FOOTNOTES:
[31] The Zenana is the sanctum allotted to the ladies.
[32] This compliment was addressed to Shah Soojah.
[33] Governor of Scinde, afterwards, or as it was then designated, "Political Agent."
[34] Vide Burnes' Travels, vol. iii. p. 272.
[35] The Ghilzies were the chief actors in the insurrection and massacre of 1842.
[36] One of our chiefs suggested, in the event of a night attack, that the men should remain in their tents, and fire upon the assailants from the cover thus afforded.
[37] They expected Ghuzni to detain us many months, judging from the difficulties it had presented in recent periods of Afghan history.
ARRIVAL AT CAUBUL—DEATH OF COLONEL ARNOLD—RETURN OF THE EXPEDITION IN PURSUIT OF DOST MAHOMED—THE RUSSIAN BUGBEAR—FALL OF KHELAT.
On the morning of the 6th of August, the army moved through a well-irrigated and woody valley, to the foot of a small hill, on the further side of which lay the celebrated metropolis of Afghanistan.
Next morning, accompanied by some of my brother officers, I visited the city of Caubul, which lies under some steep and rugged hills at the extremity of a flat and extensive valley, whose site at the city was estimated at six thousand five hundred feet above the sea. On surmounting the eminence on its western side, Caubul appears to great advantage, lying immediately beneath, with the white tops of its various structures peering out from amongst thick groves of almond, walnut, plum, and various kinds of fruit trees which flourish in this quarter of the city.
Crossing a bridge over the Caubul river, and winding through some narrow lanes, on each side of which were houses surrounded by gardens, we entered the principal bazaar, which extends completely across the city to the gates of the Bala Hissar, or Shah's palace. At the commencement of the bazaar, we were much struck with the appearance of the fruiterers' shops, where grapes, peaches, melons, pomegranates, and other fruits, were tastefully hung amidst branches of trees, to which they were suspended. This street entered a small square, which looked much like an European market-place, the centre being occupied by stalls of vendors of vegetables, milk, and ice, while the houses in the square were occupied by tea, spice, and sherbet merchants. The sight of the latter soon brought our party to a halt to enjoy the unwonted treat of a bowl of iced sherbet. In Kandahar, the sherbet was also sold cooled with snow, but the ice was acknowledged to be a great improvement. From the further side of this market-place, an arched bazaar, occupied entirely by silk and cloth merchants, conducted us into a second square, tenanted by shawl makers and dyers. Thence we passed through another well-thronged arcade into the third square, where resided the tanners and dressers of sheepskins, for which Caubul is celebrated. These skins are very neatly dressed, the wool being worn next the body, and the exterior tastefully ornamented by embroidery in silk of different colours. During the cold season, the working classes usually wear long jackets of these skins, with short sleeves reaching to the elbow, whilst the merchants, and those unaccustomed to manual labour, adopt a warmer but less commodious mantle, which reaches to the ankles. The black lamb-skins, brought from Bokhara and Persia for the manufacture of caps, are highly prized; they are made of the skin of the lamb immediately after its birth, and are extremely soft and glossy.
Beyond this square, the bazaar becomes more narrow, and much more noisy, as you enter the quarter occupied by saddlers and armorers, who form no inconsiderable portion in the manufacture of articles so requisite and so much used in this land of violence. The saddlery is made of durable materials, though clumsily put together; and in the armorer's shop,[38] it is a rare thing to find a piece of good steel among the many fantastically shaped weapons, where the ingenuity of the workman appears to have been called in play to invent these fanciful methods of inflicting torture on his fellow-creatures.
The Bala Hissar, standing apart on a mound which overlooks the city, is surrounded by a rampart garnished with circular bastions, and parapets, similarly to most of the fortresses of the East. The wall was in somewhat bad repair on our arrival, but this was soon remedied after the Shah had taken up his residence there. The place is of no importance as a fortress, being completely commanded by the range of hills in its immediate vicinity. The palace itself conveyed little idea of grandeur to the spectator; but Shah Soojah took pains in rendering it more consistent in appearance with the notions he entertains of the dignity and state requisite for the abode of so mighty and independent a monarch.[39]
In a burying ground, near the Bala Hissar, was found a tomb, with an English inscription, to the memory of one John Hicks, who died A.D. 1666. This monument formed a plentiful subject for conjecture as to who this individual could have been, who had penetrated into a country infested from time immemorial by hordes of robbers, who consider all travellers, especially when alone and unprotected, as their legitimate property. The Afghan tradition was, that two Europeans had arrived with a Persian caravan in Caubul, and had entered the service of the Shah of Afghanistan, and that this monument had been carved and built by the survivor.[40] But what brought these adventurers into Afghanistan is likely to remain a matter of some ambiguity at this distance of time, especially as the biographer of John Hicks contented himself with inscribing the date of his death and the Christian names of the deceased's parents, leaving the object and success of his travels a mystery to puzzle and embarrass posterity.
