FOOTNOTES:
[21] The cause of all this difficulty in procuring carriage for the Bombay army, was a demand of the Scindian camel-owners for payment from the time they were originally hired, which responsibility Sir J. Keane would not undertake, and the camel-owners refused to advance. The demand was no more than usual; and the results of this economy were injurious, and might have been fatal.
[22] It was afterwards known that these tribes had been instigated by Mehrab Khan of Kheiat to annoy us as much as possible during our progress.
[23] The rear columns were attacked here, but by a very small body of Beloochees, who soon retired.
[24] The Dhoomba sheep is so named from Dhoom, the tail, which grows to a great size with this species.
[25] Surwans are camel-drivers.
[26] The cold of Afghanistan may be partly owing to the great quantity of saltpetre diffused over its surface.
[27] On a more accurate survey of the country, water enough was found here to have sufficed the whole army.
KANDAHAR—MURDER OF LIEUT. INVERARITY—THE ARMY CONCENTRATED—ADVANCE BY THE VALLEY OF THE TURNUK UPON GHUZNI.
On the morning of the 27th of April we entered the plain in which Kandahar is situated, and encamped about two miles from the city. This plain is well irrigated and tilled. Gardens enclosed by high mud walls, and abounding with a great variety of fruit, are seen on almost every side on approaching the city; and so level is the plain in its vicinity, that nothing could be discerned but a long mud wall with a few domes looking over it. The wall which encloses Kandahar in an oblong figure, (whose perimeter exceeds three miles,) is flanked by numerous circular bastions, and defended by an irregular dry ditch. The curtain is about twenty feet in thickness at the base, and its relief varies from thirty-five to forty feet, according to the depth or shallowness of the ditch. In the parapet are numerous embrasures and loopholes for matchlocks or jingals. I need scarcely annex to this brief description that it is a place of no strength.
The bazaar runs from the Shikarpore gate, by which we entered, across the city, and is intersected at right angles by a similar bazaar from east to west. At the point of intersection is a large dome, which affords a respite from the sun, now becoming intolerably hot. The city was thronged with inhabitants, in every variety of Eastern costume, busily engaged in their various avocations; and notwithstanding their material change of administration which took place yesterday, business seemed to be going on as quietly as if nothing unusual had occurred. From the estimate formed on that occasion, I should say the natives of Kandahar were not very violent politicians.
The women were clad cap-à-pie in a flowing white robe, (not always particularly clean,) in which a piece of netting was inserted over the eyes, to give them an opportunity of seeing what was passing; although it precluded them from what is said, perhaps unjustly, to constitute a source of satisfaction amongst northerly dames—being seen. A neat green or scarlet leather slipper gave some relief to the ghostlike appearance, and generally attracted observation to a pretty foot.
The palace is situated in the southern quarter, and surrounded by a high shot-proof wall, which was garnished by several old guns of curious workmanship: a legend is attached to some of them, which is not likely to be interesting to the world at large.
An abundance of supplies were procured for the army in Kandahar, and the surviving horses of the cavalry brigade (nearly three hundred had died on the march) once more tasted grain: but the relief came too late with many, whose hearts had been broken, and the greater portion never recovered condition.
About a fortnight after our arrival, the Bombay division joined us, consisting of a wing of H.M. 4th Light Dragoons, H.M.'s 2nd and 17th Regiments, two troops of Horse Artillery, 1st Native Cavalry, 19th Native Infantry, and two companies of Foot Artillery; and now, for the first time, the "Army of the Indus" were assembled, though many hundred miles distant from the river in whose name they were baptized.
The Bombay force had suffered less from famine than ourselves, having marched a shorter distance, and been better supplied with grain: two thousand camel loads were dispatched for their use from Shikarpore, to the grief of the Bengal commissariat.
