IX

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA

1. DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

The Generals commanding-in-chief of the British and French armies in Portugal having determined to negotiate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22nd instant for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names: viz. on the part of the General-in-chief of the British army, Lieut.-Col. Murray, Quartermaster-General, and on the part of the French army, M. Kellermann, General of Division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a Convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the Admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus. These two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow:—

I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the moment of the signature of the present Convention.

II. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage: they shall not be considered prisoners of war: and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

III. The English Government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L’Orient inclusively.

IV. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun. All other artillery arms and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the Convention.

V. The French army shall carry away with it all its equipment, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army, that is to say its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital, or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account, as the Commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of all their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

VI. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the Generals and other officers of all ranks: it is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance[745] for horses at the disposal of the British Commander-in-chief are very limited: some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon.

VII. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry and artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days from the ratification of the Convention, or sooner if possible.

VIII. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

IX. All the French sick and wounded who cannot be embarked are entrusted to the British army.... The English Government shall provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of 150 or 200 men at a time[@ 746 repetido].

X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it ... every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay: they shall have security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port[746].

XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, or within a distance of about two leagues from it. The British army will approach to within three leagues of the capital, so as to leave about one league between the two armies.

XII. The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the Convention. Lisbon and its forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and the Fort St. Joseph on the other inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall be also the harbour and all the armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmella shall be given up so soon as British troops can arrive to occupy them: in the meantime the British General-in-chief will give notice of the present Convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops in front of them, in order to put a stop to further hostilities.

XIII. Commissaries shall be appointed on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

XIV. Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of any article, it shall be explained favourably to the French army.

XV. From the date of the ratification of the present Convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, and claims of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops since December, 1807, which may not have been paid up are cancelled; and all sequestrations laid upon their property, movable or immovable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to their proper owners.

XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected. Their property of every kind, movable and immovable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and of passing the sale[747] of it into France or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.

It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement; only, however, as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.

XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army. And all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French Government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders. They shall suffer no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French Government. They are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the sixteenth article.

XVIII. The Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon shall be given up to the General-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained[748] in Spain, without having been taken in battle or in consequence of military operations, but on the occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of May last, and the days immediately following.

XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present Convention.

The officer representing the British army to be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army, and the officer of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army[749].

XXI. It shall be allowed to the General-in-chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present Convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British Admiral to carry him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.

XXII. The British Admiral will be invited to accommodate His Excellency the Commander-in-chief[750] and the other principal French officers on board of ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon this thirteenth day of August, 1808.

George Murray, Quar.-Mas.-Gen.
Kellermann, Général de Division.

Three unimportant supplementary articles were added, one stipulating that French civilian prisoners in the hands of the English or Portuguese should be released, another that the French army should subsist on its own magazines till it embarked, a third that the British should allow the free entry of provisions into Lisbon after the signature of the Convention.

2. REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

On a consideration of all circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject. Because, howsoever some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on Your Majesty’s arms.

All which is most dutifully submitted.

(Signed)

David Dundas, General.
Moira, General.
Peter Craig, General.
Heathfield, General.
Pembroke, Lieut.-Gen.
G. Nugent, Lieut.-Gen.
Ol. Nicholls, Lieut.-Gen.

Dec. 22, 1808.

3. LORD MOIRA’S ‘OPINION.’

I feel less awkwardness in obeying the order to detail my sentiments on the nature of the Convention, because that I have already joined in the tribute of applause due in other respects to the Officers concerned. My opinion, therefore, is only opposed to theirs on a question of judgment, where their talents are likely to have so much more weight, as to render the profession of my difference, even on that point, somewhat painful. Military duty is, however, imperious on me not to disguise or qualify the deductions which I have made during this investigation.

An Armistice simply might not have been objectionable, because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly the arrival of Sir John Moore’s division, might see more advantage for himself in a short suspension of hostilities, than what the French could draw from it. But as the Armistice involved, and in fact established, the whole principle of the Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter.

Sir Arthur Wellesley has stated that he considered his force, at the commencement of the march from the Mondego river, as sufficient to drive the French from their positions on the Tagus. That force is subsequently joined by above 4,000 British troops, under Generals Anstruther and Acland. The French make an attack with their whole disposable strength, and are repulsed with heavy loss, though but a part of the British army is brought into action. It is difficult to conceive that the prospects which Sir Arthur Wellesley entertained could be unfavourably altered by these events, even had not the certainty of speedy reinforcements to the British army existed.

It is urged, that, had the French been pushed to extremity, they would have crossed the Tagus, and have protracted the campaign in such a manner as to have frustrated the more important view of the British Generals, namely, sending succours into Spain.

This measure must have been equally feasible for the French if no victory had been obtained over them; but I confess that the chance of such an attempt seems to me assumed against probability. Sir Hew Dalrymple notices what he calls ‘the critical and embarrassed state of Junot,’ before that General has been pressed by the British army; and, in explanation of that expression, observes, that the surrender of Dupont, the existence of the victorious Spanish army in Andalusia, which cut off the retreat of the French in that direction, and the universal hostility of the Portuguese, made the situation of Junot one of great distress. No temptation for the translation of the war into Alemtejo presents itself from this picture; nor does any other representation give ground to suppose, that Junot could have contemplated the measure, as holding forth any prospect but ultimate ruin, after much preliminary distress and disgrace. The strongest of all proofs as to Junot’s opinion, arises from his sending the very morning after the battle of Vimiero, to propose the evacuation of Portugal; a step which sufficiently indicated that he was satisfied he could not only make no effectual defence, but could not even prolong the contest to take the chance of accidents. He seems, indeed, to have been without any real resource.

I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition.—Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot’s army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate currency, in a quarter too, where it must interfere with our most urgent and interesting concerns.

Had it been impracticable to reduce the French army to lay down its arms unconditionally, still an obligation not to serve for a specified time might have been insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been prescribed as the place at which they should be landed, in order to prevent the possibility of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) the armies employed for the subjugation of Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than the merit of those terms presents itself. Opinion relative to the British arms was of the highest importance, as it might influence the confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the nations groaning under the yoke of France, to appeal to this country, and co-operate with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that, notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seem to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea; because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the Convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts.

I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable Officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must conscientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the Convention.

Moira, General.

December 27, 1808.