The Navy of the American Revolution

by Charles Oscar Paullin

FOOTNOTES:

[217] Force’s Archives, 5th, III, 1336, Robert Morris to American Commissioners at Paris, December 21, 1776. Morris wrote as follows: “So long as that respectable body persist in the attempt to execute, as well as to deliberate on their business, it never will be done as it ought, and this has been urged many and many a time by myself and others, but some of them do not like to part with power, or to pay others for doing what they cannot do themselves.”

[218] Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 205, Papers of William Vernon and Navy Board.

[219] Ibid., 257, Ellery to Vernon, March 23, 1779.

[220] Force’s Archives, 5th, II, 1106, Jones to Morris, October 16, 1776.

[221] Journals of Continental Congress, October 29, 1778.

[222] Ibid., July 30, 1779.

[223] Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, I, 207-08, Washington to Jay, April, 1779.

[224] Johnston, Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, I, 209, Jay to Washington, April 26, 1779.

[225] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, April 27, 1779.

[226] Journals of Continental Congress, June 9, 1779.

[227] Ibid., October 1, 1779.

[228] Ibid., October 17, November 24, 1777.

[229] Journals of Continental Congress, October 28, 1779.

[230] Ibid., September 13, 1780.

[231] Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, 37, p. 207, Report Board of Admiralty, April 12, 1781.

[232] Journals of Continental Congress, July 7, 1781.

[233] Journals of Continental Congress, November 26, December 3, 7, 8, 1779.

[234] Marine Committee Letter Book, Board of Admiralty to Navy Board at Boston, December 10, 1779.

[235] Journals of Continental Congress, January 22, 1780.

[236] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 78, XIV, 309, Lewis to President of Congress, March 21, 1780.

[237] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 78, XIV, 337-43, 349, Lewis to President of Congress, June 6, June 12, 1780.

[238] Journals of Continental Congress, June 23, 1780.

[239] Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, 37, pp. 291, 294, Lewis to President of Congress, November 4, 6, 1780.

[240] Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, 37, p. 125, Board of Admiralty to President of Congress, August 14, 1780; Journals of Continental Congress, August 18, 1780.

[241] Journals of Continental Congress, December 5, 1780; January 11, 1781.

[242] Ibid., May 7, 1781.

[243] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 37, pp. 175-77, Report of Board of Admiralty, January 24, 1780; Journals of Continental Congress, January 22, January 25, 1780.

[244] Journals of Continental Congress, July 11, 1780; Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 37, pp. 261-63, Report of Board of Admiralty, July 10, 1780.

[245] Journals of Continental Congress, August 7, 1780.

[246] Ibid., February 8, 1780.

[247] See Chapter X, pages 298-300.

[248] Journals of Continental Congress, May 4, 1780.

[249] Ibid., April 20, 1780.

[250] Journals of Continental Congress, May 2, November 27, 1780, April 7, 1781; Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 37, pp. 225-41.

[251] Journals of Continental Congress, October 5, 1780; Wharton’s Diplomatic Correspondence, III, 860, 867.

[252] Journals of Continental Congress, March 27, 1781.

[253] Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, 37, pp. 241-44. The Board of Admiralty probably had in mind the sixth as well as the ninth article of the Articles of Confederation.

[254] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 37, pp. 277, 281, Reports of Board of Admiralty, July 24, July 26, 1780.

[255] Journals of Continental Congress, January 30, 1777; January 15, January 22, 1780; Jameson, Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States, Chapter I, Predecessor of the Supreme Court; Carson, Supreme Court of the United States, Part I, 50-57.

[256] Marine Committee Letter Book, Board of Admiralty to Board of Treasury, January 7, 1780.

[257] Ibid., Board of Admiralty, to Commissary-General of Issues, August 21, 1780.

[258] Ibid., Board of Admiralty to Holker, August 29, 1780.

[259] Records and Papers of New London Country Historical Society, part IV, I, 47-56; Boston Gazette, July 24, 1780; Gomer Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 272-75.

[260] List of Officers in Revolutionary Navy, miscellaneous manuscripts in the Library of Congress.

[261] See Chapter VIII, Secretary of Marine and Agent of Marine.

[262] Journals of Continental Congress, July 9, 1781.

[263] Records and Papers of Continental Congress, 78, XIV, 445-47.

[264] Journals of Continental Congress, July 17, 1781.

[265] Ibid., July 18, 1781.

CHAPTER VIII
THE SECRETARY OF MARINE AND THE AGENT OF MARINE

On the question of the proper organization of the executive departments, the leaders of the Revolution were divided into two factions. Moved by their love of liberty, their distrust of governments, and their jealousy of delegated and concentrated powers, the members of one faction favored the vesting of the executive business in Congressional committees. The members of the other faction, who stood for governmental authority and control, for constructive legislation in the field of administration, and for the application of the principles of business to the affairs of state, declared for a system of permanent and single-headed executives chosen outside of the membership of Congress. The issue that was here joined in the special field of administration was of course a part of that perennial and perpetual conflict between the freedom of the individual and social control. In this case, as everywhere and always, the political doctrinaires, the iconoclasts and radicals, and the men of heart rather than of head, lined up on the side of liberty; while the practical and conservative men, the representatives of vested interests, and the cold, logical thinkers, stood together on the side of governmental control.