The city was thronged, on the morning Shah Soojah entered Caubul to resume his seat on the throne of his ancestors, with the former adherents of Dost Mahomed, and many a scowl was bestowed on the Shah and his escort (consisting of a squadron of the 4th Dragoons, one of the 16th Lancers, and some Horse Artillery) as they wended their way through the streets, towards the palace, although none ventured to offer any insulting language to the conquerors of Afghanistan. The reception here was far different from that he had received at Kandahar, where he was little known. He passed in solemn silence through the bazaars, where, probably, but few spectators were present who had taken an active part in his deposition thirty years since; yet tradition had handed down many a tale of oppression, and, regretting the mild and popular rule of Dost Mahomed, the inhabitants now submitted in silence to the evil they could not remedy. Such was the general impression conveyed by the demeanour of the soldiers and citizens; but, obedient to the time-serving impulse which characterizes the venal soldiery of the two nations, both the Kuzzilbashes and Afghan cavalry flocked to tender their allegiance and services to the reinstated potentate. To the loyal and civilized inhabitants of the north this comparatively patient endurance of a change of masters may appear incredible; but a perusal of the Afghan Dynasty will abundantly show that habit in this respect, as well as in many others, becomes a second nature. In the present instance, a considerable difficulty presented itself in the number of candidates for military employ; the revenue of the country being inadequate to maintain so large a force in addition to the numerous contingent which had been levied for the Shah in Hindostan. On the other hand, to reject the offers of these troublesome volunteers was tantamount to the distribution of an equal number of malcontents and robbers throughout Afghanistan, which was already abundantly supplied with these industrious communities. For the present, a great portion of the Kuzzilbashes were retained, and bodies of Afghan troops were shortly afterwards to be seen on the Champ-de-Mars of Caubul, practising, with laudable perseverance, the rigid miseries of the goose step.
A few days after our arrival the detachment which had been sent with Captain Outram, in pursuit of Dost Mahomed, returned from their laborious and unsuccessful chase. They had come within about twenty miles of the fugitive, who was accompanied by fifteen hundred Afghans, preferring to share the flight and dangers of Dost Mahomed to becoming renegades. Hadji Khan was nearly frantic with fear when he found the party had approached so much nearer the fugitives than he wished or intended. He entreated the British officers to abandon the pursuit, urging that their party was too small, and that not an Afghan of his retinue would raise a weapon against Dost Mahomed. This appears to have been one of the few truths he was known to utter, for the greater part of his retinue had already deserted. The party, however, in spite of all obstacles, strained every nerve to reach their object, but in the snowy fastnesses of the Hindoo Koosh these hardy mountaineers were not to be overcome, and the detachment was, at last, compelled to relinquish the pursuit and return to Caubul, where Hadji Khan was put in confinement, and afterwards sent as a prisoner to Hindostan.
Many are of opinion that Hadji Khan was harshly used by the Indian government, considering his ready adherence to the Shah on his arrival, and assert that, having openly abandoned his master, it became apparently his interest to secure his person. It is somewhat singular that, amongst a nation of renegades and traitors, any partiality should have been evinced in selecting an individual traitor, and one who, being influential, might have been made useful; whereas, if all had been convicted on suspicion, it would have been difficult to find conveyances and prisons for the state prisoners.
The Cavalry had now an opportunity offered them of replacing some of the horses which had been lost, for a very small number had been collected at Kandahar and Ghuzni.
Being on tolerably good terms with the Afghans, we were now able to see some of their best blood. The Government price for Cavalry remounts was restricted to four hundred and fifty rupees each horse, which was one hundred and fifty under the stud price, and the general opinion was in favour of the Caubul horse, when he could be found of sufficient size; but, generally speaking, they were so well fattened up for the market that it required the eye of a good judge to detect faults under this general rotundity. The horse dealers were also found, in every respect, capable of competing with their brotherhood in England.
