II
Preparations for the great attack were instantly begun. The battle plans were first made known in the last days of July to the commanders who were to take part, “Z” day being fixed for August 8.
The three Brigades of Tanks which were to fight, (the 5th, 3rd, and 4th) had their first intimation of what was afoot on July 27, and their orders were confirmed on August 4.
Briefly, these were the general lines on which the battle was to be fought.
Preparations were to be rushed through. They were to be as secret as brief.
The battle itself was to be in two phases.
First, an attack without artillery preparation, but under the protection of a creeping barrage. The whole action was to be very much on the lines of the First Battle of Cambrai, save that this time (1) an even larger number of Tanks—about 430 including Whippets—were to head the battle; (2) that light skirmishing lines of infantry were to be used; and that (3) as at Hamel we were this time attacking a more or less improvised defence line. The second phase of the attack, which was to be made by a fresh wave of troops, was to start about four hours after zero, that is, after the first objective had been taken.
During this second phase, the artillery was to be moved up and we were to advance without a barrage.
On the right was to be the Canadian Corps, and with them the 4th Brigade[67] of Tanks was to fight.
In the centre, with the Australian Corps its usual battle partner, the 5th Tank Brigade,[68] was again to operate.
On the left, north of the Somme, two Divisions of the 3rd Corps were to have the 10th Tank Battalion attached to them.
Behind these three bodies three cavalry Divisions, the 3rd Brigade of Whippet Tanks, and the 17th Battalion of Armoured Cars, were to be concentrated.
Their work was chiefly the exploitation of the second phase. The Armoured Car Battalion had only just returned from operations with the French.
[69]“When the 6th French Cavalry Division was withdrawn to rest, the 17th Battalion proceeded to Senlis, and at 9 a.m., having just entered this town, it received orders to proceed forthwith to Amiens and report to the Headquarters of the Australian Corps. Amiens, which was nearly 100 miles distant, was reached the same night.
“On arriving, Lieut.-Colonel Carter was informed that his unit was to take part in the projected attack east of that town. The chief difficulty foreseen in an armoured car action in this neighbourhood was the crossing of the trenches. Although only one day was available wherein to find a solution to this difficulty, it was accomplished by attaching a small force of Tanks to the Battalion. These Tanks were used to tow the armoured cars over the obstacles, or rather along the tracks the Tanks formed through them. This solution proved eminently successful.”
Short as was the time for preparations, an elaborate deceptive scheme was planned and carried out, to make it seem that we intended to fight in Flanders. Canadians were put into the line on the Kemmel front, where in due course the enemy identified them. Ostentatious Headquarters and Casualty Clearing Stations were conspicuously disposed about the area. Throughout the 1st Army sector our wireless stations hummed with messages about the concentration of troops, and arrangements were made to make it seem that a great assembling of Tanks was taking place near St. Pol. Here, indeed, Tanks elaborately trained with infantry on fine days—days, that is to say, on which the enemy’s long-distance reconnaissance and photographic aeroplanes were likely to be at work behind our lines.
The ruse was perfectly successful and—as we found out afterwards—the news of our “great projected attack in Flanders” soon spread, and by the time we were ready to strike on the Somme the enemy was momentarily expecting to be attacked in force in the north.