The Navy of the American Revolution

by Charles Oscar Paullin

FOOTNOTES:

[206] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, November 16, 1778.

[207] F. M. Caulkins, History of New London, 539-40; Records and Papers of New London Historical Society, Part IV, I, 9.

[208] Journals of Continental Congress, September 14, 1778.

[209] Bancroft, History of United States, V, 319; Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, September 28, November 10, 1779.

[210] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Captain Olney, to Captain Harding, and to Navy Board at Boston, February 10, 1779; Committee to Merchants of Baltimore, February 23, 1779; Boston Gazette, April 26, 1779; Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 259.

[211] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, May 4, May 20, 1779; Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser, August 26, 1779; Boston Gazette, September 20, 1779. “Last Saturday noon this town was alarmed by the Appearance of Seven Topsail Vessels in the Offing, which, however, soon subsided, for between the Hours of Three and Five in the Afternoon were safe anchored in this Harbour the Continental Ships of War, ‘Providence,’ ‘Queen of France’ and ‘Ranger,’ with Four Prize Ships laden with Rum and Sugar, being part of a Jamaica Fleet bound to London captured by the above Vessels.”—Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser, August 26, 1779, published at Boston.

[212] Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 259.

[213] See Chapter IX and X, Naval Duties of American Representatives in Foreign Countries.

[214] Marine Committee Letter Book, Morris to Jones, February, 1, 1777; Morris to Commodore Hopkins, February 5, 1777.

[215] Files of newspapers for the period of the Revolution.

[216] Marine Committee Letter Book, Committee to Navy Board at Boston, May 8, November 9, 1778.

CHAPTER VII
THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

It is speaking tritely, although accurately, to say that our present executive departments at Washington did not spring into perfect being in 1789 like panoplied Minerva from the head of Jove. Not a little of the interest and value of a study of the administration of the Revolution comes from the fact that the administrative practices and experiences of this period gave rootage to the later and more perfect executive organs. The development of the Continental Naval Department, both in the variety and in the character of its forms, is typical of that of the other administrative departments of the Revolution. We have already seen how the naval business of the Continental Congress was first vested in the small Naval Committee; and how this Committee, early in 1776, was overshadowed and absorbed by the more numerous and more active Marine Committee. We now come to the third step in this evolution, the superseding of the Marine Committee by the Board of Admiralty.

The Marine Committee had proved slow, cumbrous, inexpert, and irresponsible. The wiser members of Congress had long seen that it was a prime defect in governmental practice to add to the duties of a legislative committee, those of an executive office; for it threw upon the same men too much work of too diverse kinds, and it removed from the administrative organ its most essential attributes of permanency, technical skill, and responsibility. In December, 1776, Robert Morris had urged the employment of a corps of executives chosen outside the membership of Congress, as a requisite to a proper and orderly management of the business of the Revolutionary government.[217]

As early as February 26, 1777, William Ellery, a member of the Marine Committee from Rhode Island, wrote to William Vernon at Providence, who was soon to become a member of the Navy Board at Boston, that a proper Board of Admiralty was very much wanted. “The members of Congress,” he said, “are unacquainted with this Department. As one of the Marine Committee I sensibly feel my ignorance in this respect. Under a mortifying Sense of this I wrote to you for Information in this Matter. Books cannot be had here; and I should have been glad to have been pointed to proper Authors on this Subject when I should be in a Place where Books may be had.”[218] Early in 1779 when Congress was groping in search of a more efficient naval executive, Ellery again expressed regret at the lack of technical skill in the management of the navy. He said that the marine affairs would never be “well conducted so long as the supreme direction of them is in the hands of Judges, Lawyers, Planters, &c.”[219] Even before Morris and Ellery had declared for better executives, John Paul Jones, while distressed by a loss in naval rank caused by the appointing and the placing above him of certain “political skippers,” wrote that efficient naval officers could never be obtained, until Congress “in their wisdom see proper to appoint a Board of Admiralty competent to determine impartially the respective merits and abilities of their officers, and to superintend, regulate, and point out all the motions and operations of the navy.”[220]

