FOOTNOTES
[1] In general on Laodicea and the First Crusade see Riant, Scandinaves en Terre Sainte, pp. 132 ff.; Chalandon, Alexis Iᵉʳ, pp. 210 ff.; Röhricht, Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges, pp. 205-207.
[2] Usama ibn Munkidh, Autobiographie, French translation by Hartwig Derenbourg (Paris, 1895), p. 107.
[3] Ibn el-Athir, Histoire des Atabecs de Mosul, in H. C. Or., ii, 2, p. 17.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Chronique d’Alep, ibid., iii, p. 578. There is possibly some confirmation of this in the following statement of Cafaro of Genoa: “In tempore enim captionis Antiochiae arma manebat [Laodicea], nisi ecclesia episcopalis ubi clerici morabantur.” Annales Genuenses, in H. C. Oc., v, p. 66.
[6] “XII Kalendas Novembris Antiochiam obsedimus, iamque vicinas civitates Tharsum et Laodiciam multasque alias vi cepimus.” Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 145.
[7] H. C. Oc., v, p. 371.
[8] “Sed antequam ad reliqua perveniamus, de his praetermittere non debemus qui, pro amore sanctissimae expeditionis, per ignota et longissima aequora Mediterranei et Oceani navigare non dubitaverunt. Etenim Angli, audito nomine ultionis Domini in eos qui terram Nativitatis Iesu Christi et apostolorum eius indigne occupaverant, ingressi mare Anglicum, et circinata Hispania, transfretantes per mare Oceanum, atque sic Mediterraneum mare sulcantes, portum Antiochiae atque civitatem Laodiciae, antequam exercitus noster per terram illuc veniret, laboriose obtinuerunt. Profuerunt nobis eo tempore tam istorum naves, quam et Genuensium. Habebamus enim ad obsidionem, per istas naves et per securitatem eorum, commercia a Cypro insula et a reliquis insulis. Quippe hae naves quotidie discurrebant per mare, et ob ea Graecorum naves securae erant, quia Sarraceni eis incurrere formidabant. Quum vero Angli illi vidissent exercitum proficisci in Iherusalem, et robor suarum navium a longinquitate temporis imminutum, quippe quum usque ad triginta in principio naves habuissent, modo vix decem vel novem habere poterant, alii dimissis navibus suis et expositis, alii autem incensis, nobiscum iter acceleraverunt.” H. C. Oc., iii, pp. 290-291.
[9] “Civis quidam noster, Brunus nomine, … cum Anglorum navibus ad ipsam usque pervenit Antiochiam.” Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 165. The letter contains a number of chronological data, from which it is clear that Bruno set out from Italy in 1097 and that he arrived in Syria shortly before 5 March 1098. Hagenmeyer reasons plausibly that he landed at Port St. Simeon on 4 March 1098.
[10] Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 177.
[11] Grandson of Edmund Ironside, and claimant to the English throne upon the death of Harold in 1066.
[12] Ordericus, iv, pp. 70-71.
[13] G. R., ii, p. 310; cf. p. 449. Davis—who by a slip of the pen names him Baldwin—places this Robert among the native Englishmen who joined Robert Curthose at Laodicea. Normans and Angevins, p. 100. But William of Malmesbury, who is the sole authority, makes no mention of him before the siege of Ramleh. Freeman is more careful. William Rufus, ii, p. 122.
[14] “Normanniae comes ea tempore [i.e., in tertio mense obsidionis] aberat.” H. C. Oc., iii, p. 243.
[15] “Abscesserant interea ex castris, exosi taedia, comites, Blesensis in Cyliciam, Laodiciam Normannus; Blesensis Tharsum ob remedium egestatis, Normannus ad Anglos spe dominationis. Angli ea tempestate Laodiciam tenebant, missi ab imperatore tutela; cuius fines vagus populabatur exercitus, ipsam quoque cum violentia irrumpere tentantes. In hac formidine Angli assertorem vocant praescriptum comitem, consilium fidele ac prudens. Fidei fuit fidelem domino suo virum, cui se manciparent, asciscere; iugo Normannico se subtraxerant, denuo subdunt, hoc prudentiae: gentis illius fidem experti et munera, facile redeunt unde exierant. Igitur Normannus comes, ingressus Laodiciam, somno vacabat et otio; nec inutilis tamen, dum opulentiam nactus, aliis indigentibus large erogabat: quoniam conserva Cyprus baccho, cerere, et multo pecore abundans Laodiciam repleverat, quippe indigentem, vicinam, Christicolam et quasi collacteam: ipsa namque una in littore Syro et Christum colebat, et Alexio serviebat. Sed nec sic excusato otio, praedictus comes frustra semel atque iterum ad castra revocatur; tertio, sub anathemate accitus, redit invitus: difficilem enim habebat transitum commeatio, quam comiti ministrare Laodicia veniens debebat.” H. C. Oc., iii, p. 649.
[16] Ibid., iv, p. 254.
[17] Ibid., v, p. 742.
[18] H. C. G., i, p. 66.
