Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A study in imperialism

by Edward Mead Earle

The Bagdad Railway Claims French Supporters

The Bagdad Railway was not without friends in France. The French chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was an enthusiastic supporter of the project and served on the Board of Directors of the Bagdad Railway Company, for he believed that widespread railway construction was essential to the establishment, upon a firm basis, of Turkish credit. The French-controlled Imperial Ottoman Bank, as early as 1899, had agreed to participate in the financing of the Bagdad line, and an officer of the bank had accepted the position of vice-president of the Bagdad Railway Company at the time of its incorporation in 1903. The French owners of important railways in Anatolia and Syria believed it would be suicidal for them to obstruct the plans of the Deutsche Bank and preferred to coöperate with the German concessionaires. Unless the French opponents of the Bagdad Railway were prepared to offer these interests material compensation for resisting its construction, it was hardly likely that, hard-headed business men as they were, they would jeopardize the security of their investments for the sake of such intangible items as international prestige and protectorates of missions.

There were two important groups of French-owned railways in Turkey-in-Asia. In Anatolia there was the important Smyrna-Cassaba system, extending east and north-east from the French-developed port of Smyrna. At Afiun Karahissar the main line of this system from Smyrna connected with the Anatolian line from Constantinople to Konia. Therefore a route for French trade already existed to all of Asia Minor; and when the Bagdad Railway was completed, direct service could be instituted from Smyrna to Adana, Aleppo, Mosul, Bagdad, and Basra. The second group of French railways was the Syrian system, owned by La Société Ottomane du Chemin de fer Damas-Hama et Prolongements. This company operated railway lines from Aleppo to Damascus, from Tripoli to Homs, from Beirut to Damascus, from Jaffa to Jerusalem, and between other less important points. After the completion of the Bagdad Railway this group of railways would have direct connections, at Aleppo, with all of Europe via Constantinople and with the Indies via Basra and the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the French interests controlling these railways were chagrined at their inability to secure the trans-Mesopotamian concession for themselves. But faced with the fait accompli of the German concession, they realized that coöperation with the Bagdad Railway would make their lines an integral part of a greater system of rail communications within Turkey and also between Turkey and the nations of Europe and Farther Asia. Refusal to coöperate would be cutting off their noses to spite their faces.[34]

French bankers were disposed to look at the Bagdad enterprise in much the same light. The economic renaissance of Turkey, which it was hoped would be an effect of improved rail communications, would increase the value of their earlier investments in that country. But, in addition, the Bagdad Railway offered handsome profits in itself: profits of promoting the enterprise and floating the various bond issues; profits of the construction company, in which French capital was to participate; profits of the shareholders when the Railway should become a going concern. True, the Council of Ministers had requested the Bourse to outlaw the Bagdad securities. But, after all, when profits are at stake, what is a mere resolution of the Cabinet among friends? A syndicate of French financiers invested heavily in the bonds and stock of the Bagdad Railway Company, the hostility of their Government notwithstanding. And it was said that one of the bankers who participated in the syndicate was none other than M. Rouvier, Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of M. Combes, and subsequently Prime Minister.[35]

Many intelligent French students of foreign affairs felt that a merely obstructionist policy on the part of France toward the Bagdad Railway would be futile and, in the end, disastrous. In spite of the many historical and sentimental attachments of France in the Near East, she really had no vital interests which were jeopardized by the Bagdad enterprise. It was urged, therefore, that she should play the rôle of conciliator of the divergent interests of Russia, Great Britain, Germany, and Turkey. A forward-looking program, it was suggested, would be to urge these nations to reach a full and equitable agreement in the promotion of “a project unquestionably valuable in the progress of the whole human race.” National material interests should be merged in “the superior interests of civilization.” Mere self-interest demanded this of France, because, should a war break out over the Near Eastern question, France would most certainly become involved.[36]

As regards the claims of Russia to influence French policy in the Bagdad Railway affair, there was a considerable amount of irritability exhibited by French publicists. It was pointed out, for example, that M. Witte was unwilling to accept “internationalization” of the Railway at a time when the German and French bankers were prepared to effect a satisfactory settlement on that basis. It was asserted, also, that Russian strategic interests were adequately safeguarded when the northern route was abandoned by the Black Sea Basin Agreement of 1900. So far from decreased difficulties of Turkish mobilization constituting a menace to Russia, “Russia still had both the power and, apparently, the inclination to be a formidable menace to Turkey.”[37] How could the Colossus of the Caucasus tremble before the Sick Man!