During 1778 and 1779 Congress hit upon a system of executive departments that did little violence to its lust for power, and at the same time secured a permanent body of administrators and advisors. This was the system of executive boards, composed jointly of commissioners selected outside the membership of Congress, and of members of Congress. Congress and the Marine Committee probably derived a part of their knowledge of executive boards from the practice of the English government and of the states. “Board of Admiralty” was the name during the Revolution, as now, of the British Naval Office. Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina had early in the Revolution established “Navy Boards.” In October, 1777, Congress had formed a Board of War composed of five commissioners. In October, 1778, Congress attempted to clip the wings of this Board and bring it under Congressional control by substituting two members of Congress for two of its five commissioners.[221] On July 30, 1779, a Board of Treasury was constituted on exactly this plan, being composed of three commissioners and two members of Congress.[222]

In the spring of 1779 the feeling was general that some change must be made in the management of the navy. Both 1777 and 1778 had been lean, empty, and disastrous years for the Continental fleet. The blame for this failure was placed upon the Marine Committee and the naval commanders. It was in April, 1779, that Washington wrote to John Jay asking questions and making suggestions about the management of the navy, which may be briefly summarized as follows: What are the reasons for keeping the Continental vessels in port? Had not Congress better lend them to “commanders of known bravery and capacity” for a limited term? If additional encouragement is necessary in order to induce seamen to enlist, why not give them the whole of their captures? Great advantage might result from placing the whole fleet under “a man of ability and authority commissioned to act as commodore or admiral.” Under the present system the Continental ships are not only very expensive and totally useless, but sometimes they require a land force to protect them.[223]

This arraignment of the navy is somewhat severe. The last clause in the above paragraph refers to an incident which took place at New London in the spring of 1776. The reader may recall that Commodore Hopkins put into this port on his return from New Providence and just after his unfortunate engagement with the “Glasgow.” He then received a temporary loan from Washington of one hundred and seventy troops, with whom, for the time being, he replenished his depleted crews. He kept the troops less than six weeks.

In his reply to Washington’s letter, Jay ascribed the naval inefficiency to a defective Naval Department. He said: “While the maritime affairs of the continent continue under the direction of a committee, they will be exposed to all of the consequences of want of system, attention, and knowledge. The marine committee consists of a delegate from each state; it fluctuates, new members constantly coming and old ones going out; three or four, indeed, have remained in it from the beginning; and few members understand even the state of our naval affairs, or have time or inclination to attend to them. But why is not this system changed? It is in my opinion, inconvenient to the family compact.”[224] The “family compact” is supposed to refer to the Lees. During the Revolution the Lees and the Adamses formed the nucleus of a faction, which was generally opposed to constructive legislation in the field of administration.

When this letter of Jay’s was written a new naval system was forming.[225] On June 9 Congress resolved to vest in “commissioners all business relating to the marine of these United States.”[226] Apparently this resolution of Congress meant that the naval affairs were to be given over to a board chosen outside the membership of Congress; if so, Congress soon retracted it. On October 1, 1779, Congress discharged the committee that had had the new project in hand, and directed the Marine Committee “to prepare and report a plan of regulations for conducting the naval affairs of the United States.”[227] The Marine Committee reported on October 28, 1779; thereupon, Congress passed resolutions making provision for a Board of Admiralty, “to be subject in all cases to Congress.” These resolutions were in important respects based upon those of October 17 and November 24, 1777, establishing a Board of War.[228] This was natural, as the work of a war and a naval office are quite similar. In the composition of the two boards there was a vital difference. The Board of War, as has been said, consisted of five commissioners; the Board of Admiralty consisted of three commissioners and two members of Congress, being modeled after the Board of Treasury. Any three members of the Board of Admiralty were empowered to form a quorum. No two members were permitted to come from the same state. The Board must have its office in the same town in which Congress was sitting. It selected its clerks, but Congress chose its secretary.

