BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] Regarding Russian railways in the Near East cf. the article “Russia—Railways,” in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, Volume 23, p. 891. The trans-Persian railway from Resht, a Persian port on the Caspian, to Teheran was completed in September, 1899. Cf. “Russia’s Tightening Grip on Persia,” in The Globe (London), August 24, 1899; also “Russian Railways in Asia,” The Financial News (London), August 14, 1899. The Bagdad Railway frequently was referred to in the French and Russian press as the Petit Transasiatique.
[2] Foreign correspondence of The Globe, July 28, 1899; Commerce (London), August 2, 1899; articles quoted from the Novoe Vremya in The Globe, August 10, 1899; The Engineer (London), August 11, 1899; The Observer, August 13, 1899; R. Henry, “L’intérêt française en Asie occidentale—Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et l’alliance franco-russe,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 673–688.
[3] Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, pp. 64 et seq.; Paul Imbert, “Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Revue des deux mondes, 5 period, Volume 38 (1907), pp. 657–659.
[4] Quoted by Georges Mazel, Le chemin de fer de Bagdad (Montpelier, 1911), p. 324. It should be remembered that Russia at this time was experiencing the Industrial Revolution. Cf. James Mavor, An Economic History of Russia, Volume II (Toronto, 1914), Book VI.
[5] Annual Register, 1902, p. 323; 1903, pp. 293–294.
[6] Memoirs of Count Witte, edited and translated by A. Yarmolinsky (Garden City, 1921), pp. 75 et seq.; G. Drage, Russian Affairs (London, 1904), pp. 507 et seq.; A. Sauzède, “Le développement des voies ferrées en Russie,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 272–281; F. H. Skrine, The Expansion of Russia (Cambridge, 1904), passim.
[7] Bohler, loc. cit., pp. 294–295; Gervais-Courtellemont, “La question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 499–507.
[8] Baron S. A. Korff, Russia’s Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century (New York, 1922), pp. 133–134.
[9] Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, pp. 10–13; Imbert, loc. cit., p. 678. Enthusiastic Turks believed that, with adequate rail communications, Erzerum might be transformed into a Turkish Belfort. Cf. Mazel, op. cit., p. 37. Had the Bagdad Railway and the projected railways of northern Anatolia been completed before the outbreak of the Great War, the Turks could have made a more effective defence in the Caucasus campaign of the Grand Duke Nicholas in 1916.
[10] For a general statement of the attitude of Russia and the Balkan States to the Bagdad Railway cf. Alexandre Ilitch, Le chemin de fer de Bagdad, ou l’expansion de l’Allemagne en Orient (Brussels, Paris, Leipzig, 1913), pp. 100–107, 121–123.
[11] Bohler, loc. cit., pp. 273–289; cf., also, P. Rohrbach, German World Policies, pp. 223–224.
[12] Supra, pp. 59–60.
[13] Chéradame, op. cit., pp. 267 et seq.; The Times, August 10, 1899; K. Helfferich, Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, p. 124.
[14] Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, March 25, 1902, p. 1468.
[15] According to M. Deschanel, this was sophistry. The French Government, if it was not guilty of an error of commission, certainly was guilty of a sin of omission. It was the opinion of M. Deschanel that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should have done something to put the French Government on record as opposed to the Bagdad Railway. M. Deschanel was not certain, however, that the French Ministry had not consented to the participation of French capital in the plan. “How can one imagine,” he said, “that an institution such as the Ottoman Bank became involved in an enterprise of such great political and military importance without the approval of our Foreign Office?... How is it that the Ottoman Bank is a party to this enterprise, and how is it that the Board of Directors for the first section of the line has French representatives, when only a word from the Government could have prevented it?” Ibid., November 20, 1903, p. 2798.
[16] Ibid., March 25, 1902, pp. 1468 et seq.
[17] Victor Bérard, “Le Discours du Chancelier,” in the Revue de Paris, December 15, 1906.
[18] The Revue Bleue, April 6, 1907, p. 429; Syria and Palestine, p. 126. Many of the claims that the Bagdad Railway jeopardized French prosperity were purely fantastic. It was maintained that the opening of the great Mesopotamian granary would cripple French agriculture, already seriously handicapped by the competition of the new world. To this was added the suggestion that development of cotton-growing in Turkey would stifle the infant efforts at the cultivation of cotton in the French colonies. It is incredible that Mesopotamian grain and cotton would have interfered with the flourishing prosperity of the French peasantry; in any event, any such danger was at least a generation removed. France raised high tariff barriers against foreign competition in the home market for agricultural products; she was not an exporter of grain.
[19] Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, March 25, 1902, pp. 1467 et seq.
[20] Cf., M. Montbel, “Les puissances coloniales devant l’Islam,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 348–362.
[21] Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, November 20, 1905, p. 2798. The italics are mine.
[22] Revue des deux mondes, Volume 149 (1898), p. 29.