The faction which distrusted power and wished to keep it scattered, may be called the “dispersive school;” and the faction which wished to gather up the power and lodge it with a few men, may be called the “concentrative school.” To the “dispersive school” belonged Samuel Adams, the Lees, Patrick Henry, and William Whipple; to the “concentrative school”, Hamilton, Washington, the Morrises, and Jay. Early in the Revolution the advantage lay with the “dispersive school.” Its executive plan of Congressional committees needed little work to put it into operation; it was more flexible than the scheme of permanent single-headed executives; and it was more in harmony with the ultra anti-monarchical spirit of the times. The Revolutionary government, originating as a congress of delegates, organized itself, after the manner of congresses, by means of committees of its own members. When the Congress became a Government, and had entrusted to it a multiplicity of executive duties, it naturally continued and adapted the old organization for the transaction of its new business. The executive system of Congressional committees, in this way becoming fixed, could not be easily changed.

By 1780 the “concentrative school” was winning its way. Indeed, the adoption in 1779 of mixed boards composed of men both in and out of Congress was a compromise between the two schools, in which the “concentrative school” gave up its contention for simplicity in the executive organs, in order to secure, in part at least, another of its objectives, permanency in the tenure of the administrators. By 1780 both committees and boards had been tried and found wanting. Then too, there was a greater need for a change in the executive system, than in the first years of the war. As Congress became imbecile, the quality of its committees and of their work deteriorated; and as the country wearied of the war, and its finances tightened, the necessity for greater economy and efficiency in administration increased. In 1780 the feeling among the leaders was general that a crisis in the army, in the finances, and in the business of the government, which could be met only by some thorough and far-reaching reform, was approaching. The leaders of the “concentrative school” proposed a complete change in the administrative system of Congress as a solution of the serious problems that confronted the country. By the end of 1780 a movement for a reform of this sort was in progress. It was diligently furthered by one school and zealously opposed by the other.

“If Congress,” Washington wrote in December, 1780, “suppose that Boards composed of their own body, and always fluctuating, are competent to the great business of war (which requires not only close application, but a constant and uniform train of thinking and acting), they will most assuredly deceive themselves. Many, many instances might be adduced in proof of this.” Washington was convinced that extravagant and improper expenditures of the public money, inexpertness in the transacting of business, and needless delays resulted from vesting all or a part of the duties of an executive office in Congress.[266] Hamilton declared specifically for the substitution of single executives for plural ones, and he named three men whom he considered especially qualified for departmental posts, General Schuyler for Minister of War, General McDougall for Minister of Marine, and Robert Morris for Minister of Finance. He conceived that there were always more knowledge, energy, responsibility, decision, despatch, zeal, and attraction for first-rate ability “where single men, than where bodies are concerned.”[267] Gouverneur Morris contributed to the agitation in behalf of better executives an enumeration of the qualifications requisite in the men who were to become heads of the leading departments. He held, as still do some of the writers on naval administration, that a Minister of Marine should possess a practical and technical knowledge of naval affairs; and he presented a unique list of his qualities in the following words:

“A minister of the marine should be a man of plain good sense, and a good economist, firm but not harsh; well acquainted with sea affairs, such as the construction, fitting, and victualling of ships, the conduct and manœuvre on a cruise, and in action, the nautical face of the earth, and maritime phenomenon. He should know the temper, manners, and disposition of sailors; for all which purposes it is proper, that he should have been bred to that business, and have followed it, in peace and war, in a military, and commercial capacity. His principles and manners should be absolutely republican, and his circumstances not indigent.”[268]

It has been said that the debate in Congress over the change in the executive system was long, and was marked by the workings of party spirit, the self-interest of some members, and the doubts and fears and divided opinions of others.[269] Samuel Adams placed himself at the head of the advocates of the old system. On January 10, 1781, the friends of the new system gained their first decisive victory; for on this day Congress resolved to establish a Department of Foreign Affairs, and to appoint for its chief officer a Secretary for Foreign Affairs.[270] Five days later Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee a letter which is almost pathetic in its earnestness and seriousness. “My friend,” he said, “we must not suffer anything to discourage us in this great conflict. Let us recur to first principles without delay. It is our duty to make every proper exertion in our respective States to revive the old patriotic feelings among the people at large, and to get the public departments, especially the most important of them, filled with men of understanding and inflexible virtue. Our cause is surely too interesting to mankind to be put under the direction of men, vain, avaricious, or concealed under the hypocritical guise of patriotism, without a spark of public virtue.” Adams recognized that the public service needed reforming. This he would accomplish, not by a change of the administrative system, but by the introduction of more competent and more virtuous men into Congress and into its committees. This latter was to be brought about by a revival of civic interest in the several states.[1]

On February 7, 1781, Congress “resumed the consideration of the plan for the arrangement of the civil executive departments.”[271] It this day resolved that there should be a Superintendant of Finance, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary of Marine. It summed up the duties of the Secretary of Marine in the following brief paragraph:

“It shall be the duty of the secretary of marine to examine into and to report to Congress the present state of the navy, a register of the officers in and out of command, and the dates of their respective commissions; and an account of all the naval and other stores belonging to that department; to form estimates of all pay, equipments, and supplies necessary for the navy; and from time to time to report such estimates to the superintendant of finance, that he may take measures for providing for the expences, in such manner as may best suit the condition of the public treasury; to superintend and direct the execution of all resolutions of Congress respecting naval preparations; to make out, seal, and countersign all marine commissions, keep registers thereof, and publish annually a list of all appointments; to report to Congress the officers and agents necessary to assist him in the business of his department; and in general to execute all the duties and powers specified in the act of Congress constituting the board of admiralty.”