The powers and duties of the Board of Admiralty were practically The same as those of the Marine Committee. The Board was to order and direct the movements of all ships and vessels of war. It was to superintend and direct the navy boards and see that they kept fair entries and proper accounts of all the business transacted by them. It was to keep a complete and accurate register of the officers of the navy, giving their rank and the date of their commissions; these were to be signed by the President of Congress and countersigned by the secretary of the Board. The Board was to have the care and direction of the marine prisoners. It was to obtain regular and exact returns of all warlike stores, clothing, provisions, and miscellaneous articles belonging to the marine department. Lastly the Board of Admiralty was to “execute all such matters as shall be directed, and give their opinion on all such subjects as shall be referred to them by Congress, or as they may think necessary for the better regulation and improvement of the navy of the United States; and in general to superintend and direct all the branches of the marine department.”[229]

The officers of the navy were enjoined to obey the directions of the Board of Admiralty. The proceedings, records, and papers of the Board were to be open at all times to the inspection of the members of Congress. The Board of Admiralty was ordered to examine at once the unsettled accounts of the navy boards and naval agents, and report thereon to Congress. It was further directed to form proper plans for increasing the naval force of the United States and for the better regulating of the same.

The salary of each commissioner was fixed at $14,000, and that of the secretary of the Board at $8,000 a year. On September 13, 1780, these salaries were decreased to $1,850 and to $1,100 a year, respectively, to be now paid quarterly in specie or its equivalent.[230] When Congress increased the salary of its Commissioners of the Treasury from $1,850 to $2,000, the Commissioners of Admiralty, exhibiting that delicate sense of the fitness of more pay which characterizes the employees of governments, petitioned for a similar increase in their salaries;[231] and Congress, in accord with its subsequent character under the Constitution, refused a favor to the navy which it granted to a more popular branch of its public service.[232] The Congressional members received no pay for their services on the Board.

When Congress came to select Commissioners of Admiralty, it found no easy task. Men who were eager for distinction and honor felt that they were cultivating a surer field in their home governments or in the army. The prestige of the Continental government was now declining. The dilution of salaries caused by the depreciation of the currency lessened the attractiveness of the Continental offices. Employees of Congress found it hard to support their families on their pay. Then too, the navy business had become a thankless and disheartening task. The class of men who will accept a disagreeable office with little pay and no glory is a small one at any time.

The first three commissioners elected by Congress were William Whipple of New Hampshire, chairman of the Marine Committee, Thomas Waring of South Carolina, and George Bryan of Pennsylvania. Each declined. On December 7 Francis Lewis of New York was chosen commissioner, and on the next day he accepted the office. Congress on the 3rd had named the two Congressional members of the Board, William Floyd of New York, and James Forbes of Maryland. The appointment of Lewis vacated the position of Floyd, as two members from the same state could not serve on the Board. William Ellery of Rhode Island was now elected as the second Congressional member. Congress had already chosen John Brown, the secretary of the Marine Committee, to be secretary of the Board of Admiralty. Lewis, Forbes, and Ellery were sufficient to organize the Board. Accordingly on December 8, 1779, Congress resolved “that all matters heretofore referred to the marine committee be transmitted to the board of admiralty.”[233] On December 10 the Board of Admiralty wrote to the Navy Board at Boston, informing it of the dissolution of the Marine Committee, and directing it to address in the future all letters and applications relating to the navy to the “Commissioners of the Admiralty of the United States.”[234]

Upon the organization of the Board of Admiralty, its difficulties in obtaining quorums began; and the troubles of Congress in its search for additional commissioners continued. On January 22, 1780, Congress gave Brigadier-General Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania an opportunity to decline a commissionership.[235] On March 21 Lewis was complaining to Congress that Forbes was sick, and that consequently there had been no Board since the 4th instant. He hoped Congress would fill up the vacancy and prevent the navy business from being longer suspended.[236] On the death of Forbes on March 25, Congress elected James Madison to fill his place. Madison had but recently arrived at Philadelphia as a delegate from Virginia.