In May, the hot winds set in with much virulence, and the heat in our tents became very oppressive. In spite of every effort on our parts to reduce the temperature by throwing horse-cloths over the canvas, and keeping wet grass, day and night, against the doors, the thermometer stood at 110° during the heat of the day, and did not fall more than twelve degrees at night. The camp, which was now a long standing one, became exceedingly offensive, owing to the number of dead cattle in the vicinity, principally camels; and the swarms of flies that worried us, enabled one to comprehend what that visitation must have amounted to when sent to plague the Egyptians.
The hospital began to fill rapidly. By the middle of May ours held more than one fourth of the regiment to which I belonged. Jaundice, dysentery, and fever were the prevalent complaints; the two latter, far the most fatal. The 13th Light Infantry and Company's European regiment were very severe sufferers, and were ultimately reduced from sickness and death to a very weak state, especially the former, who buried more than an average of a man a day during the two months we halted at Kandahar. The causes of these complaints, independent of heat, were the bad water drank on the march, and the dampness of the soil in the neighbourhood of the city.
The people of the country being apparently better disposed towards us now than at first, the officers of the army strayed occasionally some miles from camp on fishing and shooting excursions, until these amusements were checked by a tragical event, which occurred on the evening of the 28th of May.
Two officers of the 16th Lancers, Lieuts. Wilmer and Inverarity, were returning towards camp on a sporting excursion rather later in the evening than usual. On ascending an eminence, about four miles from camp, (having given their guns to the grooms to carry,) Inverarity preceded his friend, and rode to the top of a rocky hillock, from whence the camp fires were visible. When he reached this spot about twenty Afghan savages rushed upon their unarmed victim, tore him from his horse (as supposed), and inflicted several mortal wounds with their cimiters. Wilmer, following, unconscious of what had occurred, was suddenly attacked by some of the same gang. Providentially he had a thick walking stick in his hand, which he raised in time to parry the first blow made at his head, and, escaping from his assailants, descended the hill, pursued by the assassins. These he soon distanced, and reaching an outpost of irregular horse about a mile from the place, returned with some of the party in search of the banditti. The cowardly villains had absconded, leaving poor Inverarity covered with wounds, but still alive. He spoke but a few words, faintly describing how he had met with the disaster, and begged for some water, which, as soon as it could be procured, he drank, and almost immediately afterwards expired.
In the dead of night the party arrived in camp with his corpse, so gashed and disfigured, that it could scarcely be recognised by his brother-officers, and the following day his remains were interred with the usual military honours in front of the standard guard.
The malice of his murderers rested not even in the grave, for some months after we heard of a gang (who came from the direction of the place where he was murdered) attempting to dig up his body. Having demolished the tomb, they were interrupted in their accursed project by a party of native infantry quartered in Kandahar, and fled to the hills.
Inverarity's remains were afterwards removed from the spot, and interred in the city of Kandahar.
The barbarians who, it is supposed, committed the deed, were subsequently secured by the exertions of Major Mac Laren[28] of the 16th Native Infantry, while storming a small fort near Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Some articles, supposed to have belonged to Inverarity, were found in their possession; but the punctilious judge did not consider them legally identified, and the assassins were liberated, about in sufficient time, it was conjectured, to fall in with another officer, who was murdered between Kandahar and Caubul.
Had the detection and punishment of the murderers been committed to Shah Soojah (as he requested) there is every reason to suppose they would not have escaped so easily, and the business would have afforded his Majesty sincere pleasure.
Rumours of Dost Mahomed's preparations for an obstinate resistance were now reaching us daily; but the envoy frequently expressed his firm conviction that no opposition would be made. Sir John Keane differed in opinion, and refused to leave the Bombay division behind, according to Mr. Mac Naghten's suggestion, unless the envoy could guarantee that Dost Mahomed would surrender.
This was of course out of the question, and it was at length determined that the whole force should advance, except a small garrison for the city. The commissariat exerted themselves to complete their arrangements for the march, and the approaching departure was joyfully welcomed by the army.
A Kafila, with grain from Shikarpore, arrived opportunely in camp previous to our move, under the escort of two regiments and some local horse, despatched from Kandahar to protect this caravan, as news had been received that two chiefs of the powerful Ghilzie tribe were preparing to pounce on the convoy.
