or twenty thousand (officers) like Stewart Pasha (or not); it is all one to me.
I am here, like iron, and hope to see the newly-arrived English; and if Mahomed Achmed says that the English die, it is all the same to me. And you must take a copy of this and give it to the messenger from Slātin, and send him out early in the morning, that he may go to him. It is impossible for me to have any more words with Mahomed Achmed, only lead; and if Mahomed Achmed is willing to fight he had better, instead of going to Omdurmān, go to the White Nile by the moat.
And after this the messengers whom he wants to send to us must not come by the Omdurmān; they had better come by the moat afore-mentioned. And send a literal copy of this, according to orders—when it has been sealed by you—by the emissary of Slātin Bey to be delivered, and explain to him that this is by our order.
At night.
3 of Moharram, 1302.
22nd October, 1884.
The forcible sentence: “I am here like iron, and I hope to see the newly-arrived English,” runs as a rhymed couplet:—
“Wa ana mawjood hona zey el hhadeed
Wa ashoof el Ingleez el jadeed.”
This may have been accidental on the part of the scribe, for the letter is written in Arabic, but it is worth notice. The phraseology, and even the words, are General Gordon’s own—as he wrote in a former letter that he chose his own words by help of his dictionary, and did not suffer his scribes to write only as they pleased.
Supposed Enclosure in Mahdi’s letter.
Intercepted communication from General Gordon to the Mudir of Dongola.
Note (in Arabic) from General Gordon to the Mudir of Dongola.
To His Excellency the Mudir of Dongola.
Wire the telegram enclosed herein to Cairo from the station at Dongola, and charge the expense to account of the Mudiriyeh (Government account).
(Signed) C. G. Gordon (across the seal).
Dated 7 Zu’l Hejjeh.
Sept. 28, 1884.
Gordon Pasha.
Written on a small piece of thin paper 4 by 4½ inches.
Au Consulat Général d’Autriche-Hongrie à Caire.
Kartoum, 21 September, 1884.
To-day was a joyful Sunday! The inhabitants of the city were stirred with joy when the salvoes of artillery announced from the fort the approach of the English relieving army.
Three express messengers brought to General Gordon an autograph letter from Lord Wolseley from Debbe. Rescue after all! Long live England!
Now at least the lives of (so many) these thousands will be saved, even though goods and chattels be lost.
Yesterday the news had been already orally spread of an army approaching from Dongola, but found no credence, any more than many other false rumours. It was also said that the first messenger who left on the 9th for Dongola had passed Berber without hindrance, and will probably reach Cairo in safety.
Further, I was able, on the 13th, to speak outside the city lines with Georgio Calamatino, the letter-carrier of the Mahdi. He was in dervish dress. I sent the missionaries 100 dollars by him. The Mahdi was then in Schatt, four hours from Duém, with all the European prisoners, and among them Slatin, who were enrolled as dervishes in the armoury. (Secret: the missionaries of both sexes have accepted [the religion of] Islam. The six sisters are married to Greeks; only the superior, Don Luigi Bonorn, remained steadfast, but he is condemned to martyrdom unless he also apostasizes).
It is to be hoped that soon after the arrival of the English we may or must remove (emigrate). No one knows whether they will permanently occupy the country or only effect the complete evacuation.
With respect and devotion,
(Signed)————M. L. Hansal,
Consulate General of Austro-Hungary, Cairo.
Also written on a small piece of thin paper.
Note (in Arabic) from General Gordon to the Mudir of Dongola.
To His Excellency the Mudir of Dongola.
Take from bearer Mohammed Achmet, on his safe arrival, the telegrams sent by him, and forward them to their destination, and give him fifty dollars; and if you have any telegrams for us send them by him that he may bring them here.
(Signed)————Gordon.
C. G. Gordon (written in pencil across the seal).
Dated 15 Shawwāl, 1301.
Aug. 8, 1884.
Gordon Pasha in Kartoum.