Speaking generally, the Secretary of Marine was to succeed to the duties and powers of the Board of Admiralty. It is, however, significant that the Secretary was not specifically charged with the ordering and directing of the movements of the vessels of war, as was the Board. The specified duties of the new office are largely secretarial. Congress was disposed to be less liberal in granting powers to a Secretary chosen outside its membership than to a Board partly composed of Congressmen. On February 9th the salary of the Secretary of Marine was fixed at $5000 per annum.[272]

On February 27, 1781, Congress, with a promptness which was exceptional, elected Major-General Alexander McDougall of New York to be Secretary of Marine, for which position he had been recommended by Alexander Hamilton. McDougall’s qualifications for the office were above the average. In the French and Indian War he had been a commander of privateers. Later he became a merchant in New York City. He was a leader of the Revolution in that state, and had risen to the rank of a major-general in the Revolutionary army. McDougall declined to accept the position proferred him unless permitted to hold his rank in the army, and to retain the privilege of returning to the field when his services were required. He based this partial refusal on patriotic grounds. Congress did not wish a Secretary of Marine on these conditions; and it therefore voted that it did not expect the acceptance of Major-General McDougall, and that it had a due sense of his zeal “for the safety and honour of America, and applaud his magnanimity in declining ‘to retire from the toils and perils of the field in the present critical condition of the United States in general, and that of New York in particular.’”[273] Congress made no other choice of a Secretary of Marine.

During the summer of 1781 the control of naval affairs gravitated towards Robert Morris. Soon after assuming the office of Superintendant of Finance in May, 1781, he was brought into close relation with the navy. He was invited to take upon himself more or less of the naval business by the urgent need of sending the cruisers on important errands, the helplessness of the Board of Admiralty, the inertia of Congress, and the interregnum in the headship of the Naval Department, which lasted from the discontinuance of the Board of Admiralty early in July, 1781, until the appointment of an Agent of Marine on September 7. The figure that Morris presents at this time is that of the strong and confident man of affairs, sagacious, expeditious, and painstaking, who is surrounded by weaker men, hesitating, vacillating, and procrastinating in their administrative attempts.

In June, 1781, Morris wrote to the President of Congress recommending the appointment of a captain for the 74-gun ship “America,” and explaining how money for completing her might be obtained. He says that he is aware that John Jay has liberty to sell this ship at the Court of Madrid; that he thinks and hopes that Jay will not succeed, for the sale of the “America” would be injurious to the United States; and that it would be “more consistent with Oeconomy and with the dignity of Congress to have her finished than to let her Perish.” On the receipt of this letter, Congress authorized Morris to take measures for launching the “America” and fitting her for sea.[274] Morris now hinted to the Board of Admiralty that the frigate “Trumbull” could perform an essential public service if put under his direction, and pursuing his plan, he obtained a resolution of Congress giving him control of this vessel.[275] During the summer of 1781, while the reorganization of the Naval Department was in suspense, Morris, on his own initiative, directed the fitting out of the “Alliance” and “Deane,” and ordered them to proceed to sea, “being convinced that while they lay in port, an useless Expence must necessarily be incurred.”[276]

Meanwhile, a movement to place the Naval Department under the control of Morris had been set on foot in Congress. On June 26 Meriwether Smith of Virginia reported a series of resolutions providing for the reorganization of the Naval Department, a work which he considered necessary because the present naval system was “inefficient and expensive.”[277] The most important of these resolutions was one which dissolved the offices of the Board of Admiralty, the navy boards, and the naval agents; and another, which empowered the Superintendant of Finance to appoint some discreet agent to manage the navy under the order and inspection of the said superintendant, until a Secretary of Marine should be appointed, or until the further pleasure of Congress. On the day of their introduction these resolutions were referred to a committee, consisting of Meriwether Smith of Virginia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, of Maryland. On July 2, having made a slight change in the phraseology of the resolutions, this committee reported them to Congress;[278] and on July 6 it again reported them, having now added a few additional resolutions. One of the latter was to the effect that the election of a Secretary of Marine should be postponed until the first Monday in November. On the putting of this resolution, it passed in the negative. The states divided sectionally; the four New England states and Delaware voted in the negative; Pennsylvania and the five Southern states, except South Carolina which was divided, voted in the affirmative; delegates from New York and New Jersey were not present in Congress. The vote seems to indicate the defeat of those who were in favor of placing the navy under the control of Morris. On the same day, July 6, the remaining resolutions were referred to a committee consisting of Thomas McKean of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and Theodoric Bland of Virginia.[279]

On July 18 the new committee reported a series of resolutions, differing little from those which had been referred to it, with the exception of one important change; the Agent of Marine was now to be appointed, not by Morris, but by Congress. On this day Congress passed two of the committee’s resolutions. One of these transferred the care of the marine prisoners from the Board of Admiralty to the Commissary of Prisoners of the army; and the other ordered the seal of the admiralty to be deposited with the Secretary of Congress, and empowered him to use it in countersigning naval commissions. The remaining resolutions again went over. Congress was able to agree on the discontinuance of the Board of Admiralty, but not on the arrangements for its successor.[280]