It was fortunate that this precaution had been taken; for it was ascertained that a large body of the enemy had made preparations to surprise these necessary supplies on the road, and the fidelity of the merchant who brought up the caravan was somewhat doubted, until the arrival of the reinforcement put treachery out of his power.
In the beginning of June, the force under Brigadier Sale, which had been detached soon after our arrival in pursuit of the Kandahar chiefs, returned. Those princes had fled to Girishk, a fortress about eighty miles distant from Kandahar, and near the Helmund river, but abandoned it on the approach of their pursuers, and fled towards Herat.
Thus ended, in the most undignified manner, the authority of the three Ameers, for the present. It is singular that in such extremities the scheme of a reconciliation with their brother, Dost Mahomed, had not been resorted to, for it would have been unquestionable policy in that monarch to insure the re-establishment of the Kandahar chiefs to them in their principality, in case of the united forces succeeding to repel the British invasion.
It is evident, however, that no such measures could have been preconcerted to oppose our advance, from the non-occupation of the Kojuck and Bolan passes. The Afghans, near Kandahar, informed us that the chiefs distrusted their subjects, and perhaps with cause.
Weak both in mind and authority, these chiefs hovered irresolutely around their capital, but abandoned the power they had usurped when danger accompanied its retention.
On the 27th of June, our camp was struck, and the Cavalry division, with the 1st Brigade of Infantry and head-quarters, preceded.
Next day, came the second Brigade, Shah Soojah and his motley procession, which swelled daily in numbers, with hordes of Afghans, who came to join the Shah and tender their allegiance (as they affirmed), but in reality, no doubt, to watch the progress of events: to remain faithful in case of success, or plunder in case of a reverse.
The Bombay division of Infantry, under Brigadier Willshire, brought up the rear. One regiment of Bengal Native Infantry and the heavy guns were left at Kandahar.
Most of our officers were on the sick list, and on the remainder the duty was severe, consisting principally of guards to protect the baggage, and pickets. The outlying cavalry picket was ordered, by the commander-in-chief, to take post four miles in advance, where, of course, no baggage was allowed, nor even a groom (strictly speaking) to hold your charger. This picket was posted at nightfall, with orders to fall back on the main picket, in case of feeling an enemy. The main picket was usually posted about a mile from camp, consisting of a squadron of cavalry, four companies of infantry, and two six-pounders, from whence a chain of pickets communicated along the front and round the flanks of the army, whence patrols from the rear-guards completed the circuit.
The third day's march brought us to the Turnuk river, which is a clear and shallow mountain stream, running through a valley sown abundantly with barley and Indian corn. The water was excellent, and supplies for our cattle were daily procurable; but numbers continued to die, unable to overcome the debility ensuing from previous overwork and starvation.
The natives of the valley were peaceable agriculturists, who came constantly into our camp, bringing for sale corn, eggs, fowls, and fruit; but the mountains which flanked our march, at a short distance, were amply stocked with marauders. The sickness under which the army had long suffered now began to abate, or at least, to assume a less virulent character; but the appearance of the sufferers was materially altered. Those of previously stout and portly figures were seen walking about in clothes once fitting closely, but now hanging down like empty pudding-bags; and faces, whose rubicundity once emulated the richest hues of Chateau Margaux, now wore a puckered-up, gamboge aspect, which made sympathy no easy matter with those who were prone to laughter.
Many who had never much flesh to spare, were reduced to varieties of angular shapes, which might have been useful to a mathematician when studiously inclined, on the line of march. Such had been the devastating effects of dysentery and fever on most of the community.
The zealous and able managers of the intelligence department had prophesied that we should probably be seriously molested by the tenants of a strong fort in the Ghilzie country, seven marches from Kandahar, called Khelat-i-Ghilzie.
A bribe had been sent to the two principal chiefs of the Ghilzies,[29] accompanied by a letter from Shah Soojah, desiring their assistance. The money was retained, and an insulting answer of defiance returned.