Written on a small piece of thin paper 4 inches by 3.
[APPENDIX V.]
MANIFESTO OF THE MAHDI TO THE INHABITANTS OF KARTOUM.
In the year 1300.
In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate.
Praise be to God, the bountiful Ruler, and blessing on our Lord Mahomed and his successors, with peace.
From the servant of his Lord, Mahomed the Mahdi, son of the Seyyed Abdallah, to his beloved in God the believers in God, and in His Book (the Koran).
The changes (disturbances) of the times are not hidden from you, nor the forsaking of the Sunnas; and he who has the (true) faith and understanding will not be pleased thereat, but will leave all he needs and his native place (house and home) in defence of religion and the Sunnas; and therefore jealousy for Islam will not delay to possess in full strength (the heart of) the believer.
Now, O my beloved! as to what the Most High God, to whom be praise, has willed in His Eternity and in His decrees to grant to His servant, the humble and lowly, in (bestowing on him) the great Khalifate:—
The eminent Lord (Mahomed), on whom be blessing and peace, several times informed me that I am the Mahdi, the Expected One, and (appointed) me (as) successor[349] to himself, on whom be blessing and peace, to sit on his throne, and (as successors) to their Excellencies the four Khalifs and Princes[350] (of the Faith), and to El Khudr,[351] on whom be peace: And God gave as my helpers, the angels (who are), the Cherubim, and the saints from Adam to this our day, and also the believing Jinns;[352] and in the hour of battle the eminent Lord, the Bountiful One, on Whom be blessing and peace, will in person go with them before my hosts, as also the four Khalifs and the Princes (of the faith), and El Khudr, on whom be peace.
And He gave me the sword of victory of his Excellency (Mahomed), on whom be blessing and peace; and it was made known to me that none of either race, human or Jinn, can conquer him who has it.
Then said he, on whom be blessing and peace, “God has given to thee a sign that thou art the Mahdi”; which (sign) is the mole on my right cheek; and he likewise gave to me another sign (namely, that) there should go forth before me in the hour of battle a banner of light, borne by Azraïl,[353] on whom be peace, that by it God should convince my friends, and terror should fall upon the hearts of my enemies, and (that) God will destroy whoever should encounter me in hostility.
Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said to me: “Thou art created out of the effulgence of my innermost heart,” and he to whom happiness (is granted) will believe I am the Mahdi, the Expected One. But God has put hypocrisy (wickedness) into the heart of those who love vain pomp, and they will not believe, being greedy of their vain pomps.
Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said: Love of wealth and pomps cause hypocrisy to spring up in the heart as water causes the herb to spring up; and it is found in the Athar (traditional sayings about Mahomed): If you see worldlings loving this world, charge them with it. And it is found in some of the ancient books (saying): Do not ask of me a world intoxicated with love of earthly things, for it will close against thee the way of my love. And these (are they who like brigands) stop the way of (true) service (of God).
And when there came to me, O my beloved, from God and His prophet the decree of the great Khalifate, He ordered me (to take my) Hegira[354] (flight) to Jebel Kadeer close by Masāt, and He commanded me to write thence to all entrusted with public offices. I wrote thus to the Emirs and Sheikhs of religion, and the wicked denied (my mission), but the righteous believed; even those who do not mind any hardship they may encounter for God, nor what they fail to attain of their dearest wishes; but steadfastly regard the promises of the most High God, to Whom be praise, in which He said that He will reserve that other world for those who do not desire exaltation in this world, nor (its) corruptions. Now since it is for God to decree, and since He has willed to bestow the office of Mahdi upon His humble and insignificant servant Mahomed the Mahdi, the son of the Seyyed Abdallah, it behoves us to submit to the will of God; and, seeing that it is unanimously agreed by the present and past generations to attribute supreme knowledge to God, and as His knowledge, to Whom be praise, is not limited by control of rules nor by the knowledge of the malevolent, and since God will blot out (abrogate) or establish what He wills, and since He is the source of the Book (the Koran), of which none can understand anything save what He wills, and since with Him is the key of the unknown (future),—none knows it but He, nor is He to be questioned as to what He does,—He creates what He will,—He chooses and bestows His mercy on whom He will. Sheikh Mohi ed Deen Ibn el Arabi especially says in his commentary on the glorious Koran that knowledge of the Mahdi is like knowledge of the hour (of resurrection), and that hour none knoweth but God most High. And Sheikh Ahmed Ibn Edrees said, Fourteen generations of the generations of the people of God have denied the (coming of the) Mahdi. Then he said: He will come forth from a place that they do not know and in a condition which they will disown.