In June, 1780, Lewis was again in trouble and was writing to Congress. He conceived that the addition of members of Congress to the Board of Admiralty was principally intended to lay such information before Congress from time to time as the Board desired to give, to explain its reports, and in the absence, or during the sickness, of a commissioner to make a quorum. He said that, notwithstanding the attention which Madison and Ellery had been disposed to give, their necessary attendance on Congress did not admit of their being daily and constantly present at the sessions of the Board; that Ellery had been superseded in Congress; and that at present there was no Board for lack of a quorum.[237] Congress once more came to the rescue of Lewis and his Board by appointing Ellery and Thomas Woodford as commissioners.[238] Ellery at once accepted, but Woodford for some reason declined the appointment. Congress never obtained a third commissioner. In the fall of 1780 Daniel Huntington of Connecticut and Whitmill Hill of North Carolina were the Congressional members of the Board. On their being supplanted in November, 1780, by new delegates to Congress from their respective states, it took the urgent solicitation of Lewis to get Congress to fill the vacancies.[239] When the Board was discontinued in July, 1781, it had but one Congressional member, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer of Maryland.

To all intents and purposes Lewis and Ellery were the Board of Admiralty; and in many respects they were well qualified for their positions. Both were able men, though not brilliant. Both had passed the meridian of life; Lewis was in his sixty-seventh year, and Ellery in his fifty-second. Both had taken prominent parts in the Revolutionary counsels in their respective states; both had been members of the Continental Congress and of the Marine Committee. Both were among the immortal Signers of the Declaration of Independence. Lewis had amassed a fortune as an importing merchant in New York, and had served in the French and Indian war. Ellery had been a merchant, and later a lawyer in Newport, Rhode Island. Both men were interested in naval affairs, and had rendered good service on the Marine Committee. Lewis’s work on the Board of Admiralty exceeded that of Ellery.

From the first the Board of Admiralty was more dependent on Congress than the Marine Committee had been. Congress, always jealous of its prerogatives, naturally permitted a freer exercise of power to a committee of its own members, than to a mixed board, whose work was almost entirely that of commissioners selected outside the membership of Congress. To the Board’s dependence on Congress for its organization was added that for means to carry out its naval program. The frequency with which it went to Congress asking for quorums and money indicates its helplessness and weakness.

The work of the Board of Admiralty was, generally speaking, that of the Marine Committee under a change of name. It managed the dwindling business of the navy from December, 1779, until July, 1781. It was served by the Navy Boards and naval agents of its predecessor, the Marine Committee. Immediately after its organization, the Board of Admiralty, in compliance with the resolutions of Congress, urged the Navy Boards and naval agents to transmit to it accurate accounts of their transactions up to December 31, 1779. Owing to the loose methods of business which obtained during the Revolution, the agents of the Board found it in most cases impossible to make such statements.

The failure of the agents properly to report their accounts, together with a diminution in the naval business of Congress, now led to some decrease in naval machinery. In August, 1780, the Board recommended that the two Philadelphia prize agents be discharged, since it had not been able to induce them by means of its repeated written and verbal requests to exhibit their accounts. Congress now discontinued their office and gave their work to the Board of Admiralty.[240] In the winter of 1780-81 the resignations of Winder and Wharton, as commissioners of the Navy Board at Philadelphia, were accepted by Congress, and the duties of this Board were vested in its remaining member, James Read.[241] On May 7, 1781, Congress accepted the resignation of Deshon of the Navy Board at Boston.[242] The work of the Navy Boards and naval agents had now greatly diminished. Already the settling of naval accounts was becoming one of their principal tasks. After 1779 there were few Continental prizes to libel. Upon the resignation of the naval agents at Philadelphia, those at Boston, Portsmouth, and New London were the only ones of consequence.

The Board of Admiralty was called to act upon divers letters, petitions, and memorials, differing little from the similar communications which Congress referred to the Marine Committee. It also fell to its lot to prepare and report not a little important legislation. The reports of the Board, which were in writing, were chiefly the work of Lewis and Ellery, and were presented to Congress by the Congressional members of the Board. Congress usually referred these reports to a committee, before it discussed them or took final action upon them. Not a few of the reports of the Board were, however, pigeon-holed by Congress, and no action was taken upon them. The naval legislation of Congress during the incumbency of the Board of Admiralty was in part rendered necessary by the decline of the navy. Certain other legislation was caused by the putting into effect of the Articles of Confederation on March 1, 1781; and a few Congressional resolutions on naval affairs may be attributed to the special legislative activity and enterprise of the Board of Admiralty.

