INDEX

END OF VOL. V

FOOTNOTES

[1] vol. iv. pp. 587-91.

[2] ‘The Reserve Division’ consisted of a 3rd battalion from some of the old regiments of the Valencian army, viz. 1st of Savoya, Avila, Don Carlos, Volunteers of Castile, Cazadores de Valencia, Orihuela. They were each about 1,000 strong, but averaged only 22 officers per battalion.

[3] See vol. iv. pp. 475-83.

[4] See vol. iv. pp. 540-1.

[5] Composed at this time of the 14th and 42nd and 115th Line, and the 1st Léger, the first two and last each three battalions strong, the other (115th) with four.

[6] The 24th Dragoons left about 140 men behind, the 13th Cuirassiers 50 only, the Italian ‘Dragoons of Napoleon’ 124, but the 4th Hussars about 500, much more than half their force.

[7] See vol. iii. pp. 284-6.

[8] Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. p. 156.

[9] See Arteche, xi. p. 123.

[10] See vol. iv. p. 56.

[11] The battalions were the 2nd and 3rd of Savoya (the last a new levy) the 1st and 2nd of Don Carlos, and the 3rd of Orihuela, this last raw and newly raised like the 3rd of Savoya.

[12] Vacani says that the Teruel column was intended by Suchet as a mere demonstration, and was never intended to follow the high-road Teruel-Segorbe, but to take a cross-route over the hills, such as was actually used by it. But Suchet, in his Mémoires, makes no such statement (ii. p. 152), and speaks as if Harispe had taken the Ruvielos route on his own responsibility.

[13] The complete orders for the attack may be read in the first Pièce justificative in Belmas’s history of the siege, pp. 115-17 of vol. iv of his elaborate work.

[14] Vacani (v. p. 381) contradicts Suchet, saying that there was no Spanish patrol, and that the French pickets fired from nervousness at an imaginary foe.

[15] Vacani makes the losses 360 instead of 247, and it is possible that Suchet has given only the casualties at the main assault, and not those in the distant demonstrations. Vacani says that the Italians lost 52 men in their false attack.

[16] See Mahy’s letter to Blake on pp. 109-12 of vol. xi of Arteche. The General is writing very carefully so as not to speak too ill of his army: but his views are clear.

[17] Blake kept under his own hand in the lines the divisions of Zayas, Lardizabal, Miranda, and the Reserve.

[18] Vacani gives a long and interesting account of the siege (v. pp. 404-13) and attributes the weak defence to quarrels between the commander of the Italians and the French governor, Müller.

[19] Belonging to the 7th Line of Severoli’s division.

[20] Belmas, iv. p. 97.

[21] See narrative of Vacani, an eye-witness (vol. v. p. 399).

[22] To be found in print in Belmas, iv. pp. 124-8.

[23] This indictment of Suchet must be supported by details. In his elaborate table of casualties by corps at the end of his dispatch of Oct. 20, he only allows for 3 officers killed and 8 wounded, 40 men killed and 122 wounded—total 173. But the lists of officers’ casualties in Martinien show, on the other hand, five officers killed (Coutanceau, Saint Hilaire, Turno, Giardini, Cuny), and at least ten wounded (Mathis, Durand, Gauchet, D’Autane, Adhémar, Gattinara, Lamezan, D’Esclaibes, Maillard, Laplane), and probably three more.

Oddly enough, in his Mémoires (ii. p. 173) Suchet gives by name four officers killed at the breach (out of the five), while in his official report he had stated that there were only three killed altogether. We must trust rather Vacani, an eye-witness and a man much interested in statistics and casualties, when he gives the total of 300 for the losses, than Suchet’s table.

[24] Belmas, iv. p. 96.

[25] Which may be read in full in Arteche, xi. pp. 157-9.

[26] We are luckily in possession of the exact ‘morning state’ of Blake’s army, which is printed in the rare Spanish government publication of 1822, Estados de la Organizacion y Fuerza de los Ejércitos Españoles, pp. 184-7. Obispo had 3,400 men, Miranda 4,000, Villacampa 3,350, Mahy 4,600 infantry, under Montijo and Creagh, and 830 horse. This wing had 2 horse- and 2 field-batteries, 18 guns.

[27] There are terrible difficulties as to the timing of the battle of Saguntum. Suchet says that the first engagement was between Obispo’s flanking division, coming over the hills on the west, and Robert. Schepeler says that Obispo arrived too late altogether, and was practically not in the fight (p. 472). I think that the explanation is that Suchet took O’Ronan’s two battalions for Obispo, because they came from the direction where he was expected. I follow, in my timing of the battle, the very clear narrative of Vacani (v. pp. 440-1), who seems to make it clear that the main fighting on the French right was well over before that in the centre, and long before that on the left. Schepeler (who rode with Blake that day) also makes it certain that Lardizabal and Zayas were fighting long after Miranda, Villacampa, and Mahy had been disposed of. But difficulties remain, which could only be cleared up if we had a report by Obispo. General Arteche thinks that the action began fairly simultaneously all along the line, and follows Schepeler in saying that Obispo was late (xi. p. 174), the very reverse of Suchet’s statement that he came, and was beaten, too early.

[28] Burgos and Tiradores de Cadiz.

[29] Cuenca and Molina.

[30] O’Ronan’s two battalions went off in a separate direction, unpursued, and joined Obispo, not being in the rout.

[31] See above, [page 36].

[32] Quoted in Arteche, xi. p. 178.

[33] Mémoires, ii. p. 182.

[34] Mémoires, ii. p. 185.

[35] This account of the charge of the cuirassiers comes from the Mémoires of Colonel de Gonneville, who commanded their leading squadron. There is a curious point to be settled here. Marshal Suchet says (Mémoires, ii. p. 185) that he rode in person to the head of the regiment, and harangued it shortly on Margalef and other ancient glories, before bidding it charge. While speaking he was struck by a spent ball on the shoulder. But de Gonneville (who had read Suchet’s book, as he quotes it in other places) says distinctly (p. 208 of his Souvenirs militaires) that he received no orders, and charged on his own responsibility. ‘N’ayant là d’ordre à recevoir de personne, mais comprenant la nécessité d’arrêter cette masse de cavalerie qui arrivait à nous, &c. ... je donnai le signal.’ Was Suchet romancing about his little speech? Or was de Gonneville, who wrote his Mémoires forty years later, oblivious? Either hypothesis is difficult.

[36] Schepeler, p. 473.

[37] 2nd of Badajoz (two battalions) was almost exterminated, losing 17 officers, 21 sergeants, and 500 men, ‘mostly prisoners,’ out of 800 present. See its history in the Conde de Clonard’s great work on the Spanish army.

[38] The 16th Line (three battalions) alone, in fighting Zayas, lost just double as many officers as the seven battalions of Chlopiski and Robert in their engagement with Mahy, Miranda, and Villacampa!

[39] For details see Belmas, iv. pp. 140-3.

[40] A battalion or two left in Valencia, when the rest of the army went out to deliver Saguntum, must be added to the 20,000 men who came back from the battle. These corps were 2nd of Leon of Lardizabal’s division, and one battalion of Savoya belonging to Miranda.

[41] One battalion each of Badajoz, Burgos, and Tiradores de Cuenca—under 2,000 men in all.

[42] Four thousand strong at Saguntum, it surrendered on January 8th, 5,513 strong. Of its quality, the less said the better.

[43] Mahy to Blake quoted at length in Arteche, xi. p. 196, footnote.

[44] For details see Vacani, v. pp. 470-1.

[45] Correspondance de Napoléon, 18,267, and cf. pp. 590-2 of vol. iv of this work.

[46] See these dispatches printed in full in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 256-8. This wording is most important and should be studied with care. Note that Wellington’s sick have gone up from 18,000 to 20,000 in twenty-four hours, to oblige the Emperor.

[47] Berthier to Marmont, January 23, 1812. Printed in the latter’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 297-9.

[48] Though King Joseph had said that if Marmont took over the whole of La Mancha, he could then reinforce d’Armagnac up to 8,000 men. This he never really accomplished (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 26).

[49] Date fixed by Marmont’s letter to Berthier of Feb. 6.

[50] ‘Sa Majesté (writes Berthier) pense que, dans cette circonstance, vous avez plus calculé votre gloire personnelle que le bien de son service,’ Jan. 23, letter quoted above on the last page.

[51] Each division had about 4,000 or 4,500 men: the light cavalry about 1,700, so the whole would have made about 10,000 sabres and bayonets.

[52] Apparently four or five battalions of the German division gathered from La Mancha, and a brigade of dragoons. Joseph calls it in his Correspondance 3,000 men, when describing this operation (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 12, 1811).

[53] D’Armagnac’s obscure campaign will be found chronicled in detail in the narrative of the Baden officer, Riegel, iii. pp. 357-60, who shared in it along with the rest of the German division from La Mancha.

[54] So Suchet’s narrative (Mémoires, ii. pp. 214-15). Belmas says that only one bridge was finished when Harispe and Musnier passed—the others after dawn only.

[55] For Blake’s opinions and actions see the record of his staff-officer, Schepeler (pp. 502-3).

[56] Napier says (iv. p. 30) that the gunboats fled without firing a shot. Suchet and Schepeler speak of much firing, as does Arteche.

[57] No less than three of the Italian colonels were hit, and thirty-four officers in all.

[58] Only Miranda voted against a sortie, and thought that nothing could be done, except to hold out for a while in the walls and then surrender. Arteche, xi. p. 241.

[59] Not 5,000 as Napier (probably by a misprint) says on page 31 of his 4th vol. Apparently a misprint in the original edition has been copied in all the later fourteen!

[60] See the long procès verbal of the Council’s proceedings translated in Belmas, iv. pp. 203-6.

[61] The proposal of exchange came first to Mahy at Alicante; he called a council of generals, which resolved that the release of so many French would profit Suchet overmuch, because many of them had been imprisoned at Alicante and Cartagena, and had worked on the fortifications there. They could give the Marshal valuable information, which he had better be denied. The proposal must therefore be sent on to the Regency at Cadiz. That government, after much debate, refused to ratify the proposal, considering it more profitable to the enemy than to themselves.

[62] Some notes about his captivity may be found in the Mémoires of Baron Kolli, the would-be deliverer of King Ferdinand, who was shut up in another tower of the castle.

[63] See the dispatches printed in full in Belmas, Appendix, vol. iv, pp. 218-20, and 226-7 of his great work.

[64] For which see vol. i. p. 68.

[65] The names of all seven friars are given by Toreno and Schepeler.

[66] Can the frightful figure of 600 be a mistake for 60?

[67] See Toreno, iii. p. 28.

[68] See his pages, iv. 33.

[69] On February 1st Freire’s infantry division, though it had suffered much from desertion in the meanwhile, still numbered 3,300 men present, and his cavalry 850 sabres. See tables in Los Ejércitos españoles, pp. 149-50.

[70] See above, [p. 56].

[71] According to Joseph’s letter to Montbrun (Correspondence of King Joseph, viii. p. 294) a battalion or two may have joined Montbrun, as he tells that general that he is glad to know that the troops of his army have given satisfaction.

[72] Suchet, Mémoires, ii. p. 234, for dates.

[73] Marmont accuses Montbrun exactly as Napoleon accuses Marmont!

[74] On his first appearance he sent to summon Alicante, and received the proper negative answer. But Schepeler, who was in the place, says that the governor, General de la Cruz, showed signs of yielding. Fortunately the other generals did not. It would have been absurd to treat seriously a force of 4,000 infantry and 1,500 horse with only six light guns! (Schepeler, p. 520.)

[75] It is alluded to in a dispatch of the Emperor to Berthier on that day. ‘Le duc de Dalmatie a l’ordre d’envoyer une colonne en Murcie pour faire une diversion.’ St. Cloud, Nov. 19.

[76] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 27, 1812.

[77] See Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. pp. 237-8.

[78] These were Chinchilla, 2nd of Murcia, and a new locally raised battalion called 2nd of Alicante. He was in March handed over also Canarias, Burgos, and Ligero de Aragon, which had belonged to Freire till that date.

[79] See above, [p. 14].

[80] See vol. iii. pp. 503-4.

[81] Suchet says that the captain of the boat threw his letters overboard at the last moment, but that they floated and were picked up by the French. Was this a farce? Or is the whole story doubtful?

[82] Napier, Peninsular War, iv. p. 38.

[83] See letter printed in Belmas, iv. p. 248.

[84] See notes on discussions of this sort in Sir Edward Codrington’s Memoirs, i. pp. 264 and 277. He had seen much of the evils of both kinds of organization, and leaned on the whole to the irregulars, from a personal dislike for Lacy.

[85] Who called the raid an ‘insult’—Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Feb. 29, 1812, and compare letter of March 8.

[86] There is an interesting account of the combat of Villaseca in Codrington’s Memoirs, i. pp. 254-6: he was present, having chanced to come on shore to confer with Eroles as to co-operation against Tarragona. An odd episode of the affair was that, when the French surrendered, they were found to have with them as prisoners Captains Flinn and Pringle, R.N., whom they had surprised landing at Cape Salou on the previous day.

[87] Napoleon to Berthier, Paris, Jan. 25, after the receipt of the news of the fall of Valencia.

[88] Details may be found in the dispatches of Feb. 29, and May 1st and 8th.

[89] See vol. iv. p. 215.

[90] See above, [p. 88].

[91] The exact loss is uncertain, but Bourke himself was wounded, and Martinien’s lists show 15 other casualties among French and Italian officers: Vacani (vi. p. 65) says that the 7th Italian line alone lost 15 killed and 57 wounded. A loss of 16 officers implies at least 300 men hit.

[92] For numerous anecdotes of Eroles and lively pictures of his doings the reader may refer to the Memoirs of Edward Codrington, with whom he so often co-operated.

[93] Napoleon to Berthier, March 8th, 1812.

[94] Apparently about the same time that Villacampa and his division came up to replace him in Aragon.

[95] See above, [page 21].

[96] For all this see Schepeler, pp. 570-1; King Joseph’s Letters (Ducasse), viii. pp. 291 and 305; and Toreno, iii. pp. 81-2.

[97] There seems to be an error of dates in Napier, iv. p. 172, concerning Mina’s operations, as the surprise of the convoy at Salinas is put after Mina’s escape from Pannetier at Robres. But Mina’s own Memoirs fix the date of the latter as April 23rd, 1812, while the former certainly happened on April 7th. Toreno (iii. p. 87) has got the sequence right.

[98] There is a curious and interesting account of this in Mina’s own Memoirs, pp. 31-2, where he relates his narrow escape, and tells how he had the pleasure of hanging his treacherous lieutenant, and three local alcaldes, who had conspired to keep from him the news of Pannetier’s approach.

[99] Napoleon to Berthier, Dec. 30, 1811, speaks of the order to march having been already given. The two regiments were in Castile by March: when precisely they left Drouet I cannot say—perhaps as late as February.