It is not hidden from your knowledge that the writings about the (coming of the) Mahdi are among others the Athar and the Keshef el Ulema and others; and the conclusion of them all (is), and I understand from them, that God will blot out (abrogate) what passages He will, and some of these are the Hadiths (traditional sayings), and among them Ed Dha’eef and El Maktooa’ and El Mansookh and El Mowdhooa’. The Hadith Ed Dha’eef is superseded by the Hadith El Saheehh word for word. The Ayat also are replaced by other Ayat.[355] And the truth as to this is not known save to people of deep thought and insight.
Further, this is what the eminent Lord (Mahomed), on whom be blessing and peace, said to me, “He who doubts that thou art the Mahdi has blasphemed God and His prophet.” This he, blessing and peace be upon him, declared to me thrice.
All that I have told you about my succession to the office of Mahdi was told to me by the eminent Lord (Mohammed), on whom be blessing and peace, when I was awake and in perfect health, free from all transgressions of the law, not in sleep nor in (a state of) hallucination, or drunkenness or madness, but accounted to be of sound mind, following the traditions of the prophet, on whom be blessing and peace, in ordering what he ordered and forbidding what he forbade.
And my Hegira (flight) to the aforesaid places was necessary, according to the Book (the Koran) and to the Sunnas. The Most High God has said, “Those who have had to flee (make a Hegira) for the sake of God after having been persecuted; He will give them good things in this world, and the reward in the next will be greater. And He, on whom is blessing and peace, said, ‘One who has fled from land to land, even though it be but a hand-breath of land, has deserved Paradise, and has become (in so doing) a partaker with[356] Abraham, the friend of God and of Mahomed, on whom be blessing and peace.’”
Thus also in other passages of the Hadiths.
And the duty of listening to God and His prophet is binding. The Most High God has said, “Follow the way of those who are sincere to Me.”
If you have understood this, we order all the chosen ones to flee (make their Hegira) unto us for the Jehād (holy war) in the cause of God, to the nearest town, because God Most High has said, “Slay the infidels who are nearest to you”; and he who holds back from this has come within the threat uttered by the Most High. Say if your fathers, your sons, your brethren, your wives, your tribes, the wealth you have gained, the merchandise you are in fear of losing, or the dwellings you delight in are dearer to you than God and His prophet and the Jehād (holy war) in His cause, then wait till God shall come with His sentence (against you). (So far) the Aya (verse).
The Most High has also said, “O you who have believed, why do you cleave to the earth when called upon to fly (to the war) for God? Do you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But the possessions of this world will be less than nothing in the other world.”
The Most High has also said, “O you who have believed, why do you cleave to the earth when called upon to fly (to the war) for God? Do you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But the possessions of this world will be less than nothing in the other world.”[357]
He has also said, “Seek not to fly.” He will torment you with eternal torments, and will accept others in your place.
Now, if you have understood the foregoing, hasten to us, and fear none save God, for fear of the creature shows lack of trust and confidence in God, from which may God preserve (us).
The Most High has said, “Fear ye not man, but fear ye Me;” and the Most High has said, “Dread them not, but dread Me, if ye be believers.”
The Most High has said, “God is worthy to be feared”; and especially because God has promised in His precious Book (the Koran) victory to him who contends for the faith.