The only instance of an Afghan dealer being "done," which I saw or heard of, occurred on our march towards Caubul.
A dealer, one morning, came into the Cavalry lines, bringing a showy-looking nag for sale, which seemed a well bred animal, and certainly cocked its tail and pawed the ground in a most imposing manner. J——, a young Dragoon officer, who was a very respectable jockey, asked the animal's price. "Fifteen hundred rupees," was the modest request; "and you have not a sounder or fleeter animal in the Feringhee camp," added the Afghan. J—— quietly noticed one or two defects; and pointing to a little old chesnut Arab, who certainly looked as if he were the ghost of some departed racer, but whose muscle and sinews only required the hand upon them to be acknowledged, offered to ride him a mile against the Afghan on his vaunted steed. The dealer eagerly closed the wager for a hundred rupees, and the ground was selected, as nearly as it could be guessed, for the distance. The riders were soon up, (the Afghan apparently the heavier;) the word was given, and away they went, the Afghan leading at a tearing pace, flourishing his legs and whip, and chuckling and hallooing with delight. J—— saw there was no necessity for collaring him, the Afghan doing all that could be desired. When within fifty yards of the winning-post, J——, having waited steadily on his competitor until the sleek animal was beat, gave the gallant little Arab his head and the Afghan the go-by, telling him to take his useless fifteen hundred rupees' worth home, as he had beaten him with the slowest horse in the regiment.
The fame of this race must have preceded the army, for I never heard another instance of an Afghan dealer wishing to match his horse for speed against any of our chargers. Their own races are generally for great distances, and the race-course is usually in the main road, where rocks and sharp stones are not scarce; but the horses are shod with a plate of steel which covers nearly the whole foot—a mode of shoeing adopted almost throughout the army. The Caubul ponies were very powerful and hardy animals, and have been much sought after and prized in Hindostan.
The Afghans do not appear to possess much attachment to their sovereign, though the feudal system prevalent would induce a contrary inference. Their merchandize fetching a favourable price, or the success of a marauding party, constitute their chief concernment; and the occupation of the musnud by a Barukzye, or Suddozye, is a matter of secondary importance to all, save, perhaps, the members of those two families, provided the people are unmolested in their avocations. In such a case, the usual practice has been to get rid of the obnoxious monarch as soon as a convenient conspiracy can be organized, which has been rarely unsuccessful. An escort, or pass, from a mountain-chief, will carry the bearer safely through that chief's territory; but he must beware how he uses it beyond the assigned boundary, where it may prove worse than useless. Afghanistan is occupied by such a variety of tribes, each possessing their mountain fastnesses to retreat upon in case of need—men under no control beyond the temporary influence of their several leaders and chiefs—that it would certainly be an arduous undertaking to reduce the country to a complete state of subordination.
Under the different Shahs of Afghanistan, that portion of the people only who could be attracted and held by interested motives rallied round their king in times of trouble; and amongst so capricious and disunited a people, the connecting link with their sovereign has always been weak, and often broken.
Whilst encamped in the vicinity of Caubul, a party of officers visited some hills about ten miles distant, under the escort of a petty mountain-chief, tributary to the Shah; the party were, of course, hospitably received by himself and the tribe, but his jurisdiction did not extend far. Pointing out the limits of his domain, he showed a dark range of hills, barely thirty miles' distant, belonging, as he said, to two chiefs, from whom Dost Mahomed had been unable to exact tribute or submission, although their dwellings were almost within sight of his palace-windows.
Even at this time, the British authority could not be said to extend beyond the chain of guards encircling our camp; for any soldiers or camp-followers straying far from the lines at night, and not unfrequently in the daytime also, stood a good chance of being shot, or cut down by some band of marauders. This hapless state of affairs remained unaltered during the whole time of our residence at Caubul.
Having been encamped for a fortnight, eight miles south of Caubul, the army were ordered to change ground to the north-eastern side, about two miles from the Bala Hissar, and on the Peshawur Road.