Finally, the whole business of the re-organization of the Naval Department was referred to a third committee, composed of Theodoric Bland of Virginia, James M. Varnum of Rhode Island, and James Duane of New York. On the report of this committee on August 29, Congress agreed “that for the present an agent of marine be appointed, with authority to direct, fit out, equip, and employ the ships and vessels of war belonging to the United States, according to such instructions as he shall, from time to time, receive from Congress.” The Agent of Marine was to direct the selling of all prizes. He was to settle and pay the naval accounts, and keep a record of his work. As soon as he entered into the execution of his office, the functions and appointments of the board of admiralty, the several navy boards, and all civil officers, appointed under them, should cease and be determined. The salary of the new head of the Naval Department was fixed at $1,500 a year, and that of his clerk at $500. Both the Agent of Marine and his clerk were required to take an oath “well and faithfully to execute the trust reposed in them, according to the best of their skill and judgment”; and to give good and sufficient bond.[281]

These resolutions of August 29 were to be only temporary; and they did not displace those of February 7, 1781, which provided for a Secretary of Marine. A second temporary expedient was resorted to on September 7, when Congress resolved: “That until an agent of marine shall be appointed by Congress, all the duties, powers, and authority assigned to the said agent, be devolved upon and executed by the said superintendant of finance.”[282]

The reason why Congress appointed an Agent of Marine instead of a Secretary of Marine is not at all points clear. Having failed to secure the acceptance of McDougall as Secretary of Marine, Congress may have decided that the small and disheartening business of the navy would not attract first-rate talent; or that for the transaction of this business a full-fledged executive department was not necessary. It is more probable that the appointment of an Agent of Marine, under the circumstances of a disagreeing Congress, the failure of the Board of Admiralty, and the improbability of securing an efficient Secretary, was merely a temporary and feasible expedient for conducting the affairs of the navy. There are obvious reasons why the proposal to give the Superintendant of Finance the power to appoint the Agent of Marine, or the selection of Morris as Agent, should have aroused vigorous opposition. Men of Samuel Adams’s way of thinking would oppose it, among other reasons, because it placed too much power in the hands of one man. The friends of the navy would dislike to see the Naval Department swallowed up by the Department of Finance. But on the other hand, many considerations recommended the step which was finally taken. It was the most economical disposition of the naval business which could be made. Morris had superior qualifications for the office, and he was at once available. Indeed, he was the only man in sight that promised to be equal to the task of straightening out the tangle of marine accounts, of financing a bankrupt navy, and of wielding effectively that arm of the military service. He was admirably qualified for the headship of the Naval Department by his experience as a man of business, familiar with accounts and the selection of employees, as the owner of a fleet of merchantmen, and as one of two or three of the most influential members of the Marine Committee during the years 1776 and 1777, when the navy was founded. Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the navy while Morris was directing it, they did not spring from the lack of an efficient executive. For the first time during the Revolution its management was marked by despatch, decision, and an expert and adequate understanding of its problems.

On September 8, 1781, Morris wrote to the President of Congress accepting, in words of modesty and reluctance, his appointment as Agent of Marine. “There are many Reasons,” he said, “why I would have wished that this Burthen had been laid on other Shoulders, or that at least I might have been permitted to appoint a temporary Agent untill the further Pleasure of Congress. As it is I shall undertake the Task however contrary to my Inclinations and inconsistent with the many Duties which press heavily upon me, because it will at least save Money to the Public.” He then added, in a characteristic way, some observations on his new task. “True Oeconomy in the public business,” he declared, “consists in employing a sufficient Number of Proper persons to perform the Public Business.” He wished the accounts of the marine department to be speedily settled.[283]

Morris filled the office of Agent of Marine from September 7, 1781, until November 1, 1784. It is believed that he received no salary as Agent of Marine. In addition to Morris the personnel of the Marine Office consisted of James Read, Secretary to the Agent of Marine, at a salary of $1,000 a year; Joseph Pennell, paymaster, at a salary of $1,000; and George Turner, Commissary of Naval Prisoners, at a salary of $1,200; the latter officer was authorized on July 24, 1782.[284] Read, who had been one of the commissioners of the Navy Board of the Middle Department, was of great service to Morris in conducting the business of the Marine Office. The clerical work of the Office was performed by the clerks of the office of the Superintendant of Finance, an instance of Morris’s economies.

According to the resolutions of September 7, 1781, the positions of the commissioners of the navy boards were abolished and the positions of the prize agents were vacated. The Navy Board at Boston continued however to fit out vessels until March, 1782. It was not until some time later that it delivered over the books and papers of the Board to John Brown, the former secretary of the Board of Admiralty, whom Morris had appointed naval agent for settling the business of the navy in New England. In the four New England states, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, Morris either re-appointed the prize agents of the Board of Admiralty, or appointed new ones; in the other states, he served in this capacity himself.[285]

The Agent of Marine, like the Board of Admiralty, communicated with Congress by means of written reports, which that body referred to special committees of its own members. Accordingly, when naval business was discussed in Congress, it usually came up in the form of a “report of a committee on the report of the Agent of Marine.” The subjects upon which the Agent of Marine reported were similar to those dealt with by his predecessors in naval administration. Not a few of his reports were concerned with the settling of marine accounts, and the satisfying of claimants against the government, which business was now insistent. During his tenure of the office of Agent of Marine, Morris prepared the larger part of the naval legislation of Congress. The changes or additions to his work which were made by committees of Congress were unimportant.