The Most High has said, “If you fight for God, He will fight for you and establish your goings.”
And the Most High has said, “If you do not fight for him (the Mahdi) God fighteth for him.” Because you have known this, if you do not respond to him who calls (in the name) of God and hasten to fight for the faith, you must receive punishment from God, inasmuch as you are the light of creation, its strength, and its head.
Whoever among you is anxious about his faith and zealous for the command of his Lord will answer the call, and will join with those that fight for the religion of God.
Be it known unto you that I am of the family of the prophet of God, on whom be blessing and peace. My father is a Hhusni on his father’s side; and his mother, and my mother likewise, on the side of both father and mother (are) Abbāssides, and God knows that I am of the blood of Hussein, and these excellent indications will suffice for him who has been touched by His grace and (by) the faith.
It will not be wonderful if some do see and do not believe it.
Fear God and join the righteous, and help one another in righteousness, and in the fear of God and in the Jehād (holy war) in the cause of God, and stand firm within the boundaries of God, for he who transgresses those boundaries will injure himself.
Know that all things are in the hand of God. Leave all to Him and rely on Him. He who makes God his support has been guided into the straight way.
Peace (be with you).
In the year 1300.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to God, the Bountiful Ruler, and blessing and blessing and peace on our Lord Mahomed and his successors.
From the slave of his Lord, the Imām Mohamed the Mahdi, the son of the Seyyed Abdallah, to all his beloved in God the believers, men and women, in God and in His Book.
What I have to inform you is that the world is the abode of him who has no (other) abode, and it is a prison to believers, and that the other (world) is better, and (is) enduring, and that is the abode of those who fear God.
Fear God and do....
This Manifesto is written on four sides of a two-leaved sheet of paper, and breaks off abruptly, “and do” being written at bottom as catch-word for the next page.
Specially to be noticed is the attempt made to forestall the objections of those who would see that this man contradicts well known passages in the writings which Moslems hold to be authoritative. Mahomed Achmet boldly declares all such passages to be either abrogated or superseded, or unintelligible save to those to whom deep thought and insight are given!
[APPENDIX X.]
Letter from Major Kitchener to General Gordon.
Debbeh, 14th October, 1884.
My dear General Gordon,
Please inform me by this present messenger, who is paid to return, who were on board the steamer that came down from Kartoum. I am sorry to say, whoever they were, they have fallen into the hands of Suleiman Wady Goun, Sheikh of the Minassir, and have, I am afraid, been killed. Lord Wolseley is now at Wady Halfa, and it is expected this expedition will definitely start from Dongola on or about the 1st November. Special boats are coming out from England for the passage up the Nile.
There are a considerable number of troops now at Dongola. I am instructed by Sir Evelyn Baring to send you the following telegram from the Austrian Consul-General:—
“Caire, 1er Oct.—Je vous remercie, de tout cœur, des nouvelles que vous avez bien voulu me donner. J’ai fait des démarches pour faciliter le voyage de notre consul de Berbér jusqu’au Caire, mais on m’assure que les chemins de Berber à Debbeh ne sont pas libres; en tous cas, je vous recommande chaudement la sécurité personnelle de notre consul et des sujets Austro-Hongrois et Allemands. Je serai très heureux d’avoir des nouvelles directes de Monsieur Hansall.”
I also enclose two letters that have arrived here for you.
I hope you have received some of my previous letters; I have received none from you in reply.
Enclosure in Appendix X.
General,
I hope you will excuse me such an intermezzo.
Notwithstanding they abandoned you, and they did not at all follow your instructions, I hope you will be victorious, and your name engraved in the history of the world.
I am, dear General,
Your most obedient servant,
Th. Roth.
To his Excellency General Gordon, Kartoum.
Berlin, 4th May, 1884.
Dear Sir,
I had the honour to write you on the 10th of April, &c.
Meantime I permitted me to do the following:
On the 22nd of April I wired to Earl Granville: “For Heaven’s sake, help Gordon, Kartoum.”