[23] Sources of the treaties granting special privileges to France are sighted in Note 3, Chapter II. Regarding the origins and nature of the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions see the article “Capitulations” in the Encyclopedia Britannica, previously cited; J. Brucker, “The Protectorate of Missionaries in the Near East,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XII, pp. 488–492; A. Schopoff, Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie, 1673–1904 (Paris, 1904); Livre de propagande de l’alliance française, 1883–1893 (Paris, 1894), especially pp. 35 et seq.; Viscomte Aviau de Piolant, La défense des intérêts catholiques en Terre Sainte et en Asie Mineure (Paris, 1886).
[24] Syria and Palestine, pp. 43–45, 54–55; L. Bréhier, “Turkish Empire—Missions,” in Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XV, pp. 101–102; J. Atalla, “Les solutions de la question syrienne,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 24 (1907), p. 472.
[25] Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople, June 30, 1897, pp. 112–113, November 30, 1897, p. 149.
[26] Brucker, loc. cit., p. 490.
[27] It should be added that the Treaty also stipulated that “the acquired rights of France are explicitly reserved, and there shall be no interference with the statu quo in the Holy Places.” E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Volume IV (London, 1891), p. 2797.
[28] Revue des deux mondes, Volume 149, (1898), pp. 24–25; Brucker, loc. cit., p. 491.
[29] Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XII, p. 491. The rôle of the Italians in this controversy is of considerable interest. The desire of the Italian Government to assert its right to protect its own citizens abroad was a manifestation of the Italian nationalism which brought about the establishment of the Kingdom; at the same time it was an expression of that anti-Clerical tendency which characterized Italian politics from the days of Cavour to the outbreak of the Great War. Undoubtedly, also, there was an economic side to the question. It will be recalled that Italian trade with the Ottoman Empire grew more rapidly than that of any other power after the opening of the twentieth century. (Supra, pp. 105–106.) This growth was due, in no small degree, to the earlier rise of Italian missionary activity in Turkey. This growth of missions and schools, as well as of commercial establishments, was irritating to patriotic Frenchmen. Cf. two articles by René Pinon, “Les écoles d’Orient,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 415–435, 487–517. Italian missionaries, charged M. Pinon, were encouraged in every way to ignore the French protectorate, appealing only to Italian diplomatic and consular representatives. “Official Italy, Catholic and papal Italy, free-mason Italy and clerical Italy, all are working together in a common great patriotic effort for the spread of the Italian language and the rise of the national power” (p. 500). Annoying as this is, says M. Pinon, it should be “a singular lesson for certain Frenchmen!” That there was no love lost on the Italian side of the controversy may be gathered from an analysis of the Italian press comments which appeared in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 37 (1914), p. 495.
[30] Brucker, loc. cit., p. 491. Inasmuch as the protectorate of Catholic missions involved a considerable responsibility for France, one may ask why the French Government should have been so solicitous that no other nation be allowed to share the burden. The answer is suggested by the Catholic Encyclopedia, which states that the system of religious protectorates is almost invariably subject to the abuse that “the protectors will seek payment for their services by trammeling the spiritual direction of the mission or by demanding political services in return.” Volume XII, p. 492.
[31] Supra, pp. 134–135.
[32] Revue des deux mondes, Volume 149 (1898), p. 39. The “pro-German party” was said to consist of Cardinals Ledochowski, Hohenlohe, Galimberti, and Kapp. Ibid., pp. 11–12; Reinsch, op. cit., p. 269.
[33] Revue des deux mondes, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 36–40. On this whole subject see, also, C. Lagier, Byzance et Stamboul: nos droits françaises et nos missions en Orient (Paris, 1905); Hilaire Capuchin, La France Catholique en Orient durant les trois-derniers siècles (Paris, 1902); A. Schopoff, Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie (Paris, 1904).
[34] G. Saint-Yves, Les Chemins de fer françaises dans la Turquie d’Asie (Paris, 1914).
[35] The French and Belgian banks principally interested were: the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Banque de l’Union Parisienne, and the Banque Internationale de Bruxelles. Cf. article “Ou en est la question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 167–171; E. Letailleur, Les capitalistes français contre la France (Paris, 1916), pp. 72–110. M. Rouvier visited Turkey in 1901, at the request of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, to suggest improvements in the fiscal system of the Empire. (Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, p. 110.) It was at this time, probably, that he learned enough of the Bagdad Railway to persuade him of the wisdom of investing in its securities.
[36] Gervais-Courtellemont, loc. cit., p. 507; Imbert, loc. cit., p. 682.
[37] Gervais-Courtellemont, loc. cit., p. 507; Bohler, loc. cit., p. 294.
[38] Bohler, loc. cit., pp. 293–295.
[39] Mazel, op. cit., pp. 315–322.
[40] K. Helfferich, Die deutsche Türkenpolitik, p. 18.
[41] “La politique extérieure de l’Allemagne,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 340–341.
[42] Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session, Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226 et seq.
[43] Quoted by the Annual Register, 1913, p. 326.