The day before moving, Brigadier Arnold (who had been suffering severely from illness since the army left Kandahar) died, universally regretted by the whole army, and especially by the 16th Lancers, which regiment he commanded, and to whom his loss was irreparable. We marched, in the evening, to the city; and the Lancers attended the remains of their colonel to the grave, which was dug at the foot of a steep, rocky mountain, about a quarter of a mile distant from the Bala Hissar. The funeral procession was attended by nearly all the officers of the army; and amongst them were few who had not experienced and appreciated the merits of that gallant soldier, who was now borne to the grave, from the effects of a bullet, which had pierced his breast when charging with the 10th Hussars at Waterloo.[41]
When the loose earth, which hides the tenement of the dead from the last sad gaze of the living, was cast on his coffin, the sullen roar of the cannon, which awakened from their reverie the abstracted group of mourners, and ran, telling their tale of woe, amongst the craggy precipices of the mountains of Caubul, found an echo of melancholy which thrilled in the hearts of his bereaved friends. I turned from the grave with the oppressive feeling of destitution which every soldier must experience on losing as gallant a colonel as ever drew a sabre, and as warm-hearted and accomplished a gentleman as even England can produce:
"Requiescat in pace."
Reports were in daily circulation that Dost Mahomed had crossed the Hindoo Koosh, and taken up his quarters with his brother-in-law, the King of Bokhara, who had promised his aid to the fugitive monarch in regaining the sovereignty, of which he had been deprived. Improbable as this was,—for had such been the intentions of the King of Bokhara, he would surely have advanced to the assistance of Dost Mahomed before his kingdom had been wrested from him,—Dr. Lord, of the political department, was sent with a military escort to cross the Indian Caucasus, and convey despatches, as well as gain intelligence, in that part of the country. The doctor had not reached Bameean, when, from the exaggerated reports of the inhabitants, he was led to suppose that Dost Mahomed, with a considerable force, was already between him and the mountain-pass. Not desiring a personal interview with the deposed Shah, whose arguments in favour of his own cause were likely to be weighty and incontrovertible, the political doctor wheeled about, and hastened to Caubul, where the intelligence induced Sir John Keane to order a force, under Colonel Sale, to be in readiness to move towards Bameean.
Two days after these orders were issued, news arrived that Dost Mahomed, so far from crossing the Hindoo Koosh, was hastening in an opposite direction, with as much speed as the worthy doctor had used in his return to the capital. The force was consequently countermanded; and a detachment only, consisting of part of the Shah's goorkhas, and a few guns, were sent to occupy Bameean, which lies about eighty miles from Caubul, at the foot of the mountainous barrier, which divides Afghanistan from Bokhara. The road to this outpost was exceedingly bad; and even the small force of artillery which accompanied the party, delayed them nearly a fortnight, in crossing the rugged mountains and ravines which obstruct the road from Caubul to Bameean.
So much paper has been already wasted on the Russo-phobia, that it would be superfluous to enter on a discussion of the obstacles which might oppose a march from the Caspian to the Indian Caucasus, over a country of which the little that is known has been gleaned from the scanty details of a few adventurous travellers, stealing in disguise over these inhospitable regions, and necessarily gleaning but meagre information. But of the difficulties which would present themselves to an army, on its arrival at the Hindoo Koosh, I think a very simple estimate may be formed. The pass over those mountains, on account of its elevation, and the heavy falls of snow which constantly occur during the greater part of the year, is only practicable in the summer months, which would ensure the advantage of knowing at what time to expect an enemy. The road, by Herat, does not possess this advantage, being the easiest and most frequented passage into Afghanistan; but thence to Kandahar, the country possesses all the obstacles which opposed our progress through Lower Afghanistan, which would seriously affect a force whose strength and resources must have been materially weakened during a laborious march from the shores of the Caspian, even unopposed by an enemy. When arrived in the heart of Afghanistan, the greatest difficulties would oppose themselves to the maintenance of so numerous an army as would be requisite for so important an enterprise; and the palpable truth, that amongst these barren mountains a small army would be annihilated and a large one starved, must obtrude itself on the minds of all who are qualified to canvass the dilemma.
But an army which, by an effective commissariat and consummate fortune, advanced with its efficiency but little impaired, towards the frontiers of Hindostan, from the centre of Afghanistan, need not hastily congratulate itself on the charms of ultimate success, for the passages out of that country present as formidable barriers as the entrance into it, and these are the true outposts to the defensive frontier line of our Eastern Empire.
The intricate pass of the Kyber on the one side, and that of the Bolan, with the neighbouring Gundava, on the other frontier, being the sole outlets for an effective army,[42] form the natural outworks to the Indus, taken as a base of operations; and the policy which suggested the isolated position taken up in Afghanistan, with the far distant and imperfect lines of the Sutlej and lower Indus, was surely at variance with the admitted principles of military defence.