And confirmed this despatch with the following letter:—
To the Right Honourable Lord Granville, London.
Berlin, 22nd April, 1884.
“My Lord,
“I have the honour to confirm my telegram of this afternoon: ‘For Heaven’s sake, help Gordon, Kartoum.’
“Your Lordship may be kind enough to excuse such a telegram.
“As I am an admirer of Gordon, and as he had the kindness to do his best to become liberated my brother Gottfried Roth, who is said prisoner of the Mahdi, and to whom your Lordship congratulated when he captured at Sint a band of slaveholders with several hundred slaves some years ago, I considered it a duty to do something too for Gordon. And so the idea to wire to your Lordship, who perhaps may be able in consequence of your powerful position to let have Gordon what he wants.
“I have the honour, &c., &c.”
I had the pleasure to receive the following letter from the Secretary of State, Sir J. Pauncefote:—
Foreign Office, 29th April, 1884.
“Sir,
“I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram and letter of the 22nd instant, urging that assistance may be given to General Gordon at Kartoum.
“I am, Sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) “J. Pauncefote.”
Roth did not get much change out of his Lordship!!
(C. G. Gordon.)
APPENDIX X[358].
Arabic Cypher Telegram.
Above message from Lord Wolseley, dated 20 September, forwarded by messenger for second time, 15/10/84, from Debbeh.
H. H. KITCHENER,
D.A.A.G.
This is the only paper received.
C. G. G.
APPENDICES TO BOOK VI.
[APPENDIX Y.]
From the Khedive of Egypt.
To His Excellency Gordon Pasha, the Honourable.
(Literally “to His Felicity! ... —the excellent,” which is the usual formula.)
As it is known to you that the object of the coming of your Excellency to this part, and of your going to the Soudan, is only the evacuation of that neighbourhood and the withdrawal of our troops, now found there, with the Government officials of the realm, and the bringing hither of those inhabitants of that part who may desire to come together with their belongings, we trust that your Excellency will take every care in the fulfilment of this Commission by employing the best means and arrangements which may be necessary for the safety of those troops and employés, and inhabitants and merchants, both native and foreign, who may desire to come to this part.
Then, after completion of this (business), you will adopt the necessary means and arrangements indispensable for framing a firm government in the Soudan provinces, that there may be continuance of order in that part, and that there may be security from the misfortunes (which must befall) the ignorant populace (left) without a ruler. And I rely on your understanding and courage, to which is intrusted the carrying out of this commission in the manner desired.
(Sealed)——Mohammed Tewfik.
January 27, 1884.
(Seal of Mahomet Towfik).
From the Khedive of Egypt and its dependencies to all the Ulema, Judges, Notables, Sheikhs of Arabs of villages, Merchants, and all inhabitants, both Arabs and domesticated people in the Soudan countries, greeting.