In January, 1780, Congress on the recommendation of the Board of Admiralty passed a resolution which was no doubt in harmony with administrative economy and thrift, but which pressed hard upon many naval officers. The pay of all officers in the navy not in actual service was at once to cease. Their commissions were to be deposited with the most convenient Navy Board, until the officers should be again called into service; each officer was to retain his rank.[243] This was merely a courteous way of disestablishing the larger part of the navy. Owing to the capture and destruction of many Continental vessels, most of the naval officers were not in actual service. The number of commissioned officers in actual service in both navy and marine corps at this time was about twenty. It is clear that the Continental Congress was unfriendly to the theory that an employee of a government has a vested right in his office.

On July 11, 1780, naval salaries, subsistence money, and bounties were ordered to be paid in specie; forty Continental dollars were considered equal to one of specie. On the same day, in order that the depleted crews might perchance be recruited, Congress voted a bounty of twenty dollars to able, and ten dollars to ordinary seamen who should enlist in the navy for twelve months.[244] On August 7 it provided that officers who had served aboard vessels of twenty guns or upwards, and who should afterwards be detailed to vessels of less armament, should suffer no diminution in pay.[245] These provisions all indicate a declining government and navy.

On February 8, 1780, the Board of Admiralty secured the re-enaction of the resolutions of May 6, 1778, concerning the holding of courts of enquiry and courts-martial.[246] The most important provision of these resolutions, it is recalled, lessened the requirements for the membership of courts-martial as fixed by Adams’s rules. On the partial disestablishment of the navy in January it became increasingly difficult to assemble courts-martial composed entirely of naval officers. The only naval captain cashiered by a court-martial held under the direction of the Board of Admiralty was the eccentric Peter Landais.[247]

On May 4, 1780, the Board of Admiralty reported and Congress adopted the following device for a seal: “The arms, thirteen bars mutually supporting each other, alternate red and white, in a blue field, and surmounted by an anchor proper. The crest a ship under sail. The motto, sustentans et sustentatus. Legend, U. S. A. Sigil. Naval.”[248] The anchor and ship under sail are still a part of the seal of the Department of the Navy. Instead of the arms, motto, and former legend, there now appear an eagle with outstretched wings, and the words “Navy Department, United States of America.”

On April 20, 1780, Congress adopted a new form of commission for naval officers, which the Board of Admiralty had drafted.[249] This varied little from the one which had been used since the beginning of the Revolution. With slight changes in phraseology made to adapt it to the government under the Constitution, it is still used in the Department of the Navy at Washington. It is this form properly filled out which constitutes our present Admiral’s title to his rank and office. The Board also prepared a form of commission, of bond, and of instructions for commanders of private vessels of war.[250] In the instructions the rights of neutrals were especially guarded. Following the lead of “Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias,” Congress declared that the goods of belligerents on board neutral vessels, with the exception of contraband, were not subject to capture. It confined the term contraband to those articles expressly declared to be such in the treaty of amity and commerce of February 6, 1778, between the United States and France.[251]

Congress on March 27, 1781, passed an ordinance relative to the capture and condemnation of prizes. This law was enacted by virtue of the ninth article of the Articles of Confederation, which vested the war powers in Congress. It codified the resolutions of November 25, 1775, and March 23, 1776. It was more severe than these resolutions, and omitted certain indulgences and exemptions, which they contained. It prescribed the penalty of forfeiture of vessel without trial for those captors who destroyed or falsified their ship papers. One of its provisions related to salvage.[252] This law and also the one of April 7, 1781, fixing the instructions of commanders of private armed vessels, brought former legislation into conformity with the Articles of Confederation.

