FOOTNOTES:
[28] This gallant soldier fell at the battle of Sobraon.
[29] In the subjugation of this country in 1840, this tribe of Ghilzies were found the most obstinate and inveterate foes to British influence. Khelat-i-Ghilzie was gallantly held by a native infantry regiment (which now bears the name) against frequent attacks of the Ghilzies during the insurrection.
[30] Captain Graves and Lieutenant M'Mullen, 16th Native Infantry.
STORM AND CAPTURE OF GHUZNI—ADVANCE TO MEET DOST MAHOMED—HIS ARMY DESERT HIM, AND HE FLIES TOWARDS THE HINDOO KOOSH.
The plan of operations against Ghuzni having now been arranged, general orders directed the troops to move as quietly as possible from their quarters to the allotted positions. About three in the morning the artillery had occupied the heights near the Caubul gate of the fort, and about three hundred yards from the ramparts. The infantry were drawn up in columns of companies on the road beneath the hills, and to the left rear of the artillery. The cavalry were posted round the fort to intercept the retreat of the garrison and the advance of relief.
The 16th Lancers were on the Caubul road, in the rear of the infantry, as a diversion was expected from the enemy's cavalry in the mountains, in favour of the besieged.
The morning was exceedingly dark, and all around quiet as death; for the garrison, who had hitherto kept up an almost incessant cannonade, seemed to think they had done enough, and were enjoying repose. We began to imagine that they had used up their ammunition in the past vigorous efforts to alarm us, and that the fort had been evacuated.
This oppressive silence was interrupted by the word of command passing down the ranks in a whisper; and the forlorn hope moved to their post near the Caubul gate, to await the result of the engineers' experiment. The bags of powder, amounting to three hundred pounds in weight, were carried by the sappers, supported by a party of European volunteers; and the engineer officers, who placed the powder at the gate, distinctly heard the voices of the Afghan-guard conversing near the gateway. The saucisson was laid, and fired by an officer of the Bengal Engineers.
Suddenly, a broad glare lit up the ramparts, and with a smothered, crushing report, the Caubul gate was shattered into innumerable fragments. In one moment, the face of nature seemed to have awoke in uproar. The rushing and confusion in the city, and on the ramparts, was accompanied by a hasty and random fire from any gun which could be manned, no matter where it was pointed. The whole city, aroused instantaneously from repose, and yet too late, hurried in confused masses to man the walls, ignorant of the disaster which had befallen the gateway. Then burst from the hills the solemn, majestic roar of our artillery; light flashed upon light in uninterrupted succession, and the shell, sped on its mission of death, curved steadily through the lurid atmosphere.
The fort continued a random answer from its guns, and hung out lights from the walls, to discover the locality of their assailants; but this served to direct the fire of our artillery, and the walls were soon cleared of their occupants. The wing of a Native Infantry regiment, posted on the south-eastern front, drew a part of the besieged in that direction, to repel this false attack.
Under cover of the artillery fire, sweeping the parapets, Colonel Dennie, leading four light companies from the 2nd, 13th, 17th, and Company's European Regiment, advanced to storm the Caubul gate, closely followed by Brigadier Sale, in command of the main body of the storming party, consisting of the remainder of those four British regiments.
The enemy opened a smart fire of matchlocks upon the advance, and the gateway was found much obstructed with rubbish and splintered beams from the demolished framework. The postern, turning sharply to the right, and leading to the interior of the place, induced an officer in the passage to suppose it blocked up, in consequence of which, he took upon himself to order a bugler to sound the retreat; but the advanced party having penetrated to the interior, heard, or heeded not, the recal.
Overcoming every obstacle, the gallant Britons rushed, with a loud cheer, through the postern, at whose entrance they were met by a body of Afghan desperadoes, who had thrown themselves devotedly into this passage, resolved to defend it with their lives. Here, the struggle was short, but deadly. Armed with sword and daggers, each Afghan fought and fell, with his face to the enemy; and if a spark of life remained after he had been hurled to the earth, his last act was to direct a sword or pistol against the breast of his hated foe as our men trampled over him in their ownward career. So confined had been the area for combat, that many of the soldiers, being unable to use their weapons at full length in the mêlée, unfixed their bayonets, and used them as daggers; and the broken and blood-stained weapons told with what effect they had been wielded.