It is known to all that when my grandfather Jantimgan Mahomed Ali took the reigns of Government of the Lands of Egypt, he began to spread knowledge and education and enlarge the sphere of agriculture and commerce throughout the same, and increase the means of wealth of the inhabitants, until Egypt was considered a well-cultivated and civilised country. After that he saw the necessity of taking (or opening up) the Soudan Region, to spread out the lights of civilisation therein—and God Almighty prospered him in that enterprise. From that time until now these regions have not ceased to grow in prosperity, until towns and market cities were established and enlarged, and commerce grew, and the inhabitants became enlightened by the means of commerce and agriculture. By a comparison of the condition of the Soudan Regions before these conquests, with their condition after it, it will clearly appear that they progressed and advanced greatly during the latter time. The minds of the people were enlightened by seeing their own interest and prosperity. This was the only purpose which moved our grandfather aforesaid to take these regions. But the great distance that lies between me and you caused a disintegration which had for its result the rising and rebelling of some disturbers against my Government. This rebellion caused great losses of money and men without any fruits at all; and the Land of Egypt sustained thereby very heavy burdens. Therefore I have concluded to give back again independence to the ancient families of the Kings of the Soudan Regions. And, as I know that His Excellency Gordon Pasha, during his stay among you, seeing that you witnessed the good results of his efforts for the quiet and prosperity of the country. Therefore, and also because he is deemed an able man of politics and of your judgment, and desirous of your welfare, We have appointed him to proceed to those regions as our representative, with full authority to agree with in establishing a peaceable and amicable way of withdrawing from those parts, and bringing away the officials of my Government and the troops with their belongings and the property of my Government, so that the departure from you may be brought about in perfect security. I therefore ask of all who bear arms to throw the same away, and to endeavour, with all diligence and quiet and peacefulness, to form their own Government of the future within my boundaries, and to work for the prosperity of their countries, and the security of the roads at all times; so that between us and them the bonds of communication shall continue to exist and so that commerce shall be rendered easy, which is conducive to wealth, and so that civilisation and luxury may be furthered. And thus the bonds of friendship may be kept up, as is dictated by the laws of humanity.
Written on the 28th day of Rabia the First, 1301.
(January 26th, 1884).
Notice published by Gordon.
Formerly the Government had decided to transport the Egyptians down to Cairo, and abandon the Soudan: and in fact some of them had been sent down during the time of Hussein Pasha Yusri, as you yourselves saw. On our arrival at Kartoum, we, on account of pity for you, and in order not to let your country be destroyed, we communicated with the Khedive of Egypt, our Effendi, concerning the importance and the inexpediency of abandoning it. Whereupon, the orders for abandoning the Soudan were cancelled; and serious attention was turned, and all energy was directed towards smothering the disturbances and driving away the disturbers: therefore sufficient troops were appointed, both cavalry and infantry some time ago; and indeed they have reached Dongola and started in three divisions, one under the leader of the army and the Mudir of Dongola is coming on to Berber: the second division has the Sheikh of the Hawaweer, and is coming by way of Hobaji: the third division, with Sheikh Saleh, son of Salim, Sheikh of the Kababeesh, is coming to Metemma. Each one of these divisions is alone sufficient to oppose all the rebels. They will soon be in Kartoum. We shall increase in defence of the Soudan until the arrival of the troops here, as is the will of the Khedive’s iradé issued to us on the 14th September, 1884. The Ulema and teachers of Kartoum had presented a telegram to the Khedive asking for reinforcements—now an iradé of the Khedive has been issued to them, a copy of which is given here above. Be therefore fully reassured as to yourselves and your families, and all your possessions in your houses, taking no heed of what has occurred in the past. If God will in the next few days the siege will be raised, and your alarm will pass away. Know also that if Mohammed Achmet should call upon me for three years to surrender Kartoum I will not listen to him, but will protect your lives and families and possessions with all energy and stedfastness.
(Signed)——Gordon Pasha.
[APPENDIX AB.]
Translation of a letter addressed to General Gordon by the Kalifa Abdulla Mahommed, 10. 12. 85.
In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to the Bountiful God, and blessings be upon our Lord Mahomed and upon his family.