The law that provides for a change in a governmental system is often incomplete, and experience under the new order of business soon suggests the need of supplementary legislation. This was the case with the laws which transferred the naval business from the Board of Admiralty to the Agent of Marine. Morris, in one of his first reports, explained to Congress that he had no power to hold courts of enquiry; thereupon, Congress, on November 20, 1781, revived the law of February 8, 1780, on the holding of courts of enquiry and courts-martial, which had lapsed with the passing of the Board of Admiralty. Morris’s business-like care for the saving of time and effort is well shown, when in this report he tactfully suggests that Congress adapt their act not only to the Agent of Marine, but also to the Secretary of Marine, so that when the latter is appointed, “it may not be necessary for him to bring this matter again under Consideration.”[286]

By the law of November 20 Morris was empowered to constitute a court of enquiry with three persons; and to constitute a court-martial with three captains and three first lieutenants of marines, “if there shall be so many of the marines then present”. But in the event that so many officers for a court-martial could not be conveniently assembled, he might appoint any five persons to hold it. Morris, convinced of the impropriety of constituting naval courts with civilians, did not wish to avail himself of this latter alternative. Accordingly, on June 8, 1782, he made a report on naval courts, which became the basis of the resolutions of Congress of June 12 on this subject. These provided that in the future a marine court of enquiry or court-martial for enquiring into and trying capital cases should consist of five navy and marine officers, two of whom should be captains; and in all cases not capital, should consist of three navy and marine officers, one of whom should be a captain in the navy. No sentence in capital cases was to be executed until approved by the Agent of Marine. All naval courts for commissioned officers must be appointed by the Agent of Marine. A captain in the navy might appoint a court-martial for the trial of offences committed by any other than a commissioned officer, provided that the sentencing of a warrant officer to be cashiered should have the confirmation of the Agent of Marine.[287]

During the incumbency of Morris, no captain in the navy was cashiered. The findings of a court-martial, which was held in Boston in the early summer of 1781, possess a peculiar interest, because of the light which they throw upon the penal code of the Continental navy, and because this case is one of the first in which a seaman in the American navy was sentenced to be hanged. Three seamen, who were enlisted on board the “Alliance,” were tried for a breach of the 29th article of the rules and regulations of the navy.[288] Of Patrick Sheridan, the court adjudged that he should be whipped three hundred and fifty-four lashes upon the naked back, one hundred and seventy-seven thereof alongside the ship “Alliance,” and the remainder alongside the ship “Deane.” John Crawford was sentenced to wear a halter around his neck, and receive fifty lashes. Sheridan and Crawford were to lose certain wages and their share of prize money. The court found the third seaman, William McClehany, “peculiarly Guilty of a breach of all the Clauses in the Article aforesaid,” and it adjudged that he should “suffer the punishment of death, and that he be hanged by the neck on the starboard fore Yard Arm of the said ship ‘Alliance’ until he is dead.”

The Board of Admiralty laid the proceedings of this court-martial before Congress in July, 1781, but owing to the confusion of the naval business at this time, and to the carelessness of Congress, no action was taken on them. When John Brown, the naval agent of the Agent of Marine, reached Boston, towards the end of 1781, he found the three men in prison, waiting the execution of their sentences, and “perishing with cold for want of Cloathing.” The fate of the three men is best told in Brown’s words: “Under these circumstances it was the opinion of the Board (and I agreed with them) that as the proceedings had lain so long before Congress without anything being done, and it being uncertain when they would act upon them, to save expence it was best to dispose of the Men in the best manner we could. Accordingly the two who were sentenced to be whipped were put on board the Deane, the other was sold by the Sheriff to pay his bill of fees, keeping, &c., and with the surplus of the money he procured us three good seamen for the Deane. My motive for concurring in this proceeding was to save expence and preserve the public Money in my hands for more Material purposes.”[289]

In December, 1781, and January, 1782, Congress passed an ordinance, “in pursuance of the powers delegated by the Confederation,” which codified in great part the previous legislation on captures and condemnation of prizes, recaptures and salvage, contraband, and the sharing of prizes between the captors and the government and between the captors themselves. Several changes were made in previous resolutions, and a few new ones were added. On their receiving a reasonable salvage, the recaptors of negroes, mulattoes, Indians, and indented servants, were to return all such property to its owners. The new ordinance specified in some detail the various forms of property which were subject to capture. It contained a revised list of articles of contraband. It declared that the rules of decision in the several admiralty courts should be “the resolutions and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, public treaties when declared to be so by an act of Congress, and the law of nations, according to the general usages of Europe;” public treaties were given precedence over the two other classes of rules.[290] This ordinance went into operation on February 1, 1782. Its importance is diminished by reason of its being in force during only the last year of the war, when the naval activities of the American fleets had decreased.