[100] See Schepeler, p. 172.

[101] See above, [p. 81].

[102] One case is noted of a captain of the ‘Juramentado’ detachment at Badajoz who blew himself from a gun when he saw the place taken (Lamare’s Défense de Badajoz, p. 260). Carlos de España shot the other five Spanish officers captured on that occasion (Belmas, iv. p. 362).

[103] See vol. iii. pp. 594-5.

[104] After the 28th went off, the flank-companies were those of the 2/11th, 2/47th, and 1/82nd, two from each battalion.

[105] 2/47th (8 companies) 570 men, 2/87th (560 men), 1 company 95th (75 men), 70 2nd Hussars K.G.L., 1 field-battery (Captain Hughes) 83 men, or in all 1,358 of all ranks.

[106] A battalion each of Irlanda and Cantabria, and some light companies of cazadores, with 120 gunners and 25 cavalry, amounting to about 1,650 men (sick included).

[107] For details of these operations see the anonymous Defence of Tarifa (London, 1812), and letters in Rait’s Life of Lord Gough, i. pp. 69-70.

[108] This was the famous knight who, holding the place for King Sancho IV in 1294, refused to surrender it when the Moors brought his son, captured in a skirmish, before the walls, and threatened to behead him if his father refused to capitulate. Guzman would not yield, saw his son slain, and successfully maintained the fortress.

[109] For these precautions, the work of Captain Charles Smith, R.E., see the anonymous Defence of Tarifa (p. 62), and Napier, iv. pp. 59-60.

[110] See vol. iv. pp. 101-2.

[111] Two battalions each of 43rd Line and 7th and 9th Poles, and 16th and 21st Dragoons.

[112] Three of 16th Léger, two of 54th Line, one each of 27th Léger and 94th and 95th Line.

[113] Two of 63rd and one of 8th Line.

[114] 51st Line.

[115] For details of this toilsome march see Belmas, iv. pp. 15-17.

[116] The breaching battery on the lower slope with four 16- and two 12-pounders: the upper battery with four howitzers for high-trajectory fire against the more distant guns of the besieged and the island, and two 12-pounders.

[117] According to some authorities he also spiked a 32-lb. carronade. See Defence of Tarifa, p. 63.

[118] The author of the Defence of Tarifa pretends not to know the real story (p. 63), saying that the spiking caused much ‘indignation, apprehension, and discontent,’ and that ‘whence the order proceeded is unknown.’ For the explanation see the letter from an officer of the garrison in Napier, iv, Appendix, p. 438.

[119] Gough speaks of his reply that ‘evacuation would be contrary to the spirit of General Campbell’s instructions,’ as if given at an earlier date, but, the 29th seems fixed by King’s letter to Napier in appendix to the latter’s Peninsular War, iv. pp. 443-4, quoted above.

[120] See especially the notes from officers on the spot in Napier’s appendix to vol. iv. pp. 442-4.

[121] ‘Sin duda ignorará V.S. que me hallo yo en esta plaza, cuando se prononce á su gubernador que admite una capitulacion. Á la cabeza de mis tropas me encontrará V.S. y entonces hableremos.’ See Arteche, appendix to vol. xi. p. 524.

[122] For this, see Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 477, from which Napier copies his narrative, iv. p. 55.

[123] Their part in the defence must not be denied to the Spaniards. Napier, with his usual prejudice, remarks (iv. p. 60) that Skerrett ‘assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spaniards, and if Smith had not insisted upon placing British troops alongside of them this would have ruined the defence, because hunger and neglect had so broken the spirit of these poor men that few appeared during the combat, and Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.’

[124] Skerrett and Copons estimated the loss of the enemy at nearly 500, no doubt an exaggeration. But Leval’s 207 seems far too few. The commanding officer of the 51st Ligne reports from his four flank-companies 7 officers and 81 men hit (Belmas, iv, Appendix, p. 58). Of the sapper detachment which led the column, from 50 men 43 were hors de combat (Belmas, iv. p. 31). It seems incredible that when 23 companies took part in the assault 5 of them should have suffered 131 casualties out of a total of 207. Martinien’s tables show 18 officers killed and wounded on Dec. 31, a figure which proves nothing, for though at the usual casualty rate of 20 men per officer this would imply a total loss of 360, yet it is well known that in assaults the officers often suffer a loss out of all proportion to that of the rank and file. Eighteen officers hit might be compatible with a loss as low as 200 or as high as 400 in such a case.

[125] Defence of Tarifa, p. 47.

[126] See the letter in Belmas, iv. pp. 55-6.

[127] Defence of Tarifa, p. 75.

[128] See [page 8] above.

[129] See Wellington to Hill, Dec. 18th, Dispatches, ix. pp. 465-6.

[130] But the last-named officer was absent.

[131] One Portuguese infantry and one Portuguese cavalry brigade.

[132] Napier (iv. 49) wrongly puts the combat of Navas de Membrillo on the 28th of December, not the 29th. The diaries of Stoltzenberg of the 2nd K.G.L. Hussars and Cadell of the 28th prove that the second date is correct. No force could have marched from Albuquerque to Navas in one day.

[133] Hill’s dispatch has a handsome but ungrammatical testimony to the enemy: ‘the intrepid and admirable way in which the French retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was by the nature of the country, of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting anything against him.’

[134] Apparently two killed and nine wounded.

[135] See [page 56] above.

[136] Napier (iv. p. 50) overrates the damage that Morillo suffered. He was not ‘completely defeated’ by Treillard, because he absconded without fighting. In his elaborate dispatch he gives his whole loss as two killed and nine wounded. See his life by Rodriguez Villa, appendices to vol. ii, for an almost daily series of letters describing his march.

[137] See below, section xxxiii, [page 337].

[138] For all this scheme see the Memoirs of Miot de Melito, iii. pp. 215-16, beside the Emperor’s own dispatches. Note especially the instructions which the French ambassador, Laforest, was to set before Joseph.

[139] See vol. iv. p. 215.

[140] Toreno, iii. p. 100.

[141] See vol. ii. p. 168.

[142] Toreno says that the mistress of the Duke of Infantado was implicated in the negotiation, after he had become a regent, but that he himself had no treasonable intentions, being a staunch supporter of Ferdinand.

[143] See Villa Urrutia, i. p. 13 and ii. pp. 355-9.

[144] The best and most recent account of all this, explaining many contradictions and some insincere suppression of fact in Toreno’s great history, is to be found in chapter ix of vol. ii of Señor Villa Urrutia’s Relaciones entre España y Inglaterra 1808-14.

[145] See vol. iv. p. 240.

[146] Early in 1812, however, Wellington once more spoke of requiring Souza’s retirement from office. Dispatches, ix. p. 88.

[147] Wellington to Charles Stuart, April 9, 1812. Dispatches, ix. p. 48.

[148] Napier (iv. p. 212) says that Portugal raised 25,000,000 cruzados this year. I cannot understand this, comparing it with Soriano de Luz, iii. p. 523, which quotes 12,000,000 cruzados as the total receipt of taxes for 1811. Does Napier include loans, and the inconvertible paper issued by the government?

[149] See complaints of the Conde de Redondo, the Portuguese finance minister, in Soriano de Luz, iii. p. 520.

[150] See tables on pp. 324-5 of Halliday’s Present State of Portugal, published in 1812.

[151] Halliday’s Present State of Portugal, p. 320.

[152] The deductions were—sick, 7,500; untrained recruits, 4,000; dismounted cavalry, 3,000; regiment at Cadiz, 1,500; garrisons (infantry and artillery) and men on detachment, 10,000; leaving some 33,000 for the field. By May the gross total had gone down to 56,674.

[153] Set forth in detail, and with a sample bond for 1,000 dollars added, in Dispatches, ix. pp. 104-5.

[154] See especially below in chapter iii of section xxxiii. [p. 349].

[155] For these phrases and much more abuse, see Napier, iv. p. 199, a most venomous and unjust passage.

[156] Fortescue’s British Statesmen, pp. 277-8.

[157] Per contra five depleted second battalions went home.

[158] Printed in Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, vii. pp. 257-88.

[159] Wellington to Wellesley, camp before Badajoz, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 307.

[160] Liverpool to Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 257.

[161] For this date see Marmont to Berthier, from Valladolid, Feb. 6, 1812.

[162] For details, see [chapter iii] of section xxx above.

[163] Dispatches, viii. p. 516.

[164] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 28.

[165] For details of this operation see Thiébault’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 538-43, corroborated by Wellington’s Dispatches, viii. pp. 373-5 and 385-6.

[166] See vol. iv. p. 549.

[167] Dispatches, viii, Report of Dec. 28 to Lord Liverpool on the late campaign.

[168] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, viii. p. 482, compare Wellington to Liverpool, viii. pp. 485-6, of the next morning.

[169] See Dispatches, viii. p. 520. See the Dickson MSS., edited by Major Leslie, for letter from Almeida in December.

[170] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 1, Dispatches, viii. p. 524.

[171] See Wellington to Graham, Dec. 26, Dispatches, viii. p. 521.

[172] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, viii. p. 524.

[173] Another extract from the explanatory dispatch to Lord Liverpool, written on Jan. 1st, 1812.

[174] For details of this see Thiébault’s Mémoires, iv. p. 537, where Barrié’s frank dismay at his appointment, and the arguments used to overcome it, are described at length.

[175] Wellington to Liverpool, Dispatches, viii. p. 536, Jan. 7th, 1812, ‘I can scarcely venture to calculate the time that this operation will take, but I should think not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days.’

[176] Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, p. 104.

[177] I take Colborne’s own account (see letter in his life by Moore Smith, p. 166). There were two companies each from the 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 2/52nd, and 95th, and one from each Caçador battalion. Jones wrongly says (p. 116) three companies of the 52nd only, Napier (as usual) omits all mention of the Portuguese. Cf. Harry Smith’s Autobiography, i. p. 55.

[178] In Moorsom’s History of the 52nd it is stated that a sergeant of the French artillery, while in the act of throwing a live shell, was shot dead: the shell fell back within the parapet, and was kicked away by one of the garrison, on which it rolled down into the gorge, was stopped by the gate, and then exploded and blew it open (p. 152).

[179] So Belmas, iv. p. 266. Barrié’s report says that there were 60 infantry and 13 gunners inside altogether. It is an accurate and very modest narrative, in which there is nothing to correct.

[180] Mein and Woodgate of the 52nd, and Hawkesley of the 95th. The last named died of his wounds.

[181] This mistake is acknowledged in Jones’s Sieges, i. p. 120, and much commented on by Burgoyne [Life and Correspondence, i. p. 161], who complains that an immense amount of work was wasted, two nights’ digging put in, the terre-plain levelled, and even some platforms laid, before the error was detected.

[182] Burgoyne, i. p. 162.

[183] See Schwertfeger’s History of the German Legion, i. p. 353. Jones (Sieges, i. p. 125) is quite wrong in saying that the convent was carried ‘with no loss.’

[184] See Dickson Papers, Jan. 1812.

[185] See vol. iii. p. 239. The illustration of Rodrigo on the morning after the storm, inserted to face [page 186] of this volume, shows the facts excellently.

[186] See Barrié’s report in appendix to Belmas, iv. p. 299.

[187] Jones’s Sieges, i. p. 137.

[188] For a lively account of this exploit see Grattan’s With the Connaught Rangers, p. 154.

[189] Many narratives speak of General Mackinnon as being killed by the first explosion, and others (including Wellington’s dispatch) call the second explosion that of an expense magazine fired by accident. Barrié’s report, however, settles the fact that it was a regular mine: and for Mackinnon’s death after the storming of the cuts I follow the narrative by an eye-witness appended at the end of the general’s diary.

[190] Several narrators accuse them of shirking, but Geo. Napier writes (Life, p. 215), ‘Neither Elder nor his excellent regiment were likely to neglect any duty, and I am sure the blame rested elsewhere, for George Elder was always ready for any service.’ Compare George Simmons’s autobiography—possibly he put things out by ordering the Portuguese company to carry the ladders, which he clearly was not authorized to do. [A British Rifleman, p. 221.]

[191] Some narrators say a low ravelin, but the best authority is in favour of its having been a traverse.

[192] The point has often been raised as to whether it was not the success of the Light Division at the lesser breach which enabled the 3rd Division to break through at the greater. Some Light Division diarists (e.g. Harry Smith) actually state that it was their attack on the rear of the defenders which made them flinch from a position which they had hitherto maintained. I think that the case is decided in favour of the 3rd Division by Belmas’s statement that the French fired the mine at the great breach only when the 3rd Division had got through, combined with the fact that the leading men of the Light Division reached the back of the great breach just in time to suffer from the explosion, which killed Captain Uniacke of the 95th and a few others. Apparently, therefore, the breach was forced before the head of the Light Division stormers had come up, but only just before.

[193] There is considerable controversy as to what officer received Barrié’s surrender. For the Gurwood-Mackie dispute see note in [Appendix].

[194] See his Life and Letters, p. 396.

[195] Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, p. 117.

[196] Leach’s Sketches in the Life of an Old Soldier, p. 250. For an amusing story about a plundering Connaught Ranger who came down a chimney, see Grattan, p. 162. He tried to propitiate the officer who found him by presenting him with a case of surgical instruments. Kincaid speaks of worse than plunder—armed violence and some cases of rape.

[197] So Napier and most other authorities. John Jones, however, says that the explosion was not accidental, but deliberate—some English deserters had hidden themselves in a small magazine under the rampart. ‘These desperate men, on seeing an officer approach, deeming discovery and capture inevitable, and assured that an ignominious death would follow, blew themselves up in the magazine. The explosion first found vent through the door, and shot the refugees up into the street, some alive, but so mutilated, blackened, and distorted, as to be painful to behold.’

[198] Costello (a Light Division narrator), pp. 151-2.

[199] See vol. iii. pp. 233-7.

[200] Londonderry’s Peninsular War, ii. p. 268.

[201] See Thiébault’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 551-2. Extracts from two of his letters are printed in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 280-1, and bear out all that he says in his own book.

[202] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Jan. 13, 1812.

[203] Printed in full in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 271-6.

[204] See vol. iv. p. 586.

[205] 34th Léger, 113th Line, 4th Vistula, Neuchâtel.

[206] Also two cavalry regiments, the 1st Hussars and 31st Chasseurs.

[207] Marmont, Correspondance, book xv bis, p. 287.

[208] Ibid., p. 291.

[209] Berthier to Marmont, Dec. 13, as above.

[210] Peninsular War, iv. p. 134.

[211] Correspondence in King Joseph’s Letters, viii. pp. 306-7.

[212] See Marmont’s letter acknowledging its receipt in his Correspondance, iv. pp. 342-3.

[213] Mémoires, iv. p. 554.

[214] Mémoires, iv. p. 184.