The resistance at the entrance having been overcome by the destruction of this desperate band, the cry was, "On—on! to the citadel!"
A panic had now seized and paralysed many of the garrison, for they huddled together in confined spaces, and stood to be slaughtered like sheep, or rushed in frenzy to the walls, and cast themselves from the parapets.
No thought of refuge and opposition in the citadel seemed to have occurred to any, nor had it been sufficiently equipped for defence.
The efforts of the most rational were directed towards an escape outside the walls, by secret outlets; but there, the clear light of morning, and the sabres of the cavalry, left slender hopes of escape.
As daylight brought each minute tracing of the works into view, the gallant British regiment were seen winding up the steep, rocky ascent which led to the citadel, where, with a wild "hurrah!" they burst the gate, mounted the ramparts, and cast loose the gay blazonry of their banners to the wind as it moaned along the shattered battlements of captured Ghuzni.
Scattered parties of the besieged now fled to the tops of the houses, whence, after they had recovered a little from the prevalent panic, a desultory fire was maintained on our soldiery. This useless resistance nullified all attempts to restrain the carnage which ensued, and which the garrison, by not surrendering at once, brought upon themselves. So determined were many to carry war "to the knife," that they would discharge their last pistol at the party advancing to capture them, and then resign themselves, sullenly, to the fate which followed this last act of outrage in the shape of a bullet or a bayonet. Probably, they imagined that no quarter would be granted them; "the quality of mercy" being rarely found "dropping like the gentle dew from heaven" on the rugged surface of Afghanistan.
Possibly, the intelligence of yesterday's massacre of the prisoners by Shah Soojah might have induced them to expect a similar fate in captivity.
A brigade of sepoys which had entered the town and spread on the ramparts, having scoured the buildings, soon cleared them of their defenders, and put an end to all resistance in a few hours, the British regiments being withdrawn to their lines.
Confusion, however, continued to prevail throughout the day, for a herd of about one thousand two hundred horses belonging to the garrison were dashing wildly through the town, driven frantic by wounds or alarm. An officer, with a party of dragoons, was sent into the fort to secure these horses, which now resembled wild beasts more than domestic animals; and it was with much difficulty this roving band were at length secured and led off. Very few horses of much value or of sufficient size and strength for a cavalry remount were selected from these captives. Those, however, which were used for that purpose have mostly proved active and hardy animals, and are considered by many superior to the general run of stud-bred horses in Bengal.
In the course of the day, Hyder Khan, the governor of Ghuzni, was captured, and brought into camp, where Shah Soojah, at the instigation of the commander-in-chief, reluctantly granted him his life, which the Shah no doubt considered forfeited, for bearing arms against a king who had been deposed before, or very shortly after, the delinquent's birth.
Not so fared Woolee Mahomed, (a relative of Dost Mahomed, and standard-bearer of the army,) who defended himself to the last extremity in the cellar, where he had taken refuge, close to his Zenana,[31] which he protested should be entered by none, save over his dead body. He surrendered, ultimately, to two officers on political employ, who ventured to promise that his life should be spared, and was brought before the tyrant Soojah, who immediately ordered him to be executed.
It has been alleged that Woolee Mahomed had proved treacherous to the Shah in some previous intercourse; but no sophistry can prove that Shah Soojah was then a king, when Dost Mahomed sat on the throne, and, with the approbation of his subjects, exercised supreme authority.
Many causes, too numerous to dwell upon, have been assigned for this act of severity, by those desirous to defend Shah Soojah, but none apparently can justify so cold-blooded a murder, when the words of two British officers had been pledged for the safety of the unhappy victim. Surely, blood enough had been shed that day to appease the royal resentment, had it been confined to anything resembling moderate limits.