It is believed that this ordinance was entirely the work of Congress. Indeed, it soon appeared that there was at least one provision, the giving of the whole of certain prizes to captors on board of Continental vessels, which the Agent of Marine disapproved. In June, 1782, Morris made a report to Congress in which he showed that, owing to the government’s liberality to its officers and seamen, it had lost ten thousand dollars on the late successful cruise of the frigate “Deane,” during which she had captured five prizes of considerable value. He thought that wages, bounties, and one-half of prizes were quite sufficient inducements for manning the fleet. In all cases, however, in which the capture of a vessel of the enemy was especially meritorious, Morris would have Congress encourage and stimulate effort and merit in the navy by giving the captors, by a special act of Congress, the whole of their prizes. On July 10, 1782, Congress passed an ordinance embodying Morris’s recommendations.[291]

When Morris, on September 7, 1781, became Agent of Marine, the direction of the movements of the Continental vessels was vested in him, but with a serious limitation; he was authorized to employ the armed cruisers “according to such instructions as he shall, from time to time, receive from Congress.” Morris could never abide indefinite grants of power which confused authority; and he therefore, by means of a cleverly written letter, elicited a resolution from Congress giving him full power “to fit out and employ the ships of war belonging to these United States, in such manner as shall appear to him best calculated to promote the interest of these United States.”[292]

When Morris fell heir to the duties of the Naval Department, in the summer of 1781, the Continental navy was reduced to small numbers. There were in active service only five captains and seven lieutenants in the navy, and three captains and three lieutenants in the marine corps. Including with these, those officers who were unemployed, were in private service, were prisoners, or were on parole, there were twenty-two captains and thirty-nine lieutenants in the navy, and twelve captains and twelve lieutenants in the marine corps.[293] Only three vessels were now in commission; the frigate “Trumbull,” 28, at Philadelphia, and the “Alliance,” 36, and “Deane,” 32, at Boston. The “America” and “Bourbon” were still on the stocks. About the first of September, 1782, Morris purchased the ship “Washington,” 20, and in October he took over into the Continental service in payment for a debt the ship “Duc de Lauzun,” 20.

The movements of the fleet under Morris’s direction were marked, as formerly, by bits of good and bad fortune, encounters with naval ships, privateers, and merchantmen, and voyages to France and the West Indies. From the summer of 1781 until the end of the war the little fleet captured twenty prizes, some fifteen of which reached safe ports. The last of his Majesty’s vessels to surrender to a Continental ship was the schooner “Jackall,” 20, Commander Logie, which was taken in the spring of 1782 by Captain Samuel Nicholson, when in command of the “Deane,” or the “Hague,” as she was now called. By a singular coincidence the first, and the last, valuable prize captured by a Continental ship during the Revolution, were taken by Captain John Manly. On one of the last days of November, 1775, he received the surrender of the brig “Nancy,” a transport; and in January, 1783, while in command of the “Hague” he captured the ship “Baille” of 340 tons burden, with a cargo consisting of sixteen hundred barrels of provisions.[294]

One of the most interesting, varied, and fortunate cruises of the war was made by Captain John Barry in the “Alliance,” 36, one of the largest and best-built vessels of the Continental navy. Barry left New London on August 4, 1782, and having visited the region of the Bermudas, and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, he sailed eastward and overhauled a fleet of Jamaicamen, and arrived at L’Orient on October 17. He had captured nine prizes, four of which he carried into L’Orient. These four ships were Jamaicamen, and with their rich cargoes of rum and sugar, they sold for £620,610, one of the largest sums realized on any cruise during the Revolution. On December 8, Captain Barry left France for the West Indies. Having made a call at Madeira, Barry early in January, 1783, anchored at St. Pierre, Martinique, where he found a letter from the Agent of Marine ordering him to proceed to Havana and convoy the “Duc de Lauzun” to Philadelphia. About the first of February the “Alliance” arrived at Havana, after she had put into St. Eustatius and Cape Francois, and had been chased by one fleet off Porto Rico and another off Hispaniola. On account of the closing of the port of Havana, Barry was detained here a month. After considerable correspondence with the Governor of Havana, Barry on March 6 was permitted to sail with his convoy, which had on board seventy-two thousand dollars in specie. On March 10, 1783, Barry fell in with a British vessel, which is said to have been the frigate “Sibylle,” 32, and he now fought the last naval engagement of the Revolution. It lasted forty-five minutes, ended indecisively, and resulted in the loss of ten men on board the “Alliance;” the loss of the British is unknown. The two American vessels now parted company, and each soon reached a safe port; the “Alliance” arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, on March 20, and the “Duc de Lauzun” anchored at Philadelphia on March 21. It was now two months since the Preliminary Articles of Peace had been signed at Versailles.[295] The naval movements of the Continental vessels during the Revolution ended with the arrivals of these two vessels.

While Morris had the direction of the fleet, only one vessel was captured by the enemy, and this before he became Agent of Marine. In July, 1781, he ordered the “Trumbull,” 28, Captain James Nicholson, to proceed to Havana with despatches, letters, and a cargo of flour. The “Trumbull” had scarcely cleared the Capes of the Delaware, on August 8, when she was chased by the frigate “Iris,” 32, Captain George Dawson. Encountering a storm, the “Trumbull” was dismasted, and thus crippled she was overtaken by the “Iris.” The “Trumbull’s” crew were a sorry lot; some of them were British deserters, and others were cowardly and disaffected. It was late in the evening when the fight began. Many of the crew now put out their battle lanterns and flew from their quarters. Captain Nicholson and his officers, with a handful of seamen, bravely defended their ship against impossible odds for an hour before they surrendered. Nicholson lost sixteen men; two of his lieutenants were wounded. It is recalled that the “Iris” was originally the “Hancock,” of the Continental navy, and that she was the first of the thirteen original frigates to surrender to the enemy. The “Iris” was a fast ship, and is said to have made the fortunes of all the British captains that commanded her. It was the irony of fate that the first of the thirteen frigates to be captured should receive the surrender of the last remaining one. A letter from New York, dated August 11, 1781, informs us that “this day arrived the celebrated rebel frigate named the Trumbull.”[296]