On approaching Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the adjutant-general of cavalry was sent, with a small escort, to reconnoitre the place.
The brigadier commanding the advanced guard of two squadrons of cavalry, two guns, and a small body of infantry, on approaching this memorable place, espied two or three hundred well-armed Ghilzies on an eminence not far from the road.
Having minutely examined their position, the brigadier pronounced it to be remarkably strong, and prudently resolved to await the arrival of the main body of the army, previously to dislodging the party.
Whilst revolving in his mind the most advisable method of attack, unfortunately, the head of the column hove in sight, and the doubtless brilliant result that might have ensued was precluded by the Ghilzies taking to flight.
It was considered fortunate that the enemy knew not their own strength, or that a more rash officer had not been in command on the occasion, who, in attempting to intercept the retreat of the Ghilzies, might have incurred serious responsibility.
Sir John Keane, on his arrival at the encamping ground, was so satisfied with the arrangements, that he is reported even to have instituted a comparison between the gallant colonel and the Duke of Wellington, in his usual energetic and classical mode of expression.
As we had ascended considerably since leaving Kandahar, and were frequently on high tableland, the heat ceased to annoy us so severely as during the three preceding months, and we considered we had overcome by far our most formidable enemy in the relentless sun.
Various and contradictory rumours continued to pour daily into camp. At one time, it was said that Dost Mahomed, at the head of an army of thirty thousand men, with eighty guns, had taken up a strong position near Caubul; at another, that his chiefs and Kuzzilbaches (Persian mercenaries) having deserted him, he had despaired of making any effectual resistance, and fled towards the Hindoo Koosh. Lastly, we were informed that he had detached two of his sons, with chosen men from the army, to garrison the fortress of Ghuzni; but the same evening, perhaps, merchants would travel through our camp, en route for Kandahar, and declare they had left Ghuzni but a few days, and had not seen a single soldier in the place! These reports, when compared with the actual events, are more reconcilable than appears at a first glance.
Small parties continued to arrive daily, and tender their allegiance to Shah Soojah; and we were authentically informed, that the two before-mentioned Ghilzie chiefs, with about five or six thousand horse each, were moving daily on both flanks, parallel with our line of march, and would neglect no opportunity to harass the army. Of the truth of the latter part of the information, we entertained no doubt, provided they could do it with impunity.
About seventy miles from Ghuzni, we quitted the rich valley of the Turnuk river, and crossed an extensive, well-cultivated plain, thickly studded with small mud forts. The inhabitants of this part of the country dare not dwell in open towns or villages, owing to the numerous bands of marauders infesting the neighbouring mountains, who have no mercy on the defenceless villages.
Small, but luxuriant groves of fruit-trees, bending beneath their loads of rosy-cheeked apples, speckled the plain, and formed a pleasing resting-place for the eye, fatigued with the ceaseless range of barren mountains skirting the valley.
On the 20th of July, we reached a small place called Nance, about twelve miles from Ghuzni; and as yet no authentic intelligence had been received of Dost Mahomed's intentions or movements, nor of any steps having been taken to interrupt our progress.
Sir John Keane, however, received news at this place which induced him to order the rear column to close up to us in the evening. The fort was said to be garrisoned by a body of Dost Mahomed's troops; and Ufzul Khan, his second son, was supposed to be near us with four thousand cavalry. As it was probable that Ufzul Khan would effect a junction with the Ghilzie chiefs, and attempt to surprise our camp during the night, the whole army were drawn up in line on their standard guards soon after sunset, and lay under arms during the night.
Nevertheless, nothing certain was known regarding these reports. Major Garden, the quartermaster-general, had ridden to reconnoitre Ghuzni in the evening, and perceived no signs of its being garrisoned.
At daybreak, on the morning of the 21st, our line broke into three columns, the cavalry on the right, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry on the left, and in this order advanced over the plain, at the extremity of which the fortress of Ghuzni is situated.