Amongst the besieged the carnage was found to be considerable. Upwards of seven hundred bodies were interred in the fort, and about two thousand were taken prisoners. It was impossible to ascertain the number of wounded, for many crawled out of their hiding-places, in the city, several days afterwards, and were taken charge of by such of the citizens as had resumed their usual avocations; and in the villages, some distance from Ghuzni, a few days afterwards, I found several, dreadfully scorched and wounded, who admitted they had escaped over the walls, on the morning of the storm, shortly before daylight.
Nearly all the prisoners were liberated, by direction of the commander-in-chief, in the course of the day; for this, there was no alternative, as we had not the means of taking charge of and supporting such a large body of men, in the present state of affairs, and this act of clemency, it was supposed, would produce a beneficial effect in the beginning of the campaign.
Amongst our own troops, the list of killed and wounded amounted to two hundred, but of this number not more than thirty were killed, or died of their wounds. In the list of wounded were nineteen officers, but none of their injuries proved fatal. Some had been wounded by a short barbed arrow or bolt, shot from a cross-bow, which implement the Afghans are tolerably expert in using; but these weapons had been in the hands of the townspeople during the defence. The garrison had been selected from the best of Dost Mahomed's troops, and were about three thousand in number, and universally well equipped and armed.
Among the prisoners were found several Golundauze or Foot Artillery, from Hindustan. One of these declared that, the day preceding the storm, he had suggested to the governor the probability of our attempting to blow in the gate of the fortress, and recommended that a palisade should be thrown across the entrance; but his advice had been disregarded, the gate being considered strong enough to resist any attack.
The place being now in our hands, guards were posted at the gate, and parties patrolled the town to prevent any more plundering, and to collect the prize property.
Eight pieces of cannon, of various calibres, and twenty two jingals, or wall pieces, were taken. Among the ordnance, was our old antagonist of the 21st instant, which was found to carry a sixty-eight pound shot, though assuredly at greater risk to the artillerymen who were rash enough to fire it than to the enemy, for the interior was curiously honeycombed.
Few things of much value were taken except horses, of which about one thousand were picketed in front of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, but owing to the insufficiency of ropes and picketing pegs, the greater part of the horses broke loose during the night, and more than half escaped or were stolen!
The whole of the prize property taken at Ghuzni, when sold, it is said, fetched less than three lakhs of rupees, although the horses, arms, and other articles, when put up for auction, sold for most exorbitant prices, and the amount was realized in a few weeks. Yet an impenetrable veil of mystery encompasses the subject. No officers to the present date have received any part of the treasure; and information, though frequently and publicly solicited, has been equally scarce.
After the capture of the fort, the enemy, who had occupied the adjacent heights, retired, and left us for awhile at rest. Parties of Afghan horsemen arrived daily in camp, from Caubul and its vicinity, to tender their allegiance to Shah Soojah. These people concurred in asserting that Dost Mahomed was still at Caubul, collecting his forces to give us battle, and that his present army amounted to fifteen thousand men and forty guns.
On July 27th, a deputation under Jubbar Khan (brother of Dost Mahomed) arrived at our outposts, and were conducted to head-quarters. They came to inquire what terms would be granted to Dost Mahomed by the British government.
They were answered that Dost Mahomed must surrender himself into our hands, and return with a portion of the army to Hindostan, where a jageer would be allotted him, and a pension of a lakh of rupees annually.
Indignant at the severity of the terms, the Afghan ambassador replied nearly as follows:—
"These proposals are so insulting that I will not even mention them to my brother; for what less could have been offered had you already vanquished him in the field? We have hitherto heard that the English were a just and equitable nation; but on what plea can you found the right of dethroning a monarch, the choice of his country, and placing on the throne yonder deposed puppet whom I spit at?[32] You have taken our stronghold of Ghuzni; you may also, perhaps, overcome the army which my brother has raised to defend himself; but the eyes of all Asia are upon you. Asiatics will judge and appreciate your conduct; and the blood of those innocent men who fall in the contest rests on your own heads. May Allah defend the right!"
I have rarely heard a speech more to the purpose, and never one more difficult to answer.