The attempts of Morris, in 1782, to obtain an increase in the naval force of Congress, form one of the most interesting and characteristic parts of his naval work. The surrender of Cornwallis on October 19, 1781, was not considered by many contemporaneous Americans as an event that must necessarily end the Revolution. Indeed, the final outcome of the war was in doubt for more than a year. The Agent of Marine was too cautious and conservative to count on peace before its actual accomplishment had been sealed by a formal treaty. After the surrender of Cornwallis he not only continued to send the Continental cruisers against the enemy, but whenever an occasion presented, he vigorously urged on Congress the necessity of a naval increase. To the mind of Morris the need of a navy in 1782 was greater than it had been at any previous time during the Revolution. He conceived that up to this time Britain had attempted to conquer the Colonies on land by means of her army; since she had been defeated in this, it was now her purpose to starve the Colonies into submission by means of her navy and superior sea-power. The United States must meet the enemy’s change of tactics by building a navy.

In April, 1782, Morris took steps to have the frigate “Bourbon” completed. Congress was not convinced of the expediency of this, and was inclined to sell the frigate in its unfinished state. Morris wrote reprovingly to Congress that the most economical thing to do was to complete the vessel; and that “there is also a degree of Dignity in carrying through such measures as Congress have once adopted, unless some change of circumstances renders the execution improper.” He then added: “The present circumstances of the United States I apprehend to be such as should induce our attention to the re-establishment of a Naval Force, and altho’ former attempts have proved unfortunate, we must not take it for granted that future Essays will be unsuccessful. Altho’ the Naval Force of our enemy is powerful, and their Ships Numerous, yet that Force is opposed by equal Numbers, so as to give them much more employment than at the time our infant Fleet was Crushed.”[297]

On May 10, 1782, in response to a request of Congress, Morris submitted an exhaustive report on the state of American commerce. Referring to the intentions of the British, he declared that having been compelled to abandon the idea of conquest, their avowed design was to annihilate the American commerce. The plans of the enemy could be frustrated and the American trade protected by so small a fleet as two ships of the line and ten frigates. The ships of the line, together with two frigates, should be stationed in the Chesapeake, to cruise as occasion might require. The frigates should be divided into two equal squadrons, each of which should serve as a convoy of the American trade between the United States and France. By each squadron making two round trips a year, a quarterly communication both ways between these two countries would be established. The United States of course could not provide this service, but the ships which the plan required might be detailed from the French or Spanish fleet. “It is to be hoped,” Morris said, “that if the war continues much longer, the United States will be able to provide the necessary force for themselves, which at present they are not, tho’ if the above arrangements take place, they might now provide for the trade from America to the West Indies.” Congress authorized Morris to apply to both Spain and France for the needed vessels.[298]

But a more extensive naval plan than this was in Morris’s mind, and one which could be undertaken independent of foreign ships. On July 30, 1782, he submitted to Congress an estimate for the public services of the United States for the year 1783, amounting in all to eleven millions of dollars. More than one-fifth of this sum was to be spent on the navy. “Congress will observe,” he said, “that the estimates for the Marine Department amount to two Millions and a half, whereas there was no Estimate made for that Service in the last year any more than for the civil list.” Morris based this most remarkable recommendation for a naval increase on the belief that the enemy had changed his mode of warfare, and that it was now his purpose to annihilate the commerce of America, and thus starve her into submission. With this sort of a campaign, conducted by the enemy, an American army without a navy would be burdensome without being able to accomplish anything. With a navy, we could prevent the enemy from making predatory excursions, ruining our commerce, and capturing our supplies; he would either be compelled to keep a superior naval force in this country, which would give our allies a naval superiority elsewhere; or else he must permit the balance of naval strength in America to be on our side; in which latter case we could protect our trade, annoy his commerce and cut off the supplies which he would be sending to his posts in America. Then, concluded Morris in words which remind one of the annual report of some recent Secretary of the Navy asking for the yearly quota of battleships: “By oeconomizing our Funds and constructing six ships annually we should advance so rapidly to Maritime importance that our enemy would be convinced not only of the Impossibility of subduing us, but also of the Certainty that his forces in this Country must eventually be lost without being able to produce him any possible Advantage;” and we should in this way regain the “full Possession of our Country without the Expence of Blood, or treasure, which must attend any other Mode of Operations, and while we are pursuing those Steps which lead to the Possession of our natural Strength and Defence.”[299]

The signing on November 30, 1782, of the Provisional Articles of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, news of which reached America early in the spring of 1783, removed the necessity of a naval increase, and in the minds of many the need of a navy at all. Morris did not at once give up the notion that the government on a peace footing should maintain a respectable marine. In May, 1783, he asked Congress to relieve him of his naval duties. “The affairs of the Marine Department,” he writes, “occupy more time and attention than I can easily spare. This Department will now become important, and I hope extensive. I must therefore request that Congress will be pleased to appoint an Agent of Marine as soon as their convenience will admit.”[300] He became convinced however that not much could be done for the navy until the finances of Congress were placed on a better and more permanent basis. In July, 1783, Morris made a report on a proposition of Virginia offering to sell her naval ship “Cormorant” to the United States. Congress agreed to his report, which was as follows: “That although it is an object highly desirable, to establish a respectable marine, yet the situation of the public treasury renders it not advisable to purchase ships for the present, nor until the several states shall grant such funds for the construction of ships, docks, naval arsenals, and for the support of the naval service, as shall enable the United States to establish their marine upon a permanent and respectable footing.”[301]