[215] Napier says Jan. 29. But Jones, then employed in repairing Rodrigo, gives Feb. 2 in his diary of the work.

[216] Dorsenne to Marmont, from Valladolid, Feb. 24.

[217] Same to same, from Valladolid, Feb. 27.

[218] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Feb. 6. Not in Marmont’s Mémoires, but printed in King Joseph’s Correspondance, viii. p. 301.

[219] I must confess that all Napier’s comment on Marmont’s doings (vol. iv. pp. 94-5) seems to me to be vitiated by a wish to vindicate Napoleon at all costs, and to throw all possible blame on his lieutenant. His statements contain what I cannot but call a suggestio falsi, when he says that ‘Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment in aid, and on Jan. 25 six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, 45,000 men in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad is only four marches.’ This misses the facts that (1) Marmont had only four divisions (Souham, Clausel, Maucune, and the weak division of Thiébault); (2) that Bonnet had not arrived, nor could for some days; (3) that Dorsenne sent nothing, and on Jan. 27 announced that nothing would be forthcoming; (4) that Montbrun (who was at Alicante on Jan. 16) was still far away on the borders of Murcia. With 22,000 men only in hand Marmont was naturally cautious.

[220] See Dispatches, viii. p. 547.

[221] I fancy that Wellington’s erroneous statement that Marmont had six divisions collected at Salamanca on the 23rd-24th [misprinted by Gurwood, Dispatches, viii. p. 577, as ‘the 6th Division!’] was Napier’s source for stating that such a force was assembled, which it certainly was not, Wellington reckoned that Marmont had Souham, Clausel, Maucune, Thiébault, and two divisions from the East, which last had not really come up—and never were to do so.

[222] Wellington to Hill, Jan. 22, Dispatches, viii. p. 566.

[223] Dickson Papers, ii. p. 571.

[224] Wellington, Dispatches, viii. pp. 568-9.

[225] Dickson Papers, ii. p. 576.

[226] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, viii. p. 571.

[227] Wellington to Sir Howard Douglas, Jan. 22, Dispatches, viii. p. 568.

[228] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, viii. p. 567, same day as last.

[229] Wellington to Hill, Jan. 28, Dispatches, viii. pp. 571-2 and 586-7.

[230] Wellington to Hill, Feb. 12, Dispatches. viii. p. 603.

[231] The ‘third division’ practically represented Thiébault’s old division of the Army of the North, which had long held the Salamanca district. This division was to be deprived of its Polish regiment (recalled to France with all other Poles) and to be given instead the 130th, then at Santander. But the 130th really belonged to the Army of Portugal (Sarrut’s division), though separated from it at the moment. So Marmont was being deprived of one regiment more.

[232] Dorsenne to Marmont, from Uñas, Feb. 5.

[233] Napoleon to Berthier, Jan. 27.

[234] Wellington to Douglas, Dispatches, viii. p. 568.

[235] An exaggeration, but hay was actually brought to Lisbon and Coimbra, and used for the English cavalry brigades, which had been sent to the rear and cantoned on the Lower Mondego.

[236] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Feb. 26. Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 344-5.

[237] Marmont’s ‘Observations on the Imperial Correspondence of Feb. 1812,’ Mémoires, iv. p. 512.

[238] To be exact, it was on May 10 that Marmont took over the command from Masséna, and Almeida was evacuated by Brennier that same night.

[239] I extract these various paragraphs from Marmont’s vast dispatch of March 2, omitting much more that is interesting and apposite.

[240] Marmont writes the Army of the Centre, evidently in confusion for the Army of the North. The nearest posts of the Army of the Centre were 150 miles away from the Esla, while the Army of the North at Burgos was much closer. Moreover, the Army of the Centre had not two infantry divisions, but only one—d’Armagnac’s—and some Juramentado regiments.

[241] See chapter vii of book iv, Peninsular War, iv. pp. 138-40.

[242] Why omit the 30,000 men of Graham and Hill?

[243] This was the case with G. Anson’s brigade and Bradford’s Portuguese infantry. Pack went by Coimbra, Slade’s cavalry brigade by Covilhão, and the horse artillery of Bull and McDonald with it.

[244] Nothing is rarer, as all students of the Peninsular War know to their cost, than a table of the exact movements of Wellington’s army on any march. For this particular movement the whole of the detailed orders happen to have been preserved in the D’Urban Papers. The starting-places of the units were:—

1st Division—Gallegos, Carpio, Fuentes de Oñoro.

3rd Division—Zamorra (by the Upper Agueda).

4th Division—San Felices and Sesmiro.

5th Division—Ciudad Rodrigo.

6th Division—Albergaria (near Fuente Guinaldo).

7th Division—Payo (in the Sierra de Gata).

Light Division—Fuente Guinaldo.

Bradford’s Portuguese—Barba del Puerco.

Pack’s Portuguese—Campillo and Ituero.

The marches were so arranged that the 7th Division passed through Castello Branco on Feb. 26, the 6th Division on Feb. 29, the Light Division on March 3, the 4th Division on March 5. All these were up to Portalegre, Villa Viçosa, or Castello de Vide, in touch with Elvas, by March 8. The 1st Division, coming by way of Abrantes, joined on March 10. Pack and Bradford, who had very circuitous routes, the one by Coimbra, the other by Thomar, were not up till several days later (16th). The 5th Division did not leave Rodrigo till March 9.

[245] The other regiment of V. Alten’s brigade (11th Light Dragoons) was on March 12 at Ponte de Sor, on its way to the South.

[246] Which lay at Arronches and Santa Olaya.

[247] 1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons K.G.L.

[248] 3rd Dragoons, 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards. They had been lying during the winter in the direction of Castello Branco.

[249] Dated Feb. 24 and 27, Dispatches, viii. pp. 629 and 638.

[250] These figures are those of January, taken from the ‘morning state’ in Los Ejércitos españoles, the invaluable book of 1822 published by the Spanish Staff.

[251] For details see Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, Appendix in vol. i. pp. 421-5, and the Dickson Papers, ed. Leslie, for Feb. 1812.

[252] For details see Duncan’s History of the Royal Artillery, ii. pp. 318-19.

[253] Wellington, Dispatches, viii. p. 601.

[254] For Wellington’s speculations (fairly correct) as to Marmont’s distribution of his troops, see Dispatches, viii. p. 618, Feb. 19, to Graham.

[255] Wellington to Victor Alten, March 5, Dispatches, viii. p. 649, makes a special point of ‘the difficulties which the enemy experiences in getting intelligence’ as a means of gaining time for himself.

[256] Napier (iv. p. 98) tries to make out that Wellington’s siege began ten days later than he wished and hoped, by the fault of the Portuguese Regency. I cannot see how Badajoz could have been invested on the 6th of March, when (as the route-directions show) the head of the marching column from the Agueda only reached Portalegre on the 8th. The movement of the army was not delayed, so far as I can see, by the slackness of Portuguese management at Lisbon or Elvas. But Wellington certainly grumbled. Did he intend that Hill alone should invest Badajoz, before the rest of the army arrived?

[257] D’Urban’s diary, Feb. 7-16: he accompanied Beresford, being his Chief-of-the-Staff.

[258] I spare the reader the question of Portuguese paper money and English exchequer bills, which will be found treated at great length in Napier, iv. pp. 97-9. Napier always appears to think that cash could be had by asking for it at London, in despite of the dreadful disappearance of the metallic currency and spread of irredeemable bank-notes which prevailed in 1812.

[259] The Conde had 1,114 horse and 3,638 foot on Jan. 1, not including two of Morillo’s battalions then absent. The total force used for the raid was probably as above.

[260] Details in a dispatch to Colonel Austin of March 15, Dispatches, viii, p. 666. General scheme in a letter to Castaños of Feb. 16. Ibid., p. 614.

[261] ‘Something too like a panic was occasioned at the head of the 7th by the appearance of the few French dragoons and the galloping back of the staff and orderlies. A confused firing broke out down the column without object! Mem.—Even British troops should not be allowed to load before a night attack.’ D’Urban’s diary, March 26.

[262] For details of this forgotten campaign I rely mainly on D’Urban’s unpublished diary. As he knew Estremadura well, from having served there with Beresford in 1811, he was lent to Graham, and rode with his staff to advise about roads and the resources of the country.

[263] The letter may be found in King Joseph’s Correspondance, viii. pp. 345-6. See also Girod de l’Ain’s Vie militaire du Général Foy, pp. 368-9.

[264] This man is mentioned in Wellington’s Dispatches, viii. p. 609: ‘The Sergent-major des Sapeurs and Adjudant des travaux and the French miner may be sent in charge of a steady non-commissioned officer to Estremoz, there to wait till I send for them.’

[265] This renegade’s name must have been Bonin, or Bossin: I cannot read with certainty his extraordinary signature, with a paraphe, at the bottom of his map. The English engineers used it, and have roughly sketched in their own works of the third siege on top of the original coloured drawing.

[266] When he commanded the 1st Division of the 1st Corps under Vandamme, and was present when that corps was nearly all destroyed on Aug. 30, 1813, at Culm.

[267] Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, i. p. 163.

[268] These swords were those of the large body of Spanish dismounted cavalry which had surrendered at the capitulation in March 1811.

[269] This fact, much insisted on by Jones, is disputed by certain Light Division witnesses, but does not seem to be disproved by them.

[270] My attention was called to this letter, found among Lord Liverpool’s papers in 1869, by Mr. F. Turner, of Frome.

[271] Printed in Belmas, iv, Appendix, p. 369, and dated March 26.

[272] The story may be found in Kincaid, p. 114, and in several other sources.

[273] Document in Belmas, iii. p. 287.

[274] Ibid., p. 442.

[275] Published in the collection of Mémoires sur la guerre d’Espagne in 1821.

[276] By Colonel Callwell, in an article in Blackwood’s Magazine for September 1913.

[277] See Belmas, ii. p. 381.

[278] Ibid., ii. pp. 844-5.

[279] Text in the Defence of Tarifa, p. 64, and in Arteche.

[280] Belmas, iv. p. 202.

[281] Kincaid, p. 39.

[282] Leith Hay, ii. pp. 256-7.

[283] Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, p. 158.

[284] Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 311.

[285] It is said on good first-hand authority that all the inmates of an asylum for female lunatics were raped. See Lettow-Vorbeck, Geschichte des Krieges von 1806-7, ii. p. 384.

[286] Hodenberg of the K.G.L. See his letters published in Blackwood’s Magazine for March 1913, by myself.

[287] Recollections of Col. P. P. Nevill, late Major 63rd [but with the 30th at Badajoz], pp. 15-16.

[288] Donaldson of the 94th, p. 159.

[289] The letter is printed in Marmont’s Correspondance, iv. pp. 304-5.

[290] This Soult quotes in his recriminatory letter to Marmont of April 8, and in his angry dispatch to Berthier of the same date (printed in King Joseph’s Correspondance, viii. p. 355).

[291] The date is proved by the letter from Soult to Marmont of March 11, printed in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 359.

[292] The date is proved by Soult’s letter to the Emperor of that date from Santa Maria, in which he announces his intention to start, and says that he is writing to Marmont, to get him to unite the armies as soon as possible.

[293] See his Mémoires, p. 377.

[294] To be exact, 7,776 officers and men on March 1. He also brought with him some ‘bataillons d’élite’ of grenadier companies from Villatte’s division.

[295] The 55th, three battalions about 1,500 strong, the fourth being left at Jaen. Soult says in his dispatch of April 8 that he took a whole brigade from Leval, but the states of April 14 show the 32nd and 58th regiments of Leval’s division, and three of the four battalions of the 43rd, all left in the kingdom of Granada. Apparently three battalions of the 55th and one of the 43rd marched, about 2,200 strong.

[296] Though he calls them only 21,000 in his dispatches. But the figures [see [Appendix no. VIII]] show 23,500. The total in the monthly reports indicate 25,000 as more likely.

[297] The orders to Hill issued by Wellington on April 4 and 5 (Dispatches, ix. p. 30) contemplate two possibilities: (1) Soult is marching with his whole force on Villafranca, and Foy is remaining far away: in this case Hill is to move en masse on Albuera. This is the case that actually occurred; (2) if Foy is moving toward the Upper Guadiana, and Soult is showing signs of extending to join him, Howard’s British and Ashworth’s Portuguese brigades and Campbell’s Portuguese horse will stay at Merida as long as is prudent, in order to prevent the junction, and will break the bridge at the last moment and then follow Hill.

Wellington, when he wrote his first orders of the 4th to Hill, was intending to storm Badajoz on the 5th, and knew, by calculating distances, that Soult could not be in front of Albuera till the 7th. He ultimately chanced another day of bombardment, running the time limit rather fine. But there was no real risk with Graham and Hill at Albuera: Soult could not have forced them.

[298] He says in his letter to Berthier of April 8 that he had intended (but for the fall of Badajoz) to move by his right that morning, to the lower course of the Guadajira river—which would have brought on an action near Talavera Real, lower down the stream of the Albuera than the battle-spot of May 1811.

[299] See chapter ii above, [pp. 54, 55].

[300] Berthier to Soult, Feb. 11. The same date as the fatal dispatch sent to Marmont, who was given a copy of that to Soult as an enclosure.

[301] More probably he would have brought only two divisions from north of the mountains, as he had to leave Bonnet to look after the Asturians, and Souham’s single division would hardly have sufficed to contain the Galicians, the Portuguese, and the Guerrilleros.

[302] See above, [p. 229].

[303] Infantry divisions of Cruz Murgeon (5,400 men) and the Prince of Anglona (4,300 men) and five squadrons of horse, besides irregulars.

[304] Wellington to Col. Austin from Badajoz, April 9.

[305] Napier, I know not on what authority, says that Osuna was only defended by ‘Juramentados’ who made a gallant resistance against their own countrymen. But Soult, in a letter to Berthier dated April 21 from Seville, says that Osuna was held by some companies of the 43rd Line and a detachment of the 21st Dragoons. He cannot be wrong. Moreover, the 43rd shows losses at Osuna, April 13, in Martinien’s tables.

[306] Martinien’s tables show three officers killed and nine wounded at ‘Alora near Malaga’ on this date, in the 43rd, 58th Line, and 21st Dragoons. Soult’s dispatch makes out that only Rey’s advanced guard under Maransin was cut up, and that the main body defeated the Spaniards. If so, why did they retreat on Malaga?

[307] Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17, 1812.

[308] This officer was in command of the brigade of Anson, then absent on leave, which at this time consisted of the 12th, 14th, and 16th Light Dragoons.

[309] There is a good account of all this in the admirable diary of Tomlinson of the 16th, which I so often have had to cite. He has an interesting note that the 16th in their charge found a stone wall in their way, and that the whole regiment took it in their stride, and continued their advance in perfect order (p. 150).