Jubbar Khan, having made more than half his auditors look uncomfortable, returned to Caubul, after resting a short time at the quarters of his friend, Sir Alexander Burnes, who spoke of him in the highest terms. Jubbar Khan had formerly been ill treated by Dost Mahomed, and been estranged thereby from his brother; but now that adversity loured, forgetting all former differences, he came to tender what service lay in his power, and remained faithful to the last, although through his friend Sir Alexander Burnes, he might, doubtless, have provided well for his own interests. A rare example of disinterestedness, and almost a solitary case, according to all accounts of Afghan character.
Jubbar Khan's escort consisted of about one hundred cavalry, who were nearly all uncommonly fine and powerful-looking fellows, mostly clad in chain armour, and armed with lances and matchlocks, but mounted on horses apparently not up to their weight: these animals, however, are more active and hardy than would be supposed, and are trained to perform long journeys at a shuffling pace of about five miles an hour, and frequently on very short allowances of fodder.
On the morning of the capture of Ghuzni, the Cavalry Brigade turned out about eleven o'clock, in consequence of the approach of a large body of horsemen, which proved to be Hadji Khan, Kauker, with his followers. He had kept some distance in our rear since quitting Kandahar, and now pushed forward to join us, seeing our affairs wore a more favourable aspect. This chief had maintained a correspondence with the political agent since the army had entered Afghanistan, offering to remain with the Kandahar chiefs, and do them all the injury in his power until our arrival! Yet Hadji Khan never actively assisted the army, nor did he restrain his people from committing depredations whilst we were passing through his own hills. He now came forward with a camel load of letters, (an excellent pretext,) asserting that he had been earnestly engaged in collecting and forwarding our communication. His influence might possibly have effected that object, without remaining two or three marches in rear with his whole force. This new addition augmented the Shah's force to so large a body of Afghans, that they were prudently kept at arm's length; for treachery from that camp was now quite as formidable as resistance from the enemy in our front.
On the 30th of July, we advanced from Ghuzni towards the capital, the cavalry brigade preceding as before, accompanied by the first brigade of infantry. Colonel Roberts's brigade followed, next day, with the Shah; and General Willshire's division formed the rear-guard of the army.
At the commencement of the march, we passed through a narrow defile, which would have been an admirable position for Dost Mahomed to hold during the siege of Ghuzni, or to select afterwards to oppose our progress. The summit of this defile was found to be the highest ground we had crossed, being fully 1000 feet above the site of Ghuzni, and that fortress was computed at nearly 8000 feet above the level of the sea.
Having traversed a considerable tract of rocky undulating ground, we entered, on the third day's march, a small but well irrigated valley, where the turf and bright corn fields beneath us, partially shaded by avenues of fruit trees, nourished by the friendly assistance of a mountain stream, whose course they closely and eagerly pursued to the end of the valley, presented a prospect which would anywhere have been admired, but, in these barren regions, it looked like
"That vale enchanting
Where all looks flowery, wild and sweet,
And nought but love is wanting."
Possibly, on reflection, we might have found other wants; but at present it was necessary to dispense with wishes and encounter stern reality.
Several deserters of Dost Mahomed's army joined us here, with intelligence of his being in position about thirty miles from us, at a place called Urghundee, with a force of fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of cannon; but the deserters suggested that he would probably advance to meet us at Maidan, an open ground, which sloped gradually towards a rivulet lying in our route. On receipt of this news, orders were issued to the rear columns to close immediately to the front, and we marched next morning about ten miles in momentary expectation of encountering some of the enemies' advanced posts. Our pickets were strengthened and carefully disposed along the front; and our men, elated at the prospect of the approaching struggle, burnished their arms and looked keenly to the condition of their chargers and accoutrements. Every heart beat high in the confident anticipation of shortly essaying what might be effected by a small band of resolute and disciplined soldiers against this overwhelming mass of vaunting Afghans, who amounted to more than double our numbers.
