I
The ambitious offensive which the Germans had launched on July 15 had collapsed. Our somewhat tentative counter-offensive at Hamel had been surprisingly successful, and there had been a complete change in the general military situation.
The German reserves were, it would seem, nearly used up, while ours—fresh troops which had become available during the spring and early summer—had now been incorporated and trained. Better still, the American Army was growing rapidly.
We were at last ready again to take the offensive on a grand scale.
On July 23, when the success of the battles of the 18th was well assured, a conference was held in which General Foch asked that the British, French, and American Armies should each simultaneously take the offensive.
Their assaults were to be immediate.
On the British front, after some consideration of the rival merits of various battle sites, it was decided that the attack was to be delivered to the east of Amiens on a front extending from Albert to Montdidier, and was to have for its immediate object the freeing of the Paris-Amiens railway, whose proximity to the German lines had proved so exceedingly hampering to our transport arrangements.
If the battle was successful, our advance could be exploited in a second attack directed towards the St. Quentin-Cambrai line. This line was one whose integrity was of vital importance to the enemy, as he had long ago confessed in the labour and money which he had poured out upon the vast elaborations of the Hindenburg defences.
For, twenty miles behind the Hindenburg Line lay the great railway centres round Maubeuge, the key position of his whole system of lateral communication.
If we could once penetrate so far, we should cut the only communications by which the German forces to the south in Champagne could be supplied and maintained, and should sever these troops completely from the group of German Armies operating in Flanders.
Of this great enterprise the first step was the ever memorable Battle of Amiens.