As we approached, a nephew of Dost Mahomed came to tender his submission to the Shah, and gave information of the fort being occupied by Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, with a garrison of three thousand infantry and a few cavalry; but he expressed a suspicion that they would evacuate the place. This individual complained of having been ill-treated by his uncle; but there appeared little doubt that the gentleman came into camp merely as a spy.
Reports from the advanced parties continued to state that no garrison was to be seen on the ramparts: however, we continued to advance in the same order.
When within about a mile of the walls, a smart fire of matchlocks was suddenly opened on the advanced guard of infantry on our left, from a small village, and from behind some garden walls. The column immediately halted; the 16th Native Infantry were detached to clear the village, in rear of which was a small redoubt, protected by the fire of a bastion of the fort, on which the Afghans fell back.
Two officers,[30] and several men of the 16th Native Infantry, were wounded by the Afghans in the skirmish.
The artillery now swept past us, and took up their position on an elevated post in a village about four hundred yards distant from the nearest bastion of the fort. At the same time the 4th Dragoons were ordered to the rear to protect the baggage, which, it was supposed, was likely to be attacked by a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been descried on the right, moving in that direction.
The remainder of the cavalry-division were drawn up in close column of squadrons, about three quarters of a mile from Ghuzni, and supplied escorts to the reconnoitring parties.
The garrison now opened their fire upon us, which was answered by our artillery from the village, but the guns, which were only six-pounders, were found to have little or no effect on the walls, in consequence of which they were soon withdrawn, having lost two or three horses from the enemy's fire. Sir John Keane, in his despatch, assigns as a reason for this eccentric cannonade, a desire to unmask the enemy's batteries.
About the same time the infantry were also withdrawn, and bivouacked in rear of some gardens, enclosed by mud walls, and about a mile from the fort.
The cavalry entirely escaped his excellency's notice. Early in the day, several troops had been detached with the different reconnoitring officers; but now being of no further use for the present, we were left standing to our horses' heads, and meditating on what kind of service we could be employed while the rest of the army were bivouacked.
At length, the garrison, being unemployed for the present, pitied our forlorn condition, and prepared to provide for our amusement. A monstrous gun from the citadel, carrying a sixty-eight pound shot, was seen to be trained with much assiduity, in our direction, and we awaited in agreeable suspense the result of the process.
Two little tents had been procured by some of the officers, and pitched on the spot where we had dismounted. Some luxurious fellows had been out on a foraging excursion amongst the baggage, and returned laden with a supply of bread, fowl, cold meat, and milk. This collation was being discussed, and a vote of thanks to the industrious foraging party was in the act of passing, when a loud report from the citadel interrupted them, followed by a load of iron hurtling over our heads, and plunging amongst the mass of baggage and camp followers in rear. This was immediately succeeded by another, better directed, which cut the ropes of our neighbours' tent, wounded one of their servants, and killed a trooper of Native Cavalry.
I never saw two tents struck with such admirable alacrity as on this occasion. I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say that in less than two minutes the tents had disappeared, and the spy-glasses of the inmates were directed at the walls to ascertain the cause of this uncourteous interruption.
The senior officer present now ordered the cavalry to mount, and we retreated half a mile to the rear, through the midst of a mass of baggage which our camp followers were hurrying off with incredible despatch, perceiving the probability of their becoming a target for the merciless Golundauze in the fort.
Scarcely had we picketed our horses, when the trumpet called us again to the saddle, and we changed position to the northern front of Ghuzni, on the Caubul road, and about a mile from the nearest bastion. We reached this ground about sunset; but the infantry, who passed by a more circuitous route, round the other side of the fortress, did not arrive in camp many of them till near midnight.
An incessant fire of cannon, matchlocks, and jingals, was kept up during the night on the troops whilst marching, and after their arrival in camp; but the enemy lost a night's rest, and wasted their ammunition to very small purpose. As they had done us very little injury in the daytime, the night fire was not a subject of much apprehension; but all Asiatics have much confidence in great noise and constant firing, without taking pains about its direction and effect; it keeps up their courage by diverting their thoughts.