[19] “Inventaire critique des lettres historiques des croisades,” in Archives de l’Orient latin, i, pp. 189-191.
[20] Alexis Iᵉʳ, pp. 208-212.
[21] Turcopoles are defined by Albert as “gens impia et dicta Christiana nomine, non opere, qui ex Turco patre et Graeca matre procreati [sunt].” H. C. Oc., iv, p. 434.
[22] Ibid., pp. 348-349, 380, 447.
[23] “Hi collectione navium a diversis terris et regnis contracta, videlicet ab Antwerpia, Tila, Fresia, Flandria, per mare Provincialibus in terra Sancti Aegidii, de potestate comitis Reimundo, associati.”
[24] H. C. Oc., iv, pp. 500-501.
[25] “Post captionem Antiochiae, decreto itinere suo cum ceteris in Iherusalem.” H. C. Oc., iv, p. 501.
[26] Cf. Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, no. 341.
[27] Alexis Iᵉʳ, p. 212.
[28] Annales Genuenses, in H. C. Oc., v, p. 66.
[29] Son of Malcolm Canmore.
[30] A.-S. C., a. 1097; Henry of Huntingdon, p. 230. The former places Edgar’s expedition to Scotland after Michaelmas (29 September), the latter after Martinmas (11 November). Cf. Florence of Worcester, ii, p. 41.
[31] “Navium diversi generis et operis multitudinem … quarum mali mirae altitudinis, auro purissimo operti, in radiis solis refulgebant.” H. C. Oc., iv, p. 348.
[32] Supra, p. 230.
[33] Chalandon, Alexis Iᵉʳ, pp. 212-214, 217.
[34] Supra, p. 231.
[35] This is clear from the accounts of both Raymond of Aguilers and Ralph of Caen. Cf. supra, pp. 231, 233.
[36] Alexis Iᵉʳ, ch. vii.
[37] Ralph of Caen, supra, pp. 233-234.
[38] Raymond of Aguilers, supra, p. 233.
[39] Tudebode, in H. C. Oc., iii, p. 43.
[40] On the treaty relations between Alexius and the crusaders see Chalandon, Alexis Iᵉʳ, ch. vi.
[41] Albert of Aix says that it was handed over to the Emperor by Count Raymond, but, as has been pointed out above, his account is hardly trustworthy. There is a statement in Raymond of Aguilers to the effect that during the siege of Arka (spring of 1099) Count Raymond sent Hugh de Monteil to Laodicea to fetch the cross of the late Bishop Adhemar: “Misit itaque comes Guillelmum Ugonem de Montilio, fratrem episcopi Podiensis, Laodiciam, ubi crux dimissa fuerat cum capella ipsius episcopi.” H. C. Oc., iii, p. 287. It is possible that this indicates some closer Provençal connection with Laodicea at this period than I have allowed.
[42] “Quae Christianae erat potestatis.” H. C. Oc., iv, p. 450.
[43] Ibid., p. 453.
[44] G. F., pp. 428-429.
[45] H. C. Oc., iii, pp. 276, 295. In the former passage Raymond, writing from the standpoint of Arka, mentions the arrival of Greek, Venetian, and Genoese (?) provision ships, which, in the absence of a port directly opposite Arka, were obliged to turn back northward and put in at Tortosa and Laodicea; in the latter, recording the disaster which overtook the Genoese ships at Jaffa in June, he notes that one escaped and returned to Laodicea, “ibique sociis et amicis nostris, de nobis qui eramus Iherosolymis, sicuti erat, denuntiavit.” For the date cf. Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, no. 394. For the identification of naves nostrae or naves de nostris with the ships of the Genoese, cf. H. C. Oc., iii, pp. 294, 298.
[46] Albert of Aix, in H. C. Oc., iv, p. 500; Ordericus, iv, pp. 70, 71; letter of Dagobert, Godfrey, and Raymond, to the Pope, in Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 173.
[47] Cf. Chalandon, Alexis Iᵉʳ, chs. vi, vii.
[48] Supra, p. 241.
[49] Raymond of Aguilers, in H. C. Oc., iii, p. 286.
[50] Gesta Triumphalia Pisanorum, H. C. Oc., v, p. 368.
[51] On the decline of the Byzantine fleet in the eleventh century see Carl Neumann, “Die byzantinische Marine,” in Historische Zeitschrift, lxxxi (1898), pp. 1-23.
[52] Albert of Aix, in H. C. Oc., iv, p. 500.
[53] Ibid., pp. 500-503; Ordericus, iv, pp. 70-72; Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 173.
[54] Albert of Aix, in H. C. Oc., iv, p. 503.
[55] Chalandon, Alexis Iᵉʳ, pp. 207 ff.
[56] Albert of Aix, in H. C. Oc., iv, p. 504; cf. Ordericus, iv, p. 72.
[57] Albert of Aix, in H. C. Oc., iv, p. 504; Ordericus, iv, pp. 72-75; Fulcher, pp. 320-321, 342-343; Translatio S. Nicolai Venetiam, in H. C. Oc., v, p. 271.