[310] Soult only acknowledges a loss of three officers and about 110 men in his dispatch of April 21 to Berthier, adding the ridiculous statement that the British had 100 killed and many more wounded, and that the 5th Dragoon Guards had been practically destroyed. Martinien’s tables show four French officers wounded and one killed, but (of course) take no account of unwounded prisoners. The British lost two missing, men who had ridden ahead in the pursuit into the French infantry.

[311] This was the brigade formerly under Barbaçena, 4th and 10th regiments.

[312] Mes dispositions étant faites pour une marche de quinze jours sur l’Agueda, déjà commencée, je continue ce mouvement, sans cependant (je le répète) avoir une très grande confiance dans les résultats qu’il doit donner.’ Marmont to Berthier, March 27.

[313] Wellington to V. Alten, April 18, ‘You were desired “not to be in a hurry,” to give them (España and General Baccelar) your countenance so far as might be in your power, and to tell them that you were left in the front for a particular object.... I beg you to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on March 30 and April 1, the Agueda being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, you could have kept open the communications between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.... You wrote on the seventh from Castello Branco that you knew nothing about the enemy! and instead of receiving from you (as I had expected) a daily account of their operations, you knew nothing, and, from the way in which you made your march, all those were driven off the road who might have given me intelligence, and were destined to keep up the communication between me and Carlos de España.’

[314] For complaints by Le Mesurier as to the defects of the place when he took over charge of it on March 18, see his letter of the 28th of the same month, to Wellington, in the Appendix to Napier, iv. pp. 450-1.

[315] The observation comes from D’Urban’s unpublished Journal.

[316] Wellington to Alten, Dispatches, ix. p. 69. ‘You were positively ordered by your instructions to go to Castello Branco and no farther. The reason for this instruction was obvious. First the militia of Lower Beira would be there in the case supposed [that of Marmont’s making an invasion south of the Douro], and they were there. Secondly, as soon as I should be informed of the enemy’s approach to the Coa, it would be necessary for me to assemble a force at Castello Branco—of which the foundation would be the 1st Hussars K.G.L. Yet notwithstanding my orders you marched from Castello Branco on the 8th, and crossed the Tagus on the 9th. Till I received your letter I did not conceive it possible that you could so far disregard your instructions.’

[317] I cannot resist quoting here, as an example of Trant’s over-daring and reckless temperament, his letter to Wilson, urging him to co-operate in the raid, which was lent me by Wilson’s representative of to-day:—

Guarda, 11th April, 1812.

My dear Wilson,—I arrived last night. Hasten up your division: there never was a finer opportunity of destroying a French corps, in other words and in my opinion, their 2nd Division: but I have no certainty of what force is the enemy. At any rate send me your squadron of cavalry, or even twenty dragoons. I am very ill-treated by Baccelar in regard to cavalry. Push on yourself personally. You know how happy I shall be in having you once more as the partner of my operations. Order up everything you can from Celorico to eat: here there is nothing.—Yrs. N. T.

The French 2nd Division was Clausel’s, as it chanced, the one that was precisely not at Sabugal, but executing the raid on Castello Branco.

[318] Wellington to Trant, Dispatches, ix. p. 73.

[319] Narrative of Trant in Napier’s Appendix to vol. iv. p. 451.

[320] There is an account of this rout from the French side in the Mémoires of Parquin, of the 13th Chasseurs, an officer mentioned in Marmont’s dispatch as having taken one of the flags. Parquin calls it that of the regiment of Eurillas. There was no such corps: those which lost standards were Aveiro, Oliveira, and Penafiel. A lengthy account may be found also in Beresford’s Ordens do Dia for May 7, where blame and praise are carefully distributed, and the curious order is made that the disgraced regiments are to leave their surviving flags at home, till they have washed out the stain on their honour by good service in the field.

[321] Marmont to Berthier: Fuente Guinaldo, April 22. ‘Les rapports des prisonniers sont que trois divisions de l’armée anglaise reviennent sur le Coa. Mais cette nouvelle ayant été donnée avec affectation par les parlementaires, et n’ayant vu jamais autre chose que le seul 1er de Hussards Allemands, qui était précédemment sur cette rive, et point d’infanterie, ni rien qui annonce la présence d’un corps de troupes, je suis autorisé à croire que c’est un bruit qu’on a fait courir à dessein, et qu’il n’y a pas d’Anglais en présence. Je suis à peu près certain qu’il a parti de Portalègre deux divisions, qui se sont portées à Villa Velha: mais il me paraît évident qu’elles ne se sont beaucoup éloignées du Tage.’ The actual situation was 1st Hussars K.G.L. Quadraseyes in front of Sabugal: Light Division, Sabugal: 3rd Division, Sortelha: 4th Division, Pedrogão, 5th Division, Alpedrinha; 1st, 6th, 7th Divisions, Losa: Pack’s Portuguese, Memoa. The map will show what a fearful situation Marmont would have been in had he halted for another day.

[322] Wellington to Liverpool, April 7, Dispatches, ix. p. 43.

[323] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, April 4, Dispatches, ix. p. 29.

[324] Wellington to Alten, April 18, Dispatches, ix. p. 68, ‘I beg to observe that if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on the 30th March and 1st April ... you would have kept open the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would probably have got into the latter place.’

[325] The date can be fixed from D’Urban’s Journal: ‘Marmont has blockaded Rodrigo, reconnoitred Almeida, and has now made an inroad as far as Fundão: all this obliges a movement toward him. April 11.’

[326] 5th and 17th from Elvas, 22nd from Abrantes.

[327] All these movements are taken from the elaborate tables in D’Urban’s Journal for these days.

[328] See above, [p. 288].

[329] Letter in the D’Urban Papers.

[330] See the Life of Surgeon-General Sir Jas. McGrigor, pp. 284-96. I have before me, among the Scovell papers, Grant’s original signed parole as far as Bayonne, witnessed by General Lamartinière, the chief of Marmont’s staff. It was captured by Guerrilleros in Castile, and sent to Wellington. Accompanying it is the General’s private letter, commending Grant to the attention of the French police, with the explanation that he was only not treated as a spy because he was captured in British uniform, though far in the rear of the French outpost line.

[331] Wellington to Graham, Castello Branco, April 18, Dispatches, ix. p. 70.

[332] Marmont to Berthier, Fuente Guinaldo, April 22 [original intercepted dispatch in Scovell Papers]: ‘J’ai eu la plus grande peine à faire arriver mon artillerie sur la rive droite de cette rivière. Les ponts que j’avais fait construire sur l’Agueda ayant été détruits par les grandes crues d’eau, et n’ayant pas la faculté de les rétablir, je n’ai su d’autre moyen que de la diriger par les sources de cette rivière, et les contreforts des montagnes.’ The wording of Wellington’s intercepted copy differs slightly from that of the duplicate printed in Ducasse’s Correspondence of King Joseph, viii. pp. 404-10.

[333] Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers, Fuente Guinaldo, April 22, quoted above.

[334] See Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 202. Jardet’s long report to Marmont was captured on its journey out to Salamanca from Paris, and lies among the Scovell Papers.

[335] King Joseph had been prepared for the formal proposal by a tentative letter sent off to him about three weeks earlier, on February 19, inquiring whether it would suit him to have Jourdan as his Chief-of-the-Staff, supposing that the Emperor went off to Russia and turned over the command in Spain to him. See Ducasse’s Correspondence, ix. p. 322.

[336] This is proved by Berthier’s letter to King Joseph of April 16 (Ducasse’s Correspondence of King Joseph, viii. p. 382), which says that he has just received Marmont’s dispatch of March 30 acknowledging his own of March 16, and that the Marshal now knows that he must obey orders from Madrid.

[337] Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17.

[338] A copy of this print is among the Scovell Papers: it does credit to the Valencian press by its neat appearance.

[339] The question about the Army of the North is a very curious one. The authorized copy of the dispatch of May 16, printed in Napoleon’s correspondence and in Ducasse’s Correspondence of King Joseph, certainly omits its name. But the King declared that in his original copy of it Dorsenne and his army were mentioned as put under his charge. In one of the intercepted dispatches in the Scovell Papers, Joseph writes angrily to Berthier, giving what purports to be a verbatim duplicate of the document, and in this duplicate, which lies before my eyes as I write this, the Army of the North is cited with the rest.

[340] One of Marmont’s colonels in the province of Segovia was at this moment threatening to use armed force against the King’s troops for resisting his requisitions. See Miot, iii. p. 222.

[341] See Miot de Melito’s Mémoires, iii. p. 215.

[342] Jourdan’s Mémoires, p. 384.

[343] Oddly enough this letter was in duplicate, and while one copy fell into Joseph’s hands, the other was captured by guerrilleros and sent to Wellington. The cipher was worked out by Scovell, and the contents gave Wellington useful information as to the relations between Soult and the King. See below, [pages 530-39].

[344] Printed whole in Jourdan’s Mémoires, pp. 386-94.

[345] i. e. for the collection of troops in the valley of the Tagus, to join Foy and operate for the relief of Badajoz.

[346] See Jourdan to Berthier of April 3, 1812.

[347] See Jourdan’s Mémoire, quoted above, p. 304.

[348] Jourdan to Suchet, April 9, 1812.

[349] Jourdan’s Mémoires, pp. 395-6.

[350] See above, [p. 311].

[351] Dispatches, ix. p. 173.

[352] The cipher-originals are all in the Scovell papers, worked out into their interpretation by that ingenious officer: Wellington only kept the fair copies for himself. The dispatches are dated Sabugal, 11 April (to Brennier about the Agueda bridge); Sabugal, April 16 (to Berthier); Fuente Guinaldo, April 22 (to Berthier). The last two are full of the most acrimonious criticism of Napoleon’s orders for the invasion of Beira. Scovell made out much, but not all, of the contents of these letters.

[353] All the originals are in the Scovell Papers.

[354] It is the one printed in Ducasse’s Correspondence of King Joseph, viii. pp. 413-17.

[355] See above, [p. 202].

[356] Original in the Scovell Papers. Place of capture uncertain, but clearly taken by guerrilleros between Seville and Madrid.

[357] See above, [pp. 269-70].

[358] Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, May 4, Dispatches, ix. p. 114.

[359] Ibid., p. 101.

[360] D’Urban’s unpublished diary, under May 6.

[361] Minus, of course, the 13th Light Dragoons.

[362] Erskine was the senior officer left with the corps—a dangerous experiment. One marvels that Wellington risked it after previous experience.

[363] Wellington to Graham, May 7, Dispatches, ix. p. 128.

[364] This was the Tilson of 1809: he had lengthened his name.

[365] Captain MacCarthy of the 50th.

[366] The statement in Jones’s Sieges, i. p. 259, that the enemy were unaware of the turning column is disproved by the official reports of the surviving French officers Sêve and Teppe.

[367] The berm is the line where the scarp of the ditch meets the slope of the rampart: the scarp should be perpendicular, the rampart-slope tends backward, hence there is a change on this line from the vertical to the obtuse in the profile of the work. The berm should have been only a foot or so wide and was three.

[368] The official report of the French captain, Sêve of the 6th Léger, accuses the grenadiers of the 39th of giving way and bolting at the critical moment, and this is confirmed by the report of the chef de bataillon Teppe of the 39th, an unwilling witness.

[369] According to Teppe’s narrative they left the walls, and many hid in the bakehouses, while most of the officers headed the rush for the bridge.

[370] Foy says that the centre link of the bridge was not a regular pontoon but a river boat, which could be drawn out when the garrison wanted to open the bridge for any purpose, and being light it collapsed under the feet of the flying crowd (p. 163).

[371] The 92nd and the right wing of the 71st reached the tête-de-pont just as the fugitives from Fort Napoleon entered it, and swept away the garrison. They only lost two wounded.

[372] Gardyne’s history of the 92nd gives the names of two of these gallant men, Gauld and Somerville.

[373] Hill’s total of casualties is 2 officers and 31 men killed: 13 officers and 143 wounded. The second officer killed was Lieutenant Thiele of the Artillery of the K.G.L., accidentally blown up by a mine on the day of the evacuation. But two of the wounded officers died.

[374] Teppe by name, whose narrative, written in captivity, is our best source for the French side. It is a frank confession of misbehaviour by the troops—particularly the 4th Étranger.

[375] D’Armagnac also sent the battalion of Frankfort for the same purpose, which arrived late with less excuse. See Foy, p. 375.

[376] Dispatches, ix. p. 189.

[377] To both on June 1. Dispatches, ix. p. 197. Erskine’s name is the blank to be filled up.

[378] See vol. iv. pp. 133 and 191.

[379] Marmont to Foy, June 1.

[380] See Jourdan’s Mémoires, pp. 399-400.

[381] See vol. ii. p. 444.

[382] An officer probably better remembered by the general reader as the husband of Sarah Curran, Robert Emmet’s sometime fiancée, than as the executor of some of Wellington’s most important engineering works. He fell before Bayonne in 1814.

[383] See Wellington to Graham, 23rd and 24th May. Dispatches, ix. pp. 163-5.

[384] The best and most elaborate account of this is in Leith Hay, i. pp. 300-1.

[385] See Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, June 7. Dispatches, ix. p. 219.

[386] An extraordinary case of Abadia’s ill will occurred in this spring: a damaged transport, carrying British troops to Lisbon, having put in to Corunna to repair, permission was refused for the men to land: apparently it was suspected that they were trying to garrison Corunna.

[387] For all this Galician business see the Life of Sir Howard Douglas, pp. 120-60.

[388] See above, [p. 210].

[389] Chaves, Braganza, Miranda, Villa Real.

[390] Silveira already had Nos. 11 and 12, D’Urban brought up No. 1, which had not hitherto operated on this frontier.

[391] See Thiébault, Mémoires, v. p. 561.

[392] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7.

[393] See above, [p. 304]. The intercepted cipher is in the Scovell Papers.

[394] See Lord Wellesley to Lord W. Bentinck, December 27, 1811, in Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 249.

[395] Bentinck to Lord Liverpool, January 25, 1812, ibid., pp. 290-1.

[396] Liverpool to Bentinck, March 4. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 300.

[397] Liverpool to Wellington, March 5, ibid., p. 301.

[398] Bentinck to Wellington, February 23, ibid., p. 296.

[399] The answer to Lord Liverpool went off on March 20, that to Bentinck on March 24th.

[400] Whither the 2/67th, a company of artillery, and five companies of De Watteville’s Swiss regiment had been sent, on the news of Blake’s disasters before Valencia. Dispatches, viii. p. 448.

[401] The best source of information about these subsidized corps is the life of Sir Samford Whittingham, who raised and disciplined one of them in Majorca, on the skeletons of the old regiments of Cordova, Burgos, and 5th Granaderos Provinciales. He had only 1,500 men on January 1, 1812, and 2,200 on February 21, but had worked them up to over 3,000 by April. Roche, who had to work on the cadres of Canarias, Alicante, Chinchilla, Voluntarios de Aragon, 2nd of Murcia, and Corona, had 5,500 men ready on March 1, and more by May. Whittingham maintains that his battalions always did their duty far better than other divisions, commanded by officers with unhappy traditions of defeat, and attributes the previous miserable history of the Murcian army to incapacity and poor spirit in high places.