At daylight the following morning, from the intelligence received, and the observations of reconnoitring parties, we were better enabled to judge of the difficulties opposed.
Ghuzni is situated in a plain, which it commands easily on every side but the north, where a small range of hills run down to within one hundred and fifty yards of the walls. It is built on a low extensive mound, the foot of which is surrounded by a mud rampart, flanked by numerous circular bastions. The curtain of this enceinte varied from thirty-five to forty-five feet in height, and averaged perhaps twenty in thickness, which rendered it shot-proof to our artillery, as our heaviest guns had been left at Candahar to be sent as a present to Prince Kamran of Herat!
The rampart was defended by a deep wet ditch, over which permanent bridges were built at the gates.
The citadel stands on a rock on the central and most elevated part of the mound, commanding the whole of the town, and about two hundred and fifty yards of the hills on the north, and is surrounded by a thick mud rampart, defended by a fausse-braye. The soles of the embrasures and loopholes in the parapet of the latter were not sufficiently depressed to enfilade the approaches to the citadel.
The gates were all blocked with masonry excepting that which leads to Caubul, and this was built of massive wood, strengthened by iron clamps and bars, and defended by the cross fire of two adjacent bastions.
Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, commanded the garrison, which consisted of three thousand infantry and one thousand four hundred cavalry: amongst the former were about one hundred artillerymen, who had deserted or been reduced in the East India Company's artillery.
The heights on one side of the plain were occupied by a body of about three thousand cavalry, commanded by Ufzul Khan; and on the other, a body of infidels, of similar strength, but infantry, were posted to harass our left.
It was also conjectured that the two Ghilzie chiefs who had been hovering on our flanks on the line of march, had joined their forces with those of Ufzul Khan; and these chiefs were reported to be in command of eight or ten thousand horsemen.
The news of Runjeet Singh's death (which occurred on the 27th of June, 1839) having set Dost Mahomed's mind at rest, regarding any serious co-operation on the part of the Sikhs against him, he was now preparing to move down with all the forces he could assemble, and attack us whilst engaged with the siege of Ghuzni.
His eldest son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, had been detached with about five thousand men to the entrance of the Khyber pass, which Colonel Wade was preparing to enter, in company with the Shah Zada Timoor, Shah Soojah's son.
Colonel Wade commanded a few companies of native infantry and some raw levies, and was supported by a Sikh auxiliary brigade.
Before Colonel Wade entered the Khyber Pass, the Afghan force under Mahomed Akbar had been recalled by Dost Mahomed, under the urgent circumstances then pressing upon him; and the Khyber was entrusted to the defence of the wandering tribes of Khyberees who infest those extensive ranges of mountains.
Our own effective force now scarcely amounted to two thousand eight hundred European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and about four thousand sepoys: so much had the army been reduced by sickness, death, and the detachments left to garrison the places we had passed through—viz., Bukkur, Shikarpore, Quetta, and Candahar.
Exclusive of these, of course, were the Shah's troops, whose contingent, in case of an action, would, it was conjectured, be fully employed in watching the numerous Afghan rabble which flocked around Shah Soojah. These had now swelled to a large amount by the daily influx of armed horsemen, who were as likely to be spies and adherents of Dost Mahomed, as friends of Shah Soojah.
At the best, the bare suspicion of treachery from this armed host rendered it necessary to keep a force on the watch, and the contingent must have been used for that purpose in case of a general engagement.
On the morning of the 22nd of July, Sir John Keane and the engineers were actively employed in reconnoitring the fortress.
Captain Thompson, the chief engineer, having completed his observations, and remarked that a communication was kept up by the garrison with the exterior, through the Caubul gateway, gave it as his opinion that apparently the most practicable means of assault were presented by a coup-de-main, in lieu of a regular assault, (for which we were not provided,) and suggested as a method to attain this purpose, that the Caubul gate should be destroyed by bags of powder.