APPENDIX F
THE BATTLE OF TINCHEBRAY[1]
The tactics of the battle of Tinchebray have been the subject of much discussion among recent writers, including the specialists in military history. There is general agreement as to the strategical stroke by which the victory was won, viz., a surprise attack upon the flank of the ducal forces by a band of mounted knights from Maine and Brittany. But as to the disposition of the troops in the two main armies, widely different views are held upon two points.
(1) Oman thinks that the battle formation on each side was an extended line made up of a right, centre, and left.[2] Ramsay, on the other hand, holds that the opposing forces were “marshalled in column, in successive divisions”;[3] and this view is accepted by Drummond,[4] by Delbrück,[5] and by Davis,[6] the two latter conjecturing a formation in échelon. Ramsay’s view is pretty clearly supported by the sources. Ordericus Vitalis (iv, p. 229) designates a first, second, and third acies, or division, on the side of the king, and a first and last (extrema) acies on the side of the duke; and, according to his account, only the first acies, i.e., the leading elements, of the two opposing forces engaged in the fighting. The contemporary letter of a priest of Fécamp, which is discussed below, is also specific with regard to the royal forces, describing a first and a second acies.[7]
(2) The larger question in debate between the specialists, however, turns upon the relative importance of cavalry and infantry in the battle of Tinchebray. Oman, relying upon a very specific passage in Henry of Huntingdon (p. 235), and placing a strained interpretation upon Ordericus Vitalis (iv, p. 229), holds that the battle was almost wholly an affair of infantry, and therefore almost without precedent in the tactics of the period.[8] For Ramsay, on the other hand, it was mainly an engagement of cavalry, the foot soldiers playing but a minor part.[9] Drummond has gone even further and taken great pains to demonstrate that it was a “ganze normale Schlacht des XII. Jahrhunderts,” i.e., a battle between mounted knights, the foot soldiery that happened to be present being held entirely in reserve;[10] and Drummond’s conclusions have been accepted without question by Delbrück.[11]
It is surprising that in none of the discussion above noted has any account been taken of the most important extant source for the tactics of Tinchebray, viz., a letter from a priest of Fécamp to a priest of Séez written a very few days after the engagement, and describing with exactness certain tactical features of the battle. If not actually by an eyewitness, the letter is still by one who was in touch with the king and who was well informed as to the disposition of the royal forces. It is, therefore, entitled to rank as an authority above any of the accounts in the chronicles. It was first discovered by Paul Meyer in an Oxford manuscript,[12] and published in 1872 by Léopold Delisle as a note in his great edition of the chronicle of Robert of Torigny (i, p. 129). But, strangely overlooked by all the military historians, it remained unused, and was rediscovered by H. W. C. Davis and published with extensive comment in 1909 in the English Historical Review (xxiv, pp. 728-732) as a “new source.” As afterwards turned out, Davis’s transcription of the letter had been exceedingly faulty—rendering, indeed, a part of the text which was fundamental for tactics quite unintelligible—and in a later number of the Review (xxv, p. 296) it was again published in a corrected text. By a comparison with the original edition of Delisle[13] it appears that, by an almost unbelievable coincidence, the same omission of an entire line of the manuscript was made there as in the edition of Davis. Yet all transcripts have been made from a single manuscript, viz., Jesus College, Oxford, no. 51, fol. 104. We have, then, at last, a correct edition of this important source in the English Historical Review, xxv, p. 296.[14]
Davis, in commenting on the tactics of the battle in the light of this letter, but from his own faulty transcript, maintains that neither of the extreme views is correct, and suggests “a third interpretation of the evidence, midway between the two existing theories.”[15] He holds that infantry played an important part in the action, but still assigns much prominence to the cavalry. Apropos of the corrected text of the priest’s letter, however, he remarks: “Taking the omitted words into consideration, it is clear that the foot soldiers played a larger part in the battle than I allowed in my article. The second of Henry’s divisions, like the first, was composite, containing both infantry and cavalry.”[16] This, indeed, is the correct view. Our conception of the battle of Tinchebray must be based upon the sources, and not upon a preconceived theory of the all-importance of the mounted knight in twelfth-century warfare. Drummond and Delbrück have quite unjustifiably ignored Henry of Huntingdon in favor of Ordericus Vitalis. Whatever the theorists may hold, foot soldiers did play an unusually large part in the battle of Tinchebray. In view of the explicit statement of Henry of Huntingdon (p. 235) and of the priest of Fécamp[17] it cannot be denied that, on the king’s side at least, some knights were dismounted and fought on foot, in order that they might stand more firmly (ut constantius pugnarent). On the other hand, Oman, while perfectly justified in pointing out the unusual prominence given to foot soldiers, certainly exaggerates in representing the battle as almost wholly an affair of infantry. The large part played by cavalry is clear both from the explicit statement of the priest of Fécamp and from the account of Ordericus Vitalis. The battle of Tinchebray may, therefore, still claim to stand as an important precedent in the development of mediaeval tactics because of the unusual combination of infantry and cavalry in the fighting line.