[402] Henry Wellesley to Wellington. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 320.

[403] See as evidence of eagerness Whittingham’s letter to Pellew of May 28 in the former’s Memoirs, p. 161.

[404] Liverpool to Bentinck, 4th March, quoted above.

[405] See Wellington to Lord W. Bentinck in Dispatches, ix. pp. 60-1.

[406] That veritable ‘stormy petrel of politics,’ Sir Robert Wilson, was passing through Sicily in May, and seems to have acted a mischievous part in visiting the Queen, and allowing her to set before him all her grievances against Bentinck, and the ‘Jacobin Parliament’ that he was setting up. She told Wilson that Bentinck ‘went to jails and took evidence of miserable wretches, actual malefactors or suspects, inducing them to say what he wished for his plans, and acting without any substantiating facts.’ As to the army Wilson gathered that ‘the Neapolitan soldiery hate us to a man, the Germans would adhere to us, the native Sicilians at least not act against us.’ But there were only 2,000 Sicilians and 1,900 Germans, and 8,000 Neapolitans and other Italians, eminently untrustworthy. [So untrustworthy were they, indeed, that the Italian corps sent to Spain in the autumn deserted by hundreds to the French.] See Wilson’s Private Diary, 1812-15, pp. 35-62.

[407] For details, see table in [Appendix no. XIII].

[408] Suchet’s correspondence (in the Archives of the French War Ministry) begins to be anxious from July 6 onward. On that date he hears that ships are at Alicante to take Roche on board, who is to join a very large English force, and 15,000 (!) men from Majorca. On July 13th he hears that Maitland is to have 17,000 men, though only 3,000 British regulars.

[409] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 14: ‘I have this day received a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 9th of June, from which I am concerned to observe that his Lordship does not intend to carry into execution the operation on the east coast of the Peninsula, until he shall have tried the success of another plan on the coast of Italy. I am apprehensive that this determination may bring upon us additional forces of the Army of Aragon: but I still hope that I shall be able to retain at the close of this campaign the acquisitions made at its commencement.’ Dispatches, ix. p. 285.

[410] No silver crowns had been coined since 1760 at the Mint. They weighed 463 grains: the Spanish dollar only 415 grains.

[411] See Wellington to Lord Bathurst. Dispatches, vii. p. 370.

[412] Ibid., vii. p. 319.

[413] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 22. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 318.

[414] Campbell to Shawe. Supplementary Dispatches, vii. p. 362.

[415] Wellington to Bathurst. Dispatches, ix. p. 277.

[416] The itinerary of this march in detail may be found in the excellent Diary of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons.

[417] Foy, who had been drawn away from the Tagus after the affair at Almaraz, had to march from Avila, Clausel from Peñaranda, Ferey from Valladolid, Sarrut from Toro, Maucune and Brennier had been at Salamanca, Thomières came from Zamora. Boyer’s dragoons were at Toro and Benavente, Curto’s light cavalry division had been with Maucune and Brennier at Salamanca. Valladolid, Avila, and Benavente were the most distant points: but the troops from them were all up by the 19th. Nor was it possible for Wellington to interfere with the concentration, though possibly he might have forced Foy from Avila to make a détour, if he had followed Marmont very close.

[418] Nor do we reckon the regiment of Sarrut’s division (130th) permanently detached at Santander.

[419] See tables of the armies of both sides in the [Appendix no. IX].

[420] See Caffarelli to Marmont of June 10 and June 14th in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 408-10.

[421] Jourdan to Marmont, June 14th, in Mémoires, iv. pp. 411-12.

[422] Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 162.

[423] Jones, Sieges, i. p. 269.

[424] At any rate Dickson was not, as he was with the howitzers that were coming up from Elvas, and had not started from Rodrigo with the army.

[425] Burgoyne’s diary in his Life, i. p. 192.

[426] Letter of F. Monro, R.A., lent me by his representative. See Fortnightly Review for July 1912.

[427] Nos. 2 and 3 in the map respectively.

[428] Of course a few rounds more for the howitzers could have been borrowed from the field-batteries with the divisions. For the 18-pounders, the really important guns, there was no such resource for borrowing.

[429] Acting vice G. Anson, absent.

[430] The 68th lost four officers and 46 men killed and wounded, and one officer taken prisoner. For a good account of the fight see the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, pp. 89-90.

[431] See Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 165.

[432] Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 166.

[433] Wellington to Liverpool, Salamanca, June 25, in Dispatches, ix. p. 252.

[434] The first two were great fire-eaters, and always urged action.

[435] Foy’s Vie militaire, ed. Girod de l’Ain, pp. 165-6.

[436] The 51st lost 3 killed and an officer and 20 men wounded: the 68th 2 killed and 6 wounded, the K.G.L. Light Battalions 3 killed and 3 officers and 17 men wounded. There are narratives of the combat in the Memoirs of Green of the 68th, and Major Rice and Private Wheeler of the 51st.

[437] Marmont to Joseph, night of the 22nd June, from bivouac before San Cristobal. Intercepted dispatch in the Scovell Papers.

[438] Jones, i. p. 281.

[439] The regimental history of the 53rd says that the ladders were so badly made, of green wood, that many of them came to pieces in the hands of their carriers long before they got near the fort.

[440] The loss has got exaggerated in many reports, because the casualties in the 7th Division at Morisco on the preceding day are added to the total.

[441] See above, [p. 370].

[442] I find the name Ribera de Pelagarcia only in the more modern Spanish maps: contemporary plans do not give it.

[443] Tomkinson, p. 170: ‘Just before they began to retire, I thought that their advance looked serious. Our position was good, and if they had fought with what had crossed, our force would have been the greater.’

[444] This is one of the many cipher dispatches in the Scovell Papers, which I have found so illuminating in a period when Marmont’s writings, printed or in the French archives, are very few.

[445] Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, i. p. 285.

[446] The total given by the governor to Warre of Beresford’s staff (see his Letters, ed. Dr. Warre, p. 270) were 3 officers and 40 men killed, 11 officers and 140 men wounded. Martinien’s lists show 12 officers hit, 5 in the 65th, 2 each in the 15th and 17th Léger, 1 each in 86th, artillery, and engineers. But these admirable lists are not quite complete.

[447] This is said to have been the result of the escort’s smoking round the store!

[448] Printed in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 410.

[449] If Marmont had marched for Alba de Tormes on the 28th, as he intended to do, Wellington would have had the 6th Division in hand, as well as the rest of his troops, for a battle on the 29th: for the forts fell early on the 27th June.

[450] See his explanation of his intentions in Mémoires, iv. pp. 219-20.

[451] In this dispatch and that of July 6 following, Marmont seems to understate his own force at the moment, saying that he can dispose of only 30,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry or a trifle over. Allowing for the artillery, engineers and sappers, gendarmerie and train, which the monthly returns show, this would give an army of some 35,000 or 36,000 in all. But the returns (see [Appendix]) indicate a higher figure for the infantry; after all deductions for detachments, garrisons, and sick have been made, it looks as if there must have been 33,000 or even 34,000 available. Generals with a ‘point to prove’ are always a little easy with their figures.

[452] This is again one of the Scovell intercepted cipher-dispatches, captured and brought to Wellington a day or two after it was written. It was a duplicate, and presumably the other copy reached Madrid.

[453] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 25. Dispatches, ix. pp. 253-4, and to Hill, ix. pp. 256-7, and again to Lord Liverpool, ix. pp. 261-2.

[454] See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 18. Dispatches, ix. p. 241, and June 25, p. 253. There was also in Wellington’s hands an intercepted letter of Joseph to Soult of May 26, distinctly saying that if Marmont is attacked in June, D’Erlon must pass the Tagus and go to his help. This is in the Scovell ciphers.

[455] Wellington to Hill, July 11. Dispatches, ix. p. 281. The idea that Joseph might operate on his own account begins to emerge in the correspondence on the 14th. Dispatches, ix. p. 283.

[456] By no fault of his own, according to D’Urban. The orders for him to move were, by some delay at head-quarters, only forthcoming on June 8th. Only two of the four Tras-os-Montes militia regiments were then mobilized, and it took a long time to collect the rest and the transport needed for moving across the frontier.

[457] D’Urban’s manœuvres on both sides of the Douro are detailed at great length in his very interesting diary, and his official correspondence, both of which have been placed at my disposal. He worked on both sides of the Douro, but went definitely north of it after July 1.

[458] Two battalions of 23rd Léger and one of 1st Line from Thomières’s division.

[459] For the curious story of their ignorance of their own resources see Sir Howard Douglas’s Life, pp. 156-7.

[460] Dispatches, ix. p. 274.

[461] Ibid., ix. p. 276.

[462] An interesting dispatch from D’Urban to Beresford describes the information he had got on the 5th by a daring reconnaissance along Marmont’s rear: there was not that morning any French force west of Monte de Cubillos, six miles down-stream from Pollos.

[463] Ninety-four to be exact. See 28th Chasseurs in table of Marmont’s army in [Appendix].

[464] The 122nd Line had been in Mermet’s division, in January 1809, but they had been in reserve at Corunna, and had not fired a shot in that battle.

[465] Mémoires of Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger, pp. 177-8.

[466] Wellington to Bathurst. Dispatches, ix. p. 284.

[467] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s Mémoires, iv. p. 417.

[468] Ibid., pp. 421-2.

[469] He sent finally only two regiments, not three as he had originally promised.

[470] Caffarelli to Marmont, in the latter’s Mémoires, iv. p. 425, announcing their departure.

[471] Original is in the Scovell ciphers. It seems to be unpublished.

[472] They are both in the Scovell ciphers, and quoted above, [p. 370].

[473] Joseph to Marmont, June 18, in Ducasse’s Correspondance, ix. pp. 28-39.

[474] Two battalions, the 1/38 and 1/5th, joined before the battle of the 22nd, bringing up the total force by 1,500 bayonets more.

[475] See the letter of Clarke to Marmont enclosing the Emperor’s indictment, in Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. pp. 453-4.

[476] See Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 68.

[477] See Dispatches, ix. p. 294.

[478] Wellington to Clinton, July 16, 7 a.m. Dispatches, ix. p. 291.

[479] See report of one of the officers commanding patrols, Tomkinson of the 16th L.D. in the latter’s Memoirs, p. 180.

[480] Belonging one to the cavalry, the other to the Light Division.

[481] Tomkinson, p. 188.

[482] Compare Tomkinson’s narrative of this incident (pp. 180-1) with Napier’s vivid and well-told tale (iv. pp. 254-5). Both agree that the French were inferior in numbers to the two squadrons, and that there was deplorable confusion.

[483] See Vere’s Marches and Movements of the 4th Division, p. 28. Napier’s statement that the Light Division was more exposed than the 4th or 5th during the retreat, seems to be discounted by the fact that it had not one man killed or wounded—the 5th Division had only two (in the 3rd Royal Scots), the 4th Division over 200; and though most of them fell in the last charge, a good number were hit in the retreat.

[484] Vere’s Marches and Movements of the 4th Division, p. 28.

[485] Brotherton of the 14th L.D. says with the right échelon advanced (Hamilton’s History of the 14th, p. 107), but I fancy that the German Hussars’ version that the left échelon led is correct, as the right squadron of their regiment would have been in the middle of the brigade, not on a flank. See narrative in Schwertfeger, i. pp. 368-9.

[486] These are the official returns. The regimental histories give only 45 and 56 respectively.

Martinien’s lists show six casualties in officers in the two French regiments, and two more were taken prisoners, General Carrié and a lieutenant of the 25th Dragoons.

[487] Brotherton says that the first two squadrons which charged the French dragoons made no impression, and that it was the impact of the third, led by himself, which broke them.

[488] This was the 25th Léger.

[489] The exact figures, save for officers, are as usual missing. But Martinien’s invaluable lists show that of 41 French officers killed, wounded, or taken that day, 35 belonged to the four infantry regiments (17th and 25th Léger, 22nd and 65th Line) and the two cavalry regiments (15th and 25th Dragoons) which fought at Castrillo.

[490] For dismay expressed by Wellington at this news see dispatches to Henry Wellesley dated Rueda, July 15, and to Lord Bathurst (Dispatches, ix. pp. 285 and 287).

[491] See Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, ix. p. 290.

[492] Not July 17th, as Napier says. D’Urban’s diary proves that he recrossed the Douro on the 18th.

[493] He left one squadron near Zamora, to serve as covering cavalry for Silveira’s militia, who remained waiting for Santocildes’s advance, which they were to observe and support. His force was therefore reduced to 700 men.

[494] He adds in his Mémoires, iv. pp. 251-2, that if he had not succeeded in getting ahead of Wellington’s van, he had a counter-project of trying to get round his rear, but the British marched so exactly parallel with him that he got no chance of this.

[495] Marmont describes the formation (Mémoires, iv. p. 252) as ‘gauche en tête, par peloton, à distance entière: les deux lignes pouvaient être formées en un instant par à droite en bataille.’

[496] There is an excellent description of the parallel march in Leith Hay, ii. pp. 38-40, as well as in Napier.

[497] This swerve and its consequence are best stated in Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 30.

[498] Marmont says that if he had possessed a superior cavalry he could have made great captures, but he dared attempt nothing for want of sufficient numbers: he alleges that he took 300 stragglers—certainly an exaggeration as the British returns show very few ‘missing.’ Mémoires, iv. p. 233.

[499] The heavy cavalry in the British army were still wearing the old cocked hat, the new-pattern helmet with crest was not served out till 1813. The light dragoons were still wearing the black-japanned leather headdress with the low fur crest: in 1813 they got shakos, much too like those of French chasseurs.

[500] Napier says that this move was made on the night of the 20th, under cover of the smoke of the already-lighted camp-fires of the army. This is contradicted by Vere’s journal of march of the 4th Division, by Leith Hay’s Journal [’at daylight we marched to the Heights of San Cristoval’], by Tomkinson’s diary, and D’Urban, Geo. Simonds, and many others who speak of the move as being early on the 21st.

[501] This was the division of Sarrut.

[502] That the British cavalry were still at dawn so far forward as Calvarisa de Abaxo is shown by Tomkinson’s diary (p. 185), the best possible authority for light cavalry matters. The 4th Division camped in the wood just west of Nuestra Señora de la Peña (Vere, p. 31), the 5th on high ground in rear of Calvarisa de Ariba (Leith Hay, p. 45), the 7th a little farther south, also in woody ground (diary of Wheeler of the 51st).

[503] Leith Hay, ii. p. 46.

[504] Diary of Green of the 68th, p. 98.

[505] Marmont to Berthier, July 31, printed in Mémoires, iv. p. 443.

[506] Marmont, Mémoires, iv. p. 237.