The Board of Admiralty and Congress were inclined to disagree as to the proper construction to be placed upon the ninth article of the Articles of Confederation, which gave Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war.” In a report which it made to Congress under date of May 29, 1781, after referring to the commissions which Massachusetts had issued to the “Protector” and “Mars,” two ships of the navy of that state, it said that “the Board humbly conceives that Commissions issuing from different Fountains of Power, is a matter which may merit the attention of the United States in Congress assembled who are the supreme power in Peace and War.” The Board was inclined to take the view that Massachusetts had no right to issue these commissions. The committee of Congress to whom the report was referred interpreted more narrowly the war powers of Congress than did the Board of Admiralty. It conceived that each state had the right to issue commissions to ships of war under the regulations established by Congress, and that the only step necessary to be taken for the present was for the Board to transmit to each state a copy of the present regulations governing the issuing of commissions.[253] This incident is noteworthy in its indicating the existence of “strict” and “loose” constructionists within three months after the Articles of Confederation were adopted.

If another illustration is needed to show the dependence of the makers of the American navy upon British models, some words of the Board of Admiralty are in point. For a long time it had under consideration a revision of the rules and regulations of the Continental navy. Concerning its intention to inspect the British rules and incorporate into its new code such of them as were adapted to the American navy, it observed that it did not “think it unlawful to be taught by an enemy whose naval skill and power, until the reign of the present illustrious King of France, were superior to that of any kingdom or state on earth.”[254] It is believed that the work of the Board in this particular was not brought before Congress.

On January 15, 1780, Congress created a permanent Court of Appeals for the trial of prize cases appealed from state admiralty courts. Since January 30, 1777, such cases had been heard and determined by a standing committee composed of five members of Congress. Such a committee naturally lacked permanency, expertness, and technical and legal knowledge. The Court established in January, 1780, was to consist of three judges, who were to try, in accordance with the law of nations, questions of fact as well as law. On January 22, 1780, Congress chose as the three judges of the Court, George Wythe of Virginia, William Paca of Maryland, and Titus Hosmer of Connecticut.[255]

When the Board of Admiralty took charge of the navy in December, 1779, there were ten Continental cruisers in American waters. The “Deane,” 32, was fitting for sea at Boston; the “Trumbull,” 28, was still in the Connecticut river; the “Providence,” 28, “Boston,” 24, “Queen of France,” 28, and “Ranger,” 18, were on their way to Charleston, South Carolina, in whose defence they were to assist; the “Confederacy,” 32, was at Martinique repairing and refitting; and three vessels were still on the stocks, the “America,” 74, at Portsmouth, “Bourbon,” 36, at Chatham on the Connecticut river, and “Saratoga,” 18, at Philadelphia. The “Alliance” was at the Texel in Holland where she had arrived after playing an ignominious part in the celebrated fight of Jones off Flamborough Head. This is not a formidable fleet, and its future movements have little bearing upon the great naval conflict now being waged between the mistress of the seas on the one side and France and Spain on the other. The Continental navy, however, still had some important errands to run, both Washington and the French were to ask its assistance, and on a few occasions the enemy was to find its officers and sailors no mean combatants.

In completing the vessels which were building and in refitting those which were in commission, the Board of Admiralty was from the first sorely embarrassed by a lack of money. The difficulties which the Marine Committee had encountered were now intensified by the prostration of the country’s finances and credit. The Board resorted to all means within reason in its attempts to obtain the requisites for prosecuting its work. In January, 1780, it wrote to the Board of Treasury that unless money was at once forthcoming the Naval Department would be at a standstill; and that not less than one hundred thousand dollars would be sufficient for its needs.[256] It eagerly sought the proceeds to be derived from the sale of rum, wine, fruit, and sugar, taken from Continental prizes. In the summer of 1780 in order that its vessels might be in condition to render assistance to the expected French fleet, the Board solicited aid from the governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut; pressed the Commissary-General of Issues of the Continental Army to furnish it with “62,820 weight of Bread and 13,260 weight of Flour” with all despatch;[257] and finally, applied to John Holker, the Consul-General of France at Philadelphia, for a loan of 60,000 pounds of bread, promising to take special pains to repay it.[258]

Thus hampered, the Board was unable to accomplish much with its little fleet. During its incumbency some half-dozen cruises were made by the Continental vessels. Twenty prizes were captured; half of them only reached safe ports. Two of the prizes were His Majesty’s brigs “Atalanta,” 16, and “Trepassey,” 14, which were taken by the “Alliance,” 36, Captain John Barry, in May, 1781, when returning from France. During the fight, which lasted four hours, the gallant Barry was wounded in the shoulder. This voyage of Barry, during which he captured seven prizes, was the most successful one made under the direction of the Board of Admiralty.