Such were the hopes entertained by our army; but, ere mid-day, these brilliant anticipations were given to the winds; for a large body of Afghans arrived at our pickets, bringing accounts that Dost Mahomed's army was breaking up and deserting; and that, in despair, he had abandoned them and his guns at Urghundee, and fled towards Bameean. This news was soon after confirmed by numerous bodies of the ex-king's cavalry arriving in camp to tender their useful submission and services to Shah Soojah, until in the hour of need they might find it more profitable and less dangerous to choose another master.
Major Cureton, with a squadron of the 16th Lancers, one of Native Cavalry, and a few artillerymen, was immediately despatched to take possession of the cannon. Twenty-five pieces were found in position under the brow of a hill, near Urghundee, about twenty-two miles distant from our present encampment.
At the same time, Captain Outram, A.D.C.[33] to the commander-in-chief, with twelve other officers, and about two hundred and fifty Native Cavalry, undertook the pursuit of Dost Mahomed towards the Hindoo Koosh. Hadji Khan, Kaukur, volunteered to act as their guide, and to assist in capturing the late monarch with several hundred of his Afghan retinue; but these rapidly decreased in numbers as they approached Bameean.
The gallant Outram, whose whole life has been a scene of daring exploits, which obtained for him the appropriate designation of Bayard, "Le chevalier sans peur et sans reproche," has sketched, in his "Rough Notes," the details of this expedition, and I shall therefore not presume to trace that ground.
Thus was the object of this singular campaign accomplished, and Shah Soojah, after an exile of thirty years, re-established in his dominions. The feeble resistance offered by Dost Mahomed was a matter of surprise to all the army, considering the character for enterprise, courage, and ability universally assigned him, and which the earlier period of his career fully testified; but he had been many years a king, which may perhaps account for the difficulty. Possessing such strong natural obstacles to the advance as well as maintenance of an invading army, as Afghanistan unquestionably does, he profited by none of them. In the most rugged and formidable defiles, a few marauders only were posted to assail our rear guards and baggage; and even these not always at the suggestion of their prince, but to glut their own appetites for blood and plunder. As we advanced through the inhospitable regions of Lower Afghanistan, the inhabitants generally fled from before us, but often left their standing crops for the maintenance of our cattle. Had these been cut down and carried away to the mountains by the villagers, our horses must all have died, for they endured, even as it happened, starvation enough to destroy half and enfeeble the remainder.
Though many opportunities presented themselves for cutting off our supplies of water, this expedient was only once or twice attempted, and that in so slovenly a manner that a party of twenty or thirty troopers sufficed to restore the water to its channel, unopposed by the enemy. These circumstances amply prove, without entering further into details, that Dost Mahomed had neglected the important opportunities which lay in his grasp, of multiplying our difficulties at the outset. He might assuredly have induced the chiefs of Kandahar (his own brothers) to make common cause against their common invaders, and, in conjunction with the Ghilzie chiefs and Mehrab Khan of Khelat (both of whom, as well as their adherents, showed abundant proofs of their readiness to bear arms against us) dispute the passage of the numerous and difficult passes we were compelled to traverse. This supposition may be fully warranted by the reply which Burnes describes Dost Mahomed to have given on a former occasion to the Kandahar chiefs, when threatened by the Persians. "When the Persians approach, let me know; and as I am now your enemy will I then be your friend."[34]
Such would have appeared the most rational course to pursue; and had he taken these measures and executed them with vigour, there is little doubt that his own army would have remained faithful to him when the prospect appeared favourable, and when an example should be set by other tribes. It is no matter of surprise that an army of lawless tribes should desert a chief whom they deem unable or unwilling to direct their efforts to the best advantage.
The chieftains, whose aggregate force would have been considerable, were allowed to be beaten in detail, or to abandon their position as we advanced. Mehrab Khan, with two thousand brave followers, fell in the defence of his fortress, even after the dethronement of his sovereign. The Kandahar chiefs, with what remained of their army, having lingered to the last moment, were compelled to abandon their city without a struggle. The Ghilzie chiefs were willing enough,[35] as they afterwards proved, to meet their invaders in the field, and their numbers must have been considerable, as more than six thousand were known to be moving on our flanks on the advance to Ghuzni.