[507] Dispatches, ix. p. 299, July 21st.

[508] Wellington to Bathurst, July 24. Dispatches, ix. p. 300.

[509] Again from dispatch to Bathurst, July 21st. Dispatches, ix. p. 296.

[510] Supposing it, apparently, to be over 1,000 strong, while it was really not 800 sabres.

[511] Vie militaire, edited by Girod de l’Ain, p. 173.

[512] Correspondence in Mémoires, iv. p. 254.

[513] Foy, p. 174.

[514] So says Vere, in his Marches of the 4th Division, p. 31.

[515] Marmont, Mémoires, iv. p. 255.

[516] Clausel, Brennier, Maucune, Thomières, and Sarrut also, when the latter arrived late from Babila Fuente, and joined the main body.

[517] A K.G.L. unit—the only German artillery present at Salamanca.

[518] All this from Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 32.

[519] From the 14th Light Dragoons.

[520] The hours are taken from D’Urban’s diary.

[521] Tomkinson’s Diary, pp. 187-9.

[522] Marmont, Mémoires, iv. p. 256.

[523] Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry), who had held the post for the last three years had just gone home, and his successor had not yet come out to Spain.

[524] The note concerning Delancey is from Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 31.

[525] Mémoires, iv. p. 257.

[526] Dispatch to Berthier, Mémoires, iv. pp. 445-6.

[527] Jourdan’s Mémoire sur la Guerre d’Espagne, p. 418.

[528] ‘Il y a plus de fatras et de rouages que dans une horloge, et pas un mot qui fasse connaître l’état réel des choses.’ For more hard words see Napoleon to Clarke, Ghiatz, September 2.

[529] See Memoirs of Parquin, who commanded his escort, p. 299. But he states the hour as 11 o’clock, much too early.

[530] For this artillery business see especially the six narratives of artillery officers printed by Major Leslie in his Dickson Papers, ii. pp. 685-97. Also for doings of the 5th Division battery (Lawson’s), Leith Hay, ii. pp. 47-8, and of the 4th Division battery (Sympher’s), Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, pp. 33-4.

[531] Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 33.

[532] The traditional story may be found in Greville’s Memoirs, ii. p. 39. Wellington is said to have been in the courtyard of a farmhouse, where some food had been laid out for him, ‘stumping about and munching,’ and taking occasional peeps through his telescope. Presently came the aide-de-camp with Leith’s message. Wellington took another long look through his glass, and cried, ‘By God! that will do!’ his mouth still full. He then sprang on his horse and rode off, the staff following. Another version may be found in Grattan, pp. 239-40: ‘Lord W. had given his glass to an aide-de-camp, while he himself sat down to eat a few mouthfuls of cold beef. Presently the officer reported that the enemy were still extending to their left. “The devil they are! give me the glass quickly,” said his lordship—and then, after a long inspection, “This will do at last, I think—ride off.”’

[533] His nephew, Leith Hay, whose memoir I have so often had to quote, here ii. p. 49.

[534] D’Urban’s unpublished diary gives the fact that he got his order from Wellington personally before Pakenham was reached.

[535] Grattan’s With the Connaught Rangers, pp. 241-2.

[536] Two of 14th Light Dragoons, three of 1st Hussars K.G.L.

[537] All this from Leith Hay, ii. pp. 51-2.

[538] Marmont says that it was ‘environ trois heures du soir.’ But I think that about 3.45 should be given as the hour, since Maucune only left the woods at 2 o’clock, and had to march on to the plateau, to take up his position, to send out his voltigeurs, and to get them close in to Arapiles before he would have sent such a message to his chief. Foy says ‘between 3 and 4 p.m.’

[539] Many years after, when Marmont, now a subject of Louis XVIII, was inspecting some British artillery, an officer had the maladroit idea of introducing to him the sergeant who had pointed the gun—the effect of the shot in the middle of the French staff had been noticed on the British Arapile.

[540] Vie militaire de Foy, p. 177.

[541] Marmont to Berthier, Mémoires, iv. p. 468.

[542] Ibid., ‘la gauche eut été formée en moins d’un quart d’heure’!

[543] The exact moment of Marmont’s wound is very difficult to fix, as also that of Wellington’s attack. The Marshal himself (as mentioned above, p.438) says that he was hit ‘environ les trois heures,’ and that Leith and Cole advanced ‘peu après, sur les quatre heures.’ Foy places the wound merely ‘between 3 and 4 p.m.’ Parquin, who commanded Marmont’s escort of chasseurs, says that the Marshal had been carried back to Alba de Tormes by 4 o’clock—impossibly early. On the other hand Napier gives too late an hour, when saying that Marmont was wounded only at the moment when Leith and Cole advanced, 4.45 or so, and was running down from the Arapile because of their movement. This is, I imagine, much too late. But it is supported by Victoires et Conquêtes, sometimes a well-documented work but often inaccurate, which places the unlucky shot at 4.30. Grattan places the order to the British infantry (Leith and Cole) to prepare to attack at 4.20—Leith Hay at ‘at least an hour after 3 o’clock.’ Gomm, on the other hand, makes Wellington move ‘at 3 o’clock in the afternoon.’ Tomkinson (usually very accurate) places Pakenham’s and Leith’s success at ‘about 5 p.m.’ D’Urban thinks that he met Lord Wellington and received his orders after 4 p.m.—probably he is half an hour too late in his estimate.

[544] Wellington in his dispatch (ix. p. 302) speaks of the four columns, D’Urban makes it clear that his own squadrons formed the outer two, but the fact that Power’s Portuguese followed Wallace in the 3rd column only emerges in the Regimental History of the 45th (Dalbiac), p. 103. This is quite consistent with the other information.

[545] All this from D’Urban’s unpublished narrative in the D’Urban papers.

[546] All this is from D’Urban’s narrative, and letters from Colonel Watson to D’Urban. The colonel bitterly resented Napier’s account of the charge (Peninsular War, iv. p. 268).

[547] The division was marching left in front, so that the senior regiment was in the rear. The fourth unit of the division (23rd Léger) was absent, garrisoning Astorga, as was also the 2nd battalion of the 1st, which was a very strong four-battalion corps. Hence there were only 8 battalions out of 11 present, or 4,300 men out of 6,200.

[548] It is not certain that the whole of the rear regiment (the 1st Line) was in the group: possibly one or two of its battalions were not yet on the ground.

[549] Grattan, p. 245.

[550] The 1/5th lost 126 men, more than any other 3rd Division regiment except the 88th. Sergeant Morley of the 5th, its only Salamanca diarist, writes (p. 113): ‘There was a pause—a hesitation. Here I blush—but I should blush more if I were guilty of a falsehood. We retired—slowly, in good order, not far, not 100 paces. General Pakenham approached, and very good-naturedly said “re-form,” and after a moment “advance—there they are, my lads—let them feel the temper of your bayonets.” We advanced—rather slowly at first, a regiment of dragoons which had retired with us again accompanying ... and took our retribution for our repulse.’ The dragoon regiment was presumably part of D’Urban’s brigade.

[551] This comes from the report of Arentschildt on the doings of his brigade: it is not mentioned by Napier, nor is there anything about it in Wellington’s dispatch. The time is fixed by Arentschildt speaking of it as ‘during the attack on the first hill.’ He says that he closed with the main body of the French horse and drove it off.

[552] The losses in officers of the three regiments were, taking killed and wounded only, not unwounded prisoners, 25 for the 101st, 15 for the 62nd, 5 for the 1st, by Martinien’s lists. The British returns of prisoners sent to England, at the Record Office, show 6 officers from the 101st, 2 from the 62nd, and 1 from the 1st, received after the battle. I presume that nearly all the wounded, both officers and rank and file, count among the prisoners. The 1st entered in its regimental report 176 tués ou pris, 22 blessés, 29 disparus: here the only people who got away would be the 22 blessés. The regimental return of the 101st shows 31 officers wanting—which seems to correspond to the 25 killed and wounded plus the 6 prisoners sent to England.

[553] All this from Leith Hay, ii. p. 53. The 1/38th had joined from Lisbon only twelve hours back.

[554] This is proved by the narrative of the Brunswick captain, Wachholz, who commanded the company of that corps attached to the Fusilier brigade.

[555] Leith Hay, ii. pp. 57-8.

[556] See Le Marchant’s Life, from notes supplied by his son, in Cole’s Peninsular Generals, ii. p. 281.

[557] Life of Le Marchant, p. 285.

[558] Life of Le Marchant, pp. 286-7.

[559] Le Marchant was also an admirable artist in water colours. I saw many of his pleasing sketches of Peninsular landscapes when his grandson, Sir Henry Le Marchant, allowed me to look through his correspondence and notes.

[560] See [p. 277] above.

[561] I have read with respect his admirable letters to his family. ‘I never go into battle,’ he said, ‘without subjecting myself to a strict self-examination: when, having (as I hope) humbly made my peace with God, I leave the result in His hands, with perfect confidence that He will determine what is best for me.’

[562] It is vexatious to find that neither the 22nd nor the 66th was among the fourteen Salamanca regiments of which detailed casualty lists survive. The 15th Line returned 15 officers and 359 men as their loss. Martinien’s tables show 21 officers lost in the 22nd, and 17 in the 66th. The deficits of these two regiments as shown by the muster-rolls of August 1 were respectively about 750 and 500, but these do not represent their total losses, as all the regiments present at the battle had picked up many men at their dépôts at Valladolid, and from the small evacuated posts, before August 1, e.g. the 15th had 52 officers present on July 15, lost 15 at Salamanca, but showed 46 present on August 1; 9 officers must have joined from somewhere in the interim. So the 66th had 38 officers present on July 15, lost 17, but showed 34 present on August 1. Thirteen more must have arrived, and accompanied of course by the corresponding rank and file.

[563] The regiments of Maucune’s brigade, which did not get caught in the cavalry charge (82nd and 86th), lost only 8 and 3 officers respectively, as against the 15 and 17 lost by the 66th and 15th. Of Brennier’s division the 22nd Line had 21 casualties among officers, while the 65th and 17th Léger had only 3 and 9 respectively.

[564] So Parquin of the 13th Chasseurs in his Mémoires, p. 302. The only other red-coated dragoons in Wellington’s army, Bock’s brigade, were far away to the left.

[565] Arentschildt reports that his and D’Urban’s men were all mixed and busy with the French infantry, when the French hussars charged in, and that he rallied, to beat them off, a body composed mostly of his own Germans, but with Portuguese and 14th Light Dragoons among them.

[566] The moment is fixed by Wachholz, who says that he looked at his watch, to fix the hour.

[567] This was the 122nd (three battalions), of Bonnet’s division, which Marmont says (see above, [p. 430]) that he had placed as a connecting-link between the Arapile and the troops on the plateau.

[568] All this from the journal of Chas. Synge, Pack’s aide-de-camp, who was with the caçadores, and was desperately wounded at the bank, in the first clash. It was printed in the Nineteenth Century for July 1912.

[569] See Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 36.

[570] All this from Wachholz, who was now with the 7th Fusiliers.

[571] See Vere’s Marches of the 4th Division, p. 36. The 3/27th on top of the hill was not brought forward, as some wrongly say.

[572] This from Wachholz’s narrative, very clearly explained. The Fusiliers were not relieved by the advance of the 1/40th and 3/27th, as some authorities state.

[573] The 122nd lost 21 officers and 508 men, the 118th and 119th probably as many or more—they had respectively 20 and 26 officers hit. The 120th, the regiment on the Great Arapile, lost only 8 officers—but 580 men, an almost inexplicable disproportion. The 118th claimed to have taken a flag—perhaps one of the 7th Portuguese Caçadores, who were badly cut up when Bonnet first advanced.

[574] The losses of three of Clausel’s four regiments chance to have been preserved—the 25th Léger lost 16 officers and 322 men: the 27th Ligne 7 officers and 159 men: the 59th Ligne 17 officers and 253 men. The 50th, which had 26 officers hit, must have had more casualties than any of the other three, so the total divisional loss must have been well over 1,200. But Bonnet’s division, much worse mauled, lost at least 2,200.

[575] This is stated by Napier, iv. p. 273, and seems reasonable. See also Tomkinson, p. 186.

[576] The losses in Campbell’s Guards’ brigade (62 men) were in the companies which defended the village of Arapiles earlier in the day—those in his line brigade (Wheatley’s) were trifling—16 wounded and no killed. The K.G.L. brigade lost 60 or so, all in the light companies, during the advance.

[577] All this from Lemonnier-Delafosse of Ferey’s division, pp. 158-9.

[578] But not on the best authority: regimental diaries are not always safe to follow on such points.

[579] Ross Lewin of the 32nd, ii. pp. 25-6.

[580] Grattan, p. 253.

[581] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 159. This note about Ferey’s being slain outright does not agree with the usual statement that he was mortally wounded, and died two days later, given by several English diarists. But Lemonnier-Delafosse is first-hand authority.

[582] Lemonnier-Delafosse, pp. 161-2.

[583] Ferey’s four regiments probably lost somewhat over 1,100 men—the 31st Léger had 380 casualties, the 47th Ligne (with 18 officers killed and wounded) something like 500; the 70th suffered least, it returned only 111 casualties; the 26th slightly more, perhaps 150. The whole forms a moderate total, considering the work done.

[584] Tomkinson (of Anson’s brigade), p. 187.

[585] Tomkinson in his diary (p. 188) has a curious story to the effect that ‘the Spanish general, before the action, asked if he should not take his troops out of Alba—after he had done it. Lord Wellington replied, “Certainly not,” and the Don was afraid to tell what he had done, Lord W. therefore acted, of course, as if the place had been in our possession still.’

[586] Foy, Vie militaire, pp. 176-7.

[587] This cavalry may have been the two detached squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, which had not followed the rest of Arentschildt’s brigade to the right.

[588] See Schwertfeger’s History of the German Legion, i. p. 378.

[589] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 164.

[590] Marmont to Berthier, Tudela, July 31, in his Mémoires, iv. p. 448.

[591] See vol. iv. p. 295.

[592] viz. killed or prisoners—officers 162, men 3,867; wounded—officers 232, men 7,529; traînards, 645 men; 12 guns and 2 eagles missing. This return is in the Paris archives. It is certainly incomplete: 60 officers were killed, 137 prisoners, which makes 197 tués ou pris instead of 162. And 20 guns were lost.

[593] A regiment whose 1st battalion was elsewhere carried not an eagle but a simple standard per battalion instead. Of such regiments, wanting their senior battalion and therefore their eagle, there were with Marmont three. Two, the 66th and 82nd, were in Maucune’s division, one, the 26th, in Ferey’s. The colours probably belonged to some of these, of which several were much cut up, especially the 66th.

[594] The returns of the Army of Portugal show a deficiency of 20 guns between July 15 and August 1, of which 12 represent the divisional batteries of Thomières and Bonnet, which have completely disappeared. Wellington says, ‘official returns account for only 11 guns taken, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands.’ This was correct.