In June, 1780, one of the most hotly contested engagements fought at sea during the Revolution occurred to the northward of the Bermudas between the “Trumbull,” 28, Captain James Nicholson, the ranking officer of the Continental navy, and the Liverpool privateer “Watt,” 32, Captain Coulthard. After a fight of two hours and a half both vessels withdrew seriously disabled, and with difficulty made their ways to their respective ports—the “Trumbull” to Boston and the “Watt” to New York. A British account of the engagement places the loss of the “Watt” at eighty-eight men, and that of the “Trumbull” at “considerable more.” The Americans gave their own loss as thirty-eight men, and the British as ninety-two. The “Trumbull” had two lieutenants killed. Gilbert Saltonstall, the captain of marines onboard the “Trumbull,” wrote a vivid account of the fight. He was in the thick of it, and received eleven wounds. He said that “upon the whole there has not been a more close, obstinate, and bloody engagement since the war. I hope it won’t be treason if I don’t except even Paul Jones’. All things considered we may dispute titles with him.”[259] This was the first cruise of the “Trumbull.” The other twelve frigates of the original thirteen were at this time either destroyed or captured.

In July, 1780, a futile plan for an attack on New York was made. The Continental navy and army were to coöperate with the French fleet under the Admiral the Chevalier de Ternay. Under the direction of the Board of Admiralty, the Continental vessels continued to make voyages to France and the West Indies. The losses suffered by the navy during 1780 and the first half of 1781 were considerable. The “Boston,” “Providence,” “Queen of France,” and “Ranger” were surrendered to the British on the fall of Charleston in May, 1780. The “Confederacy,” 32, Captain Seth Harding, returning from Cape Francois with a load of military stores and colonial produce, was, on April 14, 1781, captured by the British naval ships, “Roebuck,” 44, and “Orpheus,” 32. The “Confederacy” was taken into the British navy under the name of “Confederate.” In March, 1781, the “Saratoga,” 18, Captain John Young, foundered at sea and all on board were lost.[260]

Early in 1781 Congress resolved to supersede the Board of Admiralty with a Secretary of Marine, but failed to find a man who was willing to accept the new office. In June, 1781, the plan of appointing an Agent of Marine, and vesting in him the duties of the Board of Admiralty, pending the selection of a Secretary of Marine, was brought forward in Congress. The commissioners of admiralty were able to forecast the results of this agitation for a new naval system.[261] 2 On July 9, 1781, Ellery informed Congress “that his family affairs pressed his return home, and therefore requested leave of absence.”[262] As there was at this time but one Congressional member serving on the Board, on the absence of Ellery no quorum could be obtained. Lewis now prayed Congress to permit him to resign, or to give him such further directions “as they in their wisdom shall deem meet.”[263] On July 17 Congress accepted his resignation.[264] On July 18 Congress put the marine prisoners in charge of the Commissary of Prisoners of the army, and ordered the seal of the admiralty to be deposited with the Secretary of Congress until a Secretary of Marine should be appointed.[265] The Revolutionary Naval Department was without a head.

The Board of Admiralty was not a satisfactory executive. It was at all times dependent on its Congressional members for quorums. It proved to be slower, more cumbersome, and less responsible than the Marine Committee. The management of the navy still lacked unity and concentration. On the other hand, had the Board not been superseded, its commissioners would no doubt in time have developed greater expertness and technical skill than did the members of the Marine Committee. It should also be said that under more favorable auspices the Board of Admiralty would have shown a higher administrative efficiency than it did; for its lines had indeed fallen in unpleasant places, and a bankrupt federal treasury and a decadent Congress denied it the means requisite to the successful prosecution of its work.