In either of the above-named passes, a small British force would maintain their ground against any odds; for the defiles being in many places not five yards in width, and flanked by craggy mountains which rise nearly perpendicularly on each side in many places, the numbers of the enemy would advantage him nothing, the heights being in our possession, whilst a strong palisade and battery, thrown across the road and covered by musketry from the adjacent heights, ought effectually to check his progress.[43]
That Russia did meditate hostilities in the East may be inferred from the detection of her envoy's intrigues at the courts of Persia and Caubul; but the reliance to be placed on the faith and promises of these agents may be fairly estimated from the observance of the following article in a treaty between the Shah of Persia and the Ameers of Kandahar.
Dated June, 1838.
Art. V. "If an enemy[44] should appear from any quarter, and the sirdars should not be able to repel him themselves, the Shah of Persia binds himself to supply the sirdars of Kandahar with troops, artillery, and money, to whatever extent may be necessary, and not to withhold any description of assistance or support."
The treaty, from which this article is extracted, was remitted to England by Dr. M'Neill. It is thus countersigned by Count Simonich, the Russian agent:
"I, minister plenipotentiary[45] of the government of Russia, will be guarantee that neither on the part of H.M. &c. &c. &c., the Shah of Persia, nor on the part of the powerful[46] sirdars shall there arise any deviation from, or violation of, this entire treaty and their engagements.
(Signed) "L.S. Simonich."
Notwithstanding these promises of vigorous assistance from Persia, we had not the pleasure of meeting any portion of their armament in the vicinity of Kandahar, nor, to the best of our knowledge, were any Russian agents seen enforcing the Shah to perform Article No. V. of the above-named treaty. Yet an enemy did appear unto the sirdars of Kandahar, and from a quarter whence he had been many months expected, and those "powerful" chiefs did not even make the experiment of their ability to repel him.
Perhaps this article of the Shah's treaty was founded on the chance of the sirdars making the experiment; but, having adopted a more prudent course, there can be no doubt that a king, who possesses so many sublime titles as the Shah of Persia, would not be guilty of a breach of faith; and therefore the Kandahar chiefs will speedily return from Persia with artillery, troops, and money, to an unlimited amount; in fact, sufficient (as the word "necessary," in the article quoted, must imply) to expel the British from Afghanistan; and, moreover, it is Count Simonich's duty to see this done. As Russia has disowned the threats, and the author met a conveniently political death, we may infer that the project of holding India with a chain of posts, stretching over mountains and deserts more than the semi-diameter of the globe in measurement, whilst the troublesome Dardanelles would materially interfere with all commercial intercourse, when watched by a British fleet, has been abandoned, and for the present a Russian invasion of India may be deemed improbable.
Although Afghanistan was now nominally subdued, the animosity and power of many mountain-tribes was unabated, and a few hours' ride from Caubul a cold-blooded murder was committed on Colonel Herring, commanding a regiment of Native Infantry, on the march from Kandahar to join the army at Caubul. About forty miles from the capital, he strolled from camp in the evening, accompanied by two brother officers, with two sepoys in attendance. The party reached the summit of a hill, not more than a mile from the camp, when they descried a body of armed mountaineers advancing rapidly towards them. As the intention of the Afghans was evident, and their numbers considerable, Colonel Herring's party retired towards camp; but the assassins gained on them; and, in descending the hill, the Colonel, struck down by a stone or a matchlock ball, was immediately butchered. One of the sepoys, who was near Colonel Herring, in trying to defend him, was severely wounded, and left on the ground for dead. The regimental guard, on the alarm reaching the camp, hastened to the spot, but the miscreants had fled, after perpetrating their brutal outrage.
Shortly after the regiment's arrival at head-quarters, Sir John Keane ordered a part of the 16th Native Infantry, under Major Maclaren, accompanied by some irregular horse, to scour the neighbourhood, and endeavour to ferret out the assassins. This object was successfully attained, and the indefatigable Maclaren, having traced them to a hill fort, assaulted and carried the place, when the garrison, conscious of fighting with halters round their necks, made a determined resistance, and were nearly all exterminated. This example had not the effect of restraining the bloodthirsty disposition of other bands of marauders; and the road between our camp and the city continued to be infested with assassins after nightfall. A dragoon was cut down, a night or two after, within a few yards of the standard guard, and similar instances were constantly occurring during our residence in the country. So expert were they at the practice, that retaliation could seldom be made. One instance I must relate, of a singular shot made by a soldier of a Dragoon regiment, who was skirting the hills, a few miles from camp, in pursuit of snipe and partridge, with a fowling piece loaded with small shot. He suddenly perceived an Afghan, forty paces from him, kneeling behind a rock, on which he had rested his matchlock, to make sure of his aim, and coolly waiting till his intended victim approached a little nearer. The soldier instantly threw the fowling-piece to his shoulder, fired, and rolled over his black game stone dead. A few shots had entered the brain and temples, and told with deadly haste.