[595] The deficiency in cavalry rank and file shown by the muster rolls between July 15 and August 1 was 512.

[596] Perhaps more: for the Reserve Artillery and Park alone show 1,450 rank and file on July 15 and only 707 on August 1.

[597] Sixty-three officers arrived in England as the Salamanca batch of prisoners; of these some were wounded, for their names occur both in Martinien’s tables as blessés, and in the Transport Office returns at the Record Office as prisoners shipped off. The remainder of the 137 were badly wounded, and came later, or died in hospital.

[598] The 7th Division would have had practically no loss but for the skirmishing in the early morning near Nuestra Señora de la Peña, and the heaviest item in the 1st Division casualties was the 62 men of the Guards’ flank-companies who were hit while defending the village of Arapiles.

[599] Cotton was shot after the battle was over by a caçador sentry, whose challenge to halt he had disregarded while riding back from the pursuit.

[600] Diary in Vie militaire, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p. 178.

[601] Il a joué serré. This idiom is explained in the Dictionary of the Academy as ‘jouer sans rien hasarder.’

[602] Note in same volume, p. 177.

[603] See Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 190. He gives the three roads used as (1) Alba, Mancera de Abaxo, Junialcon; (2) Alba, Garcia Hernandez, Peñaranda; (3) Encina, Zorita, Cebolla [names all badly spelled]. It is doubtful whether the troops on the last road were not disorderly masses of fugitives only. The bulk of the army certainly went by Peñaranda.

[604] See vol. iii. p. 255.

[605] I took the trouble to work out the names from the immense list of prisoners at the Record Office, in order to test the truth of the statement that the whole battalion was captured. The following names appear from the 76th—Bailly, Cavie, Catrin, Demarest, Denis, Duclos, Dupin, Dupont, Dusan, Gautier, Guimblot, L’Huissier, Richard, Ravenal, besides two wounded officers, Lambert and Martinot. In addition, one officer (Lebert) was killed, and in Martinien’s Liste des officiers tués et blessés we have five more down as wounded, Dessessard, Lanzavecchia, Massibot, Norry, Rossignol. These may have died of their wounds, and so never have reached England; or they may have escaped, though wounded. The twenty-two names must represent practically the whole of the officers of the battalion.

[606] All this from Schwertfeger, i. p. 381.

[607] Foy, Guerre de la Péninsule, i. pp. 290-1.

[608] I have used for the narrative of this interesting fight not only the numerous and valuable K.G.L. sources printed or quoted by Beamish and Schwertfeger, but the letters of von Hodenberg, aide-de-camp to Bock, lent me by his representative, Major von Hodenberg, now resident in Hanover. For this officer’s interesting career see Blackwood for May 1912, where I published large sections from these letters.

[609] Their names were the colonel, Molard (who died, a prisoner, of his wounds, August 4), Baudart, Paulin, Piancet, Turpin, Paris, Bouteille; they were verified in the prisoners-rolls at the Record Office by me.

[610] Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 191.

[611] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, night of July 24. Dispatches, ix. p. 309.

[612] Tomkinson, p. 191.

[613] Clausel to King Joseph from Arevalo. Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. p. 54.

[614] Already on the day of Salamanca there were eight battalions in the army with less than 400 men present. See the tables in [Appendix].

[615] See chapter v above, [pp. 394-5].

[616] Joseph to Soult, Madrid, June 30. Correspondence of Joseph, ix. p. 42.

[617] Correspondence of Joseph, ix. pp. 44-5.

[618] Joseph to Clarke, July 13, Correspondence, ix. p. 45.

[619] For d’Erlon’s letter see Joseph to Clarke of July 17th; Correspondence, ix. p. 48.

[620] This date is fixed by a letter of Joseph to Marmont, of that day, in the Scovell ciphers. It never got to Marmont.

[621] Jourdan in his Mémoires (p. 419) says that the concentration took place on the 17th, but Joseph’s letter to Clarke of July 18 says that Treillard’s dragoons would only reach Naval Carnero on the 19th, which is conclusive.

[622] All this from Vacani, vi. p. 110, where the movements of Palombini are very carefully detailed.

[623] Maupoint’s letter to the King, announcing his arrival at Madrid on the 29th-30th July, was captured by guerrilleros, and is in the Scovell collection of ciphers.

[624] Which falls into the Adaja near Olmedo, twenty miles south of Valladolid.

[625] Clausel to Joseph, Correspondance, ix. pp. 54-5.

[626] ‘Certainement, c’était le meilleur,’ says Jourdan, commenting on the choice years after.

[627] For this business see Hamilton’s History of the 14th Light Dragoons, p. 109. The leader of the patrol, a Corporal Hanley of that regiment, had only eight men, but surprised the chasseurs in an inn, and bluffed them into surrender.

[628] See Wellington to Hill of July 26. Dispatches, ix. p. 314. The Soult letter is in the Scovell collection of ciphers.

[629] For details, see Tomkinson, p. 192.

[630] See von Hodenberg’s letter concerning this in Blackwood for June 1912.

[631] Printed in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 46-7.

[632] On the next day, August 2, the letter came to hand at Galapagar.

[633] Soult to Joseph, Correspondance, ix. pp. 45-7.

[634] Berthier to Marmont—writing from the Emperor’s personal direction—of February 18th, 1812, printed in Marmont’s Correspondence, iv. p. 332.

[635] Joseph to Soult of 29 July and August 2, Correspondence, ix. pp. 60-1.

[636] Wellington to Bathurst, Olmedo, July 28: ‘I think it probable that they [the Army of Portugal] will endeavour to join the King on the Upper Douro, if the King should continue on this side of the mountains, unless I should previously have it in my power to strike a blow against his corps.’

[637] This was the term that D’Urban used when describing, on July 30, the position of the French.

[638] Apparently two battalions of the Baden regiment, some Juramentados, and a regiment of dragoons, about 1,800 men.

[639] All these details are from dispatches of Wellington to D’Urban in the unpublished D’Urban papers, dated between July 30 and August 2, or from D’Urban’s report to Wellington.

[640] See above, [p. 408].

[641] See Dispatches, ix. p. 320.

[642] Ibid., p. 321.

[643] Wellington to Maitland, Cuellar, August 3rd, Dispatches, ix. p. 327.

[644] Wellington to Bathurst, Dispatches, ix. p. 370.

[645] Letter in Sidney’s Life of Hill, p. 211.

[646] viz. the 2/4th, 1/5th, 1/38th, 1/42nd, which had arrived in time for the battle of Salamanca, the 1/38th on the very battle morning, and the 1/82nd which came up after the battle. They were all Walcheren regiments: 1/82nd came from Gibraltar, 2/4th from Ceuta, the other three from England direct. The 1/5th and 2/82nd went on to Madrid in September.

[647] Wellington to Bathurst, Cuellar, August 4. Dispatches, ix. p. 339.

[648] Memorandum for General Clinton, to be communicated to General Santocildes. Dispatches, ix. pp. 344-6.

[649] It is curious to find that while in the ‘Memorandum’ of August 4 Wellington states that it is ‘not very probable’ that Clausel will move, in a letter to Santocildes sent off the very next day, he remarks that an advance from Burgos into the kingdom of Leon, to relieve Astorga, is ‘most likely.’ I fancy that the former was his real opinion, and that the latter was spoken of with some stress in the directions to Santocildes, mainly because Wellington wished to impress on the Spaniard the duty of being cautious and retiring to the Esla without offering battle.

[650] The 1st and 7th Divisions alone were up to their usual strength. The 4th and Light Divisions were still showing very weak battalions, owing to their dreadful Badajoz losses; and the former had also suffered very severely (1,000 casualties) at Salamanca. The 5th and 3rd had comparatively moderate casualties at each of these fights, but the combination of the two successive sets of losses had reduced them very considerably.

[651] Dyneley’s diary in R. A. Journal, vol. xxiii. p. 454.

[652] Many of the brigades did not march through Segovia, but by crossroads around it: steep gradients and fatigue were thereby avoided. One route was by the deserted palace of Rio Frio, an old royal hunting-box.

[653] All this from D’Urban’s unpublished diary, as are also most of the details about the movements of the troops.

[654] Reiset’s Souvenirs, ii. pp. 358-60.

[655] The surrender-rolls show that there were also some small leavings of Marmont’s troops in the Retiro, notably from the 50th Line [of which there were no less than six officers]. Of the Army of the South the 12th and 27th Léger, and 45th and 51st Line were strongly represented.

[656] Treillard calls them only les lanciers in his report. Dyneley in his narrative calls them Polish lancers, but they were really the Westphalian Chevaux-légers-lanciers of the Army of the Centre.

[657] This was a squadron of the 11th, whose other squadron formed the reserve.

[658] Reizenstein and Marshalk.

[659] Colonel Lobo: the other colonel (the Visconde de Barbaçena) who was taken, had been so severely wounded that the French left him behind.

[660] Three in the 19th Dragoons, one in the 22nd, one in the Italian regiment. Oddly enough, of seventeen officers in the casualty list, only one (a chef d’escadron of the 13th) was killed. The sabre disables, but does not usually slay outright.

[661] Dispatches, ix. p. 354.

[662] There are very full narratives of Majalahonda to be got from D’Urban’s correspondence, Reiset’s memoirs, and the letters of Dyneley, who was lucky enough to escape a few days later and rejoin his troop. Schwertfeger’s History of the German Legion gives the facts about the part taken by the K.G.L. Light Battalion, whose service Wellington ignored in his dispatch—wrongly stating that it was not engaged. Treillard’s dispatch is a fine piece of exaggeration, but useful as giving the official French view of the affair.

[663] Dispatches, ix. p. 351.

[664] Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, p. 27.

[665] To Lord Bathurst, August 13. Dispatches, ix. 355.

[666] The second eagle is in error described in Wellington’s dispatch as that of the 13th—which was in Russia at the time.

[667] For the ‘siege’ of the Retiro see (besides the official sources) Burgoyne’s Diary, i. pp. 208-9, and the narratives of Green of the 68th and Wheeler of the 51st. For the use of the French uniforms see the Dickson Papers, ed. Major Leslie, ii. pp. 738-9.

[668] Grattan’s With the Connaught Rangers, p. 275.

[669] Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, Dispatches, ix. p. 169, same to same of June 1, Dispatches, ix. p. 197, Wellington to Hill (June 6th), Dispatches, ix. p. 215, and more especially the last paragraph of Wellington to Henry Wellesley of June 7th, Dispatches, ix. p. 219, and same to same of June 10th, Dispatches, ix. p. 224.

[670] To quote Wellington’s own rather heavy but quite explicit phrases: ‘I am certain that the enemy will move into Estremadura upon Hill, as soon as it is known that I have moved: and I hope everything will then be done by Ballasteros, and the Army of Murcia, and the troops in Cadiz, to divert the enemy from their intentions upon Hill.’ And, on the other hand, in a letter differing in date from that first cited by three days, ‘The Spanish government have desired that in case of a movement by Marshal Soult on General Ballasteros, General Hill should make a movement to divert his attention from Ballasteros. I have directed this movement, in the notion that the Conde de Villemur [the Spanish commander in Estremadura] will also co-operate in it.’ The see-saw of alternate distractions is clearly laid down—but Ballasteros (as usual) proved a difficult factor to manage.

[671] 9th Léger, 96th Ligne, a battalion of the 16th Léger, and the 5th Chasseurs.

[672] Figures in Los Ejércitos españoles, p. 128.

[673] Possibly more—the casualty list of officers in Martinien’s admirable tables is very heavy—9 officers hit in the 9th Léger, 13 in the 96th Ligne, 3 in the 16th Léger, 5 in the 5th Chasseurs à cheval. Thirty officers hit might very probably (but not certainly) mean 600 casualties in all.

[674] See vol. iv. pp. 187 and 437.

[675] See Ainslie’s History of the 1st Royals, p. 133.

[676] Including one officer killed and four wounded.

[677] See Slade’s report in Dispatches, ix. pp. 242-3. Tomkinson (p. 174) says that Slade’s report to Cotton, commanding the cavalry, was ‘the best I ever saw. He made mention of his son having stained his maiden sword!’

[678] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, ix. p. 238.

[679] Letters of D’Erlon to Jourdan on June 9th, and of Soult to King Joseph June 12, copies from the Paris archives—lent me by Mr. Fortescue.

[680] In this report (the copy of which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) Drouet says that Soult had told him to expect reinforcements to the total of some 15,000 men, but that Barrois brought him only 3,500 infantry and 1,500 horse, and Daricau 4,500 infantry and 1,000 horse, so that his reinforcements were only 10,500 men instead of 15,000. Drouet stated his own force, horse and foot (his own division and Lallemand’s cavalry) in a preceding letter of June 9th at 6,000 of all arms, so that the concentration would only give 16,000 men. I fancy that he is deliberately understating Barrois, for that general had 7,000 men in March, and 5,000 still in October at the end of a long and fatiguing campaign, and Pierre Soult too. Drouet’s object in giving these figures to Joseph was to prove that he was so weak that he could make no detachment towards the Tagus, as the King had directed him to do. Was it for the same purpose that he always over-stated Hill’s army? Or did he really believe that the latter had 30,000 men arranged opposite him, as he repeatedly told Soult?

[681] Cf. Wellington to Hill of July 11th. Dispatches, ix. p. 280.

[682] See chapter i above, [pp. 309-10].

[683] Joseph to Soult, May 26, intercepted dispatch in the Scovell ciphers.

[684] See above, [p. 332].

[685] Soult to Joseph, printed in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 31-3.

[686] Drouet to Joseph, Villafranca, July 3, Paris Archives [paper communicated to me by Mr. Fortescue]. Cf. Drouet to Jourdan to much the same general effect, of June 18, in King Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 36-7.

[687] Espinchal says that the 2nd Hussars captured a Portuguese gun: I have no corroboration for this.

[688] Details of all this in Soult’s dispatch to Joseph of July 10, in Espinchal’s Mémoires (he served in Vinot’s brigade), and in the diaries of Swabey of the R.A. and of Stoltzenberg of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., printed in full in Schwertfeger’s History of the K. G. Legion, ii. pp. 257-8.

[689] All this from Hill’s dispatch to Wellington of July 4, from Los Santos.

[690] See Wellington to Hill of July 11 (Dispatches, ix. p. 280) and Hill to Wellington of July 9. The text of the order is in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. p. 41.

[691] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, July 11.

[692] There is plenty of detail about these quite unimportant movements in Espinchal, ii. pp. 26-33.

[693] Not, however, the bulk of Morillo’s division, which was at Medina de las Torres near Zafra, as the general’s correspondence of that date shows [Villa’s Life of Morillo, ii. p. 224].

[694] The best account of all this is in Schepeler, pp. 661-3.