One French writer was frank in advocating that France should pursue a course independent of Russia in this instance. “The St. Petersburg press,” he wrote, “has asserted vehemently that we are unjust to support an enterprise which will injure considerably the economic interests of Russia, which will seriously prejudice its grain trade, and create a ruinous competitor to Russian railways now projected. Of what use is the Franco-Russian Alliance if our policy runs counter to Russian interests?

“We are particularly pleased to answer the question. The Franco-Russian Alliance does not imply complete servility on the part of France toward Russia, or annihilation of all free will, or perpetual agreement on matters of finance. After having furnished our ally with almost seven billion francs, we find ourselves called upon to support her policies in the Far East, although we ourselves were abandoned and isolated in the Fashoda affair. It will be well for us now to think of ourselves somewhat, although respecting scrupulously, even cordially, the clauses of the contract of alliance.... It is in our own interests to coöperate with Germany in the Bagdad enterprise. It is extremely regrettable that we cannot carry it out ourselves; but since it is otherwise, we should make the most of the conditions.”[38]

It is said that M. Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, certainly no friend of German imperial designs, never really was hostile to the Bagdad Railway and its affiliated enterprises. As Bismarck welcomed French colonial activities in Africa and China as a means of diverting French attention from the Rhine and the Vosges, so Delcassé hoped that the colossal Bagdad plan would absorb all German imperial inclinations, leaving Morocco an exclusive sphere of French influence. In the construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire, Germany might satisfy her “irresistible need for expansion,” without menacing vital French interests. And all the while the Quai d’Orsay, through the French representatives on the Board of Directors of the Bagdad Railway Company, could be kept fully informed of the progress of the German concessionaires and the purpose of the German diplomatic agents interested in the success of the project.[39]

There were other ardent French nationalists who felt very much the same way about it. However, in their opinion, it would be unwise to gamble on the complete absorption of Germany in her Bagdadbahn. It would be wiser, perhaps, to withhold financial support until such time as the German Foreign Office was willing to execute a formal treaty conferring upon France an exclusive sphere of interest in Morocco. Bagdad was to be had for the asking—but in exchange for Morocco! It is said that in 1905, after the fall of Delcassé and on the eve of the Algeciras Conference, M. Rouvier, Prime Minister of France, approached the German ambassador in Paris with a view to negotiating a Franco-German agreement granting Germany a free hand in Turkey in return for recognition of the special interests of France in Morocco.[40]

M. André Tardieu revived this suggestion two years later. “Germany needs capital,” he said. “And when one needs capital, it is to France that one comes in search of it. It is inevitable, necessary, therefore, that Germany come to us. She will be obliged to come to us sooner or later to seek our capital for the Bagdad enterprise. Germany has the concession. She has commenced the lines. But all the sections requiring the greatest engineering skill are still to be constructed, and she has not the money to construct them.” If France agrees to let Germany have the necessary funds, it will be on the condition that Germany allow France important compensations. “Where will these compensations be sought? I have no hesitation in saying, in Morocco. The Act of Algeciras must be set aside, and France must have a free hand in Morocco! An agreement upon the Bagdad question would be mischievous if it concerned Bagdad alone, for, the Germans having the concession in their pockets, the positions of the negotiators would not be equal. On the other hand, if the agreement is for two purposes, if it refers to Bagdad and Morocco, I believe, I repeat, it would be both practicable and desirable.”[41]

The proposal that French consent to the Bagdad Railway could be purchased with compensations in North Africa met with no enthusiasm in Germany. Herr Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals in the Reichstag, urged the Foreign Office to meet any such diplomatic maneuver on the part of France with a sharp rebuff.[42] At the time of the Agadir crisis, furthermore, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein is said to have warned Bethmann-Hollweg that Germany would have to stand firm on Morocco, for “if, notwithstanding Damascus and Tangier, we abandon Morocco, we lose at one blow our position in Turkey, and with it the advantages and prospects for the future which we have acquired painfully by years of toil.”[43]

It was not until 1914 that an agreement was reached between France and Germany on Asiatic Turkey. For more than ten years, then, the Bagdad Railway was a stinging irritant in the relations between the Republic and the Empire. It aggravated an open wound which needed, not salt, but balm. We shall return later to consider its consequences. But in the meantime we must turn our attention to Great Britain, standing astride the Persian Gulf and blocking the way.