We, the servant of God Abdallah Mohammed Jifarah, one of the governors of the Mahdi, on whom be peace, on the East, to Gordon, the Pasha of Kartoum. You have paid no attention to the counsel and reasoning repeatedly sent to you, but have increased in folly; and the numerous kindly admonitions have only made you more haughty and wayward; because truth enlightens the breasts of believers and only increases the oppressors in their degenerations. Your letter has reached us, in which you deceived the population, saying that the British reinforcement is coming to you in three divisions, and that it will soon reach you and give you victory; thus your letter betrays the greatness of your fear, and anxiety, and alarm, as in your deceit you have caught hold of spider-web ropes and have feared to die at our hands; thou must inevitably die, O thou heathen! These promises you have been holding them out since last year to the inhabitants of Kartoum, and have been promising them that the English will come soon. Your promise has only increased their sorrows; and now that you are in straits, and that evil is coming upon you, you are practising deceit from the interior of your den (sic) in which God has imprisoned you, upon him who is in the land of peace and crowned with exceeding much honour, and who is able to get the news of riders arriving from the remotest regions. I ask, do the sounds, winged and free, unfettered, need news from the like of thee in the sea of billows covered by waves upon wave, above which are clouds of darkness piled one over the other. Know thou, O thou enemy of God, that the true news is with us and not with you, and that the news which has reached us contains nothing to cheer thy eye or uphold thy power; on the contrary, there is no escape for thee from death at our hands, and from death by lack of food. But it is no wonder that you deny the Mahdiship, for you did not believe in the Apostleship of Mahomed; but the wonder is that the learned men of wickedness, who are raised to prominent positions by you, and whom God has left to go astray, and whose hearts He has closed, whose ears He has sealed, and over whose eyes He has put a veil, since they have been satisfied with you as a leader, and have taken you as a teacher, and have waged war against Believers, and seek victory to those who believe in more than one God, as though they had not heard the word of God. “If you wage war, war will come upon you, and if you end war it is better for you, and if you return He will return, and God is with the Believers.” Do you not know, O you wicked learned men, that he who secedes from the Commonwealth has slipped away from the Faith, just as a hair is drawn out from the lump of dough? If you, by reason of your love of office and by reason of your association with darkness, are in doubt as to this Imàn, are you also in doubt as to the Apostleship of Mahommed, on whom be peace and blessings, that you followed his enemies the evil unbelievers, and have made your rulers in preference to the sons of Islam and desire them to be victorious? Have you not heard the word of God which says, “O ye who have believed, take not my enemy and your enemy to be rulers, nor bestow on them your affection, and I know what you have hidden and what you have made known; and he among you who does this has strayed away to the wrong path.” God also says, “O ye who have believed do not take your fathers and your brothers to be your chiefs if they prefer unbelief to faith.” God also says, “you will not find a people who believes in God and in the Last Day that will befriend those who stray from God and the Prophet, even though they be their fathers, brothers, or relations.” But you, you have taken the Christians to be your rulers when you have no doubt as to their heathenism. Look therefore to yourselves after these quotations; do you consider it to be counted of the company of Believers? (sic). It is strange how you frighten the people, saying the English are coming, and how you think that the Allies will be affected by your false rumours. No, by God! even though swarms of English and others should come, this would only increase the faith of the Allies, and their steadfastness would grow in the labour of the siege until God shall make you taste confusion and destruction. Take warning by those who are like you if you are children of intelligence. Before you the people of Obeid were longing for reinforcements like the longing of the thirsty for water; and they too were writing deceitful and cheering letters, more than you have done; and, nevertheless, you have heard what befel them.
If you are content to remain as you are, then prepare for what shall come: but if you knock at the door of repentance, peradventure it may be opened unto you.
Peace be upon those who follow after the right way.
(Signed)——Abdullah Mahommed.
19 S. 1302.
7th or 8th December, 1884.
[APPENDIX CD.]
Telegraphic Petition from the Ulema and officials of Kartoum to the Khedive.
We make bold to present our humble thanks to our Sovereign the Khedive. The enemy drew near to Kartoum and besieged it, and our lives were in our throats, and we had no more patience, and words cannot describe our miserable condition. Then the Governor-Generalship was conferred upon H. E. Gordon Pasha, and on his arrival he bestowed all kinds of favours and conceded all that had been demanded, and took all precautions and brought order out of chaos. And although Kartoum was attacked on all four sides by musketry and cannon, the Governor-General watched day and night; and when the Nile rose he sent out the victorious soldiers who were victorious over the enemy, and we hope the victory will be soon complete. Kartoum is fortified like an impregnable rock.
We pray God to give long life to H.H. the Khedive, and to remove our present disturbances.