[695] Letter of August 4 in Sidney’s Life of Hill, p. 210.

[696] Soult to Joseph, August 8, Paris Archives (lent me by Mr. Fortescue).

[697] Soult to Joseph, Seville, August 12, in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 67-8.

[698] There had been such intrigues between the King and persons in Cadiz (see above, [p. 140]), but they had been opened by Napoleon’s own advice, in order to sow seeds of dissension among the patriots.

[699] The point of this insinuation is that Bernadotte and Joseph were brothers-in-law, having married the two sisters Clary.

[700] Printed in Joseph’s Correspondence, ix. pp. 68-70.

[701] Minus four companies left at Tarifa.

[702] Two from the 2/95th, those of Cadoux and Jenkins.

[703] Skerrett in his dispatch (Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiv. p. 108), speaks of attacking San Lucar with 800 men: but this was not his whole force.

[704] Toreno (iii. p. 151) and other historians tell the tale how Downie, finding that none of his men had followed him, though they had reached the other side of the cut, flung back to them his sword, which was the rapier of the Conquistador Pizarro, presented to him by a descendant of that great adventurer. It was caught and saved, and he recovered it, for he was left behind by the French a few miles from Seville, because of his wounds. They stripped him and left him by the wayside, where he was found and cared for by the pursuing Spaniards.

[705] The defence of Seville seems mainly to have been by the French 63rd Ligne, which lost eight officers in the fight.

[706] For a curious story of the contents of a captured carriage, which turned out to be stuffed with silver plate, see the Memoirs of Harley of the 47th, ii. p. 24.

[707] ‘Confound all spiritless and dilatory generals,’ writes Swabey of the R.A. in his diary, ‘... Sir W. E. actually halted while four squadrons and 400 infantry were doing what they liked in Ribera, though he had the Hussars, the 9th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Dragoon Guards and our guns, and he might have had the 71st regiment also, though it did not arrive till all was over. The transaction was calculated to dispirit the soldier, to discontent the officers, and to take away all confidence in the general.’

[708] Swabey’s diary, p. 307. There is an interesting account of Strenowitz’s capture and release in Espinchal’s Mémoires, ii. pp. 36-40, as also of the long skirmish of this day.

[709] Schepeler says that he scared the French rearguard out of Cordova on September 3 by lighting fires along the mountain slopes, and giving out that Hill was behind him with his army. See p. 666 of his history.

[710] Napier, iv. p. 371.

[711] Soult suggested that the less efficient of Joseph’s troops should go on garrison duty, and set free a corresponding number of his own best battalions.

[712] See above, [pp. 340-1].

[713] In and about Santander, 2 battalions of the 130th, 2 squadrons of gendarmes, &c. In Santoña, 93 officers and 1,382 men of the 28th, 75th, and 34th. In Burgos, 2 battalions of 34th Line.

[714] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7.

[715] The Venerable (his flag-ship) and the Magnificent. The Magnificent went home with prisoners some weeks later, and was replaced for a time by the Abercrombie, from the Brest blockading squadron.

[716] Medusa, Isis, Diadem, Surveillante, and Rhin. The Belle Poule looked in for a short time later in the season.

[717] Sparrow and Lyra.

[718] So says Popham in his dispatch at the Record Office: though Napier (iv. p. 246) says that the Spaniards attacked and were repulsed. But Popham must have known best! Sir Howard Douglas corroborates him, Life, p. 168.

[719] See above, [p. 378].

[720] One of them, Sir George Collier, commanding the Medusa.

[721] Popham’s prescience is shown by the fact that his papers relating to Burgos began to be drawn up as early as July 26. He cross-questioned not only Porlier but other Spanish officers. Their answers did not always tally with each other. See all Popham’s dispatches of the time, in the Admiralty Section at the Record Office—under the general head ‘Channel Fleet!’ They have this misleading heading because Popham was under Lord Keith, then commanding that fleet.

[722] See above, [p. 86].

[723] See above, [p. 56].

[724] The 2/67th and a part of the foreign Regiment of de Watteville, also a British battery, from Cadiz.

[725] See Mémoires, ii. pp. 283-99.

[726] See vol. iii. p. 307.

[727] See above, [p. 75].

[728] See [p. 73] above.

[729] Schepeler, pp. 609-10.

[730] See above, [pp. 304-5].

[731] This is Suchet’s own view, see his Mémoires, ii. p. 251.

[732] See above, [p. 98].

[733] See notes in Vidal de la Blache’s L’Evacuation d’Espagne, 1914, which reaches me just as this goes to press, for anecdotes concerning his doings.

[734] About the same time a still more dreadful plot was said to have been formed in Barcelona, with the knowledge and approval of Lacy—arsenic was to be mixed with the flour of the garrison’s rations by secret agents. [See Suchet’s Mémoires, ii. p. 256, and Arteche, xii. p. 353.] How far the plan was a reality is difficult to decide. There is a large file of papers in the Paris War Office concerning experiments carried out by a commission of army-doctors, in consequence of a sudden outbreak of sickness among the troops in July. One or two soldiers died, a great number were seized with vomiting and stomach-cramps; poison being suspected, the doctors took possession of the flour, attempted to analyse it, and tried its effects on a number of street dogs. A few of the animals died: most were violently sick, but got over the dose. Poison was not definitely proved, and dirty utensils and bad baking might conceivably have been the cause of the outbreak. Some Catalan writers say that there was a poisoning-plot, or I should have doubted the whole story. See the Appendix to Arteche, xii. p. 483.

[735] See above, [p. 347].

[736] 1/10th, 1/81st, 1/58th, 4th and 6th Line battalions K.G.L., and parts of the foreign battalions of De Roll, Dillon, and the Calabrian Free Corps. See table in [Appendix XIV]. The total was 248 officers, and 6,643 rank and file.

[737] Clarke’s dispatch with the information was dated June 9th.

[738] Two of them dated July 22 and August 12 did ultimately fall into his hands, but only after the victory of Salamanca. See below, [pp. 617-18].

[739] See Schepeler, pp. 617 and 623.

[740] Of the 44th Line.

[741] The 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons.

[742] The 116th Line, 2 battalions.

[743] The 1st Léger, 3 battalions.

[744] The 7th Line, 2 battalions.

[745] Cuenca, of Montijo’s brigade. Schepeler, p. 619.

[746] This is the figure given by Suchet in his contemporary dispatch to King Joseph, of which a copy lies in the Scovell papers. In some French accounts the number is cut down to 70.

[747] Vol. ii. p. 260.

[748] 7th Line, about 1,200; 13th Cuirassiers and 24th Dragoons, about 1,000; one battalion 44th, about 650; artillery, &c., about 150 = 3,000 in all. The 1st Léger and 116th Line were practically not engaged.

[749] This seems to have been Codrington’s view, see his Memoirs, i. p. 278, and he knew Lacy and the Catalans well.

[750] See above, [pp. 487 and 488].

[751] See Wellington to Maitland, Dispatches, ix. p. 386, dated Aug. 30.

[752] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Dispatches, ix. p. 364.

[753] Same to same, Dispatches, ix. p. 373. He was particularly indignant at the supersession of Mexia, Intendant of Castile, by Lozano de Torres, with whom he had quarrelled in Estremadura in 1809, ‘the most useless and inefficient of all God’s creatures, and an impediment to all business.’

[754] Dispatches, ix. p. 370.

[755] See above, [p. 537].

[756] Dispatches, ix. p. 377.

[757] Ibid., ix. pp. 380-1.

[758] News from Joseph O’Donnell commanding the Spanish army of Murcia. Dispatches, ix. p. 388.

[759] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, August 30, from Madrid. Dispatches, ix. p. 390.

[760] The cavalry at the head of the column were at Truxillo on the 15th September, Almaraz on the 19th, Talavera on the 21st. The infantry in the rear of the division only crossed the Guadiana at Medellin on September 14th, was at Truxillo on the 17th, Almaraz on the 20th, Talavera on the 26th, Toledo on the 30th (Swabey’s diary).

[761] Hill brought up the 2nd Division—British, 7,000; Portuguese, 2,900; Hamilton’s Portuguese, 5,300; Long’s and Slade’s cavalry, about 1,900; artillery, about 400 = 17,500 of all ranks.

[762] Late Power’s brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison of Elvas, and the 22nd.

[763] They marched from Cabeza del Buey, on the borders of Andalusia and Estremadura, via Talarubia and Mazarambros to Herencia. ‘Journal of Regiment of Leon,’ in Clonard, vol. iv.

[764] There marched with Wellington—1st Division, 5,980 of all ranks; 5th Division, 4,726; 7th Division, 4,841; Pack and Bradford, 3,954; Bock and Ponsonby, 1,673; artillery, &c., about 500 = 21,674.

[765] There remained at Madrid, the Escurial, &c.—Arentschildt’s cavalry, 515; D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry, 552; 3rd Division, 4,234; 4th Division, 4,548; Light Division, 3,462; artillery, about 350; Carlos de España’s Spaniards, about 3,000 = 16,661.

[766] Dispatches, ix. p. 375.

[767] General Mackinnon.

[768] Generals Craufurd and Vandeleur.

[769] Phillipon’s report to Clarke, drawn up on June 12, gives 273 instead of 317 for the loss in this sally (see Belmas, iv. p. 414).

[770] The 2/58th though properly belonging to the 5th Division, appears to have acted on this day with the 1st Division.

[771] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

[772] This battalion only joined the division on the battle-morning.

[773] The losses of the attached companies of Brunswick Oels are only to be found under its regimental total in 7th Division.

[774] The 12th Dragoons were marching to the rear in charge of the baggage-train.

[775] Not including 2nd battalion, about 450 strong, at Astorga in garrison.

[776] In garrison at Astorga.

[777] Plus 1 killed and 5 wounded at the combat of the Guarena, July 18.

[778] Plus 2 killed 6 wounded at the Guarena.

[779] Plus 2 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena.

[780] Plus 5 wounded at the Guarena.

[781] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at Castrejon.

[782] Plus 3 wounded at Castrejon.

[783] Plus 1 wounded on July 21, and 2 wounded at Garcia Hernandez, July 23.

[784] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena, July 18.

[785] Plus 4 wounded at the Guarena.

[786] Plus 1 general wounded July 16, died next day (Dembouski), and 1 general wounded and taken July 18 (at the Guarena), Carrié, and 1 officer wounded at Garcia Hernandez.

[787] And one odd company of its 3rd battalion, 61 of all ranks, while in the return of August 1, the 3rd battalion has 13 officers and 480 men.

[788] The 2/47th shows on July 15, 310 of all ranks, on August 1, 513.

[789] The fight at Castrillo is often called the ‘Combat of the Guarena’.

[790] This corps was organized in five ‘divisions,’ each of three companies.

[791] From 2/10th, 1/21st, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1/75th, 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.

[792] Schwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, says it was composed of the light companies of De Roll’s, Dillon’s, De Watteville’s (this is inaccurate, as De Watteville’s regiment had moved to Cadiz before the end of 1811), and the 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.

[793] 150 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[794] 140 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[795] A ‘division’ of the Calabrian Free Corps, 300 strong, was left behind for want of room, as well as the Sicilian Regiment de Presidi, 1,200 strong.

[796] In a letter to Lord Bathurst of December 9 Bentinck announces his intention to add to this force 2/27th Foot and 1st Anglo-Italians, who had been 28 officers and 823 men and 40 officers and 1,153 men respectively, in the ‘state’ of October 25, but are not present in the ‘state’ of December 10 (except for 288 men of 1st Anglo-Italians).

[797] This particular letter is not one of the Scovell file.

[798] Wellington wrongly guessed Plasencia: it was Aranjuez.

[799] Governor of La Mancha.

[800] Commanding cavalry on the Tagus.

[801] Marmont’s Chief-of-the-Staff.

[802] See above, [p. 293].

[803] Commanding artillery of the Army of Portugal, on leave.

[804] Commanding artillery of the Army of the Centre.

[805] Now governor of Madrid.

[806] Governor of Segovia.

[807] For the story of this letter see above, [pp. 538-9].

[808] Lefebure died of sickness in October, and the battery was commanded till next spring by Whinyates.

[809] Actually under command of 2nd Captain H. Baynes.

[810] Actually under command of 2nd Captain W. G. Power.

[811] Eligé was shot through the heart on the second day of the siege of the Salamanca forts. 2nd Captain W. Greene commanded the company at the battle of Salamanca.

[812] This company went to Cartagena from Cadiz at the end of January 1812, where it remained until the end of the war. Campbell was not with it, having command of an infantry regiment in the Spanish Army.

[813] From Gibraltar.

[814] Captain R.A., but now serving in the Portuguese Artillery, with the rank of Major.

Transcriber’s note

Aguilar del Campo,now Aguilar de Campoo,
Albalete,now Albalat,
Albaracin,now Albarracín,
Albuquerque,now Alburquerque,
Alemtejo,now Alentejo,
Almanza,now Almansa,
Arroyo dos Molinos,now Arroyomolinos, Cáceres,
Arzobispo,now El Puente del Arzobispo,
Baccelar (Manuel),now Manuel Pinto de Morais Bacelar,
Ballasteros,now Ballesteros,
Barba del Puerco,now Puerto Seguro,
Bussaco,now Buçaco,
Caçeres,now Cáceres,
Calvarisa de Abaxo,now Calvarrasa de Abajo,
Calvarisa de Ariba,now Calvarrasa de Arriba,
Canizal,now Cañizal,
Cordova,now Córdoba,
Corunna,now La Coruña,
Douro,now Duero (in Spain),
and Douro (in Portugal),
Ernani,now Hernani,
Estremadura,now Extremadura (for Spain),
and Estremadura (for Portugal),
Estremos,now Estremoz,
Fascinas,now Facinas,
Gibalfaro,now Gibralfaro,
Guadalaviar (river),now Turia (río),
Guarena,now Guareña,
Junialcon,now Gimialcón,
La Baneza,now La Bañeza,
La Bispal,now La Bisbal,
Las Rosas,now Las Rozas,
Majalahonda,now Majadahonda,
Majorca,now Mallorca,
Montanches,now Montánchez,
Mozencillo,now Mozoncillo,
Niza,now Nisa,
Pampeluna,now Pamplona,
Peniscola,now Peñíscola,
Puzzol,now Puçol,
Requeña,now Requena,
Ruvielos,now Rubielos de Mora,
Saguntum,now Sagunto,
Sanguessa,now Sangüesa,
Saragossa,now Zaragoza,
Senabria,now Sanabria,
Tagus (river),now Tajo (Spanish), Tejo (Portuguese),
Talarubia,now Talarrubias,
Truxillo,now Trujillo,
Vincente,now Vicente,
Villa Real,now Vila Real,
Villafanes,now Villafamés,
Vittoria,now Vitoria,
Xeres,now Jerez,
Xiloca,now Jiloca,
Zamorra,now Zamarra.