Some officers were in favour of an immediate escalade, but as that method would necessarily involve a greater loss, and might still remain in reserve, in case of the failure of the former and more expeditious method, Sir John Keane resolved on adopting Captain Thompson's suggestion.
During the morning of the 22nd, we were most of us endeavouring to make amends for the two days and nights of almost unremitting vigilance that had been exercised, when the shrill tones of the alarm trumpet rang confusedly from many quarters of the camp, and caused us all to start up and prepare for the saddle. A smart rattling fire of musketry, interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, was heard, apparently near the foot of the hills, on our left flank, and a hurried report ran along the lines, that Dost Mahomed, with his whole army, had come suddenly upon us.
We were now become too well used to our harness to take long in preparing, and a very few minutes served to show us formed, on our alarm posts.
The Bengal cavalry brigade were immediately dispatched at a round pace towards the scene of action. The ground we passed over was rough and undulating, and in many places covered with crops of high standing corn, which completely intercepted our view; but the nearer rattle of musketry indicated we were not far from the field of strife.
Having ridden over about two miles of country, of the above description, we came upon an open and barren plain, which extended to the foot of the hills, where we descried some of Shah Soojah's contingent, accompanied by two or three guns, closely engaged with a body of two or three thousand Afghans.
On our approach, the Afghans commenced a retreat upon the hills, pressed hard by the Shah's troops, who were unable, however, to bring their guns far up the hill-side.
The cavalry brigade were detached by wings of regiments to the flanks and rear of the heights, in order to intercept the enemy, should the infantry succeed in dislodging them.
The Afghans having ascended to the summit of the hill, took up a hasty order for battle, and awaited their enemies. A deep ravine skirted the base of their position, and its crest was occupied by a party of matchlock-men, thus enfilading the approach by the only practicable ascent. The Shah's troops were not inclined to storm this strong defensible position, but halted behind the ravine, and under cover of rocks and broken ground endeavoured to drive the enemy from the heights by musketry; but the distance between the skirmishing parties, to admit of either fire being very galling, was much too considerable.
We remained watching the skirmish taking place on the heights, in expectation of seeing a reinforcement arrive from camp, which would enable the infantry to dislodge their enemies, and force them into collision with us; but the commander-in-chief refused the application for reinforcements, being resolved to keep the infantry fresh for the work which awaited them on the morrow, and Shah Soojah would not part with any more of his guards. A body of cavalry, as a last resource, endeavoured to mount the hill side, and take the Afghans in reverse, but after ascending a few hundred yards, the rocks and ravines became so numerous that the ascent was quite impracticable, and they reluctantly descended under a harmless salute from the enemy on the summit.
At sunset, the forces were withdrawn to camp, having killed about sixty Afghans, and taken fifty prisoners, with a loss of only a few wounded on the side of the British.
The prisoners being brought into the presence of Shah Soojah, declared they were Ghazees, or Crusaders, bound by a religious vow to take his head, and that the oath of the party would sooner or later be accomplished, although they had not been successful in the present attempt.
"I will, at all events, secure your head now," replied the indignant monarch; and beckoning to his executioner, (who was never far from his master's side, knowing the Shah's predilection for the office,) the speaker's head rapidly disappeared.
The comrades of the decapitated being loth to part with this useful article, showed signs of resistance, when the brave and zealous attendants of his majesty rushed upon the unarmed prisoners, unrestrained by word or gesture of their king, and massacred their victims.
One old man, it is said, escaped to tell his comrades in the mountains the fate of the captives. And this act was perpetrated in the midst of the first Christian army which had set foot in Afghanistan since the creation of the world.
Let it not be supposed that the suppression of the murder lay in the power of the British authorities; there was not, I believe, one British officer present, and the whole merit rests with Shah Soojah; but he was viewed as a mere puppet in our hands, and on us, throughout Asia, will rest the obloquy of this savage massacre. No doubt the Afghans have done as bloody deeds, but it became, therefore, more incumbent to show a better example.