Copy of the Khedive’s Iradé sent in cypher to all the Ulemas and Teachers, and to the Cadi and all military officers and civil officials in Kartoum, dated September 21st, 1884.
Your telegram, dated 27th Shamal, 1301, (19th August, 1884), was received on the first day of Dhee-l-Hijjah, 1301, (September 20th, 1884). We regret the condition you are in by reason of the impossibility of sending you reinforcements, and help up till now on account of circumstances. But we are very glad because you are still safe, and the city is kept by your energy and bravery. If God will, reinforcements will soon reach you, and you shall be rewarded. We hope you will exercise all diligence in upholding the honour of Government. The difficulties are being overcome and the time of relief is at hand by the Grace of God.
[APPENDIX EF.]
Organisation of the Soudan.
1. His Excellency, El Zubair Pasha, shall be the Governor (or Ruler) of the Soudan; he shall have the rank of Fareek and the Osmaniah decoration. His pay shall be £6000 per annum, i.e. £500 per month.
2. He shall be free to appoint and discharge the Mudirs and Wakeels, and all other officials and employés of his own motion, and make regulations for the employés necessary for the administrative and military work in every region in each mudirieh and in the central town, and for the finances and arsenal, etc.; and also regulations fixing the taxes and all the revenues and expenses needed yearly.
3. He is permitted to give military and civil grades up to the grade of Mir-Alâi, and shall refer to the Khedive’s cabinet in Cairo asking for the brevets (or commissions), but above that grade he must refer to the Khedive of Egypt.
4. The boundaries of the Soudan on the north shall be at Handak, one of the Dongola regions: and the Soudan regions shall be by Mudirieh as follows: Dongola: whose boundary shall be Handak as aforesaid: and Berber and Kartoum: the extreme boundary of which shall be Donaim and Sennaar up to Faiz-Aghlon, Godareep, Gallabat, Kassala and Suakin. As for Massowa and Senheit, they shall not belong to the Soudan Government. The regions of Fashoda, the Equator and Bahr-Gazelle, shall be left (or abandoned) and the employés withdrawn from them.
5. The Egyptian Government now pays towards the Soudan expenses, £250,000; it shall further send a like sum for two more years.
6. The customs duties taken upon goods coming up and going down by way of Suakin shall be the same as before, and shall enter into the Soudan revenues. Also, goods coming to Suakin while passing Suez shall be paid at Suakin; but goods going from or coming to the Soudan by Handak, the boundary of the Soudan, shall pay no duty and shall remain as formerly.
7. All warlike stores and all ammunition and arsenal stores, and baggage of soldiers that shall be needed, shall be asked for from the Egyptian Government, and shall be sent to the Soudan. The value of the same shall not be included in the sum of money fixed to be supplied by Egypt to the Soudan.
8. The military stores and soldiers’ baggage, and apparatus for boats and steamers now in the Soudan, shall remain in it.
9. The boats and steamers which are in the Soudan and which are brought up with the English shall be left for the use of the Soudan.
10. Stations for steamers must be erected from Handak to Kartoum: each station shall have a fort and earthworks and that which is necessary for transport; but the stations from Handak northwards shall belong to the Egyptian Government.
11. The British troops must help in carrying on the war until the central town is passed and the siege raised from Kartoum and Sennaar: after which, under direction of the Ruler of the Soudan, that shall be done which will quell the disturbance.
12. His Excellency El Zubair Pasha shall undertake to capture Mohammed Achmed, the would-be Mahdi, and bring the captives that are with him, both Europeans and others, for the execution of which His said Excellency shall receive £30,000.
13. Trade in slaves shall be stopped, and the lines to be followed herein shall be the Convention of 1877 between England and Egypt.
14. The monopoly and contract of roads in the Soudan and the Atmoor (desert) shall be wholly denied to Hussein-Khalifa, his family, and relations.
15. The Soudan Government must pay the losses sustained by the family of Seyd Mahomet Osman during the disturbances.