As it was now considered improbable that any serious opposition to Shah Soojah's authority would be attempted, an order was issued, directing the Bombay column of the army of the Indus to return to their presidency by the route we had advanced.
On the 15th of September, 1839, our Bombay brethren quitted us, and proceeded on their homeward route, destroying, on their way, some petty hill forts, tenanted by refractory tribes. On approaching the fortress of Khelat, the residence of Mehrab Khan, whose duplicity had thrown such difficulties in our way by the promise of supplies, which were never sent, a deputation was forwarded to that chief, demanding atonement for his behaviour, and intimating, that nothing short of the most unqualified submission to Shah Soojah's clemency would avert the fall of his city and destruction of his power. Mehrab Khan preferred reposing confidence in the temper of his cimeter rather than in that of his sovereign; and General Willshire advanced upon Khelat with a brigade of infantry, consisting of her Majesty's 2nd and 17th regiments, and the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, accompanied by a troop of horse artillery, and some irregular horse. The remainder of the column pursued their way towards the mountain-passes.
On approaching the fort, a large party of the enemy, who held possession of the heights, opened their fire on the head of the British column. The enemy were soon dislodged from this post by the infantry; and, rushing from the heights into the city, were so closely pursued by their assailants, that the gates were shut barely soon enough to prevent the British from entering also. The troops, when falling back under cover from the galling fire which was now poured upon them from the walls of Khelat, lost several men.
Two horse artillery guns came up without delay, and their fire sufficed, in a few strokes, to crush the unprotected gate sufficiently to render an assault practicable. General Willshire now ordered the infantry to advance, which was hailed with the alacrity usual on similar occasions. With a cheer, they rushed up the ascent, regardless of the fire from the walls, and soon, beating down all opposition, took possession of the city. Mehrab Khan, surrounded by many of his chieftains and the greater part of the garrison, betook himself to the citadel, but this was incapable of defence; and the prince, with the greater part of his kinsmen and retinue, fell gallantly defending themselves at the gateway. Amongst the chief and his sirdars, no thoughts of surrender were harboured: each fought with a determination which put all chance of quarter out of the question; but the flashing cimeters of the Afghans, though wielded with the energy of desperation, soon drooped before the irresistible stroke of the British bayonet, which drank deeply that morning of the blood which, according to Colonel Mitchel, it never had, and never possibly could, shed.
When Mehrab Khan and his sirdars had fallen in the front of the struggle, the remainder of the garrison surrendered; and thus, under the prowess of British arms, fell the second important fortress of Afghanistan, and with a rapidity which, to the Afghans, must have been bewildering; for the bayonet glittered on the parapets of the citadel in less than two hours from the time it was levelled to drive the enemy on the heights under cover of the walls, which they fondly believed impregnable.
Such examples as had now been shown would, it was supposed, have taught the Afghans the vanity of resistance; but many revolting lessons of blood were yet requisite to teach these fierce mountaineers the necessity of submission, and our resolution of benefiting them, whether they wished it or not, with the inestimable advantages of civilization. But this radical reform can never be consummated in our day; nor can I imagine a more arduous undertaking than such a crusade would be amongst a nation with whom the "lex fortioris" has been the established code of centuries.
The garrison of Khelat amounted to about two thousand men, as near as an estimate could be formed; but the greater part of these fell during the storm.[47]
In General Willshire's force, which numbered about twelve hundred men, the casualties were—one lieutenant and thirty men killed; four captains, four subalterns, and ninety-seven men wounded; killed, Lieut. Gravatt, 2nd, or Queen's Regiment.
A great number of the wounded afterwards died before reaching Bombay, which induced a supposition of the enemies' weapons having been poisoned; but there seems no foundation for the report. The climate below the mountain-passes was most probably the poison which carried off so many gallant fellows.