Meanwhile, Congress had been rapidly going out of the naval business, by formally ending the war at sea, by providing for the settlement of marine accounts, and by disposing of its naval stock. On March 24, 1783, it ordered the Agent of Marine to recall all armed vessels cruising under the American colors. On April 11 it issued a “Proclamation, Declaring the Cessation of arms, as well by Sea as by Land, agreed upon between the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty; and enjoining the observance thereof.” On April 15 it ordered the Agent of Marine to set free all the naval prisoners of the enemy.[302]

During the last year of the Revolution and for several years after its close, one of the principal administrative tasks of the government was the settling of the outstanding accounts of the several executive departments. This was a work fraught with extraordinary difficulties. The administration of a government founded and conducted amid the distractions of war was necessarily marked by irregularities in official procedure, the lack of system in accounting, and in general by haphazard ways of business. On February 27, 1782, Congress acting on the recommendation of Morris authorized him to appoint five commissioners with full power and authority to liquidate and finally settle the Revolutionary accounts. Each commissioner was paid $1,500 a year; he was permitted to employ a clerk. The states were recommended to empower the commissioners to examine witnesses under oath. Each commissioner was given charge of a certain class of accounts; to one of the five men fell the settling of the accounts of the Naval Department. Owing to Morris’s caution in making appointments, and to the obstacles that stood in the way of a wise choice, the “commissioner for settling the accounts of the marine department” was not selected until June 19, 1783, when Joseph Pennell, the paymaster of the Marine Office, was named for the place.[303] By the fall of 1783 Pennell was settled in his work, and was complaining of its arduousness. He soon found himself involved in a dispute with the members of the old Naval Committee. He said that they had received money from Congress for which they had not accounted; and that, according to the vouchers, they had paid one debt twice. He found that the members of the Marine Committee were individually charged with the moneys they had received; and that when they left the Committee, they made no settlement. In many instances vouchers were lacking. Statements from members of the Navy Boards and from the naval agents could be obtained only with great difficulty, as these men were now discharged, and they were often scattered. He discovered that the prize agents made no uniform charge for their services; some exacted five, and others two and a half per cent on the receipts from the sale of prizes. Offices for settling the naval accounts were opened in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. On the retirement of Morris, Pennell became responsible to the new Board of Treasury.[304]

In the last year of the war Congress began to dispose of its naval craft. On September 3, 1782, the 74-gun ship “America” now at last almost ready for launching was on the recommendation of the Agent of Marine given to France to replace the ship of the line “Magnifique,” 74, which the French fleet had recently lost in Boston harbor. Congress, “desirous of testifying on this occasion to his Majesty, the sense they entertain of his generous exertions in behalf of the United States,” directed the Agent of Marine to present the “America” to Luzerne, the French minister at Philadelphia, for the service of His Most Christian Majesty.[305] It was a gracious act of international friendship. In April, 1783, the “Duc de Lauzun” was lent to the French minister to carry home some French troops, after which service she was to be sold.[306] In July Morris ordered the “Hague” to be sold, and recommended to Congress a like disposition of the “Bourbon,” which latter ship in all probability had been recently launched.[307] In March, 1784, Morris recommended the sale of the “Alliance,” as she was “now a mere bill of costs;” and also the “Washington,” because much money would be required to repair her, and there was no need to employ her as a packet, since the French and English had established a mail service.[308] Lieutenant Joshua Barney, acting as the agent for the Naval Department, sold the “Washington” in Baltimore in the summer of 1784.

The members of Congress were not unanimous on the question of the proper disposition of the “Alliance.” On January 15, 1784, a committee of three reported: “That the honour of the Flag of the United States and the protection of its trade and coasts from the insults of pirates require that the Frigate of Alliance should be repaired.”[309] A committee in March, 1784, and another in May, 1785, recommended her sale.[310] Finally, on June 3, 1785, Congress directed the Board of Treasury “to sell for specie or public securities, at public or private sale, the frigate Alliance, with her tackle and appurtenances.”[311] In August, 1785, the Board of Treasury sold this vessel for £2,887, to be paid in United States certificates of public debt. The purchasers afterwards sold the “Alliance” at a great profit to Robert Morris. In June, 1787, this vessel sailed for Canton, China, as a merchantman.[312] From the sale of the “Alliance” until the establishment of a new navy under the Constitution in 1794 it was left to the stars and stripes floating from American merchantmen to familiarize foreign ports and seas with the symbol of the new Nation.

Congress did not formally end the naval establishment by act or resolution, unless one considers that such was the effect of the resolution of January 25, 1780, which provided that the pay of all naval officers except those in actual service should cease. After this date it would seem that as the vessels were captured, sold, or thrown out of commission, the names of the officers were taken from the pay-roll. In September, 1783, an unsuccessful attempt was made in Congress to discontinue the Agent of Marine.[313] Morris continued in office until November 1, 1784, when he retired from public service. Congress made no move to fill his place as Agent of Marine, for there was little need for such an official. Certain unimportant naval business, chiefly concerned with the settlement of naval accounts, remained, however, to be transacted. This for the most part naturally fell to the Board of Treasury, organized in the spring of 1785. This Board, aided by the commissioner for settling the marine accounts, and by James Read, the efficient secretary to the Agent of Marine, with whom Morris on retiring left the books and papers of the Naval Department, wound up the small, unimportant, and dwindling business of the navy.