Lastly, a garrison of less than three thousand men in a fortress, which, by the modern rules of the art of war, must inevitably fall in a few days, (considering the Gothic tracing of its defences,) was the forlorn bulwark opposed by the monarch himself to the approaches of his capital.
However, this dernier resort, even, was made the least of by his majesty's unaccountable desire to linger near the capital. Had the defile, five miles on the Caubul side of Ghuzni, been selected as a position for his army, they would have been advantageously placed to intercept our advance upon Caubul, and from thence dispositions might have been made for the relief of Ghuzni, or to surprise us by a chupao, or night attack, which mode of warfare has often been successfully practised among the Afghans. What might have been the result of such a manœuvre it is difficult even to conjecture;[36] for in the darkness of night many advantages of discipline are lost, where the enemy is felt before he is seen, and fire is almost as likely to tell upon friend as foe; their habit, it is said, is to attack the rear of camp, where the confused mass of cattle driven from the bazaar into the lines must create no trifling confusion amongst the troops turning out to form on their alarm posts.
The fall of Ghuzni greatly dispirited Dost Mahomed's army;[37] they became distrustful of him, and he of them, and the result was a mutual separation.
Many of his soldiers concurred in stating, that they had assured Dost Mahomed of their faith, and would have abided by him; but when it became known that Jubbar Khan had proceeded to Ghuzni to open a negotiation, they doubted him, and concluded he was about to provide for himself at their expense.
Taking all these circumstances into consideration, this campaign, in an abstract military point of view, has thus far turned out more fortunately, and with less and feebler opposition from the enemy, than the most sanguine of its instigators or conductors could reasonably have anticipated.
Politically, I shall not discuss the subject, because I could never perceive one sound reason for taking the haphazard and unprofitable tour.
On advancing towards the position lately occupied by Dost Mahomed, nearly the whole line of march was flanked by troops of the deposed monarch. Many of them were well mounted, and all well armed, although little uniformity was maintained in dress or weapons.
Some wore steel caps and gauntlets, chain-armour variously wrought, and light, neatly-finished cimeters, which bore a remarkably keen edge, owing to the hardness of the material; others were clad in padded cotton or silk dresses, of every variety of colour, the head being covered by turbans of thick and embroidered Cashmere, or plain white muslin. They carried over their shoulders long matchlocks, inlaid with silver or ivory.
The Kuzzilbashes, or Persian mercenaries, were the only troops amongst whom prevailed any uniformity, and they were generally distinguished by a high, black, sheepskin cap, with a small red cloth top, and a sort of frock dress, generally white, which reached to the knees, opening in four places from the waist. Light deerskin boots, fitting closely to the leg, completed this plain and serviceable costume.
Amongst the cavalry were certainly some of the handsomest and most powerful-looking fellows I ever saw; the complexions of many were fairer than those of some of our own sunburnt veterans; and amongst them, also, were some of the dirtiest, long-bearded, ferocious-looking savages I had hitherto seen: men who would doubtless have taken no small pleasure in carving and dissecting any luckless straggler from our camp whom they might happen to meet singly and unarmed. The descriptions I have read of the Huns and Goths who overran the Roman empire in the fifth century, forcibly occurred to me as I marked their personification on each side of the road, unaltered and unimproved by a lapse of fourteen centuries; while the western emigrants have progressed to a state of civilization and intelligence, having subverted nations and monarchies in their resistless course.
As we surmounted the hill near Urghundee, which is flanked by dark lofty mountains, without a trace of vegetation, the peaks of the Hindoo Koosh were visible, glittering in the morning sun from their snowy summits. The intervening country, to the foot of this mighty barrier of Afghanistan, presented a most unattractive appearance: an undulating, rocky soil, with a few patches of short dry grass, extended apparently a great portion of the way towards their foot.
The guns remained in the same position in which they had been left by Dost Mahomed, on high ground, and were ranged to command a gorge from which our army issued. The ground, in front and rear, was flat and favourable for cavalry, in which his principal strength consisted. All that was requisite for the fray was a little more heart and less distrust.